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Nevertheless, China's inclusion in a Climate Forum will not be easy. China is suspicious of the G7 initiative and is not inclined to participate in an international format it did not initiate. The Forum should therefore take a proactive stance, accept some risk of confrontation to encourage greater ambition over time, and assume competition between countries. The paper proposes to create a flexible Climate Forum, enabling sub-groups of members to form. Specifically, members would be able to choose the sectors in which they wish to cooperate, decide which members they want to cooperate with, and the time frame of this cooperation. This flexibility will encourage the inclusion of large emitters such as China and India, which are a priori reluctant to join a climate club based on the G7 initiative. By enabling them to cooperate in specific sectors they deem crucial for their decarbonization, the Forum would incentivize countries to increase their participation gradually. Governance: design an open and inclusive Climate Forum To achieve the Forum’s goals, different levels of membership should be considered, involving different levels of integration by sector and by policy. The Forum should allow different subgroups of members to cooperate on certain issues. Companies operating in sectors covered by the Forum should be allowed in as proactive members. Membership requirements must ensure the effectiveness of the Climate Forum, such as the implementation of legally binding policies on the carbon intensity of goods. Carbon pricing: the achievable establishment of a compliance mechanism in a Climate Forum The Forum should be a cooperation platform upon which member countries can work toward harmonizing their carbon pricing policies. The Forum should recognize carbon price heterogeneity in the short to medium-term and become an instrument for cooperation on border carbon adjustment, without aiming at a common carbon border adjustment mechanism for member countries.

While the EU's proposed CBAM would mark the first time any jurisdiction adopts a BCA targeting foreign goods, it is unlikely to be the last. In Canada, the federal government launched a consultation process to consider how a BCA could help the country meet its climate targets. Similarly, the UK Parliament's Environmental Audit Committee opened an inquiry into BCAs. Meanwhile, in the United States, Senator Christopher A. Coons and Representative Scott H. Peters introduced a bill that would impose a fee on imports of certain carbon-intensive products based on the “domestic environmental cost” incurred by U.S. producers under a portfolio of climate policies. More recently, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse has introduced a bill that would impose a BCA on a range of imported goods based on a levy domestic manufacturers would pay for emissions that exceed the industry average. Although designed as a unilateral measure, the EU's CBAM could offer a foundation for international cooperation among like-minded jurisdictions. Recent developments lend support to such a possibility. On the eve of the Glasgow Climate Conference in November 2021, the United States and the EU issued a joint statement on trade in steel and aluminum, an area where the two trading partners have clashed in the past. Under the deal, both sides agreed to expand market access and suspend ongoing trade disputes over steel and aluminum tariffs at the World Trade Organization (WTO), while also launching negotiations on a Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum scheduled to conclude by 2024. This agreement would, inter alia, commit participants to “restrict market access for non-participants that do not meet standards for low-carbon intensity.” Another suggestion for international cooperation entailing a possible BCA has come from German Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who expressed an interest in forming an international “climate club” during Germany's Group of Seven (G7) Presidency in 2022. While the G7 Statement on Climate Club adopted in June 2022 does not specifically mention BCAs, it commits the G7 to the establishment of “an open and cooperative international Climate Club” by the end of 2022, and expressly mentions “countering carbon leakage at the international level” as one of its goals. While international cooperation on BCAs is thus emerging as a policy option on both sides of the Atlantic, it is less evident what shape such cooperation might take. Some calls for cooperation involving BCAs have invoked the concept of a “climate club” without offering a clear definition of the concept. As evidenced by the vision set out by G7, the notion of a “club” is typically used in a much broader sense than that proposed in economic theory, where it entails an excludable “club good”—that is, a benefit to which only members have access—as well as penalties for non-compliant members and non-members. Several ideal types of clubs can be distinguished: normative clubs, under which like-minded members commit to achieving certain climate policy goals; bargaining clubs to enable more efficient negotiations of objectives, targets, and policies among major powers; and transformational clubs, which set legally binding rules for members and offer incentives for participation and compliance in the form of club goods and sanctioning. While the latter best describes the prominent call for a “climate club” articulated by economist William Nordhaus, the “club” designation is still often used to refer to any form of international climate cooperation with less than universal participation. Irrespective of whether it merits the label of a “club,” cooperation on BCAs between two or more trading partners will have to address three main questions. First, what legal form should international cooperation on BCAs take? International law in “her infinite variety” comprises a range of possible instruments, each of which can generate varying legal effects. Closely related to form is a second question, namely: through what forum—existing or new—can and should such cooperation be pursued? And third, what would constitute the substance of such cooperation, both in procedural and material terms? While not offering definitive answers to these questions, we consider the landscape of options policymakers will need to navigate. In pursuing cooperation on BCAs, jurisdictions have the option of enshrining such cooperation in a legally binding treaty or in more informal arrangements without binding status.Footnote17 A formal treaty would signal a strong commitment, as most states require domestic ratification, usually involving approval by a legislature. Even in the absence of a formal enforcement mechanism, legally binding treaty obligations may exert a “compliance pull,” for instance by making non-compliance less attractive due to the reputational damage caused. Treaties also tend to be more amenable to enforcement in domestic legal orders.Footnote18 While offering greater legal certainty, however, treaties are more cumbersome to negotiate and ratify as compared to informal agreements. Pursuing a treaty containing legally binding provisions may also make it more challenging to attract participation by states, and may altogether rule out participation of subnational jurisdictions, such as provinces or municipalities. By contrast, more informal arrangements—such as a memorandum of understanding—would not only avoid the foregoing drawbacks but could also allow for greater flexibility in the face of evolving circumstances.Footnote19 While details remain sparse, the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum, for instance, is likely to be non-binding in nature. Given that BCAs are only beginning to see concrete elaboration, such flexibility appears particularly desirable at this early stage, enabling international cooperation to better adjust to unfolding political dynamics at the domestic and international level. Even if states agree on a legally binding treaty, not all provisions need to be binding: international cooperation on BCAs could include a combination of non-binding objectives and principles as well as binding procedural obligations. Such binding obligations would offer greater legal certainty, but they would likewise be more challenging to negotiate and, depending on their substance, may require ratification at the domestic level. Although international cooperation on BCAs could emerge within its own political and institutional context, as the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum illustrates, embedding it within an existing forum could offer benefits. Not only would it provide a setting for the political negotiations preceding cooperation, but it could also afford an institutional “home” with existing administrative and financial resources. Different options exist to institutionalize cooperation on BCAs, each with different implications for the relevant procedures, actors, and political dynamics. One such option is cooperation under the international climate regime. Cooperation on BCAs could be framed as promoting the implementation of parties’ nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement. Parties could negotiate the terms of cooperation through existing processes, such as the annual climate summits, and build on operational support from the standing bodies of the international climate regime. Another international regime that could provide a forum for cooperation is the WTO, under whose auspices members could initiate dialogue through relevant bodies such as the Committee on Trade and Environment. Indeed, BCAs are expected to feature in the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions, an initiative recently launched by a subset of WTO members. Given political realities, however, options for more substantive engagement under the WTO regime—such as plurilateral trade agreements or a customs union—are unlikely to offer a basis for cooperation on divisive trade-restrictive measures such as BCAs. “Minilateral” approaches outside a multilateral regime may therefore hold greater promise, although these could again evolve within the confines of an existing institution whose structures and processes would facilitate the necessary dialogue. Germany, for instance, has endorsed discussing its proposed “climate club” within the G7 and, subsequently, the Group of Twenty. Both groups of countries are informal gatherings without a mandate to adopt binding agreements, but they can serve as a vehicle for signaling political commitment. By contrast, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which has recently expressed interest in fostering cooperative engagement around BCAs, represents a type of formal organization that possesses a sizeable career staff and abundant technical and epistemic resources, all of which it could leverage to foster cooperation on BCAs. Finally, cooperation on BCAs could occur through bilateral arrangements. The proposed CBAM, for instance, envisions the ability of the EU to “conclude agreements with third countries with a view to take account of carbon pricing mechanisms in these countries.” Although the geographic scope of such bilateral cooperation would be limited, it could provide the nucleus for expanded BCA cooperation over time—for instance through inclusion in regional agreements, such as the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability launched in 2019 by New Zealand, Costa Rica, Fiji, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland.

While the EU's proposed CBAM would mark the first time any jurisdiction adopts a BCA targeting foreign goods, it is unlikely to be the last. In Canada, the federal government launched a consultation process to consider how a BCA could help the country meet its climate targets. Similarly, the UK Parliament's Environmental Audit Committee opened an inquiry into BCAs. Meanwhile, in the United States, Senator Christopher A. Coons and Representative Scott H. Peters introduced a bill that would impose a fee on imports of certain carbon-intensive products based on the “domestic environmental cost” incurred by U.S. producers under a portfolio of climate policies. More recently, Senator Sheldon Whitehouse has introduced a bill that would impose a BCA on a range of imported goods based on a levy domestic manufacturers would pay for emissions that exceed the industry average. Although designed as a unilateral measure, the EU's CBAM could offer a foundation for international cooperation among like-minded jurisdictions. Recent developments lend support to such a possibility. On the eve of the Glasgow Climate Conference in November 2021, the United States and the EU issued a joint statement on trade in steel and aluminum, an area where the two trading partners have clashed in the past. Under the deal, both sides agreed to expand market access and suspend ongoing trade disputes over steel and aluminum tariffs at the World Trade Organization (WTO), while also launching negotiations on a Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum scheduled to conclude by 2024. This agreement would, inter alia, commit participants to “restrict market access for non-participants that do not meet standards for low-carbon intensity.” Another suggestion for international cooperation entailing a possible BCA has come from German Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz, who expressed an interest in forming an international “climate club” during Germany's Group of Seven (G7) Presidency in 2022. While the G7 Statement on Climate Club adopted in June 2022 does not specifically mention BCAs, it commits the G7 to the establishment of “an open and cooperative international Climate Club” by the end of 2022, and expressly mentions “countering carbon leakage at the international level” as one of its goals. While international cooperation on BCAs is thus emerging as a policy option on both sides of the Atlantic, it is less evident what shape such cooperation might take. Some calls for cooperation involving BCAs have invoked the concept of a “climate club” without offering a clear definition of the concept. As evidenced by the vision set out by G7, the notion of a “club” is typically used in a much broader sense than that proposed in economic theory, where it entails an excludable “club good”—that is, a benefit to which only members have access—as well as penalties for non-compliant members and non-members. Several ideal types of clubs can be distinguished: normative clubs, under which like-minded members commit to achieving certain climate policy goals; bargaining clubs to enable more efficient negotiations of objectives, targets, and policies among major powers; and transformational clubs, which set legally binding rules for members and offer incentives for participation and compliance in the form of club goods and sanctioning. While the latter best describes the prominent call for a “climate club” articulated by economist William Nordhaus, the “club” designation is still often used to refer to any form of international climate cooperation with less than universal participation. Irrespective of whether it merits the label of a “club,” cooperation on BCAs between two or more trading partners will have to address three main questions. First, what legal form should international cooperation on BCAs take? International law in “her infinite variety” comprises a range of possible instruments, each of which can generate varying legal effects. Closely related to form is a second question, namely: through what forum—existing or new—can and should such cooperation be pursued? And third, what would constitute the substance of such cooperation, both in procedural and material terms? While not offering definitive answers to these questions, we consider the landscape of options policymakers will need to navigate. In pursuing cooperation on BCAs, jurisdictions have the option of enshrining such cooperation in a legally binding treaty or in more informal arrangements without binding status.Footnote17 A formal treaty would signal a strong commitment, as most states require domestic ratification, usually involving approval by a legislature. Even in the absence of a formal enforcement mechanism, legally binding treaty obligations may exert a “compliance pull,” for instance by making non-compliance less attractive due to the reputational damage caused. Treaties also tend to be more amenable to enforcement in domestic legal orders.Footnote18 While offering greater legal certainty, however, treaties are more cumbersome to negotiate and ratify as compared to informal agreements. Pursuing a treaty containing legally binding provisions may also make it more challenging to attract participation by states, and may altogether rule out participation of subnational jurisdictions, such as provinces or municipalities. By contrast, more informal arrangements—such as a memorandum of understanding—would not only avoid the foregoing drawbacks but could also allow for greater flexibility in the face of evolving circumstances.Footnote19 While details remain sparse, the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum, for instance, is likely to be non-binding in nature. Given that BCAs are only beginning to see concrete elaboration, such flexibility appears particularly desirable at this early stage, enabling international cooperation to better adjust to unfolding political dynamics at the domestic and international level. Even if states agree on a legally binding treaty, not all provisions need to be binding: international cooperation on BCAs could include a combination of non-binding objectives and principles as well as binding procedural obligations. Such binding obligations would offer greater legal certainty, but they would likewise be more challenging to negotiate and, depending on their substance, may require ratification at the domestic level. Although international cooperation on BCAs could emerge within its own political and institutional context, as the Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel and Aluminum illustrates, embedding it within an existing forum could offer benefits. Not only would it provide a setting for the political negotiations preceding cooperation, but it could also afford an institutional “home” with existing administrative and financial resources. Different options exist to institutionalize cooperation on BCAs, each with different implications for the relevant procedures, actors, and political dynamics. One such option is cooperation under the international climate regime. Cooperation on BCAs could be framed as promoting the implementation of parties’ nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement. Parties could negotiate the terms of cooperation through existing processes, such as the annual climate summits, and build on operational support from the standing bodies of the international climate regime. Another international regime that could provide a forum for cooperation is the WTO, under whose auspices members could initiate dialogue through relevant bodies such as the Committee on Trade and Environment. Indeed, BCAs are expected to feature in the Trade and Environmental Sustainability Structured Discussions, an initiative recently launched by a subset of WTO members. Given political realities, however, options for more substantive engagement under the WTO regime—such as plurilateral trade agreements or a customs union—are unlikely to offer a basis for cooperation on divisive trade-restrictive measures such as BCAs. “Minilateral” approaches outside a multilateral regime may therefore hold greater promise, although these could again evolve within the confines of an existing institution whose structures and processes would facilitate the necessary dialogue. Germany, for instance, has endorsed discussing its proposed “climate club” within the G7 and, subsequently, the Group of Twenty. Both groups of countries are informal gatherings without a mandate to adopt binding agreements, but they can serve as a vehicle for signaling political commitment. By contrast, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which has recently expressed interest in fostering cooperative engagement around BCAs, represents a type of formal organization that possesses a sizeable career staff and abundant technical and epistemic resources, all of which it could leverage to foster cooperation on BCAs. Finally, cooperation on BCAs could occur through bilateral arrangements. The proposed CBAM, for instance, envisions the ability of the EU to “conclude agreements with third countries with a view to take account of carbon pricing mechanisms in these countries.” Although the geographic scope of such bilateral cooperation would be limited, it could provide the nucleus for expanded BCA cooperation over time—for instance through inclusion in regional agreements, such as the Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability launched in 2019 by New Zealand, Costa Rica, Fiji, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland.

2---Carbon border tax violates international principles and growth – Liu Youbin reiterated it would undermine mutual trust – prefer an actual Chinese minister.

Cosbey emphasized the integral symbiotic nature of BCAs with domestic policies aiming at curbing emissions. The BCA cannot stand alone; instead, it complements either a domestic carbon tax or a regulatory regime for emission trading programs and allowances. Fundamentally, BCAs apply domestic carbon pricing schemes to imported goods.

“It is not clear what a BCA could look like, absent the accompanying domestic policy [at federal level], in the United States,” Cosbey said.

However, the foreign policy responses to a carbon border adjustment mechanism need not be accommodating. Not all governments abroad will be sanguine about the threat of foreign tariffs for example, China, India, Indonesia, and Thailand have suggested that they will oppose carbon border adjustment mechanisms on the grounds that they are protectionist and discriminatory (Böhringer et al. 2022). If some countries launch retaliatory actions in response, this risks a trade war of escalating tariffs, reducing the gains from trade on both sides and harming international cooperative efforts on both climate and other areas of joint concern. Given the many agenda items requiring international cooperation (including security, public health, and tax competition), the downsides of additional trade frictions are substantial, especially at a time when the international trading system is already under strain.

Any U.S. carbon tax will face another challenge: international trade. Imported goods from nations with a lower carbon tax, or no carbon tax, would have an advantage over domestic goods, undermining the effectiveness of the carbon tax. To prevent this, a carbon tax policy might include border adjustments, which are taxes on imports used to ensure that all goods in the United States, whether made at home or abroad, are taxed in a similar way. Without these adjustments, domestic producers would be unable to compete with foreign, non-taxed goods. Under current international law, however, border adjustments are illegal.

A nationwide carbon tax that included border adjustments on foreign imports would raise several issues. The World Trade Organization would likely consider the tax to be a direct violation of international trade agreements. International bodies might force the United States to roll back the carbon tax on all imported goods. And other nations would likely take actions of their own, levying retaliatory fees on American exports. The impact on U.S. competitiveness could be dramatic. A trade war could ensue and gravely damage the global economy, like the trade war a century ago that contributed to the Great Depression.

The US and China are on the brink of war, warned billionaire and renowned China investor Ray Dalio.

Both sides are at severe risk of crossing each other's red lines, and diplomacy between them is clearly failing, Dalio wrote in a 

Blinken’s remarks came ahead of U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s expected trip to Beijing in the coming weeks. He highlighted the fact that bilateral trade between the two countries continues to expand despite tensions over issues such as advanced semiconductors and Beijing’s persecution of Uyghurs.

“Our trade with China last year reached the highest level ever. We had more foreign direct investment going to China last year than any year since 2014,” said Blinken, adding U.S. export controls and sanctions on Chinese entities affect only a very small fraction of companies operating in China.

STATE DEPARTMENT —  The United States has to find a way to “coexist peacefully” with China amid intense competition, said U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken on Wednesday, noting that Washington is not economically “decoupling” from Beijing and that bilateral trade last year hit a record high.

In a press conference Monday that wrapped up his visit, Blinken noted record high trade between the two countries, and said the U.S. is “prepared to cooperate with China” in “macroeconomic stability,” among other areas of mutual interest.

The United States is inching toward World War III with China.

All the lights on the dashboard are flashing.

A senior Chinese military analyst has warned that worsening relations between China and the US are raising the risks of a maritime conflict in the Asia-Pacific region.

Yao Yunzhu, an academic committee member at Tsinghua University’s Centre for International Security and Strategy, also said the rivalry between the two countries could lead to an arms race that would undermine regional security.

BEIJING, July 26 (Reuters) - China said on Monday the European Union's plan to impose the world's first carbon border tax will expand climate issues into trade in violation of international principles and hurt prospects for economic growth.

The European Commission this month outlined plans to impose a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), or CO2 tariff, on polluting goods from 2026, forcing some companies importing into the European Union to pay carbon costs at the border on carbon-intensive products such as steel.

Despite tensions between the superpowers, U.S.-China trade last year set a record at $630 billion. Figures show trade growing at an even faster pace over the last four months, with a 7 percent rise in U.S. exports, as imports from China declined 25 percent.

Whatever progress the superpowers can achieve over the next 16 months will be limited. That’s because Joe Biden will be hard-pressed by Republican challengers to stand up to their allegations that China threatens Americans’ jobs, privacy, values and futures. Biden knows “America First” rhetoric solidifies his core, blue-collar workers, and moves right-of-center voters into his camp in what will be a replay of the bitter and tight 2020 race. Criticism about Yellen’s three awkward “bows” to Vice Premier He Lifeng shows how trigger-ready Biden opponents are.

Ideology in China is itself malleable, rather than a rigid cage that determines policy and has been continually tweaked to justify the maintenance of one-party rule through decades of great change. Under Mao, for instance, capitalists were persecuted as “counterrevolutionaries.” But under President Jiang Zemin the Chinese Communist Party abandoned a core Marxist belief in 2001 by accepting private entrepreneurs as party members. China’s economy today is more capitalist than Marxist and highly dependent on access to world markets. Assessments of China based on cherry-picked phrases from party propaganda overlook the frequent gap between rhetoric and reality. In 2018, for example, China cracked down on Marxist student groups and labor organizers, possibly because — as the labor scholar and sociologist Eli Friedman has noted — the young activists embodied “the Marxist principles the C.C.P. has long since abandoned in practice.” Likewise, Beijing has for years emphasized the sanctity of national sovereignty and noninterference in a country’s domestic affairs, yet has provided diplomatic cover for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Leading Chinese intellectuals openly acknowledge the difficulty of reconciling what China says with what it does. “Even we don’t believe much of what we say,” the Chinese economist Yao Yang, who is known for his pragmatic views, has said. “Our goal is not to defeat liberalism, but instead to say that what we have can be as good as what you have.” Jiang Shigong, a legal scholar and apologist for Mr. Xi’s political philosophy, has written that “‘socialism’ is not ossified dogma, but instead an open concept awaiting exploration and definition.” China’s long-term ambitions are difficult to know with certainty, and they can change. But it is far from clear that it can — or even seeks to — replace the United States as the world’s dominant power. Mr. Xi and the C.C.P. apparently see the United States as trying to keep China perpetually subordinate and vulnerable, opposing whatever China does or advocates in an international system that Beijing believes favors the United States and developed democracies. But at a minimum, China seems more intent on modifying aspects of a system under which it has prospered — making it safer for autocracy — rather than replacing it. Mr. Xi often couches this effort in his political slogans like the “China dream” and a “shared future for humankind.” But there is continuing debate in China over what these visions really mean and what costs and risks China should accept in seeking global leadership. China’s overseas development largess, for example, is limited by the imperative of addressing its own persistent development needs at home, research by the scholar Min Ye has shown. Same for other key Chinese strategies for widening its influence: Its efforts to internationalize the renminbi and reduce dollar dominance are constrained by the tight grip it keeps on the currency’s value, as well as other capital controls. These policies help stabilize its economy and prevent capital flight, but they limit the renminbi’s global appeal. Editors’ Picks Help! I Signed Up for a $4,800 Bird-Watching Trip but the Company Shut Down. Why My Father Called Me Son, Daughter, He, She and It Gretchen Whitmer Would Like You to Meet ‘Governor Barbie’ U.S. concerns often center on the legitimate fear that China could attack Taiwan. But despite menacing Chinese military exercises meant to deter the self-ruled island from moving closer to formal independence, many experts believe that Beijing still prefers to achieve its longstanding objective of “peaceful reunification” through measures short of war. China could lose in a war and face international sanctions and supply chain disruptions. These would be economically and politically devastating, jeopardizing Mr. Xi’s prime objectives of regime security, domestic stability and national rejuvenation. Doubts are growing that China, facing economic headwinds and a shrinking population, can achieve its goal of surpassing the United States as the world’s largest economy, let alone other metrics of global leadership. There is broad recognition in China that it remains militarily, economically and technologically weaker than the United States and that further modernization depends upon continued access to international technology, capital and markets within a stable economic order. “It is impossible for America to contain the rise of China,” the influential Chinese scholar Huang Renwei has noted, “and it is equally impossible for China to quickly surpass America.” Chinese rhetoric about global governance reform has resonated in many developing countries that also see international institutions as tilted against them. But there is little reason to believe that the C.C.P.’s self-serving, nationalist ideology will captivate the world, especially as Mr. Xi feeds mistrust with his authoritarian ways, coercive tactics against foreign businesses and trading partners, and policies that increasingly smack of paranoia. China tends to be viewed more favorably in parts of the developing world. But that owes more to economics than to ideas, and its overseas investments have often been criticized for lacking transparency, saddling poor countries with debt, as well as environmental and other concerns. The United States must continue to discourage and hedge against more threatening Chinese behavior, including bolstering Taiwan’s capacity to resist coercion. But Washington should resist being guided solely by fear, which threatens the openness and dynamism responsible for American technological and scientific leadership. Policymakers should pair deterrent threats with more robust efforts to seek a constructive relationship with China, while also protecting the core values and interests of an inclusive international order and calling on Beijing to offer more credible reassurances of its intentions. There is no doubt that China — whatever its trajectory — poses a huge and complex policy challenge for America. But exaggerating fears of an “existential struggle” increases the likelihood of conflict, crowds out efforts to tackle shared challenges like climate change and creates a with-us-or-against-us framing that could alienate the United States from allies and much of the world. Worse, reflexively maneuvering to outcompete or thwart China only validates hard-liners in Beijing who believe that America is implacably hostile and that the only response lies in undermining the United States. By continuing on that road, the world’s two most powerful countries may end up turning each other into the enemies that they fear.

Why Regional Hegemony Is (Nearly) Impossible to Achieve Regional hegemony may be desirable in theory, but history suggests that it is an elusive goal. As Jonathan Kirshner points out, several different great powers have launched bids for regional dominance in the modern era and all but one of these attempts ended in disaster. France failed under Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte, Germany was beaten decisively in both world wars, and Japan’s attempt to establish a hegemonic order in Asia ended in total defeat as well. Only the United States managed to pull off becoming the sole great power in its region. In the modern world, in short, the success rate is less than 20 percent. Furthermore, the failures were not just minor setbacks: They were unmitigated disasters for the countries that made the attempt. Perhaps a million Frenchmen lost their lives in the Napoleonic Wars, and Bonaparte died in exile on a remote island in the South Atlantic. Germany suffered mightily in both world wars and ended up divided into separate states for more than 40 years. Japan was firebombed in World War II, had two cities destroyed by atomic bombs, and its political order was remade by a foreign occupier. Being a regional hegemon might be desirable, but trying to become one almost always makes a state less, rather than more, secure. Bids for hegemony fail for two main reasons. First, as defensive realists have long emphasized, there is a powerful tendency for major powers to balance against threats. When a powerful state is nearby, when its military forces seem tailored to project power against others, and when it seems to have revisionist ambitions, nearby powers typically band together to deter or defeat them. If a would-be hegemon reveals its aims by starting a war, balancing behavior becomes even more pronounced and effective. The second barrier to regional hegemony is nationalism. As Napoleon discovered when he invaded Spain, as the Soviet Union and United States both learned in Afghanistan, and as Moscow is now being reminded in Ukraine, local populations will make enormous sacrifices to repel invaders. Even nations that have been temporarily vanquished often remain restive and eager to throw off an aspiring hegemon’s yoke. The dissolution of the European colonial empires during the 20th century further illustrates how the spread of nationalist doctrines has strengthened resistance to foreign dominance. The United States is the one exception to this recurring tendency: It is the only regional hegemon in the modern era. Other would-be hegemons faced coordinated opposition from formidable and well-organized nation-states, but the United States was an ocean away from the other great powers and able to expand across North America without having to fight another major power or overcome a balancing coalition. The Indigenous population tried to resist, but it was weakened by its susceptibility to European diseases and divided into many loosely organized tribes and nations. Although Indigenous opposition to American expansion persisted until the late 19th century, the native tribes faced insurmountable collective-action problems and a dwindling population and were eventually swamped by an irresistible demographic tide. To put it plainly, the United States got lucky. Could China Become a Regional Hegemon Today? The conditions that allowed the United States to dominate the Western Hemisphere and exclude other major powers do not exist in Asia today. China may be stronger than any of its neighbors, but several of them are major industrial powers with considerable potential to check Chinese power, and the world’s other major power—the United States—remains committed to helping defend them. India’s population is now larger and significantly younger than China’s and its economy is growing more rapidly. Many of China’s neighbors are already balancing more energetically: Defense budgets are rising sharply, and Australia, India, and Japan are coordinating with each other and with the United States. The greater their fear of Chinese hegemony, the more vigorous such responses will be. In addition, India already has a nuclear arsenal and Japan or South Korea could acquire a nuclear deterrent if the need arose. Officials in Tokyo and Seoul have previously made it clear that they see this as a viable option should circumstances require, and possessing their own deterrent would further limit China’s ability to intimidate them. If China does not want more of its neighbors to acquire nuclear weapons, therefore, it should limit its ambitions and make such a step unnecessary. Nor are Asian powers likely to be swayed by Chinese President Xi Jinping’s suggestion that “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia.” Such statements are obviously intended to make the U.S. role in Asia seem less legitimate, but the belief that a shared “Asian” identity will override each individual state’s self-interest ignores the power of modern nationalism, which did not exist when the pre-modern, Sino-centric tributary system was in place. Nationalism is a powerful force in China, of course, but also in India, South Korea, Japan, Australia, and Vietnam. It is hard to imagine any of these states preferring subordination to Beijing to national autonomy. Lastly, modern surveillance and communications technology makes it much easier for states to identify threatening powers and coordinate defensive responses. A Chinese bid for hegemony in Asia would be impossible to disguise, and states threatened by this attempt could share concerns, pool resources, and formulate a collective response quickly. As the rapid and vigorous Western response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine illustrates, countries facing a common danger can act with surprising swiftness when necessary. If Regional Hegemony Is Not an Option, What Then? If China’s prospects for regional hegemony are limited, then what do the United States and China have to fight about? Each is a vast country populated by hundreds of millions of patriotic citizens. They have large and sophisticated economies that no outside power could successfully strangle, powerful conventional military forces, and second-strike nuclear capabilities. An enormous ocean separates them, and neither side could possibly mount a successful invasion of the other. Coexistence is not merely desirable; it is unavoidable. Yet China’s leaders could still decide to choose the same risky path that other would-be hegemons have followed. If they believed the regional balance of power heavily tilted in their favor, that nearby states could be bullied into neutrality, that one or two triumphs would render subsequent resistance impossible, and that other states in Asia would eventually regard Chinese primacy as legitimate, then the risks of a hegemonic bid (however ill-advised) would rise. In the worst case, Chinese leaders could convince themselves that conditions temporarily favored a bid for regional hegemony while at the same time fearing that the balance of power could turn against them decisively if the opportunity was not seized. This combination of wishful thinking and paranoia is that textbook condition for preventive war; precisely the logic that convinced German and Japanese leaders to launch unsuccessful bids for hegemony during the first half of the 20th century. The implications for the United States and its Asian partners are clear. On the one hand, they should work to mitigate the various factors that can impede effective balancing and could lead Beijing to erroneously conclude that a bid for hegemony might succeed. At the same time, however, the United States and its allies need to make it crystal clear that they not trying to threaten China’s independence or territorial integrity, undermine the authority of the Chinese Communist Party, or crash the Chinese economy. Reassurance is needed so that China’s leaders do not conclude that they have no choice but to pursue hegemony even if the odds of success are small. Consistent messaging will be essential. Although recent speeches by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen were clearly intended to reassure Beijing about the scope and purpose of U.S. export controls and other economic measures, efforts to give NATO a strategic role in Asia and the more confrontational closing statement issued after the G-7 summit meeting earlier this month send a different signal, one that cannot help but heighten tensions On several occasions over the past three centuries, a great power concluded that its security required it to establish a dominant position over its neighbors. All but one of these attempts failed catastrophically. China would be unwise to make the attempt, but the United States and its allies would be equally unwise if their own actions unwittingly convinced Beijing that a risky bid for hegemony was still its best option.

Realist Perspectives on the Rise of China While there are different types of Realism,[6] proponents such as Kenneth Waltz and Hans J. Morgenthau agree on the pessimistic assumption that human nature is selfish and the international system is anarchic.[7] That is, it lacks a governing authority above and beyond the state. This lacuna leaves self-interested sovereign states—the central actors in world politics—competing for power and security.[8] This competition is a zero-sum game in that states seek to take advantage of any possible means to achieve relative gains. Since states often fail to cooperate in the Realist “self-help system”,[9] survival depends on the struggle for power and security, which can ultimately lead to conflict.[10] In a world where perceptions matter,[11] China’s actions are in some quarters perceived as Realist. Those who argue a realist perspective when interpreting China’s rise look to several distinctive examples. Two of these will be analysed in this paper: military expansionism and historical analogy. Realist interpretations have been bolstered by Xi Jinping’s declaration of a “China Dream” resulting in the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”,[12] as well as retired People’s Liberation Army Colonel Liu Mingfu’s directives that China needs to “take over from the United States as the world’s greatest military power”.[13] However, through a comprehensive illustration of these two facets of Realist concern (military expansionism and historical analogy), we will see that Realism cannot fully account for them. China’s unprecedented economic growth has been coupled with the “world’s largest military build-up”[14] via a huge expansion of military spending and technological advancement. This would superficially adhere to Realist interpretations of a China that wants to “change the international system” and “obtain global hegemony”.[15] Statistics compiled by Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) confirm China’s dramatic increase in military expenditure; during the period 2003–2012, its military expenditure increased by 175 per cent, significantly more than any other state listed in SIPRI’s Yearbook[16]. In monetary terms, SIPRI states that China’s annual defence spending rose from over $30 billion in 2008 (when it became the second largest military spender) to almost $170 billion in 2010. Furthermore, estimates published by The Economist in 2012 show that, if recent trends continue, China’s military spending could overtake America’s after 2035.[17] In addition, China’s military expansion has led it to be more confident in its military capacities and more assertive in their use. Realist interpretations are reinforced by the Taiwan Anti-Secession Law.[18] Furthermore, Jia Xiudong’s[19] comment in response to Taiwanese independence—“We will use whatever means we have to prevent it happening”[20]—shows China’s military capabilities go “well beyond Taiwan”, helping to strengthen realist interpretations of China’s rise. A Pentagon senior defence official’s opinion that “the balance of cross-Strait military forces continues to shift in the mainland’s favour” supports this.[21] Nevertheless, solely Realist interpretations of China’s rise through a military perspective would constitute an oversimplification and exaggeration of reality. As SIPRI figures show in terms of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP, China’s (2 per cent) military expenditure is less than half that of the United States (4.4 per cent) and lower than that of the UK (2.5 per cent), Russia (4.4 per cent), France (2.3 per cent), India (2.5 per cent), and Saudi Arabia (8.9 per cent). Thus, “As a percentage of GDP, Chinese military expenditures do not appear to have reached levels where one could conclude that the Chinese economy is being militarised and mobilised to balance against US power.”[22] In addition, data listing military spending as a percentage of the world share shows China’s 5.5% representing spending of 89.8$bn remains significantly behind the United States’s 45.7% representing 739.3$bn [23]. While China’s increased military assertiveness has been highlighted, it is also important to note its diverse role in the international community. Figure 1 For example, China’s troop deployment for UN Peacekeeping Operations has seen a twenty-fold increase since 2000,[24] and in 2012, China’s troop contributions to peacekeeping operations outnumbered those of all permanent members of the UN Security Council.[25] While there may be vested interests at stake for China, the level of cooperation and integration exhibited by its increasing role in UN peacekeeping missions—which seek global peace and security—suggests states are not only ‘self-interested’, as Realist theory would advocate. Hence, to use only Realist interpretations of China’s rise provides too narrow a view, as it does not explain the full extent of China’s rise through military aspirations. Another important empirical illustration of the Realist interpretation of China’s rise is the United States’ response to China’s military expansion. US Defence Department figures evidence the considerable military presence of the United States in the Asia-Pacific—a region blighted by territorial rights and surrounding resource-rich waters[26]. As part of a response which the United States calls a “pivot” or “rebalance”[27] towards the Asia-Pacific region, there have been efforts to bolster America’s military presence in the region. This has resulted in increased naval assets in Singapore, a full marine task force in Australia planned by 2016, increased troop and hardware deployment in South Korea, a new military access agreement with the Philippines, and a commitment that 60 per cent of US Navy assets will be deployed to the Asia-Pacific region by 2020.[28] The pivot or rebalance towards the Asia-Pacific region seems to align with the Realist ‘Thucydides Trap’ cited earlier. As Thucydides puts it, “It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable.”[29] In other words: “The dynamic inherent when a rapidly rising power (China) becomes more confident, a ruling power (US) fears losing its edge, and entangling alliances on each side drive the parties towards war.”[30] History seems to support the tendency for war: “In 11 of 15 cases since 1500 in which a rising power rivalled a ruling power, the outcome was war”.[31] If we consider John Mearsheimer’s argument valid, China will respond to the American build-up by pushing the United States out of Asia, in “much the way the US pushed the European great powers out of the Western Hemisphere”.[32] One view is that China will “come up with its own version of the Monroe Doctrine as Japan did in the 1930s”.[33] However, it is problematic to use the Thucydides Trap and Mearsheimer’s predictions to assess China’s rise through Realist interpretations. Although former US Defence Secretary Robert Gates’ comments that the US ‘pivot’ “isn’t about China at all”, his clarification that “it is more about our relationships with the rest of Asia” suggests a much more balanced approach then Realists would claim.[34] In addition, President Obama compliments the positive role that China can play: “from reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula to preventing proliferation” [to] “seeking more opportunities for cooperation with Beijing” [which will include] “greater communication” [between militaries in order to] “promote understanding and avoid miscalculation”.[35] This weakens the case for the use of Realist interpretations in relation to the rise of China—not entirely, but enough to conclude that a fully Realist interpretation of China’s rise is inadequate. Elements highlighted by Mr Bates and President Obama, “cooperation”, “communication” and “reducing tension”, in addition to the actual visit of China’s top military commander General Chen Bingde to the United States in order to improve military ties,[36] decrease the likelihood of falling into the Thucydides Trap. It can be argued that Mearsheimer’s arguments, based on historical analogies, are too weak to hold merit in this discussion. How can historical analogies from an American experience predict what China, a country with a contrasting and unique history and culture, will do today? Analogical arguments are “not causes or explanations”; they

Many Americans are nervous about looming future competition with China. One¶ business man returning from a visit to China “came away acutely perceptive and fearful¶ of whether America is willing and able to compete with a nation so focused, so¶ energetic, so willing to do what it takes to prosper in this new century.”83 Senior Fellow,¶ Jonathan D. Pollack, of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution,¶ says that “China looms large in the American consciousness.”84 Adding to the¶ nervousness are several books indicating tension in US-Chinese relations. For¶ example, Aaron Friedberg recently wrote China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery¶ in Asia. Other titles include Living with the Dragon: How the American Public Views the Rise of China by Benjamin Page and Tao Xie and Superpower Struggles: Mighty¶ America, Faltering Europe, Rising China by John Redwood. Several recent journal¶ articles speak to the same subject. For instance, the National Defense University¶ publication, Joint Force Quarterly, published five articles specifically addressing USChinese¶ relations between the 4th Quarter 2011 and 1st Quarter 2012 issues. Military¶ leaders also feed public concerns, last fall, Admiral Robert Willard, the new head of¶ United States Pacific Command, noted that “in the past decade or so, China has¶ executed most of our intelligence estimates of their military capability implying that¶ maybe the alarmists are on to something.”¶ 85 It is apparent that “there is deep strategic¶ mistrust between the two countries. China’s rapid economic growth, steady military¶ modernization, and relentless nationalistic propaganda at home are shaping Chinese¶ public expectations and limiting possibilities for compromise with other powers.”¶ 86 Many Americans simply are not comfortable with a growing and influential Communist China. In July 2011 “John Birch Society members passed out literature and held up signs on the sidewalk in front of the National Governors Association Conference opposing new coziness with Communist China.”87 As we decipher whether the United States is helping to construct a future environment of high tension with China, we must remember that our speech acts highlighting Chinese “violation” of norms, as we interpret them, might only exacerbate the problem and alienate China further. According to TIME Magazine’s Michael Schuman, “Simplistic sloganeering that goes on in the United States about China only intensifies those problems and makes them harder to resolve.” 88 21 Understanding constructivism in an international theory context, and understanding that speech acts create rules and norms about how actors view issues, sets the foundation for understanding that the United States is helping to make an enemy out of China. Our numerous defense policy documents, combined with speech acts generated by our nation’s senior leaders, only fuel the negative image of China among the American people. This process becomes self-feeding and self-perpetuating. Interpretation of these speech acts and ideas is not a one sided event. While the United States domestic population interprets ideas about China, Chinese leadership and the Chinese people are doing the same. Constructivist theory predicts that when two sides continuously refer to one another in hostile and wary terms, they will “construct” a scenario in which they become enemies. The United States arguably has painted China as an enemy and security threat while at the same time identifying it as an economic competitor on the world stage. Actions by the United States decision-makers, and speech acts by United States leaders, are creating an environment of increasing hostility and mistrust. As we survey documents, speeches, and media, we can see that the constructivists may well be right. We may be “constructing” our enemy of the future.¶

Irrespective of one’s approach to the study of present and future Sino-American relations it seems clear that their interactions in the early 21st century have been mostly based on cooperation. Certainly, instances of tension have occurred. However, as Ikenberry (2010) argues, China has yet to show any signs of wishing to disrupt current international structures or to challenge the US. Tellingly, tensions over issues such as the Dalai Lama’s meeting with Barack Obama, American arms sales to Taiwan and the alleged undervaluation of the renminbi have not prevented cooperation. In fact, a bilateral Strategic and Economic Dialogue is in place. In addition, both countries have been working together in multilateral efforts to curb the nuclear programmes of Iran and North Korea. Furthermore, the US and China have recently been cooperating to manage the threat of proliferation of WMD. China and the US have worked together to contain the effects of the recent global financial crisis as well. Finally, Washington and Beijing officials met several times to reach an agreement on climate change, leading to the Copenhagen Accord of December 2009. The above would serve to prove that socialization of China has worked so far. Material considerations on the part of Chinese leaders have led them to pursue integration within the current international system. Beijing is increasingly willing to take its share of responsibility in managing the system in return for material gains. Meanwhile, American elites wish to help China integrate in the existing world order. This would reinforce the existing order, which reflects American interests. Peaceful integration of China would also avert the costs of Cold War-style bipolarity. Hence, socialization of China is a win-win situation for Washington and Beijing. However, the argument that Sino-American relations are defined¶ purely in materialistic terms seems incomplete. Ideas do matter in the¶ conduct of foreign policy (KEOHANE, 1993). From this follows that they¶ also matter in the study of bilateral relations between states – in the case of this article, relations between the US and China. The notion that nonmaterial factors matter in IR is of course not new. However, constructivism has been the main driving force behind the move beyond material explanations of IR phenomena over the past two decades. In this article the author draws from constructivist accounts of how socially constructed identities and interests shape actor behaviour. The author will argue that US-China cooperation in the period between 2001 and 2012 is partly explained by each country’s self-image and the interests associated with it. Even though material considerations are important in understanding relations between China and the US, their identities are a key driver behind cooperation between them. What the author seeks is to elaborate on American and Chinese corporate and social identities to show how Sino-American cooperation is to a certain extent the byproduct of ideas, culture and history.

Plato, the author of the ‘Republic’, would never consider International Relations (IR), as a discipline, as science. For Plato’s definition of knowledge assumes it has to be something certain and indubitable. [1] Neither of those conditions, however, is met by IR. There are many theories of how international political arena works, i.a. realism, liberalism, neo-realism, neo-liberalism, social constructivism, Marxism, feminism, green theory, post-structuralism and many others variations of those, and all of them are equally feasible. [2] That means there is some merit to all theories, yet all of them are flawed to a certain extent. A very popular metaphor states that international relations should be understood as a set of lenses; each lens allows us to see only a fragment of the whole picture, hence we cannot limit ourselves to only one theory.  The problem arises, however, when we realize that some of these “lenses” are incompatible with each other. For instance, it is impossible to bring reconciliation between realism, that assumes constant struggle between states, and liberalism, which concludes something very opposite, meaning the possibility of peaceful and just relations. Consequently, there is a dispute between academics regarding which theory offers the most accurate explanation of the IR system. One of the most basic problems of IR is how to explain the phenomenon of war. At first it seems a very simple question – war is a military conflict between two, or more, parties. However, difficulties arise when we reflect on why wars break out. While a would say that elites in wealthy states wage wars to exploit the poorer people, a realist would argue that war is connected with human behavior, so wars are naturally occurring phenomena. Additionally, a neo-realist would assume that the absence of higher authority in international arena results in anarchical system and hence state of war.[3] Basically, Marxist each theory has its own explanation, although it does not imply that those explanations are equally accurate. Therefore the aim of this essay is to evaluate the usefulness of two theories, realism and constructivism, in accounting for war. The analysis will hopefully reveal the strengths and weaknesses of both approaches. The theories of IR differ solely because they are built on different premises. Realism operates under the assumption that states are the only actors on the political stage, also known as ‘statism’ [4] and ‘individualism’[5]. Additionally, the states work in an anarchical system, meaning in the absence of higher, trans-governmental and universally recognizable authority no rules are applied in the international realm. The other assumption is that politics is driven by law of human behavior- the mix of urges like the drive for powers, will to dominate, self-interest and ambition.[6] How does all of this help us understand war? Realism offers a rather cynical explanation: we are destined to wage wars, for all politics is a struggle for power and survival. Wars may be fought either to protect or expand security of the states (both the aggressor and the attacked may fight to protect their security- one to defend its country directly, the other by eliminating the threat the other country poses to its security or interests). A clear example would be the Second World War and events that preceded the outbreak of the war. Hitler’s violation of Versailles Treaty, Anschluss of Austria and incorporation of Czechoslovakian Sudetenland may be perceived as a direct way of securing Germany’s survival as a state. Starting war with Poland and Western Europe should be perceived as purely ideological move, though war with Russia (known as Operation Barbarossa) was aimed at securing oil resources in Baku and Caucasus. The reference to law of human behavior is probably the strongest argument of realists. For it is undeniable that in the history of mankind there were many leaders or generals that fought battles for the sole purpose to feed their personal ambitions, i.a. Alexander the Great, Julius Cesar, Napoleon Bonaparte, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. Therefore realism seems as a very feasible and reasonable theory. The cynicism of realism comes from the assumption that war is unavoidable and a constant element of our nature, while ideas and ideologies are of no importance. That is ideologies serve the purpose of arguing in favor of war using various arguments at different times. We might feel insulted by this view, and yet whether it is Alexander calling his soldiers to fight for Greece, Attila the Hun persuading his to plunder the cities of Western and Eastern Rome, Napoleon fighting under the cloak of French Revolution and freedom, or Khrushchev pretending to care about working people- one thing remains constant- we fight wars.  So even though it seems as there is some development in human thought, the true intentions remains the same through ages, and wars remain an extension of politics. It is hard not to appreciate realism and its account for war, since history seems to favor it. Constructivism, on the other hand, represents much more complex approach. It views the priority of ideas and human consciousness[7], hence the core assumptions: holism[8] and idealism[9]. The striking difference between realism and constructivism lies in the approach to ideas – the latter demands that we take seriously the role of ideas in world politics, while the former completely disregards it. However, we already saw that realism has much historical evidence in its favor, so is it even possible to defend social constructivism? Not only it is possible, but constructivism even offers a much more accurate account for war. To start with, statism is a flawed concept, for history has ample evidence that state power is being challenged from both above and below. [10] The American War of Independence, French Revolution, or even the struggle between Huguenots and Cardinal Richelieu pose a certain problem for realism. Also, the logical consequence of the absence of world government is not the state of war. It is rather an option that people have selected.[11] As the 20th century has shown, the trends changed and some attempts to create a world government, or at least regional governments, have been made. The United Nations, International Monetary Fund and European Union are the main examples of this. These problems are not encountered by constructivism. That is because constructivism understands IR as a social construction: a social theory that focuses on analysis and evaluation of various elements, such as culture, society, law, ethnography, economy etc. All these issues are of the highest importance to social constructivist, for they constitute differences between states and societies across historical and geographical context.[12] Simply put, social constructivism is capable of explaining all the wars by referring not to their common elements, but distinctive features and identity. The conquests of Alexander the Great, Julius Cesar and Napoleon may be perceived as embodiments of the same cultural legacy[13] And yet, it would be an oversimplification; it is necessary to place those leaders in the context of history, for it happens that some of them were actually devoted ideologists – like Hitler, Lenin, Mussolini, Mark Aurelius or even Charles the Great. So ideas, rather than political cynicism constituted those people. Constructivism’s advantage is evident in that by focusing on social factors and by stressing the importance of context, it is capable of addressing the current civil war in Mexico between the government and narcotic cartels, which is not in the scope of realism. Constructivism is therefore to be appreciated for its accuracy, while realism may be deemed oversimplified in comparison. The essay has attempted to prove the superiority of social constructivism over realism in accounting for war. Realism, although flawed with oversimplification and inability to address various issues concerning war, remains the dominant theory of international relations. That is because although the domestic realm in many countries and across cultures has experienced a certain degree of progress, which is an unaddressed issue by realism, the international arena seems to be ruled by the balance of power. The European Union and United Nations, the organizations that are supposed to secure peace, might be understood as a realistic way to balance power. Also, politicians all over the world seem to embrace purely Machiavellian approach. As Machiavelli put it: “You ought never to suffer your designs to be crossed in order to avoid war, since war is not to be avoided, but is only to be deferred to your advantage!”[14] And so, it seems that engagement of EU and USA in Libya in 2011 was not driven by humanitarian impulse, but because the war (at least at the time) seemed to propose enormous economic and political advantages (including winning additional votes in popularity polls, as the intervention was generally welcomed by European citizens). In theory, social constructivism offers the more detailed and accurate account for war not only than realism, but than any other theory. Its focus on social factors and importance of ideas allows it to address problems that are not even in the scope of realism. Additionally, the example of liberalism, Christianity and socialism, among others, prove that ideas and ideologies can really change the world. The superiority of constructivism may be explained in a way that it is capable of explaining realism, while realism is not capable of returning the favor.