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2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AR — DA — Terrorism › 1AR — Terror — Link

Military presence is costly and makes terror more likely.

Logan 20 – [Justin, director of defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He is an expert on U.S. grand strategy, international relations theory, and American foreign policy. His current research focuses on the shifting balance of power in Asia—specifically with regard to China—and the limited relevance of the Middle East to U.S. national security. “The Case for Withdrawing from the Middle East” Defense Priorities, , September 30, 2020] TDI

Finally, there is terrorism. Here the striking fact is that less than two decades after the 9/11 attacks, the Washington establishment has almost completely moved on from the subject, yet it retains a central place in U.S. foreign policy.38 One never hears reference to a Global War on Terrorism. There are no longer any discussions of whether terrorism represents an “existential” threat.

Moreover, since the basic contours of American policy in the region predate 9/11 by decades, it is strange to think that a concern that emerged after a policy began explains the policy. But there is no evidence that terrorism is a threat that warrants an effort to manage the Middle East militarily.39 The chance of an American being killed by terrorism outside a war zone from 1970 to 2012 was roughly one in 4,000,000.40 By any conventional risk analysis, this is an extraordinarily low risk. As early as 2002, smart analysts were asking questions about counterterrorism policy such as “How much should we be willing to pay for a small reduction in probabilities that are already extremely low?”41

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AR — CP — Integrated Posture › 1AR — SD — Missile Defense

Threshold is low. There is uncertainty about missile defense, and escalation threat is growing.

Cordesman 20 – [Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the CSIS in Washington, D.C. Consultant on Afghanistan to the DOD and the DOS, “The Gulf and the Challenge of Missile Defense: Net Assessment Indicators” CSIS, , February 24, 2020] TDI

So far, the United States and Arab partner response is unclear. The scale and nature of the U.S. commitment to the Gulf region is becoming less and less certain, and the self-destructive tensions between Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE – along with the uncertain role of Oman and Kuwait – create further major uncertainties as to what process will really be made in missile defense.

Moreover, the growing tensions between Iran, the Arab Gulf states, and the United States have already led to significant clashes at low to moderate levels that warn that deterrence has weakened and that there is both a growing threat of long wars of attrition and escalation to much higher levels of conflict. This is particularly true because Iran deals with intense pressure from U.S. sanctions and internal unrest, and the Arab partner states face a common need to fund major economic and social reform although they are already spending far more of their GDP on military forces than the United States – Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are spending close to 10%.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AR — CP — Integrated Posture › 1AR — SD — Missile Defense

Allies won’t share intelligence, cooperation is slow, and mistrust and technical hurdles make a regional defense shield impossible.

Seligman & Ward 22 – [Lara, Defense reporter, covers the Pentagon for POLITICO. Her reporting on the military and the defense industry has taken her around the world, from the Middle East to Mongolia to the backseat of an Air Force Thunderbird, & Alexander, national security reporter and former associate director in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he worked on military issues and U.S. foreign policy, “Biden Wants a Middle East Air Defense ‘alliance.’ But It’s a Long Way Off.” POLITICO, , July 12, 2022] TDI

JERUSALEM — The Biden administration is urging Arab nations to team up with Israel to counter Iranian missiles, but continued mistrust and technological differences mean any kind of alliance could be years away.

Officials and experts say a more realistic goal would be for Israel to share some intelligence with Arab states, conduct tabletop exercises together and perhaps even purchase additional compatible weaponry. That’s more attainable than a regional defense shield linking shooters with radars, satellites and other sensors, they say.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AR — CP — Integrated Posture › 1AR — SD — General

Any sustainable and stable regional order requires complete drawdown.

Gholz 21 – [Eugene, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, currently on leave as a Visiting Fellow at the Defense Priorities Foundation. He served as chair of the international security section of the International Studies Association (2019-2021) and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He previously held faculty positions at the University of Texas at Austin, Williams College, the University of Kentucky, and George Mason University. His Ph.D. is from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “Nothing Much to Do: Why America Can Bring All Troops Home From the Middle East” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, , June 24, 2021] TDI

If the United States genuinely seeks a more stable Middle East, it must remove its weight from the scales and allow the region to recalibrate according to its actual multipolar balance of power. By allowing regional states to balance against each other, a more sustainable regional order can emerge, one not dependent on the eternal presence of thousands of U.S. troops. This approach would better serve U.S. interests, as a multipolar balance will both prevent hostile hegemony in the region and ensure that no party can close the Strait of Hormuz.

Consequently, to preserve Americans’ physical and economic well-being more effectively, the United States should significantly draw down its military presence in the region over a period of five to 10 years.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AR — CP — Integrated Posture › 1AR — SD — General

International standing. Reducing military contact is key.

Gholz 21 – [Eugene, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, currently on leave as a Visiting Fellow at the Defense Priorities Foundation. He served as chair of the international security section of the International Studies Association (2019-2021) and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He previously held faculty positions at the University of Texas at Austin, Williams College, the University of Kentucky, and George Mason University. His Ph.D. is from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “Nothing Much to Do: Why America Can Bring All Troops Home From the Middle East” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, , June 24, 2021] TDI

Given the low risk of regional hegemony in the Middle East, what might the United States military nevertheless do to serve the U.S. national interest? First, the United States might reasonably choose to cut back on its current tool of choice in the region. For decades, much of the non-combat U.S. effort has emphasized attempts to train local forces that the United States has considered to be “friendly.” These efforts have had little payoff in terms of apparent improvements in local force quality. Notably, heavily trained Iraqi forces melted away in the face of ISIS attacks, and U.S.-trained Saudi forces performed poorly in Yemen, struggling against Houthi militias while killing and injuring many non-combatants. Perhaps more important, even successful training, if it were to improve Middle Eastern militaries’ ability to execute modern combined arms tactics, would augment the locals’ capabilities on both the offensive and the defensive, offering little leverage over the core issue for the U.S. national interest, namely locals’ ability to bid for regional hegemony. Reducing U.S. military contact with regional militaries could also improve the U.S. image among the people of the Middle East — or at least mitigate the conspiratorial image that the United States is the real power controlling local politics and setting the local agenda. Even those people inclined to be hostile to the United States would tend to view the U.S. military as a more distant influence rather than as a day-to-day priority on their list of complaints.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AR — CP — Integrated Posture › 1AR — SD — General

Can’t solve either advantage. Military solutions encourage regional competition, prop up dictators, and don’t serve national security interests.

Goldenberg & Thomas 20 – [Ilan, former Senior Fellow and Director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. He is a foreign policy and defense expert with extensive government experience covering Iran’s nuclear program, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the broader challenges facing the Middle East. He holds a master’s degree in international Affairs from Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs, & Kaleigh, former Associate Fellow for the Middle East Security Program and 2020 recipient of the 1LT Andrew J. Bacevich Jr., USA Award at CNAS. Kaleigh has her master’s degree in international peace and conflict resolution from American University, where her studies focused on peacebuilding and terrorism. “Demilitarizing U.S. Policy in the Middle East.” Center for a New American Security, , July 20, 2020] TDI

America’s policies in the Middle East over the past 20 years have exacerbated this dynamic. U.S. military interventions in Iraq and Libya—and to a lesser extent in Syria and Yemen—have fueled the fires of civil war. Propping up dictators has entrenched corrupt ineffective governments. The sale of billions of dollars in weapons has only entrenched the security state in places such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Taking sides in the intense competition between different regional blocs has encouraged competition. Common among all these mistakes is the emphasis on military solutions—not diplomatic and economic ones. This stands in strong contrast to U.S. policy in Asia and Europe, where the U.S. military is certainly part of the equation but not the exclusive driver.

Reimagining U.S. Policy: A More Sustainable, Limited Approach to the Middle East

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AR — ADV — Rightsizing › 1AR — AT: Chinese Hegemony

China is certainly capable of regional hegemony in Asia.

Brown 21 [Gerald, Defense Analyst, Valiant Integrated Services; Arms Control Association, "Understanding the Risks and Realities of China’s Nuclear Forces," , June 1, 2021] TDI

Unlike Russia and the United States, China has found nuclear weapons to be of rather limited utility in war-fighting. It built what it describes as a “lean and effective” nuclear deterrent, with the intentions of deterring a nuclear attack and preventing nuclear coercion.1 Strategists in Beijing have long thought that the destructive force of nuclear weapons limits their utility, while conventional forces are more flexible and usable in conflict. Conventional forces are thought to be where wars are won or lost.2 In that sense, China’s nuclear forces are intended to check U.S. nuclear dominance while winning conventional conflicts at lower levels of escalation. To make that happen, China is seeking to build a nuclear force capable of surviving a nuclear first strike and retaliating with an unacceptable level of damage. Experts have perhaps best described China’s nuclear strategy as one of “assured retaliation.”3 Instead of seeking parity with other nuclear states and being able to engage in counterforce campaigns, China finds it sufficient to maintain a more modest, secure, and survivable force. If China can sufficiently absorb a first strike and retaliate, even with only a few warheads, Beijing believes an adversary is unlikely to decide that the risk of attacking China is worth the benefit.

Since China’s first nuclear test in 1964, it has consistently maintained a public, declaratory no-first-use policy, adhering to what it describes as a “self-defensive nuclear strategy” that would anticipate using nuclear weapons only as a “counterattack in self-defense.”4 Western analysts have rightfully pointed out that a no-first-use pledge may not be entirely credible on its own. Although the pledge may be sincerely held, during a crisis, escalation could be unpredictable. Additionally, a small number of Chinese analysts have suggested that what China defines as a counterattack may be ambiguous under certain, limited conditions, such as conventional attacks seeking to neutralize China’s nuclear forces.5

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AR — ADV — Rightsizing › 1AR — AT: ! — Asian Prolif

Asian allied prolif is necessary for deterrence, inevitable and no impact. San Antonio for Seoul makes nuclear war more likely.

Kelly ’22 — [Robert, professor of political science at Pusan National University. “The U.S. Should Get Out of the Way in East Asia’s Nuclear Debates” Foreign Policy, , July 15, 2022] TDI

Alternatives to direct South Korean/Japanese nuclear deterrence of North Korean WMDs are soft. Extended nuclear deterrence is weakly credible if it means nuked U.S. cities to defend South Korea or Japan. Missile defense does not work well enough to provide a roof against as many weapons North Korea appears to be building. China will not take serious action to stop Pyongyang. A negotiated deal — the best solution and hence discussed at length below — might control Pyongyang’s programs somewhat via missile or warhead limits or inspector access. But North Korea seems unwilling to negotiate seriously, is an untrustworthy counterparty, is unlikely to cut enough to relieve the existential threat its WMDs now pose to South Korea and Japan, and would demand exorbitant counter-concessions as payment.

This poor option set is already forcing “thinking the unthinkable” discussions in the region. South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has suggested preemptive strikes on North Korean missile sites in a crisis, and former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe suggested the return of U.S. nuclear weapons to the region. The sheer precarity of South Korean and Japanese exposure to a nuclearized/missile Orwellian tyranny — which will be evident yet again this year if Pyongyang tests another nuclear weapon as predicted — will make it increasingly awkward for the United States to hegemonically insist that Seoul, and Tokyo even, may not investigate all security options.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AR — ADV — Rightsizing › 1AR — AT: Retrenchment Turn

It's impossible to predict or quantify and military presence emboldens adversarial acquisition.

Logan 20 – [Justin, director of defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. He is an expert on U.S. grand strategy, international relations theory, and American foreign policy. His current research focuses on the shifting balance of power in Asia—specifically with regard to China—and the limited relevance of the Middle East to U.S. national security. “The Case for Withdrawing from the Middle East” Defense Priorities, , September 30, 2020] TDI

A concern related both to the fear of a regional hegemon and to Israel’s well-being concerns the longstanding U.S. goal of slowing or preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. U.S. policymakers have generally opposed the spread of nuclear weapons to both its partners and its adversaries since the dawn of the nuclear age. Washington opposes nuclear acquisition in its partners because it would diminish U.S. influence with those countries and grant them more say in decisions about their own defense. Washington opposes nuclear acquisition in its adversaries because, as Kenneth Waltz wrote, “if weak countries have some, they will cramp our style. Militarily punishing small countries for behavior we dislike would become much more perilous.”30

The U.S. presence in the Middle East likely makes its partners feel somewhat more secure and its adversaries somewhat less secure. If we were able to quantify the two effects, we could judge their value against one another, but they are impossible to quantify.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AR — ADV — Rightsizing › 1AR — AT: Retrenchment Turn

More thumpers – nuclear deal, Saudi relations, Afghanistan.

Hale 23 – [Erin, reporter. “Can China Replace the US in the Middle East?” Business and Economy | Al Jazeera, , April 25, 2023] TDI

All of this comes at a time when the influence of the United States — traditionally the biggest power broker in the Middle East — has waned, according to many analysts. The US decision to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal, its blow-hot-blow-cold relationship with Saudi Arabia, and its long occupation and chaotic withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan have hurt its credibility. Domestic politics have also kept the US distracted, as has a growing wariness among the American public about the country’s decades-long role as a global policeman.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AR — ADV — Rightsizing › 1AR — AT: Retrenchment Turn

Afghanistan and Iraq thump OR misperception is inevitable.

Lopez 23 – [Todd, Writer and Editor, United States Department of Defense, “Defense Official Says U.S. Remains Committed to Middle East.” U.S. Department of Defense, , June 5, 2023] TDI

"The significant capabilities across our Navy, our Air Force, our Army and our Marines — it's still in the region," Dana Stroul told the Jerusalem Post during an interview yesterday in New York City. "And they're still doing those important activities every day."

Although the U.S. at one time had more than 100,000 troops in Afghanistan and more than 160,000 troops in Iraq, the military pulled out of Afghanistan completely in 2021. And, in Iraq, operations are limited now to just a handful of troops performing advise-and-assist missions only. 

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AR — ADV — Regional Instability › 1AR — AO — Environmental Destruction

Bases cause environmental destruction.

Behnam 20 – [Reza, Ph.D., political scientist whose specialties include American foreign policy and the history, politics and governments of the Middle East “America’s Devastating Legacy of Endless Wars in the Middle East.” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, , December 14, 2020] TDI

PRESIDENT-ELECT Joseph Biden has advocated for domestic policies focused on equity, decency, justice and climate change. These noble principles cannot be achieved at home if they are not practiced abroad. If the new administration is serious about establishing America’s moral authority in the world, it must change its behavior in the Middle East—a region that has suffered profoundly as a result of policies that have been devoid of these ethical precepts. 

The Bush administration’s decision after the attacks of 9/11 to use force in Afghanistan, Iraq and in its “war on terror,” has damaged and destabilized a region already struggling with severe political and environmental difficulties. Although America’s endless wars have been a windfall for the Pentagon and weapons manufacturers, the human toll has been enormous.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AR — ADV — Regional Instability › 1AR — ! — Populism

Populists will ensure nuclear war.

Hymans ’22 [Jacques; 2022; PhD, Government, Harvard University, Professor, International Relations, University of Southern California; The Nonproliferation Review, “Responses to Meier and Vieluf,” vol. 28] TDI5

I have argued that nuclear-armed establishments are more dangerous than Meier and Vieluf suggest. Now I will also argue that nuclear-armed populists are dangerous for even more reasons than Meier and Vieluf enumerate.

Meier and Vieluf’s article does not do enough with its basic definition of nationalist populism as a black–white oppositional stance toward internal as well as external enemies. If we take that definition seriously, it becomes apparent that the biggest problem stemming from the rise of populists is not that they might ignore the advice of traditional nuclear and defense establishments and behave carelessly toward foreign powers. The biggest problem is that populism is a gateway drug to internal political violence, revolution, and civil war.12 And, perhaps needless to say, serious domestic upheaval in a nuclear power also increases the likelihood of a nuclear incident of some kind.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AR — ADV — Regional Instability › 1AR — AT: ME War Defense

Iran controls the Gulf now despite ‘permanent’ military presence.

Bing 23 – [West, served as assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs in the Reagan administration. A graduate of Georgetown and Princeton Universities, he served in Vietnam with Marine Force Recon and Combined Action Platoons. While serving as assistant secretary, he chaired the U.S. Security Commissions with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Oman, South Korea, and Japan.  “Iran Is Gaining Control of the Persian Gulf.” Hoover Institution, , May 9, 2023] TDI

The theocracy of Iran is America’s implacable enemy. For decades, a bedrock American policy has been to contain Iran’s employment of political pressure, sedition, and proxy forces in order to emerge as the dominant power in the Persian Gulf region. Since 2018, sanctions have prohibited the export of Iranian oil until that country ceases its nuclear weapons program. But that canon of containment is breaking down.

An estimated 70 foreign vessels were illicitly transferring Iranian oil in 2020; today, that number . Four years ago, illegal oil exports by this so-called “ghost armada” were estimated at 500,000 barrels per day; by 2023, it had.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AR — ADV — Regional Instability › 1AR — AT: Laser Weapons

Iran matches laser weapons.

Saballa 22 – [Joe, author at the defense post. “Iran Claims Development of Laser Cannon for Aerial Targets.” The Defense Post, , March 14, 2022] TDI

Iran claims it has produced and begun deploying a laser weapon capable of countering aerial threats, including enemy drones.

Called the “Sateb,” the laser cannon can reportedly shoot down aerial targets using powerful laser beams and is being utilized to protect “sensitive regions.”

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AR — ADV — Regional Instability › 1AR — AT: Hormuz

A hardline newspaper editor appointed by the Supreme Leader started a trial balloon—motive certainly exists.

The National 22 – [“Hardline Iranian Editor Suggests Closing Strait of Hormuz over Mahsa Amini Protests.” The National, , December 15, 2022] TDI

A hardline newspaper close to Iran’s ruling clerics on Wednesday suggested that authorities close the , a crucial waterway for global energy supplies, in response to alleged foreign support for the  gripping the country.

The suggestion came from the editor-in-chief of the Kayhan newspaper, who is appointed by supreme leader Ayatollah , in an editorial considered to be a trial balloon.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AR — ADV — Regional Instability › 1AR — AT: Israeli Isolation

No Israeli first strike.

Beres 15 – [Louis, Professor of political science and international law at Purdue University. **Leon Edney is a retired US Navy admiral, NATO supreme allied commander, and distinguished professor of leadership at the US Naval Academy. “What -Now for Israel?” US News, , July 14, 2015] TDI

To be sure, following careful assessments of the new Iran agreement, Israel's prime minister will need to make an 11th-hour decision on preemption. In principle, at least, considering any such defensive first strike against Iranian nuclear assets and infrastructures could still make strategic sense if the following conditions were assumed: 1. Iran will inevitably become militarily nuclear; 2. Iran will very likely plan to use its new nuclear forces in a first-strike aggression against Israel; and 3. Iran's key decision makers will likely be irrational. Regarding core definitions, irrational decision-makers would be those Iranian leaders who could sometime value certain preferences or combinations of preferences (e.g., certain Shiite religious expectations) more highly than Iran's national survival. In the absence of any one of these three critical assumptions, the expected retaliatory costs to Israel of any contemplated preemption would plausibly exceed the expected benefits. Moreover, there would be nothing genuinely scientific about making such difficult policy choices. For one thing, all of the associated probability judgments would need to be overwhelmingly subjective. How, for example, could Israeli analysts say anything meaningfully predictive about unique or unprecedented circumstances? In science, probabilities must always be based upon the determinable frequency of past events. Here, however, in pertinent history, there exists no usable guidance. To wit, exactly how many preemptive attacks have already been launched by a nuclear state against a nearly-nuclear state? The "zero" answer is obvious and irrefutable. It must, therefore, be a cautionary reply. An additional complication exists. The nearly-nuclear state, Iran, will still possess large conventional and chemical rocket forces. Many other threatening missiles will remain under the operational control of its sub-state terrorist proxies. Hezbollah, the well-armed Shiite militia, already has more rockets in its arsenal than do all NATO countries combined; it is even less likely than Iran's own leaders to hold back on any post-preemption retaliations. All things considered, Israel's best security plan, going forward, would be to enhance its underlying nuclear deterrence posture, and to render this critical enhancement as conspicuous as possible. More precisely, this means that Jerusalem should do everything possible to signal to any future Iranian aggressor that its own nuclear forces are plainly survivable, and capable of penetrating any of Tehran's ballistic missile or other active defenses. Correspondingly, it will also become necessary for Israel to move very carefully beyond its traditional posture of deliberate nuclear ambiguity, or the so-called "bomb in the basement." In the irremediably arcane world of Israeli nuclear deterrence, it can never be adequate that enemy states should simply acknowledge the Jewish State's nuclear status. It is equally important that these adversarial states believe Israel to hold usable and survivable nuclear forces, and be willing to employ these weapons in certain clear and readily identifiable circumstances. Israel's nuclear doctrine and weapons are necessary to various scenarios that could require conventional preemptive action, or more residually, a specifically nuclear retaliation. In any event, for Israel, the core purpose of its nuclear weapons must always be deterrence ex ante, not revenge ex post. An integral part of Israel's multi-layered security system lies in maintaining effective ballistic missile defenses, primarily, the Arrow or "Hetz." Yet, even the well-regarded and successfully-tested Arrow could never achieve a sufficiently high capacity for missile intercept, a quality needed to adequately protect Israeli civilians from any Iranian nuclear attack. In essence, this means that Israel can never rely too heavily upon active defenses for its national protection. What about the prospect of an irrational Iranian adversary? Any Israeli move from ambiguity to disclosure, however selective, might not help in the particular case of an irrational nuclear enemy . It remains possible, or even plausible, that certain elements of Iranian leadership will determinedly subscribe to certain end-times visions of a Shiite apocalypse. Still, taken by itself, such subscription does not automatically or even persuasively call for an Israeli preemption.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AC › 1AC — ADV — Rightsizing

Now is the best time to get out of the Gulf.

Kirshner 23 – [Jonathan, Ph.D. from Princeton, Professor of Political Science and International Studies at Boston College. Kirshner was the first World Politics Visiting Fellow at Princeton University’s Institute for International and Regional Studies, and was the director of the Economics and National Security Program at the Olin Institute at Harvard University from 2000-04, “It’s a Good Time to Leave the Persian Gulf.” The National Interest, , March 22, 2023] TDI

Such responses are not surprising. The United States, after all, likes to think of the Persian Gulf as its turf. It maintains a very large military presence throughout the region, tends to fight wars there, and for decades has been the ultimate guarantor that Gulf oil will not be impeded from reaching world markets. Those long-invested in these and attendant commitments do have reason to calculate that American political influence is on the wane in the Middle East, and, perhaps alarmingly, that China’s is on the rise.

It is important not to allow the fanfare to run ahead of the facts. However welcome (or, to some eyes, unwelcome) this one agreement may be, the region remains rife with intricately enmeshed political conflicts and rivalries. What the People’s Republic of China wants to achieve, and what it has the capacity to achieve—plausibly little more than contributing to stability in a region that has been the site of violent and bitter political contestation, with the bonus of reducing the Americans to spectators of their diplomatic accomplishments—remains to be seen.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AC › 1AC — ADV — Rightsizing

The plan sends a fast, clear and certain signal to allies that protects international standing.

Pillar et al. ’20 – Pillar, Paul, Andrew Bacevich, Annelle Sheline, and Trita Parsi. “A New U.S. Paradigm for the Middle East: Ending America’s Misguided Policy of Domination.” Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, July 2020. https://quincyinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Ending-America%E2%80%99s-Misguided-Policy-of-Domination_FINAL_COMPRESSED.pdf. TDI

Conventional wisdom holds that the presence of United States forces in the Middle East makes America and the region more secure. To the contrary, the U.S. military’s large footprint in the region, combined with voluminous U.S. arms sales and support for repressive regimes, drives instability and exacerbates grievances and conditions that threaten the United States. This presence has made Americans less safe and undermined U.S. standing abroad; it also leaves America less prepared to address more dangerous nonmilitary challenges such as pandemics and climate change, as the Covid–19 crisis makes clear.

Given the manifest failure of the current strategy, growing calls for a demilitarized approach to the region should come as no surprise. However, translating concepts of military restraint into practical policy requires sustained effort. This paper is intended to move the debate forward by operationalizing a holistic approach to the region based on a narrow definition of vital U.S. interests, in accordance with a foreign policy centered on military restraint and responsible statecraft.

2023 TDI Affirmative
AFF---Persian Gulf › 1AC › 1AC — ADV — Rightsizing

Chinese ascension to regional hegemony risks global transition wars and nuclear conflict.

Minemura and Mearsheimer '20 [Kenji and John; August 17; Researcher at Hokkaido University Public Policy School; Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, Ph.D. in Political Science from Cornell University; The Asahi Shimbun, "Interview/ John Mearsheimer: U.S.-China rift runs real risk of escalating into a nuclear war," ]

Answer: The real Cold War started before the coronavirus, and the coronavirus doesn't matter much. And ideology doesn't matter much. What matters is the balance of power. And the fact is, China has become so powerful over the past 20 years.

There is a serious chance that (China) could become a regional hegemon in Asia. And the United States does not tolerate peer competitors. The idea that China is going to become a regional hegemon is unacceptable to the United States.