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2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Settler Colonialism K

Settler Colonialism is based on the usage and possession of land which enables an ongoing process of alienation, indigenous elimination, and ecocide.

paperson 17 – la paperson, also known as K. Wayne Yang, Associate Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies in the Ethnic Studies Department at the University of California at San Diego, co-founder of the Avenues Project, a non-profit youth development organization, and also the co-founder of East Oakland Community High School, 2017 (A Third University is Possible, Published by the University of Minnesota Press, ISBN 978-1-4529-5410-3) AJH

In Dreams in a Time of War, the first book in a trilogy of memoirs, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o begins with land. The dispossession of Indigenous Kenyans from their land, his Gĩkũyũ family’s dispossession from their traditional lands in particular, was made legally possible through the legitimation of the printed English word over the millennia-old word of the Gĩkũyũ people. How land becomes property not only was but is still the great colonizing trick that paves the way for capitalist accumulation.

Indigenous land rights in Kenya were and are still largely guided by customary law, which evolved over millennia to describe clan and community rights to cultivation, freedom of use, and stewardship of land. Under customary law, land often cannot be permanently alienated into property. Nineteenth-century British colonial authorities found it convenient to respect customary law, as it seemed to preclude African land titles, and colonialists actually used customary law to justify the forced labor of Indigenous Africans as “cultivators.” However, Kenya’s “white highlands” of the Gĩkũyũ became one of the few hotbeds of white settlement outside of South Africa. There, lands of Indigenous Africans were declared terra nullius, making way for white land titles, and as the land was bought and sold under their homes and under their feet, the Gĩkũyũ became tenants on their own land. When needed to be removed, they became designated as “squatters.” In 1948, British colonialists extended the Indian Act to Kenya, a legal claim to convert (Black) Indigenous land into British Crown lands and Black (Indigenous) peoples into Crown subjects.[1] In this example, we can see the separations of Black–Indigenous, people–land, and the simultaneous extension of white sovereignty over these now separate lands and peoples. Technologies of alienation, separation, conversion of land into property and of people into targets of subjection, continue to mutate. Black bodies become squatters, become subjects of the Crown, then of the colonial state, and now of the state of Kenya. Settlers become protected by rule of force; their violence against Black “squatters” becomes legitimate; state violence becomes normalized repertoire. Black bodies become exchangeable juridical objects to be recast as needed for settler property making. Settler colonialism is about the land. Yet, technologies to make land into property also remake Indigenous African bodies.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Techno-Orientalism K

The alternative is to bracket the plan in favor of a prior refusal of the affirmative’s investment in techno-orientalist logic.

Chow, Rey. 06 The Age of the World Target Self-Referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006. Web.//olivia

Among the most important elements in war, writes Karl von Clausewitz, are the ‘‘moral elements.’’≥∂ From the United States’ point of view, this phrase does not seem at all ironic. Just as the bombings of Afghanistan and Iraq in the first few years of the twenty-first century were justified as benevolent acts to preserve the United States and the rest of the world against ‘‘the axis of evil,’’ ‘‘weapons of mass destruction,’’ and the like, so were the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki considered pacific acts, acts that were meant to save lives and save civilization in a world threatened by German Nazism. (Though, by the time the bombs were dropped in Japan, Germany had already surrendered.) Even today, some of the most educated, scientifically knowledgeable members of U.S. society continue to believe that the atomic bomb was the best way to terminate the hostilities.≥∑ And, while the media in the United States are quick to join the media elsewhere in reporting the controversies over Japan’s refusal to apologize for its war crimes in Asia or over France’s belatedness in apologizing for the Vichy Government’s persecution of the Jews, no U.S. head of state has ever visited Hiroshima or Nagasaki, or expressed regret for the nuclear holocaust.≥∏ In this—its absolute conviction of its own moral superiority and legitimacy— lies perhaps the most deeply ingrained connection between the foundation myth of the United States as an exceptional nation and the dropping of the atomic bombs (as well as all the military and economic interventions the United States has made in nationalist struggles in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East since the Second World War).≥π Even on occasions such as Pearl Harbor (December 7, 1941) and September 11, 2001, when the United States had to recognize that it was just part of the world (and hence could be attacked like any other country), its response was typically that of reasserting U.S. exceptionalism—This cannot happen to us! We are unique, we cannot be attacked!—by ferociously attacking others. In the decades since 1945, whether in dealing with the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, North Korea, Vietnam, and countries in Central America, or during the Gulf Wars, the United States has been conducting war on the basis of a certain kind of knowledge production, and producing knowledge on the basis of war. War and knowledge enable and foster each other primarily through the collective fantasizing of some foreign or alien body that poses danger to the ‘‘self’’ and the ‘‘eye’’ that is the nation. Once the monstrosity of this foreign body is firmly established in the national consciousness, the decision makers of the U.S. government often talk and behave as though they had no choice but war.≥∫ War, then, is acted out as a moral obligation to expel an imagined dangerous alienness from the United States’ self-concept as the global custodian of freedom and democracy. Put in a di√erent way, the ‘‘moral element,’’ insofar as it produces knowledge about the ‘‘self’’ and ‘‘other’’—and hence the ‘‘eye’’ and its ‘‘target’’—as such, justifies war by its very dichotomizing logic. Conversely, the violence of war, once begun, fixes the other in its attributed monstrosity and arms the idealized image of the self. In this regard, the pernicious stereotyping of the Japanese during the Second World War—not only by U.S. military personnel but also by social and behavioral scientists—was simply a flagrant example of an ongoing ideological mechanism that had accompanied Western treatments of nonWestern ‘‘others’’ for centuries. In the hands of academics such as Geoffrey Gorer, writes Dower, the notion that was collectively and ‘‘objectively’’ formed about the Japanese was that they were ‘‘a clinically compulsive and probably collectively neurotic people, whose lives were governed by ritual and ‘situational ethics,’ wracked with insecurity, and swollen with deep, dark currents of repressed resentment and aggression.’’≥Ω As Dower points out, such stereotyping was by no means accidental or unprecedented: The Japanese, so ‘‘unique’’ in the rhetoric of World War Two, were actually saddled with racial stereotypes that Europeans and Americans had applied to nonwhites for centuries: during the conquest of the New World, the slave trade, the Indian wars in the United States, the agitation against Chinese immigrants in America, the colonization of Asia and Africa, the U.S. conquest of the Philippines at the turn of the century. These were stereotypes, moreover, which had been strongly reinforced by nineteenth-century Western science. In the final analysis, in fact, these favored idioms denoting superiority and inferiority transcended race and represented formulaic expressions of Self and Other in general.∂≠ The moralistic divide between ‘‘self’’ and ‘‘other’’ constitutes the production of knowledge during the U.S. Occupation of Japan after the Second World War as well. As Monica Braw writes, in the years immediately after 1945, the risk that the United States would be regarded as barbaric and inhumane was carefully monitored, in the main by cutting o√ Japan from the rest of the world through the ban on travel, control of private mail, and censorship of research, mass media information, and other kinds of communication. The entire Occupation policy was permeated by the view that ‘‘the United States was not to be accused; guilt was only for Japan’’:∂∞ As the Occupation of Japan started, the atmosphere was military. Japan was a defeated enemy that must be subdued. The Japanese should be taught their place in the world: as a defeated nation, Japan had no status and was entitled to no respect. People should be made to realize that any catastrophe that had befallen them was of their own making. Until they had repented, they were suspect. If they wanted to release information about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, it could only be for the wrong reasons, such as accusing the United States of inhumanity. Thus this information was suppressed.∂≤ As in the scenario of aerial bombing, the elitist and aggressive panoramic ‘‘vision’’ in which the other is beheld means that the su√erings of the other matter much less than the transcendent aspirations of the self. And, despite being the products of a particular culture’s technological fanaticism, such transcendent aspirations are typically expressed in the form of selfless universalisms. As Sherry puts it, ‘‘The reality of Hiroshima and Nagasaki seemed less important than the bomb’s e√ect on ‘mankind’s destiny,’ on ‘humanity’s choice,’ on ‘what is happening to men’s minds,’ and on hopes (now often extravagantly revived) to achieve world government.’’∂≥ On Japan’s side, as Yoneyama writes, such a ‘‘global narrative of the universal history of humanity’’ has helped sustain ‘‘a national victimology and phantasm of innocence throughout most of the postwar years.’’ Going one step further, she remarks: ‘‘The idea that Hiroshima’s disaster ought to be remembered from the transcendent and anonymous position of humanity . . . might best be described as ‘nuclear universalism.’’’∂∂ Once the relations among war, racism, and knowledge production are underlined in these terms, it is no longer possible to assume, as some still do, that the recognizable features of modern war—its impersonality, coerciveness, and deliberate cruelty—are ‘‘divergences’’ from the ‘‘antipathy’’ to violence and to conflict that characterize the modern world.∂∑ Instead, it would be incumbent on us to realize that the pursuit of war—with its use of violence—and the pursuit of peace—with its cultivation of knowledge—are the obverse and reverse of the same coin, the coin that I have been calling ‘‘the age of the world target.’’ Rather than being irreconcilable opposites, war and peace are coexisting, collaborative functions in the continuum of a virtualized world. More crucially still, only the privileged nations of the world can a√ord to wage war and preach peace at one and the same time. As Sherry writes, ‘‘The United States had di√erent resources with which to be fanatical: resources allowing it to take the lives of others more than its own, ones whose accompanying rhetoric of technique disguised the will to destroy.’’∂∏ From this it follows that, if indeed political and military acts of cruelty are not unique to the United States—a point which is easy enough to substantiate—what is nonetheless remarkable is the manner in which such acts are, in the United States, usually cloaked in the form of enlightenment and altruism, in the form of an aspiration simultaneously toward technological perfection and the pursuit of peace. In a country in which political leaders are held accountable for their decisions by an electorate, violence simply cannot—as it can in totalitarian countries—exist in the raw. Even the most violent acts must be adorned with a benign, rational story. It is in the light of such interlocking relations among war, racism, and knowledge production that I would make the following comments about area studies, the academic establishment that crystallizes the connection between the epistemic targeting of the world and the ‘‘humane’’ practices of peacetime learning. From Atomic Bombs to Area Studies As its name suggests, area studies as a mode of knowledge production is, strictly speaking, military in its origins. Even though the study of the history, languages, and literatures of, for instance, ‘‘Far Eastern’’ cultures existed well before the Second World War (in what Edward W. Said would term the old Orientalist tradition predicated on philology), the systematization of such study under the rubric of special geopolitical areas was largely a postwar and U.S. phenomenon. In H. D. Harootunian’s words, ‘‘The systematic formation of area studies, principally in major universities, was . . . a massive attempt to relocate the enemy in the new configuration of the Cold War.’’∂π As Bruce Cumings puts it: ‘‘It is now fair to say, based on the declassified evidence, that the American state and especially the intelligence elements in it shaped the entire field of postwar area studies, with the clearest and most direct impact on those regions of the world where communism was strongest: Russia, Central and Eastern Europe, and East Asia.’’∂∫ In the decades after 1945, when the United States competed with the Soviet Union for the power to rule and/or destroy the world, these regions were the ones that required continued, specialized super-vision; to this list we may also add Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. As areas to be studied, these regions took on the significance of target fields—fields of information retrieval and dissemination that were necessary for the perpetuation of the United States’ political and ideological hegemony. In the final part of his classic Orientalism, Said describes area studies as a continuation of the old European Orientalism with a di√erent pedagogical emphasis: No longer does an Orientalist try first to master the esoteric languages of the Orient; he begins instead as a trained social scientist and ‘‘applies’’ his science to the Orient, or anywhere else. This is the specifically American contribution to the history of Orientalism, and it can be dated roughly from the period immediately following World War II, when the United States found itself in the position recently vacated by Britain and France.∂Ω Whereas Said draws his examples mainly from Islamic and Middle Eastern area studies, Cumings provides this portrait of the East Asian target field: The Association for Asian Studies (aas) was the first ‘‘area’’ organization in the U.S., founded in 1943 as the Far Eastern Association and reorganized as the aas in 1956. Before 1945 there had been little attention to and not much funding for such things; but now the idea was to bring contemporary social science theory to bear on the non-Western world, rather than continue to pursue the classic themes of Oriental studies, often examined through philology. . . . In return for their su√erance, the Orientalists would get vastly enhanced academic resources (positions, libraries, language studies)—and soon, a certain degree of separation which came from the social scientists inhabiting institutes of East Asian studies, whereas the Orientalists occupied departments of East Asian languages and cultures. This implicit Faustian bargain sealed the postwar academic deal.∑≠ A largely administrative enterprise, closely tied to policy, the new American Orientalism took over from the old Orientalism attitudes of cultural hostility, among which is, as Said writes, the dogma that ‘‘the Orient is at bottom something either to be feared (the Yellow Peril, the Mongol hordes, the brown dominions) or to be controlled (by pacification, research and development, outright occupation whenever possible).’’∑∞ Often under the modest and apparently innocuous agendas of fact gathering and documentation, the ‘‘scientific’’ and ‘‘objective’’ production of knowledge during peacetime about the various special ‘‘areas’’ became the institutional practice that substantiated and elaborated the militaristic conception of the world as target.∑≤ In other words, despite the claims about the apolitical and disinterested nature of the pursuits of higher learning, activities undertaken under the rubric of area studies, such as language training, historiography, anthropology, economics, political science, and so forth, are fully inscribed in the politics and ideology of war. To that extent, the disciplining, research, and development of so-called academic information are part and parcel of a strategic logic. And yet, if the production of knowledge (with its vocabulary of aims and goals, research, data analysis, experimentation, and verification) in fact shares the same scientific and military premises as war—if, for instance, the ability to translate a di≈cult language can be regarded as equivalent to the ability to break military codes∑≥—is it a surprise that it is doomed to fail in its avowed attempts to ‘‘know’’ the other cultures? Can ‘‘knowledge’’ that is derived from the same kinds of bases as war put an end to the violence of warfare, or is such knowledge not simply warfare’s accomplice, destined to destroy rather than preserve the forms of lives at which it aims its focus? As long as knowledge is produced in this self-referential manner, as a circuit of targeting or getting the other that ultimately consolidates the omnipotence and omnipresence of the sovereign ‘‘self’’/‘‘eye’’—the ‘‘I’’—that is the United States, the other will have no choice but remain just that— a target whose existence justifies only one thing, its destruction by the bomber. As long as the focus of our study of Asia remains the United States, and as long as this focus is not accompanied by knowledge of what is happening elsewhere at other times as well as at the present, such study will ultimately confirm once again the self-referential function of virtual worlding that was unleashed by the dropping of the atomic bombs, with the United States always occupying the position of the bomber, and other cultures always viewed as the military and information target fields. In this manner, events whose historicity does not fall into the epistemically closed orbit of the atomic bomber—such as the Chinese reactions to the war from a primarily anti-Japanese point of view that I alluded to at the beginning of this chapter—will never receive the attention that is due to them. ‘‘Knowledge,’’ however conscientiously gathered and however large in volume, will lead only to further silence and to the silencing of diverse experiences.∑∂ This is one reason why, as Harootunian remarks, area studies has been, since its inception, haunted by ‘‘the absence of a definable object’’—and by ‘‘the problem of the vanishing object.’’∑∑

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Techno-Orientalism K

Their unsubstantiated fear towards Chinese tech domination is rooted in problematic racialized logic.

Siu and Chun 20 – * Associate Professor Asian American and Asian Diaspora Studies Chinese Diaspora, Cultural Citizenship, Cultural Politics of Food, Diaspora / Transnationalism; Asians in the Americas, Ethnography PhD, Anthropology, Stanford University, MA, Anthropology, Stanford University, BA, Anthropology, minor in Ethnic Studies, University of California, Berkeley **Ph.D. student at the University of California, Berkeley in the Department of Ethnic Studies, 19-2020 recipient of The Catherine and William L. Magistretti Graduate Fellowship, B.A. in Politics and Social and Cultural Analysis from New York University. [Lok, Claire, Yellow Peril and Techno-orientalism in the Time of Covid-19: Racialized Contagion, Scientific Espionage, and Techno-Economic Warfare, Journal of Asian American Studies, Volume 23, Number 3, October 2020, pp. 421-440 (Article)//rct olivia

Technological Behemoth: the Racial Capitalist Frontier of Techno-Economic Warfare The American media coverage of Wuhan’s shutdown and the Chinese state’s deployment of surveillance technology to contain the virus through contact tracing and quarantine enforcement measures offered the American public a preview of the PRC government at work. Enfolded in these stories are both the underlying admiration and fear around the Chinese state’s efficiency and efficacy in using technology for population control. Similarly, the same kind of admiration and fear are evident in American perceptions of China’s explosive economic development and global reach since the 1990s. And arguably, these same sentiments re-emerge when we read about the seemingly rapid success of Huawei Technologies, which has become the world’s largest telecommunications technology company, overtaking Western companies that were once household names, like Eriksson, Nokia, and Motorola. The exemplary case of Huawei brings our discussion of yellow peril into the explicit terrain of techno-Orientalism where the idea of the Chinese techno-virus—emerging at the nexus of technology, international trade, and cyber-security—is articulated through the racialized fear of Chinese technological domination achieved purportedly by stealing trade secrets, engaging unfair trade practices, and enabling Chinese state surveillance. What the case of Huawei illustrates is the extension of the “Chinese virus” trope that already exists in the domains of public health (as biological pathogen) and research institutions (scientist-spy) into the realm of everyday consumer technologies. Our point in discussing Huawei is not to defend it or to judge its activities. Rather, we want to call attention to the increasing significance of media/communications technologies as sites of interstate techno-economic-security struggles (in addition to already existing corporate surveillance). Toward that end, the Huawei example clearly shows the entwined issues and discourses of technology, international trade, and cybersecurity, all of which are filtered through and constitutive of the racializing techniques of the “Chinese virus.” Between January 2019 and February 2020, the U.S. Department of Justice filed three indictments against Huawei and its subsidiaries. That Huawei is the first foreign company of recent memory that is singled out by the United States for charges related to sanctions violations, conspiracy to steal trade secrets from American companies (including source code and wireless technology manuals), and federal racketeering (including fraud, obstruction of justice, money laundering) is noteworthy in itself. This last charge of racketeering is used historically to address organized crime (i.e. mafias) and points to the U.S. government’s intended juridical delegitimization of Huawei as an irrational institution mired in secrecy and an unlawful global corporation that cannot be trusted. In response to these allegations, Huawei accused the Department of Justice of exercising a form of political persecution and asserted that “[the charges] are based largely on resolved civil disputes from the last twenty years that have been previously settled, litigated, and in some cases, rejected by federal judges and juries.”31 The case will likely take years to resolve, but its function will become apparent by the ensuing interstate trade and diplomatic negotiations between China and the United States. Meanwhile, the White House and various U.S. state departments have begun to exert pressure on both domestic institutions and allied nation-states to end contracts and research collaborations with Huawei. For instance, the U.S. Department of Commerce in 2019 blacklisted the firm on charges of intellectual property theft and barred U.S. companies from selling products to Huawei without federal authorization.32 Also, as discussed in the above section, the FBI has placed pressure on universities to increase oversight of Chinese American researchers and to divest from research collaborations funded by Huawei and other Chinese firms. Multiple universities, including MIT, Stanford University, and the University of Illinois, have terminated research partnerships with Huawei.33 In addition to these domestic pressures, U.S. officials have asked allied nation-states to cancel any existing contracts with Huawei, especially ones that involve using the firm’s equipment for developing 5G wireless networks. Cybersecurity serves as the stated rationale, conjuring the potential of the Chinese Communist Party through its ties to the firm to engage in cyber surveillance/espionage by intercepting individual, corporate, and government data flowing through the 5G wireless networks. According to this logic, the “Chinese/Asian contagion” manifest as “Chinese/Asian espionage” can now be hardwired into the infrastructural fabric of our telecommunications systems through which data will travel from our phones, computers, online accounts, and other kinds of technologies to Chinese companies and, potentially, the Chinese state. The assertion is that the use of Huawei’s equipment will create massive security vulnerabilities not just to U.S. intelligence but also to American individuals whose personal information can be captured and used for endless possibilities of commoditization. It is also argued that Chinese technology integration into any Western cyber infrastructure project “would give China the upper hand in any potential cyber war.”34 Recently, this racialized fear of Chinese technology has materialized with intensified urgency in the privacy debates surrounding the immensely popular video-sharing platform, TikTok, and its Chinese parent company, ByteDance. With over 100 million users in the United States alone, TikTok has ascended to social media ubiquity, exacerbating American anxieties around China’s technological dominance.35 Rehearsing much of the same rhetoric used to condemn Huawei, U.S. lawmakers have argued that TikTok poses a threat to the “national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States,” citing concerns over TikTok’s handling of user data and the company’s alleged allegiance to the Chinese government.36 Indeed, in early August 2020, the Trump administration released an executive order that would effectively ban the social media app from the United States if ByteDance failed to address concerns regarding the app’s surveillance mechanisms, including the Chinese Communist Party’s “access to Americans’ personal and proprietary information . . . ”37 Worth noting is the fact that TikTok was the platform of choice used by K-pop fans to flood the Trump campaign with fake ticket reservations to the Tulsa, Oklahoma, rally. The spectacular embarrassment of a half-empty arena no doubt left an impression on the White House. However, even as the U.S. government is accusing Chinese corporations like ByteDance and Huawei of colluding with the state, it too is expanding collaborations with U.S. technology companies. For instance, in 2019, Microsoft was awarded a $10 billion contract from the Department of Defense to update and transform the U.S. military’s cloud computing infrastructure. The project, known as the Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure (JEDI), is the Pentagon’s largest technology contract to date38 and represents the growing relationship between the high-tech industry and the military. Ironically, these are the very same nationalistic ties that the U.S. government has accused TikTok of advancing. The strategic framing of potential foreign violation of individual privacy is part and parcel of the racialized construction of the “Chinese/ Asian techno-virus” as a danger to both American liberal personhood and national capitalist democracy. Indeed, the potentiality for China to gain the upper hand in any possible cyber and technological war with the United States compounds the economic threat that conglomerates like Huawei and ByteDance pose to U.S. global capitalism. The perceived dual dangers of compromised national security and economic competition—as embodied by Chinese transnational tech firms—positions Chinese technology, its commoditization, and its capture of the global market as evidence of China’s advance in “techno-economic warfare.” In this way, the specter of the Chinese/Asian threat is central, if not necessary, to legitimizing the insistence of American hegemony.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Techno-Orientalism K

The affirmative’s demonizing Western representations of Asia reinscribes yellow peril which results in xenophobia, cultural deprivation, and racist stereotypes.

Siu & Chun 20 – [Associate Professor Asian American and Asian Diaspora Studies Chinese Diaspora, Cultural Citizenship, Cultural Politics of Food, Diaspora / Transnationalism; Asians in the Americas, Ethnography PhD, Anthropology, Stanford University, MA, Anthropology, Stanford University, BA, Anthropology, minor in Ethnic Studies, University of California, Berkeley **Ph.D. student at the University of California, Berkeley in the Department of Ethnic Studies, 19-2020 recipient of The Catherine and William L. Magistretti Graduate Fellowship, B.A. in Politics and Social and Cultural Analysis from New York University. [Lok, Claire, Yellow Peril and Techno-orientalism in the Time of Covid-19: Racialized Contagion, Scientific Espionage, and Techno-Economic Warfare, Journal of Asian American Studies, Volume 23, Number 3, October 2020, pp. 421-440 (Article)//olivia

In its inherent attempt to construct a racial other, “yellow peril” is more a projection of Western fear than a representation of an Asian object/subject, and in this sense, it may be better understood as a repository of racial affect that can animate a myriad of representational figures, images, and discourses, depending on context. Indeed, the images and discourses of yellow peril have surfaced multiple times throughout the twentieth century, capturing a multitude of ever-shifting perceived threats that range from the danger of military intrusion (i.e., Japanese Americans during WWII), economic competition (i.e., Chinese laborers in the late nineteenth century, Japan in the 1980s), Asian moral and cultural depravity (i.e., non-Christian heathens, Chinese prostitutes, opium smokers), to biological inferiority (i.e., effeminacy, disease carriers). As Colleen Lye observes, “the incipient ‘yellow peril’ refers to a particular combinatory kind of anticolonial [and anti-West] nationalism, in which the union of Japanese technological advance and Chinese numerical mass confronts Western civilization with a potentially unbeatable force.”11 Arguably, the yellow peril of today represents heightened Western anxieties around China’s combined forces of population size, global economic growth, and rapid technological-scientific innovation—all of which emerge from a political system that is considered ideologically oppositional to ours. The current context, we suggest, is best understood through the lens of techno-Orientalism. When the idea of techno-Orientalism first appeared in David Morley and Kevin Robins’s analysis of why Japan occupied such a threatening position in Western imagination in the late 1980s, techno-Orientalism offered a framework to make sense of the technologically imbued racist stereotypes of Japan/the Japanese that were emerging within the context of Western fears and anxieties around Japan’s ascendancy as a technological global power. They proposed that if technological advancement has been crucial to Western civilizational progress, then Japan’s technological superiority over the West also signals a critical challenge to Western hegemony, including its cultural authority to control representations of the West and its “others.” They claimed that the shifting balance in global power—the West’s loss of technological preeminence—has induced an identity crisis in the West. In response, techno-Orientalism, in which “[idioms of technology] become structured into the discourse of Orientalism,” is produced in large part to discipline Japan and its rise to techno-economic power.12 The United States, for instance, externalized its anxiety into xenophobic projections of Japan as a “culture that is cold, impersonal, and machine-like” in which its people are “sub-human” and “unfeeling aliens.”13 Techno-Orientalism, born from the “Japan Panic,” was effectively consolidated through and around political-economic concerns that frame Japanese and, by extension, Asian techno-capitalist progress as dangerous and dystopian. Extending Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism,14 techno-Orientalism marks a geo-historical shift where the West no longer has control over the terms that define the East—the “Orient”—as weak, inferior, and subordinate to the West. It marks a shift not only in political-economic power but also in cultural authority. Techno-Orientalism, then, is the expressive vehicle (cultural productions and visual representations) by which Western and Eastern nations articulate their fears, desires, and anxieties that are produced in their competitive struggle to gain technological hegemony through economic trade and scientific innovation.15 Analogous to Japan’s position in the late 1980s, China currently figures into the techno-Orientalist imaginary as a powerful competitor in mass production, a global financial giant, and an aggressive investor in technological, infrastructural, and scientific developments. At the same time, the increasing purchasing power of China provokes American fear of a future global market that is economically driven by Chinese consumptive desires and practices. It is this duality—the domination of both production and consumption across different sectors of the techno-capitalist global economy—that undergirds American anxieties of a sinicized future.16 Further amplifying these anxieties around Chinese techno-economic domination is our imagination of China/the Chinese as the ultimate yellow peril, whose state ideology is oppositional to that of the United States and whose unmatched population size combined with its economic expansion and technological advancements may actually pose a real challenge to U.S. global hegemony. We turn now to examine how the ideology of yellow peril is manifesting in the current context of techno-Orientalism, beginning first with an analysis of the racial trope of “Chinese as contagion” and its connection to anti-Asian aggression. The Racialized Contagion The recent exponential rise of anti-Asian violence in the United States and globally during the pandemic illustrates the persistent danger of racializing diseases. Historians and social critics have documented and traced the ways in which diseases have been continually racialized by their association with particular peoples in geographical regions. Examples in recent memory include SARS marked as Asian, MERS as Middle Eastern, Ebola as African, and so on. In regards to this current pandemic, it might be useful to recall the popularization of the “Chinese as contagion” trope in U.S. history, as its multiple afterlives continue to inform the public’s facile acceptance of the notion of Chinese as diseased bodies and pathogenic carriers. The late nineteenth century racialization of the smallpox outbreak in San Francisco serves as the antecedent to the current moment and illustrates its relationship to the broader context of the anti-Chinese movement.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Security K

The alternative is desecuritization --- that creates an interrogation of the failure of the affirmative’s epistemology

Philippe Bourbeau 14 [Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, Cambridge, United Kingdom] - ("Security, resilience and desecuritization: multidirectional moves and dynamics," Taylor & Francis, published 9-28-2014, accessed 7-24-2023, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/21624887.2015.1111095)//olivia

The ceteris paribus normative push, and political recommendation of the securitization approach has been “less security, more politics”, and the development of “possible modalities” for the desecuritization of politics (Wæver 1989a: 52): it is generally (which can only be assessed in practice though) more conducive to treat identities as identities, religion as religion, the environment as the environment, and so on, and to engage their politics through the particular modalities and rationalities of those fields rather than those of security. In the received reading, whilst securitization raises issues into the realm of security policies and practices (Arrow 2a in Figure 1), desecuritization lowers issues back into the realm of “regular politics” or removes issues from the political agenda altogether (Arrow 1 in Figure 1). Desecuritization can be achieved through a number of options: by simply not talking about issues in terms of security, by keeping responses to securitized issues in forms that do not create security dilemmas or other vicious spirals, and by moving security issues back into “normal politics” (Wæver 2000: 253). These options can follow objectivist, constructivist, or deconstructivist strategies in bringing about desecuritization (Huysmans (1995: 65-67). These differ in regard to how the process relates to the claimed threat: has the threat been dealt with, can the security drama be somehow handled from without, or can identities beyond security threats be produced from within the process. Beyond conceptualizing desecuritization as an option or a strategy, it has also been viewed from the viewpoint of political actors (de Wilde 2008: 597), and their political moves in games of contestation and resistance (Vuori 2011a, 2015). There can be desecuritizing actors who evade, circumvent, or directly oppose securitizing moves by, for example, emphasizing competing threats (de Wilde 2008: 597). Security policies aim at desecuritization (the solution to the threatening situation), but desecuritization can also happen independently from the actions of securitizing or desecuritizing actors: the original security problem may be solved, institutions may adapt through new reproductive structures, discourses may change (e.g. with the loss of interest or audiences), and the original referent object may be lost (de Wilde 2008). A key issue of debate has been on whether desecuritization can be considered to be an active political process, or whether desecuritization can only happen as a fading away of the issue (Behnke 2006: 65): the question is whether the logic and possibility of securitization is necessarily retained in explicit discussions of whether an issue has retained the status of a security issue. As empirical studies of securitization and desecuritization dynamics (e.g. Salter and Multu 2013, Lupovici 2014, Vuori 2015, Donnelly 2015) have shown, it is difficult to point to a definitive end-point for either securitization or desecuritization: political and social situations evolve. Whichever the philosophical stance on how and whether desecuritization can be achieved (Vuori 2011a), such empirical studies show that political actors do make active desecuritization moves. Indeed, systematizing empirical studies of desecuritization, Hansen (2012: 529; 539-545) has identified four ideal type forms for the concept. In regard to its issues of concern, namely the status of enmity and the possibility of a public sphere, when a larger conflict is still within the realm of possibility, but when a particular issue is presented with terms other than security, we have an instance of (1) “change through stabilisation” (Arrow 2b in Figure 1); when another issue takes the place of a previously securitized issue, we have (2) “replacement”; when the originally phrased threat is resolved, we have (3) rearticulation; and finally, when potentially insecure subjects are marginalized through depoliticization, we have (4) “silencing” (types 2-3 are represented by arrow 1 in Figure 1). The previous literature on both securitization (Arrow 2a in Figure 1) and desecuritization (Arrow 1 in Figure 1) have produced ample illustrations of both dynamics. As a brief example of how both dynamics can alter between the same political actors, we can use some of the vicissitudes of Sino-Soviet relations. China entered the Cold War in the Soviet camp and relied on the Soviet Union as the guarantee of the international security of the new People’s Republic. Chinese views in the late 1940s clearly structured the world into two opposing camps, with China firmly in the Soviet one (Mao 1949). In the 1950s, however, Sino-Soviet relations soured, and the following “Sino-Soviet split” (Lüthi 2008) has been used as an example of the capacity of “parochial” securitizations to become disaffected by or even be withdrawn from dominant “macrosecuritizations” (Buzan and Wæver 2009: 257). Following the split, Sino-Soviet relations in the 1960s were characterized by intensive ideological conflict, and Mao Zedong securitized Soviet revisionism as a major threat for the Chinese Communist Party (Vuori 2011b). Indeed, newly available documents suggest that it was the Chinese side, in effect Mao Zedong, which was more active in the pursuit of ideological conflict (Lüthi 2008: 2). In his securitization of the Soviet Union, Mao linked the revisionism he identified there to that which he also securitized domestically (Vuori 2011b), and the issue of revisionism was presented as an issue of life and death for the party. Sino-Soviet relations began to mend in the 1980s with the removal of a number of political obstacles and with the intensification of the conflict between the US and the Soviet Union (Wishnick 2001). Yet, it is only with the fall of the Soviet Union that we can see an overall desecuritization in the form of rearticulation (Hansen 2012: 542-544) taking place in Sino-Russian relations. In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, China’s line was not to take the lead in international affairs. China worked towards “world multipolarization”, which was exemplified with China and Russia forming a “strategic partnership” in 1996. China and Russia even shared the same “threat package” of “terrorism, separatism, and religious extremism” (the “three evils”) within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Jackson 2006: 310). These are strong indicators of how the two states have managed to reform their identities away from the Sino-Soviet antagonism. In the overall state relations then, we can see a rearticulative desecuritization tactic at play on both sides: ever since the early 1980s, China’s policy towards the Soviet Union (and later Russia) shifted from antagonism to one of collaboration and negotiation rather than securitization. Desecuritization can be conceptualised in the above manner as a negative ontological corollary to securitization. Yet, it is also prudent to investigate securitization and desecuritization as political moves in order to potentially understand the logic of when and how they are wielded in practical politics. It is proposed here that in addition to instances where a securitized situation is dismantled (Arrow 1 in Figure 1), desecuritization can also be viewed as a political move that can be deployed before “securitization plays” in a game of securitization (Arrow 2a in Figure 1). In other words, desecuritization moves – both in terms of discourse and practice – can be used in a preemptive manner before the threshold of securitization is reached (Arrow 2b in Figure 1). For Wæver (2000: 254), silencing can be a strategy to “pre-empt or forestall securitization”. We argue here that beyond silencing, active desecuritization efforts can be made to block the escalation of a contention. Thereby, in addition to change through stabilization (Hansen 2012) and the silencing of an issue (Wæver 2000), there can be explicit rebuttals of security frames and claims before they are solidified into policy. This tactic can be termed pre-emptive desecuritization through rebuttal.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › Security K

The affirmative’s scenarios for conflict are products of paranoia that project our violent impulses onto the other. Claims of war and conflict create a false dichotomy between the good us and the evil them, ignoring our role in provoking the aggression.

Ahmed 17, Nafeez Mosaddeq [Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development, M.A. in Contemporary War & Peace Studies and P.D. in International Relations from the School of Global Studies at Sussex University] 2017, “Failing States, Collapsing Systems: BioPhysical Triggers of Political Violence,” p. 1-12

Since the 2008 financial crash, the world has witnessed an unprecedented outbreak of social protest in every major continent. Beginning with the birth of the Occupy movement in the US and Western Europe, and the Arab Spring, the eruption of civil unrest has continued to wreak havoc unpredictably from Greece to Ukraine, from China to Thailand, from Brazil to Turkey, and beyond. In some regions, civil unrest has coalesced into the collapse of incumbent governments or even the eruption of a prolonged state of internecine warfare, as is happening in Iraq-Syria and Ukraine Crimea. To what extent is this apparent heightening of geopolitical instability new? Increasing public dissatisfaction with government is correlated with continued government difficulties in meeting public expectations. Yet while policymakers and media observers have raced to keep up with events, they have largely missed the deeper causes of this new age of unrest—the end of the age of cheap fossil fuels, and its multiplying consequences for economic growth, industrial food production, and the Earth’s climate stability. Contrary to widely reported claims across mainstream media of a new era of prosperity heralded by the US-led shale oil and gas boom, the proliferation of contemporary climate, food and economic crises have at their root a single common denominator: the fundamental and permanent disruption in the energy basis of industrial civilization. This inevitable energy transition away from high quality fossil fuels to lower quality, more expensive energy forms—which will be completed well before the close of this century, and quite possibly much earlier—will force a paradigm shift in the organization of civilization. The twenty-first century, in this context, is a pivotal one for humanity as industrial civilization pivots through a process of systemic transition, driven by the complex interplay between human societies and biophysical realities. Yet for this shift to result in a viable new way of life will require a fundamental epistemological shift recognizing humanity’s embeddedness in the natural world. This, in turn, cannot be achieved without breaking the stranglehold of conventional models achieved through the hegemony of establishment narratives—dominated by fossil fuel interests and the banality of the mainstream media news cycle. The central thesis of this study is that the escalation of social protest and political instability around the world is causally related to the unstoppable thermodynamics of global hydrocarbon energy decline and its interconnected environmental and economic consequences. It offers, in this sense, a biophysical approach to international relations, and argues that geopolitics remains fundamentally embedded in biophysical processes. This is not to reduce geopolitics to the biophysical—far from it—but to recognize that the dynamics of the geopolitical cannot be dislocated from the dynamics of the biophysical, and that biophysical processes are increasingly driving geopolitical instability to a degree unrecognized by policymakers, the media, as well as social and natural scientists. Hydrocarbon energy decline can be understood as consisting of the following two intertwined processes: the inexorable reduction in industrial civilization’s production of net energy from hydrocarbon sources (fossil fuels) over the last decades; the acceleration of hydrocarbon energy production to attempt to make-up for this decline and sustain economic growth. This process has in turn had two major consequences, namely: climate change and the corresponding destabilization of the Earth System due to the increasing quantity of greenhouse gas emissions due to hydrocarbon energy dependence; and the permanent slowdown of global economic growth due to the increasing costs of energy production relative to GDP. Climate and economic crises are, in turn, acting as amplifying feedbacks on the process of hydrocarbon energy decline, and in themselves are acting synergistically to undermine global industrial food production while simultaneously impinging on socio-political stability and human well-being. While conventional policy and media approaches to socio-political instability tend to focus almost purely on ‘surface’ social symptoms—geopolitical competition, political corruption, economic mismanagement, ideological extremism, and so on—the deeper biophysical systemic drivers of instability are largely ignored or misunderstood. As such, missing from the vast bulk of conventional wisdom on escalating socio-political instability around the world is the crucial recognition of its central cause in a systemic process of hydrocarbon energy decline and concomitant civilizational transition toward an inevitable post-carbon future. Currently, climate change is rightly and consensually recognized by the scientific community and has been accepted at least in principle by policymakers as a reality requiring an urgent collective response from human societies. However, despite growing recognition of the interconnected nature of these crises—illustrated through concepts such as the food-water-energy nexus—there remains a fundamental failure in the conceptualization of their interconnected nature in terms of the relationship between human societies and the biophysical environment, and relatedly, the relationship between human polities and the biophysical environment. This root failure of conceptualization is perhaps the most significant factor focusing on the role of human agency in driving the current convergence of global crises. The failure is compounded by the necessarily compartmentalized nature of scientific specialization, which has produced a vast volume of information, but little in the way of epistemological mechanisms to integrate that into knowledge across disciplinary boundaries. It is further compounded by the transmission of incorrect conceptual diagnoses of global crises through the global mainstream media. The perpetual transmission of false and inaccurate knowledge on the origins and dynamic of global crises has created a situation in which as such crises accelerate, the human species as a whole is disempowered from being able to correctly understand these crises and their symptoms, and thus unable to solve them. Yet to diagnose the intensifying perfect storm of climate, energy and economic crises requires a fundamental reconceptualization of their true nature as symptoms of an overall civilizational system which, increasingly, cannot be sustained by the biophysical environment. This study offers an empirically-grounded social scientific theoretical framework for developing a holistic approach to this perfect storm through the lens of what this author has called the ‘Crisis of Civilization’ (as opposed to a ‘clash of civilizations’). My approach is not to create yet another new statistical model to add to the plethora of models that exist, but to strike at a deeper lacuna within the discipline of international relations—to create the beginnings of an accurate, integrated transdisciplinary theoretical basis for such modelling, derived from a holistic analysis of the relevant empirical data. The study is divided into two main sections. The first consists of a general framework of the broad crises that this author considers to be integral to the biophysical processes driving geopolitical instability today. The second consists of a series of case studies which provide specific empirical data supporting and building on this general framework to test how and whether they are indeed acting out on local, national and regional levels as is my hypothesis. This opening section begins by building on this author’s previous work on the ‘Crisis of Civilization’ as an overarching analytical framework for the integrated examination of global climate, energy, food, economic and socio-political crises (Ahmed 2010 , 2011 ). This is achieved by establishing the inherent systemic interconnections between these crises on a global macro-level scale. The monograph then proceeds to explore how the general framework of biophysical factors aka the ‘Crisis of Civilization’ plays out at a micro-level within specific countries in key regions—the Middle East, Africa, Europe, South Asia, and North America. This examination takes us to the crux of my argument and provides specific evidence that the biophysical processes discussed more generally in the opening are, in fact, already having concrete geopolitical impacts accelerating the destabilization of human societies across the world, in a manner that can now be detected through a holistic and transdisciplinary empirical analysis. This not only provides surprising empirical vindication for our hypothesis that biophysical processes are playing an integral causal role in the intensification of political and geopolitical disruption on a global scale, it also provides us a basis to explore some tentative business-as-usual (BAU) forecasts. This permits further exploration of the intersection between the thermodynamics of escalating hydrocarbon energy decline and the accelerating disruption of global industrial civilization. As prevailing social, political and economic structures become increasingly dysfunctional against the strain of hydrocarbon energy decline, the resulting rupture manifests in an increasing frequency of social protest and violent conflict. Part of this study, then, identifies how conventional governmental, industry and media narratives of these crises for the most part fail to accurately understand them, not just due to a lack of a holistic-systemic frameworks for examining these crises as interdependent—but due to a fundamental epistemological failure that has allowed mythological ‘theories’ of human progress in the form of neoclassical and neoliberal economics to become entrenched as the dominant cognitive paradigm. The most powerful hegemonic component of this ideological capture of human collective cognition occurs through the global institutions associated with the mainstream media. The principal problem here is a highly compromised ownership and editorial structure that ties media outlets to the very prevailing structures of fossil fuel-centric power complicit in global crisis acceleration. The preponderance of fossil fuel-centric interests in conventional media ownership has led to consistently inaccurate reporting on energy issues, and their relationships with economic, food and climate crises, as well as specific conflicts. Yet to some extent, and compounding the insular ideological approach of powerful government, industry and media institutions, there has been a similar failure from amongst experts in different fields of these crises, who have been unable to develop theoretical, conceptual and empirical frameworks to view their specialized data in its inherent interconnections with data from other fields. In other words, a lack of generalized systems training in our schools. Due to this problem, we are beginning to grasp only recently the extent to which geopolitical ruptures that overwhelm of the news of the day have been exacerbated by a convergence of crises studied largely separately in these disparate fields. There is, therefore, little understanding of how energy and resource depletion tangibly impact the political economies of different societies, and how these processes interact with the local impacts of global processes like climate change. This has led to a knowledge deficit—specifically, a whole systems knowledge deficit comprising a paucity of reliable, actionable knowledge in the mainstream, exacerbating a sense of public apathy and confusion, and cementing a policymaking impasse among political leaders who remain subject to a fatal combination of intensive fossil fuel lobbying and media misinformation. Among the most critical solutions to the ‘Crisis of Civilization’, then, is a concerted grassroots mobilization to rectify the whole systems knowledge deficit. This could be achieved in many different ways—whether through responsible journalism or more informed policy formulation based on the effective communication of interdisciplinary scientific research—but the end goal is the same: mass public education with a view to catalyze social action that is systemically transformative. Without addressing the knowledge deficit, the self-reinforcing cycle of amplifying crisis feedbacks cannot be overturned. It is hoped that this study can begin contributing to addressing the whole systems knowledge deficit by firstly, establishing a scientifically-grounded systems theory framework for integrating data from different fields for the study of international politics; secondly, beginning the process of recognizing major geopolitical ruptures in the context of systemic crises driven by biophysical processes; thirdly, outlining the basis for a major, urgent new transdisciplinary research program bringing together the natural and social sciences to develop a holistic theoretical-empirical model of global crisis convergence; which in turn can pave the way for a fourth major, urgent new transdisciplinary action-research program on mitigating the impact of global crisis convergence, while transitioning human civilization to new more viable political economic structures that subsist in parity with their biophysical contexts. Chapter 2 The Crisis of Civilization as an Analytical Framework 2.1 The Human-Environment System as a Complex Adaptive System The idea of a ‘Crisis of Civilization’ pivots around the goal of understanding human activity as a whole. It is premised on the fact that as a single biological species, human beings share common individual and social characteristics through which they interact with each other, with other species, and with the biophysical environment. Global civilization constitutes the full mechanism of social organization by which this nexus of activities and interactions operates. I use a ‘Crisis of Civilization’ framework to examine multiple, seemingly disparate global and local crises. This does not obviate the specific and distinctive dynamics of those crises but permits examination of how these crises interrelate with one another in the context of the overarching global system of which they are part. The theorization of human civilization as a “complex adaptive system” derives from the application of complex systems theory as developed in relation to biological systems and ecosystems (Kauffmann; Dyke; Homer-Dixon; Diamond). A rich and dense literature demonstrates that complex systems are found across the natural sciences in physics, chemistry, and biology (Ross and Arkin 2009), as well as in ecology (May et al. 2008) and economics (Farmer et al. 2012 ). A system exists whenever a plurality of entities subsists in which each entity functions in some sort of relationship with the others. A complex system exists when the relations between these parts leads the system as a whole to display emergent properties and behavior which cannot be reduced solely to the nature of its different parts and their relationships. Those emergent properties can be codifi ed as overarching rules that characterize the system’s structure as a whole. In some cases this can be done mathematically, although this is a less useful approach when examining human societies. A complex adaptive system exists when the system as a whole is able to adapt— to generate a collective shift in its internal behavior in order to survive. Thus, while the relations between parts of a system generates the emergent structures that comprise the system as a whole, those relationships are, in turn, restrained and enabled by those wider structures. This circular relationship is integral to the system’s capacity to adapt to new environmental conditions. In time this is done by evolution; more immediately this can be done by behavioral changes or species shifts. Equally, due to the nested and interconnected nature of the components of a complex adaptive system, small perturbations in one part can have ramifying effects on other parts of the system, depending on how they are connected. This sort of internal positive feedback process means that the overall structure of a system can be greatly impacted by seemingly random occurrences—those structures can either be reinforced or undermined by these internal feedback processes. When such internal feedback processes reach certain thresholds, or ‘tipping points’, they can induce fundamental re-ordering of key structures in the system as a whole—the convergence of multiple tipping points, in turn, can generate a systemwide adaptive cycle of re-structuring, a ‘phase shift’, through which the system undergoes a transition to a new equilibrium (Holling 2001 ). The human-environment system is complex and adaptive because it represents a historically evolving civilizational form comprised of a vast interlocking array of nested sub-systems, including some from the earth’s geology, resources, oceans, and atmosphere; multiple living and non-living ecosystems across these domains; and human systems, comprised of psychological, cultural and ideological fi elds, relations of production and associated modes of energy extraction, technological and economic systems, and political structures. Thus, the ‘Crisis of Civilization’ framework is a systems approach that attempts to analyze the complex interrelationships between multiple global crises and human activities as a whole, thus understanding them not simply as discrete crises and activities in themselves, but as component factors of a wider global human environmental system with its own emergent properties and behaviors. This approach recognizes that each of these crises pertains to a specifi c subsystem in itself, with distinctive features and patterns of behavior, but equally recognizes that each of these sub-systems do not exist in isolation. Rather, their mutual interrelationship generates emergent patterns characterizing the system as a whole. Those emergent structural features, in turn, exert causal regulatory effects that shape, enable and constrain the behaviors of the sub-systems. A systems approach thus views particular crises and associated human activities as discrete sub-systems which are, nevertheless, inherently interconnected as subsystems in an emergent human-environmental system, captured through the concept of a world-scale human civilization. It is in this respect that the ‘Crisis of Civilization’ as an analytical framework is able to systemically locate multiple crises as interconnected features of a wider world-scale crisis in human civilization as an emergent macro-structure. By integrating detailed trans-disciplinary examination of crisis sub-systems with analysis of their systemic interconnections within the world-scale human-environment system, a much clearer picture of the precise drivers, dynamics and potential trajectories of these crises is possible. This permits discernment of a birds-eye perspective of overall civilizational structures and their emergent direction. Examining human civilization as a complex adaptive system, therefore, permits multiple global crises to be understood through the lens of a range of powerful concepts with solid empirical basis in the biophysical sciences—the thresholds and tipping points of feedback processes; how interconnections between different crises can generate amplifying feedbacks with the potential to accelerate the breaching of tipping points; the extent to which different crises can be seen as properly systemic— that is, related fundamentally to the key global structures integral to the prevailing dynamic of human civilization; and how these crises relate to the system’s adaptive capacity, in particular, whether they are generating a major ‘phase change’ in the system itself. In particular, this allows analysis of human civilization to return to a scientific framework defied by the thermodynamics of the fossil fuel system, and the evolution and adaptation of species, bringing in critical insights from the physical and natural sciences that can inform the development of robust historical and sociological theories. 2.2 The Energy Metabolism of Human Civilization Applications of complex systems approaches to social, environmental and economic phenomena have largely neglected the most fundamental factor in the evolution and adaptation of complex systems: energy metabolism. Extensive research in the biological and ecological sciences demonstrates that an organism’s relation to the environment is mediated fundamentally through the mode and manner by which it extracts energy from the environment, to maintain and improve its distance from thermodynamic equilibrium. Living systems extract free energy from the sun, store it, and use it. Further, they can reproduce as well as collect, process, and exchange information in order to control and direct energy and matter they receive from their environments (Terzis and Arp 2011 ; Hall et al. 1992 ). According to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, physical systems display a tendency to dissipate energy and thus transition from states of order to increasing disorder. Therefore, physicist Erwin Schrödinger defined a living system as an embodiment of “negative entropy” as they “extract order” from their environments to survive, adapt and evolve. (Schrodinger 1944 ) A living system or organism is thus defined by its ability to store energy under energy fl ow, before dissipation. It develops, maintains and reproduces, or renews, itself by mobilizing material and energy extracted from the environment, which is stored internally through cyclic non-dissipative processes coupled to irreversible dissipative processes. This permits the organism to survive precisely through the consumption and ordering of energy within systemic biological processes organized through genetic information protocols. The capacity to extract, store and mobilize stored energy is therefore integral to a reproducing life cycle. Eventually, of course, the energy must be irreversibly dissipated as required by the Second Law. But the increasing complexity of a living system is related directly to its capacity to extract, store and mobilize stored energy, and to thereby stave off the thermodynamic dissipation of energy. (Ho 1999) Organisms which successfully adapt to changing or challenging environmental conditions do so through the superior processing of information about those external conditions through genetic modification, reflecting increased efficiencies in energy extraction, storage and mobilization in relationship with the environment. (Schneider and Kay 1994 ) The thermodynamics of living systems applies, of course, not just to any single individual organism, but simultaneously to collections of organisms inhabiting specific environments. While human beings are the most advanced—that is, complex— biological organisms known to science, human civilization constitutes a complex adaptive system which has been able to maximize energy extraction, storage and mobilization from its environment far more efficiently and powerfully than ever before. The astonishing complexity of human civilization is related directly to its capacity to harness energy from the environment through numerous sub-systemic processes of social organization, thus maintaining increasing distance from thermodynamic equilibrium (Odum 1994). This framework allows for a more complete empirically-grounded theorization of what the contemporary escalation of global environmental and economic crises entails for the current trajectory of human civilization. Over its historical evolution, human civilization has demonstrated a relationship with its environment involving escalating energy use and energy dissipation, with wide-ranging consequences for the stability of the global human-environment system. Social power is an organic constitution grounded in an exploitative relationship with nature by which energy is extracted from natural resources, transformed into a commodity (through production) and eventually consumed. Energy is thus the very condition of production—but to examine the fl uctuating relationship between the two requires the recognition of social power through property : that is, the way access to land, resources and technology to enable energy production is mediated through property rights, which in turn are related to confi gurations of class (Wood 1981 ; Aston et al. 1987 ; Rioux and Dufour 2008 ). It is therefore necessary, in examining the energy trajectory of human civilization as a whole, to investigate inequalities in social power and class in the context of differentiated access to land, resources and technology between various human groups, and how this relates to the thermodynamics of energy as applied to human society as a complex adaptive system. This will enable us to properly grasp the processes of extraction, transformation and consumption of energy through labor, and varying relationships between society, labor, technology and natural resources, that are integral to diagnosing human civilization’s current predicament (Foster et al. 2010 ; Hall and Klitgaard 2012 ). The historical development of human civilization illustrates an accelerating trend in global net energy production driven by a series of increasingly sophisticated technological breakthroughs, each linked to fundamental shifts in the humanenvironment relations and corresponding socio-political and economic systems of organization. These civilizational phase-shifts toward more complex forms can be conceptualized in multiple overlapping ways. These phase-shifts have encompassed fundamental transitions in the energy metabolism of human societies—in terms of both the types of energy extracted, and the relations of production by which this energy is extracted, stored and mobilized in society through the creation of goods and services. These energy sources include our own muscle and that of animals, as well as wood, wind, water, coal, oil, and nuclear power (LePoire et al. 2015 ). The relations of production accompanying these phase shifts have included the following social-property relations: huntergatherer, nomadic, pastoral, agrarian, feudalism, slavery, agrarian capitalism, industrial capitalism, and neoliberal fi nance capitalism, which is rapidly moving to a new phase of late capitalism predominated by information technology and artifi cial intelligence (Ahmed 2009 ). It is also important to note that each new phase-shift does not necessarily constitute a clean break with previous shifts, but in the course of increasing complexity often builds on or incorporates older structures within a new, wider structural context. One useful way of understanding this process in an evolutionary fashion is through Arthur Koestler’s concept of nested self-organizing hierarchical systems which successively incorporate less complex systems to create higher scales of overarching complexity (Pichler 1999 ). While the latest phase shift of neoliberal fi nance capitalism has been able to generate an unprecedented level of wealth within the system, it has simultaneously developed an unprecedented degree of global inequality between the core—consisting of a transnational nexus of class power centred in the former G8—dominating the world’s productive resources including energy, raw materials, military and information technology; and the periphery—whose countries remains largely subordinated to the global structures institutionalized by the core (Ahmed 2009 ; Tainter 1990 ). 2.3 The Physics of System Failure Today, human civilization under late capitalism maintains its increasing distance from thermodynamic equilibrium via the throughput of vast quantities of increasingly depleted fossil fuel reserves, along with other fi nite and increasingly scarce resources such as metal ores, radionucleotides, rare earth elements, phosphate fertilizer, arable land, and fresh water (Nekola et al. 2013 ). One indicator of the system’s growing complexity today is the measure of material throughput, or economic growth—Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Under capitalist social-property relations, GDP must continuously increase through the maximization of private sector profi ts, simply for businesses to survive in the competitive marketplace and for the economy to maintain its ability to meet the consumption requirements of a growing population. However, as the complexity of human civilization has advanced, the continual growth in material throughput is correlated with an escalating rate of depletion of energy and raw materials, as well as an acceleration in the dissipation of energy through intensifying greenhouse gas emissions. Robust scientifi c assessments now demonstrate that the continuation of those biophysical processes of environmental degradation in a business-as-usual scenario will, before the end of the twenty-fi rst century, fundamentally undermine the biophysical basis of human civilization in its current mode of material organization and structural complexity. Further, the uncontrolled energy releases generated by these biophysical processes are manifested in climate change, extreme weather events, and natural disasters (Earth System Disruption); and drives geopolitical competition, social unrest, and violent confl ict (Human System Destabilization). These manifestations of dissipative energy release can be seen as distinctive feedback processes resulting from human civilization’s accelerating exploitation of fossil fuel energy sources within the context of the biophysical limits of the environment. In turn, these two strands of systemic feedbacks—Earth System Disruption (ESD) and Human System Destabilization (HSD)—are occurring within a single, overarching human-environment system, and thus are already inherently interconnected, therefore feeding back into each other. This mutual feedback process creates an amplifying global systemic feedback in which: (1) ESD drives HSD, which in turn generates ‘security’ issues perceived through the lens of ‘threat’ and ‘risk’ analysis; (2) this invites traditional securitized human responses that focus on the expansion of existing military, political and economic power to stabilize existing structures of authority and advance prevailing mechanisms of energy extraction and mobilization; (3) the entrenchment and expansion of existing structures undermines human civilization’s capacity to pursue structural modifications to ameliorate, mitigate or prevent [Earth Systems Disruption] ESD, thus intensifying ESD; (4) the feedback process continues as ESD drives further [Human System Destabilization] HSD. The trajectory of this amplifying global systemic feedback, carried to its logical conclusion and assuming no intervening shift, is simply the protracted, cascading collapse of human civilization in its current form toward increasingly less complex, and therefore less resource-intensive configurations, corresponding to available resources and constrained within the environmental limits imposed by accelerating climate change (Tainter 1990).

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › T JG

A FJG guarantees everyone a job

Bhandari 19 Former Senior Policy Advisor, Economic Program [3-25-19, “What is a federal jobs guarantee? And what are people saying about it?” , accessed 7-18-23, angelina]

A federal jobs guarantee is as simple as it sounds on the surface: everyone in the country will be guaranteed a job by the US government should they desire one. There are two versions right now gaining attention. One plan is written by academics Mark Paul, Sandy Darity, and Darrick Hamilton. The other was written by Pavlina Tcherneva.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › T JG

Job guarantee is universal and permanent.

Tcherneva, Pavlina R., 2018 "The job guarantee: design, jobs, and implementation." Levy Economics Institute, Working Papers Series 902 (2018)., panav

As discussed above, the JG is a permanent, universal program that provides jobs to all, in good times or bad. The program in India comes close to such a program. The NREGA guarantees at least 100 days of wage work to each household per year. The program enshrines the right to paid work into law—a right that has been written into the constitutions of many countries, inspired by the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, though signatory countries have yet to meet that mandate. India’s program guarantees work by household only, not per individual—as in this JG proposal.

2023 DDI Negative
DDI BK—Tuberville Neg › T JG

Job guarantee is universal.

Mitchell, William, and Randall L. Wray, 2017, THE MODERN MONEY NETWORK, , panav

A government job guarantee is a proposed program where the government would provide a job with a basic wage and benefits package to anyone willing and ready to work. The job guarantee is one component of an overall program to stabilize an economy. The job guarantee is financially feasible when a sovereign government’s currency uses a floating exchange rate.

2023 DDI Negative
Off Case Positions › Reparations CP › To Incorporate

The aff’s emphasis on sacrifice replicates Bataille’s logic that feminine qualities like the weak, the easily trapped and pursued should be sacrificed

Connolly 14 [Connolly, Sean P, Chair of Department Humanities. Bluefield State College. “Georges Bataille, Gender, and Sacrificial Excess.” The Comparatist, vol. 38, 2014, pp. 108–27. marlborough-mjen]

The Sexuality of Sacrifice Literary illustrations of this process can be found throughout Bataille’s narrative fiction. The female characters provide the transgressive portal to eroticism, death, and the sacred that the solitary man, “lacking the lack” of a woman, conquers and loses. Bataille’s feminine characters and characterization of the feminine initially offer privileged access to this otherworldly space where subjectivity is lost and the sacred is found in self-sacrifice. The figures of presence and absence as a result mark gendered difference in Bataille; whereas men are present, women are frequently absent, if not absence itself figured in the form of death. Male characters approach the feminine as they approach death, a death that seems to fulfill their prior “human” fate while also apparently feminizing their male character. In Madame Edwarda, for example, a nameless and impotent male narrator enters a brothel in Paris in search of a prostitute and finds the mysterious Edwarda, whom he approaches with ambivalent feelings of fear and wonder, as she is God. These sentiments are no less equivocal than Edwarda herself, who, he explains, constantly disappears and is yet always “sensibly absent.” Though he desirously follows her through the night, he cannot broach her without sensing his own absence and self-loss, which he morbidly describes as a “shattering” (se briser), “sickness” (être malade) and “decomposition” (décomposer). Edwarda is essentially constituted, or de-constituted, as the night itself; she becomes a vortex, an absence, a black hole, one the male narrator cannot fill. “Edwarda, something alien,” the narrator says, a statement juxtaposed against the image in the next sentence: “above our heads, a starry sky, mad and void” (Edwarda 152). Epitomizing the distinction between masculine presence and feminine absence in Bataille’s story is the scene at La Porte Saint-Denis. This arch, located in the former red-light district of North Paris, embodies a threshold analogous to that Edwarda herself, who crosses the realms of life and death. On the far side of the archway, the narrator explains, is the “deathly darkness” (l’obscurité de mort), “absence,” and even “emptiness itself.” With a seductive back-step, Edwarda traverses threshold, disappearing into what the narrator calls “the nothingness of the arch” (Edwarda 153). Though he follows her in frenzy, eager to embrace the “season of agony” and “suffering” by passing into the emptiness; he wants to “go farther, as far as the ‘emptiness’ itself.” Yet he is anxious and apprehensive, remaining “overwhelmed” or “condemned” (accablé) before the portal and “sinking into despair.” While he hesitates before the absence that would consume him and render him lost, Edwarda crosses the arch and “loses herself” (se perdre), only to be found later by the narrator on an empty terrace. As if woken from sleep, she turns to the narrator and asks him, in a “lifeless” voice, “Where am I?” (154). Whereas the narrator finds Edwarda, Edwarda herself is “lifeless,” absent, lost in the night. As this example illustrates, the difference between male and female characters in Bataille is less one of kind than of degree; Edwarda can “go further” than the narrator. She goes there where the narrator cannot; she is lost where he is found. Analogously, while the narrator continually describes the presentiment of absence, death, and loss, Edwarda actually achieves this absence; indeed, she is this absence. She is “less than a phantom, less than a lingering mist” (153–54). Yet the distinction between masculine presence and feminine absence becomes less clear in moments of erotic encounter. The absence and ecstasy Edwarda personifies infects the male narrator, who cannot desire or possess her without a commensurate experience of sacrificial self-loss. When Edwarda first commands the narrator to kiss her, for example, he hesitates out of embarrassment but then proceeds, provoking an uncanny feeling of absence and vacuity: I was shaking; I looked at her: motionless, she smiled back so sweetly that I shook. At last, reeling, I sank down on my knees and feverishly pressed my lips to that running, teeming wound [plaie vive]. Her bare thigh caressingly nudged my ear, I thought I heard a sound of roaring seasurge [bruit de houle], it is the same sound you hear when you put your ear to a large conch shell. In the brothel’s boisterous chaos and in the atmosphere of corroding absurdity I was breathing (it seemed to me I was choking, I was flushed, I was sweating). I hung strangely suspended, quite as though at that same point we, Edwarda and I, were losing ourselves in a wind-freighted night, on the edge of the ocean. (Edwarda 150) As the narrative suggests, it becomes progressively ambiguous who is solid and who is hollow, who is present and who is absent. While the narrator trembles, Edwarda remains static, imperious. When he kneels before her, however, to kiss her “teeming wound” (plaie vive), he senses her emptiness as if hearing the sea inside of a conch shell. Yet this emptiness does not solely belong to Edwarda; the narrator too poses his “lips” to her “wound”—i.e., her “lips”—and the sound of her thigh, that of a conch shell, fills his ear. With his mouth to her wound, her shell to his ear, it would seem that orifice meets orifice, emptiness meets emptiness, creating a greater “queer absence” between them both that, in the confusion of the bordello, becomes even more vacuous in the “wind-freighted night on the edge of the ocean” where they are both “losing themselves.” Edwarda’s absence and vacuity becomes indistinguishable from the narrator’s own, with his morbid feeling of self-loss, suspension, and suffocation in the bordello. The figures of the seasurge and conch shell further metonymically link Edwarda, with her “wound,” to the abyssal sea, if not also to the vacuity of the narrator’s mouth and the figure of night as well. And this his shared loss, experienced between the twin abysses of night and sea, mouth and wound, echoes the lesson eroticism teaches in the Preface, and in turn Edwarda’s assertion that she is God: “God is nothing if He is not, in every sense, the surpassing of God . . . in the sense of dread . . . and, finally, in the sense of nothing” (Edwarda 142). As this passage illustrates, in the erotic and sacrificial space of self-loss, the difference between the narrator and Edwarda, the masculine and feminine, becomes evermore “lost,” rendered into a queer space of nothingness where gendered identity is not. Similarly, in his “Prostitution” chapter of Erotism, Bataille offers one of his more controversial and well-known sexist claims. He asserts that prostitution is the logical result of what he calls the “feminine attitude.” I repeat the example given above: “Not every woman is a potential prostitute, but prostitution is the logical consequence of the feminine attitude. In so far as she is attractive, a woman is prey to men’s desire” (Erotism 131). In other words, while women typically withhold, men typically pursue, and the classic amorous project for men therefore becomes the discovery of the conditions under which the woman will surrender herself to the man. Yet, for Bataille, by restraining eroticism to a restricted commercial exchange, modern prostitution represents a degraded form of what was formerly a religious matter in the practice of hierogamy. This latter form constitutes “true” or “sacred prostitution” for Bataille because its purpose is religious rather than economic. Indeed, such prostitution represented a form of sacrifice. Religious prostitution disrupts the profane world of commodity exchange and instead approximates sacrifice as a divine self-giving: “With prostitution, the prostitute was dedicated to a life of transgression. The sacred or forbidden aspect of sexual activity remained apparent in her, for her whole life was dedicated to violating the taboo” (Erotism 133). Given the dis-identificatory, self-differential practice of sacrifice elaborated above, there is an implicit challenge made to the heterosexist logic that undergirds his account of prostitution here, however.

2023 DDI Negative
Off Case Positions › Reparations CP › 1NC

Reparations are productive for black people- that’s good.

National African American Reparations Commission (NAARC), No-date, "What is NAARC's 10-Point Reparations Plan?," //VDR

A. The descendants of the millions of Africans who were stolen from Africa and transported to the strange lands of the “Americas” against their will to enrich their captors have a right to return to the motherland to an African nation of their choice. Africans in America who choose to exercise the right to return will be provided with sufficient monetary resources to become productive citizens in their new home and shall be aided in their resettlement by a Black controlled agency funded by the federal government to perform this function.

B. The Repatriation Program will be complemented by an African Knowledge Program similar to the one included in the CARICOM Reparations Commissions’ Ten Point Program of Reparatory Justice. This Program will serve to bridge the barriers and heal the wounds between Africans in the U.S. and Africans on the continent, resulting from centuries of enslavement, cultural alienation, misinformation and divide and conquer/exploit schemes initiated by European and American slave traders, colonialists and neo-colonialists. Emotional Emancipation Healing Circles, research missions and cultural/ educational exchanges to build “bridges of belonging” will be part of such a Program.

2023 DDI Negative
Off Case Positions › Reparations CP › 1NC

Reparations are simple- black people who were harmed by America in America, should be repaired by America in America.

National African American Reparations Commission (NAARC), 03-25-2022, "Who Should Receive Reparations and In What Forms?," National African American Reparations Commission (NAARC), //VDR

In the most basic terms, NAARC advances a simple expansive and inclusive definition of eligibility for reparations for African Americans/Black people: All Black people who were harmed by America in America, should be repaired by America in America!

We take this position because the focus on who can prove a direct lineage to the enslavement era contains two major false assumptions:

2023 DDI Negative
Off Case Positions › Reparations CP › 1NC

Reparations are our duty and obligation- key to divesting from capitalist thinking about race.

Usha Iyer 1-8-2022, Iyer's research lie at the intersection of performance, and gender and sexuality studies, with a specific focus on film and performance histories, body cultures, and Global South cultural traffic along the vectors of race, gender, caste, and religion, “A Pedagogy of Reparations”, University of California Press, VDR

Reparations demand clear-eyed accountability for acts in the past and our role in them so we may be able to envision other futures. Academic reparations call for community accountability from all of us. Collaboratively conceptualizing a pedagogy of reparations fosters the possibility of a genuinely intersectional, decolonial, global imagination for film and media studies. Reparations are not about benevolence or charity. Reparations are our duty and obligation. I don’t like the word fix, it makes me uncomfortable. ...there is no once and for all fix for anything. The word I like is “ repair”: more tentative, more humble. ... The marines go in there to fix things, they don’t go in there to repair things. Repair can always be undone. —Teju Cole20 Institutions like to forget. A reparative pedagogy is committed to remembering, to witnessing, to repairing. A reparative pedagogy commits to curricula that critique hegemonic colonial, settler, cisheteropatriarchal, ethnocentrist, casteist epistemologies. A reparative pedagogy demands that we recognize and situate our own positionality. A reparative pedagogy asks, what will our classrooms look like when we move from stories of innocence to admissions of complicity? Rather than be defensive, when we start with complicity, we recognize our “proximity to the problems we are addressing.”21 A reparative pedagogy covers a wide range of histories, genres, and media traditions. A reparative pedagogy resists minor curricular reform, the hush money, the reluctant bribe of the one Black or one queer or one non-Western text in the syllabus (e.g., “the infamous “race week” in any Intro to Film/Media course”).22 A reparative pedagogy thinks through the relationship between epistemic violence and state violence. Iyer | A Pedagogy of Reparations 185 Downloaded from http://online.ucpress.edu/fmh/article-pdf/8/1/181/495522/fmh.2022.8.1.181.pdf by Dartmouth College user on 15 July 2023 A reparative pedagogy divests from binaries of form and content, theory and history, aesthetics and political economy, art and geopolitics. A reparative pedagogy recognizes “film’s rootedness in politics, imperialism, and capital” and interrogates purely formal, aesthetic appraisals of media forms.23 A reparative pedagogy divests from the dichotomous, hierarchical logics central to modern, colonial, capitalist thinking about race, gender, and sexuality.24 A reparative pedagogy invests in multidirectional visions, granular and textured histories, global media circulations, labor practices, underrepresented epistemologies.

2023 DDI Negative
Off Case Positions › Fem/Gender K › 2NC – Impact

The exchange of women as a commodity is inherent to the patriarchal family – female labor has continually been exploited and circulated without compensation

Irigaray 97 [Luce Irigaray received a bachelor's, master’s degree from the University of Louvain, and a PhD in linguistics in 1968 from the . “Women on the Market,” (1977). This text was originally published as "Lc marchc des femmes," in Sessualitae politica, (Milan: Feltrinclli, 1978)]//zemh

The society we know, our own culture, is based upon the exchange of women. Without the exchange of women, we are told, we would fall back into the anarchy (?) of the natural world, the randomness (?) of the animal kingdom. The passage into the social order, into the symbolic order, into order as such, is assured by the fact that men, or groups of men; circulate women among themselves, according to a rule known as the incest taboo.

Whatever familial form this prohibition may take in a given state of soci- ety, its signification has a much broader impact. It assures the foundation of the economic, social, and cultural order that has been ours for centuries.

2023 DDI Negative
Off Case Positions › Fem/Gender K › 2NC – AT: Perm

Women as objects of circulation is embedded in the established social order – a shift of “physiological” energy does nothing to address systemic issues and the 1AC’s mechanism further perpetuates this order – only the alt alone can solve

Irigaray 97 [Luce Irigaray received a bachelor's, master’s degree from the University of Louvain, and a PhD in linguistics in 1968 from the . “Women on the Market,” (1977). This text was originally published as "Lc marchc des femmes," in Sessualitae politica, (Milan: Feltrinclli, 1978)]//zemh

This type of social system can be interpreted as the practical realization of the meta-physical. As the practical destiny of the meta-physical, it would also represent its most fully realized form. Operating in such a way, moreover, that subjects themselves, being implicated in it through and through, being produced in it as concepts, would lack the means to analyze it. Except in an after-the-fact way whose delays are yet to be fully measured ...

This practical realization of the meta-physical has as its founding opera- tion the appropriation of woman's body by the father or his substitutes. It is marked by women's submission to a system of general equivalents, the proper name representing the father's monopoly of power. It is from this standardization that women receive their value, as they pass from the state of nature to the status of social object. This trans-formation of women's bodies into use values and exchange values inaugurates the symbolic order. But that order depends upon a nearly pure added value. Women, animals endowed with speech like men, assure the possibility of the use and circulation of the symbolic without being recipients of it. Their nonaccess to the symbolic is what has established the social order. Putting men in touch with each other, in relations among themselves, women only fulfill this role by relinquishing their right to speech and even to animality. No longer in the natural order, not yet in the social order that they nonetheless main- tain, women are the symptom of the exploitation of individuals by a society that remunerates them only partially, or even not at all, for their "work” Unless subordination to a system that utilizes you and oppresses you should be considered as sufficient compensation... ? Unless the fact that women are branded with the proper narne-of the "father"-should be viewed as the symbolic payment awarded them for sustaining the social order with their bodies?

2023 DDI Negative
Off Case Positions › Fem/Gender K › 2NC – AT: Bataille Re-Defines Gender

Sacrificial threshold is determined on personal identity- the degree to which the human subject is “queered” and gendered is the degree to which it is sacrificial.

Sean P Connolly, 2014, Head of Humanities of Bluefield State College, “Georges Bataille, Gender, and Sacrificial Excess” The Comparatist, //VDR

The sacrificial threshold between life and death, therefore, is kin to the threshold at which personal identity is created and undone, including heteronormative identity. Along this threshold, Bataille’s work evinces a veritable excess of differing males and females, masculinities and femininities, which the mobile limits of heteronormativity ambivalently constrain and enable. Given that heteronormativity and queerness both commonly exist in Bataille, they should be understood as representing differing degrees of the subject’s (self-)sacrificial self-differentiation. Sacrificial self-differentiation is analogous to sexed and gendered self-differentiation, or queerness. The degree to which a human subject is “queered” is the degree to which it is self-sacrificial, broaching experiences of eroticism and death. The degree to which it resists sacrifice, conversely, is the degree to which it is a subject that eschews experiences of eroticism and death. Queerness arises in Bataille when characters and subjectivity transgress the sacrificial limits of life and death, selfhood and otherness. Such moments reveal a high degree of sacrificial self-differentiation, an attribute more strongly tethered to Bataille’s female characters and representation of femininity. It is in this way that the feminine is “exceptional” in Bataille. “One knows” writes Bataille in the History of Eroticism, that (my translation) “the ancients identified the possession of a woman with sacrifice. Concerning this, I cannot fail to insist on the fact that women are, more than men, the center of eroticism. They are the only ones that can completely dedicate themselves to it [s’y consacrer]” (Œuvres VIII 337). Heteronormativity, in contrast, exhibits a lower degree of sacrificial self-differentiation, and is more closely linked to Bataille’s more timid and anxious male narrators, if not men lacking “virility.” These differing degrees of sacrificial self-differentiation enable us to explain the apparent antinomy of heteronormativity and queerness in Bataille’s work. These degrees not only clarify his heternormative, sexist tendencies, but also their immanent critique and subversion. In Bataille, typically, men and women provisionally differ in their degrees of self-sacrifice, and thus also in their respective degrees of subjectivity, along a continuous spectrum of genders, sexes, and sexualities. Insofar as men and women provisionally differ in these respective degrees, they likewise provisionally differ in their degrees of queerness. These differences, as I show below, also provisionally structure the heteronormativity between men and women apparent in Bataille’s work. If self-sacrifice itself describes the mode of selfdifferentiation as described above, therefore, heteronormative difference should be understood as provisionally different degrees of sacrificial self-differentiation. In other words, sexed and gendered differences are provisional differences in degrees—not kinds—of subjectivity and self-sacrifice. Whereas Bataille’s men and masculinity provisionally err on the defensive side of a stable subjectivity, women tend toward self-sacrifice and the sacred realm of complete otherness, abjection, and absence. As Bataille famously writes in Madame Edwarda: This God, for all that, is what? A public whore, in no way different from any other public whore . . . God is nothing if He is not, in every sense, the surpassing of God: in the sense of common everyday being, in the sense of dread, horrror and impurity, and, finally, in the sense of nothing. (Edwarda 142) As this passage suggests, God, otherness, eroticism, and nothingness are provisionally feminine things, whereas the subjective experience of these, as revealed by the anxious narrator of this story, is characteristically masculine. In contrast to the “ravishing” Edwarda (L. rapere, “to seize,” “to take away”), the male narrator anxiously reflects upon her fearful absence: “I was alone, as if face to face with a black rock. I trembled, seeing before me what in all this world is most barren, most bleak” (Edwarda 152). Besides explaining the prevalence of heteronormativity in Bataille, these differing degrees of self-difference explain the controversial exemplarity of women as well. The gender divide seems intimately related to a divide provisionally particular to women before or beyond men and their desires. In Bataille, women always traverse the sacrificial threshold between life and death with a facility foreign to men, making them figuratively embody, or rather disembody, the bivalence characteristic of sacrifice itself. In a short essay, critic Phillipe Sollers accurately notes that Bataille’s women signify . . . the compromise that humanity establishes between prohibition and transgression, a compromise which, through marriage, is transpierced by the possibility of erotic violence; not only does she assume the role of (pure) mother and (impure) animal, of respect and the violation of respect . . . but she lends her consistency to a structure of exclusion within which a resistant milieu—a stage (scène)—may be constituted in terms of its potential reversal. (Sollers 89) The “staged compromise” between prohibition and transgression, pure and impure, violation and respect Sollers describes echoes the sacrificial self-differentiation described above. In short, women in Bataille are the compromise, the self-differentiated threshold that challenges the secure limits of identity. In this way, women in Bataille exhibit a greater degree of sacrificial self-differentiation than men or masculine identity, and thus a lesser degree of subjectivity; yet once this is recognized or experienced by men, they too cross the same sacrificial divide provisionally proper to women such that, in the end, self-sacrificial self-differentiation queers all gendered difference. This result is especially apparent in Bataille’s erotic fiction. If queering is the effect of sacrifice on gender, however, and women in Bataille are more intimately linked to sacrifice, it follows that women and feminine identity are provisionally “queerer” than men and masculine identity—even though such queerness, as shown above, ultimately obscures the heteronormative difference that gives rise to femininity and masculinity themselves. In other words, women exemplify sacrifice insofar as they are the primary provisional gender that “ungenders” itself, that queers itself, and becomes the gender that “is not.” Becoming so compels the desire of men—i.e., a desire that compels an analogous inner-lack and openness—setting them along the path of self-sacrifice, which queers them in turn. With both genders commonly lost in erotic self-sacrifice, they exceed all heteronormative difference, yielding to a queer shared sacrificial self-differentiation.

2023 DDI Negative
Off Case Positions › Fem/Gender K › 2NC – AT: Bataille Re-Defines Gender

Even if Bataille’s work redefines gender norms, self-sacrifice is still rooted in identity- sacrifices polarize masculinity and femininity.

Sean P Connolly, 2014, Head of Humanities of Bluefield State College, “Georges Bataille, Gender, and Sacrificial Excess” The Comparatist, //VDR

Two subtle negotiations must be made to respond to this question. The first concerns conceiving gender in Bataille as a degree of subjectivity, rather than as a kind of subjectivity. The second concerns the means and ends of Bataille’s critique of the subject, specifically as it relates to his notion of sacrifice as a form of self differentiation. Provisionally, it will suffice to say that gendered identity in Bataille is itself provisional, permitting for tentative differences between masculine subjects and abject femininity, between potent and impotent men, between holy and whorish women that, to varying degrees, commonly herald the sacrificial space of eroticism in which these become a veritable excess of possible genders and sexualities. Ultimately, I argue that queer identity in Bataille concerns the inherently excessive and self-sacrificial quality of identity itself in Bataille, however apparently “virile” or “feminine.” As I argue below, the concept and function of sacrifice in Bataille offers an unexplored entry point into the queer qualities of his work. As a form of self-differentiation, sacrifice and sacrificial experiences demonstrate that, for Bataille, gender and sexual identity are not one. The excess implied in sacrifice always exceeds the limits of gender, sex, and sexual identity. In this way, the implications of sacrifice for gender extend recent discussions in queer and feminist scholarship on Bataille, especially as presented in the work of Shannon Winnubst and Zeynep Direk, who examine the complex implications of Bataille’s eroticism for sexual identity and difference. Much like erotic experience, sacrifice challenges the ostensible sexism and heternormativity that does typify the characters we see in Bataille’s work. We may consider in his fiction, for example, the (sexist) centrality of male narrators and their contrasting female counterparts, like Madame Edwarda, Simone in Story of the Eye, or Pierre’s mother in My Mother. Men seek women, and women seduce men into sex, violence, and transgression. Men are typically the virile subjects of erotic experiences, and women typically the taboo objects of erotic desire. In this vein, we might recall Bataille’s sexist assertion in Erotism: “Not every woman is a potential prostitute, but prostitution is the logical consequence of the feminine attitude. In so far as she is attractive, a woman is prey to men’s desire” (Erotism 131). How might one, then, negotiate the prevalence of sexist heteronormativity in Bataille’s work with the simultaneous and starkly contrasting ambiguities his work also presents for personal identity, whether male or female? To begin, it must be said that heteronormativity in Bataille does not describe a single, unified state of sexual or gendered identity opposed to another. Rather, heternormativity reveals a more ambiguous, prior form of queerness inherent to identity itself that comes to reveal a spectrum of genders and sexualities that polarizes the masculine and the feminine, albeit without dividing them. For example, Bataille’s conceptions of “virility” and “femininity” both ironically challenge heteronormative identity. In Inner Experience, for example, Bataille at once traces and erases the limits of heternormative difference with statements like the following (my translation): “I can capture the self in tears, in anguish (I can even endlessly [à perte de vue] prolong my vertigo and find myself only in the desire of another—of a woman— unique, irreplaceable, dying, in all things similar to me)” (85). As usual, Bataille grasps self-identity paradoxically in experiences of self-loss like anguish, eroticism, and death; yet such self-discovery through self-loss conjoins immediately with the desire of “another,” a woman, who is completely “similar” to him. At once Bataille posits a difference between male and female identity while claiming that self-recognition itself imbricates self and other, man and woman. Otherwise stated, Bataille paradoxically asserts that, in death and desire, “I am other than who I am,” or more subtly “I am gendered other than my gender,” simultaneously challenging and reproducing heteronormative difference in the self-realization of a queer difference within. Redoubling the queer ambiguity of self and other in this declaration of self-discovery is the phrase “desire of another” (désir d’un autre), which may ambiguously suggest in this context both Bataille’s desire of another—i.e., desire for a woman—or another’s desire for him, a woman’s desire. In this way, just as Bataille’s declaration here therefore challenges or queers the boundaries of (male) subjectivity, so does it make possible by implication a desirous female subject, another who desires “him.” Thus in the same movement does Bataille pose and subvert heteronormative identity, betraying varying possible degrees of masculinity and femininity within the same desiring subject. It is remarkable to note how often in Bataille sexual differences advance a concept or experience that itself undercuts the very sexual differences upon which it is based. In his famous essay “The Sorcerer’s Apprentice” for example, Bataille promotes the quality of “virility” in the pursuits of myth, art, eroticism, and secret societies, since all express a form of amor fati that, like sacrifice, triumphantly embrace mortality. For Bataille, however, the “virile” challenge to individualism takes place in transcending the material conditions of life that hide the presence of love, myth, and human destiny, those mortal things that give life “human” meaning and valorize “human destiny.” Yet this “virile” man, initially emblematic of universal humanity, is quite intimately wed to heterosexual masculinity, shifting the universal meaning of man (l’homme) to manliness (virilité). The most obvious illustration of this shift is found in sections IX–XII of the essay, in which he talks about the relationship between the lover and beloved. The male lover confronts the beloved woman in a manner analogous to death and destiny. “The woman toward whom a man is drawn, as to his human destiny,” he writes, “no longer belongs to the space that money controls. Her sweetness escapes the real world, through which she moves without allowing herself to be any more imprisoned than a dream” (Visions 228–29). If the man faces his destiny, the woman “incarnates” it, yet not in a manner that would “imprison” her within the living “real world” the lover tries heroically overcome through her. Instead she represents a dreamy portal to destiny, a gateway between the real and transcendent, life and mortal destiny, much like the one sought in self-sacrifice. Staring at the woman is not enough for the man to capture his destiny and achieve true virility; however, this would remain only “an aesthetic emotion” without the “will to possess her and make true what her apparition had seemed to mean.” It is only when this feminine figure of fate, this femme fatale, is “conquered or lost” that the “fugitive image of destiny” becomes realized, and “ceases to be an aleatory figure and becomes reality determining fate” (Visions 230). The fulfillment of the man’s virility lies in conquering or losing the woman, whereby she becomes the reality of human destiny—i.e., his own “virile” destiny. As Bataille explains later in the essay, this virile, erotic pursuit of the feminine figure of fate is analogous to transgressing the limit that separates the profane from the sacred, making it tantamount to a form of transgression and sacrifice: Secrecy, in the domain where [the sorcerer’s apprentice] advances, is no less necessary to his strange procedures than it is to the transports of eroticism (the total world of myth, the world of being, is separated from the dissociated world by the very limits that separate the sacred from the profane). (Visions 233) On the one hand, therefore, virility is a condition seemingly particular to the masculine subject and his (heterosexual) desire; he is the one who pursues, loves, and dies, self-sacrificially embracing destiny through the erotic and fateful pursuit of the feminine. On the other hand, however, virility goes unrealized without the feminine, which provides a gateway to this destiny both figuratively and in fact. While “virility” seems to represent the “human” fulfillment of what is paradigmatically a heterosexual male subject (through its divestiture in virile self-sacrifice), virility is possible only on the condition also of a fateful feminine presence to be “conquered” or “lost.” The sorcerer’s apprentice does not realize his “virile” destiny without the presence of the feminine; yet this presence, paradoxically, he can “realize”—or rather “unrealize”—only in absentia, in the fateful sacrifice of self. Therefore, if the feminine is understood as an absence in Bataille—a vacuous realm of desire, fate, and heroic, self-sacrificial death—so too is, therefore, the virile man. Several ambiguities thus arise from this: does this obligatory pursuit of feminine fate subsume femininity under a virile manhood, or does it rather feminize this virility in some way, such that human destiny would go unrealized without the woman, without femininity itself? Is it not the fate of virility to be tainted with femininity? As the above demonstrates, the man’s amor fati, or self-sacrifice for virility is also, ultimately, the self-sacrifice of virility itself. Being a man necessarily implies also not being a man, the loss of oneself—a type of “loss” always akin to a fateful feminine absence. The virile man that is the sorcerer’s apprentice seeks out femininity as the fulfillment of his self-sacrificial fate, and yet such a fate seems This content downloaded from queerly both, and neither, masculine and feminine. In the virile and erotic pursuit of self-sacrifice, there is a mobile divide not only between life and death, but also between man and woman, the masculine and the feminine.

2023 DDI Negative
Off Case Positions › Fem/Gender K › 1NC Shell

The alternative is to reject previous forms of exchange in favor of a cultural critique of Western gender hierarchies

Joy 99 [Morny Joy is a Professor of Classics and Religion at the University of Calgary. “Beyond the given and the all-giving: extraneous speculations on women and the gift,” Vol. 17 No. 1 (1999): Approaching Religion, ] //VDR

4. Beyond the Token of the Gift The reaction of women theorists to this phenomenon has not been without its problems. The early work of Luce Irigaray with her use of the term iouissance, and of Hélène Cixous with her deployment of the term l'écriture féminine, demonstrate that both these French women theorists were disposed to the notion of woman as a term that eluded, in its expansiveness, "phallogocentric" confinement/repression. Both waxed lyrical, in a quasi-deconstructive style (and here the influence of Derrida is evident), about the possibilities of female recalcitrance to control and the exorbitance of female sexuality. Cixous contrasted the debased form of exchange economy that has been exploited by men in the past, with that of women (such in the figure of Ariadne) who lives "without calculating, without hesitating, but believing, taking everything as far as it goes, giving everything, renouncing all security " (Cixous and Clemént 1986: 75). Cixous obviously believes that there is a inordinate mode of "feminine" economy, that can be distinguished from that of the manipulative and calculating "masculine" formula.' In this capacity Cixous observes it is possible for a woman to give of herself without reserve, but, in this proposed model, she is never taken advantage of, never despoiled. If there is a self proper to women, paradoxically, it is her capacity to depropriate herself without self-interest: endless body, without 'end,' without Principal `parts'; if she is a whole, it is a whole made up of parts that are whole, not simple, partial objects but varied entirety, moving and boundless change, a cosmos where eros never stops travelling, vast astral space. (1986: 87) Cixous' vocabulary of immoderation, however, is reminiscent of the prodigality endorsed by Bataille, where woman offers herself as a gift which is not in need of recompense. I think such utopian alternatives require extremely careful contextual scrutiny by women before they are unhesitatingly adopted (even as a disruptive strategy), or women will only too easily still find themselves at the mercy of a system, that while paying lip-service to a nomenclature of freedom from constraint, simply conducts business as usual. Cixous does allow, however, that it is possible for men to have "feminine" as well as "masculine" attributes, just as women may have "masculine" as well as "feminine" ones. BEYOND THE GIVEN AND THE ALL-GIVING 119 Irigaray, influenced by Lacan as well as Derrida, sought initially to affirm jouissance both as a mode of excess sexual pleasure and also as a tactic of textual sedition, disruptive of the patriarchal symbolic system: Turn everything upside down, inside out, back to front. Rack it with radical convulsions, carry back, reimport, those crises that her "body" suffers in her impotence to say what disturbs her... Not by means of a growing complexity of the same, of course, but by the irruption of other circuits, by the intervention at times of short-circuits that will disperse, diffract, deflect endlessly, making energy explode sometimes, with no possibility of returning to one single origin. (1985a: 142) Though these various images of refractory women are galvanized in the service of dismantling the foundations of both the philosophical and social order, something could easily go awry in these programmes Irigaray's endless diffusions initially seemed to run a similar risk as Cixous' of playing into the hands of entrenched structures. The question needs to be asked to whom, and for what purpose, does woman give (of) herself without reserve? Is it for subversion, for self-affirmation, or in the service of others? Unless women are clear about their motivation, it is too easy for women's munificence, viewed as a reckless abandonment, to be rendered ineffective by a system finely tuned to neutralize any wayward impulses. Still trapped by the ubiquitous binary structures, which remain unaffected by magnanimity, women may continue to represent an excessiveness which is the obverse of a capitalistic accumulation and exploitation. I believe that this aspect of both Cixous' and Irigaray's work, though reformatory in its motives, flirts with the danger of simply reinforcing women's eccentricity and incapability of challenging in any practical way the sacrificial nature of women's situation. There is, however, a change in the direction of Irigaray's work from approximately the late 1980s, when she began to reflect on the work of Hegel and Levinas. Aware that deconstructive excesses were not sufficient for a new order, she began to seek a position that would not simply be a reactive move within a restrictive dialectic formula: If neither absolute spirit nor the traditional Western monotheistic God seem to be the paths of a becoming, how can we ensure that the negative does not entail martyrdom? (1996: 13) This search marks a rejection of the previous rules of exchange, whether of a binary or dialectical mode, where "the sacrifice of sexed identity to a universal [was] defined by man with death as its master" (1996: 26). This introduces a further exploration by Irigaray of the possibility of a non-coercive, non-retributive exchange. In the social domain, Irigaray's utopian vision of a new order is based on a new mode of relationship beyond the enslavement to property, beyond the subjects' submission to the object...[it seeks] a new economy of existence or being which is neither that of mastery nor that of slavery but rather of exchange with no preconstituted object — vital exchange...an exchange able to communicate, at times commune, beyond any exchange of objects. (1996: 45)

Though these exhortations of Irigaray are extraordinarily powerful, and her assertions regarding women's suppression by religion and its substitutes in the West are valid, they are perhaps in need of some cautionary restraints. Just as the male theorists have made false universalizations regarding women and the gift, I believe it is incorrect to assume, as Irigaray does, that such restrictions have been ubiquitously imposed on women throughout all histories and cultures.

2023 DDI Negative
Off Case Positions › Fem/Gender K › 1NC Shell

The female figure is thus manifested as the ultimate scapegoat, a commodity that can be sacrificed at the will of the patriarchy

Joy 99 [Morny Joy is a Professor of Classics and Religion at the University of Calgary. “Beyond the given and the all-giving: extraneous speculations on women and the gift,” Vol. 17 No. 1 (1999): Approaching Religion, https://doi.org/10.30674/scripta.67247]//zemh

Girard's work, while it acknowledges this human propensity to ward off potential malevolence of deistic figures, expands the basic gestures of placation to include actual human sacrifice. For Girard, the origin of religion can be located in the complex motivations that instigate such sacrificial activity. He would claim: "All religious rituals spring from the surrogate victim (scapegoat), and all the great institutions of mankind, both secular and religious, spring from this [sacrificial] ritual" (Girard 1991: 306). In Girard's reading of a primal act of violence, it is not protection, nor appeasement for the murder of the father (as in Freud's Totem and Taboo), that instigates this immemorial compensatory gesture. Instead, Girard cites a form of guilt that arises in response to arbitrarily motivated designs on another's property (which he terms as a form of mimesis) as responsible. Such cupidity of another's goods can escalate out of proportion, unless it is contained by the sacrifice of a substitute figure that defuses the situation. (Again, as with Freud, this archaic mythic projection would seem implausible on many counts; Frear 1992).

In Girard's script, however, in contrast to Freud's conclusions regarding the endless repetition compulsion of religion rituals, there is the intervention of the Christ figure, the ultimate innocent victim Christ inverts the established order by revealing the mercenary machinations involved in former sacrifices, and thus, by his own sacrifice, overturns and renders as henceforth inappropriate, the violent origins of religion

2023 DDI Negative
Off Case Positions › Fem/Gender K › 1NC Shell

Sacrifice reifies the existing gender divide- women are common examples of sacrifice and excess.

Sean P Connolly, 2014, Head of Humanities of Bluefield State College, “Georges Bataille, Gender, and Sacrificial Excess” The Comparatist, //VDR

In Bataille, women and femininity are often exemplars of self-sacrificial death, eroticism, and excess. Through contrast with male characters and the masculine, they structure a heteronormative, albeit provisional, sexual difference from men who, as narrators, illustrate a more stable subjectivity and a lesser degree of sacrificial self-differentiation. This gives rise to Bataille’s sexist heteronormativity. Yet the man’s heteronormative desire for women hews the path toward self-sacrifice, which is first figured as sacred ambivalence but finally so in the form of self differentiation, recounted both in silence and in the excess of narrative voices. Such self-differentiation reveals itself to be the same formerly specific to the feminine, first revealing the “extimacy” of femininity within masculine identity, but finally the prior self-sacrifice that conditions all identity, whether male or female, masculine or feminine. Such is the double-bind of Bataille’s women and femininity. Since they are provisionally “nothing,” i.e., that which “is not,” there where they “are not,” they cannot and do not provide an exclusive or totalizable category under which identity can be securely assumed. The feminine is also somehow not feminine as that which is largely self-differentiating, self-sacrificial, and non-identical. As such, however, it is impossible to ultimately oppose the feminine to men or the masculine—or indeed to anything else—since that to which it would be opposed is always already included by its inherent sacrificial non-identicality, which is also to say its excess of possible identities. By differing from itself, and thus compelling self-sacrifice and desire, it thereby implicates also that which exceeds it—including men and the masculine. For Bataille, sacrifice exposes the process by which identity always exceeds itself, differs from itself, in a queer space where gender and sex, male and female, are never one.