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2023 DDI Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Rate hikes

Increased labor costs and money increases inflation

Benson 21- Senior Economist at the United States Joint Economic Committee

Jackie Benson, "The Economics of Inflation and the Risks of Ballooning Government Spending," United States Joint Economic Committee, 10-06-2021, https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/republicans/2021/10/the-economics-of-inflation-and-the-risks-of-ballooning-government-spending-- 嘉玮

What Causes Inflation?

2023 DDI Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Rate hikes

A FJG would accelerate inflation by stimulating demand

Bivens, 18 --- Josh Bivens is the chief economist at the Economic Policy Institute (EPI). His areas of research include macroeconomics, inequality, social insurance, public investment, and the economics of globalization. (Josh Bivens, "How do our job creation recommendations stack up against a job guarantee?", 4-12-2018, Economic Policy Institute, https://www.epi.org/blog/how-do-our-job-creation-recommendations-stack-up-against-a-job-guarantee/)//EG

Further agreement between our recommendations and the job guarantee is that the ambition of job creation strategies should go beyond hitting the target of macroeconomic full employment at the national level—even if people committed to pushing the lower bounds of unemployment are defining this target. That is, there is almost surely some national unemployment rate (4 percent? 3 percent? lower?) at which further stimulus to aggregate demand could lead to accelerating inflation. Should we just stop there (what I’m calling macroeconomic full employment) and declare concern about jobs addressed? Definitely not. Instead, by deploying public investments strategically, we should be able to lean harder on (targeted) fiscal stimulus and less hard on (across-the-board) monetary stimulus to make sure that national full employment is spread more evenly across communities. If, for example, it turns out that macroeconomic full employment nationally is 3 percent (don’t laugh, it might be—and making sure we know how low it can sustainably go is a key part of our job creation recommendations), then it’s possible to hit this 3 percent rate nationally, but in a way where some communities are at more-than-full employment while other communities face substantially higher joblessness. To put it too simply, when we’ve hit the target national unemployment rate of (say) 3 percent, we’d like it to be 3 percent in both (say) Seattle and Detroit, rather than 2 percent in the Seattle and 4 percent in Detroit.

2023 DDI Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Rate hikes

A FJG funded by deficit spending causes rate hikes

Lawrence H. Summers 23 [Larry, is the Charles W. Eliot University Professor and President Emeritus at Harvard University and he served as the 71st Secretary of the Treasury for President Clinton and the Director of the National Economic Council for President Obama."A jobs guarantee", Larry Summers Blog, https://larrysummers.com/2018/07/03/a-jobs-guarantee-progressives-latest-big-idea/, 1LEE]

If the United States could guarantee jobs in even a modestly efficient manner and in a way that significantly increased employment, it would be a very good thing. I want to be enthusiastic about job-guarantee proposals. But at a time when cynicism about government runs strong, it is important for progressives to avoid making promises that they cannot keep. We must rigorously examine the practicality of a job guarantee. A first question is how much to pay. A program of last-resort employment could likely provide the minimum wage and low benefits. But that will not help those laid off from highly paid manufacturing jobs or those who expect to earn wages well above the poverty line. While such a proposal could help many young people, it is far from clear that it would connect with the principal concerns of Rust Belt adults. On the other hand, if the guaranteed jobs paid premium wages, say double the $7.25 per hour national minimum wage, they would be an attractive alternative for a quarter or more of the workforce, raising questions of cost and economic disruption. Suppose a $15 per hour guaranteed job drew 4 million additional people into the workforce and also attracted 10 million existing employees, just one quarter of those for whom it would represent a wage increase. The cost, once benefits, materials and supervisory needs are included, would, conservatively, be $60,000 per worker. That would increase government spending by $840 billion — one-fifth of the current federal total. If wages for the 30 million lower-wage workers who remained in the private sector went up by just $4 per hour, private-sector costs would rise by $240 billion. The burden would largely fall on small businesses and disproportionately hurt restaurants and other major employers of low-wage labor. A second question job guarantees raise is what all these new workers would do. The current federal government civilian workforce comprises 2 million people . Meaningfully increasing employment or offsetting adverse trends even if all hired came off the sidelines of the workforce through a jobs program would require boosting the federal workforce by at least 50 percent. The United States has large needs, for example in infrastructure and care of the aged. At the federal level, these are met through contracting, not direct hiring. Using an employment guarantee to address these national problems would require significant restructuring of the way services are provided, likely with an efficiency cost.

A final question concerns the macroeconomics of a jobs guarantee. If the Federal Reserve saw the budget deficit expanding substantially, a tightening of the labor market or upward pressure on wages, it would probably respond by raising interest rates significantly. This would discourage spending and offset the employment gains from a guarantee scheme. If, on the other hand, the program was financed with new taxes, demand from those who paid the taxes would go down. That would reduce private-sector employment and offset the gains from an employment guarantee.

2023 DDI Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Taxes

MMT requires taxation to overcome inflation

Thorndike 20 [Joseph; director of Tax Analysts’ Tax History Project; 12-17-2020; "Tax Theory: Are We All Modern Monetarists Now?"; New York Times; https://www.forbes.com/sites/taxnotes/2020/12/17/tax-theory-are-we-all-modern-monetarists-now/?sh=4218bc885c13;]//LASA-بيلال

The policy upshot of this observation about sovereign currencies is that countries like Japan and the United States are free to spend more. How much more? More than might seem prudent, at least to those accustomed to using debt-to-GDP ratios as a metric of fiscal sustainability (Summers and Furman specifically reject this way of measuring fiscal prudence). MMT advocates and their mainstream colleagues increasingly insist that U.S. deficits are too small, especially relative to the needs of American citizens and the economy in which they live.

MMT has some interesting things to say about taxes. Most basically, it challenges the idea that taxes are linked to spending in any meaningful way. Under traditional ways of thinking, the government collects money through taxes and then decides how to spend it. Under an MMT way of thinking, the government decides how to spend money and then just goes ahead and spends it. Whether the government decides to levy taxes depends on other factors, not on the need to raise money for its spending priorities.

2023 DDI Negative
DA Links › DA Links › Taxes

A job guarantee will require higher taxation

Crooked Timber ’20 [Crooked Timber is a left-of-centre political blog run by a group of (mostly) academics from and working in several different nations, including the United States https://crookedtimber.org/2020/08/01/why-a-job-guarantee-will-require-higher-taxation/]

Ever since I wrote Work for All with Australian MP John Langmore back in 1994, I’ve been pushing the idea that a path to full employment requires an expansion of publicly provided services. For about the same length of time, Bill Mitchell (also an Australian economist has been putting forward similar (but not identical) proposals. At some point in this process, Bill became one of the advocates of what’s called Modern Monetary Theory, which makes the point that taxes don’t (directly) “fund” public expenditure. Rather, they ensure that the total demand for goods and services (for consumption and investment) don’t exceed the productive capacity of the economy, thereby generating inflation. This reframing raises the question: does a Job Guarantee require higher taxation? The answer, using MMT reasoning, is “Almost certainly, yes”. Suppose the economy initially has two groups of workers, employed and unemployed. Employed workers produce some quantity of marketed goods and services, as well as freely provided public services. They receive a wage, while unemployed workers get a (low) benefit. As well as workers, there are people receiving profits, interest and so on. Now we introduce a Job Guarantee in which all unemployed workers are hired, at the minimum wage or more, to produce public services (say, extra contact tracing for pandemics), that would otherwise not be provided. The newly employed workers spend their wages (over and above previous benefits) on marketed goods and services. But where are these goods and services to come from? It can only be from reducing the consumption of those who are already receiving wages or other market incomes. Shifting the consumption to public use is the job of taxation (alternatively, the government could cut existing services, freeing the workers there to produce market goods and services, but I won’t explore this). We can refine this a bit by allowing for a multiplier effect. Instead of employing all the previously unemployed workers, the Job Guarantee would only need to employ some. Their demand would increase employment in the market sector, providing jobs for the remaining unemployed workers. But it would still be the case that the additional output of marketed goods and services from those workers would be less than the total wage being paid to all formerly unemployed workers. The only exception is in situations where the unemployment benefit is very high relative to the minimum wage, so that the extra consumption of all the newly employed workers is less than the extra output of those who go to work in the market sector. That doesn’t mean a Job Guarantee is a bad idea. The newly employed workers would be better off, and those already employed would get additional services in return for their higher taxes. But this isn’t a free lunch. As Oliver Wendell Holmes put it, taxes are what we pay for civilized society.

2023 DDI Negative
Recruitment DA › Impact › Populism – 2NC

Card

Yilmaz and Ali Saleem 21 [Ishan; Nonresident Senior Research Fellow; Raja M; Associate Professor (Public Policy) at the Centre for Public Policy and Governance at Forman Christian College in Lahore, Pakistan. 4-26-2021; "Military and Populism: An Introduction"; ECPS; https://www.populismstudies.org/military-and-populism-an-introduction/;]//LASA-بيلال

The points of contention between populists and the military are primarily populism’s anti-capitalism, anti-science, and anti-war program. Populists are generally anti-capitalistic, which is problematic to the military as capitalists are enthusiastic about military expenditures and generally support wars. US President Dwight D. Eisenhower, himself a former five-star general, warned the Americans about the rise of the military-industrial complex. Populists are also against foreign interventions and wars and are generally ready to decrease defense expenditures to increase the budget for social programs, which is not acceptable to the military. Populists are also anti-science, making their alliance with the army difficult as nowadays the armed forces use the most sophisticated technologies available.

There are several possible ways in which the military deals with populism and populist leaders. In advanced consolidated democracies, the military, as an institution, keeps its opinions to itself and serves whoever is elected. Populist leaders—because of their fiery rhetoric and meager respect for conventional legal rules—are more difficult to deal with. Depending on their institutional interests, the military elite silently helps or thwarts populist leaders while remaining within the laws and rules in advanced democracies. The interests of the military generally find more acceptance in right-wing populism than left-wing populism. The idea of the nation being in danger from foreigners or traitors who are constantly conspiring against it supports authoritarianism and an increased role of law-enforcement agencies, including the military.

2023 DDI Negative
Recruitment DA › Impact › Bio-terror – 2NC

Improving readiness is key to prevent bioterror.

Matthew Cox, 9-2-2020, [defense reporter at Military.com for 23 years and former reporter at Army Times and infantryman in the 82nd Airborne Division, "The Next Major Battlefield Threat Facing US Troops May Be Undetectable", Military, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/09/02/covid-19-may-force-pentagon-pay-attention-major-weak-spot-bioweapons.html //Weese]

As the world contends with the COVID-19 pandemic, civilian and U.S. military experts alike are voicing worries that combat units are ill-equipped to detect powerful new bioweapons that are likely to become a reality on the future battlefield. Since the pandemic struck, the active-duty military has fared far better than the general population, thanks in significant part to its youthful population. While Defense Department-connected coronavirus cases have now surpassed 50,000, only six U.S. troops have died from the disease. Nonetheless, COVID-19 has illustrated the ability of a biological threat to sideline military assets and cripple [hurt] readiness. Early in the pandemic, the aircraft carrier Theodore Roosevelt had to pause deployed activities to contend with a massive outbreak that infected about 1,200 sailors; elsewhere, many combat training rotations were put on hold as units isolated for months to prevent spread of the disease. The military has learned to adapt with new safety protocols, and operations are returning to a new normal. But experts say that COVID-19 was only a wakeup call: a harbinger for the next new threat that may not be a naturally occurring pandemic, but a sophisticated bioweapon that troops may not be able to detect or deter until it's too late. Over the past decade, the joint force has focused its attention on the threat of cyberattacks from countries like Russia and China that can devastate communications, GPS and other battlefield tech. But the military's ability to operate on a chemical-biological battlefield is still calibrated for the last war, when the chemical weapons threat was the predominant focus. "I am a lot more afraid of the biological threat than I am of the chemical threat," Dr. Peter Emanuel, senior research scientist for bioengineering at Army's Combat Capabilities Development Command's Chemical Biological Center, told Military.com. As the executive agent for the Defense Department, the Army is responsible for overseeing chemical and biological warfare defense programs for the services. "My job is to make sure that the U.S. warfighter is safe on the battlefield that is contested. … When I am faced with a chemical threat, I have a lot of tools in my toolbox to give to the senior leaders," Emanuel said. "But when I am faced with a biological threat, I have very few." A new age of biological weapons is now far more likely with recent advances in synthetic biology, a scientific revolution that could be a Pandora's Box that gives rise to deadly new strains of pathogens that are easily duplicated, scientists say. The Pentagon is playing a significant role in Operation Warp Speed, a massive effort by government and private organizations that involves synthetic biology to develop and deliver 300 million doses of a COVID-19 vaccine by January 2021. "That's how a vaccine is being made; we are using synthetic biology, purposely engineered biology to make the vaccine that is going to save the world," said Emanuel, the Army's lead for synthetic biology. But he worries that "super weapons" can emerge as easily as life-saving cures, he said. "The same technology that is going to save you with a vaccine when Operation Warp Speed is complete," Emanuel said, "is the same technology that can create the next threat." And there are very few short-term solutions to countering this new threat that can be accelerated with more money from Congress, experts maintain. Despite the warnings, there is little evidence that the Army has launched any initiatives to assess its readiness for the future bio threat. Warnings Before COVID-19 The last time warnings emerged of U.S. adversaries possessing deadly biological and chemical weapons was in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, but fears that then-Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein would release weapons of mass destruction were based on faulty intelligence. To prepare for such an attack, soldiers and Marines crossed into Iraq wearing chemical-biological protective suits known as Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) gear. U.S. combat units, believing the threat was real, inoculated troops against known pathogens such as smallpox and anthrax. Experts say that troops were likely more prepared then because they were dealing with known threats. When COVID-19 hit nearly two decades later, it educated the world about how effective a global pandemic can be at creating an atmosphere of terror and helplessness while wreaking economic havoc. The threat landscape is shifting as it becomes more likely that synthetic biology will allow scientists to alter pathogens such as anthrax, making them more resistant to traditional vaccinations and detection, experts say. Scientists have been warning that natural pathogens distributed through trade and transportation are only a few of the perils that go along with this new biological revolution. "Bioweapons have been with us a long time, but because of the revolution in biology that is going on, we have the capacity to make new, more powerful bioweapons that could evade all of our capacity to diagnose them and to treat them," Tara O'Toole, executive vice president of the not-for-profit scientific investment organization In-Q-Tel, testified at a November 2019 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee's subcommittee on emerging threats and capabilities. "And it is very unlikely, given the difficulty of gathering intel on these programs, that we will have advance tactical knowledge of what weapon we might be facing or even where it might come from," she added. O'Toole, the former undersecretary of Homeland Security for Science and Technology from 2009 to 2013, told lawmakers that the threat of new bioweapons and bioterror exists because of the advances that have been made in the life sciences in the past 40 years, which are now more accessible across the Internet. "More and more people are going to have access to this technology as it becomes a foundational technology of the 21st century economy," according to the transcript of O'Toole's testimony. Emanuel calls this the "democratization of science," meaning that the "first time you do something in science, it's very difficult, and then it becomes substantially easier as people have seen how you can do it." In synthetic biology, scientists are applying the principles of engineering to biology to turn bacteria microbes into biomanufacturing, he said. "As biotechnology becomes more mature and synthetic biology becomes the new thing, the democratization of biology now presents us with a conundrum -- Pandora's Box is open," Emanuel said. "I think that one of the concerns that has been bounced around ... is now that people have seen the power of biology to seize control of the global economy; does that make biology a more attractive weapon? Could the people that are intent on ill purpose suddenly rethink their ill-will to employ this technology? And that is a pretty scary thought." From 2009 to 2019, the Government Accountability Office identified challenges in America's ability to detect and respond to biological events, highlighting vulnerabilities in biodetection technologies, biological laboratory safety and security, and emerging infectious disease surveillance, according to a June 2019 report. In September 2018, the White House released the National Biodefense Strategy, which established a Biodefense Steering Committee including agencies such as the Defense Department, Department of Homeland Security, State Department and the Environmental Protection Agency. But Dan Gerstein, a former Army officer and senior researcher at Rand Corp., says the U.S. is nowhere near ready to deal with future biological threats. "I testified about a year and a half ago in front of the National Commission on Biodefense, and I followed a group of government guys. And the government guys were all happy to talk about how we coordinate and we share information and this and that," Gerstein, a former acting under secretary at DHS, told Military.com. "I was the next one up, and I looked at the group and said, 'I hate to say this, but I'm like the turd in the punchbowl,' and I sort of laid into it. We are not ready. We don't have vaccines, we don't have protocols, we don't have [effective] biosurveillance." Biodetection: the U.S. Military's Weak Link Unlike a natural virus such as COVID-19, an effective biological weapon would cause exposed individuals to start showing signs of infection in hours, not weeks, said Gerstein, who holds a Ph.D in biodefense. "If you had a properly prepared biological weapon -- think about a state-sponsored weapon -- it wouldn't act like a normal disease," he said. "You would have massive numbers of people who have received an overwhelming dose and ... you would actually see disease, in some cases, occur in hours." When Gerstein was a signal brigade commander in the early 2000s, chemical-biological warfare training was always more focused on chemical weapons. "The sensors are actually pretty good for chemical, and if you emplace them according to doctrine, you should get a warning," he said. "The problem with biological is, we are just not very good at detecting it, and so we have always worried." One of the main bio-detection systems in the U.S. military's inventory is the Joint Biological Point Detection System, which is a box about the size of a dishwasher that fits inside combat vehicles like the Stryker Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Reconnaissance Vehicle. It's designed to provide early warning and identification of aerosolized biological warfare agents. But the system is only somewhat effective against known agents, Thomas Spoehr, a retired Army lieutenant general and director of Heritage Foundation's Center for National Defense, told Military.com. "They detect only a set number of biological agents; they detect anthrax, because that is a very powerful biological weapon, and they detect plague and some others," said Spoehr, who is a former commandant of the Army's Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) School at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. "If somebody was to engineer something new that your [system] wasn't set up to detect, you wouldn't get a positive reading," he said. So a new bioweapon could be created if an adversary, such as a state-sponsored terrorist group, had the scientific technical support to engineer a synthetic new strain of a deadly virus, Gerstein said.

2023 DDI Negative
Recruitment DA › Impact › OCO’s – 2NC

Effective OCOs key to deterrence – solves Extinction

USCYBERCOM, 18 [United States Cyber Command, "Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority Command Vision for US Cyber Command," https://www.cybercom.mil/Portals/56/Documents/USCYBERCOM%20Vision%20April%202018.pdf?ver=2018-06-14-152556-010, accessed 11-6-19]

Military superiority in the air, land, sea, and space domains is critical to our ability to defend our interests and protect our values. Achieving superiority in the physical domains in no small part depends on superiority in cyberspace. Yet we risk ceding cyberspace superiority. As the 2018 National Defense Strategy explains, adversaries are increasingly capable of contesting and disrupting Americas society, economy, and military. This is in part because of our growing reliance on cyberspace. Adversaries direct continuous operations and activities against our allies and us in campaigns short of open warfare to achieve competitive advantage and impair US interests. The cyberspace domain that existed at the creation of US Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) has changed. Our adversaries have exploited the velocity and volume of data and events in cyberspace to make the domain more hostile. They have raised the stakes for our nation and allies. In order to improve security and stability, we need a new approach.

As the nation’s cyber warriors, USCYBERCOM operates daily in cyberspace against capable adversaries, some of whom are now near-peer competitors in this domain. We have learned we must stop attacks before they penetrate our cyber defenses or impair our military forces; and through persistent, integrated operations, we can influence adversary behavior and introduce uncertainty into their calculations. Our forces must be agile, our partnerships operational, and our operations continuous. Policies, doctrine, and processes should keep pace with the speed of events in cyberspace to maintain decisive advantage. Superior strategic effects depend on the alignment of operations, capabilities, and processes, and the seamless integration of intelligence with operations. Now we must apply this experience by scaling to the magnitude of the threat, removing constraints on our speed and agility, and maneuvering to counter adversaries and enhance our national security.

2023 DDI Negative
Recruitment DA › Impact › Readiness Impact – 2NC

Readiness solves nuclear war.

Dowd ‘15 [Alan, senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute Center for America's Purpose, “Shield & Sword: The Case for Military Deterrence”, December 2015, https://providencemag.com/2015/12/shield-sword-the-case-for-military-deterrence/]

Surely, the same principle applies in the realm of nations. Our world teems with violent regimes and vicious men. And something precious—our notion of peace, sovereignty, liberty, civilization itself—sits exposed to all that danger. In a world where might makes right, the only thing that keeps the peace, defends our sovereignty and liberty, and upholds civilization is the willingness to use our resources to keep the dangers at bay. Yet too many policymakers disregard the wisdom of military deterrence, and too many people of faith forget that the aim of deterrence is, by definition, to prevent wars, not start them. Some people of faith oppose the threat of military force, let alone the use of military force, because of Christ’s message of peace. This is understandable in the abstract, but we must keep in mind two truths. First, governments are held to a different standard than individuals, and hence are expected to do certain things individuals aren’t expected to do—and arguably shouldn’t do certain things individuals should do. For example, a government that turned the other cheek when attacked would be conquered by its foes, leaving countless innocents defenseless. A government that put away the sword—that neglected its defenses—would invite aggression, thus jeopardizing its people. Second, all uses of force are not the same. The sheriff who uses force to apprehend a murderer is decidedly different from the criminal who uses force to commit a murder. The policemen posted outside a sporting event to deter violence are decidedly different from those who plot violence. Moral relativism is anything but a virtue. Some lament the fact that we live in such a violent world, but that’s precisely the point. Because we live in a violent world, governments must take steps to deter those who can be deterred—and neutralize those who cannot. In this regard, it pays to recall that Jesus had sterner words for scholars and scribes than He did for soldiers. In fact, when a centurion asked Jesus for help, He didn’t admonish the military commander to put down his sword. Instead, He commended him for his faith.[i] “Even in the Gospels,” soldier-scholar Ralph Peters reminds us, “it is assumed that soldiers are, however regrettably, necessary.”[ii] They are necessary not only for waging war but, preferably, for maintaining peace. It’s a paradoxical truth that military readiness can keep the peace. The Romans had a phrase for it: Si vis pacem, para bellum. “If you wish for peace, prepare for war.” President George Washington put it more genteelly: “There is nothing so likely to produce peace as to be well prepared to meet an enemy.” Or, in the same way, “We infinitely desire peace,” President Theodore Roosevelt declared. “And the surest way of obtaining it is to show that we are not afraid of war.” After the West gambled civilization’s very existence in the 1920s and 1930s on hopes that war could somehow be outlawed, the men who crafted the blueprint for waging the Cold War returned to peace through strength. Winston Churchill proposed “defense through deterrents.” President Harry Truman called NATO “an integrated international force whose object is to maintain peace through strength…we devoutly pray that our present course of action will succeed and maintain peace without war.”[iii] President Dwight Eisenhower explained, “Our arms must be mighty, ready for instant action, so that no potential aggressor may be tempted to risk its own destruction.” President John Kennedy vowed to “strengthen our military power to the point where no aggressor will dare attack.” And President Ronald Reagan steered the Cold War to a peaceful end by noting, “None of the four wars in my lifetime came about because we were too strong.” Reagan also argued, “Our military strength is a prerequisite for peace.”[iv] Even so, arms alone aren’t enough to deter war. After all, the great powers were armed to the teeth in 1914. But since they weren’t clear about their intentions and treaty commitments, a small crisis on the fringes of Europe mushroomed into a global war. Neither is clarity alone enough to deter war. After all, President Woodrow Wilson’s admonitions to the Kaiser were clear, but America lacked the military strength at the onset of war to make those words matter and thus deter German aggression. In other words, America was unable to deter. “The purpose of a deterrence force is to create a set of conditions that would cause an adversary to conclude that the cost of any particular act against the United States of America or her allies is far higher than the potential benefit of that act,” explains Gen. Kevin Chilton, former commander of U.S. Strategic Command. It is a “cost-benefit calculus.”[v] So, given the anemic state of America’s military before 1917, the Kaiser calculated that the benefits of attacking U.S. ships and trying to lure Mexico into an alliance outweighed the costs. That proved to be a grave miscalculation. In order for the adversary not to miscalculate, a few factors must hold. First, consequences must be clear, which was not the case on the eve of World War I. Critics of deterrence often cite World War I to argue that arms races trigger wars. But if it were that simple, then a) there wouldn’t have been a World War II, since the Allies allowed their arsenals to atrophy after 1918, and b) there would have been a World War III, since Washington and Moscow engaged in an unprecedented arms race. The reality is that miscalculation lit the fuse of World War I. The antidote, as alluded to above, is strength plus clarity. A second important factor to avoid miscalculation: The adversary must be rational, which means it can grasp and fear consequences. Fear is an essential ingredient of deterrence. It pays to recall that deterrence comes from the Latin dēterreō: “to frighten off.”[vi] Of course, as Churchill conceded, “The deterrent does not cover the case of lunatics.”[vii] Mass-murderers masquerading as holy men and death-wish dictators may be immune from deterrence. (The secondary benefit of the peace-through-strength model is that it equips those who embrace it with the capacity to defeat these sorts of enemies rapidly and return to the status quo ante.) Third, the consequences of military confrontation must be credible and tangible, which was the case during most of the Cold War. Not only did Washington and Moscow construct vast military arsenals to deter one another; they were clear about their treaty commitments and about the consequences of any threat to those commitments. Recall how Eisenhower answered Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s boast about the Red Army’s overwhelming conventional advantage in Germany: “If you attack us in Germany,” the steely American commander-in-chief fired back, “there will be nothing conventional about our response.”[viii] Eisenhower’s words were unambiguously clear, and unlike Wilson, he wielded the military strength to give them credibility. Discussing military deterrence in the context of Christianity may seem incongruent to some readers. But for a pair of reasons it is not. First, deterrence is not just a matter of GDPs and geopolitics. In fact, scripture often uses the language of deterrence and preparedness. For example, in the first chapter of Numbers the Lord directs Moses and Aaron to count “all the men in Israel who are twenty years old or more and able to serve in the army.” This ancient selective-service system is a form of military readiness. Similarly, I Chronicles 27 provides detail about the Israelites’ massive standing army: twelve divisions of 24,000 men each. II Chronicles 17 explains the military preparations made by King Jehoshaphat of Judah, a king highly revered for his piety, who built forts, maintained armories in strategically located cities “with large supplies” and fielded an army of more than a million men “armed for battle.” Not surprisingly, “the fear of the Lord fell on all the kingdoms of the lands surrounding Judah, so that they did not go to war against Jehoshaphat.” In the New Testament, Paul writes in Romans 13 that “Rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong…Rulers do not bear the sword for no reason.” Again, this is the language of deterrence. Those who follow the law within a country and who respect codes of conduct between countries have nothing to fear. Those who don’t have much to fear. Likewise, to explain the importance of calculating the costs of following Him, Jesus asks in Luke 14, “What king would go to war against another king without first sitting down to consider whether his 10,000 soldiers could go up against the 20,000 coming against him? And if he didn’t think he could win, he would send a representative to discuss terms of peace while his enemy was still a long way off.” In a sense, both kings are wise—one because he recognizes that he’s outnumbered; the other because he makes sure that he’s not. Put another way, both kings subscribe to peace through strength. Again, as with the Centurion earlier, Jesus could have rebuked the martial character of these kings, but he did not. This is not just description but commendation. We ignore their example at our peril. Secondly, it is not incongruent if we understand military deterrence as a means to prevent great-power war—the kind that kills by the millions, the kind humanity has not endured for seven decades. We know we will not experience the biblical notion of peace—of shalom, peace with harmony and justice—until Christ returns to make all things new. In the interim, in a broken world, the alternatives to peace through strength leave much to be desired: peace through hope, peace through violence, or peace through submission. But these options are inadequate. The sheer destructiveness and totality of great-power war testify that crossing our fingers and hoping for peace is not a Christian option. Wishful thinking, romanticizing reality, is the surest way to invite what Churchill called “temptations to a trial of strength.” Moreover, the likelihood that the next great-power war would involve multiple nuclear-weapons states means that it could end civilization. Therefore, a posture that leaves peer adversaries doubting the West’s capabilities and resolve—thus inviting miscalculation—is not only unsound, but immoral and inhumane—unchristian. “Deterrence of war is more humanitarian than anything,” Gen. Park Yong Ok, a longtime South Korean military official, argues. “If we fail to deter war, a tremendous number of civilians will be killed.”[ix] Peace through violence has been tried throughout history. Pharaoh, Caesar and Genghis Khan, Lenin, Hitler, Stalin and Mao, all attained a kind of peace by employing brutal forms of violence. However, this is not the kind of “peace” under which God’s crowning creation can flourish; neither would the world long tolerate such a scorched-earth “peace.” This option, too, the Christian rejects. Finally, the civilized world could bring about peace simply by not resisting the enemies of civilization—by not blunting the Islamic State’s blitzkrieg of Iraq; by not defending the 38th Parallel; by not standing up to Beijing’s land-grab in the South China Sea or Moscow’s bullying of the Baltics or al-Qaeda’s death creed; by not having armies or, for that matter, police. As Reagan said, “There’s only one guaranteed way you can have peace—and you can have it in the next second—surrender.”[x] The world has tried these alternatives to peace through strength, and the outcomes have been disastrous. After World War I, Western powers disarmed and convinced themselves they had waged the war to end all wars. By 1938, as Churchill concluded after Munich, the Allies had been “reduced…from a position of security so overwhelming and so unchallengeable that we never cared to think about it.”[xi] Like predators in the wilderness, the Axis powers sensed weakness and attacked. In October 1945—not three months after the Missouri steamed into Tokyo Bay—Gen. George Marshall decried the “disintegration not only of the Armed Forces, but apparently…all conception of world responsibility,” warily asking, “Are we already, at this early date, inviting that same international disrespect that prevailed before this war?”[xii] Stalin answered Marshall’s question by gobbling up half of Europe, blockading Berlin, and arming Kim Il-Sung in patient preparation for the invasion of South Korea.[xiii] The U.S. military had taken up positions in Korea in 1945, but withdrew all combat forces in 1949.[xiv] Then, in 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced that Japan, Alaska and the Philippines fell within America’s “defensive perimeter.”[xv] Korea didn’t. Stalin noticed. Without a U.S. deterrent in place, Stalin gave Kim a green light to invade. Washington then reversed course and rushed American forces back into Korea, and the Korean peninsula plunged into one of the most ferocious wars in history. The cost of miscalculation in Washington and Moscow: 38,000 Americans, 103,250 South Korean troops, 316,000 North Korean troops, 422,000 Chinese troops and 2 million civilian casualties.[xvi] The North Korean tyranny— now under command of Kim’s grandson—still dreams of conquering South Korea. The difference between 2015 and 1950 is that tens of thousands of battle-ready U.S. and ROK troops are stationed on the border. They’ve been there every day since 1953. The lesson of history is that waging war is far more costly than maintaining a military capable of deterring war. As Washington observed, “Timely disbursements to prepare for danger frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it.” Just compare military allocations, as a percentage of GDP, during times of war and times of peace: In the eight years before entering World War I, the United States devoted an average of 0.7 percent of GDP to defense; during the war, U.S. defense spending spiked to 16.1 percent of GDP. In the decade before entering World War II, the United States spent an average of 1.1 percent of GDP on defense; during the war, the U.S. diverted an average of 27 percent of GDP to the military annually. During the Cold War, Washington spent an average of 7 percent of GDP on defense to deter Moscow; it worked. Yet it seems we have forgotten those hard-learned lessons. In his book The World America Made, Robert Kagan explains how “America’s most important role has been to dampen and deter the normal tendencies of other great powers to compete and jostle with one another in ways that historically have led to war.” This role has depended on America’s military might. “There is no better recipe for great-power peace,” Kagan concludes, “than certainty about who holds the upper hand.”[xvii]

2023 DDI Negative
Recruitment DA › Impact › Readiness Impact – 2NC

Readiness is key to deter great power war, nuke terror, and cyberattacks.

Jim Mattis, 2018, [former secretary of Defense and retired United States Marine Corps four-star general, "Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy", https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf //Weese]

The surest way to prevent war is to be prepared to win one. Doing so requires a competitive approach to force development and a consistent, multiyear investment to restore warfighting readiness and field a lethal force. The size of our force matters. The Nation must field sufficient, capable forces to defeat enemies and achieve sustainable outcomes that protect the American people and our vital interests. Our aim is a Joint Force that possesses decisive advantages for any likely conflict, while remaining proficient across the entire spectrum of conflict. Prioritize preparedness for war. Achieving peace through strength requires the Joint Force to deter conflict through preparedness for war. During normal day-to-day operations, the Joint Force will sustainably compete to: deter aggression in three key regions—the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and Middle East; degrade terrorist and WMD threats; and defend U.S. interests from challenges below the level of armed conflict. In wartime, the fully mobilized Joint Force will be capable of: defeating aggression by a major power; deterring opportunistic aggression elsewhere; and disrupting imminent terrorist and WMD threats. During peace or in war, the Joint Force will deter nuclear and non-nuclear strategic attacks and defend the homeland. To support these missions, the Joint Force must gain and maintain information superiority; and develop, strengthen, and sustain U.S. security relationships. Modernize key capabilities. We cannot expect success fighting tomorrow’s conflicts with yesterday’s weapons or equipment. To address the scope and pace of our competitors’ and adversaries’ ambitions and capabilities, we must invest in modernization of key capabilities through sustained, predictable budgets. Our backlog of deferred readiness, procurement, and modernization requirements has grown in the last decade and a half and can no longer be ignored. We will make targeted, disciplined increases in personnel and platforms to meet key capability and capacity needs. The 2018 National Defense Strategy underpins our planned fiscal year 2019-2023 budgets, accelerating our modernization programs and devoting additional resources in a sustained effort to solidify our competitive advantage. Nuclear forces. The Department will modernize the nuclear triad—including nuclear command, control, and communications, and supporting infrastructure. Modernization of the nuclear force includes developing options to counter competitors’ coercive strategies, predicated on the threatened use of nuclear or strategic non-nuclear attacks. Space and cyberspace as warfighting domains. The Department will prioritize investments in resilience, reconstitution, and operations to assure our space capabilities. We will also invest in cyber defense, resilience, and the continued integration of cyber capabilities into the full spectrum of military operations. Command, control, communications, computers and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR). Investments will prioritize developing resilient, survivable, federated networks and information ecosystems from the tactical level up to strategic planning. Investments will also prioritize capabilities to gain and exploit information, deny competitors those same advantages, and enable us to provide attribution while defending against and holding accountable state or non-state actors during cyberattacks. Missile defense. Investments will focus on layered missile defenses and disruptive capabilities for both theater missile threats and North Korean ballistic missile threats. Joint lethality in contested environments. The Joint Force must be able to strike diverse targets inside adversary air and missile defense networks to destroy mobile power-projection platforms. This will include capabilities to enhance close combat lethality in complex terrain. Forward force maneuver and posture resilience. Investments will prioritize ground, air, sea, and space forces that can deploy, survive, operate, maneuver, and regenerate in all domains while under attack. Transitioning from large, centralized, unhardened infrastructure to smaller, dispersed, resilient, adaptive basing that include active and passive defenses will also be prioritized. Advanced autonomous systems. The Department will invest broadly in military application of autonomy, artificial intelligence, and machine learning, including rapid application of commercial breakthroughs, to gain competitive military advantages. Resilient and agile logistics. Investments will prioritize prepositioned forward stocks and munitions, strategic mobility assets, partner and allied support, as well as non-commercially dependent distributed logistics and maintenance to ensure logistics sustainment while under persistent multi-domain attack.

2023 DDI Negative
Recruitment DA › Impact › Readiness Impact – 2NC

Military readiness is key to prevent great power conflict.

Christina L. LYONS 17. Graduate degree in political science, American University; Former editor for the Congressional Quarterly; Journalist. “Military Readiness: Is the Pentagon prepared for future threats?” CQ Researcher. November 3.

The U.S. military also responds to humanitarian crises, including the recent hurricanes that devastated Puerto Rico. Responding to such emergencies is expected to become more challenging as climate change contributes to more natural disasters, potentially sparking international conflicts over fresh water, food and other resources.14

Defense spending in recent years peaked in fiscal 2010 at $691 billion, and Trump's proposal would not bring it up to that level. Some of the country's potential adversaries, meanwhile, have stepped up their military outlays and activities.15

2023 DDI Negative
Recruitment DA › Impact › Readiness Impact – 2NC

Readiness solves nuclear war, terror, and WMD prolif but military recruitment is key.

Bonds 17 (Timothy M. Bonds is vice president, Army Research Division, and director, RAND Arroyo Center. Bonds has served as a RAND vice president since 2011. Previously, he was deputy director of the Arroyo Center from 2003 to 2011, acting director from March 2009 to May 2010, and, from 1999 to 2003, director of the Aerospace Force Development Program within RAND Project AIR FORCE. Prior to joining RAND, Bonds spent nine years in the aerospace industry, where he led projects to develop high-speed vehicle and weapons concepts. He holds an M.S. in aero/astro engineering from the University of Illinois and an M.B.A. from Washington University, St. Louis. Limiting Regret: Building the Army We Will Need—An Update. Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces on March 1, 2017. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT466/RAND_CT466.pdf) Garg

Given that our most recent defense plans have not completely anticipated current threats, let’s examine the regrets that the nation might face if it does not meet the commitments we have made to meet those threats. For our first example, what might happen if the United States does not continue its missions to defeat ISIL, al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other violent extremist groups around the world? One potential regret is enduring terror movements that continue to destabilize vulnerable nations and whole regions; harm captured peoples; exploit captured territory to train terrorists, raise funds, and attract new recruits; and export violence to the United States and its allies and friends. It remains unknown whether currently deployed forces are sufficient to achieve U.S. objectives. In fact, the United States has steadily increased troop deployments to Iraq and Syria and extended the mission in Afghanistan. However, this analysis assumes that U.S. ground forces will remain engaged at their current levels against extremist groups in order to continue to degrade them. Therefore, we assume here that these troops could not be pulled away for other operations without ending this mission. It is also possible that countering violent extremists will require more troops if the mission changes—for example, if additional ground troops are committed to combat operations, such as those in Syria and Iraq. Total troop requirements would remain those shown earlier as the worldwide commitments.

2023 DDI Negative
Recruitment DA › Impact › Readiness Impact – 2NC

Military readiness is critical for U.S defense and security - extinction

Brands 18 [Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump, p. 129-33]

Much contemporary commentary favors the first option—reducing commitments—and denounces the third as financially ruinous and perhaps impossible.5 Yet significantly expanding American capabilities would not be nearly as economically onerous as it may seem. Compared to the alternatives, in fact, this approach represents the best option for sustaining American primacy and preventing a slide into strategic bankruptcy that will eventually be punished. Since World War II, the United States has had a military second to none. Since the Cold War, America has committed to having overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6 From the early 1990s, for example, the United States consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained peerless global power-projection capabilities.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas strategic regions—Europe, East Asia, the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on its own geopolitical doorstep. This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy, and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military preponderance. Washington would need the military power necessary to underwrite worldwide alliance commitments. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch versus any potential great-power rival. It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities, America would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate. American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap. Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances would lose credibility; the stability of key regions would be eroded; rivals would be emboldened; international crises would go unaddressed. American primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled. THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by remarkably low levels of great-power competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, and the comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors. First, great-power military competition is back. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of power-projection and antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment. Second, the international outlaws are no longer so weak. North Korea’s conventional forces have atrophied, but it has amassed a growing nuclear arsenal and is developing an intercontinental delivery capability that will soon allow it to threaten not just America’s regional allies but also the continental United States.12 Iran remains a nuclear threshold state, one that continues to develop ballistic missiles and A2/AD capabilities while employing sectarian and proxy forces across the Middle East. The Islamic State, for its part, is headed for defeat, but has displayed military capabilities unprecedented for any terrorist group, and shown that counterterrorism will continue to place significant operational demands on U.S. forces whether in this context or in others. Rogue actors have long preoccupied American planners, but the rogues are now more capable than at any time in decades. Third, the democratization of technology has allowed more actors to contest American superiority in dangerous ways. The spread of antisatellite and cyberwarfare capabilities; the proliferation of man-portable air defense systems and ballistic missiles; the increasing availability of key elements of the precision-strike complex— these phenomena have had a military leveling effect by giving weaker actors capabilities which were formerly unique to technologically advanced states. As such technologies “proliferate worldwide,” Air Force Chief of Staff General David Goldfein commented in 2016, “the technology and capability gaps between America and our adversaries are closing dangerously fast.”13 Indeed, as these capabilities spread, fourth-generation systems (such as F-15s and F-16s) may provide decreasing utility against even non-great-power competitors, and far more fifth-generation capabilities may be needed to perpetuate American overmatch. Finally, the number of challenges has multiplied. During the 1990s and early 2000s, Washington faced rogue states and jihadist extremism—but not intense great-power rivalry. America faced conflicts in the Middle East—but East Asia and Europe were comparatively secure. Now, the old threats still exist—but the more permissive conditions have vanished. The United States confronts rogue states, lethal jihadist organizations, and great-power competition; there are severe challenges in all three Eurasian theaters. “I don’t recall a time when we have been confronted with a more diverse array of threats, whether it’s the nation state threats posed by Russia and China and particularly their substantial nuclear capabilities, or non-nation states of the likes of ISIL, Al Qaida, etc.,” Director of National Intelligence James Clapper commented in 2016. Trends in the strategic landscape constituted a veritable “litany of doom.”14 The United States thus faces not just more significant, but also more numerous, challenges to its military dominance than it has for at least a quarter century.

2023 DDI Negative
Recruitment DA › Impact › Readiness Impact – UQ – 2NC

Readiness high- long-term planning

Miller, 19 -- senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

[Dr. James N., PhD, leads a project on preventing war among great powers, former under secretary of defense for policy and department’s deputy for National Security Council policymaking and crisis management; and Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow and director of research in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, member of the external advisory board at the Central Intelligence Agency from 2011 to 2012, "Quality Over Quantity: U.S. Military Strategy and Spending in the Trump Years," January 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/FP_20190103_military_strategy_spending.pdf

Two years into the Trump administration, there is much to like about the overall direction that former Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis has taken at the Pentagon. Although we have often been critics of Trump administration foreign policy, there is a clarity and cogency to longer-term defense strategy, reflected most vividly in Mattis’ National Defense Strategy of early 2018, entitled “Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge." That document prioritized great-power competition over the forever wars of the Middle East and South Asia. The shift toward focusing on China’s rise, with economic and diplomatic as well as military tools, had begun in the Obama administration, with the so-called pivot or rebalance to Asia starting in 2011. The changes intensified after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and aggression against eastern Ukraine of 2014, and the promulgation of a “third offset” modernization agenda. But Mattis brought even greater mission clarity—and more budgetary resources—to the Department of Defense. No one wants war with Russia or China. However, to prevent it, intensified efforts to shore up America’s deterrence of these two powers, especially for possible crises or conflicts in Eastern Europe and the western Pacific region, are entirely warranted.

2023 DDI Negative
Recruitment DA › Internal Links › Internal Link – OCOs – 2NC

Recruitment key to OCOs

Cordell, 18 -- Senior Technology Reporter for FedScoop

[Carten, "Army officials are on the hunt for more cyber talent," FedScoop, 10-11-18, fedscoop.com/army-cyber-officials-hunt-for-talent/, accessed 11-16-19]

Amid the Army’s push to modernize through its Futures Command, the service is also actively recruiting cybersecurity personnel with a cadre of recruitment and incentive strategies.

2023 DDI Negative
Recruitment DA › Internal Links › Internal Link – OCOs – 2NC

Recruitment is key to prevent and mitigate cyber attacks

Armstrong, 18 -- electronic warfare officer

[Capt. James, "The Us Military Can’t Just “Hire” Cyber Expertise. Here’s Why," 5-2-18, mwi.usma.edu/us-military-cant-just-hire-cyber-expertise-heres/, accessed 11-16-19]

In short, while strategic cyberspace operations will continue to provide support to combatant commanders, many cyber warriors of the future will need to be deployed forward, and will even be within range of enemy artillery and possibly direct fire.

2023 DDI Negative
Recruitment DA › Internal Links › Readiness Internal Link – Recruitment DA – 2NC

Personel key to readiness

Lopez 23 [C. Todd; Writer and editor at United States Department of Defense; 3-2-2023; "All-Volunteer Force Proves Successful for U.S. Military"; U.S. Department of Defense; https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3316678/all-volunteer-force-proves-successful-for-us-military/;]//LASA-بيلال

Since the end of military conscription in the United States, Hicks said, more than 11 million have joined active-duty service. Today, she said, more than 1.5 million men and women serve in the uniform across the total force.

People stand with their hands over their hearts.

2023 DDI Negative
Recruitment DA › Internal Links › Readiness Internal Link – Recruitment DA – 2NC

Key to check hotspot escalation globally – recruitment gaps decimate warfighting primacy

Iyengar 17 — [Radha Iyengar, Radha Iyengar, PhD, is a senior economist at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. She served as member of the Department of Energy (DOE) Chief of Staff team and served as Deputy Chief of Staff to Deputy Secretary at DOE, “Military Power is All About People: A Return to Personnel Policy,” War on the Rocks, 7-27-2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/military-power-is-all-about-people-a-return-to-personnel-policy/, accessed 9-23-2022 HKR-RA]

The U.S. military is often described as the “best fighting force in the world,” and we agree. It’s superior to its possible adversaries in nearly every way. No other military has the globe-spanning responsibilities, the all-domain combat experience, or the technological edge. Yet, as the United States remains militarily engaged around a world that demands unyielding attention and unwavering commitment, its military faces a dynamic threat environment that includes new and resurgent challenges in emerging battle domains such as cyber. With tensions on the Korean peninsula, a continuing series of crises in the Middle East, a rising China, and a resurgent Russia, it would be wise to keep front and center the key source of strength in the armed forces — our people.

Policy debates have raged about Syria, Yemen, NATO, North Korea, and beyond. At the same time, defense acquisition experts publicly debated options related to new technologies and acquisition reform. But the new and growing challenges facing the country are all the more reason to also think about what additional approaches are needed to acquire the key personnel skills and capabilities needed to meet America’s growing and changing military requirements.

2023 DDI Negative
Recruitment DA › Internal Links › Readiness Internal Link – Recruitment DA – 2NC

Readiness is high but not infallible -- Recruitment is key

Miller, 19 -- senior fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

[Dr. James N., PhD, leads a project on preventing war among great powers, former under secretary of defense for policy and department’s deputy for National Security Council policymaking and crisis management; and Michael O’Hanlon, senior fellow and director of research in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, member of the external advisory board at the Central Intelligence Agency from 2011 to 2012, "Quality Over Quantity: U.S. Military Strategy and Spending in the Trump Years," January 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/FP_20190103_military_strategy_spending.pdf

Today's U.S. national defense budget is certainly large by some measures. It exceeds the Cold War average for the United States of about $575 billion as expressed in 2020 dollars. The U.S. national defense budget, which does not include budgets for the Department of Veterans Affairs or the Department of Homeland Security (but does include Department of Energy nuclear weapons expenses as well as most intelligence accounts and war costs), constitutes nearly 40 percent of global military spending. America’s allies and close friends account for another third or so of the global total, meaning that the Western alliance system wields the preponderance of global military resources even in the context of China’s rise and Russia’s revanchism.

2023 DDI Negative
Recruitment DA › Internal Links › Readiness Internal Link – Recruitment DA – 2NC

Trades off with military spending

Aigner 18 [Peter-Christian; Writer for the New Republic; 5-11-2018; "The Long, Tortured History of the Job Guarantee "; New Republic; https://newrepublic.com/article/148388/long-tortured-history-job-guarantee;]//LASA-بيلال

Ronald Reagan dismantled the job program Nixon had been forced to create just before his reelection. In response, Democratic Party elites followed the advice of the so-called New Democrats, and steadily moved right on “bread and butter” issues. When the Cold War ended, Bill Clinton, who cut his teeth on the 1972 McGovern campaign, reanimated the idea of converting the military—the longest-running, if unacknowledged, jobs program in the U.S.—to more economically and socially productive industries (as McGovern had suggested a generation earlier, taking off from the now-lonely work of Seymour Melman). But the idea never took. Even self-admitted socialists like Oakland’s Ron Dellums refused to close military bases in his district, emblematic of Democratic politicians across the board who failed to recognize defense as an endless source of patronage and pork.

By the time Barack Obama became president, Democrats never entertained full employment in any serious, programmatic manner—highlighting how far they had strayed from their New Deal origins in terms of economic policy.