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2023 TDI Kritik
NR › Vs Persian Gulf › Gulf =/= Strait of Hormoz

Gulf =/= Strait of Hormoz

Haynes 19 [Suyin London School of Economics and Political Science in International Relations and History July 23, 2019 1 19 7-23-2019 Time The Strait of Hormuz Is at the Center of Iran Tensions Again. Here's How the Narrow Waterway Gained Wide Importance https://time.com/5632388/strait-of-hormuz-iran-tanker/ Accessed 7-7-2023] CSUF JmB TDI

The Strait of Hormuz is only 21 miles wide at its narrowest point, but it’s once again the biggest waterway in the news headlines, after Iran seized a British oil tanker in what is widely regarded as the world’s most strategically important passage for international trade. Twenty percent of the global oil supply flows through the Strait, which links the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. And though it is technically regulated by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982 (UNCLOS), Iran has signed but not ratified that convention and has historically acted to protect its interests in the passage.

2023 TDI Kritik
NR › Assorted Answers › AT: Imperialism worse than Neoimperialism

The aff is another failed project of anti-imperialism – like British in Hong Kong who installed a systems of laws and governance that favored them – the PRC uses those codes in order to justify neoimperialism – like what US empire has done since its inception of its empire

Sophia Chan 19 12-29-2019 Lausan For Hong Kong, Beijing's so-called 'anti-imperialism' is a sham https://lausan.hk/2019/beijing-sham-anti-imperialism-hong-kong/ Accessed 3-16-2021] CSUF JmB NDT 2021 TDI

Since the beginning of the anti-extradition movement in Hong Kong, which has now evolved into a broader struggle for democracy and against police brutality, Beijing has repeatedly rebuffed foreign criticism of Hong Kong authorities’ handling of the political crisis. In response to criticism from then-British Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt, for example, a Chinese government spokesperson issued an immediate and harsh rebuke: that Hunt was “fantasizing in the faded glory of British colonialism.” More recently, as Hong Kong activists met with members of the U.S. Congress to rally support for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act—which enables the U.S. government to sanction officials responsible for the erosion of the city’s guaranteed autonomy under “One Country, Two Systems”—the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shaung reacted angrily and demanded that the U.S. “respect China’s sovereignty.” Time and again, Beijing has made the argument that, since 1997, it has liberated Hong Kong from the yoke of European colonialism and continues to keep the West’s imperialistic foreign influence at bay. This is part of the Chinese Communist Party’s broader narrative, in which they have portrayed themselves as the anti-imperialist revolutionary agents that re-built China from its “Hundred Years of Humiliation,” a long century of invasions and unequal treaties starting from when the first European gunboat docked at Chinese shores. This history of Western imperialism is, to a large extent, true. The harm done by European colonialism—of which systematic exploitation and racial inequality were integral features—is not to be taken lightly, and certainly nothing to be nostalgic about. Moreover, Western capitalist powers like the United States have repeatedly exercised their political and economic influence to further their own agendas across the world, often at the expense of the very values protestors in Hong Kong are fighting for. Wholehearted trust in help from these corridors of power seems naïve at best, and at worst a betrayal of the movement’s demand for self-determination. Yet if we—especially those on the left—buy into the narrative that Beijing tells about its “anti-imperialism” today, we would be, as former PRC President Jiang Zemin once berated Hong Kong, “too simple, sometimes naïve.” The fact is: for Hong Kongers, Beijing’s contemporary version of anti-imperialism is a gross distortion and betrayal of the core principles of anti-colonialism, a body of political thought that grew out of the revolutionary movements of the 20th century. The colonial structure A central belief, shared by many Asian and African anti-imperial leaders and thinkers, is that a change in the identity of the ruling class and the formal recognition of states’ borders were only small steps towards achieving decolonization. Decolonization was more than a movement for national independence; it was about enacting an egalitarian revolution. Anti-colonialists saw that colonialism was not only foreign domination, but crucially also a system of governance in which political rights, economic resources, and social status were distributed unequally within the colonial society, and between the colony and metropole. In the prominent postcolonial theorist Partha Chatterjee’s words, colonial governance followed “the rule of colonial difference.” Colonialism divided people along racial, religious, ethnic, linguistic, and other forms of difference, and distributed rights and privileges along that difference. The result is that colonies were rife with deep social divisions and hierarchies, making it easier and more manageable for a European minority to rule over large populations. Amílcar Cabral, one of Africa’s foremost anti-colonial leaders, was the founder and leader of the African Party for the Independence and Unity of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC). He led a 17-year long armed struggle against Portuguese colonialists (and had read and admired the writings of China’s own anti-colonial thinker, Mao Zedong). He describes inequality under colonialism as a “pyramid.” At the “summit” of the pyramid, Cabral argues, is the ruling class, which includes both the foreign and local rulers. “The colonizer installs chiefs who support him, and who are to some degree accepted by the masses; he gives these chiefs material privileges .… Above all, by means of the repressive organs of colonial administration, he guarantees economic and social privileges to the ruling class in their relations with the masses.” Next on the pyramid is the “indigenous petite bourgeoisie,” which “stands midway between the masses of the working class … and the small number of local representatives of the foreign ruling class.” This indigenous middle class comprises of professionals, civil servants, businesspeople, landowners, and so on, and most of them “aspire to a way of life which is similar if not identical with that of the foreign minority.” They indirectly or directly help colonizers control the masses, and benefit from colonialism. Lastly, the working class, or the rural and urban masses, is at the base of the pyramid, to be exploited, repressed, and completely marginalized. These political and economic structures of inequality do not simply wither away with the hoisting of a new flag. Rather, without comprehensive reforms to the political and economic institutions of the post-colony, inequality remains deeply entrenched. Whereas colonizers formerly occupied positions of power and privilege, the same positions are now occupied by local capitalists and the ruling elite. In Hong Kong, 22 years after British colonialism was replaced by Beijing’s rule, inequality here remains rampant. The politics of inequality Under Beijing’s rule, ordinary citizens are given meager say in Hong Kong’s undemocratic political system. Instead, a small committee dominated by Beijing-friendly business interests selects the Chief Executive. The Legislative Council’s so-called “functional constituencies,” a system created by the British allowing the city’s business sectors to elect their own legislators, all but ensure the dominance of establishment politicians over representatives from the opposition, who are favored by Hong Kong citizens. Without universal suffrage, Hong Kong people lack the power to hold their rulers accountable. Instead, Hong Kong tops measurements of crony capitalism, a form of collusion in which the state gives economic benefits to business interests in return for political support. This ensures China-backed capitalists and corporations, not the general population, make Hong Kong’s policy’s choices: low income taxes and non-existent capital gains taxes, meager spending on social welfare, a lack of basic labor rights such as collective bargaining, a persistent shortage of affordable housing, and so on. As a result, Hong Kong has the developed world’s largest gap between rich and poor: with a Gini coefficient of 0.539 in 2018, Hong Kong’s economic inequality is only second to New York among the world’s cities. A report in 2017 found that the city’s richest 10 percent earns about 44 times what the poorest family makes. Among the many protest graffiti photographed by the media in the past few months, one particularly strikes at the heart of the matter: scrawled along a main highway, the graffiti reads, “7k for a house like a cell and you really think we out here [are] scared of jail?” Toward a genuine decolonization Anti-colonial thinkers saw that in order to tie governance to the interests of the masses, political equality in the form of democracy is a basic and essential requirement of a decolonized political system. Léopold Senghor, anti-colonial activist and first President of Senegal, stressed the importance of democratization in the country’s postcolonial era. Reflecting in 1960 on the country’s independence from France, Senghor argues that, “Upon reflection, even independence is not, of itself, political independence. At any rate, not for the people …. Sovereignty, restored to the Senegalese people, had to be exercised by this people and for this people.” Today, Senegal is one of the most stable democracies on the African continent. To achieve genuine and full decolonization, anti-colonial thinkers saw it as crucial to address colonial-era economic exploitation by redistributing wealth and the means of production. Land reform, for example, was an important part of many 20th century anti-colonial programs. Without political and economic egalitarian reforms, the freedom won by anti-colonial struggles would only be as empty as the freedom to wave a different flag. It is, of course, much easier for the Chinese government (and its Hong Kong lackeys) today to pretend that anti-imperialism is only about keeping out all forms of external influence. It allows the government to dismiss any Chinese and Hong Kong persons promoting progressive change, by smearing them as foreign agents. Indeed, rather than engaging with these popular demands for egalitarian reform, Beijing has chosen to hail the PRC flag–waving, national anthem–singing crowds as the “true patriots”, while ignoring the festering injustices that pro-democracy protesters seek to address. No wonder symbols of Chinese national pride have become, for many people in Hong Kong, symbols of oppression rather than emancipation. Hence, on July 1 of this year—the same day Chinese officials and Hong Kong’s elite drank champagne to celebrate the anniversary of the city’s handover in 1997 from rule by the United Kingdom to rule by the People’s Republic of China—protestors in Hong Kong stormed the Legislative Council and defaced the emblem of Hong Kong. On October 1, the 70th anniversary of the founding of the PRC, protestors in Hong Kong burned the national flag and demanded the end of one-party rule. (The bloody day, filled with clashes between citizens and the police, ended with a secondary school student being shot.) In fact, Frantz Fanon, the French West Indian anti-colonial writer and revolutionary, foresaw this in 1963. “Nationalism,” he writes in The Wretched of the Earth, “is not a program … [A] government needs a program if it really wants to liberate the people politically and socially. Not only an economic program but also a policy on the distribution of wealth and social relations.” Without such a program, “nationalism … leads to a dead end …. It is then that flags and government buildings cease to be the symbols of the nation.” Here, Fanon warns that postcolonial rule grounded on a superficial nationalism that does not address structural inequality will ultimately fail. Citizens of such a postcolonial regime will come to see the regime as alienating as foreign rule. Anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism in their truest sense requires radical egalitarian reforms at all levels of society: political, economic, and social. Yet, in its bid to stifle dissent and remain in power at all costs, the Chinese Communist Party today has abandoned a core insight of the anti-colonial tradition: that a liberated people consists not of detached elite leaders and their disempowered subjects, but, as Fanon writes, “the enlightened and coherent praxis of the men and women.”

2023 TDI Kritik
NR › Assorted Answers › AT: Cannot Collapse

The signals of the collapse of neo-imperialism along with capitalism are being revealed – the 2008 financial crisis, collapse of the Eurozone, and challenges to US hegemony are all proof of it – the alternative is the only method to find a way out of neo-imperialism because it galvanizes movements toward material decolonization – like the Vietcong, the Chinese and North Koreans during the Korean war prove that we can stand up to US neo-imperialism but only through collectivity

Yu 20 [Bin, Neo-imperialism, the Final Stage of Imperialism, Taylor & Francis Online, International Critical Thought, Vol. 10, 1 p. 495-518 Accessed 3-11-21] CSUF JmB NDT 2021 TDI

In the 1980s, the Japanese-American scholar Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama advanced the concept of “the end of history” (Luo 2019), the essence of which is the contention that the form of human society will end with the neo-imperialism that is now in its heyday. However, the course of events before and after the US financial crisis shows that it is neo-imperialism that is facing its end. William Tabb was once concerned that the United States might go bankrupt due to a loss of competitiveness and the excessive cost of maintaining the operations of imperialism (Tabb 2006). After making an elaborate calculation, Joseph Stiglitz and Professor Linda Bilmes from Harvard University concluded that based on a conservative estimate the total US expenditure on the Iraq War would reach 3 trillion US dollars, and that the sum might perhaps be even more than the 5 trillion US dollars (discounted for inflation) that the United States spent on the Second World War (Bilmes and Stiglitz 2009). Such a huge cost is obviously unbearable for neo-imperialism. When asked by a journalist if the Iraq War was the cause of the slowdown of the US economy, Stiglitz answered in the affirmative. 17 When confronting the socialist camp, (neo-)imperialism for a time made relatively large concessions to the domestic working class, even adopting a strategy of buying off the working class in the countries of the neo-imperialist core through implementing the so-called “welfare state” model (Meng 1981). After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, however, the neo-imperialist countries one after another seized their “peace dividend,” slashing workers’ welfare provisions and withdrawing numerous concessions made earlier to the working class. Despite this, the European sovereign debt crisis shows that neo-imperialism, perhaps surprisingly, now finds this model unbearable. Marx once stated, Without the great alternative phases of dullness, prosperity, over-excitement, crisis and distress, which modern industry traverses in periodically recurring cycles, with the up and down of wages resulting from them, as with the constant warfare between masters and men closely corresponding with those variations in wages and profits, the working-classes of Great Britain, and of all Europe, would be a heart-broken, a weakminded, a worn-out, unresisting mass, whose self-emancipation would prove as impossible as that of the slaves of Ancient Greece and Rome. (Marx [1853] 2010, 169) Obviously, with the economic crisis in the neo-imperialist countries and the great reduction of welfare caused by the US financial crisis, opposition on the part of the working class inside the neo-imperialist group will grow increasingly strong. The fact that the US financial crisis of 2008 was triggered by a financial product, subprime mortgages, shows that neo-imperialism is the last stage of imperialism and the last stage of capitalism, in which money capital and productive capital experience the most thorough separation. In the face of this situation, human society can move forward only by actively rejecting capitalism, which is obsolete and unsuited to the development of the productive forces. Only by advancing toward socialism can human society rid itself of the economic crisis that has brought disaster to billions of people, and attain salvation. Although neo-imperialism possesses an arsenal powerful enough to destroy the earth and all humanity, this cannot stave off the system’s demise. On the contrary, neo-imperialism is forced to devote immense wealth to its armaments industry, and to continuously conduct research and development on weapons such as unmanned aerial vehicles that need no or few humans to pursue the fight. This is precisely a manifestation of the vulnerability of neo-imperialism, and proof that neo-imperialism dare not trust or rely on anyone. In reviewing the history of the twentieth century, Yu and Zhang also pointed out that during the Korean War in the 1950s, the United States had the most powerful navy and air force (its ground forces were second only to those of the Soviet Union) and absolute air supremacy. Nevertheless, China and North Korea fought side by side for three years and finally defeated US imperialism. In the Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s, the United States still had absolute air supremacy, and US planes kept bombing Vietnam. The people of Vietnam, however, were united as one, fought dauntlessly, and with the support of people all over the world finally drove out the US invaders. These examples demonstrate that even countries that are at a disadvantage can defeat US imperialism so long as their people unite and fight bravely. It should also be pointed out that Cuba, located in the “backyard” of the United States, has thwarted endless US conspiracies and adhered to socialism for sixty years. The fact that Cuba remains standing is further proof of the mythical nature of the claim that “the empire is invincible.” When saluting the Cuban people, we should brim with confidence that we can rise to the challenge posed by neo-imperialism, and defeat its menaces (Yu and Zhang 2003). The productive forces of neo-imperialism can no longer promote the development of the capitalist relations of production, since these productive forces have now developed to such an extent that capitalist relations can no longer accommodate them. Neo-imperialism has become a roadblock obstructing the further development of the productive forces, and when the productive forces begin to break through this obstacle, the whole of neo-imperialist society must fall into chaos. The new and higher relations of production, i.e., socialist relations of production, have already started bursting through the constraints of capitalism, and through their distinctive practice, are providing both positive and negative experience. All round the world, people have scientific Marxism as their guide. The end of neo-imperialism and the complete demise of capitalism are not only unavoidable, but no longer belong solely to the distant future.

2023 TDI Kritik
NR › Assorted Answers › AT: Movements Fail

the only way out of US neoimperalism is to continue to fight – the Vietcong and Chinese and North Korean forces are proof that movements can stand up to US imperialism

Sirohi & Bhupatiraju 2021 (Rahual Assistant Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology & Bhupatira is a School of Development Studies, Tata Institute of Social Sciences (2020). Reassessing the Pink Tide: Lessons from Brazil and Venezuela. Springer Nature. doi:10.1007/978-981-15-8674-3) CSUF JmB TDI

For the left to accept such a possibility however would be to miss the polarizing effects of capitalism on a global scale; it would be to ignore the reality of the vast transfers of surpluses from the South to the North that sustain the system. Moreover, to accept such an understanding would also put the left in direct confrontation with its mass base-the poorest sections of society who bear the brunt of imperialism. This is precisely why a generation of anti-imperialist thinkers argued that the way out of underdevelopment and poverty that the peripheries were stuck in, was to break away from global trading and financial networks and not in the hope that imperialism could be made benevolent. Their preferred strategy was for 12Here Harvey seems to be differentiating between “accumulation by dispossession” on the one hand and “primitive accumulation” on the other. By doing so, even as he takes to task those versions of Marxism that relegate the violence of dispossession to the margins of capitalism and even as he asserts the continued relevance of such forms of accumulation, his reading nonetheless remains stuck in a stadial conceptualization of capitalism. 4 REARMING THE LEFT 179 peripheral regions to regain hold of the nation state and use the national sovereignty thus obtained to push against the boundaries of imperialism. Thus while radical critics of capitalism are correct in suggesting that only an “inner” transformation of our societies can provide lasting answers to the problems that we face today, for the Global South this process must begin first and foremost through an “outer” transformation of its external links. What is more is that this assertion of sovereignty does not necessarily have to come at the cost of socialist internationalism and indeed historically, the most vociferous demands for political and economic independence have gone hand in hand with heroic acts of internationalism. In a speech delivered in 1965, Che Guevara emphasized this relation as follows: “To raise the living standards of the underdeveloped nations, therefore, we must fight against imperialism. And each time a country is torn away from the imperialist tree, it is not only a partial battle won against the main enemy but it also contributes to the real weakening of that enemy, and is one more step toward the final victory. There are no borders in this struggle to the death. We cannot be indifferent to what happens anywhere in the world, because a victory by any country over imperialism is our victory, just as any country’s defeat is a defeat for all of us. The practice of proletarian internationalism is not only a duty for the peoples struggling for a better future, it is also an inescapable necessity” (Guevara 1965). These words remain as true today. Countries like Brazil and India which have diversified industrial bases and major agricultural capabilities can afford to think of an ambitious project of delinking, but such a strategy is likely to be much harder for smaller economies without some sort of international or at least regional level cooperation. Moreover, countries of the Global South that seek to radically challenge capitalism in this way are bound to face the wrath of capital in imperial centres through sanctions, military interventions and so on, and thus the success of delinking in any one country no doubt can benefit from cooperation and support of workers and peasants across the world. Left forces in the North have a particularly important role to play in this regard and in some senses the new contours of the global world economy make such solidarity more possible than ever before. Because although imperialism today continues to rely on extracting super profits from the peripheries, this renewed cycle of imperialism today has gone hand in hand with an erosion of the welfare state in the North and an intense commodification of labour in these parts of the world, all of which have served to weaken the “internal alliances” between capital and labour; Alliances, one 180 R. A. SIROHI AND S. BHUPATIRAJU might add, that Samir Amin at one point saw as constituting a crucial feature of autonomous capitalist development in centres of world capitalism. Conditions such as these can serve to sharpen class conflict and raise working-class consciousness to an entirely new levels in the North, thus providing fertile soil for genuine socialist internationalism. Beyond Developmentalism If the left in the Global South is to emphasize delinking, then such a strategy directly brings home the question of state power to the centre of discussion. It was Lenin’s major contribution to show how important it was for the left not to be satisfied merely by taking state power. In order for socialist movement to move forward and not get trapped within the boundaries of capitalism, the state would have to be “smashed”. And yet the very concept of “smashing” has been very fuzzy. Smashing the state did not for once imply a rejection of economic planning for instance. It was not some nihilistic strategy aimed at the destruction of all things that the state had its hands in. It did not for example mean that there was no room for provision of public services like health and education within socialist society.13 It however did mean destruction of the army, prisons and all those arms of the state that were bulwarks of status quo. It also implied a level of decentralization that the capitalist state could never dream of accommodating. Thus what Marxists implied when they sought the smashing of the state was the destruction of the alienating form that the state took; an institution that people create but one that nonetheless comes to dominate them as if it were an external force.

2023 TDI Kritik
NR › Assorted Answers › Alt solvency – Reject

It’s a prior question – speculative planning in the simulation of military policy mandates a ‘readiness’ to roll-back the plan. Historicizing war-making exposes the reproduction of military presence through everyday conditions.

Hyde 15 (Alexandra, faculty fellow at the Gender Institute, “The present tense of Afghanistan: accounting for space, time, and gender in processes of militarization,” Gender, Place & Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography R.C.)

What the rupture of op minimise shows is that even when particular spaces have been constructed as fixed and stable, such as ‘home’ as a place of identity, security and ‘reassuring boundedness’ (Massey 1994, 169), they cannot be understood as insulated against the contingency of political events and dismissed from an understanding of the depths to which ‘international relations’ penetrate. Fundamentally, it is a spatial logic that posits soldiers in the role of geopolitical actors who are ‘mobilised’ as part of the global reach of contemporary US and British military power, for example, while their wives are ‘left behind’ (Massey 1994, 10) to maintain place as a fixed locus of belonging (Massey 1994, 180). Such a configuration underestimates the ways in which any place is an active site of presence that is constituted in different ways at different times. What is at stake in a multi-dimensional understanding of militarisation and its effects, one that takes into account the contingency of time and the experience of the same events in different places, is the imperative to take the presence of Afghanistan as it is experienced by the families of service personnel as seriously as a soldier’s experience of being present in Afghanistan. But the mandate to pay attention to everyday times and spaces of militarisation goes beyond the need to look simply at moments of rupture and discontinuity. As Woodward has argued, war is merely the most obvious manifestation of military force, the apex of a pyramid that at its base includes the ‘continual preparations which states make in order to be able to wage war’ (2004, 4). Although military bases such as Camp Bastion have gained totemic visibility as part of current theatres of war, for example, more detailed accounts of the everyday workings of such bases attest to a curious degree of ambiguity with respect to their war-fighting purpose. Paying attention to their internal, day-to-day function illustrates how even those bases that might be described as ‘front line’ installations betray the more banal manifestations of military presence: [t]ours in Iraq and Afghanistan, lengthened to one year like a tour in South Korea, have many of the accoutrements of garrison life, such as gymnasiums, cafeterias, post exchanges, and other qualities that evince a more stable garrison life than a nation at war. (Morgan 2006, 208) Such research highlights the need to pay attention to the reproduction of the military as an institution6 and the everyday conditions in and through which war is normalised. As Lefebvre argues ‘The army has its everyday life’ ([1961] 2008, 41). In the same way that battle’s other is the homefront, ‘war’s shadow’ is ‘readiness’ (Lutz 2001, 7). Research on or around military bases (Lutz 2001; MacLeish 2013) reveals the repetition, rehearsal and simulation entailed in the military’s requirement for ‘combat readiness’, which ‘because it involves peering into the void of the future and the blurry shapes of the present’, Lutz argues, ‘must also be mythic’ (2001, 87). The everyday life of the army, therefore, is founded on temporal conditions that go beyond the sudden interruption of events, and are bound up in the contingency of what might happen. Militarily, these conditions reach their apotheosis in the pre-emptive strike, and within critical scholarship, war games and combat readiness can tell us much about the mythologies of the nation and its others (Lutz 2001, 87). Less common, however, is research on the everyday lived experience of this contingency, an altogether more diffuse process of militarisation. In the concluding section of this essay, therefore, I wish to consider some of the everyday forms this contingency takes, which can be understood as the way in which Afghanistan makes its presence felt.

2023 TDI Kritik
NR › Assorted Answers › Alt solvency – Reject

Even if we lose the alternative you should still reject the affs emergency politics because the K is a deconstruction of the US militarism – that deconstruction produces a relationality that rejects the dominate form of life that will help us confront the end of this epoch

Grove 2019 [Jairus Victor. Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai‘i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. Savage Ecology : War and Geopolitics at the End of the World : War and Geopolitics at the End of the World, Duke University Press. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/fullerton/detail.action?docID=5826044.] CSUF JmB TDI

The emergency politics of the Anthropocene, particularly when contracted into the last decade of political stalemate and neoauthoritarian retrenchment, also resonates with a particular geopolitics in the sense that it favors the power politics of the same states and the same practices of state­ craft that made the Anthropocene. For 90 percent ­ of the planet, this is a five-­ hundred-­ year emergency with catastrophic punctuations of disease, famine, and warfare. In so much as ­ there is a “we,” we do not live in a contemporary emergency of decades but a centuries-­ long present of slow violence. 40 In this sense, we are not finished with the tools of rhetorical analysis as an essential way to make sense of how we have come to understand our current moment. And yet that framing would not be possible without the eruptions of hurricanes, insurgencies, disappearing megafauna, and spectacular accidents. However, the lag between the scale of violence and catastrophe and the recognition of the crisis says something about hegemony, and who can speak and what is legible or sensible. I do not think I am alone in wanting to open up to the global magnitude of what confronts the planet. Yet in this chapter, I want to do so without losing sight of the real differences in politics, geography, history, meaning, and cosmology that modulate how each one of us ­ w ill confront the end of this epoch. In so doing, ­ I hope to emphasize a refrain that the end of the world is never the end of every­ thing. An apocalypse is always more and less than an extinction, and what­ ever makes a life out of the mess we are currently in will ­ depend in some ways on how we come to understand the con­ temporary condition. Ideas ­ matter even if they cannot save us. Stories, explanations, and philosophical adventures are the best of what the human ­ estate has to offer. No matter ­ how desperate things ­ get, someone will ­ still ask why this is happening and we ­ will share in that question the possibility of thinking together. As we explore the dark fascination with the ­futures of our species, the catastrophic inadequacy of our dominate form of life becomes more and more apparent. The dominant forms of planetary life display an obsession with warfare and order— part ­ technological hubris, part ecological sabotage— ­ which have ripped their way through ­ e very continent on the planet, making a geological mark. The making of the Eurocene has been created by no single class or nation, much less by a clearly defined agenda. An aggregating and heterogeneous collection of people, ­ things, ­ perspectives, hatreds, malignancies, and creeping global expansions has unleashed our con­ temporary condition. We live in a moment imperiled by an immature giganticism. All of us experience this moment differently, but a rare few can escape even for a moment the degree to which a weight impinges upon us all. We live in an apocalyptic era unequally created by a minority bent on the accumulation of wealth and a self-­ interested regenerating political order. However, the “we” that w ­ ill bear the burden of this five-­ hundred-­ year project of rationalized exploitation is much vaster, and includes bumblebees; humpback w ­ hales; poison arrow frogs; wolves; Hawaiians; Micronesians; African Americans; the inhabitants of Flint, Michigan; Syrians; Mayans; Queers; Christians; Muslims; Atheists; transhumanists; hipsters; shamans; entrepreneurs; homeless veterans; war orphans; albatrosses; elephants . .

2023 TDI Kritik
NR › Impact › Foreign Policy Analysts Wrong

You should be skeptical of the predictions of the aff – foreign policy analysts are riddled with bad predictions about conflict – they do this because it gives them a pay check – especially overexaggerating Russian and Chinese power

Drezner 21 [Daniel W. is a professor of international politics at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University 1-15-2021 Foreign Policy Wonks Gone Wild https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/15/foreign-policy-predictions-always-bad-worst-international-relations-rewards-catastrophic-thinking/ Accessed 3-7-2021] CSUF JmB NDT 2021 TDI

In a world defined by scarcity, there will always be a bountiful harvest of bad predictions about the future. This is true for both foreign policy and Foreign Policy alike. In January 1989, East Germany’s leader, Erich Honecker, declared that the Berlin Wall would still be standing in “50 or even 100 years.” He turned out to be off by 49 to 99 years; the wall crumbled 10 months after his statement. No one writing in the pages of this magazine has been as consequentially wrong as Honecker. Nonetheless, even a cursory perusal of Foreign Policy’s archives reveals some serious errors in foresight. One article in the Winter 1999-2000 issue by the Russia expert Daniel Treisman claimed that Boris Yeltsin’s successor as president of Russia would “find himself blocked in by the realities of Russia’s political game, pushed back toward a set of policies and a style of governing that closely resemble Yeltsin’s.” In retrospect, this seems like a poor description of Vladimir Putin’s style of governance. This is less Treisman’s fault than a consequence of the ever present danger of believing the status quo will persist. Similarly, a 1995 article by the sociologist Jack A. Goldstone asserted that rapid economic growth would not save the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and that “we can expect a terminal crisis in China within the next 10 to 15 years.” It is safe to say that the CCP has, so far, managed to endure and entrench itself. Goldstone was proved wrong because the past didn’t predict the future; Chinese economic growth accelerated to a historically unprecedented rate. Likewise, in early 2009, the economist William Easterly forecast that the 2008 financial crisis would immiserate those who had just emerged from extreme poverty. Over the next five years, however, growth in the developing world actually outpaced growth in the wealthier economies of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Predictions that did not come true were by no means limited to the pages of Foreign Policy; the field of international relations is full of them. In the 1970s, the Club of Rome predicted that resource depletion would stunt global prosperity. Instead, the greatest reduction in global extreme poverty began a few years later. In the late 1990s, when petroleum prices were plummeting, some took to these pages to predict the end of OPEC. Instead, the price of oil skyrocketed well past $100 a barrel. This, in turn, led to renewed claims of “peak oil”—the idea that petroleum reserves would near depletion and the industry would go into decline. Fracking and the development of alternative energy systems proved that to be wrong as well. When the Cold War ended, multiple prognosticators predicted geopolitical chaos in Europe and a great-power rivalry between the United States, Europe, and Japan. Oops. The 100th anniversary of the start of World War I led many historians to envisage a replay of those events in the Pacific Rim in 2014. Thankfully, this too did not come to pass. With a surfeit of bad takes, it would be logical to conclude that there have been few good foreign-policy ideas over the same time period. This assumption is incorrect. Consider two examples from the early 1970s. After the 1973 OPEC embargo, the fear of commodity cartels gripped national security analysts. The political scientist Stephen D. Krasner argued in this magazine, however, that oil was the exception. History proved him right. The push by civil rights activists to make human rights a key component of U.S. foreign policy during the Carter administration was one of those ideas that seemed to bear little fruit at the time. This emphasis, however, persisted into the Reagan administration, and the result was the dawn of the third wave of democratization that transformed Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the Pacific Rim. Some ideas that are underappreciated when first proposed acquire momentum over time. A number of concrete foreign-policy ideas have been responsible for tangible improvements in people’s lives. Weirdly, however, these constructive arguments get less attention than famously wrong ones, like Samuel P. Huntington’s proposed clash of civilizations or the neoconservative belief that forcible regime change can contribute to democratization. The past 30 years have demonstrated that wars within civilizations are far more bloody than those between them and that forcible regime change is far more likely to lead to military quagmires than Madisonian republics. For anyone intimately familiar with the marketplace of foreign-policy ideas, this phenomenon should be unsurprising. Scholars like to think that, in the public sphere, good notions drive out bad ones, but that’s not necessarily true. Even foreign-policy experts tend to dwell on spectacularly bad ideas rather than helpful suggestions. Francis Fukuyama has a long, distinguished career of trenchant scholarship, but most foreign-policy observers remember him only for his premature prediction of the “end of history” in the early 1990s—the idea that Cold War ideological confrontation would give way to the triumph of liberal democracy. A review of the worst predictions and most useful ideas of the past half-century reveals a few lessons for the readers of Foreign Policy. The first is that foreign-policy observers are a pessimistic lot. We are awash with doomsaying that has proved no more accurate than a cult member holding a sign declaring “The end is nigh” on the street corner. The second is that when examining trends within countries, the primary source of bad predictions is the fallacy of extrapolation: the belief that the future will be just like the present, only more so. The third is that the most useful ideas are not rooted in grand strategy or doctrine. Sometimes grand narratives get the big things right, but just as often they create cognitive blinders that make it difficult to recognize error. By contrast, small-bore ideas—grounded in concrete, specific, well-defined problems—have made the most tangible contributions to international affairs. To be fair, international relations experts are hardly the only social scientists with a poor record of projecting the future. Economists have also proved extremely bad at forecasting, even though there are some awfully powerful incentives for economists to get things right. What makes foreign-policy analysts different is the bias in their forecasting errors. Economists are overly rosy about the future. This profound “optimism bias” explains the errors of the Bretton Woods institutions. On average, for example, a 10-year macroeconomic forecast from the International Monetary Fund or World Bank overestimates a country’s annual GDP growth by 1.1 percentage points. Political forecasters, however, suffer from a different bias: We are a profoundly pessimistic lot. As the Yale University professor John Lewis Gaddis once delineated in painstaking detail, international relations scholars failed to predict both the peaceful end of the Cold War and the manner of the Soviet collapse. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, realists in particular made overly pessimistic predictions about how the post-Cold War order would affect NATO, nuclear proliferation, violent conflict, and balancing against the United States. In reality, the 20 years after the breakup of the Soviet Union saw dramatic declines in almost every category of political violence. The realist line sounds slightly more accurate now, but prognosticators earn no points for predictions that might come true 30 years late. There are three reasons why foreign-policy analysts are so morose. First, it’s good for business. International relations is a countercyclical profession; bad times in the world are good times for geopolitical analysts—and there are incentives for doomsaying. The growth industry of political risk analysis, the first generation of which emanated from international relations scholarship, is predicated on things going wrong. One high-ranking officer at a prominent risk consultancy once explained the company’s sales pitch as follows: “You scare the shit out of them first. That’s what gets the clients through the front door.” Second, much like the reasons for having insurance on your house or car, it pays to devote greater attention to the extreme negative event. Over the past 50 years, there have been positive events: the end of the Cold War, collapse of apartheid, reduction in extreme poverty, and growing ease of cross-border communication. Nonetheless, both government officials and corporate leaders are compelled to respond to negative shocks like a terrorist attack, a global financial crisis, or a pandemic, which will have a far greater impact on politics and profits than a spate of good news. This is partly because human beings are hard-wired to be wary of threats; governments are, too. As one academic paper recently observed, “States tend to inflate threats, exhibit loss aversion, and learn more from failures than from successes.” Even if the probability of bad events happening is low, warning about them has minimal downside. No officials have ever been punished because they were too prepared for a worst-case contingency. Leaders get punished for sleeping at the wheel far more than they do for appearing too vigilant. Finally, there’s an asymmetry in the marketplace of foreign-policy ideas. It is much safer to predict doom and gloom than to predict that everything will work out fine. Warnings about disaster scenarios that never happen carry less cost to one’s reputation—that is someone just being cautious and prudent—and if you happen to be right, you’re treated as a prophet, as the Foreign Policy columnist and health writer Laurie Garrett recently discovered. History has stigmatized optimistic prognosticators who, in retrospect, turned out to be wrong—see, for example, the caricatures of Norman Angell’s 1909 book, The Great Illusion, which predicted that economic interdependence would make war obsolete, or Fukuyama’s end of history. When in doubt, predict the worst-case scenario. These professional tendencies have led to some bad collective forecasts. The end of U.S. hegemony in world politics has been the hardiest of bad predictions. By my count, in Foreign Policy’s 50 years, the death of U.S. hegemony has been declared after at least six different events: the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime in the early 1970s, the stagflation of the mid-1970s, the late 1980s “twin deficits” crisis, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, and the election of Donald Trump. U.S. hegemony will end at some point, but America’s status as a superpower has outlived many of its most pessimistic prognosticators. If forecasters have been too pessimistic about the state of the world, they have been too complacent in their assessments of the great powers. When it comes to country analyses, the natural tendency has been to extrapolate from current trends. Indeed, two political scientists made this very point in these pages in 2012 when characterizing U.S. National Intelligence Council documents: “The reports almost inevitably fall into the trap of treating the conventional wisdom of the present as the blueprint for the future 15 to 20 years down the road.” While this is a natural human tendency, large complex societies have a way of confounding that instinctual view. Sometimes trends do persist, but just as often they stop abruptly or reverse course. Predictions about China are a case in point. Two decades ago, predictions about the future of Chinese politics ran the gamut from democratization to stable authoritarianism. In March 2000, U.S. President Bill Clinton predicted, “The more China liberalizes its economy, the more fully it will liberate the potential of its people. … And when individuals have the power not just to dream but to realize their dreams, they will demand a greater say.” Even more sober analysts noted that by the early 2000s China had seemed to institutionalize the transfer of power, a rarity in authoritarian regimes. Instead, under Xi Jinping, China has transformed into the most personalist regime since the days of Mao Zedong. The fallacy of extrapolation also applies to forecasts about China’s economy. A decade ago, Robert Fogel, a Nobel-winning economist, made waves with a Foreign Policy article predicting that China’s economy would swell to $123 trillion by 2040. He made this prediction simply by assuming that China’s double-digit growth rates from the early 2000s would persist and extrapolating from there. In the decade since, China’s growth rate has slowed significantly—and even those growth figures are likely to be exaggerated. Over the past quarter century, China’s productivity growth has fallen by two-thirds. Now, some experts believe that people should fear a faltering China more than a rising one. China is the standout for bad predictions about national trajectories, but it is hardly alone. U.S. analysts persistently overestimated the capabilities of Soviet Russia during the Cold War. These same analysts underestimated Russian power during the days of Yeltsin. Under Putin, the pendulum has swung back toward exaggerating Russian power. Fifteen years ago, in his book Expert Political Judgment, the political scientist Philip Tetlock warned about the poor predictive ability of most political experts. The discipline’s short-term predictive abilities are lackluster. Worse, the public tends to pay attention to the out-of-the-box prediction that proves correct. The problem is that these kinds of predictions also tend to be wrong more frequently. Tetlock later wrote that these conditions would create a ripe environment for charlatans: “The demand for accurate predictions is insatiable. Reliable suppliers are few and far between. And this gap between demand and supply creates opportunities for unscrupulous suppliers to fill the void by gulling desperate customers into thinking they are getting something no one else knows how to provide.” It would be easy to infer from this that the foreign-policy community has produced nothing but 50 years of bad ideas. Indeed, this is what younger generations tend to think. A recent Rand Corp. report concluded, “A generation of Americans have come of age in an era in which foreign policy setbacks have been more frequent than advances.” Anyone as old as Foreign Policy has some memory of successful foreign policies: containment, the peaceful end of the Cold War, the cessation of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans, beneficial trade agreements, and the expansion of U.S.-created international institutions to the rest of the world. Any American who came of age after the 9/11 terrorist attacks would be hard-pressed to identify similarly successful policies in this century. Any autopsy of this shift is likely to arrive at the same explanation for the cause. Because the U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan’s strategy of containment is now viewed as a smashing foreign-policy success, successive generations of foreign-policy analysts have tried to devise a similar “big idea” in grand strategy that would prove to be just as valuable. The world is a more complex place than it was during the 1950s, however, making it next to impossible for a single grand strategy to suffice. None of the post-Cold War grand strategies, from George W. Bush’s neoconservative democracy-promotion-by-force to Donald Trump’s America First, has served the United States well. This does not mean, however, that there haven’t been any good ideas in foreign policy. A more fine-grained analysis reveals the success of small-bore initiatives. The most significant foreign-policy accomplishment of the post-Cold War era was arguably the Nunn-Lugar program. This program helped ensure the security of the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal after the collapse in 1991. Over the next two decades, the program succeeded in preventing both nuclear material and nuclear scientists from furthering proliferation across the globe. Unsurprisingly, as one historian noted, “this success did not get major publicity at the time, and remains largely unknown today outside the expert communities in both countries.” The Barack Obama-era Nuclear Safety Summits might be viewed through a similar lens. Another tangible success has been the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), created by the Bush administration in 2003. It was announced at a time when the HIV epidemic was lowering life spans in sub-Saharan Africa. According to the program’s website, the U.S. government has since invested some $85 billion in the global HIV/AIDS response, saving more than 18 million lives. This is a rare case of the United States doing well by doing good. Global surveys of public attitudes toward the United States since PEPFAR was launched consistently show that recipient countries display more positive attitudes toward America. As infectious disease prevention moves to the top of the global policy queue, the United States should learn from PEPFAR’s success. A final example is the 2014 bilateral climate deal between the United States and China. This might seem like an odd inclusion, since it was soon supplanted by the 2015 Paris climate change accords, which the Trump administration abandoned. But the earlier bilateral deal played a crucial role in paving the way for a more wide-ranging agreement. By getting Beijing to formally pledge to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the 2014 deal reversed China’s long-standing position that, as a developing country, it should not bear any responsibility to reduce climate change. Once China shifted its approach, it became far easier to cajole developing countries into an international agreement. The takeaway from all this is clear: To stand out, future foreign-policy observers will become less pessimistic and more concrete. Of course, I am making a prediction here. The odds are excellent that I am wrong.

2023 TDI Kritik
NR › Impact › Global Nomos

The political imagination of the 1AC’s standard as a metric to resolve violence or conflict results in a global nomos of colonization since 1492 the Europaeum have plagued the world that maintains the distinction between the global north and the global south

Kalyvas, (2018). (Andreas is Associate Professor in the Department of Politics at The New School for Social Research. Carl Schmitt's postcolonial imagination. Constellations, 25(1), 35-53. Accessed 10-12-22) CSUF JmB TDI

It is certainly true that Schmitt often described the age of conquest in the conventional and celebratory language of the “discovery of a new world,” the “achievement of newly awaked Occidental rationalism,” “the product of an intellectual and scientific culture,” suggesting it was the necessary and legitimate outcome of a presumed European superiority (Schmitt, 1942/2015, p. 59, 1950/2003, p. 132). As many commentators have rightly noted, there is a nostalgic yearning that elevates the age of conquest into a great, epic moment of European history, an unprecedented civilizational accomplishment, which Schmitt depicted as one of the highest manifestations of human reason and “the last great heroic act of the European peoples” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 151, 1957/2003, p. 349). It seems reasonable to infer that Schmitt saw the global rise of Europe as the result of a purely endogenous and autonomous dynamic, internal only to that continent, caused by the intrinsic tendencies of an already formed higher geopolitical and cultural totality. At times he sounds almost Hegelian as if the global rise of Europe was a foretold story, justified by a pre-established superiority that was fated to conquer the world (Schmitt, 1942/2015, p. 59). These statements, however, do not adequately represent the novelty of Schmitt's history of international law. Notwithstanding an explicit celebration of a bygone age and the concomitant lamentation for its irrevocable demise, there is a parallel narrative that runs through his writings on the modern spatial order and world politics and hints at a different historico-political understanding and geographic imagination. What I wish to emphasize is this tendency to give an account opposed to the conventional theories of the history of international law, which is signaled by Schmitt's insistence on the centrality of the category of the colony as indispensable to the spatial constitution of the international system of states and the geopolitical rise of Europe. On this issue, he sounded unequivocal: “The whole spatial structure of the earth in European international law was based on the distinctive territorial status of colonial overseas lands” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 221, emphasis added). This bold proposition identifies the colonies and their “distinctive territorial status” as the basis (die Grundlage) of the Eurocentric order, its “basic spatial fact” (raumhafte Grundtatsache) (Schmitt, 2011, pp. 114, 117). It is the colony, for Schmitt, and its special significance in international law, that determined and sustained the Eurocentric order.7 For one thing, against internalist and teleological views, Schmitt's approach questions traditional accounts that have propagated the idea of the political and legal order of sovereign territorial states that emerged in Europe, autochthonously, so to speak, arrived in the colonies fully formed, and became global through time by simply extending its sphere of application on a larger scale with the quantitative inclusion of new non-European entities into an existing stable interstate spatial structure.8 Instead, his heterodox history highlights how modern international law and the advent of the Eurocentric global order “did not derive essentially from internal European land-appropriation and territorial changes, but rather from the European land-appropriation of a non-European new world” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 183). He could not have been more explicit. The very existence of the jus publicum Europaeum depended upon a “free colonial soil outside Europe” as it did on the sea (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 198, emphasis added, see also Schmitt, 1943, pp. 7). The modern interstate system originated outside the geographical confines of Europe with the colonial expansion to the Americas, as the effect of an illegal and violent land taking (Schmitt, 1940/1995b, p. 241, 1943, p. 1–2, 1950/2003, pp. 48–9, 132, 135, 352, 1955/2003, 1958/2015, pp. 77–78). For this reason, he described “The landappropriation of a new world,” its colonization, as “the global event in the history of European international law,” which, with “[v]ast, seemingly endless free spaces made possible and viable the internal law of an interstate European order” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 83, 183, 140, emphasis added). For it is the conquest of the Americas that “led to a new spatial order of the earth” and, as he repeatedly maintained, “for 400 years it supported a Eurocentric international law: the jus publicum Europaeum” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 87, 140, 49, emphasis added). Thus, for Schmitt, it is 1492 and not 1648 that marks the beginning of the modern world and the global rise of international public law, defined as “a law among states, among European sovereigns. This European core determined the nomos of the rest of the earth” (Schmitt, 1941/1995, pp. 401, 403–4, 408–409, 1950/2003, p. 126–127).9 This “unrepeatable historical event” inaugurated a new epoch, the first complete spatial revolution on a planetary scale, propelling Europe to the geopolitical center of the earth (Schmitt, 1940/1995a, p. 388, 1941/1995, pp. 406, 1942/2015, pp. 55–64, 1950/2003, pp. 39, 49, 2011, p. 118). The colonization of an extra-European world is the real constitutive event of global modernity (Schmitt, 1941/1995, pp. 405, 408–409, 2011 p. 118). How the conquest and colonization of a new continent gave rise to the modern interstate system of international law is explained by Schmitt's singular interpretation of the global lines (first, with the Spanish-Portuguese divisional lines but mostly with the French-English amity lines) that were drawn by European powers from the end of the 15th to the middle of the 17th century in order to regulate their inter-imperial rivalries. These lines were foundational and generative of the first global spatial order as they put into effective play the rule of colonial difference (Jameson, 2005, p. 201; Schmitt, 1943, pp. 2–3, 7, 1950/2003, pp. 86–100, 228, 2011, p. 116; Stirk, 2011, pp. 276– 283). In fact, the “distinctive” territorial status of the colonial overseas lands originates with the division of the earth into two distinct spatial zones, the statist and the colonial, the European and the non-European, the civilized and the uncivilized. For Schmitt, this division indicates the world-historical uniqueness of the modern nomos (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 49, 50–5).10 The new discoveries and the circumnavigation of the globe unified geographically the earth by carving “internal divisions … within the framework of one and the same spatial order” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 92). The global lines encompassed for the first time in human history the whole earth by differentiating between two spheres, Europe and the rest of the world (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 198, 140, 148). The colony is the effect of this partition of the earth and it is foundational, like the free sea, as it partakes in a constitutive act of spatial ordering. For this reason Schmitt considered the special meaning of the colony and its exceptional territorial status both as a symptom and an effect of global linear thinking (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 87). He understood it in relation to the originary split between “the soil of European states, i.e. state areas in the specific sense, and the soil of overseas possessions, i.e. colonial lands” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 184, emphasis added; see also Schmitt, 1940/1995a, pp. 244–245). The New World, the colonized territories, came to designate an extra-European, non-sovereign realm located outside international law but immanent to and productive of the spatial structure of the global nomos (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 93): The sense and core of the Christian-European law of peoples, its fundamental order, lay in the partition of the new earth. Among themselves the European peoples were, without much planned reflection, united in treating the non-European soil of the earth as colonial soil, i.e., as an object for their conquest and exploitation. This side of historical development is so important that one can equally well, and perhaps more rightly, call the Age of Discoveries the Age of European land appropriation. (Schmitt, 1942/2015, p. 64, emphasis added) The territorial status of the colony is special and distinctive, therefore, to the extent that, while it rests outside international law, not subject to and thus not guided by Europe's interstate rules of war, it remains internal to the global spatial order (Levinson, 2005, pp. 206–209; Schmitt, 1948/2005, p. 794).11 Schmitt describes a case of an inclusive exclusion. This explains, for instance, how wars could be waged between European powers in the colonies despite peace being concluded in Europe; or, likewise, how treaties and agreements among states that were valid for Europe did not apply to the colonies; or, how the dualism in English law between English soil, where common law ruled, and other areas where the king's power was unrestricted, reached global proportions. Included into modern world politics by means of their exclusion, the colonies occupy an exceptional position in the structure of the Eurocentric order. Schmitt regarded this exception as foundational because it produced a normal, relatively pacified, secure, and stable space against an anomic zone, a lawless colonial space free for appropriation that became the indispensable site of limitless violence and wars of expansion and annihilation (Agamben, 1998, p. 36; Rasch, 2003, pp. 124–126; Schmitt, 1940/1995b, pp. 241–242). “The old Eurocentric system of international law,” Schmitt asserted, “rested upon the differentiation of international law of a European space of states of fully valid state order and implemented peace from a non-European space of free European expansion,” that is, between “the soil of the metropolis” and “colonial soil” (Schmitt, 1940/1995b, p. 245, 1950/2003, pp. 218, 148, 2011 p. 114): The special territorial status of colonies thus was as clear as was the division of the earth between state territory and colonial territory. This division was characteristic of the structure of international law in this epoch and was inherent in its spatial structure. (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 199). The construction of a European normal space (the core) upon and in opposition to an anomic colonial zone (the periphery) was foundational for the Eurocentric order of the earth in the same way that the concept of the colony was special for the development of modern international law (Schmitt, 1940/1995b, p. 242, 1942/2015, p. 60). Schmitt claimed that in these extra-European spaces the imperial powers displaced their violent conflicts outside their continent, outsourcing them to the new world (Müller, 2003, pp. 88–91). They imagined the non-European world “without a master, uncivilized or half-civilized, an area of colonization, an object for the seizure of holdings through European powers” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 228; see also Schmitt, 1942/2015, p. 60); “a sphere outside the law and open to the use of force” since “everything that occurred ‘beyond the line’ remained outside the legal, moral, and political values recognized on this side of the line” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 94, 93). It was there that sovereigns could freely wage absolute wars against each other and against the indigenous populations, that is, colonial wars, sparing the European territory from the destruction they brought about (Schmitt, 1962/2007, p. 11). The spatial ordering and legal orientation that resulted from the distinction of the two zones unburdened the state-making process as the colonial powers went on to formalize and bracket their wars on one side of the line, shielding Europe from destructive conflicts, which could be now removed and exorcised, on the other side, “beyond the lines” (Schmitt, 1943, pp. 2–3, 7, 1950/2003, p. 94, 2011, p. 117; see Rasch, 2005, pp. 257–278).12 The politicojuridical system of sovereign states, which rested upon the externalization of violence, was valid only in Europe. This spatial order of a regulated and balanced coexistence among territorial sovereigns, their equilibrium, their mutual recognition as equal and independent subjects of international law, the “humanization,” “bracketing,” “rationalization,” and “formalization” of European wars, “ended here,” Schmitt emphatically proclaimed, on this side of the lines, in Europe and on its soil (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 93). It did not extend to the other side, the overseas colonies. Thus, “Both civil wars and colonial wars remained outside this bracketing,” outside the limits and restraints of international interstate law, in the colonial territories, removed from Europe and civilization” (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 309). The colonies, therefore, have another, additional exceptional meaning and the special territorial status they possess in the Eurocentric international order as overseas zones derives from their designation as stateless and lawless, extra-legal and normless, that is, as conflict zones. Their existence was necessary for the pacification of modern Europe (Galli & Fay, 2010, p. 6). Europeans could conduct their total wars freely, outside the law, in those overseas colonial “zones designated for agonal test of strength,” “where force could be used freely and ruthlessly” and “only the law of the stronger applied” (Schmitt, 1943, pp. 4–8, Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 93, 94, 95, 97, 99, 140–171, 148, 309). The designation of a conflict zone outside Europe contributed also to the bracketing of European wars, which is its meaning and its justification in international law. (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 97–98, emphasis added; see also Rasch, 2003, p. 124) This unprecedented geopolitical distinction between Europe and its colonies differentiated the war-in-form from colonial wars, the just enemy (justus hostis) from the just cause (justa causa), removed civil warfare from domestic politics, and produced the spatial conditions for a secure and protected geopolitical framework conducive to the development and rise of the European interstate order (Schmitt, 1962/2007, p. 9). “Classical European international law,” Schmitt asserted, “pushed both of these dangerous forms of war and enmity [i.e. civil and colonial wars] to the margins” (Schmitt, 1962/2007, p. 11. Europe was spared total war because “the upholders of this international law had available sufficient free space in the colonies in order to rob their mutual confrontations in Europe of a genuine existential severity” (Schmitt, 2011 pp. 117, 116, emphasis added). In the absence of such colonial spaces and their anomalous territorial status it would have been impossible for Europe to bracket war (1940/1995b, p. 244, Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 145– 147).13 The significance of the amity lines in 16th and 17th century international law was that great areas of freedom were designated as conflict zones in the struggle over the distribution of a new world. As a practical justification, one could argue that the designation of a conflict zone at once freed the area on this side of the line—a sphere of peace and order ruled by European public law—from the immediate threat of those events “beyond the line,” which would not have been the case had there been no such zone. (Schmitt, 1950/2003, p. 97) In short, the distinction of state and the colony, law and anomie, inside and outside, the civilized and the uncivilized, which made possible a continental law of European sovereigns with a global reach, explains the special territorial status of the colony (Schmitt, 2011 p. 114). Here. Then. lies the centrality of this concept for Schmitt: The decisive meaning of the overseas colony for international law lies in the fact that the concrete reality of the conceptswar and peace of hitherto existing international law could only be understood on the basis of this image of space. One must always be reminded of the fact that international law is a law of war and peace, jus belli ac paci. (Schmitt, 2011 p. 115) This conceptual primacy of the colony in Schmitt's theory is reflected nowhere better than in his original interpretation of the doctrine of the natural state in modern political thought, which strongly evokes his earlier famous distinction between the norm and the exception (Schmitt, 1988/1922). The relationship between the two is now framed explicitly in concrete spatial terms as Schmitt came to identify the intellectual origins of the modern doctrine of the state of nature in the historical experience of European land appropriation and colonization (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 95–97).14 Shifting attention from the familiar view that saw in the concept of the natural state a metaphor for the religious civil wars in Europe, Schmitt introduced a geopolitical reading that instead located it in the extra-European colonial spaces of the Americas. The depiction of a normless state of war of all against all, devoid of sovereignty and government, deprived of state and law, he argued, was influenced by how Europeans imagined human existence beyond the lines, outside politics and civilization (Rasch, 2003, pp. 126, 129; Schmitt, 1940/1995b, p. 242, 1950/2003, p. 96). It is in this manner that Schmitt redefined the traditional contrast between the natural and political state as a distinction between colonial spaces of exception, that is, extra-European lawless zones of war, violence, and expansion, and an interstate international order that self-regulates its internal discord and contains war.15 In a similar vein he designated the juridical domestic state of exception as a spatial correlate analogous to the extra-European colonies (Blanco and de Valle, 2014, pp. 3, 6–7; Schmitt, 1943, pp. 4–5, 1950/2003, pp. 98, 207).16 Thus, hidden underneath the normative foundations of the political philosophy of the modern state, at the very roots of its justification, Schmitt hinted at the sublimated presence of a colonial geography whose existence was acknowledged insofar as it had to be negated and disavowed. These colonial zones of exception constituted the spatial foundation of the Eurocentric global norm and sustained the political and cultural idea of Europe as such (Schmitt, 1932, pp. 185–186). Modern Europe, in other words, emerges only with the global lines, through its encounter with and distinction from the overseas territories (Levinson, 2005, p. 206). It is the difference that colonialism introduces, as an exception to the law, which effectively grounds the concrete unity of a global spatial order, the “Family of Nations,” and supplies it with a common European culture and shared legal and moral values, always against the background of the colonies (Rasch, 2005, pp. 255–259; Schmitt, 1940/1995b, pp. 242, 245, 1942/2015, pp. 61–64, 1950/2003, pp. 86, 141, 168). Schmitt identifies here the necessary presence of a colonial difference against which the statocentric political and legal identity of modern Europe was constructed, took roots, and was enthroned at the center of the earth (Schmitt, 1950/2003, pp. 233–234). In the end, Schmitt's understanding of the colony is determined by how the spatial structure of political modernity works by excluding its own foundation. As a “basic spatial fact” of the modern nomos, the colony is constitutive of the European order of the earth. This atypical history of the rise of the Eurocentric nomos underscores how the norm (i.e., the state, the European center, international law) yet again rests on and depends upon an exception (i.e., the colony, the extra-European periphery) (Rasch, 2003, pp. 128–130; Schmitt, 1942/2015, pp. 61–62).

2023 TDI Kritik
NR › Impact › AT: Extinction

Extinction is a question of life – that question must be answered is in what other forms of life can be theorized within catastrophe – only that can break the martial form of life and dispose the form of life that has dominated the Eurocene

Grove 2019 [Jairus Victor. Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai‘i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. Savage Ecology : War and Geopolitics at the End of the World : War and Geopolitics at the End of the World, Duke University Press. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/fullerton/detail.action?docID=5826044.] CSUF JmB TDI

Political theory and history follow similar stories of development and continuous upward mobility. Claims to the ubiquity of Western political forms such as the state, universal theories of rights and norms premised on provincial Kantian and Hegelian traditions, chauvinistic species claims to natural resources in Locke and Marx— all ­ these ­ traditions find refuge in presumptions of crypto-­ providence, that is, the idea that success of a particular way of being is selected by nature for its superior functionality or character. In “Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View,” Kant calls it “nature’s secret plan.” 10 Furthermore, the idea that life, ideas, and ways of life improve as time moves forward, and that outmoded forms of life are culled or left behind, ­ has as its tableau an image of nature that is vicious but consistent, such that se­ lection can drive a grand ­ dialectic forward toward ­ improvement. If accidents, exogenous interventions, and unforeseen and meaningless alliances of organisms and environments determine the fate of living things, ­ then what security can be found in rectitude and superiority? None. According to Gould, “we grant too much power to the calm of daily life because we live within its immediate surrounding pervasiveness. We therefore fail to realize that rare and unusual events set the basic patterns of history.” 11 This does not mean giving up on order altogether. Gould, following Georges Cuvier, argues that the fossil record is catastrophic but that “this sequence of catastrophes imparted a directional history to earth and life. . . . ​ Life’s vector of progress records an increasing adaptation to harsher climates of a cooling earth.” 12 So life is more complex and this striving for complexity can be seen intensifying over time, what Gould calls a “vector of progress.” Yet the history of mutation and adaptation cannot be mechanistically reduced to a process of natural selection. Instead, there ­ is a dynamic, natural history of creativity, se­ lection, catastrophe, alliance, convergence, divergence, and real chance at work in the emergence of the human ­ estate. Following Gould, I want to consider how we might theorize differently if our attempts at making sense of the world accorded with the actual world we have inherited. What onto-­ ethical adventures might come out of the tumultuous and catastrophic history of our planet? And why, despite our claims to intellectual progress, do we humans remain so indebted to a gradualist image of thought that refused, until the middle of the nineteenth ­ century, to even accept that there ­ had been a single extinction of an organism? Unlike many of his peers, political theorist William Connolly has become interested in the turn away from gradualism to catastrophism in contemporary geology and evolutionary theory. Although geology seems a strange touchstone for a political theorist, the history of the world— deep ­ geological time— confounds ­ much of our inherited wisdom about the relationship between humanity and the planet that creates the condition of possibility for humanity’s existence. 13 In a blog post at The Con­temporary Condition , Connolly and I note how even secular stalwarts of political theory such as John Rawls follow a very literalist Christian view of the planet. 14 The formative geological events responsible for the creation of Earth from the big bang to the cooling of the planet’s surface took place in the “beginning” and have since been replaced by the imperceptible and thus politically insignificant cyclical behavior of a “mature” planet. ­ There was creation and now there ­ is the age of man. The geological history of our planet and even the more recent history of life on our planet tells a very different story. Geologists and paleontologist describe at least five great ­ extinctions generally defined as the loss of more than 70 ­percent of the species on Earth. In almost all cases, exogenous events such as asteroids, or in one case the emergence of a new mountain range, set into motion a series of amplifying feedbacks that accelerated too rapidly for the majority of the planet’s life forms to adapt. In this light, Alfred North Whitehead’s characterization of life as a war against entropy takes on a more startling and dramatic character. 15 Not only is the world not promised to humanity; it is not even guaranteed to be hospitable to organic life. There ­ are no promises. For Connolly and Whitehead, this is the opening for the possibility of freedom and ethics. If life, human ­ flourishing, and planetary systems were ­ in some sense irrefutable, it would also mean we lived in a mechanical, law-­ driven world devoid of the possibility of novelty, which is a precondition for something like freedom. 16 Contrary to a world of tight and perpetual equilibria, life is, in the final instance, novel and not reducible to initial conditions. It is here that we can also see Connolly’s attraction to the “teleodynamism” and “teleosearching” of biologist Terrance Deacon as it resonates too with Whitehead’s concept of aim, or creative struggle, in the evolutionary process. 17 Reality is not path dependent. Precisely what makes catastrophe possible is also what makes creative evolution possible, or the capacity to effect change that is unprecedented, novel, and therefore unpredictable. This is as true for the innovation of the eye as it is for the rise of U.S. hegemony or industrialized animal slaughter. Therefore, Connolly and Whitehead’s interpenetrating open systems from microbe to cosmos have to be capable of catastrophe— that ­ is, not self-­ correcting—if something like real creativity is to exist. This is the speculative wager Connolly makes in The Fragility of Things ­ , which I hope to push further into the thinking about the many apocalypses of humanity and earth. An Apocalyptic Tone Apocalypse is a touchy subject even for ­those of us in critical traditions prone to question developmentalist and teleological theories. We often respond to the possibility of catastrophe with skepticism. The practiced intervention is to criticize those ­ proposing the possibility of apocalypse with critiques of eschatological thinking or to argue that representations of the end-­ time stem from cultural malaise or a reactionary romanticism for simpler times. Cultural theory has long since been enamored with the under­ lying psychic and discursive explanations of the fear of human ­ extinction. Much of this work located the advent of nuclear weapons as the zero point for a renewed sense of apocalypse. In general, this work— such ­ as Martin Heidegger’s dread in ­later works like The Question Concerning Technology , Jacques Derrida’s “Missives and Missiles,” or the vast troves of literary theory on science fiction— ­ focuses on what apocalypse represents in the sense that it does not actually represent the possibility of apocalypse. It must be something else ­ that we are obsessing about. There are good reasons to be skeptical of apocalyptic thinking, particularly because ­ it has become an entertainment industry in its own right. ­ After all, much of the genre of American apocalypse horror, from the disaster movies of the 1990s such as Deep Impact and Armageddon to the popular tv series The Walking Dead , depends on the narrative adventures of mostly white privileged people ­ having to live like most of the rest of the world does on a daily basis: no food security, the risk of being forced from one’s home, unpredictable access to basic things ­ like medicine and emergency care, terrifying people ­ or zombies or robots coming to get you in the dead of night. There ­ is something undeniably precious about this vision of apocalypse where people with perfect teeth pretend to be terrified at the possibility of killing and preparing their own food. But the genre is also dangerous because ­ images that depict the loss of a manageable world do not remain in the world of fiction. The fear that is amplified and given form by ­ these immersive experiences of doom find their way into the major budgetary and strategic decisions at the U.S. Department of Defense as well as many other military agencies across the planet. 18 Since the second term of the George W. Bush administration, the dod has been the most out­ spoken division of the U.S. government on the dangers of climate change as a driver for apocalyptic upheaval. 19 The fear of security analysts is that U.S. citizens ­ will require military repression to maintain order during the inevitable tumult of sea-­ level rise and agricultural disruption resulting from erratic weather and seasons. 20 In the case of many environmental advocacy groups, it is the apocalypse that is coming for the poor and the marginal that will ­ be most impacted by the storm surges and food shortages. Given the high density of low-­ income populations near costal zones, this will likely be true. However, there are as many reasons to believe that what is ­ really animating the intensity of both military and environmentalist fears is that climate change will ­ bring a particular way of life to an end. It is a way of life that is as threatened by peak oil or any of the other shortages of minerals or capital that are necessary for the predictable routines that many Americans and Eu­ro­pe­ans have grown accustomed to, undoubtedly at the expense of the rest of the planet’s population of ­ human and nonhuman Earthlings. 21 So why study apocalypses? In part because ­ we can learn a lot about the Earthling condition from how that condition has and ­ w ill be punctuated by events far beyond our control. 22 We live in a world sensitive to perturbation, prone to turbulences of vari­ ous kinds, and it is out of that noise that creativity can be cultivated even if only by alliance rather than willed individualism. So to come to grips with apocalypses means also to think about the scales of action and efficacy with which we can participate while also cultivating attentiveness to what kinds of living things we want to intervene with and on behalf of. This is the mess that we find ourselves in. Transformation is possible but its possibility may be indifferent, or at least inured, to our existence. This puts the emphasis on how to live and how to die rather than whether ­ we live or die. This is, I think, also present in the cacophony of apocalypticisms. There ­ are minor strains of what, much more than Kant’s sense of enlightenment, we ought ­ to call maturity. This time it is not the knowledge of our unique capacity for reason that should be championed and cultivated but the limited ­ hold we have on this world and just how vulnerable we are to forces beyond our control. Maturity as humility and tragedy bares the marks of what many have called the Anthropocene much more than the particular consequences of sea-­ level rise in the course of any one human ­ life. ­ Whether our current trajectory toward ­ climate turbulence succeeds in mass extinction cannot exclusively cause or prevent the apocalypse before us. The confrontation with the Earth system, its fragility, and its capricious grip on life will ­ irreversibly change what it is to be human. ­ So there ­ must be both concern and sanguinity in preparing ourselves for what is already happening. We need to find an immortality, what Whitehead called perishing, worthy of the event of humanity. What this means is that we should not be fighting so hard to avoid perishing as a species, if that even means something, but rather we should be trying to perish better. This is a dangerous endeavor. For all the reasons Connolly’s work has fought so hard against negative critique and the debilitating stupor of Theodor Adorno, Giorgio Agamben, and other followers of the dark arts that see this life as damaged or in need of redemption, we have to find a place to take the catastrophism of the universe seriously while also following Deleuze’s invitation to intensify belief in this world. 23 This might ask too much of words and ideas. Connolly warns that catastrophes “shatter the bond of trust in the world that had tacitly bound you to humanity and the world.” 24 Or even worse yet, apocalypses may, as Bataille writes, “conceal a possibility of enticement.” 25 I hope that we, particularly in the extravagant and luxurious countries of the world, are reaching a point of saturation in which apocalypse is becoming so obvious as to no longer paralyze or entice but to finally provoke. I suppose we will ­ see.

2023 TDI Kritik
NR › Impact › AT: Extinction

Their impact analysis is not egalitarian – rather the cartography and racialized nature of the Eurocene as it creates an idea of who lives and who dies – their utilitarian risk calculus favors the greatest number which has no geographical or historical sensibility of how unequally goods are distributed

Grove 2019 [Jairus Victor. Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai‘i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. Savage Ecology : War and Geopolitics at the End of the World : War and Geopolitics at the End of the World, Duke University Press. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/fullerton/detail.action?docID=5826044.] CSUF JmB TDI

Rather than see ­these two career ­ trajectories as opposed, I think Crutzen’s thinking displays a continuous concern for the Northern Hemisphere and a particular cartography, rather than a geography, of human ­ survival. 9 Crutzen, as well as the concept of the Anthropocene itself, cannot escape preceding geopolitical conceptions of the Earth. Crutzen and ­others who rush so quickly to the necessity to transition efforts from climate abatement to climate modification are unsurprisingly not moved by claims that artificial cooling will ­ likely cause droughts and famines in the tropics and subtropical zones of the global south; nor are they moved by how such plans may accelerate ocean acidification. 10 The utilitarian risk calculus that ­ favors the greatest good for the greatest number has no geo­ graphical or historical sensibility of how unequally aggregate conceptions of the good are distributed around the planet. Global thinking, even in its scientific and seemingly universalist claims to an atmosphere that “we” all share, belies the geopolitics that enlivens scientific concern, as well as the global public policy agenda of geoengineering that seeks to act on behalf of it. Saving humanity as an aggregate, ­ whether from nuclear war, Styrofoam, or climate turbulence, has never meant an egalitarian distribution of survivors and sacrifices. Instead, our new cosmopolitanism— ­ the global environment— follows ­ almost exactly the drawn lines, that is, the cartography or racialized and selective solidarities and zones of indifference that characterize economic development, the selective application of combat, and, before that, the zones of settlement and colonization. More than a result of con­ temporary white supremacy or lingering white privilege, the territorialization of who lives and who dies, who matters and who must be left behind ­ for the sake of humanity, represents a five-­ hundred-­ year geopolitical tradition of conquest, colonization, extraction, and the martial forms of life that made them all possible through war and through more subtle and languid forms of organized killing. I am not suggesting that Crutzen and others ­ are part of a vast conspiracy; rather, I want to outline how climate change, species loss, slavery, the elimination of native peoples, ­ and the globalization of extractive capitalism are all part of the same global ordering. That is, all of these crises are geopolitical. The particular geopolitical arrangement of what others ­ have called the longue durée , and what I am calling the Eurocene, is geologically significant but is not universally part of “­ human activity” despite the false syllogism at the heart of popular ecological thinking that a global threat to humanity must be shared in cause and crisis by all of humanity. 11

2023 TDI Kritik
NR › Permutation › End of History DA

There is end of history disad to the permutation – politicizing geopolitics and saying the US did something bad and we should redress those issues falls fate to the bad predictions of Fukuyama because that ignores the ecological approach to geopolitics that the alternative takes.

Grove 2019 [Jairus Victor. Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai‘i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. Savage Ecology : War and Geopolitics at the End of the World : War and Geopolitics at the End of the World, Duke University Press. ProQuest Ebook Central, http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/fullerton/detail.action?docID=5826044.] CSUF JmB TDI

Yet the double movement of politicizing ecol­ogy and historicizing geopolitics is insufficient, as it can become too easily and too narrowly anthropocentric— ­ “we” make nature and therefore “we” make history. Instead, “we” humans, ­ as defined as late moderns, are in desperate need of an ecological approach to geopolitics as well. By ecological, I mean a form of analysis characterized by multispecies encounters and deep relational processes across geographical scales rather than a form of political thinking that relies on discreteness, causality, and human agency. Hence an ecological approach does not center principally on the environment, what in international relations is called environmental security; nor does it limit global politics to states, international organizations, social movements, or even ­ humans. Instead, I take ecology to mean that all things ­ that make a difference in the vast landscape of global security ought ­ to be included in the geopolitical considerations of con­temporary life. From this ecological perspective, geopolitics has culminated in a planetary epoch in which a particular Anthropos is capable of making a “cene.” 24 However, I think the Anthropocene as a philosophical and political crisis has been too quick to forget the geopolitical arrangements of power and vio­ lence that have brought us to this point. Not all of “us” have played an equal part in the making of either ­ the Anthropos or the Anthropocene. In part, the often narrow focus on climate change and the fever pitch of the contemporary crisis erases the Euro-­American role in building and maintaining the current world order. The argument often advanced by great ­ powers and environmentalists alike amounts to something like this: now that every­ thing is broken, it is everyone’s problem, so pointing fingers only gets in the way of a solution. Even critical and posthumanist approaches often lose sight of the role of hegemony and power. This is, in part, because ­ the effort of those ­ lines of thought to decenter the human ­ as the sole locus of thinking and action is also a necessary but insufficient maneuver. This chapter attempts to relax the focus on a narrow human ­ world while holding on to the very specifically human ­ and often national assemblages that broke this planet.

2023 TDI Kritik
NR › FW › Militarized Academy

You should apply a high level of skepticism to their impact analysis because of the military’s investment into institutions writ large

Howell 2018 [Allison. Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark) . Forget “militarization”: Race, disability and the “martial politics” of the police and of the university. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20(2), 117-136.] CSUF JmB TDI

Just as “militarization” has guided inquiry into contemporary police violence, it has also been used to call attention to worrying connections between the university and the US national security apparatus. One prominent example is the series of Vice News reports exposing the “100 Most Militarized Universities in America” (Arkin and O’Brien 2015a, 2015b). The authors of the study note that initially they were reluctant to use the term “militarization,” which was not meant to simply evoke … ROTC [Reserve Officer Training Corps] drills held on a campus quad. It was also a measure of university labs funded by US intelligence agencies, administrators with strong ties to those same agencies, and, most importantly, the educational backgrounds of the approximately 1.4 million people who hold Top Secret clearance. (Arkin and O’Brien 2015a) But “militarization” leads us to underestimate the depth and extent of national security ties to the university, past and present, and to assume that universities can revert to some non-militarized past. This limitation is also evident in scholarly literature. One of the central scholarly texts on the so-called “militarization” of the university is Giroux’s The University in Chains (2007). Cited hundreds of times, and reported on in popular media, it argues that the post-9/11 period saw a significant acceleration of the corporatization and militarization of the university (Giroux 2007, 2008). Giroux goes so far as to say that while corporatization had previously taken root in the university, “it is only in the aftermath of 9/11 that the university has also become an intense site of militarization” (Giroux 2008, 58). Furthermore, “militarization” of the university begins for Giroux only after World War II (see also Chomsky et al. 1998). These popular and scholarly works identify important changes in the nature of military involvement in universities. For example, the Vice report notes that funding now flows to intelligence-gathering disciplines (e.g., computer science) rather than solely weapons-oriented ones (e.g., physics). Yet research guided by the concept of “militarization” falls into the trap of imagining military encroachment on previously civil institutions: “the idea of the university as a site of critical thinking, public service and socially responsible research appears to have been usurped” (Giroux 2008, 63). This is a fantasy. The university was never such a pure site. Many American universities were built with slave labor or its proceeds (Brown University Committee on Slavery and Justice n.d.), and from the outset have contributed vitally to colonization and White supremacy. By positing a purely civilian “before” to a military “after,” “militarization” accounts wrongfully elide this history. In the American university no such “before” exists. This is not to say nothing has changed. Seeing the university as a site of “martial politics” allows us to provide a historical account attuned to the ways in which politics is shaped by the precise forms warfare takes. Most academic disciplines – the very categories by which we organize knowledge – were fundamentally shaped by conquest, warfare and military funding. This is not only true for IR, a discipline born out of colonialism and war (Vitalis 2015), but for any number of other disciplines from physics (Gusterson 1998, 2011) to business (Cowen 2014) to neuroscience (Howell 2017). Excavating these histories gives us a sense of how thoroughly we live with “martial politics.” Several disciplines were said to have been “militarized” after 9/11. Most controversially, medicine, psychiatry, psychology and anthropology all had major debates about involvement in torture and warfare in their professional associations. In anthropology, for example, this debate concerned the 2008 establishment of Project Minerva (which provided $50 million in defense funding to social sciences) and the recruitment of anthropologists in counterinsurgency warfare through the Human Terrain Program (Gusterson 2009). To describe this as the “militarization” of anthropology, however, is to ignore that anthropology is foundationally a colonial discipline set up to catalog “primitive” subject peoples, with a long history of entanglement with the security state, not least in Cold War-era counterinsurgency operations in Latin America and Asia (Gusterson 2009). The concept of “martial politics” allows us to pose new questions about the historical relationship between formal knowledge production and forms of warfare, rather than just relations between the university and the military. It allows us to ask how certain forms of warfare are produced by, and produce, academic disciplines. The nature of this mutual production will differ depending on the particular military strategy undertaken at any historical moment. The case of psychology is instructive here. After psychologists were implicated in devising, administering and overseeing torture at the US naval base at Guantánamo Bay (Howell 2007), concern was raised about the “militarization” of psychology (Ariggo, Eidelson, and Bennett 2012). Again, this concern assumes that the discipline was once free from involvement in war or colonialism, and that an unusual trespass occurred after 9/11. Not so. Since almost its very foundation, psychology has been tied to forms of military strategy. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, psychology was a fledgling discipline and was understood as a humanistic form of knowledge. That changed drastically in World War I. At that time Robert Yerkes, a eugenics proponent and professor of psychology, was President of the American Psychological Association. Convinced that psychologists could be of service in the war, and that war could be useful to psychologists, Yerkes approached the US Army with a proposition: he could help the Army with its personnel problem (of appropriately placing the massive number of new recruits) in return for funding and access to an unprecedented number of subjects on which to experiment: soldiers. World War I enabled the first mass scientific experiment in psychology in the form of intelligence testing. The data accumulated provided fodder for a generation of psychologists, establishing the experiment as the primary methodology of psychology and massively reshaping the discipline from a philosophical/humanistic one into an (American) science. This constitutes a symbiotic relationship: psychology was not “militarized” in World War I. Rather, it propelled a particular kind of warfare: industrial warfare conducted on frontlines, involving mass mobilization and requiring new personnel management techniques. Wartime support, in return, worked to reshape psychology into a science. The academy is not the victim of military breach but has foundationally been produced and formed, in its specificities, through warfare – and has formed warfare in return as a technology of security (Howell 2011). Psychology was already well steeped in the racist and ableist science of eugenics prior to World War I (Mitchell and Snyder 2003; Carey 2009; Thomson 2010), but through military funding it was able to systematize its eugenicism as a science of “intelligence.” This martial entanglement did not end with the war and the return of psychology to “domestic” applications. Intelligence data not only established psychology as a science but went on to practical applications in war-like relations of disability and race both within the US and other colonial settings. Three examples follow that demonstrate this move. First, the data from the Army experiment produced results that “proved” that the average American had the intelligence level of a 13-year-old, just above the level of “moron” (an ableist construct). This contributed to a moral panic about the degeneration of the “stock” of the American nation due to Southern European immigrants, and led to some of the first sweeping US immigration restrictions. It also bolstered mental hygiene and eugenics movements, promoting the sterilization of disabled, racialized, Indigenous or “promiscuous” women who were labeled feeble-minded (Carey 2003). This form of martial politics perpetrates violence especially on women’s bodies, managing their sexuality and reproductive capacities for the purposes of extirpating “dangerous” or degenerate populations. Second, since they were constructed by White men who saw “intelligence” in their own image, the Army tests unsurprisingly placed the “negro” at the bottom of a racist (and sexist) hierarchy of intelligence (Mensh and Mensh 1991; Gould 1999). With their sheen of objective science, these very same Army tests were administered in South Africa and other colonies, justifying colonial rule and later Apartheid. Finally, Carl Brigham, who was part of the Army experiment team, and later a Princeton University professor and member of the advisory council of the American Eugenics Society, went on to create the high school Scholastic Aptitude Tests (SATs). The SATs remain the cornerstone of one of the most pernicious and racist aspects of the Army tests’ afterlife: standardized testing. This regime, to this day, outrageously ranks African American students as having lower intelligence, or aptitude, significantly reducing access to higher education and thus economic mobility. All this history, all these contributions of the discipline of psychology to unjust dynamics surrounding race, disability, poverty and gender, are shuttered by a “militarization” framework because it assumes that when psychology is used in war (e.g., in torture) that this is an aberration rather than part of a broad history of violence done to marginalized people, citizens and enemies alike. In thinking through the “martial politics” of the university, any number of disciplines could be subjected to this kind of analysis. Returning to Maneuvers, consider the case of nursing, to which Enloe (2000) directs her attention in assessing the “militarization” of women’s lives. The chapter in question perceptively begins with Florence Nightingale, who is widely considered to be the “mother” of nursing, a pioneer in statistical visualization and a major figure in the reform of public health and medical care in both the Crimean War and Victorian workhouses. Yet Nightingale sits uneasily in a framework that inquires into the “militarization” of women’s lives because, as Enloe (2000, 204) shows, as a patriotic upper-class White English woman, she herself was active in propelling “militarization.” Because of its “militarization” framework, Enloe’s account misses the fact that warfare and nursing were both modernized and professionalized through their mutual encounter. Nightingale’s innovations transformed siege warfare, helping ensure British victory in the Crimea, and laid the foundations for World War I industrial warfare. After Nightingale returned from the war she was instrumental in creating nursing as a profession and discipline of study, using techniques developed for military purposes in “domestic” settings such as workhouses. The story here is not one of military encroachment on nursing; rather, nursing became a discipline and profession initially through war, and subsequently through war-like relations with the poor. This symbiosis between war and academic disciplines such as nursing, psychology and – for that matter – IR should make it unsurprising when war-like relations are propelled through knowledge created in these disciplines. When we view academic disciplines, or indeed the university as a whole, through the lens of “martial politics” it becomes clear they are not innocent domains sullied by military values. Rather, like the can of soup, their form and function are embedded in how they emerge out of and simultaneously shape warfare. Even when “militarization” accounts are historical, they lead us to misconstrue the importance and nature of that history. When there is violence in domestic political life – whether the outright violence of killer cops or the structural violence of the SATs – it is not that “war” is encroaching on “peace,” and it is not that “the military” is trespassing on the “civilian.” Rather, “martial politics” are fundamental to the constitution and continued production of liberal democracies such as the US. This is not directed equally at all parts of the population but targets those who are constituted as a threat to the nation’s strength or civil order.

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › Impact › Endless War

Its extensential

Charlotte Heath-Kelly 18, Associate Professor in Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, Ph.D. in International Politics from Aberystwyth University, 2018, “Forgetting ISIS: enmity, drive and repetition in security discourse,” Critical Studies on Security, Vol. 6, No.1, p. 85-86

Security never seems to make any progress. Despite military investments, security reviews and ever more powerful technological surveillance, European and North American populations are continually represented as unsafe. The most powerful states in the world, enjoying historically unprecedented levels of health, prosperity and stability, are simultaneously the most hysterically possessed by security-related fears. The compulsion to experience the self as insecure, despite evidence to the contrary, is the starting point for this paper. Much has been written about political anxiety in the fields of political theory and sociology. Corey Robin has explored the developing permutations of fear in Western philosophical thought as an operational concept (Robin 2004); Frank Furedi has explored how the social alienation and declining community ties associated with contemporary neoliberalism have led to cultures of insecurity (Furedi 2002), and Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck have both written about the transformation of risk and anxiety in an age where technology produces its own, sometimes existential, dangers (Beck 1992; Giddens 1990). Fear and risk are prominent topics on sociological and philosophical landscapes. Not wanting to be left behind, international relations has also produced substantial literatures on the risk discourses and anxieties which dominate contemporary political life. Much of this research was initially located within the Copenhagen School of securitisation theory, which analysed the construction of threat by political elites and the centrality of speech acts to processes of securitisation (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998; Hansen 2012a; McDonald 2008). The functionality of securitisation is here understood in terms of identity: identifying and invoking an external threat serves to performatively constitute the nation (Jackson 2005; McCrisken 2003). In the wake of securitisation theory, European international relations developed a poststructuralist critique of Beck’s ‘Risk Society’ thesis. In their rethinking of risk, Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster critiqued Beck’s macro-sociological assumptions that risks exist independently in the world from the governmental technologies which invoke them (Aradau and Van Munster 2007). The incalculability of contemporary risks does not make them ungovernable, as Beck suggests; rather governance structures have shifted to incorporate the unpredictability of certain dangers into precautionary risk management. Incalculability becomes the modality of security.1 Poststructuralist International Relations has found fertile terrain in the idea of risks and their governance. Pushing this research beyond its focus on the security sector, Emmy Eklundh, Andreja Zevnik and Emmanuel Pierre-Guittet have explored the logics of anxiety at play in austerity politics and security governance, and the anxious and resistant subjectivities produced therein (Eklundh, Zevnik, and Pierre-Guittet 2017). But what does it mean to centralise anxiety, fear and risk in Western political and sociological thought at a time of relative geopolitical stability and wealth? In his own take on the politics of anxiety, Mark Neocleous (2000) tackled the proliferation of (in)security and risk discourse in sociology and international relations, arguing that the acceleration of (in) securitisation reflects the policing of civil society to protect bourgeois property and status. The articulation of pollution, terrorism and migration as security threats depoliticises them; it silences the social and political creation of these issues, enabling governing structures to pursue technocratic solutions which efface the real genesis of threats: capital accumulation. It is important to note that the arguments made by Neocleous, poststructuralist scholars of risk and securitisation theorists share more in common than their focus on political anxiety. They all also describe ambivalence within security practices towards the threat object. While politicians promise that destroying the enemy will bring about resolution and ontological stability, IR literatures show that frames of enmity enable the pursuit of other goals: biopolitical governance, identity consolidation and the furtherance of capital accumulation. There is a gap between security and its threat object. The threat object is made hypersignificant in political discourse, but it is simultaneously treated ambivalently and can be replaced at will. New objects wait in the wings as potential vessels for enmity.

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › Impact › Endless War

The logic that underpins the security dilemma locks in endless wars.

Harnett 2022 (Liane Hartnett, Australian National University, , , , , , “Winning? The Politics of Victory in an Era of Endless War“ ) TDI

In his 1904 letter on the Russo–Japanese war, Leo Tolstoy—the literary figure turned prophet of peace—admonished against the possibility of endless war (Tolstoy 1904, 4; Moyn 2020). Tolstoy may have foretold of this era of endless war that has besieged us since the “war on terror” was first waged over twenty years ago, yet it is also written into the very logic that shapes the study of international relations and its approach to war and worlds. Implicit in the realist embrace of the tragic, contained in the Augustinian conviction that “to the end of history the peace of the world … must be gained by strife” (Niebuhr 2013, 256), promulgated by a liberal pursuit of perpetual peace that fails to interrogate how it propagates perpetual war, and contained in the constructivist doxa that war-making is world-making, the specter of endless war seems destined to haunt our horizons. The ubiquity of “victory” in war talk is coupled with an ambiguity of what it actually means to win a war, which only serves to exacerbate and inscribe war’s endlessness. Despite the burgeoning literatures on endless war (Wertheim 2020; Moyn 2021) and indeed victory (Martel 2011; Hom, O’Driscoll, and Mills 2018; O’Driscoll 2019), there is little substantive engagement with how these themes intersect when thinking ethically about the question of war and what passes for peace. This forum seeks to spark a conversation to address this gap. We ask: What might we render visible and redress by thinking critically of the politics of victory in an era of endless war? Further, to the extent that just-war theory has long offered a grammar for the ethics of war, how does it help or hinder this quest? Beyond the claim that engaging with these questions reveals something about the ethical elision of the tragedy (O’Driscoll 2019) or absurdity (Hartnett and O’Driscoll 2020) of war, this conversation aims to both unsettle the abstractions, which inhere in the ethics of war, and recover its promise to pay heed to the particularity and plurality of life and lived experience. This forum begins by revealing the ironic: endless wars are never won, yet the pursuit of victory perpetuates and perhaps even presupposes them. Lauren Wilcox, therefore, invites us to consider war as the ongoing practice of transforming injuring and killing into world-making. In their emphasis on the historic, Lauren Wilcox, Alex Bellamy, and Luke Glanville articulate how the moral categories of just war are predicated upon contradictory yet co-constituted conceptions of power and justice, and a flawed temporal and colonial logic. Focusing on practices of protection, reparation, and restitution, Alex Bellamy and Luke Glanville ask how to reconceive responsibility in an epoch of enmeshment, where it is no longer clear when war and its legacies begin or end. Finally, Brent Steele and Cian O’Driscoll seek to recuperate just-war theory, beyond war, traditionally conceived, and its canon. Brent Steele reimagines just war as a just struggle against the Covid-19 pandemic, while Cian O’Driscoll writes of an ethics of war that begins to theorize from our bare existence. Attentive to irony, the conversation, then, continues in hope: in its calls to interrogate the logics of victory and violence, to reckon with responsibility, to reimagine an ethics of war that centers on life, we collectively seek an ethics of war and peace tethered to the pursuit of justice.

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › Alt › Critical History

The alternative is a critical history of US military presence in the Arab States of the Persian Gulf. The linear narrative of the 1AC articulates existence as a field of endemic violence that requires Pastoral State action; exposing the historical production of this current moment is the only way to reanimate pedagogies oriented around producing better futures

Giroux and Evans 15 [Henry, Distinguished Visiting Professorship @ Ryerson University and Chair in English and Cultural Studies Department @ McMaster University, and Brad, senior lecturer in the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies @ University of Bristol, “Disposable Futures: The Seduction of Violence in the Age of the Spectacle,”] CSUF JmB TDI

There is an important point to stress here regarding the logics of brutality. Violence is easily condemned when it appears exceptional. This also unfortunately precludes more searching and uncomfortable questions. Normalized violence, by contrast, represents a more formidable challenge, requiring a more sophisticated and learned response. Exposing more fully how these normalized cultures of cruelty shape the historic moment is the main purpose of this work, as it is integral to the critical imagination and those forms of political agency necessary for successfully living in a nonviolent and civilian future. Our motivation for writing this book is driven by a commitment to the value of critical pedagogy in countering mechanisms of dehumanization and domination at play in neoliberal societies and beyond. We have no time whatsoever for those who reason that violence may be studied in an “objective” or “rational” way. There are no neutral pedagogies indifferent to matters of politics, power, and ideology. Pedagogy is, in part, always about both struggle and vision—struggles over identities, modes of agency, values, desires, and visions of the possible. Not only does the apologetics of neutrality lead to the most remiss intellectualism when the personal experience of violence is reduced to emotionless inquiry, but it also announces complicity in the rationalizations of violence that depend upon the degradation of those qualities that constitute what is essential to the human condition. Thus, education is by definition a form of political intervention. It is always disentangling itself from particular regimes of power that attempt to authenticate and disqualify certain ways of perceiving and thinking about the world. The larger issue is that not only is education central to politics, but the educative nature of politics begins with the assumption that how people think, critically engage the world, and are self-reflective about the shaping of their own experiences and relations to others marks the beginning with a viable and oppositional politics. We dare to perceive and think differently from both neoliberal rule and the increasingly stagnant and redundant left, which does little to counter it. The world that we inhabit is systematically oppressive and tolerates the most banal and ritualistic forms of violence. It educates us of the need for warfare; it prizes, above all, the values of militarism and its conceptual apparatus of “civic soldierology.” It sanctions and openly celebrates killings as if they are necessary to prove our civilization’s credentials. It takes pride, if not pleasure, in punishing peoples of distinct racial and class profiles, all in the name of better securing society. It promotes those within that order with characteristics that in other situations would be both criminalized and deemed pathological. And it invests significantly in all manner of cultural productions so that we develop a taste for violence, and even learn to appreciate aesthetics of violence, as the normal and necessary price of being entertained. This book inevitably draws upon a number of critical visionaries whose fight for dignity cannot be divorced from their intellectual concerns. The spirit of the late Paulo Freire in particular is impressed upon each of these pages. His critical pedagogy was unashamedly tasked with liberating both the oppressed and their oppressors from the self-perpetuating dynamics of subjugation. Freire’s prose echoed the humanizing call for a more just, literate, and tolerant world. He remains a strong influence in the field of education and in other areas of practice that require thinking about the possibility of an ethics of difference that resists violence in all its forms. The power and forcefulness of Freire’s works are to be found in the tensions, conflicts, poetry, and politics that make it a project for thinking about (non)violence meaningfully. Siding with the disempowered of history—those at the raw ends of tyranny—Freire’s work calls for a more poetic image of thought that is a way of reclaiming power by reimagining the space and practice of cultural and political resistance. His work thus represents a textual borderland where poetry slips into liberation politics, and solidarity becomes a song for the present begun in the past while waiting to be heard in the future. Freire, no less trenchant in his critique of illegitimate rule, refuses to dwell in hopelessness. His resistance is empowering because it is infused with a fearless belief in people’s abilities and finds reasons to rejoice in the transformative possibilities of living: The more radical the person is, the more fully he or she enters into reality so that, knowing it better, he or she can transform it. This individual is not afraid to confront, to listen, to see the world unveiled. This person is not afraid to meet the people or to enter into a dialogue with them. This person does not consider himself or herself the proprietor of history or of all people, or the liberator of the oppressed; but he or she does commit himself or herself, within history, to fight at their side. Freire is not our only source of inspiration. Nearly a century ago Walter Benjamin responded to the tyranny of his times by writing his famous “Critique of Violence.” Ours is a different age. And yet the need for a critique adequate to our times is as pressing as ever. We are not lacking in knowledge of our own oppression. Let’s be sure of that. Oppressive power reveals enough of its violent traces for even a casual cartographer to expose its deceptions or else retreat into conspiracy. What we do lack is a rigorous critique of the historical moment and its varied modes of imaginative resistance. Such modes of artistic imagination are as important as contemporary sources of oppression are in mediating suffering in the service of established contemporary power. This requires a critique of violence that once again encourages us to think beyond its necessity, so as to make clear that in a world in which violence is normalized, it once again becomes possible to imagine the unimaginable, particularly the notion that collective resistance not only is possible but can transform the world with confidence. Hence, while authors like Steven Pinker cloud our perception by claiming the current era is the least violent era in human history, relying upon credo per capita human death rates etc., it takes only a slightly different angle of vision to see the current social order’s full range of preventable violence: impoverishment, financial predation, malnutrition, mass incarceration, and rapidly accelerating deforestation, ecological degradation, and irreversible biocide. Pinker would do well to acknowledge that political violence is poorly understood if it simply refers to a failure of liberal modernity. Political violence cannot be reduced to such a crude and reductionist metric. Indeed, conventional demarcations between times of war and times of peace, zones of security and zones of crises, friends and enemies, have long since evaporated. We live in complex and radically interconnected societies, whose social morphology has radically altered our sense of the world such that we are taught to accept insecurity as the natural order of things. This is fully in keeping with the proliferation of media output, factual and fictional, that bombards us continuously with images of violence and catastrophe for subtle political gain. Indeed, what is new about the current historical conjuncture is not only a commodified popular culture of entertainment, but the emergence of a predatory society in which the suffering and death of others becomes a reason to rejoice rather than mourn. Extreme violence has become not only a commodified spectacle, but one of the few popular resources available through which people can bump up their pleasure quotient. Our critique begins from the realization that violence has become ubiquitous, “settling like some all-enveloping excremental mist … that has permeated every nook of any institution or being that has real influence on the way we live now. We cannot escape its spectre. Its presence is everywhere. It is hardwired into the fabric of our digital DNA. Capitalism in fact has always thrived on its consumption. There is, after all, no profit in peace. We are not calling here for the censoring of all representations of violence as if we could retreat into some sheltered protectorate. That would be foolish and intellectually dangerous. Our claim is both that the violence we are exposed to is heavily mediated, and that as such we are witness to various spectacles that serve a distinct political function, especially as they either work to demonize political resistance or simply extract from its occurrence (fictional and actual) any sense of political context and critical insight. Moving beyond the spectacle by making visible the reality of violence in all of its modes is both necessary and politically important. What we need then is an ethical approach to the problem of violence such that its occurrence is intolerable to witness. Exposing violence is not the same as being exposed to it, though the former too often comes as a result of the latter. The corrupting and punishing forms taken by violence today must be addressed by all people as both the most important element of power and the most vital of forces shaping social relationships under the predatory formation of neoliberalism. Violence is both symbolic and material in its effects and its assaults on all social relations, whereas the mediation of violence coupled with its aesthetic regimes of suffering is a form of violence that takes as its object both memory and thought. It purges the historical record, denying access to the history of a more dignified present, purposefully destroying the ability to connect forms of struggle across the ages. Memory as such is fundamental to any ethics of responsibility. Our critique of violence begins, then, as an ethical imperative. It demands a rigorous questioning of the normalized culture of violence in which we are now immersed. It looks to the past so that we may understand the violence of our present. It looks to the ways that ideas about the future shape the present such that we learn to accept a world that is deemed to be violent by design. This requires a proper critical reading of the way violence is mediated in our contemporary moment; how skewed power relations and propagators of violence are absolved of any wider blame in a pedagogical and political game that permits only winners and losers; how any act of injustice is made permissible in a world that enshrines systemic cruelty.

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › Alt › Pluriversal Global Nomos

The alternative is to affirm a pluriversal global nomos in favor of their realist – a type of third space, a plurality of coexisting independent entities, differentiated but interdependent, recognizing one another as juridically equals with the same rights of non-intervention, war-making, and neutrality – culminating in a global order that is anti-Eurocentric and antagonistic to the current state order.

Kalyvas, A. (2018). Carl Schmitt's postcolonial imagination. Constellations, 25(1), 35-53. Accessed 10-12-22 CSUF JmB

Tellingly, and rather paradoxically in light of his severe criticism of anticolonialism and his apparent nostalgia for the Eurocentric interstate order, Schmitt’s post-war writings do not advocate a return to the spatial structure and territorial distinctions of international public law. The first global nomos, its statocentrism, and the hegemony of Europe, he acknowledged, belonged irrevocably to the past and as much as he lamented their collapse, his work adapted and responded to the profound changes that were transforming world politics, including the new postcolonial reality brought about by the process of decolonization. During this period, the possibility of a new global nomos of the earth, beyond the Cold War’s bipolar system, emerges as his main theoretical and political preoccupation.116 His concerted attempts to think the contemporary global situation from the perspective of the vanishing colony are undoubtedly tentative, inconclusive, characterized by an occasional experimental quality, with sweeping positions, and often puzzling conclusions. But even though they lack the analytical rigor and conceptual sharpness of his previous studies on the history of international law and world politics they remain pertinent to the degree that they interrogated the geopolitical dualism of West and East by exploring the political promises of a post-Eurocentric world without formal colonies, that is, a world order lacking the territorial divisions, spatial distinctions, and zones of exception that defined the classical interstate system. Thus, while he traced the origins of European public law to the colonial encounter and explained its demise in terms of the abolition of the colonial difference, he also contemplated how order and balance might be restored in a global age where the formal colonial frontiers were dissolved and Europe itself displaced. In spite of the many criticisms that can be made of Schmitt’s work, his post-war reflections evoke alternative futures and open up the space for a post-European postcolonial order in the contradictions and conflicts he delineated between the movement towards world unity and the pluralization of autonomous greater regions. It is more or less around the time of the Bandung Conference in Indonesia that Schmitt begun to consider systematically the former colonies as potential harbingers of a new division of the global space and a new nomos. 117 In so doing, he revised and gave a new concrete historical and spatial content to the general idea of “pluriverse,” which he had initially proposed during the inter-war period in his theory of the political and further developed in the direction of a doctrine of greater spaces or pan-regions (Großräume) as a member of the Nazi party and in the context of Germany’s expansionist policies. 118 After the war, he posed afresh the question of a new nomos by identifying the former colonies as growing regional blocks and a possible basis for a post-European spatial ordering that will succeed the bipolar interval. 119 Already in 1952, for instance, he argued explicitly for a “third factor” (dritte Faktor), as a viable political alternative against the bleak prospect of the universal humanism of a single world sovereign. 120 He considered India, the Arab block, the Luso-Hispanic world, and China emerging international actors that could potentially break away from the transitional hegemonic phase of the two nuclear superpowers to inaugurate a new stage in world history, an era of “real pluralism” among several grand spaces capable of establishing an equilibrium of forces that will regulate and bracket war, thus instituting “a new international law of new dimensions.”121 Ten years later, he observed a “surprising number of new African and Asian states” and described the “undeveloped” and “uncommitted nations or regions” as “the neutral states of the anticolonial space” and placed them at “the point of departure of a new world order.”122 He attributed their privileged geopolitical positioning as worldhistorical actors of global change to the fact that “The previously colonized space seems to be the predestined environment for a new kind of neutrality.”123 The same year, in his treatise on the partisan, Schmitt lauded the spatial particularism and territorial dimension of anticolonial struggles by observing that “the names of Mao Tse-tung, Ho Chi-minh, and Fidel Castro indicate that the tie to the soil, to the autochthonous population, and to the geographical particularities of the land” could signal the possibility of a new respatialization of the earth, resulting from a telluric politics grounded in specific places. He also praised Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese-Asiatic struggle against capitalist colonialism and endorsed his pluralistic image of a new nomos of the earth by approvingly quoting from his 1935 poem “Kunlun”: If I could stand above the heavens, I would draw my sword And cut you in three parts: One piece for Europe, Once piece for America, One piece left for China, The peace would rule the world.124 Likewise, in his last published article, in 1978, Schmitt associated the “third sphere” with the “non-aligned states” and saw again in their efforts to affirm their neutrality a clear albeit contradictory historical movement towards a new plural nomos characterized by a balance between several autonomous and politically integrated regions representing a polycentric spatial structure of the earth.125 The political spaces that decolonization has open up against the West-East bipolarity could provoke a radical restructuring of the world order, a new special revolution. Schmitt’s hypothesis of a postcolonial pluriversal spatial order, “an international order of the Grossraum,” is predicated on the assumption that it possesses all the formal attributes of his general theory of nomos and has similar effects.126 It represents a model of balanced and equitable interdependence that seeks to reconcile spatial division and political difference.127 In opposition to a boundless and spaceless universalism, and like the defunct international interstate order, the new post-Eurocentric nomos of the earth will consist of a plurality of coexisting independent entities, in this case, larger regions or continental blocks encompassing the whole earth instead only of the European states, each of which would be prohibited from intervening in the affairs of the others. Internally, each unit will have to be historically and culturally homogeneous with their own distinct political and legal forms of collective life; externally, in relation to each other, they will need to remain differentiated but interdependent, recognizing one another as juridically equals with the same rights of non-intervention, war-making, and neutrality, that is, in other words, each in possession of the monopoly of the political. The sharing of a set of common ordering principles and rules of engagement will entail new “just measures” and “sensible proportions” that will sustain an equilibrium of power among the several independent Großräume and achieve a balanced relationship of relative peace and bracketed wars without having recourse to a single hegemon or a superior sovereign standing above them.128 Schmitt expected that such a post-universal, post-state world order will carve new spatial divisions and re-establish the link between law and space by providing binding reciprocal guarantees, crucial for the maintenance of the autonomy and particularity of each distinct regional block and for the pluralism of the system as a whole. Hence, Schmitt envisions a new post-European nomos as a non-universal global law among Großräume, with the parts recognized as equal legal and political subjects, based on the non-intervention of extra-regional parts, all partaking on a common spatial order.129 In short, Schmitt’s postcolonial imagination expresses the transformation of global relations into a mutually beneficial interdependence, a new “normative order of the earth” consisting of several expectations, such as peace, stability, multilateralism, and coexistence.130 Clearly, this postcolonial vision of a new re-territorialized planetary “pluralist and multipolar” spatial order resembles and reproduces the logic, function, and effects of the older interstate public law but now mediated through the experience of the Monroe Doctrine and projected onto a bigger scale, as it would be truly global, consisting of political units much larger than the territorial state.131 A great deal can be said about Schmitt’s hypothesis, its traditional realist presuppositions, its underlying method of analogy, its globalized multi-cultural tendencies, and its indeterminate dialectics of difference and sameness. I cannot venture here into these vast and complex debates. I can only comment briefly on two evident problems that Schmitt failed to adequately address and much less to resolve. The first refers to his general account of the origins and foundations of any nomos as such; the second pertains to its conditions of possibility. Regarding the first problem, it’s important to recall that all concrete spatial orders are preceded by a spatial revolution, that is, every international order in the broader sense of the term is premised on an original and constitutive act of land-appropriation that establishes an ultimate radical legal title that determines subsequent divisions, partitions, and distributions.132 The concept of an alternative postcolonial global system of greater political spaces, however, seems to lack such a pre-juridical founding moment since, as Schmitt came to recognize, in the post-war age, land appropriation is not anymore a political option.133 Although appropriations have occurred in sea and air, and may occur in outer space with the conquest of planets, he seems to have insisted on the terrestrial, telluric dimension of human politics.134 But with the option of colonization foreclosed, he did not provide a clear alternative account of what might be the great primeval act that will usher a spatial revolution generative of the postcolonial order. The idea of a second spatial revolution is poorly theorized, elusive and uncertain to the effect that Schmitt lacks a theory of transitions from one nomos to the next. As a result, the foundations of his post-European global pluriverse remain indeterminate. Unspecified also remains the concept of the enemy that would correspond to and could sustain a new nomos of the earth. As for the second problem, an essential structural condition for the existence of a concrete order of the earth was the demarcation of a bounded space, geographically and culturally situated, of an inside that is clearly distinguished from an outside - even if the latter is included in the former - separated by divisional lines that provide a sense of orientation, measure, and commonality in relation to and against the background of what lies beyond. The hypothesis of coexisting regional or continental blocks on a planetary scale based on mutual recognition eludes the operation of a constitutive outside.135 Can a comprehensive and common global spatial order generate internal coherence, a minimum of commonality, and a shared symbolic consciousness among its diverse members without external zones of exception? Can postcolonial non-discriminatory wars among greater spaces remain limited and bracketed in the absence of free anomic conflict zones? Confining disorder to an exterior while keeping peace in the interior appears as an indispensable attribute of any concrete spatial order for the management and limitation of conflict but does not fit well with Schmitt’s allusions to the new postcolonial nomic pluriverse, which seems all inclusive and thus incapable of generating a inside/outside distinction, especially so since the soil of each and all the regional powers of the earth is conceived as juridically equivalent and equally protected. Schmitt sought to tackle both problems by introducing the idea of new industrial appropriations as an epochal equivalent of sorts to the primordial act of land taking. “Industry-appropriation,” he asserted, is the new form of appropriation that corresponds to the industrial-technical age.136 The forces that will appropriate and control the “spaces of development” (Entwicklungräume) will also divide anew the earth to determine the possibility of a postcolonial order.137 He concluded that “the space of industrial development and the division of the earth into industrially developed and underdeveloped regions and peoples” is decisive for the future nomos. 138 This is why he regarded the Third World as a foremost geopolitical terrain, “an area of conflict,” where the concrete planetary struggles for the coming nomos are fought out over industrial development and where alternative futures are enacted. 139 These incomplete and fragmented commentaries, the last Schmitt wrote on world politics, reiterate his claim that the main political question of his times is what and who will succeed the interval of the Cold War. He saw a clear opposition between the two likely outcomes: On the one hand, he denounced the dangerous prospects of “a planetary appropriation of industry” by one of the two contending Cold War super-powers emerging victorious to become the world’s sole sovereign, “the great appropriator, the great divider and distributor of our planet;” on the other, he ascertained a balanced pluralism among autonomous regional powers, unfolding in the anticolonial spaces of the postcolonies, in the combined efforts to appropriate their natural and industrial resources and break the binary spatial structure. 140 For Schmitt, eventually, the historical resolution of the antithesis between unipolarity and multipolarity, a global monopoly of a single power and a pluralism of coexisting Großräume, has a world-disclosing significance as, It will then be seen that certain nations and peoples have sufficient strength to endure within industrial development and to remain faithful to themselves, while others lose face and sacrifice their human individuality to the idol of a technicized earth.141 Reading Schmitt from the perspective of the concept of the colony opens up his political and legal theory of international law to a postcolonial horizon and indicates its contemporary actuality. What remains so interesting in Schmitt’s approach is the uncompromising attitude with which he exposed the colonial underpinnings of the modern nomos and interrogated relentlessly Western universalism in his quest for alternative post-Eurocentric global futures. One does not have to accept his political motivations and choices, or agree with all of his philosophical assumptions to recognize the significance of the insights his historical reconstruction offers in rethinking critically about world politics. By arguing with Schmitt beyond Schmitt, engaging in a kind of post-Schmittian exercise, I draw some preliminary conclusions pertaining to the relevance and limitations of his insistence that the colony is essential for the spatial constitution of political modernity. For one thing, Schmitt’s account incorporates the violent colonization and exploitation of the Americas into a broader global narrative that highlights the constitutive role of conquest in the making of the international interstate system as an originary moment of modernity. Probably the first to do so, his narrative runs against the dominant idea that the modern world order developed first within Europe, immanently, and then gradually spread outwards, exported to the rest of the world through colonial force and postcolonial imitation. Schmitt’s history of the relationship between international law and the nonEuropean world allows for a better understanding of how the global spatial revolution, which gave birth to and elevated modern Europe to the center of the world, was created by the colonial encounter and sustained with the difference between state and colony. This descriptive account includes what Bhupinder Chimni has insightfully named “a foundational critique of the history of international law,” which he associates with the Third World Approaches in International Law (TWAIL) that, like Antony Anghie, situates colonialism at the very heart of international law. 142 A similar influential critical discourse resonates powerfully in the philosophical and epistemological writings of Enrique Dussel, Aníbal Quijano, Walter Mignolo, and the decolonial perspectives from Latin America.143 It also reverberates in the original analyses of colonialism and imperialism developed from the African continent, like Samir Amin, Siba N’Zatioula Grovogui, and James Thuo Gathii. 144 Correspondingly, Schmitt’s plural and mutlipolar new nomos of the earth prefigures in later debates on a polycentric order, the transcivilizational perspective in international law, and in visions of plural legal orders and Third Worldism’s pan-regionalism as anticolonial alternatives to Western domination.145 These and other unexpected encounters between Schmitt’s theory of international law and anticolonial and postcolonial critical perspectives occur and become intelligible through the primacy assigned to the colony. It is a political primacy as well as an epistemological and historical one. Its centrality - as exception, foundation, and constitutive presence but also as a destructive force and a negative absence– animates both Schmitt’s unconventional theory of international law and the anticolonial and postcolonial radical rethinking of modernity. The colony is treated correspondingly, as essential for the making of international law, itself a fundamental determination of modernity. This shared understanding indicates the point of a certain convergence, a common position that accentuates the formative role of colonialism as the real foundation and the inescapable condition of possibility of the modern. Colonialism becomes constitutive of modernity to the extent that the modern age is regarded as irrevocably colonial. Recognizing this common ground between Schmitt and critical postcolonial approaches does not erase obvious differences, irreconcilable disagreements, and an unbridgeable chasm that expectedly and for good reasons separates them. Although points of encounter should not be neglected neither acknowledging them can cover up the obvious presence of a Eurocentric paradigm at work in Schmitt’s history of international law. This is not only because of his well-known admiration of European civilization and the praise of its superiority. It is also that his metropolitan gaze departs from the center to reach the periphery in order to return back to this very same center, whose demise he lamented. For instance, his idea of a post-Eurocentric, pluralistic, and multipolar order, a balanced coexistence among distinct regional blocks forming an equilibrium of forces, does not escape the grasp of Europe as it reproduces a model of a mechanical order based on a specific statist rationality and ontology, historically and geographically determined. This realist rationality he applied it to larger entities and at global level but organized along modern European philosophical principles, norms and rules. Schmitt’s legal and political international theory faces here an important limitation as it reproduces what it sets to repudiate. A similar impasse appears in the glaring absence of the indigenous and the colonized. This is captured by Benno Teschke’s poignant criticism of Schmitt's account that indicts him, rightly so, for “the absence of an inquiry into the inter-political nature of the encounter. The native Amerindians remain missing from his account.... They are not even acknowledged as passive bearers and victims of the incoming Spaniards and Portuguese, but nullified and written out of history.”146 It is true that Schmitt’s discussion of the conquest of the Americas ignores the standpoint of the oppressed. His, remains a European perspective, built from the singular position of the colonizer. As such, his heterodox world history is not heterodoxical enough to accommodate the political agency of the colonized. 147 Indeed, Schmitt’s postcolonial imagination is neither pure nor complete. It can be partial and flowed, contradictory, aporetic at times, cynical and ideological, occasionally distorted and distorting, even prejudicial. Notwithstanding these limitations, his international theory of politics and law and the primacy of the concept of the colony suggest three clear conclusions with a certain critical and emancipatory orientation. The first pertains to the colonial foundations of the interstate system, state sovereignty, and political modernity as such. Simply put, for Schmitt, modernity is both Eurocentric and colonial. The second refers to the opposition between anticolonialism and decolonization, on the one hand, and the modern Eurocentric international order, on the other. The former is described as a real political negation of the latter: the spatial structure of anticolonialism is inherently anti-Eurocentric. The last conclusion involves the political significance of the postcolonies as alternative spaces where greater regions and geopolitical blocks might develop into becoming founding participants and equal members of a pluriversal global nomos. As a categorical description of the intimate relationship between colonialism and modernity and their complicity in the making of colonial modernity all three of Schmitt’s conclusions register at the core of his thought the modern horizon opened by colonialism and point, however dimly, at possible decolonial global futures. 148

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › Alt › Decolonization

Thus, the only alternative is an ethic of incommensurability.

Tuck and Yang 12 (Eve Tuck, Unangax, State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego, Decolonization is not a metaphor, Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, pp. 1-40, JKS)

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability. when you take away the punctuation he says of lines lifted from the documents about military-occupied land its acreage and location you take away its finality opening the possibility of other futures -Craig Santos Perez, Chamoru scholar and poet (as quoted by Voeltz, 2012) Decolonization offers a different perspective to human and civil rights based approaches to justice, an unsettling one, rather than a complementary one. Decolonization is not an “and”. It is an elsewhere.

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › Alt › Critical Peace Research

The alternative is a critical peace research strategy that critiques and reforms sovereign conceptions of violence and peace – interrogation of why threats are constructed as such must come prior to political decision-making

Jackson 15 (Richard, ‘Towards critical peace research: Lessons from critical terrorism studies,’ chapter in Researching Terrorism, Peace and Conflict Studies: Interaction, synthesis, and opposition, edited by Ioannis Tellidis and Harmonie Toros, pp. 24-31) CSUF JmB TDI

Critical peace research: a proposal On the basis of the above assessment, this section briefly outlines a set of core commitments which I believe ought to characterise CPR. I conceive of ‘critical’ (peace) research in two primary senses. First, it simply means an intellectual orientation or attitude which attempts to stand apart from the existing order (while at the same time acknowledging that one can never fully escape one’s own situatedness or biases), which questions widely accepted common- sense and dominant forms of knowledge about peace and conflict, and which asks probing questions about how existing social and epistemic orders came into existence and the processes by which they are maintained. Second, and more narrowly, the term ‘critical’ is used to refer to approaches which draw upon the analytical tools and insights of Frankfurt School- inspired Critical Theory, as well as related critical-normative social theories and disciplinary approaches such as critical constructivism, post- structuralism, feminism, post- colonialism and others. In the first instance, critical approaches are characterised by a healthy scepticism towards accepted knowledge claims and dominant ideas, and instead, seek to continuously question and interrogate that which is taken for granted. In particular, critical scholars are committed to interrogating how the status quo is implicated in some of the very problems that traditional theory seeks to solve, in this case, the ‘problems’ of conflict, violence, lack of reconciliation and the like. In part, this is because critical approaches recognise that knowledge and power are intimately connected– that knowledge is never neutral, but ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Cox 1981). Lastly, in contrast to the social scientific adoption of a purportedly neutral standpoint on political and ethical issues, critical approaches are characterised by an openly ethical- normative commitment to human rights, social justice, progressive politics, and improving the lives of individuals and communities – or what is often called ‘emancipation’ or praxis (McDonald 2009). Ontological commitments What exactly are the things called ‘conflict’, ‘peace’, ‘violence’, ‘terrorism’, ‘mediation’, ‘reconciliation’ and the like, that we study, and how should we conceive, understand and speak of them? An openly critical approach would suggest that all of these objects of study are not free- standing, ontologically distinct phenomena discoverable by objective social scientific study. Instead, things like ‘peace’, ‘humanitarian intervention’, ‘cultural violence’ or ‘reconciliation’ are social formations and sets of social activities that are in large part contingent upon, and constituted by, the terms, languages and discourses used to describe and study them. A concept like ‘peace’ is actually ‘an ontologically suspicious concept’ (Elshtain quoted in Neufeld 1993: 172), and whether a particular society is described as ‘peaceful’, ‘post- conflict’, ‘reconciled’, or ‘violent’ is not a value- free fact or ‘truth’ waiting to be discovered by a scholar through the scientific method, but the consequence of the operation of a series of academic, political and social discourses, judgements and practices in different locales. In other words, there is a discursive, political, cultural and academic process by which real world actors and processes are given meaning through the negotiated application of different kinds of political and intellectual labels, categories and narratives, including a set of discursively constructed measures by which ‘peacefulness’ or ‘violence’ can be ranked, or groups judged to be ‘spoilers’, for example. Such measurements are inherently ideological in that they prioritise some values over others: direct violence over structural violence, order over social justice, dialogue over resistance. Moreover, such labels, concepts, categories and meanings are prone to change and contestation; they never just ‘speak for themselves’. In terms of exactly what a ‘conflict’ consists of, for example, something that started as a ‘rebellion’ might then become a ‘terrorist campaign’ (or ‘The troubles’), before being designated a ‘civil war’ (usually, by virtue of reaching an arbitrary fatality threshold), a ‘genocide’ or a ‘counter-insurgency campaign’. This is not to say that critical approaches do not recognise actual physical violence in the ‘real world’ which is experienced by people as ‘civil war’ or ‘terrorism’, or conditions of low direct violence which is understood as ‘peace’. Rather, it is to adopt a Frankfurt School- inspired ontology which maintains a ‘minimal foundationalism’ in which the ontological distinction between subject and object is preserved, and discourse and materiality are conceptualised as shaping each other in a dialectical, never-ceasing dynamic, rather than the one being solely constituted by the other (Toros and Gunning 2009). Such an ontological standpoint recognizes that there are observable ‘regularities’ in human activity (what positivists might call laws), and that one can distinguish between different phenomena on the basis of their delineated characteristics, while at the same time recognising that these characteristics and how they are interpreted are a product of their social and historical context and thus, are not ‘objective facts’ in the positivist sense. Consequently, for critical scholars, the acceptance of the relative ontological insecurity of analytical concepts results in a real sensitivity to the politics of labelling and categorising, and extreme care in the use of different terms during research and teaching. However, critical approaches go even further, recognising that peace, conflict, violence, reconciliation and the like are in themselves constituted by social and political narratives, discourses and practices. As a consequence, critical scholars are interested in the constitutive nature of norms, ideas and other discursive elements which make the social practices of conflict, violence, dialogue, peace and reconciliation possible in specific historical and spatial contexts (Alkopher 2005: 716). In other words, critical approaches suggest that violent conflict cannot be fully understood apart from the particular kinds of narratives, discourses and social practices which make it possible by rendering it conceivable, legitimate and reasonable (see Jabri 1996). Crucial to this process is the role played by existing normative structures which function to construct identities, interests and modes of social action (Alkopher 2005: 720). Importantly, in addition to critical civil war research (see Jackson 2014) within the conflict analysis side of the field, a critical ontology which accepts the social construction and inherent instability of the key concepts is also starting to inform approaches to the study of peace (Richmond 2007, Shinko 2008) and conflict resolution (Hansen 2008), among others. Epistemological commitments A critical epistemology accepts that creating knowledge is ultimately a social process which depends on a range of contextual and process- related factors, not least the social position of the researcher, the institutional context within which they conduct their research, and the kinds of methods they employ. Such factors impact on the kinds of knowledge produced, as well as the purposes to which it is ultimately put. Importantly, this does not mean that all knowledge about the social world is hopelessly insecure, that scholarly standards and procedures in research should be rejected, or that ‘anchorages’ – relatively secure knowledge claims – cannot be found and built upon (Booth 2008). Rather, it suggests that CPR should be characterised by a continuous and critical reflexivity in regards to its own epistemology, methodology and assumptions. It also means that there are few if any knowledge claims about conflict, violence, peace, reconciliation and the like that cannot be challenged or questioned. Related to this, a critical perspective also recognises that no individual, including academic researchers, can completely put aside their personal identity, values, perceptions, and world view and then engage in purely objective, dispassionate, value- free research. Rather, every researcher brings with them a particular culture and set of values and understandings which shapes their research in important ways. At the very least, critical scholars argue that recognising and acknowledging the personal subjectivity of the researcher is an important step (see Breen Smyth 2009), not least because such continuous reflexivity acts as an antidote to the dangerous claim that some kinds of knowledge are objective and wholly unbiased, and therefore superior to others. Crucially, such an epistemological stance does not entail a wholesale rejection of the social scientific notion of objectivity, but instead accepts that there are multiple ways of knowing about objects of social analysis, such as conflicts or peace processes, that it is in any case beyond the capacity of any single narrative to provide the best account of such processes, and that through a pluralisation of perspectives and their inevitable clashes a more justifiable knowledge can be assembled (see Campbell 1998: 279–281). A critical approach therefore suggests that ‘continual contestation, rather than the aspirations of synthesis and totality, should be the aim of inquiry’ (ibid.: 281).

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › Links › West Asia

After the fall of Iraq the product of reducing presence in the (X region) is a farce – lack of US presence in Iraq shifted engagement where hard power resources of boots on the ground become obsolete and instead soft power resources or drone strikes and arm sales maintains the violence of US militarism

Fawcett 2023 [Louise, Professor of International Relations and Wilfrid Knapp Fellow and Tutor in Politics. The Iraq War 20 years on: towards a new regional architecture. International Affairs, 99(2), 567-585.] CSUF JmB TDI

The first level examined here is the international one, from which arguably all other changes flowed. IR scholarship is frequently criticized for its top-down, overly ‘systemic’ perspective, focusing on the agency of major states, which can occlude the effects of local influences and actors, but in this case such a perspective is inescapable. In contrast with other major regional events which had strong local as well as international origins (the Arab–Israel wars, Lebanon’s wars, the Iranian Revolution or the Iran–Iraq War, for example), this was a top-down decision: a war that ‘did not need to happen and certainly not when it did’,39 and one opposed by multiple regional and international actors. The US decision to go to war and remake the Iraqi state, and to refashion the Middle East, was critical in facilitating new international alignments, changing perceptions of US power, and opening the way to a new regional balance of power and institutions. The effects were greater because the Iraq War occurred at a time when US unipolarity was still at its height; the Middle East constituted one of the most important testing grounds of the ‘new world order’ articulated by President George W. Bush following the Gulf War of 1991, and the ‘Asia pivot’ was still a project in the making. If that new world order had been bruised by the events of the later 1990s, including the demise of the MEPP and the rise of anti-western Islamic extremism, it had not been broken, and in some ways the Iraq War decision was further confirmation of that. But the protracted nature, cost and ultimate failure of that war to achieve its stated goals had a significant impact on US influence in the region and the wider world, lessening its diplomatic reputation.40 In the words of Joseph Nye, it at once marked the end of the ‘unipolar moment’, the ‘fall of US hegemony’ and the failure of ‘democratic enlargement’41—large claims, but the message was not lost on either allies or rivals. None of this was intended. President Obama spoke of the war as one that should not have been authorized and waged, but he also spoke of moving ‘beyond Iraq’ and ‘renewing American leadership’.42 Any renewal of leadership, however, would not take place in the Middle East theatre, and not on the same terms. The Iraq War heralded a distinctive change in the nature of US involvement in the region, from high to low intensity—highlighted by the withdrawal from Iraq itself, and later Afghanistan, and its taking more measured roles in Libya and Syria. Lynch notes how three consecutive presidents effectively downgraded their security commitments to the region.43 True, this was not disengagement, but ‘shifting engagement’.44 In terms of military bases and arms exports, the US footprint in the region remains far larger than that of any other power, notwithstanding withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan.45 In this regard, the path dependence of US military commitment and overseas presence is striking.46 Still, after Iraq, the willingness to use traditional hard power resources has declined, with a preference for a light military presence, air power or ‘surrogate’ warfare, using proxy actors, drones and sanctions regimes with consequences that are unpredictable in terms of reputation and results.47 The assassination, in January 2020, of Iran’s General Soleimani by a US-ordered drone strike was illustrative of such a strategy, one designed to downgrade Iran as a regional power, visible also in the renewed sanctions regime after US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Alongside this reduced appetite for direct intervention, the soft power resources of the United States were evidently eroded, including its credibility and status as a leading regional power, with consequences for allies and enemies alike. This was not the ‘new beginning’ that Obama promised in his Cairo speech.48 Some of this could have happened anyway, or happened elsewhere, in the light of new global challenges and growing multipolarity, but events in Iraq were decisive in determining the new character of US involvement. Approving a new arms deal in July 2022, President Biden sought to reassure regional allies, but the wider lessons of US policy have not been lost on Arab states as they seek greater autonomy and new partners. Nor were those lessons lost on America’s competitors or allies further afield. Both Russia and China, which opposed the war, and helped to block the possibility of any favourable UN Security Council resolution, were ultimately beneficiaries, though in different ways. They shared US concerns about Iraqi pretensions and stability in the Gulf, and were not inclined, at that time, to mount a robust opposition to the US intervention, for reasons that had to do with domestic politics and their international standing. However, they stood to gain materially and strategically in distancing themselves from the conflict and its subsequent fallout. New opportunities arose for these two powers and their aspirations to global influence: in supporting a sovereignty-first and pro-UN position, they were on the ‘right side’ in the Iraq War. For China the opportunities in MENA were mostly economic— the region became central to China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative, unveiled in 2013. By 2020 China had become a major trading partner of regional states and importer of Middle East oil, but was also at the forefront of nuclear energy cooperation.49 However, scholars have also noted that the war had another effect on China, encouraging it to ‘think globally’; to move away from isolationism and enjoy the benefits of membership in an expanded international society.50 For Russia, the opportunities were economic, strategic and political, hastening the opportunity, effectively seized by President Putin, to re-establish a regional foothold—one lost since the 1960s.51 After the Libyan intervention, which Putin opposed, that opportunity was provided decisively by the Syrian civil war, which also aligned with Russia’s more activist ‘counter-revolutionary’ foreign policy as reflected in the colour revolutions: ‘Russia’s response to the Arab Spring, most notably the diplomatic, political, and military support it provided for the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, represented a major return of Russian power and influence in the region.’52 Russia’s growing influence in Syria was made possible not only by changes in its own foreign policy orientation, but also by the reduced US appetite for intervention after Iraq. For both Russia and China, therefore, the Iraq War helped to erode the myth of western omnipotence and open the Middle East as a competitive space for economic and strategic opportunity.

2023 TDI Kritik
K --- Liberal Militarism › Links › Shifts to the Local

The marital form of politics has always been at home from the war on drugs to the post 9/11 security apparatus captures a militarization framework that in the aftermath of debasing military equipment come home to the militarized police

Howell 2018 [Allison. Associate Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University, Newark) . Forget “militarization”: Race, disability and the “martial politics” of the police and of the university. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20(2), 117-136.] CSUF JmB TDI

In June 2014, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) released a report entitled, War Comes Home: The Excessive Militarization of American Policing (ACLU 2014). The report’s launch received initial press attention, focused on accounts of police forces’ possession of military equipment such as tanks and mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles (MRAPs). Then, in August 2014, White police officer Darren Wilson killed unarmed African American teenager Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. The shooting was one amongst many across the US, becoming emblematic of the racism of policing. It sparked ongoing protests and the Black Lives Matter movement, which builds on existing civil rights, Black liberation, anti-racist, queer, women’s and prison abolition activism. Suddenly, the ACLU report seemed prescient. Images of armored vehicles and police wearing camouflage fatigues circulated widely. Media outlets across the political spectrum framed Ferguson in terms of the “militarization” of police forces sent to restore social order. I focus here on the ACLU report not only because of its influence on journalistic reporting, but because it stands as an example of the best kind of analysis that can be conducted via the (faulty) concept of “militarization,” which it adopts from scholarly work on policing (see Kraska 2007). My aim is to take seriously what the report offers but also to reveal what it obscures. The ACLU report provides excellent reporting on the changing tactics, training methods and uses of technology of contemporary US police forces. Following the before-and-after logic of “militarization,” the report identifies the origin point of the problem as the 1980s, drawing our attention to the racial inequities of the War on Drugs, and the increasing post-9/11 use of SWAT teams to conduct search warrants. It exposes federal government programs that have transferred military equipment to police forces, including bomb suits, drones, facial recognition technology, armored vehicles and personal protective armor. Finally, it examines the training of police officers into a “warrior mentality.” Much of this research is valuable, but the report relies throughout on two false assumptions: first, that if police forces are militaristic, this is an aberration that can be dated to the 1980s, and thus that there is a latent, more positive form of policing to which we can retreat; second, and relatedly, that the raison d’être of American police forces is itself not worthy of questioning. The critical point is not that “war comes home” as the title of the report would have it: war has always been at home in America. The concept of “martial politics” can capture what the “militarization” framework elides: the historical context out of which the use of MRAPs against Black activism develops. To claim an origin point for “militarization” in the 1980s is to ignore the ways that warfare against Indigenous people and chattel slavery were foundational to the American criminal justice system (Grenier 2008; Dunbar-Ortiz 2014; Davis 2003). As Black studies scholars and anti-racist activists have illustrated, American law and practices of policing can be traced from slave patrols and Indian War militias, through the Jim Crow era, to contemporary mass incarceration (Davis 2002, 2003; Muhammad 2010; Alexander 2010; Hinton 2016). Disability scholars and activists have drawn out a parallel history of disability incarceration (Ben-Moshe, Chapman, and Carey 2014; Erevelles 2014). For instance, psychiatric incarceration has moved from a system of forced institutionalization to one of compulsory chemical incarceration through enforced medicating in community treatment orders (Fabris 2011). Just as emancipation from slavery gave way to renewed forms of racism perpetrated through law, so has deinstitutionalization given way to renewed forms of ableism perpetrated through medicine and law. These are not separate processes: policing systemically criminalizes racialized, Indigenous, disabled and queer people (Mogul, Ritchie, and Whitlock 2011, 45–68; Amar 2013, 73–78, 209–210; Steele 2016, 331, 340–341). Understanding this history requires acknowledgement that police are not a natural fact. Organized police forces are relatively recent inventions, developing especially in the nineteenth century. They emerged as (and remain) a means of imposing social order. Their precise nature differs in important ways across national contexts and forms of government, depending on which populations were perceived to be threats to social order. For example, British police were formed to quell Irish nationalism and Chartist demonstrations in the interests of wealthy Victorians, fearful that London was growing rapidly in size and impoverishment. The London Metropolitan Police was modelled both on the Bow Street Runners, originators of the concept of regular uniformed police patrols, and on the London Marine Police Force, initially funded by the West India Merchants and the West India Planters Committee for the purposes of securing cargo from the colonies. Techniques of policing were also derived from colonial governance (Brogden 1987). Through the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, British police forces increasingly took on the role of ensuring public order against the threat of rioting (Harris 2004). In nineteenth-century Canada and Australia, national “mounted” police forces were established to control Indigenous populations, serving as security forces for settler colonialism (Nettelbeck and Smandych 2010; Monaghan 2013). These histories are important for understanding not only the criminalization of Indigeneity (Ross 1998), and the continued regularity of the murder of Indigenous people in police custody (Razack 2015), but also the ways that war and police have been inextricably entwined for centuries (Bachman, Bell, and Holmqvist 2014). Policing is not a matter of “domestic” politics that can be shuttered from IR inquiry: it is precisely a matter of martial politics, of war-like relations within so-called “domestic” and “international” politics alike. Likewise, in the US, describing police as “militarized” ignores that the establishment of police forces was tied directly to the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and in particular the institution of slave patrols. While in northern US cities like Boston and New York, as in London, policing developed mainly as a means for the social control of the poor and immigrants, in the US south, it emerged precisely as a means for ensuring White social and economic order in relation to (freed) slaves – dynamics that migrated northward alongside those same freed slaves. In the antebellum South, Blacks outnumbered Whites, and slave-owners lived in fear not only of slave rebellions, but also of the enticement of slaves to join opposing Spanish forces (Hadden 2001). First germinated in the colonial Caribbean, slave patrols were created in the early eighteenth century to enforce slave law (a separate code of law governing slaves). Intended to replace the system of private bounties, slave patrols complemented militias that protected colonists from “external” threats (Indigenous and Spanish). The idea that policing is different from warfare (and requires different forces) is based on the positioning of threats as either internal (slaves) or external (“Indians” and Spanish), but both served the same purpose: securing a White supremacist social and economic order. To this end, slave patrols not only tracked down runaways, but also broke up slave meetings to quash rebellions. They were officially appointed and indemnified by courts of law, operating not only in rural areas but also in cities (Hadden 2001). After the Civil War, and the official abandonment of the slavery system, police forces filled the role previously played by slave patrols (Reichel 1988; Hadden 2001; Davis 2003). While the American Civil War is traditionally cast as a victory for emancipation, the Jim Crow system of local and state laws soon arose to enforce racial segregation and ensure inequality in everything from housing to public transportation, education and voting rights. Vagrancy laws punishing unemployment were selectively applied, criminalizing freed slaves but not unemployed Whites, resulting in the imprisonment of African Americans who were then put to hard labor – reproducing White supremacism through criminal law (Davis 2003; Alexander 2010). This state of affairs was produced not just by the apparatus of the state. For example, scientific thought also supported White supremacy by creating bogus “proof” of the propensity for criminality in African Americans (Muhammad 2010, 2). The mid-twentieth century Civil Rights era, like the Civil War before it, is often cast as a triumph of liberal emancipation from Jim Crow – but just as slavery gave way to Jim Crow, segregation gave way to new forms of racist civil order. Much as slave owners feared Black organizing in the antebellum South, so did White urbanites in the Civil Rights era. So-called “riots” in Birmingham, Newark, Detroit and other cities – uprisings against police brutality and inequality – as well as organized resistance movements like the Black Panthers became a “problem” of social order like the slave rebellions of a prior period. The relationship between the military and the police is perhaps clearest in the subjugation of Black organizing in this period: not only was the National Guard called in to “restore order” in Watts, Newark and elsewhere (much as it has recently been activated in Ferguson), but the FBI also created its own counterinsurgency campaign, COINTELPRO, which surveilled, infiltrated and disrupted anti-war and Black power organizations (Browne 2015). This illustrates the martial nature of political formations aimed at suppressing anti-racist activism, from slave patrols through COINTELPRO. The War on Drugs was then-President Richard Nixon’s own innovation for quashing Black resistance in the name of “law and order.” The ongoing War on Drugs involves strict penalties for drug crimes, which are enforced and punished disproportionately in Black communities. It produced the mass conviction of African Americans, leading not only to imprisonment and forced labor, but also to a substantial diminishment of rights including access to employment, education and voting through the status of so many African Americans as felons (Provine 2007). If the War on Drugs has failed in its stated aim of reducing the drug trade, it has succeeded in enforcing a new racial order based on mass incarceration. A lineage persists here: police forces, whether antebellum slave patrols, or enforcers of Jim Crow segregation or the War on Drugs, have been central to a form of “martial politics” waged for the purposes of maintaining renewed forms of White social and economic order. Contemporary policing and mass incarceration can thus best be understood not in terms of “militarization,” as the ACLU and others suggest, but as a new expression of the “martial politics” of policing. Through an analysis grounded in “martial politics” we can grasp the presence of military vehicles and uniforms in Ferguson as a matter of continuity in the US state’s war-like relations with slaves and their descendants. This does not mean that modern policing is entirely the same as, for instance, slave patrols. Racism is highly adaptable (Bonilla-Silva 2006). “Martial politics” denotes a continuous framework of war-like relations with people of color, and allows for tracing different systems of racism within it. It is not that “war” happens elsewhere and is then brought home through “militarization.” This idea relies on a false distinction between what kinds of politics happen at “home” versus in “war.” It positions “domestic” violence as an aberration or inward leakiness of war. On the contrary, like the can of soup, policing does not merely now contain obvious military symbols – it is always already “of war” and war-like in its very form. Policing cannot be said to have been “militarized,” but rather forms part of a broader “martial politics” directed against racialized, Indigenous, disabled and queer people with the aim of reproducing liberal order.