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2023 TDI Disadvantage
AT: DA---Assurances › Assurance Core › AT: Credibility---1ar

Allies don’t believe in credibility theory.

Henry ’20 — Iain; Lecturer in the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University. April 13, 2020; “What Allies Want: Reconsidering Loyalty, Reliability, and Alliance Interdependence”; International Security, Volume 44, Issue 4; Accessed Online via University of Michigan Libraries; //CYang

Leaders believe that if their state abandons one ally during a crisis, then their state's other allies will expect similar disloyalty in the future. Thus, a single instance of disloyalty can damage, or even destroy, alliances with other states. Because of this belief in interdependence — that developments in one alliance will also affect other alliances — the desire to demonstrate loyalty has exercised a tremendous influence on U.S. policy. But is indiscriminate loyalty what allies want? The First Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954–55) case study suggests that allies do not desire U.S. loyalty in all situations. Instead, they want the [US] United States to be a reliable ally, posing no risk of abandonment or entrapment. In the First Taiwan Strait Crisis, several allies worried that U.S. loyalty to the Republic of China increased the risk of unwanted conflict, and as the crisis persisted, these allies sought to restrain the United States and thus reduce the likelihood of war. Although U.S. leaders were reluctant to coerce the Republic of China into backing down during this territorial dispute with the People's Republic of China, other U.S. allies actively encouraged such disloyalty. These findings have significance for theories of alliance politics and international reputation, as well as contemporary alliance management.

Introduction

2023 TDI Disadvantage
AT: DA---Assurances › Assurance Core › AT: Credibility---1ar

Credibility is nonsense – especially in the context of our aff

Larison 22 [Daniel; 9-2-2022; Ph.D. in History from the University of Chicago; “Amazing: US ‘credibility’ intact a year after Afghanistan withdrawal”; ] brett

Hawks denounced the withdrawal from Afghanistan for many reasons, but one of their recurring complaints was that it threatened to wreck U.S. credibility in the world.

According to the standard hawkish view, withdrawing from a failed war signals weakness and a lack of resolve, which in turn causes allies to lose confidence in U.S. commitments to protect them and encourages adversaries to become aggressive on the assumption that the U.S. is unwilling or unable to oppose them. Hawks hold to a quasi-mystical view of credibility where a withdrawal anywhere invites aggression everywhere, and they then try to blame the withdrawal for causing whatever goes wrong anywhere else in the world afterwards.

2023 TDI Disadvantage
AT: DA---Assurances › Assurance Core › Europe turn---1ar

The plan provides European allies with security. It won’t be perceived a broad disengagement from world politics.

Kirshner 23 – [Jonathan, Ph.D. from Princeton, Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Boston College. Kirshner was the first World Politics Visiting Fellow at Princeton University’s Institute for International and Regional Studies, and was the director of the Economics and National Security Program at the Olin Institute at Harvard University from 2000-04, “It’s a Good Time to Leave the Persian Gulf.” The National Interest, , March 22, 2023] TDI

On the evolving world stage, regarding the American national interest, two primary and pressing political goals stand out. It remains vital for the United States that its allies and affiliates in Europe remain secure, democratic, and well-disposed toward each other. This is an example of what Arnold Wolfers called “milieu goals”—which are especially important for countries like the United States that do not face present and immediate military threats at the border.

As Wolfers insightfully described, milieu goals relate to foreign policy measures taken to influence world politics in ways that make the international environment conducive to the thriving of national values, and one in which political allies feel secure and content in their shared affinities. For a great power, this, more than anything, is the stuffing of foreign policy in practice.

2023 TDI Disadvantage
AT: DA---Assurances › Assurance Core › Restraint turn---1ar

Exercising restraint in West Asia bolsters US assurances elsewhere.

Hickey 23 [Samuel; Jun 23, 2023; Paul Castleman Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation; “Melding U.S. Non-Proliferation Strategy with Middle East De-Escalation Dynamics”; ] brett TDI

The United States and Iran appear to be circling in on an informal, unwritten understanding to prevent the simmering nuclear crisis from boiling over. Avoiding a nuclear crisis in the Middle East is in the United States’ interest, particularly as Washington remains preoccupied with other parts of the world.

The Biden administration wants to keep global attention on Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and negotiating an iron-clad verification and monitoring agreement with Iran is not immediately feasible due to Iran’s recent crackdown on protesters and drone sales to Russia. However, region-led efforts to de-escalate tensions across the Middle East are complicating U.S. efforts to strengthen deterrence against Iran should the nuclear crisis reach criticality. Instead of relying on U.S. security guarantees, states are generating new security concepts to reduce tensions and establish mechanisms to maintain peace and stability. While the Abraham Accords have more openly integrated Israel into the region’s economic and security plans, the Arab Gulf states are signaling that they will not take part in Israel and Iran’s shadow war.

2023 TDI Disadvantage
AT: DA---Assurances › Assurance Core › Uniqueness---1ar

Allied confidence is down now---Ukraine.

Levite ’22 [Ariel; 6-29-22; senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Technology and International Affairs Program; “Why security assurances are losing their clout as a nuclear nonproliferation instrument”; ] brett TDI

Security guarantees have long served as powerful nonproliferation instruments, helping convince countries to cap and walk back their nuclear programs. It was the creation of NATO with Article 5 collective security guarantees at its core that made it possible to wean Germany off the nuclear weapons path. The same goes for the Warsaw Pact and Romania. Elsewhere, South Korea, Taiwan, and even Italy, Sweden, and Australia all had nuclear weapons ambitions at some point that were squelched by the offer of various US security commitments. It has been mostly vulnerable states, lacking such assurances, that have ventured to press ahead. The likes of South Africa, Pakistan, and Israel immediately come to mind.

Here the lessons of the most recent crisis with Ukraine come to mind. Ukraine was the only one (besides Russia, of course) of the four former Soviet republics that not only had Soviet nuclear weapons stationed on its soil during the Cold War, but actually had physical possession of these devices. It lacked only the activation codes needed to use the weapons; had it wanted to, Ukraine could have mastered triggering systems for the weapons in a matter of months. But in 1994, after much external prodding and internal soul searching, Ukraine agreed to give up on its precious nuclear possession in return for formal “assurances” for its security and territorial integrity anchored in the so-called Budapest Memorandum, co-signed by the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom.

2023 TDI Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Impacts › Probing !

Nuclear war.

Mitchell ’17 [Wess; 2017; President of the Center for European Policy Analysis; “The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and The Crisis of American Power,” p. 42-71]

America’s deprioritization of allies creates opportunities for revisionist powers. Such transition is recurrent in geopolitics; international relations are always characterized by uncertainty. Policy makers have to navigate a landscape that is often difficult to delineate, full of strategic actors whose purposes are often obscure and whose power is difficult to assess. Intentions are notoriously hard to divine, in part because rival states obfuscate them but in part because often the states themselves do not have a clear and consistent perception of what they want to achieve. Uncertainty arises also out of a more quantifiable source of knowledge, an assessment of hard power, which is imperfect and results in widely different estimates. It is sufficient to recall the challenges of assessing Soviet power throughout the Cold War.

Moments characterized by alleged large shifts in relative power present particularly acute problems of assessing power and intentions, adding an additional layer of ambiguity and uncertainty. Rumors of change put in doubt the relatively well- known, or at least familiar, geopolitical situation. All parties involved are unsure about their position relative to the others, the extent of their political sway, and the match between their commitments and their power. The established great powers may have a crisis of confidence, while emboldened rising states are uncertain how far their influence extends as well as how solid and credible is the power reach of their weakening rival. Revisionist powers now openly but cautiously question what was the grudgingly accepted geopolitical status quo.

2023 TDI Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Impacts › Prolif !

Regional prolif outweighs---it’s unprecedented and shreds traditional barriers to dyadic escalation.

Kamil et al 23 [Aya Kamil is a junior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Zuha Noor is a senior at the University of Pennsylvania. Kamil and Noor worked on this paper while research assistants at the Middle East Institute. Daniel Serwer, the lead author for this article, is a scholar at the Middle East Institute, a professor at Johns Hopkins University and a senior fellow at its Foreign Policy Institute. He spent seven years in US embassies as a science counselor focused on non-proliferation issues; 2023; “Assessing Proliferation Risks in the Middle East”; ] brett TDI

The answers to these questions are important. One-on-one nuclear faceoffs (as between the US and the Soviet Union/Russia, the US and China, China and India, and India and Pakistan) have so far proven manageable and even favourable to non-proliferation (as was the case for Argentina and Brazil). But the prospect of a Middle Eastern nuclear regatta with three or more participants in close proximity is daunting. There have been no comparable cases of multiple adversaries in the same region gaining nuclear weapons. Multilateral deterrence would be a dicey affair, due to greater uncertainties and short lead times for crucial decisions. The possibility of loose nukes, or nuclear weapons in the hands of extremist groups, would grow. The nuclear question in the Middle East is a long-standing one for good reason. Further proliferation there could make the region’s current problems, severe as they are, seem minor. Prevention based on careful analysis is the best way forward.

2023 TDI Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Impacts › Prolif !

Prolif causes extinction---accidents, brinksmanship, and loose nukes

Kroenig 15 [Matthew, Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, 2015. “The History of Proliferation Optimism: Does It Have a Future?” Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 38, Issue 1-2, 2015; ] brett TDI

The spread of nuclear weapons poses at least six severe threats to international peace and security including: nuclear war, nuclear terrorism, global and regional instability, constrained US freedom of action, weakened alliances, and further nuclear proliferation. Each of these threats has received extensive treatment elsewhere and this review is not intended to replicate or even necessarily to improve upon these previous efforts. Rather the goals of this section are more modest: to usefully bring together and recap the many reasons why we should be pessimistic about the likely consequences of nuclear proliferation. Many of these threats will be illuminated with a discussion of a case of much contemporary concern: Iran’s advanced nuclear program.

Nuclear War

2023 TDI Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Impacts › Prolif !

Credibility gaps spill over---extinction.

Beauchamp ’18 — Zach; senior reporter at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, and a host of Worldly, Vox's podcast on covering foreign policy and international relations. June 12, 2018; “How Trump is killing America’s alliances”; Vox; ; //CYang

Thankfully, those predictions turned out to be wrong. There are multiple reasons for that, but one big one — one that also helped keep relations between other historical enemies, like South Korea and Japan, peaceful — is a shared participation in US alliance networks. The US serves as the ultimate security blanket, preventing these countries from having to build up their own armaments and thus risk a replay of World War I. But if American alliance commitments become and remain less credible, it’s possible this order could crack up. America’s partners aren’t stupid. They understand that Trump is the product of deep forces in American politics, and that his victory might not be a one-off. If they think that this won’t be the last “America First” president in modern history, depending on America the way that they have in the past could quickly become a nightmare. The worst-case scenarios for a collapse in the US alliance system are terrible. Imagine full Japanese and German rearmament, alongside rapid-fire proliferation of nuclear weapons. Imagine a crack-up of NATO, with European powers at loggerheads while Russia gobbles up the Baltic states and the rest of Ukraine. Imagine South Korea’s historical tensions with Japan reigniting, and a war between those two countries or any combination of them and China. All of this seems impossible to imagine now, almost absurd. And indeed, in the short run, it is. There is no risk — zero — of American allies turning on each other in the foreseeable future. And it’s possible that the next president after Trump could reassure American allies that nothing like this could ever happen again. But the truth is that there’s just no way to know. When a fundamental force for world peace starts to weaken, no one can really be sure how well the system will hold up.

2023 TDI Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Impacts › Prolif !

Doubts about future intentions cascade, independently triggering revisionist probing and arms races.

Mitchell ’17 [Wess; 2017; President of the Center for European Policy Analysis; “The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and The Crisis of American Power,” p. 157-162]

First, recent evidence suggests that a policy of U.S. military retrenchment would make major regions less rather than more stable. For decades advocates of offshore balancing have asserted as an unproven dogma that a reduction in American alliance commitments would lead regional states to automatically balance against threatening powers, replacing the function of containment normally provided by U.S. extended deterrence, and that this would make regions more stable— all at lower expense to the United States. Recent experience provides a laboratory for testing the validity of these claims. As discussed in chapter 4, the behavior of U.S. allies over the past few years has shown that small states do not only balance against threats as offshore balancing advocates would predict; some also acquiesce in revisionist behavior through various forms of accommodation. More over, while many U.S. allies are investing in greater local military capabilities, it is not just taking the form of defensive postures; many are considering offensive or even nuclear capabilities that could contribute to regional destabilization unless accompanied by a U.S. security presence. The deterrent value of defensive alliances and the benefits of combined U.S. and allied balancing against rivals, once lost, may not be so easy to replace.

Second, it is not clear that jettisoning alliances would result in the financial windfall to the United States that many offshore balancing advocates expect. Losing the advantage of forward positions provided by allies would impose two new kinds of cost on the United States. One is the need to increase air and naval power: to achieve a level of power projection capability similar to what it possesses through overseas basing, much of which is on the territory of allied states, the United States would have to develop a significantly larger air force cap able of conducting offensive and lift operations mainly from North America and U.S. territories. It would also have to design and build large numbers of airplanes capable of crossing large distances into hostile air zones, a technological feat that is costly and unlikely to be achieved anytime soon. Similarly, relying on the oceanic moat would call for a much larger navy capable of maintaining a continuous presence across multiple oceans. Developing such a force would cost the United States a lot of money— perhaps as much if not more than it currently spends on overseas installations.5 A second, longer-term problem would be strategic in nature: the high costs of achieving reentry into the global rimlands once the United States has lost a forward presence there. The wars of the twentieth century are a reminder of the degree of national economic, military, and human exertion required of a power in America’s geographic position to achieve landfall in the Eurasian littorals and mainland once regional balances have been upset. Fortunately, in those eras, U.S. enemies did not develop the capability to deny the United States access to these regions. In the era of rapidly accelerating A2AD warfare technology, it cannot be assumed that America’s technological edge would allow it to do so again without enduring prohibitively high costs in U.S. blood and treasure— costs that are likely to be higher than any temporary savings from an ad hoc retrenchment.

2023 TDI Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Impacts › East Asia !

East Asian prolif goes nuclear.

Tan '15 [Associate Professor At the University of New South Wales; Andrew T.H., Security and Conflict in East Asia, p. 31] TDI

East Asia’s arms race leads to the classic problem of the security dilemma, in which a state that is perceived as becoming too powerful leads to counter-acquisitions by other states. This results in misperceptions, conflict spirals, heightened tensions and ultimately open conflict, thereby destroying the very security that arms are supposed to guarantee (Jervis 1976). East Asia’s sustained economic rise since the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the lack of any major conflict since has lulled many into believing that growing economic interdependence will make war unlikely in that region (Khoo 2013: 47-48). However, this is a false premise as significant historical antagonisms have remained. Japan’s imperialism prior to 1945 and its failure adequately to account for its past continues to stir up strong nationalist emotions in China and South Korea. In additions, the divisions between North Korea and South Korea are as strong as intractable as ever, leading to an arms race on the Korean peninsula. The situation is compounded by the weakness or absence of regional institutions, regimes and laws that could regulate interstate relations, build trust and confidence- and security-building measures which were in pace in Europe during the Cold War and helped to calm tensions as well as contain the arms race exist in Asia. Within East Asia itself, the Six-Party Talks have focused only on the Korean issue and have not managed to stem North Korea’s open brinkmanship that in early 2013 almost brought the Korean peninsula to war again. The arms race in East Asia is dangerous owing to the increased risk of miscalculation as a result of misperception. Chinese policymakers appear to be convinced that Japan is dominated by right-wing conservatives bent on reviving militarism (Glosserman 2012). At the same time, there is also a perception within China that given its growing strength, it should now aggressively assert what it perceives to be its legitimate claims in the East and South China Seas. Thus, China’s nationalist discourse perceives that the problems about disputed territory emanate from other powers, not China (Sutter 2012). The consequences of conflict between China and Japan, on the Korean peninsula or over Taiwan, however, will not stay regional. As a key player in East Asia, the USA, which has security commitments to Japan and South Korea, residual commitments to Taiwan, and troops on the ground in East Asia and in the Western Pacific, will be drawn in. The problem is that any conflict in East Asia is not likely to remain conventional for long. In fact, it is likely that it would rapidly escalate into a nuclear war because three of the key players, namely China, North Korea and the USA, possess nuclear weapons.

2023 TDI Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Impacts › East Asia !

East Asian prolif would be quick

Sanger et al 17 [David E. Sanger is a national security correspondent and a senior writer for New York Times and senior fellow in The Press and National Security at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard. Choe Sang-Hun is the Seoul bureau chief for The New York Times, focusing on news on North and South Korea, and a 2010-11 fellow in Korean studies at the Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center of Stanford University. Motoko Rich is Tokyo bureau chief for The New York Times and a graduate of Yale University and Cambridge University, 10-28-2017, "North Korea Rouses Neighbors to Reconsider Nuclear Weapons," New York Times, ] TDI

Long before North Korea detonated its first nuclear device, several of its neighbors secretly explored going nuclear themselves. Japan briefly considered building a “defensive” nuclear arsenal in the 1960s despite its pacifist Constitution. South Korea twice pursued the bomb in the 1970s and 1980s, and twice backed down under American pressure. Even Taiwan ran a covert nuclear program before the United States shut it down. Today, there is no question that both South Korea and Japan have the material and expertise to build a weapon. All that is stopping them is political sentiment and the risk of international sanctions. Both nations signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but it is unclear how severely other countries would punish two of the world’s largest economies for violating the agreement. South Korea has 24 nuclear reactors and a huge stockpile of spent fuel from which it can extract plutonium — enough for more than 4,300 bombs, according to a 2015 paper by Charles D. Ferguson, then president of the Federation of American Scientists. Japan once pledged never to stockpile more nuclear fuel than it can burn off. But it has never completed the necessary recycling and has 10 tons of plutonium stored domestically and another 37 tons overseas. “We keep reminding the Japanese of their pledge,” said Ernest J. Moniz, chief executive of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and an energy secretary in the Obama administration, noting that it would take years if not decades for Japan to consume its fissile material because almost all its nuclear plants have remained offline since the 2011 Fukushima accident. China, in particular, has objected to Japan’s stockpile, warning that its traditional rival is so advanced technologically that it could use the material to quickly build a large arsenal. Analysts often describe Japan as a “de facto” nuclear state, capable of building a weapon within a year or two. “Building a physical device is not that difficult anymore,” said Tatsujiro Suzuki, former deputy chairman of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission. Japan already possesses long-range missile technology, he added, but would need some time to develop more sophisticated communications and control systems. South Korea may be even further along, with a fleet of advanced missiles that carry conventional warheads. In 2004, the government disclosed that its scientists had dabbled in reprocessing and enriching nuclear material without first informing the International Atomic Energy Agency as required by treaty. “If we decide to stand on our own feet and put our resources together, we can build nuclear weapons in six months,” said Suh Kune-yull, a professor of nuclear engineering at Seoul National University. “The question is whether the president has the political will.”

2023 TDI Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Impacts › Germany !

It causes Russian threat perception AND countermeasures.

Ischinger ’18 [Wolfgang; 2018; Professor of Security Policy and Diplomatic Practice at the Hertie School and Founding Director of the Centre for International Security; Hertie School, “Germany’s Dangerous Nuclear Flirtation,” https://www.hertie-school.org/en/news/allcontent/detail/content/germanys-dangerous-nuclear-flirtation]

Second, a German nuclear bomb would damage the strategic environment in Europe – to Germany’s disadvantage. Russia would interpret German steps toward a nuclear arsenal as a direct threat to its own national security and would likely adopt military countermeasures. That, in turn, would make it even harder to pursue the vision of a pan-European order of peace and security, a core foreign-policy goal of all German governments since that of Konrad Adenauer. Moreover, a German nuclear ambition might jeopardize the delicate balance of power in Europe – including between Germany and France, for example – with incalculable consequences for the long-term cohesion of the European Union.

2023 TDI Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Impacts › Germany !

Germany gets the bomb in months.

Steff ’16 [Reuben; 2016; Senior Lecturer in International Relations and Global Security at the University of Waikato; Strategic Thinking, “Strategic Thinking, Deterrence and the US Ballistic Missile Defense Project: From Truman to Obama,” p. 139-140]

Commentators like Samuel Huntington and Zbiegniew Brezinski asserted that a world without US primacy would be a world of violence and disorder, less democracy and economic growth; American primacy facilitates global peace.1 Thus BMD was cast as inherently defensive; it enables the US to protect the global commons and international economic system that benefits all nations as the US assumes the role of a global-ordering superpower.2 Bush administration officials supported this position, in line with Hegemonic Stability Theory, holding that BMD could restore the freedom of action that would be lost in the second nuclear age, by allowing America to retain the capability to project power.3 There is some support for the nuclear age thesis. Firstly, nine states have nuclear weapons and apparently 49 countries have the know how to construct them.4 Secondly, to reduce greenhouse gases, many states may soon judge it prudent to construct nuclear power plants. Thirdly, states like Japan, Germany and South Korea have latent nuclear weapons potential and could apparently militarize their program in the space of a few months; Myanmar was suspected of having a covert program; Russia helped Iran build its Bushehr power plant and many states around the Persian Gulf are considering developing civilian programs. Syria also had a covert nuclear program until an Israeli strike in 2007.5 Finally, the IAEA is tasked with the contradictory mission of promoting the spread of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and inhibiting its diversion to military purposes. These goals are not mutually exclusive as the former provides a path towards weaponization.6

2023 TDI Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Links › East Asia Link

Pivoting to Asia ironically hurts East Asian allied assurances. The perceived loss of energy security freaks out allies.

---2nd to last paragraph = consult East Asia/Japan CP

Alterman 20 [Jon; 10-19-20; Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Director, Middle East Program; “Pivoting to Asia Doesn’t Get You Out of the Middle East”; ] brett TDI

Of all of President Donald Trump’s foreign policy ideas, the one that may enjoy the broadest public consensus is that the United States has been overcommitted to the Middle East. Seemingly endless U.S. military engagements, intractable problems, and rising energy self-sufficiency all push a growing number of Americans to argue for a far lighter footprint there, in favor of a shift in focus to the Pacific. There, the United States can partner with dynamic economies, engage with fast-growing populations, and confront Chinese aggression. Much of the same argument was behind the Obama administration’s “rebalance to Asia,” announced almost a decade ago.

2023 TDI Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Links › AT: Other Assurance Solves

Credibility theory is true -- studies.

Brands ’20 [Hal; 2020; Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at Johns Hopkins University; NDC Research Paper, “Does U.S. Credibility Matter? Trump Is Putting It to the Test,” https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-01-16/does-u-s-credibility-matter-trump-is-putting-it-to-the-test]

This position was always a bit of a head-scratcher, because it required accepting that what a country does today has no impact on what others expect it will do tomorrow. Fortunately, a third wave of scholarship has now knocked down the more extreme academic critiques, without obscuring important nuances in how credibility actually works.

Cold War historians have suggested that U.S. intervention in Korea, which Josef Stalin had not expected, did strongly influence his views of whether Washington would also resist blatant communist military provocations elsewhere. We now know that John F. Kennedy’s perceived weakness in handling the botched Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 encouraged Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev to think he could bully the young president by trying to evict Western forces from Berlin and secretly shipping nuclear missiles to Cuba.

2023 TDI Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Links › XT Link---Unilateralism

A unilateral withdrawal is perceived as America First optics that crush alliances.

McGee 21 [Luke; Aug 25, 2021; UK and European Policy and Politics Editor for CNN Digital; “Europe left exposed as Biden walks America away from the world stage”; https://www.cnn.com/2021/08/20/europe/europe-left-exposed-intl-cmd/index.html] brett TDI

When US President Joe Biden finally broke his silence on the , European allies who’d had high hopes for a reset in the  were left dismayed.

Their disappointment was not at the contents of Biden’s address, but the America First optics of the leader of the free world washing his hands of a global problem. The unilateral decision to withdraw seemed to somewhat contradict Biden’s claim upon entering the White House 

2023 TDI Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Links › XT Link---Unilateralism

Even if allies support the content, unilateral withdrawal ensures prolif.

Lanoszka ’18 [Alexander; 2018; Assistant Professor Department of Political Science Balsillie School of International Affairs University of Waterloo; Cornell Studies in Security Affairs, “Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation,” p. 149-157]

How do alliances curb potential or actual cases of nuclear proliferation, if at all? Many scholars argue that alliances are effective tools for bridling the nuclear ambitions of states. When allies do try to acquire nuclear weapons, their alliance relationships serve as conduits for the guarantor to coerce a nonproliferation outcome. In this book, I show that such optimism about the role military alliances play is overstated. Alliances can deter nuclear proliferation if they marry written pledges of support with compatible foreign policy and defense doctrines as well as in-theater conventional deployments. Yet alliances are prone to severe adjustments that can unsettle the ally. When guarantors make major unilateral changes to the security relationship, through undesirable doctrinal announcements or troop withdrawals, abandonment fears intensify. The affected ally becomes so doubtful of its received guarantees that it becomes more likely to engage in nuclear proliferation–related behavior. Unfortunately for the guarantor, curbing such behavior once it has started is very difficult. It requires fixing the broken security guarantee that prompted the nuclear interest in the first place. Nonmilitary tools like economic sanctions may be the best coercive instruments available, but their viability depends on the extent to which the ally relies on the guarantor. Simply put, alliances are better for deterring potential than for preventing actual nuclear proliferation.

The empirical cases support this argument. Table 2 summarizes the main findings. Fears of abandonment in West Germany intensified after July 1956 amid rumors that the Eisenhower administration would reduce the size of the US Army by a third. Shortly thereafter, West Germany joined France and Italy in a short-lived and unsuccessful effort to develop nuclear weapons. Throughout the subsequent decade, Bonn deflected calls for it to make clear nonproliferation pledges while obtaining enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Its alliance with the United States certainly constrained its decision-making, but arguments that distinct coercion episodes prompted West German leaders to renounce nuclear proliferation are overstated. Domestic politics and prestige considerations were important factors as well.

2023 TDI Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Links › XT Link---Retrenchment

Military presence is vital to constrain proliferation cascades---best studies.

Brooks & Wohlforth 16 [Stephen Brooks, Ph. D in Political Science from Yale, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University AND William, Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College; 2016; “Assessing the Security Benefits of Deep Engagement”; Page 103-108] brett TDI

Deterrence Effectiveness The determinants of deterrence success and failure have attracted scores of quantitative and case study tests. Much of the case study work yields a cautionary finding: that deterrence is much harder in practice than in theory, because standard models assume away the complexities of human psychology and domestic politics that tend to make some states hard to deter and might cause deterrence policies to backfire. 1 Many quantitative findings, mean- while, are mutually contradictory or are clearly not relevant to extended deterrence. But some relevant results receive broad support:

Alliances generally do have a deterrent effect. In a study spanning nearly two centuries, Johnson and Leeds found “support for the hypothesis that defensive alliances deter the initiation of disputes.” They conclude that “defensive alliances lower the probability of international conflict and are thus a good policy option for states seeking to maintain peace in the world.” Sechser and Fuhrmann similarly find that formal defense pacts with nuclear states have significant deterrence benefits. 2 3

2023 TDI Disadvantage
DA---Assurances › Uniqueness › UQ---West Asia

US credibility is in doubt, but it’s still holding post-Afghan withdrawal

McKercher 22 [Asa; 2022; Royal Military College of Canada; ““How reliable an ally?”: Surveying American power and credibility after the fall of Saigon—and Kabul”; ] brett TDI

The fall of Kabul is, then, perhaps not the bellwether of American decline or retrenchment that it seems. Then again, the 2020s are not the 1970s. Indeed, over the course of the 2010s, US credibility took several hits. President Barack Obama’s failure to respond to Syrian despot Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons against dissidents—crossing, in the president’s words, a “red line”—evidently called into question American security guarantees to countries in the Middle East. John Kerry, Obama’s secretary of state, later acknowledged that the failure to strike al-Assad “cost us significantly in the region. And I know that and so does the president. … Perception can often just be the reality.”36 Giving voice to this notion, Jordanian King Abdullah II remarked to a reporter, “I think I believe in American power more than Obama does.”37 There were other serious doubts raised under Donald Trump, who questioned the stationing of US troops in South Korea and mused about not honouring Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, leading less nationalist-minded members of his administration to offer assurances to wary allies.38 But apparently the damage was done. “The times when we could completely rely on others are, to an extent, over,” German chancellor Angela Merkel commented after Trump’s fateful trip to Europe in May 2017. “We Europeans must really take our fate into our own hands.”39 Trump’s increasingly erratic and punitive conduct toward friendly governments over the course of his administration led some analysts to urge a revaluation of Canadian foreign policy. In particular, talk of a new Third Option emerged, with the aim of lessening dependence on Canada’s southern neighbour. As then Canadian foreign minister Francois-Philippe Champagne remarked in 2020, “Pax Americana is probably behind us.”40 What the future holds is unclear, but as in 1975, analysts today might wonder of the United States: how reliable an ally?