Chevron solves bad instance of delegation

It is for these reasons that Professors Seidenfeld and Rossi favor judicial review of an agency rule after the interpretation of the statute has been made.3 °5 Judicial review of agency rulemaking that utilizes various canons of construction, including the Chevron doctrine, is very effective at limiting the scope of congressional delegation. 30 6 Indeed, Chevron operates in the same way the "new" nondelegation doctrine would, upholding exercises of agency discretion if they are reasonable.30 7 Chevron is thus, in a very real sense, a better answer to the problem of delegation for two reasons. First, unlike the "old" nondelegation doctrine, it is judicially enforceable because it is principled analysis rather than an arbitrary "Iknow-it-when-l-see-it" approach to grants of excessive discretionary authority. Second, unlike the "new" doctrine, it is meaningful, after-the-fact review of agency action that neither sacrifices accountability or flexibility, nor places an agency in the position of exercising the discretion that is forbidden in the first place.30 8