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2023 UTNIF Evidence
Aff › 2AC/1AR – Sustainability › 2AC – Growth Sus + Good

The aff solves their internal link – green new deal and green jobs create shifts to sustainable climate infrastructure without forgoing growth!

Harris 19

Ph.D., Economics, Boston University Graduate School, 1988. M.A., Political Economy, Boston University Graduate School, 1981. B.A. cum laude, Economics, Harvard College, 1971. “Ecological Economics of the Green New Deal” august 2019 tufts university https://sites.tufts.edu/gdae/files/2019/10/ClimatePolicyBrief11_GreenNewDeal.pdf caddo SV

Ecological economics, as distinct from mainstream environmental economics, is based on a specific and powerful insight: the economy, as a subsystem of the planetary ecological system, is fundamentally limited by the physical realities of that planetary system. This has always been true, but it was possible to neglect the implications of this basic truth so long as human economic activity was at a relatively low level relative to planetary capacity—allowing economic theorists to take what Herman Daly has referred to as an “empty world” rather than a “full world” perspective. In Keynes’ time, this was basically still true. Although there was significant evidence of environmental degradation, giving rise to the resource and conservation concerns mentioned in connection with the New Deal, the overall pressures of global population and economic activity were far less than today. Since about 1950, there have been staggering increases in global population, energy use, and carbon emissions—more than threefold for global population and more than six fold for energy use and carbon emissions. While the most obvious and widely known result of this is the current climate crisis, parallel crises have emerged in terms of other resources, including water resources, forests and wetlands, agricultural soils, ocean pollution, fisheries decline, and biodiversity loss. Even with optimistic forecasts of population stabilization, these consumption-generated pressures on the global ecosystem can be reliably forecast to increase further during the twenty-first century. This broader perspective implies that a more drastic change will be required in the nature of economic production than was envisioned in the original Keynesian perspective. Keynes assumed that the goal of government policy was to promote full employment and economic growth. While he speculated about an eventual end to standard economic growth in his essay on “Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren,”5 this was not an immediate concern in an era of mass unemployment, nor was it a concern for the policymakers who applied Keynesian economics on a broad scale following World War II. The ecological economics perspective, in contrast, implies that an extraordinary reorientation will be required as the period of steady economic growth, characteristic of the past 200 years and especially of the last 75 years, necessarily comes up against firm ecological limits. Does this mean an end to economic growth? I have noted elsewhere that: GDAE Climate Policy Brief 11 4 There is an extensive debate on the possibility of achieving “absolute decoupling” reducing overall resource inputs, specifically carbon-based fuels, while “growing” the economy. Advocates of “degrowth” argue that absolute decoupling is unlikely to be possible, meaning that consumption must be reduced if carbon reduction targets are to be achieved. But regardless of whether we anticipate only “relative decoupling” – reducing the carbon intensity of the economy – or absolute decoupling, some form of green Keynesian policies will be essential to redirect economic activity away from a carbon-intensive path.6 A Green New Deal, then, has to envision an economic transition at least as sweeping as that of the original Keynesian revolution, and likely more so. It is notable that the full impact of Keynesian policies were only felt with the onset of World War II—a massive transformation of national and global economies. If we take into account the full implications of the ecological economic perspective, the next stage of economic development will necessarily reflect an even greater realignment of economic production—but in a quite different direction. 3. Fundamental Goals of a Green New Deal The first goal of a Green New Deal (GND) is an energy transformation to a low-carbon economy. The GND proposal by Data for Progress calls for 100% renewable electricity by 2035, and zero net emissions for energy by 2050. This implies an energy mix that is either zero-emission or 100% carbon capture. Related goals include 100% net-zero building energy standards by 2030, overall dramatic increases in efficiency standards for appliances, lighting, and equipment, 100% zero-emission passenger vehicles by 2030, 100% fossil-fuel free transportation by 2050, and reducing methane leakage 50% by 2030.7 An important, and neglected, element of climate policy is the management of forests, wetlands, and soils. GND goals cited by Data for Progress include the preservation of existing forests and reforestation of 400 million acres of public and private land by 2035. Wetland preservation and restoration is another critical component. Wetlands are extremely efficient at carbon storage, and wetland loss is a significant cause of increased carbon emissions.8 Agriculture is a major contributor to carbon and methane emissions, as well as to pesticide and fertilizer pollution degrading waterways and oceans, but sustainable agricultural practices promoting healthy soils have the potential to turn the agricultural sector into a major net carbon sink.9 A third major focus for a GND is infrastructure investment. In addition to infrastructure investment related to the low-carbon energy transition, major investment is urgently needed in water, sewage, transportation, and waste management. A single example gives a sense of the scope of the issue. New Jersey’s largest lake, Lake Hopatcong, has recently been closed to recreational uses due to a major bloom of toxic blue-green algae – a problem that affects many inland and coastal waters. The causes include climate change, leading to more GDAE Climate Policy Brief 11 5 intense rainfall, and “older sewer and stormwater systems that have been overwhelmed by fast-moving storms. . . . the Environmental Protection Agency has put the cost of upgrading New Jersey’s stormwater system at $16 billion.”10 A price tag of $16 billion, for one major problem in one state, strongly suggests many hundreds of billions in needed infrastructure investment nationwide. 4. Specific Policies to Achieve Green New Deal Goals Policies to achieve GND goals can be roughly divided into three areas: (1) Redirection of existing economic activity and investment. These policies could include carbon taxes, elimination of “perverse” subsides for carbon emissions and resource extraction, subsidies for renewable energy or sustainable agricultural and forestry practices, establishing strong fuel and building efficiency standards, renewable energy portfolio standards, and stronger environmental regulation (2) New public investment in water and sewer infrastructure, energy transition, public transit, research and development of new renewable technologies and battery storage, electrical grid integration and modernization, public trust funds for community resilience and land protection programs. (3) Employment creation programs, overlapping with (2) but also including human resource areas such as health, education, and community services. 5. Budget Implications of a Green New Deal The goals of the GND are extremely ambitious, but do not necessarily involve high economic costs in all cases. Many environmental problems arise from the exploitation of “free” or low-priced natural resources. Putting a proper price on these resources can be consistent with both good economic theory and sound ecological principles, and generally implies a shift in economic techniques and activities rather than an absolute cost. In some cases, greater efficiency in resource use can save money as well as reduce ecosystem impact. While proper pricing of resources can generate significant revenue streams, carbon taxes and other resource taxes are generally regressive. A portion of the revenue stream associated with them therefore needs to be channeled into individual per capita rebates (which have the effect of changing the net tax impact from regressive to progressive or at least proportional), or into social investment that primarily befits lower-income individuals and families, such as health care and education. To the extent that necessary infrastructure investment is not covered by remaining carbon tax revenues, it will need to be funded out of general government budgets. According to standard Keynesian theory, at times of severe recession government deficits are acceptable GDAE Climate Policy Brief 11 6 and indeed necessary to counter a deficiency of private investment. But at times of relatively high employment, budget deficits should be reduced or eliminated. In the U.S., this implies at a minimum reversing most of the 2017 tax cuts, especially those for upper-income individuals, and closing loopholes such as the infamous carried interest provision (the 2017 tax package did little or nothing to close major loopholes). Another option is a financial transaction or “Tobin” tax, set at a very low rate but with significant revenue potential due to the high volume of financial transactions. Opponents of a GND will argue that its implementation will be enormously costly and require government takeover of major economic functions. Unwise GND advocacy, including unrealistic goals and “add-ons” such as the concept of guaranteed jobs, have lent credibility to these critics. But in fact, implementation of a GND can be flexible and not necessarily involve high costs. GND investment policies can both promote employment and advance a transition to a more environmentally sustainable economy at relatively low cost in terms of national budgets and GDP. For example, the Obama administration stimulus program included $5 billion for weatherization programs. A major nationwide program for building energy efficiency retrofit could easily be ten times as large. The stimulus program temporarily quadrupled U.S. spending on energy research and development, to about $12 billion; a permanent increase of this magnitude would have enormous long-term benefits in promoting a transition to efficiency and renewables. In the context of a Federal budget of over $4 trillion, these are not very large amounts. A “greener” economic view, taking into account ecological benefits, implies that the policies required to promote a massive transition to renewables and greater energy efficiency could be considered a net benefit, not a net cost. As noted above, infrastructure investment will ultimately involve much larger amounts. Some of these may require dedicated revenue sources at the state or local level; for example, in the New Jersey example mentioned above, a possible solution involves “stormwater utilities”, which are a mechanism for localities to charge fees to property owners based on how much stormwater runoff they generate. An important issue in assessing costs is the standard economic principle of increasing marginal cost. This implies that the initial costs are the lowest, and indeed in the case of greenhouse gas abatement costs a major study by McKinsey & Company found that the costs of abating up to about a third of total emissions were negative – implying that for these abatement programs, especially increasing energy efficiency, economic advantages outweighed costs even without considering environmental gains. The second third involved relatively low cost, less than $20 per ton of CO2 equivalent. On a global scale, the total cost of reducing 2030 emissions by 35% compared to 1990 levels, or 70% compared with business-as-usual levels, would be less than 1% of global GDP.11 GDAE Climate Policy Brief 11 7 It would thus be a major mistake to reject the GND based on an inflated estimate of its total potential cost. Unfortunately some its early advocacy has encouraged just that perception: that it involves trillions of dollars in new spending. Many GND policies, as noted above, would require minimal spending and deliver net benefits in terms of employment and environmental advances. In terms of carbon reduction, the higher costs would potentially come later: 30% reduction would be cheap, 100% could be expensive. By trumpeting a 100% goal within the unrealistically short period of ten years, the advocates have done the program a disservice. If initiated with an emphasis on energy efficiency, low-cost renewables, and employment generation, it would demonstrate employment and environmental benefits, and could be ramped up over time. A Green Keynesian analysis suggests that the overall effects would be beneficial, even though some greater tax revenues and spending would eventually be involved.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Aff › 2AC/1AR – Sustainability › 2AC – Growth Sus + Good

Continued Investment and education in R&D programs key for creating sustainable ways of combating climate change and creates international follow on now

Sarpong et al 23 College of Business, Arts & Social Sciences Brunel Business School, Brunel University London, Kingston Lane, Uxbridge, UB8 3PH, United Kingdom b Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen, Center for International Development and Environmental Research - ZEU, Germany “The three pointers of research and development (R&D) for growth-boosting sustainable innovation system,” Version of Record 3 April 2023. Technoinnovation https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0166497222001286 caddo SV

It is widely reflected in the literature that R&D is germane to the process of building sustainable and robust innovation machinery. Specifically, current R&D efforts create a knowledge pool for appropriability and increase the potential for future research to exploit technological opportunities (Miroshnychenko and De Massis, 2020; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Therefore, R&D enables the accumulation of knowledge needed to build a rich absorptive capacity that serves as the substrate on which new technological insights are conceived (Lewin et al., 2011; Miller et al., 2007). In this respect, it follows that learning performance and productivity is sensitive to the prior or existing knowledge stock (Garvin et al., 2008; Lewis et al., 2005). This cumulative nature of knowledge acquisition creates the impetus for intensive R&D initiatives in order to be prepared to capitalise on innovative opportunities that may emerge from the external environment (Lewin et al., 2011). Intensive R&D is also significant in enhancing cooperation among firms and in facilitating collaboration with external institutions such as universities (Melnychuk et al., 2021; Lewin et al., 2020; Ahuja, 2000). Such cooperation in the research effort enables the sharing and development of ideas about new areas of scientific knowledge for eco-innovation development and the value extraction thereof (Tumelero et al., 2019; Sarpong et al., 2017). In turn, the knowledge-sharing mechanism facilitates the development of novel technologies and transcends the innovative capacity to the frontiers of technological preadaptation and the predictability of potential trajectories of the innovation landscape (Vrontis et al., 2017; Cattani, 2006). R&D thus provides the necessary means to effectively assimilate and apply knowledge in novel ways to improve the performance of the existing scientific infrastructure and to provide new and sustainable product development models and processes (Furman et al., 2002; Lane et al., 2006). A look into the recent dynamics of the R&D investment landscape among leading countries reveals a competitive arena where nations who seek to control the commanding heights of the scientific knowledge production and technological innovation battle for hegemony (Kondo, 2013; Wang 2010). The United States (US), for instance, takes up its position as a global leader in scientific research and knowledge production with $550 bn annual expenditure on R&D (The Economist, 2021a). A steep rise in the expenditure on R&D by China, from $135 bn in 2008 to $439 bn in 2018, has also propelled the country to take on the front rank of scientific research thereby dominating in 23 out of the 30 mostly popular research domains and accounting for 24.5 percent of the 21 percent increase in scientific publications between 2015 and 2019 (; ). This has inspired many other countries to dedicate more resources to R&D in the race to gain global dominance in science and technology (). This competitive playing field, characterised by a rising expenditure for R&D, is, however, motivated by the quest to achieve sustainable green innovations that would yield huge socio-economic benefits (Wang and Zhang, 2020; Ganda, 2019). The UK government's strategic plan to invest in sustainable innovation and become a world-leading hydrogen economy (The Economist, 2021b; UK Gov, 2021) is the quintessence of such strong nudges by governments to address systemic climate challenges (Mazzucato, 2018). Al Also, the private sector is not excluded from this global endeavour to catalyse and navigate the sustainability transition as they account for 85% of investment, as reported in the European Union's research and innovation in low carbon technologies (European Commission, 2017, 2021). A new crop of investors adopting what has come to be known as sustainable investing, which seeks to embed sustainability into the global financial system (Umar et al., 2021; Eccles and Klimenko, 2019), illustrates that the current innovation system has found a new paradigm, one which is characterised by the notion of eco-economic decoupling (Vadén et al., 2020). However, our re-reading of these commitments to providing financial investment for R&D prompted us to wonder why there has been little evidence of growth to underscore these efforts. In response, we argue that the many benefits of R&D would only yield significant and sustainable benefits if investments were aligned with the development of R&D personnel talents and learning institutions. More importantly, in an era when issues of sustainability have gained much traction and support, efforts to speed up new and sustainable business models call for a reimagination of the traditional conception of R&D in order to establish a clear path towards resolving the human-induced climate challenges (Janzwood, 2021; Shao et al., 2021). As depicted in the framework in Fig. 1, aligning investments in R&D with talented cadres and learning institutions is significant for enriching the absorptive capacity needed to build the knowledge pool to assimilate and exploit new technological ideas. This stock of knowledge, we argue, is what is needed to create a modern scientific infrastructure, such as artificial intelligence and data analytic tools, which are needed to trigger a rapid response to the calls for sustainable innovation. Our framework also highlights the role of entrepreneurial universities as critical to nurturing entrepreneurial scientists, who would pursue basic research in the shadow of addressing socio-ecological and economic concerns, to produce the ground-breaking innovations needed to propel the research on climate change and provide widespread economic impact. Against this backdrop, we now provide brief discussions on each of these three key pointers in our framework to reinforce our position that they command a central role in strengthening efforts to infix growth gear in the sustainable innovation system.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Aff › 2AC/1AR – Sustainability › 2AC – Growth Sus + Good

Decoupling proves economic growth solves climate change now

Kounis et al 23

Nick Kounis is Head of Financial Markets & Sustainability Research at Group Economics of ABN AMRO Bank.Casper Burgering is Senior Economist Sustainability at Group Economics of ABN AMRO.Sonia is Rates Strategist at Group Economics of ABN AMRO. “The decoupling of emissions and economic growth” SustainaWeekly 26 February 2023 https://www.abnamro.com/research/en/our-research/sustainaweekly-the-decoupling-of-emissions-and-economic-growth caddo SV

Economic growth and sustainability can go hand-in-hand Reducing carbon emissions can go hand-in-hand with economic growth Many developed economies in particular have now achieved a strong decoupling between GDP growth and growth in CO2 emissions Many emerging and developing economies have not yet achieved decoupling demonstrating that the stage of economic development plays a key role This reflects the amount of resources available for green investment, available technologies and the share of industry in the economy While many people believe that ‘de-growing’ the economy is necessary to meet CO2 reduction targets, others believe that improving living standards in an economic sense can be consistent with decarbonisation. It remains an interesting discussion, with plausible reasoning being offered from the two different sides. In this analysis, we further examine the relationship between the trend in CO2 emissions and the economic developments of countries and regions. It shows that a decoupling of economic growth and CO2 emissions is more common in developed economies. Decoupling The arguments from the two aforementioned camps is in most instances clear and follows a credible line. For example, the ‘de-growers’ want to prioritize climate change by consuming much less. On balance, by reducing consumption strongly, we use less energy and resources. This gives sustainable development a stronger boost, which is good for our well-being in general. The ‘growers’, on the other hand, see an increase in prosperity as a prerequisite for sustainability and tackling climate change. They argue that only stronger economic development and an increase in prosperity will enable countries to invest in low-carbon innovation and technologies to become more sustainable at a faster pace. In addition, continued expansion is possible by changing the way we produce and by increasing our energy efficiency. It is often added that ‘de-growth’ for the sake of climate is undesirable because it increases the likelihood of social unrest in a society. To gain a better understanding about the relationship between GDP growth and the trend in CO2 emissions, we use historical data for the period 1995-2021 and a model that provides more insight into the matter. SW-230227 - ENG1 Decoupling occurs once there is a clear trend, for example, where continued growth in the economy is accompanied by a further contraction in CO2 emissions. Then decoupling can be called ‘strong’. It can all be mapped with the so-called 'Tapio decoupling model' (from Energy Report, November 2022). The model is shown in the figure below, using GDP and CO2 data on a global basis. SW-230227 - ENG2 Breaking the negative link between CO2 emissions and GDP growth altogether will be crucial to achieving climate goals. From a global perspective, a weak decoupling of GDP growth and growth in CO2 emissions is apparent. Global GDP growth is accompanied by an increase in CO2 emissions, but GDP growth exceeds CO2 emissions growth. From this global perspective, this makes the ‘de-growth’ argument partly credible. After all, the decoupling between the two magnitudes is weak and this calls for an increase in energy efficiency to more strongly reduce CO2 emissions. However, the global picture hides a lot of detail. In fact, the developments by region and in countries give a better insights. The variation between regions and countries is large. Further analysis shows that there are cases where economic growth does not go hand-in-hand with an increase in carbon emissions. Not only the efforts of companies and individuals play a key role here, but also government climate policies. If these policies aim to increase energy efficiency, promote low-carbon energy and/or techniques, and encourage behavioral changes, the result will be lower energy intensity and thus lower CO2 emissions. However, this requires large investments, both public and private. Decoupling by region Many countries have committed to take measures to limit global warming, regardless of economic development level. However, some governments hesitate to take more ambitious measures to reduce CO2 emissions faster if they have to bear the price of its economic loss, whether real or perceived. It stands in the way of a decoupling between the trends in CO2 emissions and GDP growth. Countries with ambitious climate policies that focus much more on renewable energy deployment and sharp reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, for example, tend to show greater decoupling. But the degree of decoupling also depends heavily, for example, on the stage of economic development of countries. According to the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), countries are more likely to achieve decoupling of GDP growth and growth in CO2 emissions at higher levels of economic development. This is because these countries have more resources to invest sufficiently in the transition to a low-carbon economyand shifted heavy industries abroad (see our note on electricity). Moreover, businesses in these countries have more and often earlier advanced options available for further improvements in production efficiency and other decarbonization measures. And finally, these advanced countries transformed their economies over time towards the more services oriented sectors, with a much lower energy intensive and emissions intensive economic activities. This has contributed to a faster reductions in CO2 emissions. SW-230227 - ENG3 The difference in the degree of decoupling and the stage of economic development also emerges from our analysis. For example, a clear difference can be seen between different regions, such as Asia, South America (emerging economies) on the one hand, and North America and the eurozone (developed economies) on the other. China has indicated that peak CO2 emissions will be reached in 2030. India's peak emissions are also around that year. Both countries are still developing and have high economic growth numbers, which is associated with high and increasing greenhouse gas emissions. However, the figures also show that Asia is often also in the phase of weak decoupling. In this case, both GDP and CO2 emissions are growing, but the GDP growth rate is at least 20% higher than the growth rate of CO2 emissions. Most countries in South America are also emerging economically and, as a result, an expansion of negative decoupling is still frequent. However, according to a November 2022 OECD report, South America is in a ‘good position to begin an effective green transition and make faster progress toward its economic, social and environmental goals’. The region ranks relatively well on many sustainability indicators. For example, per capita emissions are lower than other regions with similar levels of development, and its energy mix is already greener today. Renewable energy sources represent 33% of its total energy supply, compared to 13% worldwide, according to the OECD. Many countries in Europe have already decoupled CO2 emissions from GDP growth. The United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Italy, the Czech Republic and Romania are some examples where this process is observable. Outside Europe, the US is the largest country that has experienced several consecutive years in which economic growth has been largely decoupled from CO2 emissions growth. SW-230227 - ENG4 The table above shows that ‘strong negative decoupling’ (the darkest red areas) is more something of the past and, for now, only occurs during major economic shocks. In any case, this extreme situation has not been observed at the regional level since 2016. Of course, this situation can occur at the country level. In any case, it is clearly visible from the table that during economic shocks or other external dismay (like a pandemic), the trend in the linkage between CO2 emissions and GDP is disturbed considerably. Around economic shocks the negative decoupling often increases, varying between strong, weak and expanding. We see this occurring during the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the 2000 Dotcom Crisis, the 2008-2009 Financial Crisis, and the milder crises in 2012 and 2016. In the Covid year 2020, it was especially recessive decoupling across all regions. Then both GDP and CO2 emissions declined firmly, but CO2 emissions declined much more sharply. The world was in lockdown, and this resulted in a strong decline in the movement of people and goods, causing CO2 emissions to fall more quickly. Decoupling in the Netherlands The decoupling of GDP growth and CO2 emissions growth is partly seen in the Netherlands as well, although here the variation in outcomes are sometimes much larger. In the left graph below, the dots are scattered across almost all areas of the matrix, except in the 'strong negative decoupling' area. The outliers in the Netherlands in the relationship between growth in CO2 emissions and GDP growth are particularly noticeable in the 1970s, but partly also in the 1980s. SW-230227 - ENG5 The general trend seen for the Netherlands run from weak decoupling to strong decoupling. However, in terms of emission reduction since 1990, the Netherlands compares worse than other EU countries. Compared to 1990, total greenhouse gas emissions in the Netherlands have fallen less than the EU average and almost all major economies in the eurozone. This underperformance has been linked to relatively slow progress towards renewables, and to some extent also because of large reliance on gas in the Netherlands. But over the past decade, the Netherlands has stepped up and performed better than the EU average. In many sectors, CO2 emissions have declined since 1995, while their value added has grown. These are all dark green dots in the right-hand figure above. Almost two-thirds of the sectors are plotted there, with mostly industrial sectors, but also energy supply, retail and ICT-services sector. About eight sectors show a weak decoupling over time, with GDP growth exceeding growth in CO2 emissions. Finally, two sectors show both a decline in value added and emissions, where the decline in CO2 emissions has been sharper. Maintaining economic growth is important for further sustainability This analysis shows that reducing carbon emissions need not necessarily be accompanied by a decrease in economic growth. Decarbonization of an economy can be well achieved by improving energy efficiency and reducing carbon intensity. To this end, companies in sectors have various measures and techniques available to decarbonise, with many low-hanging fruit (see here). However, there is no one standard success formula, no common climate policy or other typical solution that leads to stronger decoupling. Some countries have an ambitious and strict climate policies, which accelerates decoupling, while other countries have managed to increase both private and public investment sharply in renewable energy. In any case, our analysis shows that limiting CO2 emissions can go well hand-in-hand with maintaining economic growth. The data show that many countries have achieved a strong decoupling, with CO2 emissions decreasing and the economy growing. The results thus offer a strong argument that economic growth is an important and perhaps crucial condition for further sustainable development. However, it does not take away from the fact that a strong rationalization of our consumption behaviour for further sustainable development is eminently a good way to contribute to our goal of a stronger reduction of CO2 emissions towards 2030 and 2050. Finally, it remains a complex story for developing and also emerging countries to achieve strong decoupling. As long as this does not happen, then it may eventually become a major threat to global warming mitigation. Many of these countries (especially developing countries) may not have the resources to invest in a low-carbon economy. The investment gap of these countries is much larger than for advanced economies. In the end, this relates strongly to the need for climate solidarity.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – A2s › 2NC – A2 Tsuda

Tons of clear transition proposals.

Parrique 21

(Timothée Parrique holds a PhD in economics from the Centre d’Études et de Recherches sur le Développement (University of Clermont Auvergne, France) and the Stockholm Resilience Centre (Stockholm University, Sweden). Titled “” (2019), his dissertation explores the economic implications of degrowth. “A response to Kenta Tsuda: Welcome to degrowth” 09/08/21 https://timotheeparrique.com/a-response-to-kenta-tsuda-welcome-to-degrowth/)

Questions of policy design and transition management “What does the administration of a planned contraction look like?” (p.119). Kenta Tsuda complains about the inexistence of “clear administrative proposals.” This is indeed a naïve complaint because there are many. In my , I counted a total of 232 policy proposals in the degrowth literature. If anything, the problem of degrowth is not that it lacks proposals but that it has too many of them. In the third part of my dissertation, which I titled “Recipes for degrowth,” I tried to articulate these changes together, ending up with a programme made of 9 goals, 32 objectives, and a number of policy instruments. Kenta Tsuda writes a bit fast when he claims that “degrowthers fail to describe how they will administer the managed economic contraction.” There is a growing scholarship on the matter, with events dedicated to this very question like the degrowth conference of Spring 2020 in Vienna, which was themed “.” There are good reasons to question the division between degrowth and the Green New Deal that makes. Several degrowth scholars are actively engaged with the question and have proposed degrowth-oriented Green New Deals. For example, Riccardo Mastini, Giorgos Kallis, and Jason Hickel participated in the crafting of the DiEM25’s , injecting degrowth policies into the agenda. A year later, the three same authors published , a paper arguing that “degrowth policies could be incorporated into a ‘Green New Deal without growth.’” Degrowth does not call for making tabula rasa of every single institution existing today. Rather, it points to a number of instruments in order to make the economy more sustainable, more just, more effective in delivering well-being, and more democratic. The proposed strategy might be different, but these end goals are similar to what you would read in a Green New Deal agenda. Of course, one should unbundle social policy and environmental protection (here Kenta Tsuda makes the mistake of reducing degrowth to an ecological concern only). But degrowth is about more than just ecological sustainability – only of the four essential features of degrowth, among social justice, democracy, and well-being. There is no silver bullet policy to such a broad agenda; complex and diverse issues require complex and diverse interventions. The diversity of policy goals and instruments in the degrowth literature is a reflection of that approach. Even though discussing the design of the transition matters, one should be careful that calls for policy precision do not come to be perceived as valid delay for action. It would be a mistake to think that any complex transition should be perfectly crafted on paper before it can start in reality. Degrowth is a political project, not a spaceship. Most of what a democratic transition is about should be figured out during the transition. This is why it is futile to plan an entire itinerary to a distant, precise destination; rather, we should be focusing on how to take the first couple of steps. For example, the author worries that “any calibration error will have grave consequences. Undershoot, and humanity experiences the strife of contraction but still ends up with an uninhabitable, wasteland Earth. Overshoot and the Earth remains habitable, but with a ‘deadweight loss’ paid in unnecessary human suffering, mostly by the poor, and a foregone alternative future of social investment and scientific developments” (p.118). Here, he falls back into the (this comes on top of another prior confusion between GDP growth and living standards). But, in the affluent countries concerned by degrowth, economic growth is no longer coupled with well-being. If fluctuations in GDP have no effect whatsoever on well-being, then where would the “human suffering” come from? Economic growth currently widens inequality, and it has been shown many times that it is possible to degrow and reduce inequality at the same time (; ; ; ). Besides, let us not forget that many developed countries are already experiencing a lack of growth, the so-called “secular stagnation.” In this situation, the ideal of post-growth (an economy that can thrive without growth) is rather timely. Another risk of perfectionist decision-making is to confuse the tool with the task.- Focusing too much on policy details runs the risk of letting the how question smother the questions of the why and what. It is important to make degrowth administratively viable, but not if it means giving up on what degrowth is about (sustainability, justice, well-being, and democracy). In fact, it is a good thing that degrowth is considered unrealistic. If everyone was on board with it, the degrowth agenda would probably bear little change to the status quo. Degrowthers can be called utopian only because they explore the borders of the unimaginable. They think and act as if it was possible for degrowth to exist and through opposition and brave leaps of social eccentricity, they create the conditions of its own feasibility. Degrowth is, in that sense, an impossible goal but an impossible goal worth having. Kenta Tsuda points out, with some justice, that the degrowth literature has remained silent about issues of international coordination. “International coordination of degrowth, however, threatens to reproduce the domestic coordination problem within the anarchic dynamics of inter-state politics” (p.122). But this is true for anything. International politics is famously complicated, whether we are talking about international trade, the management of the Euro, or the mitigation of climate change. But again, degrowth is not a great reset of everything. There is no need to launch a whole new process leading to a “Global Degrowth Pact,” as the author suggests. Instead, let us use the mechanisms that already exist: the Sustainable Development Goals, the Paris Agreement, the Biodiversity Convention, the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, the European Green Deal, etc. See degrowth as a more ambitious set of objectives – and sometimes a more radical design – for each of these initiatives (compare for the example the with the more radical, degrowth-inspired ). The risks that the author foresees, degrowth falling “into a spiral of bureaucratic mismanagement and international conflict,” are unjustified. If anything, imagine how less bureaucratic and conflictual the global economy would be if rich countries decided to limit their consumption of natural resources, thus putting an end to the patterns of neo-colonial extractivism and unequal exchange that enable the “” of a minority of rich people.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – A2s › 2NC – A2 Tsuda

His critique of throughput is wrong.

Parrique 21

(Timothée Parrique holds a PhD in economics from the Centre d’Études et de Recherches sur le Développement (University of Clermont Auvergne, France) and the Stockholm Resilience Centre (Stockholm University, Sweden). Titled “” (2019), his dissertation explores the economic implications of degrowth. “A response to Kenta Tsuda: Welcome to degrowth” 09/08/21 https://timotheeparrique.com/a-response-to-kenta-tsuda-welcome-to-degrowth/)

The ecological case for degrowth For Kenta Tsuda, “material throughput” is a placeholder term – “while material throughput may be a fruitful category for thought experiments, it is deeply flawed as a basis for effective environmental policymaking” (p.119). The term ecological economists actually use is biophysical throughput, to refer to all the natural resources that go through the economy and are disposed back in nature. This is a theoretical category, which can be divided into several more measurable indexes. looks at how fast we consume resources and generate waste compared to how fast nature can absorb our waste and generate new resources. estimates the global quantity of materials like biomass, fossil fuels, and minerals consumed by a country. measures the amount of water used to produce goods and services. sums up the amount of carbon being emitted by an activity. There are many others, all of them useful for evidence-based, environmental policymaking. Kenta Tsuda appears surprisingly unaware of the range of ecological indicators used in the degrowth literature: “the ecological rationale for degrowth boils down to necessary climate action” (pp.123-127). It does not. A “sustainable” economy in any meaningful understanding of the term must consider all the complex interactions it has with ecosystems, and not only carbon. Economies should be carbon neutral, but also remain within the regenerative capacities of all renewable resources, within the acceptable stocks of non-renewable resources, and within the assimilative capacities of ecosystems. What makes degrowth complicated is that it aims to reduce several patterns of resource use at once. It is a response to the “”: rising curves in primary energy use, ocean acidification, fertilizer consumption, marine fish capture, water use, and many other indicators of environmental stress. One of the key assumptions underpinning the degrowth argument is that further economic growth in rich countries will exacerbate these trends. There is room for about how much that is so, and whether these countries can decouple a smaller or larger part of their GDP growth from environmental pressures in the future. But the is clear: today, economic growth is still a driver of environmental disruption. If I understand him well, Kenta Tsuda agrees that degrowth might be necessary at some point (because he does acknowledge that there are absolute, material limits to production), but not today. This is a strange claim that goes against what we know about the biocrisis, starting with recent reports about and . These reports never bring good news, as often reminded by the recurrent calls by scientists demanding urgent action. Many of the problems are definitely getting worse, and any delay in addressing them will imply faster, more difficult changes in the future.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – A2s › 2NC – A2 Poverty

Econ growth in developing countries will never pull citizens out of poverty.

De Shutter 23, “Economic growth is not a magic wand for ending poverty”, Olivier De Schutter is the UN special rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, March 20, 2023, Date Accessed: 07/02/23. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2023/mar/20/economic-growth-is-not-a-magic-wand-for-ending-poverty (GMF)

A from the Center for Global Development claims extreme poverty may be eradicated by 2050 thanks to economic growth in low-income countries. However, a cause for celebration, this is not. Before we start putting our feet up, it’s worth remembering that extreme poverty is measured according to the World Bank’s , which is set at $2.15 (£1.80) a day per person using 2017 prices. This pitiful amount would barely save you from starvation, let alone allow you to pay for essentials such as housing, heating or transport. It leads you to wonder whether the figure was chosen to ensure the international community would be able to boast quick gains in the fight against poverty. It is conceivable that as monetary wealth increases in low-income countries, the situation of specific groups will actually get worse Whatever the political reasons for sticking to this measure of extreme poverty, no one can seriously claim that this amount would allow anyone to lead a decent life. Economic growth, defined as the increase of GDP (or total economic output measured in monetary value) per capita, is not the panacea it is made out to be. It is quite conceivable that as monetary wealth increases in low-income countries, the situation of specific groups within them will actually get worse. First, much of the world’s growth has historically been attributed to the commodification of the natural or cultural resources on which poor communities rely, and that in the past they could have accessed for free. For people in poverty, a world in which a large range of things required for a decent life must be paid for, and can be bought by the highest bidder, is much worse than a world in which such things are treated as “commons”, democratically governed and allocated on the basis of need, or provided by the state as part of its duty to guarantee the welfare of its population. At the same time, the search for growth has led to some pretty disastrous political decisions for people in poverty, such as establishing “investment-friendly business environments” to attract or retain investors. This is simply codeword for lowering taxes on corporate income and removing regulatory requirements, depriving the state of public revenue for financing public services and social protection. And it is in the pursuit of growth that labour markets have been made more “flexible” – with more casual work, fewer long-term employment contracts, and lower wages and reduced protections for workers. This is all justified to ensure that countries remain attractive to investors – as if the comparative advantage of a country resides in its working population being kept in poverty. These and other misguided policies may create the conditions for economic growth, and a woeful $2.15 a day in the hands of the very poorest, but they won’t eradicate poverty or the social exclusion that comes with it. Over the past 40 years, while general affluence has increased, in most countries. And this persistence of wealth and income inequalities has largely cancelled out the positive impacts on wellbeing that are expected to derive from an increase in GDP. It’s not hard to see how if the situation of a particular individual improves in absolute terms, but remains stagnant (or, even worse, falls) in relation to other members of society, that individual will experience a loss in wellbeing that their increased purchasing power will not compensate for. Whether an economy grows or not matters less than whether progress is achieved for those at the bottom. Our efforts today, should focus on reducing inequalities, not on growing the economy, as if a large GDP were some sort of magic wand. What is required is to make social protection universal, to strengthen public services, to achieve progressive taxation, and to build an inclusive economy. An increase in GDP is neither a necessary condition to achieve this, nor is it sufficient to fulfil the promise of ending poverty.Top of Form Bottom of Form.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – A2s › 2NC – A2 GDP

Bad measure – misrepresents data and is too detached from political realities.

Tsuda ‘21

[Kenta, University College London. 04/30/2021. “Naïve Questions on Degrowth”, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3837997] pfox

In conventional terminology, economic growth is a Kaldor-Hicks efficient transaction, in that it generates sufficient benefits for transactional winners to compensate transactional losers, thus potentially leaving no one worse off and some better off. That does not make GDP growth necessarily desirable, for two reasons. First, not all economic effects are legible, and GDP data may misrepresent economic reality. Degrowthers are not alone in pointing out the deficiencies of such indices. The formulae for national reporting have been determined by sometimes arbitrary methodological choices, making GDP too narrow to capture all economic activity that is legible. More importantly, GDP figures necessarily exclude economic effects that remain unquantifiable, either because they are not accounted for in human knowledge or because they elude measurement and neat articulation. Transactions are embedded in a web of complex socio-economic relations—they can be exploitative, harmful and, importantly for this discussion, have detrimental ecological effects. Many of these innumerable externalities—positive and negative—are not understood, or even apprehended, and so cannot be captured in GDP.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – A2s › 2NC – A2 Tech

Green tech can’t solve the non-stop consumption of a growth economy

Kallis, G., & Vansintjan, A. (2022). In defense of degrowth: Opinions and Minifestos. Uneven Earth Press.

Instead of engaging with the creative construction of political alternatives beyond the capitalist growth economy, many environmentalists in positions of influence, in green parties, NGOs, or the academia, insist on “techno-fixing” our way out of our current ecological-economic conundrum. Their vision is one of a dematerializing, “green growth” future based on efficiency and new, environmental-friendly technologies. The illusion here is that capitalist economies can grow as always, just by switching to renewable energies, organic farming and pollution abatement, substituting “dirty” industrial development fed by fossil fuel and material extraction.2 Much hope is put on efficiency, be it in the form of better technologies (e.g. energy-efficient or hybrid cars) or conservation by individuals (change your lamps, retrofit your house, use less water, etc). These strategies of technological innovation and social moralizing have been on the table for a long time and they are not working. There is a good reason for this. Any efficiency gains that have been realized are generally reinvested back to further growth. This is what some analysts have named the “rebound effect”, i.e. less consumption rebounding to more consumption eventually. Leaner cars travel faster and farther way. The money we save with energy-efficiency lamps in our houses, we use to fly farther away for our holidays. Economist Stanley Jevons writing in the 19th century, the era of steam-fired coal engines, noted how technological efficiency improvements were leading to using more coal, not less. As efficiency makes resources cheaper, demand increases and new technologies emerge to make use of the affordable resources. If we remain within a growth economy, efficiency and conservation simply mean capital accumulation plowed back to further growth. Physicist-economist Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen1 noted that the first source of wealth on Earth is the sun’s energy. While solar flow will last for a very long time, the undeground stocks upon which industrial society has been based will end sooner or later. As fossil fuels are burnt, they cannot be recycled and fresh supplies are needed all the time. Entropy increases. While entropy degradation cannot be averted, its pace can be arrested by shifting timely and smoothly from stock to flow sources. Renewable technologies capture flows but do not escape the laws of physics; they also use energy, resources (such as rare metals); and they occupy space. Renewable sources have much lower EROI (energy return on energy investment) than the oil and gas sources whose surpluses provided the “invisible labor” of the industrial revolution. Environmentalists who calculate how much energy we will need in 50 years and then proclaim that we can meet it all with renewable energy commit a vital factual error: they forget to calculate the energy that will be consumed for producing and maintaining the renewable sources themselves. All this is not to discard the usefulness of renewable energies and the need to shift from oil and carbon stocks to solar and wind flows. It is only a reminder that whereas a solar and wind future is possible, it will by necessity be a simpler one: a degrowth future, indeed.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – A2s › 2NC – A2 Decoupling

decoupling false and empirically denied – laundry list.

Parrique, 19 Timothée Parrique (pronounced “tea-mo-tay pa-rick”) is an economist, originally from Versailles, France. He is currently a researcher at the School of Economics and Management of Lund University (Sweden) Evidence and arguments against green growth as a sole strategy for sustainability. Big SPENCE

Discussing decoupling requires using a rigorous analytical framework. Depending on the indicators considered to account for economic activities and environmental pressures as well as the range of their evolution, decoupling can be characterised in different ways. It can be global or local, relative or absolute, territorial- or footprint-based, happen over a short or a long period of time, and last but not least, it should be put in perspective with relevant environmental thresholds, political targets and the global socio-economic context, as to assess its adequacy in magnitude taking into account equity considerations. The validity of the green growth discourse relies on the assumption of an absolute, permanent, global, large and fast enough decoupling of economic growth from all critical environmental pressures. The literature reviewed clearly shows that there is no empirical evidence for such a decoupling currently happening. This is the case for materials, energy, water, greenhouse gases, land, water pollutants, and biodiversity loss for which decoupling is either only relative, and/or observed only temporarily, and/or only locally. In most cases, decoupling is relative. When absolute decoupling occurs, it is observed only during rather short periods of time, concerning only certain resources or forms of impact, for specific locations, and with very small rates of mitigation. There are at least seven reasons to be sceptical about the occurrence of sufficient decoupling in the future. Each of them taken individually casts doubt on the possibility for sufficient decoupling and, thus, the feasibility of “green growth.” Considered all together, the hypothesis that decoupling will allow economic growth to continue without a rise in environmental pressures appears highly compromised, if not clearly unrealistic. 1. Rising energy expenditures. When extracting a resource, cheaper options are generally used first, the extraction of remaining stocks then becoming a more resource- and energy-intensive process resulting in an increase in total environmental degradation per unit of resource extracted. 2 Rebound effects. Efficiency improvements are often partly or totally compensated by a reallocation of saved resources and money to either more of the same consumption (e.g. using a fuel-efficient car more often), or other impactful consumptions (e.g. buying plane tickets for remote holidays with the money saved from fuel economies). It can also generate structural changes in the economy that induce higher consumption (e.g. more fuel-efficient cars reinforce a car-based transport system at the expense of greener alternatives, such as public transport and cycling). 3 Problem shifting. Technological solutions to one environmental problem can create new ones and/or exacerbate others. For example, the production of private electric vehicles puts pressure on lithium, copper, and cobalt resources; the production of biofuel raises concerns about land use; while nuclear power generation produces nuclear risks and logistic concerns regarding nuclear waste disposal.4 The underestimated impact of services. The service economy can only exist on top of the material economy, not instead of it. Services have a significant footprint that often adds to, rather than substitute, that of goods. 5. Limited potential of recycling. Recycling rates are currently low and only slowly increasing, and recycling processes generally still require a significant amount of energy and virgin raw materials. Most importantly, recycling is strictly limited in its ability to provide resources for an expanding material economy.6 Insufficient and inappropriate technological change. Technological progress is not targeting the factors of production that matter for ecological sustainability and not leading to the type of innovations that reduce environmental pressures; it is not disruptive enough as it fails to displace other undesirable technologies; and it is not in itself fast enough to enable a sufficient decoupling. 7 Cost shifting. What has been observed and termed as decoupling in some local cases was generally only apparent decoupling resulting mostly from an externalisation of environmental impact from high-consumption to low-consumption countries enabled by international trade. Accounting on a footprint basis reveals a much less optimistic picture and casts further doubt on the possibility of a consistent decoupling in the future. This report highlights the need for a new conceptual toolbox to inform and support the design and evaluation of environmental policies. Policy-makers have to acknowledge the fact that addressing environmental breakdown may require a direct downscaling of economic production and consumption in the wealthiest countries. In other words, we advocate complementing efficiencyoriented policies with sufficiency policies, with a shift in priority and emphasis from the former to the latter even though both have a role to play. From this perspective, it appears urgent for policy-makers to pay more attention to and support the developing diversity of alternatives to green growth.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – Sustainability › 2NC – REMs

Economic Growth and Green Tech Unsustainable – Rare Earths

Nayar 21

(Jaya Nayar is a senior editor and staff writer for the Harvard International Review, 08/12/2021, Not So “Green” Technology: The Complicated Legacy of Rare Earth Mining, https://hir.harvard.edu/not-so-green-technology-the-complicated-legacy-of-rare-earth-mining/)

Most people view technology as the future, a force of good that will generally improve quality of life around the world. In the business sector, Silicon Valley and tech startups exhibit massive growth potential; in manufacturing, new machinery and automation are boosting efficiency; and in the environmental realm, green technology presents the best prospects for decarbonization. But as much as technology is hailed as the panacea of the future, most of these innovations have a dirty underside: production of these new technologies requires companies to dig up what are referred to as rare earth elements (REEs). REEs the 15 lanthanides on the periodic table (La-Lu), plus Scandium (Sc) and Yttrium (Y). Contrary to what the name suggests, REEs are abundant in the . The catch is that they come in in minerals, and even when found, they are hard to separate from other elements, which is what makes them “rare.” Perhaps these elements also get their name from being rarely discussed, even though everything from the to the to use REEs. Demand for these elements is projected to in coming years as governments, organizations, and individuals increasingly invest in clean energy. An electric car requires the mineral inputs of a conventional car, and a wind plant requires more minerals than a gas-fired plant. With current estimates, demand for REEs could increase by 2040. Lithium and cobalt demand could increase by 2050 because of electric cars. Demand for dysprosium and neodymium is estimated to increase over the next 25 years as a result of electric vehicles and wind turbines. But REEs also have grim prospects: the way companies extract REEs largely damages communities and contaminates surrounding areas. Mining Externalities There are for REE mining, both of which release toxic chemicals into the environment. The first involves removing topsoil and creating a leaching pond where chemicals are added to the extracted earth to separate metals. This form of chemical erosion is common since the chemicals dissolve the rare earth, allowing it to be concentrated and then refined. However, leaching ponds, full of toxic chemicals, may into groundwater when not properly secured and can sometimes affect . The second method involves holes into the ground using polyvinyl chloride (PVC) pipes and rubber hoses to pump chemicals into the earth, which also creates a leaching pond with similar problems. Additionally, PVC pipes are sometimes left in areas that are never cleaned up. Both methods produce mountains of , with high risk of environmental and health hazards. For every ton of rare earth produced, the mining process 13kg of dust, 9,600-12,000 cubic meters of waste gas, 75 cubic meters of wastewater, and one ton of radioactive residue. This stems from the fact that rare earth element ores metals that, when mixed with leaching pond chemicals, contaminate air, water, and soil. Most worrying is that rare earth ores are often with radioactive thorium and uranium, which result in especially detrimental health effects. Overall, for every ton of rare earth, are produced. China currently dominates the REE market, 85 percent of the global supply in 2016. Australia is the next largest producer 10 percent of the market, yet barely making a dent in China’s monopoly. For comparison, in 2018 China 120,000 tons of REEs while the United States produced 15,000 tons. China has even used REEs as a tool to coerce other nations: in 2010, it REE exports to Japan as punishment for Japan’s detention of a Chinese captain. More recently, it considered REE exports to the United States in response to tariffs put in place by former US President Donald Trump, presenting a tremendous threat since the US defense industry relies heavily on these minerals. However, of the world’s REE reserves are in China, raising questions about how the country has been able to monopolize the industry. China’s REE Empire China was only able to establish such dominance over the REE industry in large part because of . Low cost, high pollution enabled China to outpace competitors and create a strong foothold in the international REE market. This market is now booming: China spiked its outputs for the first half of 2021 by more than , hitting record levels of REE extraction as demand increases. The most infamous mine in China is , the largest REE mine in the world. Even more infamous than the mine itself is the tailing pond it has produced: there are over of radioactive thorium stored in the area. This has become a larger issue recently because the tailing pond lacks . As a result, its contents have been into groundwater and will eventually hit the Yellow River, a of drinking water. Currently, the sludge is moving at a pace of per year, a dangerously rapid rate. There are plenty more examples of unsafe mines throughout China. The village of in the Southern Jiangxi province has leaching ponds and wastewater pools exposed to open air. It is easy to imagine toxic chemicals spilling into groundwater or waterways since they are left unmonitored and vulnerable to the whims of nature. In another mine, so much wastewater was created that China had to a treatment facility to clean 40,000 tons of wastewater per day before letting the water flow back into the river. Workers are also suffering from health complications due to exposure to these toxic chemicals. is not prioritized or monitored in these mines, resulting in skin irritation and disruptions to their respiratory, nervous, and cardiovascular systems. have been reported throughout mines in these areas as laborers are overworked and underpaid. China has taken some steps to address issues arising from REE mining, but not nearly enough. China estimates in damage from illegal mining that needs to be cleaned. The Chinese government has also acknowledged the existence of so-called “” where a disproportionately large number of people have fallen ill with cancer due to mining-based pollution. Officials have some smaller illegal mining operations, looking to mining under six state-owned groups that the Chinese government claims will maintain better practices surrounding toxic waste management, but farmers state-owned companies are just as bad. Some argue state-owned companies are worse because they poison communities with governmental support. For example, in Zhongshan, a company claimed it was extracting resources before the government built a highway in the area, but after the highway was finished, it refused to leave. People in the area began noticing wastewater seeping into their farms, and they were forced to inhale sulfur every time they went outside. 15 protestors were arrested in 2015, and ten more protestors were arrested two years later. Some farmers from Yulin, an area with REE mining, have a similar story: they started protesting when they saw their crops and livelihoods being affected by REE extraction. Ten protesters from Yulin were detained in May 2018, and seven still remain in detention. For all its narratives of progressive reform on REE mining, China understands the value of its monopoly and wants to maintain the status quo. It appears as though China is now moving its to Africa, where it can contaminate outside communities instead of exposing its citizens at home to the risks of REE mining. Though some of these operations are conducted by private companies, the six major mining companies are all . China has achieved exclusive rights to the REE deposits in a handful of African countries in return for infrastructure building. For example, China the rights to lithium mines in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in return for building national roads, highways, and hospitals. Similarly, China obtained commercial licenses for REE mines in by agreeing to build a US$666 million data center. are surfacing in Cameroon, Angola, Tanzania, and elsewhere. Though African nations accept these deals now, some worry that this is a long-term strategy for China to lock African nations into a In order to counter Chinese influence, the United States has restarted some of its older REE mining operations in various states. The government wants to ensure that critical can remain separate from China in the event of a larger dispute. Thankfully, the US has environmental regulations on its REE mining, though its methods are certainly not perfect. The Path Forward With China looking to mine in Africa and more REE being launched in the United States, Brazil, Mongolia, and India, REE mines are presenting a unique challenge to the global environment. On one hand, clean energy is an absolute necessity. Green tech is at a where its costs are rapidly decreasing as it is becoming more efficient at harnessing energy. Additionally, more areas are looking to attain zero levels with four states in the United States—Hawaii, New Mexico, California, and Washington—having already enacted legislation requiring all electricity to come from clean sources by 2050. But the environmental impact in communities in which REE mining occurs may not be worth tackling, as viewed by some in China. It is rather counterintuitive that to solve environmental problems, companies are using methods that only further damage the environment, even if not emitting carbon dioxide. This complicated ethical problem requires deep consideration of who benefits from REE mining, who experiences its negative effects, and to what extent it is necessary. For example, if the communities experiencing the effects of REE mining are not receiving any of its benefits, then there is a substantial issue of justice at hand. If REE mining produces such substantial environmental impacts that it contributes to the climate problem more than it mitigates, then there is an issue of purpose. Finally, if the communities with REE mining are also the ones experiencing the benefits of green technology in abating climate change, then they may view the tradeoff as worth the costs. All in all, the costs and benefits of REEs are difficult to quantify. As businesses and communities grapple with these ethical questions, new innovations present easy opportunities to move away from REE mining. Harvard researchers have a new method for extracting REEs using bacteria rather than toxic chemicals to separate metals from each other. Likewise, researchers at Purdue University a way to extract REEs from coal ash instead of mining for ores. Of course, these new methods have yet to be perfected. As society awaits further technological developments and ways to make these methods cost effective, more companies are committing themselves to using exclusively recycled REEs or are attempting to get rid of the need for REEs at all. Renault’s Zoe car copper windings instead of magnets to avoid REE usage. Similarly, BMW’s fifth generation electric vehicle eliminated REEs. There is also a substantial opportunity for companies to start recycling REEs, as the United Nations a recycling rate of less than 1 percent for REEs. For example, Apple’s newest is made from 98 percent reused REEs. It is up to us, as consumers, to choose more ethically produced products so we don’t replicate the same environmental issues of the past. Though green energy has its benefits, we cannot let it lull us into complacency with toxic mining practices. There are no simple solutions to this debate, but there are ways to hold companies accountable and mitigate the needs, and effects, of toxic mining.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – Sustainability › 2NC – Defo

Deforestation is driven by economic growth – leads to soil erosion, bio-d loss, and accelerated climate change.

Reichl 19, “Deforestation in the pursuit or rootless economic growth: A matter of scale”, Jannes Reichl is an author for the Discuss Leeds Journal which is funded by is funded by the , and the School of Earth and Environment Teaching Enhancement Fund, May 7, 2019, Date Accessed: 07/01/23 (GMF)

In 2017, we lost one football pitch of forest every second [1]. From the dawn of the industrial revolution up until now, the global forest cover has decreased from 5.9 billion hectares to nearly 4 billion hectares [2]. During this same period, the global economy has grown excessively. These are not two coincidental facts. The big driver behind deforestation is our ever-growing global economy that demands more than what the forests can sustain. Therefore, deforestation is happening on an unsustainable scale. Scale represents the physical size of our economy relative to the ecosystem in which the economy is embedded [3]. The economy extracts materials from the ecosystem to produce goods, services and waste [4]. This throughput activity consumes energy as well. The amount of extraction should be kept on a sustainable scale. As stated by Santa-Barbara et al., to ensure sustainable scale, we should “harvest renewable resources below the natural regeneration rates of all critical ecosystem services associated with the specific throughput activities” [3, p. 4]. This rule of thumb enables us to thrive, without limiting the prosperity of future generations [4]. So sustainable scale implies that when we cut down trees, we should not only make sure that the forest can grow back to its original tree capacity, we must also consider the various other services the forest has to offer to its environment, such as soil protection and habitat space to foster biodiversity [5]. If these ecological services disappear, it would become very difficult for the forest to flourish and maintain its tree capacity. Between 1990 and 2010, we have lost more than 3% of the global forest cover [6]. Hence, deforestation is happening on an unsustainable scale, since we lose more trees than that we gain. Since forests take carbon out of the air and nurture biodiversity, deforestation worsens climate change and biodiversity loss. These two environmental issues have already surpassed their sustainable limits [7]. Therefore, deforestation also negatively impacts other environmental problems. To understand the factors that cause this harmful deforestation, I have split them up into proximate causes and underlying causes [8, 9]. Proximate causes have a direct impact on deforestation and are mainly caused by human action. On a global scale, agriculture is the proximate cause for around 80% of deforestation [8]. A big share of this new won agricultural land is used for cattle ranching and growing crops to feed this immense livestock [10]. Palm oil plantation also plays a significant part in this agricultural cause. Other proximate causes for deforestation are mining, infrastructure, urban expansion and wildfires [8]. Overall, these causes show that the majority of forests that disappear do not have a chance to restore themselves, since the land is now used for these new throughput activities to serve economic growth. Underlying causes have an indirect impact on deforestation. These causes operate on a global scale and consist of economic, political and social factors that influence each other [8]. The biggest underlying cause is economic growth [8, 11]. Research shows that a price increase for meat and soy causes an increase in the deforestation rate in the Brazilian Amazon [12]. This relationship is caused by the fact that, when meat or soy prices rise, farmers can expect a higher profit from cutting down forest and using it for agriculture. This mechanism shows how underlying and proximate causes of deforestation are strongly interlinked. Another important underlying cause of deforestation is population growth [8]. The continuous growth of our global population boosts economic growth, by increasing the demand for those products that are the main drivers behind deforestation. To tackle deforestation, we must focus on policy measures that reduce the demand for products that cause deforestation. Since one of the biggest causes of deforestation is cattle ranching, policies that decrease the demand for meat are very effective. Governments could increase taxes on meat and promote plant-based diets. Likewise, countries could decide to only import sustainably sourced palm oil, which the Netherlands is already doing [8]. Overall, deforestation is happening on an unsustainable scale and economic growth is the main cause for this. Deforestation is a complex issue, driven by proximate and underlying factors that interconnect with each other. The forest enables biodiversity to thrive, gives us oxygen and fights climate change by taking carbon out of the air. Therefore, we should be grateful for all the services that the forest offers unconditionally. Humankind is responsible for deforestation, so we have to work together on a global scale to implement the required policy measures to fight this mindless destruction of our global forest.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – Sustainability › 2NC – Pollution

Emissions – best stats.

Pettinger 21, “Environmental Impact of Economic Growth”, Tejvan Pettinger studied PPE at LMH, Oxford University and works as an economics teacher and writer, March 29, 2021, Date Accessed: 07/01/23. https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/145989/economics/environmental-impact-of economicgrowth/#:~:text=The%20environmental%20impact%20of%20economic,cause%20damage%20to%20the%20environment. (GMF)

External costs of economic growth {Image} Pollution. Increased consumption of fossil fuels can lead to immediate problems such as poor air quality and soot, (London smogs of the 1950s). Some of the worst problems of burning fossil fuels have been mitigated by Clean Air Acts – which limit the burning of coal in city centres. Showing that economic growth can be consistent with reducing a certain type of pollution. Less visible more diffuse pollution. While smogs were a very clear and obvious danger, the effects of increased CO2 emissions are less immediately obvious and therefore there is less incentive for policymakers to tackle. Scientists state the accumulation of CO2 emissions have contributed to global warming and more volatile weather. All this suggests economic growth is increasing long-term environmental costs – not just for the present moment, but future generations. {graph of carbon emissions} This graph shows CO2 emissions per capita. It shows a 66% rise in per capita pollution between 1960 and 2014. The total emissions are also higher because of population growth. 1960 to 2014 was a period of strong economic growth and despite the development of new technologies, has failed to halt the rise. The last few years 2011 to 2014 show a levelling – this is only a short time range, but could be due to improved global efforts to reduce pollution. (it was also a period of low economic growth in Western economies) Damage to nature. Air/land/water pollution causes health problems and can damage the productivity of land and seas. Global warming and volatile weather. Global warming leads to rising sea levels, volatile weather patterns and could cause significant economic costs Soil erosion. Deforestation resulting from economic development damages soil and makes areas more prone to drought. Loss of biodiversity. Economic growth leads to resource depletion and loss of biodiversity. This could harm future ‘carrying capacity of ecological systems’ for the economy. Though there is uncertainty about the extent of this cost as the benefit of lost genetic maps may never be known. Long-term toxins. Economic growth creates long-term waste and toxins, which may have unknown consequences. For example, economic growth has led to increased use of plastic, which when disposed of do not degrade. So there is an ever-increasing stock of plastic in the seas and environment – which is both unsightly but also damaging to wildlife.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – CP › 2NC – A2 Transition Fails

The aff scenario is our solvency argument – collapse causes cultural shift – that means even if we lose the CP, we still solve!

Trainer, T., (2019) an Australian academic, author, and an advocate of economic degrowth, eco-anarchism, simple living, and 'conserver' lifestyles. He is a retired lecturer from the School of Social Work, University of New South Wales. He has written numerous books and articles on sustainability and is developing Pigface Point, an alternative lifestyle educational site near Sydney. “Entering the era of limits and scarcity: the radical implications for social theory”, Journal of Political Ecology 26(1), 1-18. doi:  == MJ

If present rich world per capita resource consumption rates must be cut dramatically, possibly by 90%, there is a strong case that this cannot be done unless there is a transition to some kind of Simpler Way (for the detail see TSW 2018). For the rich world, this involves: A profound cultural shift, to simpler lifestyles, involving far less production and consumption per capita, less concern with luxury, affluence, possessions and wealth, and instead a focus on non-material sources of life satisfaction. In addition the predominant outlook would have to be cooperative not competitive, much more collectivist and less individualistic. The enormity of such a cultural transition can hardly be exaggerated. It contradicts some core Enlightenment ideas and values. Mostly small, highly self-sufficient local economies, largely independent of national or global economies, devoting local resources to meeting local needs, with little intra-state let alone international trade. This means transition from globalized to localized systems. A new form of governance, primarily involving people in small communities taking cooperative and participatory control over their own local development, via voluntary committees, working bees and town meetings. A new economy, one that is a small fraction of the size of the present economy, is not driven by profit or market forces, does not grow, and ensures that needs, rights, justice, welfare and ecological sustainability determine the purposes to which limited resources are devoted. Following is a brief elaboration on some of the elements indicated by the above statement of principles. Production of most basic goods by many small firms and farms (some cooperatives, some privately owned) within and close to settlements -- much use of intermediate and low technologies especially craft and hand-tool production, mainly for their quality of life benefits -- extensive development of commons providing many free goods especially 'edible landscapes' -- building using earth, enabling all people to have very low-cost modest housing -- voluntary working bees developing and maintaining community facilities -- conversion of existing towns and suburbs into highly self-sufficient communities -- many voluntary The main concern of the Simpler Way project has been to show that a society of this kind would be viable and could be easily built, in terms of technical ease, although the political and cultural changes would be difficult. It would provide a higher quality of life than most people experience in rich-world societies today. The detailed vision laid out in this and other publications is not offered as a precise prescription but as an illustration of possibilities intended to indicate feasibility (e.g., Alexander and Gleeson 2019; Simplicity Institute 2018; TSW 2018). As explained further below, the account generally corresponds to the nature of many existing eco-villages and to goals found within the Transition Towns movement (Aiken 2012; Henfrey and Ford 2017). ommittees, e.g., for agriculture, care of aged, care of youth, entertainment and leisure, cultural activities - - few paid officials -- large cashless, free goods and gifting sectors -- little need for transport, enabling bicycle access to work and conversion of most suburban roads to commons -- the need to work for a monetary income only one or two days a week, at a relaxed pace -- thus enabling much involvement in arts and crafts and community activities -- town-owned banks -- local currencies that do not involve interest -- relatively little dependence on corporations, professionals, bureaucrats and high-tech ways – no unemployment; communities organize to use all productive labour and to ensure everyone has a livelihood (Trainer 1995). The document Remaking settlements (TSW: 2016c) derives detailed tentative estimates supporting the claim that these procedures could cut the energy, dollar and footprint costs typical of a Sydney suburb by more than 90%, while improving all dimensions of the quality of life. Reductions of this magnitude are also achieved by the Dancing Rabbit Eco-village in Missouri, USA (Lockyer 2017). The crucial point here is that only in small, and highly integrated communities can per capita resource and ecological costs be dramatically reduced. For instance in a consumer society egg supply involves complex international networks for agribusiness and industrial feed and fertilizer production, production of steel for factories, tractors, shipping, warehousing, battery farming, logistics, advertising, trucks, super marketing, IT, finance, consultants, packaging, waste removal, and expensive technical skills. However eggs produced in backyards, community co-ops and local small farms eliminate almost all of these costs while adding benefits such as enabling 'waste' kitchen scraps to become chicken feed, and 'waste' chicken manures to go directly to soils, thus eliminating dependence on a fertilizer industry. The proximity and smallness of scale make possible much recycling and reuse, without need for transport etc., and enable arrangements and problem solving via spontaneous communication among neighbors, as well as creating community, leisure resources and resilience. A study of inputs to local egg production finds that dollar and energy costs are typically around 2% of eggs supplied by the commercial/industrial path (Trainer, Malik and Lenzen 2019).

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – CP › 2NC – A2 Transition Fails

Transition wars are necessary to cause radical change in climate policy

Alexander and Rutherford 14 [Dr. Samuel Alexander is the co-director of the Simplicity Institute and a lecturer at the Office for Environmental Programs, University of Melbourne, Australia. Jonathan Ruther is Coordinator of the New International Bookshop, a Fellow of the Simplicity Institute, and completing a Master of Environment at the University of Melbourne, Australia; “The Deep Green Alternative: Debating Strategies of Transition”; Simplicity Institute Report; accessed 7/2/23; ; kate]

Again, one must not romanticise such theories or transitions. The Cuban crisis, for example, entailed much hardship. But it does expose the mechanisms by which crisis can induce significant societal change in ways that, in the end, are not always negative. In the face of a global crisis or breakdown, therefore, it could be that elements of the deep green vision (such as organic agriculture, frugal living, sharing, radical recycling, post-oil transportation, etc.) come to be forced upon humanity, in which case the question of strategy has less to do with avoiding a deep crisis or collapse (which may be inevitable) and more to do with negotiating the descent as wisely as possible. This is hardly a reliable path to the deep green alternative, but it presents itself as a possible path. Perhaps a more reliable path could be based on the possibility that, rather than imposing an alternative way of life on a society through sudden collapse, a deep crisis could provoke a social or political revolution in consciousness that opens up space for the deep green vision to be embraced and implemented as some form of crisis management strategy. Currently, there is insufficient social or political support for such an alternative, but perhaps a deep crisis will shake the world awake. Indeed, perhaps that is the only way to create the necessary mindset. After all, today we are hardly lacking in evidence on the need for radical change (Turner, 2012), suggesting that shock and response may be the form the transition takes, rather than it being induced through orderly, rational planning, whether from ‘top down’ or ‘from below’. Again, this ‘non- ideal’ pathway to a post-growth or post-industrial society could be built into the other strategies discussed above, adding some realism to strategies that might otherwise appear too utopian. That is to say, it may be that only deep crisis will create the social support or political will needed for radical reformism, eco-socialism, or eco-anarchism to emerge as social or political movements capable of rapid transformation. Furthermore, it would be wise to keep an open and evolving mind regarding the best strategy to adopt, because the relative effectiveness of various strategies may change over time, depending on how forthcoming crises unfold. It was Milton Friedman (1982: ix) who once wrote: ‘only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around.’ What this ‘collapse’ or ‘crisis’ theory of change suggests, as a matter of strategy, is that deep green social and political movements should be doing all they can to mainstream the practices and values of their alternative vision. By doing so they would be aiming to ‘prefigure’ the deep green social, economic, and political structures, so far as that it is possible, in the hope that deep green ideas and systems are alive and available when the crises hit. Although Friedman obviously had a very different notion of what ideas should be ‘lying around’, the relevance of his point to this discussion is that in times of crisis, the politically or socially impossible can become politically or socially inevitable (Friedman, 1982: ix); or, one might say, if not inevitable, then perhaps much more likely. It is sometimes stated that every crisis is an opportunity – from which the optimist infers that the more crises there are, the more opportunities there are. This may encapsulate one of the most realistic forms of hope we have left

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – CP › 2NC – S – Misc Hickel Cards

The US uniquely needs to practice degrowth – it benefits the Global South

Jason Hickel 2020. Jason Edward Hickel is an economic anthropologist whose research focuses on ecological economics, global inequality, imperialism and political economy.[2] He is a professor at the Institute for Environmental Science and Technology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, a Visiting Senior Fellow at the International Inequalities Institute at the London School of Economics,[2] and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts. “What does degrowth mean? A few points of clarification.” https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2020.1812222 ==MJ

Some people worry that proponents of degrowth want to see degrowth universally applied, in all countries. This would be problematic, because clearly many poor countries in fact need to increase resource and energy use in order to meet human needs. In reality, proponents of degrowth are clear that it is specifically high-income countries that need to degrow (or, more specifically, countries that exceed per capita fair-shares of planetary boundaries by a significant margin; see Hickel, 2019), not the rest of the world. Again, because degrowth is focused on reducing excess resource and energy use, it does not apply to economies that are not characterized by excess resource and energy use. This brings us to an important implication of degrowth policy. The vast majority of ecological breakdown is being driven by excess consumption in the global North, and yet has consequences that disproportionately damage the South. We can see this in terms of both emissions and material extraction. (1) The North is responsible for 92% of global CO2 emissions in excess of the safe pla- netary boundary (Hickel, 2020a), and yet the South suffers the vast majority of climate change- related damages (in terms of both monetary costs as well as loss of life). (2) High-income countries rely on a large net appropriation of resources from the rest of the world (equivalent to 50% of their total consumption). In other words, resource consumption in the North has an ecological impact that registers largely in the South (Dorninger et al., 2020). In terms of both emissions and resource use, then, excess consumption in the North relies on pat- terns of colonization: the appropriation of the South’s fair share of atmospheric commons, and the plunder of Southern ecosystems. From this perspective, degrowth in the North represents a process of decolonization in the South, to the extent that it releases communities in the South from the press- ures of atmospheric colonization and material extractivism. Still, some worry that degrowth in the North might have a negative impact on economies in the South. After all, many global South economies rely heavily on exports of raw materials and light manufactures to the North. If Northern demand declines, where will they get their revenues? This might seem like a reasonable question on the face of it, but it rests on a problematic logic, namely, that excess consumption in the North must continue to rise, even if it causes ecological breakdown that disproportionately harms the South, because it is necessary for the South’s development and is ulti- mately for the South’s own good. This argument echoes arguments that were regularly made under colo- nialism, namely, that extraction and exploitation by the colonizer is ultimately good for the colonized. For instance, Nicholas Kristof, in a New York Times column titled ‘Three cheers for sweatshops’ has argued that sweatshops are the best way to get people out of poverty, so we need more of them: if we care about the poor, we should not boycott sweatshop products but rather consume more of them. The fallacy in this argument shouldn’t need to be pointed out. Obviously, the best way to reduce poverty isn’t more exploitation, but more economic justice: the South should receive fair prices for the labour and resources they render to the global economy. No one would ever suggest that an American company paying American workers $2 a day is a good way to reduce poverty in America; we would insist that reducing poverty requires paying a living wage. But for some reason this logic is not applied to workers in the South, likely because it would reduce the rate of surplus accumulation among Northern companies and countries that rely on Southern labour and resources. In other words, justice for the South (fair wages for labour and fair prices for resources) would entail degrowth in the North. We should embrace this outcome. In fact, abandoning the pursuit of growth in the North would be salutary inasmuch as it would remove the constant pressure applied by North- ern governments and companies to depress the costs of labour and resources in the South. This brings us to another, related point. Degrowth in the North creates space for Southern econ- omies to shift away from their enforced role as exporters of cheap labour and raw materials, and to focus instead on developmentalist reforms: building economies focused on sovereignty, self- sufficiency, and human well-being. This was the approach pursued by most global South govern- ments in the immediate post-colonial decades, during the 1960s and 1970s, before the imposition GLOBALIZATIONS 5 6 J. HICKEL of neoliberal structural adjustment from the 1980s onward (Hickel, 2018b). Structural adjustment sought to dismantle developmentalist reforms across the South in order to create new frontiers for Northern accumulation. In a degrowth scenario the pressure for this ‘fix’ would be ameliorated, and Southern governments would find themselves freer to pursue a more human-centered econ- omics (Hickel, 2020b; Nirmal & Rocheleau, 2019). Here too, it becomes clear that degrowth in the North represents decolonization in the South. Of course, the global South need not and should not wait for decolonization; they can cast off the chains themselves. Here I have in mind Samir Amin’s notion of ‘delinking’: the refusal to submit national development policy to the imperatives of Northern capital. For instance, global South gov- ernments could organize collectively to increase the prices of their labour and resources, and could mobilize to demand fairer terms of trade and finance, and more democratic representation in global governance (as they did with the New International Economic Order in the early 1970s). These ideas are today represented in the discourse of post-development. In addition to rejecting the tenets of neoliberal globalization, post-development thought also rejects the notion (introduced by colonizers and international financial institutions) that GDP growth should be pursued for its own sake, pre- ferring instead a focus on human well-being (Escobar, 2015; Kothari et al., 2019). Either way, decolonization in the South along these lines would likely cause degrowth in the North. This is true in a very concrete sense. Right now, high-income nations maintain high levels of income and consumption through an ongoing process of net appropriation (of land, labour, resources and energy) from the South, through unequal exchange: in other words, they seek to depress the prices of labour and resources to below the global average price (Dorninger et al., 2020). This is a continuation of the basic tenets of the colonial relationship, although (in most cases) without the occu- pation. Ending this exploitative relationship would mean either ending the pattern of net appropriation or ending unequal exchange, both of which would likely result in a reduction in the rate of surplus accumulation by economic elites, and a reduction in the growth driven by this accumulation in the North, but to the benefit of communities and ecologies in the global South.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – CP › 2NC – S – Misc Hickel Cards

Degrowth is the reduction of production and waste to slow the economy and distributing goods equally in order to reduce climate change and income inequality. A simple tax is not enough.

Jason Hickel 2020. Jason Edward Hickel is an economic anthropologist whose research focuses on ecological economics, global inequality, imperialism and political economy.[2] He is a professor at the Institute for Environmental Science and Technology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, a Visiting Senior Fellow at the International Inequalities Institute at the London School of Economics,[2] and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Art. “LESS IS MORE: How Degrowth Will Save the World”==MJ

Capitalism is a giant energy-sucking machine.1 In order to reduce energy use, we need to slow it all down. Slow down the mad pace of extraction, production and waste, and slow down the mad pace of our lives. This is what we mean by ‘degrowth’. Again, degrowth is not about reducing GDP. It is about reducing the material and energy throughput of the economy to bring it back into balance with the living world, while distributing income and resources more fairly, liberating people from needless work, and investing in the public goods that people need to thrive. It is the first step toward a more ecological civilisation. Of course, doing this may mean that GDP grows more slowly, or stops growing, or even declines. And if so, that’s okay; because GDP isn’t what matters. Under normal circumstances, this might cause a recession. But a recession is what happens when a growth-dependent economy stops growing: it’s a disaster. Degrowth is completely different. It is about shifting to a different kind of economy altogether – an economy that doesn’t need growth in the first place. An economy that’s organised around human flourishing and ecological stability, rather than around the constant accumulation of capital. This is not meant to be an exhaustive list. My point here is to illustrate that we can accomplish significant reductions in material throughput without any negative impact on human welfare. And here’s the powerful part. This approach would not only reduce the flows of material goods, it would also reduce the stocks that support those flows. Half of all the materials that we extract each year go to building up and maintaining material stocks: things like factories and machines and transport infrastructure.21 If we consume half as many products, we also need half as many factories and machines to produce them, half as many aeroplanes and trucks and ships to transport them, half as many warehouses and retail outlets to distribute them, half as many garbage trucks and waste disposal plants to process them when they’re binned, and half as much energy to produce and maintain and operate all of that infrastructure. The efficiencies begin to multiply. But we can’t assume that these measures will automatically accomplish the reductions we need. Ultimately, governments need to roll out concrete targets for reducing material and energy use. As we saw in Chapter 3, taxes alone won’t be enough. Ecological economists insist that the only way to do it is with a hard limit: cap resource and energy use at existing levels and ratchet them down each year until you get back within planetary boundaries.22 This approach will rapidly change incentives across the economy, forcing companies and governments to be more rational, efficient and innovative. The key is that this has to be done in a just and equitable way, to ensure that everyone has access to the resources and livelihoods they need to flourish, and so small businesses and underdog industries don’t get squeezed out by bigger players. This can be done with a cap, fee and dividend system: charge industries a progressively rising fee for resource and energy use, and distribute the yields as an equal dividend to all citizens. The Yellow Vests movement that erupted in France in 2018 rightly rejected the government’s attempts to balance environmental goals on the backs of the working class and poor. Injustice cannot solve a problem that has been caused by injustice in the first place. We need to take the opposite approach.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – CP › 2NC – S – Misc Hickel Cards

Growth in the economy has led to mass inequality AND reducing climate change is possible in a de-dev economy

Jason Hickel 2020. Jason Edward Hickel is an economic anthropologist whose research focuses on ecological economics, global inequality, imperialism and political economy.[2] He is a professor at the Institute for Environmental Science and Technology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, a Visiting Senior Fellow at the International Inequalities Institute at the London School of Economics,[2] and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Art. “LESS IS MORE: How Degrowth Will Save the World”==MJ

Over and over again, the empirical evidence shows that it is possible to achieve high levels of human development without high levels of GDP. According to data from the UN, it is possible for nations to reach the very highest category on the life expectancy index with as little as $8,000 per capita, and very high levels on the education index with as little as $9,000 per capita. In fact, nations can succeed on a wide range of key social indicators – not just health and education, but also employment, nutrition, social support, democracy and life satisfaction – with as little as $10,000 per capita, while staying within or near planetary boundaries.11 What’s remarkable about these figures is that they are less than world average GDP per capita ($11,300). In other words, in theory we could achieve all of these social goals, for every person in the world, without any additional GDP growth at all, simply by investing in public goods, and distributing income and opportunity more fairly. So it’s clear that the relationship between GDP and human welfare breaks down after a certain point. But there is also something else interesting about this relationship. Past a certain threshold, more growth actually begins to have a negative impact. We can see this effect when we look at alternative metrics of progress, like the Genuine Progress Indicator. GPI starts with personal consumption expenditure (which is also the starting point for GDP) and adjusts for income inequality as well as the social and environmental costs of economic activity. By accounting for the costs as well as the benefits of growth, this measure gives us a more balanced view of what’s happening in an economy. When we plot this data over time, we see that global GPI grew along with GDP until the mid-1970s, but since then has flattened out and even declined, as the social and environmental costs of growth have become significant enough to cancel out consumption- related gains.12 Once we grasp the scale of national and global inequalities, then the narrative that seeks to cast GDP growth as a proxy for human progress begins to seem a bit tendentious – perhaps even a bit ideological. And by ideology I mean in the technical sense: a set of ideas promoted by the dominant class, which serves their material interests, and which everybody else has internalised to such an extent that they are willing to go along with a system they might otherwise reject as unjust. The Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci has called this ‘cultural hegemony’: when an ideology becomes so normalised that it is difficult or even impossible to reflect on it. The elites of our world know very well what’s going on here. It would be silly to assume they don’t. They know the data on income distribution. They live by that data. They spend their lives thinking of ways to increase their share of national and global income. Their call for more growth is ultimately about speeding up the mechanisms of accumulation; the claims about the putative relationship between growth and human progress are just an alibi. Of course, they hope that growth will end up improving the incomes of the poor, and in so doing pacify social conflict. After all, elite accumulation is more politically palatable if the incomes of the poor are rising too. But this strategy cannot be sustained in an era of ecological crisis. Something has to give. The problem with growthism is that for decades it has distracted us from the difficult politics of distribution. We have ceded our political agency to the lazy calculus of growth – the notion that growth is automatically good for everyone. The climate emergency changes this. It forces us to face up to the brutal inequalities of the global economy. It forces us into the zone of political contestation. The notion that we need aggregate growth to improve people’s lives no longer makes any sense. We need to be able to specify growth for whom, and for what ends. We must learn to ask: where does the money go? Who benefits from it? In an era of ecological breakdown, are we really content to accept an economy where nearly a quarter of total output goes into the pockets of millionaires? Henry Wallich, a former member of the US Federal Reserve Board, once famously pointed out that ‘growth is a substitute for equality of income’. And it’s true: it is politically easier to rev up GDP and hope some of it trickles down to the poor than it is to distribute existing income more fairly. But we can flip Wallich’s logic around: if growth is a substitute for equality, then equality can be a substitute for growth.44 We live on an abundant planet. If we can find ways to share what we already have more fairly, we won’t need to plunder the Earth for more. Justice is the antidote to growth. Those who insist that aggregate growth is necessary to improve people’s lives force us into a horrible double-bind. We are made to choose between human welfare or ecological stability – an impossible choice that nobody wants to face. But when we understand how inequality works, suddenly the choice becomes much easier: between living in a more equitable society, on the one hand, and risking ecological catastrophe on the other. Most people would have little difficulty choosing. Of course, achieving this will not be easy. It will require an enormous struggle against those who benefit so prodigiously from the status quo. And presumably this is why some are so eager that we avoid this course of action: they would prefer to sacrifice the planet in order to maintain the existing distribution of global income. There’s no question we need innovation to solve the climate crisis. We need better solar panels, better wind turbines, better batteries, and we need to figure out how to dismantle the global fossil fuel infrastructure and replace it with renewables. That’s a big challenge. But here’s the good news: we don’t need growth in order to do it. First, there is no evidence to back up the assumption that aggregate growth is necessary for achieving these goals. It doesn’t make sense to grow the whole GDP and just blindly hope that it will magically end up invested in solar panel factories. If that’s how the Allies had approached the need for tanks and aircraft during the Second World War, the Nazis would be in charge of Europe right now. This kind of mobilisation requires government policy to guide and direct existing financial resources. The vast majority of major, collaborative infrastructure projects around the world have been guided by government policy and funded by public resources: sanitation systems, road systems, railway networks, public health systems, national power grids, the postal service. These are not the spontaneous outcomes of market forces, much less of abstract growth. Projects like these require public investment. Once we realise this, it becomes clear that we can fund the transition quite easily by directing existing public resources from, say, fossil fuel subsidies (which presently stand at $5.2 trillion, 6.5% of global GDP) and military expenditure ($1.8 trillion) into solar panels, batteries and wind turbines.45 Government policy can also be used to guide private investment. We know that when governments begin investing in specific sectors it ‘crowds in’ other investors who are eager to take advantage of incentives or provide necessary upstream supplies.46 On top of this, simple rules can be introduced that require large companies and rich individuals to use a share of their income (say, 5%) to buy bonds designed to fund specific projects – like a rapid rollout of renewable energy. Such measures have been used by governments many times in the past – such as during the New Deal in the United States, and during the developmentalist period in the global South – and there’s no reason we can’t do it again. As for the process of innovation itself: it’s important to remember that many of the most important innovations of the modern era, including truly life-changing technologies we use every day, were funded not by growth- oriented firms but rather by public bodies. From plumbing to the internet, vaccines to microchips, even the technologies that make up smartphones – all of these came from publicly funded research. We don’t need aggregate growth to deliver innovation. If the objective is to achieve specific kinds of innovation, then it makes more sense to invest in those directly, or incentivise investment with targeted policy measures, rather than grow the whole economy indiscriminately and hope it will deliver the innovation we want. Is it really reasonable to grow the plastics industry, the timber industry and the advertising industry in order to get more efficient trains? Does it really make sense to grow dirty things in order to get clean things? We have to be smarter than that. Over and over again, it turns out that the dominant belief in the necessity of growth is under-justified. Those who call for continued growth at the expense of ecological stability are ready to risk everything – literally – for the sake of something we don’t really even need.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – CP › 2NC – S – Misc Hickel Cards

Degrowth is key to reducing global tempeture

Jason Hickel 2020. Jason Edward Hickel is an economic anthropologist whose research focuses on ecological economics, global inequality, imperialism and political economy.[2] He is a professor at the Institute for Environmental Science and Technology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, a Visiting Senior Fellow at the International Inequalities Institute at the London School of Economics,[2] and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts. “What does degrowth mean? A few points of clarification.” https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2020.1812222 == //

Human civilization is presently overshooting a number of critical planetary boundaries and faces a multi-dimensional crisis of ecological breakdown, including dangerous climate change, ocean acid- ification, deforestation and biodiversity collapse (Lenton et al., 2020; Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015; Steffen et al., 2018). Contrary to the general narrative about the Anthropocene, this crisis is not being caused by human beings as such, but by a particular economic system: a system that is predicated on perpetual expansion, disproportionately to the benefit of a small minority of rich people (Moore, 2015). The relationship between economic growth and ecological breakdown is now well demonstrated in the empirical record. In mainstream economics, the dominant claim is that we must continue to pursue perpetual growth (see Hickel, 2018a), and therefore must seek to decouple GDP from eco- logical impacts and make growth ‘green’. Unfortunately, green growth hopes have little grounding. There is no historical evidence of long-term absolute decoupling of GDP from resource use (as measured by material footprint), and all extant models project that it cannot be achieved even under optimistic conditions (Hickel & Kallis, 2020; Vadén, Lähde, Majava, Järvensivu, Toivanen, & Eronen 2020; Vadén et al. 2020b). Absolute decoupling of GDP from emissions can be achieved simply by replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy; but this cannot be done quickly enough to respect carbon budgets for 1.5°C and 2°C if the economy continues to grow at usual rates. More growth means more energy demand, and more energy demand makes it all the more difficult to cover it with renewables in the short time we have left (Hickel & Kallis, 2020; Raftery et al., 2017; Schroder & Storm, 2020). In light of this evidence, scientists and ecological economists are increasingly calling for a shift to ‘post-growth’ and ‘degrowth’ strategies. The 2018 special report of the IPCC indicates that, in the absence of speculative negative-emissions technologies, the only feasible way to remain within safe carbon budgets is for high-income nations to actively slow down the pace of material production and consumption (Grubler et al., 2018; IPCC, 2018). Reducing material throughput reduces energy demand, which makes it easier to accomplish a rapid transition to renewables. This approach is also ecologically coherent: reducing material throughput not only helps us to address climate change, but also removes pressure on other planetary boundaries.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – CP › 2NC – S – Misc Hickel Cards

Degrowth solves- zero growth economies and scientific consensus prove key to boost life expectancy and curb warming

Jason Hickel 2020. Jason Edward Hickel is an economic anthropologist whose research focuses on ecological economics, global inequality, imperialism and political economy.[2] He is a professor at the Institute for Environmental Science and Technology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, a Visiting Senior Fellow at the International Inequalities Institute at the London School of Economics,[2] and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Art. “LESS IS MORE: How Degrowth Will Save the World”==MJ

All this brings us into new political terrain. A new consensus has emerged. While for decades we have been relying on market mechanisms to somehow magically fix the climate crisis, it’s now clear this approach isn’t going to do. The only way to make it work is with co-ordinated government action on a massive scale. Proponents of the Green New Deal have it right: we need to pump public investment into building renewable energy infrastructure at a historically unprecedented rate, reminiscent of the industrial retooling that enabled the Allies to win the Second World War. But there’s something troubling about the way this idea has been picked up and repackaged by some media pundits. The claim is that transitioning to clean energy will liberate capitalism from any concerns about ecology. It will pave the way to ‘green growth’, they say, and we can keep expanding the economy for ever. It’s a compelling story. It seems so obvious and straightforward. And not surprisingly, it has seized the imaginations of orthodox economists and politicians. But this narrative suffers from a number of serious flaws. In fact, scientists go so far as to reject green growth hopes as empirically baseless. The key point to grasp is that while it’s possible to transition to 100% renewable energy, we cannot do it fast enough to stay under 1.5°C or 2°C if we continue to grow the global economy at existing rates. Again: more growth means more energy demand, and more energy demand makes it all the more difficult (impossible, in fact) to generate enough renewable capacity to meet it. Don’t get me wrong. We have made extraordinary gains in renewable energy capacity over the past couple of decades, and this is wonderful news. Today the world is producing 8 billion more megawatt hours of clean energy each year than in 2000. That’s a lot – enough to power all of Russia. But over exactly the same period, economic growth has caused energy demand to increase by 48 billion megawatt hours. In other words, all the clean energy we’ve been rolling out covers only a small fraction of new demand. It’s like shovelling sand into a pit that just keeps getting bigger. Even if we doubled or tripled the output of clean energy production, we would still make zero dent in global emissions. Growth keeps outstripping our best efforts to decarbonise. Think about it this way. If we continue to grow the global economy at projected rates, it will more than double in size by the middle of the century – that’s twice as much extraction and production and consumption than we are presently doing, all of which will suck up nearly twice as much end-use energy than would otherwise be the case.14 It will be unimaginably difficult for us to decarbonise the existing global economy in the short time we have left; impossible to do it nearly twice over. It would require that we decarbonise at a rate of 7% per year to stay under 2°C (which is dangerous), or 14% per year to stay under 1.5°C. That’s two to three times faster than what scientists say is possible even under best-case scenario conditions.15 As one team of researchers put it, it is ‘well outside what is currently deemed achievable’.16 Our insistence on perpetual growth is making our task much more difficult than it needs to be. It’s as though we’ve chosen to fight this life-or-death battle facing uphill, blindfolded, with our hands tied behind our backs. We are knowingly stacking the odds against ourselves. This conclusion is shared widely among scientists, including at the very highest levels. Even the IPCC itself acknowledges that without BECCS and other speculative technologies, there’s no feasible way to roll out clean energy fast enough to get to zero emissions by 2050 as long as energy demand keeps growing.17 If we want to succeed, we have to do exactly the opposite: we have to scale down energy use. In fact, there are many countries that manage to achieve strikingly high levels of human welfare with relatively little GDP per capita. We tend to see these countries as ‘outliers’, but they prove the very point that Szreter and other public health researchers have been trying to make: it’s all about distribution. And what matters most of all is investment in universal public goods. This is where things get interesting. Take life expectancy, for example. The United States has a GDP per capita of $59,500, making it one of the world’s richest countries. Americans can expect to live 78.7 years, nudging them just over the UN’s threshold for ‘very high’ life expectancy. But dozens of countries beat the US on this crucial indicator with only a fraction of the income. Japan has 35% less income than the US, but a life expectancy of 84 years – the highest in the world. South Korea has 50% less income and a life expectancy of 82 years. And then there’s Portugal, which has 65% less income and a life expectancy of 81.1 years. This is not a matter of just a few special cases. The European Union as a whole has 36% less income than the United States, and yet beats the US not only on life expectancy but on virtually every other indicator of human welfare. Then there’s Costa Rica, which provides perhaps the most astonishing example. The rainforest-rich Central American country beats the US on life expectancy despite having 80% less income. Indeed, Costa Rica ranks among the most ecologically efficient economies on the planet, in terms of its ability to deliver high standards of welfare with minimal pressure on the environment. And when we look at it across time, the story becomes even more fascinating: Costa Rica managed to achieve some of its most impressive gains in life expectancy during the 1980s, catching up to and surpassing the United States, during a time when its GDP per capita was not only small (one-seventh that of the US) but not growing at all. It’s not just life expectancy that behaves like this. We can see the same pattern playing out when it comes to education. Finland is widely known as having one of the best education systems in the world, despite having a GDP per capita that’s 25% less than the United States. Estonia is right towards the top of world education rankings too, but with 66% less income than the US.8 Poland outperforms the US with 77% less. On the UN’s education index, the nation of Belarus beats high-performers like Austria, Spain, Italy and Hong Kong with a GDP per capita of only $5,700 – a mere fraction of its rivals, and a full 90% less than the US. What explains the remarkable results that these countries have achieved? It’s simple: they’ve all invested in building high-quality universal healthcare and education systems.9 When it comes to delivering long, healthy, flourishing lives for all, this is what counts.

2023 UTNIF Evidence
Neg › 2NC – CP › 2NC – S – Misc Hickel Cards

It’s not just a recession.

Jason Hickel 2020. Jason Edward Hickel is an economic anthropologist whose research focuses on ecological economics, global inequality, imperialism and political economy.[2] He is a professor at the Institute for Environmental Science and Technology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, a Visiting Senior Fellow at the International Inequalities Institute at the London School of Economics,[2] and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts. “What does degrowth mean? A few points of clarification.” https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2020.1812222 ==MJ

Degrowth vs recession Another common question about degrowth has to do with recessions. Indeed, when the COVID-19 recession hit, some detractors of degrowth pointed to it as an example of why degrowth would be a disaster. For the most part, this is not a good-faith argument but rather an intentional attempt to mislead, for it is impossible to make this mistake with even a cursory reading of the actual literature on degrowth. In fact, degrowth is in every way the opposite of a recession. We have different words for them because they are different things. Here are six key differences worth noting: (1) Degrowth is a planned, coherent policy to reduce ecological impact, reduce inequality, and improve well-being. Recessions are not planned, and do not target any of these outcomes. They are not intended to reduce ecological impact (even though this might in some cases be an unintended outcome), and they are certainly not intended to reduce inequality and improve well-being – indeed, they do the opposite. (2) Degrowth has a discriminating approach to reducing economic activity. It seeks to scale down ecologically destructive and socially less necessary production (i.e. the production of SUVs, arms, beef, private transportation, advertising and planned obsolescence), while expanding socially important sectors like healthcare, education, care and conviviality. Recessions, by con- trast, do not discriminate so wisely. Indeed, they quite often destroy socially important sectors while empowering socially less necessary sectors. In the present COVID crisis, for instance, schools, recreational facilities and public transportation are negatively affected, while Amazon is expanding and stocks are rallying. (3) Degrowth introduces policies to prevent unemployment, and indeed even to improve employ- ment, such as by shortening the working week, introducing a job guarantee with a living wage, and rolling out retraining programmes to shift people out of sunset sectors. Degrowth is expli- citly focused on maintaining and improving people’s livelihoods despite a reduction in aggregate economic activity. Recessions, by contrast, result in mass unemployment and everyday people suffer loss of livelihood. (4) Degrowth seeks to reduce inequality and share national and global income more fairly, such as with progressive taxation and living wage policies. Recessions, by contrast, tend to make inequality worse. Again, the COVID crisis presents an example of this, where the response packages (QE, corporate bailouts, etc.) have made the rich richer (specifically to the benefit of asset owners), and billionaires have added billions to their wealth, while virtually everybody else has lost, with the poorest 50% of humanity losing $4.4 billion per day (Sumner et al., 2020). (5) Degrowth seeks to expand universal public goods and services, such as health, education, trans- portation and housing, in order to decommodify the foundational goods that people need in order to lead flourishing lives. Recessions, by contrast, generally entail austerity measures that cut spending on public services. (6) Degrowth is part of a plan to achieve a rapid transition to renewable energy, restore soils and biodiversity, and reverse ecological breakdown. During recessions, by contrast, governments typically abandon such objectives in order to instead focus everything on getting growth going again, whatever the ecological cost might be. We have different words for recession and degrowth because they are different things. Recessions happen when growth-dependent economies stop growing: it is a disaster that ruins people’s lives and exacerbates injustices. Degrowth calls for a different kind of economy altogether: an economy that does not require growth in the first place, and which can deliver justice and well-being even while throughput declines.