2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Cobalt DA › AFF---UQ
DoD ‘23 [U.S. Department of Defense; ; 6-15-2023; "DOD Enters Agreement to Expand Domestic Manufacturing and Strengthen U.S. Cobalt Supply Ch"; Defense.gov; https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3429442/dod-enters-agreement-to-expand-domestic-manufacturing-and-strengthen-us-cobalt/; Accessed 7-19-2023; ARy]
The $15 million agreement, entered into under Defense Production Act (DPA) Title III authorities and utilizing funds appropriated by the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, will enable Jervois to undertake mineral resource drilling that will accelerate the improved definition and expansion of currently known cobalt resources at Jervois's Idaho Cobalt Operations (ICO) and the adjacent Sunrise deposit and studies to assess a domestic U.S. cobalt refinery. The project is a critical step in the U.S. effort to decrease reliance on overseas sources of strategic and critical minerals. Cobalt is a component of multiple munitions and high-temperature aerospace alloys used by DoD and has critical applications in high-capacity batteries for military and commercial electric vehicles. DoD has identified a foreign dependence for cobalt in the reports completed pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14017. "In investing in domestic cobalt resources, Industrial Base Policy is building a sustainable, responsible industrial base capable of meeting our future national defense challenges" said Dr. Laura Taylor-Kale, ASD(IBP). "Investments such as these execute President Biden's focus on strengthening supply chains for critical minerals for large capacity batteries and are one step in the Defense Department's strategy for minerals and materials related to batteries."
2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Cobalt DA › AFF---Cobalt-Free Batteries
IEF ’22 [International Energy Forum; 11-25-2022; "Flow, Cobalt-Free and Solid-State: What's the Future of Rechargeable Batteries?"; ; https://www.ief.org/news/flow-cobalt-free-and-solid-state-whats-the-future-of-rechargeable-batteries; Accessed 7-20-2023; ARy]
Cobalt is used in the cathodes of almost all lithium-ion batteries today, stabilizing them and boosting energy density. But this wonder material is scarce, expensive and toxic. It is unsurprising, then, that there is interest in replacing cobalt with other materials. Nickel is considered a promising alternative. A 2020 study found nickel-rich cathodes could be used in lithium-ion batteries, with slightly lower energy density than the typical cobalt battery but otherwise excellent performance – the researchers described it as the first of its kind without major performance drawbacks such as short battery life. Another alternative to cobalt is manganese, which is more affordable and easier to mine than cobalt. Researchers at Argonne National Laboratory are among those working to improve the performance of manganese-rich batteries to help displace cobalt. Iron has been attracting attention as a possible ingredient in cobalt-free batteries. Automotive company Tesla is betting on iron-based batteries, announcing last year that it was shifting to iron-phosphate batteries for standard-range vehicles. Iron phosphate batteries are cheaper and safer than cobalt batteries, but have lower energy density, limiting vehicle range. Interest is also growing in iron-based batteries more broadly. Iron-flow batteries, for instance, are attractive due to their cheapness and suitability for grid storage and recently, a start-up developing iron-air batteries – which it says can store electricity for several days – secured US$450m in investment. Solid-state batteries – which use a solid separator and electrolyte rather than the liquid electrolyte found in lithium-ion batteries – are often described as a ‘holy grail’ technology. In fact, automakers have spent hundreds of millions of dollars in the past decade in pursuit of solid-state batteries. They have many advantages over lithium-ion batteries, including being non-combustible, fast charging and having high-energy density. Solid-state batteries could incorporate relatively accessible materials such as glass, glass ceramic, or graphite. For instance, glass-based solid-state batteries have three times higher energy density than lithium-ion batteries, and have a high tolerance for below-freezing temperatures. Despite their great potential, these batteries are at an early stage of development, and it is not yet clear how they might be mass manufactured. For now, lithium-ion remains top of the rechargeable battery pile, and these alternatives are unlikely to knock it from its place any time soon. However, with electrification at the core of the energy transition, there is intense interest in improving battery technology – and one of these innovations may have a major part to play.
2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Cobalt DA › AT: DRC
CFR ’23 [Center for Preventative Action; 6-7-2023; "Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo"; Council on Foreign Relations; https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/violence-democratic-republic-congo; Accessed 7-19-2023; ARy]
Conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC; the Congo) has been ongoing since the 1990s. The country has faced political repression and instability since it achieved independence in 1960. DRC is the fourth largest African country by population and the most populous francophone country in the world, and is home to an abundance of vital natural resources. Despite its massive human capital and resource endowment, peace has eluded the Congo, and human security challenges proliferate. Currently, the eastern DRC is the site of ethnic conflict and violent resource competition involving ethnic militias, Congolese security forces, UN troops, and complex external interests. Since 1996, conflict in eastern DRC has led to approximately six million deaths. The First Congo War (1996—1997), began in the wake of the 1994 Rwandan Genocide, during which ethnic Hutu extremists killed an estimated one million minority ethnic Tutsis and non-extremist Hutus in Rwanda (DRC’s neighbor to the east). During and following the genocide, nearly two million Hutu refugees crossed the Congolese border, mostly settling in refugee camps in the North Kivu and South Kivu provinces. A small subset of those Rwandans who entered DRC were Hutu extremists who feared retribution or prosecution at home and began organizing militias within the Congo. Pressure intensified as Tutsi militias organized against the Hutu groups and as foreign powers began taking sides.
2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Cobalt DA › AT: Cobalt-Free Batteries
Castillo ’22 [Castillo, Rodrigo; Research Associate, Brookings Institution; 9-21-2022; "Indonesia’s electric vehicle batteries dream has a dirty nickel problem"; Brookings; https://www.brookings.edu/articles/indonesias-electric-vehicle-batteries-dream-has-a-dirty-nickel-problem/; Accessed 7-20-2023; ARy]
Indonesia—the world’s largest nickel miner—is making moves to become a key player in the electric vehicle supply chain. Most of Indonesia’s nickel output is currently Class 2 nickel, a low-purity type used for stainless steel. The country’s government and the mining sector are determined to transform its nickel industry to meet the rising demand for Class 1 nickel, a crucial component for electric vehicle (EV) batteries.[1] EVs are widely viewed as a pillar of the transition toward renewable energy sources since they typically have a smaller carbon footprint over their lifespan than gasoline-powered vehicles. These efforts have seen some success to date, with the EV and battery manufacturing sector making investments in the country’s downstream industry (in other words, investment in end-uses of nickel, such as EV batteries), including an EV battery cell plant near Jakarta. Nickel is a key part of Indonesia’s commodity-led development strategy, in which the country has banned exports of raw commodities to attract downstream investment and catalyze socioeconomic development. The government is planning to tax exports of nickel pig iron (NPI) and ferronickel, which would likely boost production of battery-grade nickel. And for EV manufacturers struggling to source nickel in a tight market, Indonesia has become a key supplier in the past year. But there is a catch: Indonesia’s nickel sector is particularly carbon-intensive and environmentally damaging. This creates an awkward challenge for EV manufacturers, who are under pressure to manage environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues in their supply chains, including carbon emissions. Some EV manufacturers have expressed a preference for “low-carbon” nickel. However, the supply of “low-carbon” is insufficient to meet forecasted demand, and it comes with a higher price tag. In this piece, we unpack the environmental risks and recent developments in Indonesia’s nickel industry that illustrate several of the difficult trade-offs required for decarbonization. Indonesia’s nickel sector poses many environmental challenges. Its nickel processing industry is especially carbon-intensive due to its reliance on coal. Civil society groups have also voiced concerns about the environmental risks of nickel mining and processing. Most recently, environmental groups urged Tesla to terminate its investment plans in the country’s nickel industry, citing concerns over deforestation, pollution of water bodies, and disruption to the livelihoods of indigenous people as a result of nickel mining. The way nickel is processed, and particularly how Indonesian nickel resources are transformed into material suited for EV batteries, is energy-intensive and environmentally damaging. On average, producing Class 1 nickel from Indonesia’s laterite ore resources, releases two to six times more the amount of carbon dioxide emissions than producing Class 1 nickel from sulfide deposits. The latter tend to have higher grades than laterite deposits and are easier to process, but more laterite projects in Indonesia and elsewhere are being developed to meet rising demand for nickel. Moreover, Indonesia’s energy grid remains highly reliant on coal—which accounts for approximately 60 percent of its total electricity capacity. Its industrial parks, which have become major hubs for nickel and aluminum processing, currently account for 15 percent of the country’s coal power output. If plans to expand the captive power of these industrial parks are fulfilled, their share of Indonesia’s total coal power output is expected to rise to 24 percent. While Indonesia’s government technically has plans to phase out coal for electricity by 2056, it may not prove willing to make any economic tradeoffs, including reducing industrial park capacity. Initiatives by Tsingshan, the world’s largest nickel producer, highlight some of these environmental challenges. For example, Tsingshan is spearheading one of Indonesia’s five hydrometallurgy projects through PT Huayue, a joint venture that is using high-pressure acid leaching (HPAL) to produce Class 1 nickel from laterite resources, which are generally used for Class 2 nickel production. Even if in the long-term HPAL in Indonesia can be decarbonized, the process produces “toxic waste that is difficult to manage” and poses environmental risks, like many traditional metal smelters in Indonesia. Similarly, Tsingshan has also converted Class 2 nickel pig iron (NPI), which is mainly used to produce stainless steel, into nickel matte, a higher-grade form of the material. This process has raised even greater concerns given that matte production from NPI results in nearly three times as many greenhouse gas emissions per unit of nickel as HPAL processing. The government of Indonesia and investors jumping into the country’s nickel sector seem willing to overlook these environmental concerns. President Joko Widodo has expressed aspirations to develop an onshore nickel-based EV industry, including processing and refining, as well as producing battery components. In 2020, Indonesia banned raw nickel exports to develop a domestic downstream industry, which halted the large outflow of raw nickel to China. Since the export ban, Indonesia has seen an uptick in downstream investments focused on nickel refining and processing, especially from China. Chinese refineries, including GEM Co, have committed approximately $30 billion to offshore their activities to Indonesia. In mid-April 2022, Chinese battery giant CATL entered a joint investment in Indonesia for nickel mining and EV battery production. Downstream EV players, including Volkswagen and Tesla, have also aimed to secure minerals from the Southeast Asian nation. In April 2022, a Korean consortium led by LG Energy Solution, the world’s second-largest EV battery manufacturer, signed a $9 billion investment agreement with local mining company PT Aneka Tambang (Antam) and Indonesia Battery Corporation. LG Energy Solution is also building a $1.1 billion battery cell plant in Karawang Regency, 65 km southeast of Jakarta, as part of a joint venture with Hyundai Motor Group. China has played a key role in the financing of coal-fired power plants required for nickel processing. Indeed, China’s large-scale investment in Indonesia’s nickel industry raises serious questions about China’s own climate agenda. President Xi has announced broad plans to stop building coal plants overseas and halt new coal-related projects. Indonesian coal-powered nickel processing plants seem to be an exception. A report by the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air explains that China may be using a loophole to develop two nickel and steel processing plants powered by coal plants in Indonesia. The projects fall under a gray area, as they are not “new.” Rather, they are linked to existing steel and nickel complexes approved before the ban. As a result, the coal-fired power plants have secured construction and purchasing agreements from Chinese firms. Moreover, it would be difficult for EV manufacturers to cut Indonesian nickel out of their supply chains even if they wanted to. Russia supplies roughly 20 percent of Class 1 nickel, but the repercussions of its invasion of Ukraine and the potential for sanctions may reduce this and constrain European and U.S. actors’ willingness or ability to source nickel from Russia. Given the investments into Indonesia’s refining and processing capacity and the sheer amount of its nickel reserves, Indonesia will likely become an even more important source of refined nickel for EV batteries over the next decade. Government action will be vital to cutting carbon emissions in the nickel supply chain. There are some encouraging moves in Europe. For example, the new EU Batteries Regulation will require EV battery manufacturers to disclose the carbon footprint of all batteries sold in Europe. While manufacturers may be motivated to reduce the carbon footprint of their batteries, including by opting for lower-carbon nickel, they will also likely face practical constraints due to a supply squeeze. Moreover, there is little sign of action when it comes to cutting carbon emissions in the nickel supply chain from other major players like China and the U.S.
2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Cobalt DA › AT: Cobalt-Free Batteries
Economist 7-05 [Economist; 7-05-23; "New technology could cement Indonesia’s dominance of vital nickel"; ; https://www.economist.com/science-and-technology/2023/07/05/new-technology-could-cement-indonesias-dominance-of-vital-nickel; Accessed 7-20-2023; ARy]
Now a new resource boom is under way. Indonesia is already the world’s biggest producer of nickel, a metal that is—among other uses—vital for building high-performance batteries. Demand for those is expected to increase hugely as demand for electric cars ramps up. Helped by new technologies for extracting nickel from the soil, Indonesia is planning big production increases (see chart). Macquarie Group, an Australian financial firm, thinks that by 2025 the country could supply 60% of the world’s nickel, up from around half today. Most of the world’s nickel, including that mined in Indonesia, comes from laterite ores. These, in turn, come in two sorts, limonite and saprolite. Saprolite, which contains higher concentrations of nickel, is well-suited for processing in a device known as a rotary kiln electric furnace (rkef). This melts the ore at more than 1,500°C, producing a compound of nickel and iron called nickel pig iron (npi), much of which is in turn used to produce stainless steel. But by injecting sulphur into the npi to displace the iron, a higher-purity product, nickel matte, can be produced that is suitable for batteries. That approach has two drawbacks. The first is that it is energy-intensive. In Indonesia, that energy usually comes from coal-fired power stations built near the mines. Coal is cheap and reliable, but produces plenty of greenhouse gases. With Western electric-car makers such as Tesla keen to tout the green credentials of their products, that is a big concern.
2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Cobalt DA › AT: Cobalt-Free Batteries
IEF ’22 [International Energy Forum; 11-25-2022; "Flow, Cobalt-Free and Solid-State: What's the Future of Rechargeable Batteries?"; ; https://www.ief.org/news/flow-cobalt-free-and-solid-state-whats-the-future-of-rechargeable-batteries; Accessed 7-20-2023; ARy]
Cobalt is used in the cathodes of almost all lithium-ion batteries today, stabilizing them and boosting energy density. But this wonder material is scarce, expensive and toxic. It is unsurprising, then, that there is interest in replacing cobalt with other materials. Nickel is considered a promising alternative. A 2020 study found nickel-rich cathodes could be used in lithium-ion batteries, with slightly lower energy density than the typical cobalt battery but otherwise excellent performance – the researchers described it as the first of its kind without major performance drawbacks such as short battery life. Another alternative to cobalt is manganese, which is more affordable and easier to mine than cobalt. Researchers at Argonne National Laboratory are among those working to improve the performance of manganese-rich batteries to help displace cobalt. Iron has been attracting attention as a possible ingredient in cobalt-free batteries. Automotive company Tesla is betting on iron-based batteries, announcing last year that it was shifting to iron-phosphate batteries for standard-range vehicles. Iron phosphate batteries are cheaper and safer than cobalt batteries, but have lower energy density, limiting vehicle range. Interest is also growing in iron-based batteries more broadly. Iron-flow batteries, for instance, are attractive due to their cheapness and suitability for grid storage and recently, a start-up developing iron-air batteries – which it says can store electricity for several days – secured US$450m in investment. Solid-state batteries – which use a solid separator and electrolyte rather than the liquid electrolyte found in lithium-ion batteries – are often described as a ‘holy grail’ technology. In fact, automakers have spent hundreds of millions of dollars in the past decade in pursuit of solid-state batteries. They have many advantages over lithium-ion batteries, including being non-combustible, fast charging and having high-energy density. Solid-state batteries could incorporate relatively accessible materials such as glass, glass ceramic, or graphite. For instance, glass-based solid-state batteries have three times higher energy density than lithium-ion batteries, and have a high tolerance for below-freezing temperatures. Despite their great potential, these batteries are at an early stage of development, and it is not yet clear how they might be mass manufactured. For now, lithium-ion remains top of the rechargeable battery pile, and these alternatives are unlikely to knock it from its place any time soon. However, with electrification at the core of the energy transition, there is intense interest in improving battery technology – and one of these innovations may have a major part to play.
2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Cobalt DA › AT: Cobalt = REE
Cho ‘23 [Cho, Renee; contributor, Columbia Climate School, Columbia University; 4-5-2023; "The Energy Transition Will Need More Rare Earth Elements. Can We Secure Them Sustainably?"; State of the Planet; https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2023/04/05/the-energy-transition-will-need-more-rare-earth-elements-can-we-secure-them-sustainably/; Accessed 7-19-2023; ARy]
To limit the global temperature increase to 1.5 degrees C or close to it, all countries must decarbonize—cut fossil fuel use, transition to zero-carbon renewable energy sources, and electrify as many sectors as possible. It will require huge numbers of wind turbines, solar panels, electric vehicles (EVs), and storage batteries — all of which are made with rare earth elements and critical metals. The elements critical to the energy transition include the 17 rare earth elements, the 15 lanthanides plus scandium and yttrium. While many rare earth metals are actually common, they are called “rare” because they are seldom found in sufficient amounts to be extracted easily or economically. Elements such as silicon, cobalt, lithium, and manganese are not rare earth elements, but are critical minerals that are also essential for the energy transition. Supplying these vast quantities of minerals in a sustainable manner will be a significant challenge, but scientists are exploring a variety of ways to provide materials for the energy transition with less harm to people and the planet.
2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Cobalt DA › Nuclear War---Impact
O’Hanlon ’22 [O’Hanlon, Michael; Senior Fellow and Director of Research in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution ; 9-22; ""; Brookings Institution; https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/FP_20220926_nds_china.pdf; Accessed 7-19-2023; ARy]
The United States has spent the last three decades planning for and fighting conventional wars of choice against adversaries lacking nuclear weapons. It now faces in China the challenge of designing a conventional defense strategy under the nuclear shadow cast by a peer competitor. For this reason alone, a war with China over Taiwan will almost inevitably raise risks of both inadvertent and deliberate nuclear escalation, to a degree that the United States has not directly experienced since the Cold War. Yet the relationship between integrated deterrence, as spelled out in the NDS, and nuclear deterrence, as discussed in the accompanying Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), is not entirely clear. China has had nuclear weapons since 1964, but recent qualitative improvements in its forces as well as the apparent pace of its quantitative expansion are pushing it toward a position of deep nuclear stalemate with the United States. If the two countries are not already there, they will be soon. Nuclear stalemate, also often called mutual vulnerability or mutually assured destruction, is a situation in which two countries’ nuclear forces are each able to inflict devastating retaliation against the other’s cities, no matter who strikes first. This is what people mean when they say that no one can win a nuclear war. Credible nuclear threats on behalf of allies and partners, or extended deterrence, will be hard to achieve in a world where China’s nuclear weapons pose an increasingly robust threat to the U.S. homeland. This means that it will become especially difficult for the United States to rely on its nuclear weapons to defend allies against conventional attacks, as it has done for many years. The world got a taste of this last summer with China’s test of a nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle mounted atop a fractional orbital bombardment system. The deployment of that system, along with other Chinese capabilities designed to evade missile defenses, is a reminder to the United States that if a conventional conflict escalates, the U.S. homeland will be vulnerable to Chinese nuclear weapons. Indeed, even today China could simply exhaust U.S. missile defense capabilities with a sufficiently large saturation attack. In fact, China may believe that its more robust nuclear arsenal endows it with greater freedom to engage in aggression as its conventional capabilities also continue to grow, knowing that the United States’ long-standing nuclear trump card is likely off the table. In other words, Beijing could believe that conventional war is less risky, and more promising, since the United States would have a harder time using its nuclear supremacy to force China into some form of capitulation. Something akin to nuclear parity would make it even harder than it is today for either side to believe it could wield nuclear threats in a convincing way. Paradoxically, the “strategic stability” sought in the NPR could actually facilitate instability at the conventional level, which the NDS is most concerned with addressing. This would be a return to the “stability-instability paradox” that strategists wrote about in the U.S.-Soviet context during the Cold War
2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Cobalt DA › Export Restrictions---Internal
Bader ’20 [Bader, Jeffrey; Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution; 11-2020; "Future U.S. policy toward China"; China Center at the Brookings Institution; https://www.academia.edu/49134577/Future_U_S_policy_toward_China; Accessed 7-24-2023; ARy]
There is no evidence suggesting that China seriously aspires to threaten the United States homeland or seek a global confrontation with the United States replicating the pattern of the U.S.-Soviet Union Cold War. Rather, we can expect to face a China that strives for economic preeminence in East and Central Asia, military security against the United States in the western Pacific, and rising but not predominant influence outside of Asia based largely on economic connections. We should not expect China to build up a network of like-minded or satellite states that pose a security threat to the United States, or to adopt the U.S. role in recent decades as the world’s policeman. China is not an existential threat to the United States, but there is no avoiding the fact that we will be competitors and, in some respects, rivals — economically, politically, militarily, and technologically. That will require the United States to get its house in order in numerous ways that go beyond the scope of this paper, as domestic rejuvenation is the basis for successful competition. Such competition also will compel limitations on cooperation in some areas where the United States and China interacted relatively freely in the past. The U.S. will have to secure its fundamental foreign policy interests against Chinese attacks or erosion, through defense of our allies in the Asia Pacific, deterring use of force against Taiwan, and protection of the key values and institutions of the international rules-based order. We also will have to formulate an economic strategy that not only rebuilds competitiveness at home, but brings together a coalition of like-minded aggrieved countries, eliminates Chinese trade and investment privileges unsuitable for an advanced economy, fights for maintenance of an open internet, and preserves the dollar’s special role in international trade and finance. The compilation of papers in this project offer specific recommendations for how the United States can most effectively compete with China across the full range of political, economic, military, security, and ideological domains. The most important battleground for U.S.-China rivalry is likely to be in the field of technology. U.S. creation and domination of the chief technology platforms provided the springboard for the American century. With the astonishing advances in technology that mark the 21st century, whoever is the chief innovator will be strongly positioned to be the dominant military and economic power for years to come. The reality that the United States and China will be technology rivals does not mean that there can or should be radical decoupling. American companies will want access to the Chinese market for profits and to Chinese immigrants and researchers who contribute so extraordinarily to their advances. We need to recognize the trade-off between restricting Chinese access to advanced U.S. technology and the encouragement we inadvertently provide to Chinese competitors when we force them to develop the products we refuse to provide. We should aspire to a world that is not completely fractured between American and Chinese technology forcing the world’s 190 countries to choose between mutually incompatible systems. We will need to protect technologies critical to U.S. national security and economic competitiveness without making export of every product with a chip an obstacle course. And we will need to redouble vigilance against Chinese theft of technology and impose enforceable penalties on Chinese entities that engage in such actions.The central challenge for the United States, however, will be how to project and protect our interests in the face of this emerging competitor but without losing our way by exaggerating or misunderstanding the nature and magnitude of that challenge. We cannot compete with China by outbidding China in an unwinnable race to the bottom through technology and social media prohibitions, expansive definitions of national security in trade and investment, managed trade, cancellation of scholarly and research exchanges, visa and immigration bans, and imposition of diplomatic restrictions. When we feel the need to use such tools in order to gain greater reciprocity, our goal should be for both sides to eliminate restrictions whenever possible, not impose them permanently. Our strength lies in our traditional openness, which cannot be casually tossed aside in every skirmish that comes along. The United States also cannot neglect one of its great assets: the alliances and partnerships we have built up over the last 70 years in Asia and Europe. Our allies and partners will not follow us in radical decoupling from China or a new Cold War, but they share many of the same grievances and can be a powerful force multiplier on all manner of issues if we treat them and their interests with respect. Many of the trends in Chinese development can become serious threats, but in some cases, they could be opportunities for cooperation, depending on China’s behavior but also on our intentions. China’s economic growth and presence, for example, can close overseas markets to American companies or expand American opportunities as wealth is created abroad. It is worth recalling that the great recession of 2008 would have become a depression without U.S.-China joint efforts to cushion the fall and provide massive stimulus. Continued Chinese construction of coal-fired power plants will contribute to global warming, but if the United States doesn’t work with China to combat global warming, the results will be catastrophic for the world. As two deadly epidemics (SARS and COVID-19) emerged from China in the last two decades, it is clear that isolation and sanctions alone cannot keep China-born viruses outside our borders. Rather, both countries must also engage in intensive scientific and public health cooperation. China does not agree with U.S. sanctions-based policies to deal with North Korean and Iranian nuclear weapons programs, but it does wish to roll back both, and it is naïve to believe that the United States will have success in containing either program without Chinese cooperation. The costs of radical decoupling have received little attention in the rush to announce the arrival of an ominous new strategic rival. The inevitable ensuing enmity would exacerbate an arms race that would crowd out pressing domestic priorities. It would divide scientists, researchers, and scholars working on common problems. Ethnic hatred and stereotypes would find fertile soil. Above all, it would increase the risk of military conflict between two nuclear powers. The temptation to see China as an enemy rather than a competitor is reinforced by its internal policies of repression. But there is much more to China’s impact on the world than its appalling imprisonment of political dissidents and repression of ethnic minorities; U.S. policy cannot ignore this behavior, but it cannot be the singular focus. Americans should not expect that the Chinese will yield to U.S. blandishments or pressure on human rights or governance issues. We should speak out on human rights and democracy because they have defined our character as a nation and our international standing. More importantly, we should live up to our ideals to inspire admirers abroad, including in China. Along with interaction with Chinese civil society when possible in the face of current restrictions, American soft power provides the best opportunity for modest progress. The United States and China have areas of overlapping interest and issues on which they must work together. Additionally, the overall character of the relationship will affect Chinese decisions, for better or for worse. If the Chinese see the value of at least a non-hostile relationship with the United States, it will restrain them from taking actions that they think might damage that relationship. There are still strong voices in China favoring marketbased reform, and their voices are amplified when they are met with encouragement and incentives by the United States. On the other hand, if relations with the United States deteriorate, the voices of recklessness and protectionism on the Chinese side will be strengthened. The Xi Jinping years have seen a change in Chinese behavior that has elicited a sharp American reaction and brought us to our current state. Modern Chinese political history, however, rarely validates those who project a straight line forward from the present. The changes from Mao to Deng, from Tiananmen to double-digit growth, from the marketdriven reforms and low-profile foreign policies of Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji to the retrenchment and risk tolerance of Xi Jinping should make us cautious about assuming that today’s policies will persist. The United States has to plan on the basis of current unhappy realities and trends, but not pursue an approach that makes the worst-case evolution more likely.
2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Cobalt DA › Export Restrictions---Internal
Hammelehle ’21 [Hammelehle, Julia; Policy Advisor at the Munich Security Institute; 7-20-2021; "Power Shifts: On the Geopolitics of the Energy Transition"; Munich Security Report; https://securityconference.org/en/media/msc-blog/article/power-shifts-geopolitics-energy-transition/; Accessed 7-24-2023; ARy]
Besides the potential for increasing state fragility, the path towards decarbonization is accompanied by significant power shifts and changes in trade patterns between states. The energy transition has thus also profound implications for the relationship between states. One example is the rising competition for leadership in the green economy. Given that low carbon technology constitutes a key factor for countries’ future prosperity, it has been described by some analysts as the “geo-economic battleground of the future.” As the role of clean energy technologies for global power competition is rising, so are the West’s concerns about the leading position of China in this field. For instance, the current US climate envoy John Kerry warned in 2019 “that it would be folly to replace a world order too dependent on Middle Eastern oil with one that’s too dependent on Chinese technology.”It is not only the pole position of the Peoples’ Republic in the market supply shares of clean technologies like solar modules and electric vehicles that alarms Western countries, but in particular the Chinese global stronghold in the supply chains of minerals and materials needed for their production. For example, China accounts 50% to 70% of global lithium and cobalt refining and dominates the whole rare earths value chain. This strong market position of Beijing in the rare earths industry has been at the center of the attention of China’s competitors. In 2010, the Peoples’ Republic used export restrictions on rare earths as geopolitical levers amidst a territorial dispute with Japan. More recently, it threatened to do so in a case of a trade conflict with the West. As China “appears to recognize the strength of its critical minerals supply chains as geopolitical leverage,” access to them has become a key strategic issue. While China’s competitors have begun to diversify the mining of rare earths following the Japan incident, Beijing has cemented its strong position in their processing. According to current figures, it accounts for 85-90 percent of the world’s capacity to convert mined rare earths into metals and magnets. As China and the US are the world’s two largest emitters and major economic and technological powerhouses, their “full-throttle” engagement is needed to move towards net-zero. Concerning Sino-American cooperation, two developments seem promising: first, the recent signs that both countries are willing to work together on climate; second, the potential of the competition for clean energy and climate leadership to inspire a “race to the top,” spurring green investment and fostering bold climate action. Yet, in an environment of fierce geopolitical competition and a profound lack of trust, substantial climate cooperation between China and the US seems unlikely. As a first step, Washington and Beijing should thus seek to prevent adverse effects of their rivalry on climate policies, for instance by avoiding that economic tensions also affect the low-carbon technology sector and lead to higher costs and disruptions of clean energy supply chains. As global climate cooperation is set to remain difficult and as states are facing substantial obstacles in decarbonizing their economies, different multilateral coalitions and collaborative frameworks will be needed to foster climate action. Concerning climate cooperation between states, a strong joint transatlantic climate approach, as also envisaged in the EU-US Summit Statement, could play an important role in advancing the fight against climate change. Beyond bold domestic climate policies and comprehensive bilateral cooperation, for instance on clean hydrogen, Europe and the US should work towards deepening their climate and green energy relations with the Global South and should push for stronger international regulations, including on green trade and the responsible sourcing of critical minerals. Beyond states, subnational actors like cities, civil society, and businesses have become key actors for tackling climate change. On the global path to net zero, their contributions – and thus the move toward what the UN Secretary-General termed as “inclusive multilateralism” – will also play a crucial role.
2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Cobalt DA › Interdependence---Internal
Johansmeyer ‘22 [Johansmeyer, Tom; PhD in International Conflict, University of Kent; 9-26-2022; "How Renewable Energy Could Set the Stage for Future Resource Conflict"; Small Wars Journal; https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/how-renewable-energy-could-set-stage-future-resource-conflict; Accessed 7-19-2023; ARy]
Renewable energy may be natural, but the components used to harness it are not. Energy independence is only as resilient as the sourcing of components and raw materials necessary for the likes of solar panels and wind turbine, such as cobalt, nickel, and other minerals. While the affected nation may not need to source them directly, the necessary raw materials need to be available to the manufacturer of renewable energy equipment, which could be complicated in cases where an aggressor nation is also rich in relevant resources. In addition to raw materials, demand for renewable energy equipment could frustrate the recovery and reconstruction process. Recent supply chain challenges for renewable energy equipment resulting from the pandemic are worth noting, but they have also occurred during a period of increased demand. Wind power installations are growing rapidly, as are renewables in general. Repair demand has to compete with new installation demand, which could elongate the time needed for recovery, increasing attendant post-conflict security risks – including political, economic, and societal concerns. Developing a renewable energy mix that includes faster and less expensive restoration of service can reduce that risk, as evidenced by the possibility of having solar facilities installed in western Ukraine by the end of the year. Finally, the importance of predictable capital flows can’t be overstated. Recovery is fueled by cash, and conflict aftermath can involve plenty of competing interests. A quick scan of the Kyiv School of Economics assessment of the implications of the conflict so far provides an indication of the potential cost. The process of post-conflict remediation is further frustrated by the fact foreign aid tends to be negotiated during and after a conflict – i.e., during a period of peak need. Securing resources can be a volatile process, with distribution compounding that volatility. The fact that the wind farms in Ukraine are insured offers an additional lesson for renewable energy security. Pre-negotiated terms should result in higher-velocity capital with increased certainty of use. The wind farms have greater predictability of capital flow because of their insurance, which should factor into future considerations of the economic aspects of renewable energy security. Energy transition should entail a security transition, as well. Moving from fossil fuels to renewables may lessen demand for the former and the attendant risk of conflict from resource competition, but that does not mean the risk of energy-related conflict will subside. Air and sunshine may seem to be everywhere, but some parts of the world are more favorable to capturing their power than others, which could form the basis for a new form of energy competition – one particularly suited to the age of renewable energy.
2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Cobalt DA › GND/Green-Tech---Link
World Bank ’22 [Islam, Roumeen; Economic Advisor for World Bank’s Infrastructure Practice Group; 4-13-2022; "Infrastructure Podcast"; World Bank; https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/podcast/2022/04/13/cobalt-market-dynamics-and-the-energy-transition; Accessed 7-19-2023; ARy]
Remi Pelon: Cobalt is a metal, that has become quite popular recently because of its role in battery technologies. You know, especially for electrical vehicles, EVs. Cobalt has been used for a long time across different industries and products like superalloys, magnets, electronics, and even paint. But the so-called lithium-ion batteries now account for more than 50% of the demand for cobalt today. Roumeen Islam: And those are the main batteries used in electric vehicles, right? Remi Pelon: Yeah, exactly. That particular technology has gained a lot of traction in recent years. Roumeen Islam: So as the demand for batteries increases, this looks good for cobalt and those who produce cobalt, right? Remi Pelon: Yeah, exactly. If you only take electric vehicles that should represent half of the car sales globally by 2035. Well, to enable this to happen, cobalt consumption will have to grow from about a hundred thousand tones in 2020 to 660,000 tones in 2035. So that's nearly seven fold. So imagine what it represents for the countries that are indeed mining or processing or trading that mineral.
2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Cobalt DA › GND/Green-Tech---Link
World Bank ’19 [World Bank; 5-26-2019; "Climate-Smart Mining: Minerals for Climate Action"; World Bank; https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/extractiveindustries/brief/climate-smart-mining-minerals-for-climate-action; Accessed 7-19-2023; ARy]
A new World Bank Group report, "Minerals for Climate Action: "The Mineral Intensity of the Clean Energy Transition," finds that the production of minerals, such as graphite, lithium and cobalt, could increase by nearly 500% by 2050, to meet the growing demand for clean energy technologies. It estimates that over 3 billion tons of minerals and metals will be needed to deploy wind, solar and geothermal power, as well as energy storage, required for achieving a below 2°C future.
2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Cobalt DA › GND/Green-Tech---Link
IEA ’21 [IEA; 5-05-21; "Mineral requirements for clean energy transitions – The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions – Analysis"; International Energy Agency ; https://www.iea.org/reports/the-role-of-critical-minerals-in-clean-energy-transitions/mineral-requirements-for-clean-energy-transitions; Accessed 7-19-2023; ARy]
Safe and cheaper LFP batteries for utility-scale storage are expected to dominate the overall battery storage market. The remaining demand is covered by the more expensive, but energy-dense, NMC 111 and NMC 532 used predominantly for home energy storage. The NMC variants transition towards NMC 622 and NMC 811 in a similar way to the market for EV batteries, albeit with a delay owing to the time needed for transfer of technology and sufficient reduction in prices. Vanadium flow batteries (VFBs) first become commercially suitable in 2030 with a small share, growing modestly to capture a wider market for storage applications in large renewables projects. In the SDS, battery storage grows by 11 times between 2020 (37 GWh) and 2040 (420 GWh). Overall demand for minerals in the base case grows by 33 times between 2020 and 2040, from 26 kt to nearly 850 kt. Overall mineral demand outpaces battery demand growth, as the market share for LFP batteries is displaced by more mineral-intensive NMC chemistries. The largest relative growth is seen in nickel, which grows more than 140 times from 0.4 kt in 2020 to 57 kt in 2040. Cobalt demand increases by 70 times while manganese demand increases by 58 times. For battery storage, we explore two alternative scenarios. A more rapid adoption of wall-mounted home energy storage would make size and thus energy density a prime concern, thereby pushing up the market share of NMC batteries. The rapid adoption of home energy storage with NMC chemistries results in 75% higher demand for nickel, manganese and cobalt in 2040 compared to the base case. A faster uptake of silicon-rich anodes also results in 20% greater demand for silicon compared to the base case in 2040.
2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Cobalt DA › Carbon Tax---Link
Black ’22 [Black Simon; economist at the IMF; 7-21-2022; "More Countries Are Pricing Carbon, but Emissions Are Still Too Cheap"; IMF; https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/07/21/blog-more-countries-are-pricing-carbon-but-emissions-are-still-too-cheap; Accessed 7-24-2023; ARy]
Globally, ETSs and carbon taxes cover 30 percent of emissions, with prices rising as high as $90 per ton (in the European Union). Despite the proliferation of carbon pricing schemes, policymakers should do more. To limit global warming, coverage must expand while prices rise from a global average of $6 per ton of CO2 today to $75 by 2030. Policymakers considering introducing or scaling up carbon pricing face multiple decisions when choosing among and within policy instruments, as we explain in an IMF Staff Climate Note. These include ease of implementation, price levels, competitiveness concerns, alignment with other mitigation instruments, and coordination across countries. Countries may choose different approaches based on their own circumstances and objectives. A key choice is between carbon taxes and emissions trading schemes. Carbon taxes have practical appeal as they provide certainty over future emissions prices, helping encourage green investments and energy conservation. They can also be very simple to implement by tweaking existing fuel taxes and provide revenues that finance ministries can use to assist the poor, cut other taxes, or boost productive investments. Carbon taxes could also be extended to broader emissions sources, for example, methane emissions from extractive industries and, in some cases, agriculture. Emissions trading schemes have appeal if policymakers prefer certainty over future emission levels. These schemes can be designed to mimic some of the advantages of taxes, including through price floors and allowance auctions (though allocating some allowances initially for free may garner support from affected firms). But given their significant complexity in design, implementation, and administration, many countries will find it challenging to develop ETSs. Despite these differences, the two approaches have much in common. Both operate on the “polluter pays” principle, which efficiently encourages switching to more sustainable sources of energy and reducing emissions-intensive activities. Under both approaches, it’s vital to ensure that the rise in carbon prices needed to tackle climate change is acceptable politically. Carbon pricing reforms can protect the poor while supporting economic growth, for example by using some of the revenues to compensate vulnerable households and the remainder for labor tax cuts or productive investments. With careful design, implementation and coordination, the economic costs of carbon pricing can be manageable—indeed for some countries these costs are more than offset by domestic environmental co-benefits (such as fewer deaths from local air pollution) even before counting the global climate benefits. Carbon pricing, in one form or another, is likely to be an essential element of mitigation strategies as the world transitions to net zero over the next three decades.
2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Cobalt DA › Carbon Tax---Link
Lilliestam ’20 [Lilliestam, Johan; Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany; 9-30-2020; "The effect of carbon pricing on technological change for full energy decarbonization: A review of empirical ex‐post evidence"; Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews; https://wires.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/wcc.681; Accessed 7-23-2023; ARy]
The argument for using carbon pricing as the central mitigation instrument is simple and compelling: with a price on carbon, polluters have an economic incentive to immediately reduce their emissions. The price signal will trigger both development and deployment of lower- or zero-emitting technologies such as renewable energy or insulating buildings. We discuss the underlying theory in detail in Section 2.1. Another line of argumentation suggests there may be limits to carbon pricing's value. Achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement requires not just a reduction in emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2), but rather its complete elimination, by about mid-century, from the energy sector (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 2018). For this, a complete reconfiguration of the energy system, mobility, and of carbon-emitting industry is necessary. To be most helpful, near-term emissions cuts must align with enhancing society's capacity to quickly replace all sources of fossil carbon emissions with other forms of energy (Patt, van Vliet, Lilliestam, & Pfenninger, 2019). Complete decarbonization requires development and deployment, up to full market penetration, of zero-carbon technologies and systems. The literature on technological transitions suggests that the factors influencing the direction and pace of technological change go well beyond differences in costs: through their existing systems of infrastructure and institutions, societies can be “locked in” to using high carbon technologies. This lock-in is exacerbated by economic mechanisms such as decreasing costs (learning) and increasing returns (e.g., network effects), which put new technologies at a competitive disadvantage (Unruh, 2000). Spillover effects mean that markets tend to achieve suboptimal levels of innovation, suggesting that state interventions to increase the rate of innovation, including via learning-by-doing, are needed (Arthur, 1989; Bertram et al., 2015; Fremstad, Petach, & Tavani, 2019; Klitkou, Bolwig, Hansen, & Wessberg, 2015; Romer, 1990). Hence, factors other than relative costs play an important role in the initial adoption and later diffusion of zero-carbon technologies. That would imply that even with changes in relative costs due to carbon prices, market behavior could remain constant, simply because other barriers are present. Policies addressing these other factors could play a large role in stimulating a technology transition to an entirely carbon-neutral one (Geels, Sovacool, Schwanen, & Sorrell, 2017; Patt & Lilliestam, 2018; Rosenbloom, Markard, Geels, & Fuenfschilling, 2020). In short, there are competing theoretical arguments about the effectiveness of carbon pricing for triggering the technological change needed to solve the climate problem: a simple and intuitive argument based on economic incentives and price signals, calling for carbon pricing as the central policy instrument; and a more complicated argument based on the specifics of climate change targets, combined with the mechanisms of technological transitions, suggesting that carbon pricing's value may be limited. Whenever contradictory theoretical insights are present, empirical investigation is critical. Here, we review the empirical peer-reviewed research on the effects of carbon pricing policies on technological change—innovation and investment toward a completely decarbonized energy system, including transport, consistent with the Paris Agreement. In this, we distinguish between different effects. Carbon prices can trigger short-term effects, originating in operational changes in existing assets, such as a switch within a power plant fleet from coal toward gas power (Vogt-Schilb, Meunier, & Hallegatte, 2018). This would reduce emissions quickly, so that the remaining carbon budget is exhausted slower, but it does not constitute the necessary technological change. Of more relevance for full decarbonization, carbon pricing can have longer-term effects, both by triggering investments in new low- or zero-carbon assets (e.g., more efficient airplanes, or new wind farms) or by inducing innovation in new low- or zero-carbon technologies or practices (e.g., private R&D in enhanced solar energy production). In these, the rate of technological progress, and the change rate of emission reductions, rather than the immediate emission level, is relevant (Patt, 2015; Vogt-Schilb et al., 2018). We show that the empirical evidence for the effectiveness of carbon pricing for triggering technological change is on the one hand thin, and on the other hand discouraging. As to the former, there are surprisingly few studies that empirically document a link between carbon pricing and technological change. As to the latter, the few studies that have taken place document emission reductions originating in short-term operational shifts, but find only very minor effects, if any effects at all, on low- and zero-carbon investment and innovation. We thus conclude that the empirical evidence, while limited, in fact contradicts claims for the effectiveness of carbon pricing schemes in promoting the technological change necessary for the full decarbonization aim implied by the Paris Agreement.
2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Cobalt DA › Carbon Tax---Link
Center on Global Energy Policy ’18 [Center on Global Energy Policy, Columbia University; 07-18; ""; Columbia University; https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/pictures/CGEP_Energy_Environmental_Impacts_CarbonTax_FINAL.pdf; Accessed 7-23-2023; ARy]
A price on carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions has long been a preferred instrument among economists and other academics for addressing the threat of climate change.1 The idea is simple: putting a price on carbon internalizes the societal costs caused by consumption of fossil fuels and other activities that emit GHGs. The concept sits firmly in the tradition of Pigouvian taxation, which has been applied to address other “externalities”—from the health system costs of tobacco and alcohol use to the environmental cost of substances that deplete Earth’s ozone layer. The concept of pricing carbon by way of a tax has been gaining traction among economists as an efcient, market-based strategy for reducing GHG emissions in the United States. More recently, the idea has garnered the attention of prominent Republicans and Democrats within and outside of Congress as well as advocates on the left and right poles of the national political spectrum. Regardless of the motivation for pursuing a carbon tax, current and future discussions can benefit from an up-to-date and comprehensive assessment of what such a policy would mean for the US energy system and resulting GHG emissions in the future. This paper is part of a series under the Columbia University Center on Global Energy Policy’s (CGEP’s) Carbon Tax Research Initiative. It provides projections of the US energy system and emissions implications of carbon taxes and associated policy choices2 using RHGNEMS, which is a version of the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) maintained by the Rhodium Group.3 NEMS is developed and used by the Energy Information Administration (EIA) to produce its Annual Energy Outlook and relied on by Congress to assess the impact of past energy and climate legislation.4 This paper seeks to answer key questions about the impacts of a carbon tax in the United States. First, how responsive are diferent sectors of the US economy to a carbon tax at diferent tax rates? The answer has important policy implications, such as the amount of federal revenue collected under any given tax rate, the likelihood of achieving specified GHG reduction targets, and the potential role of other emission reducing policies. Second, what changes in energy prices, production, and consumption occur under diferent tax rates? These questions are addressed by assessing three carbon tax rate scenarios. Based on this analysis, we make the following key findings: A carbon tax can drive substantial reductions in US GHG emissions in the near and medium term. In our analysis, an economy-wide carbon tax set at $50/ton in 2020 and rising at a real rate of 2 percent ach hieves emission reductions of 39 to 47 percent below 2005 levels by 2030 (figure ES1). Emission reductions primarily occur in the electric power sector. The sector is the most responsive to a carbon price, and, in turn, this is where most economy-wide emission reductions occur. The presence of readily available low carbon substitutes drive emission reductions of 23 to 67 percent in the $50/ton scenario relative to emissions under current policy in 2030. A carbon tax drives large increases in renewable energy production and large declines in coal production. Zero-emitting renewable energy makes up 29 to 41 percent of total US electric power generation in 2030, depending on the tax rate scenario, which represents a two- to threefold increase from 2015 levels. Renewables fill in behind coal generation, which declines substantially in all scenarios. The carbon tax drives a 28 to 84 percent reduction in US coal production by 2030 compared to current policy. Average per capita energy expenditures rise under a carbon tax but do not reach the (inflation adjusted) high levels seen in recent history, even in the highest tax rate scenario. Increases in energy expenditures per capita due to a carbon tax range from 7 to 27 percent relative to current policy in 2030. Meanwhile, per capita energy expenditures during the commodities boom in the run-up to the great recession were even higher. Carbon tax revenue could potentially be large, ranging from $617 million to as much as $2.5 trillion over the first 10 years, depending on the tax rate and technological innovation in the US economy. Decisions over revenue of this magnitude could be contentious. Revenue could be directed to a variety of productive uses, including cutting other taxes, deficit reduction or rebates to individuals. Beyond 2030, a carbon tax at the levels considered in this analysis may not be not sufcient for achieving emissions targets. In the long term, the range of tax rates considered in this analysis will likely be insufcient to reduce US GHG emissions 80 percent below 2005 levels by 2050, absent complementary GHG policies, significant improvements in technologies that can act as direct substitutes for fossil fuels, and/or significantly faster electrification of the transportation, buildings, and industrial sectors than we considered in this analysis. While this paper focuses on the emissions and energy system impacts of a carbon tax in the United States, the results are used in separate analyses of the potential distributional and macroeconomic impacts of a carbon tax, which are also part of the CGEP Carbon Tax Research Initiative series. Eighty years ago, British engineer Guy Stewart Callendar provided the first convincing evidence that emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases (GHG) from human activity were warming the planet. Today, the body of scientific evidence of humancaused climate change is overwhelming and unequivocal. These changes are imposing a growing economic cost, both in the United States5 and around the world.6 These costs are not paid by the individuals and companies responsible for the GHG emissions behind them, but by society as a whole. One of Guy Stewart Callendar’s contemporaries was an economist named Arthur Cecil Pigou, who in 1920 argued in The Economics of Welfare that the societal costs of industrial production should be “internalized” through a tax. In the decades since, Pigouvian taxes have been used to address a range of social costs through market forces, from the impact on the public health system of tobacco and alcohol use to the environmental impact of substances that deplete Earth’s ozone layer. Economists and other academics have long argued that a similar approach could be taken to address climate change through a tax on CO2 and other GHG emissions.7 Such a tax would also raise significant revenues. Over the past few years, a carbon tax has garnered increased attention from elected ofcials at both the federal and state levels, and from both the Democratic and Republican parties.8 The Trump administration has broadly dismissed the threat of climate change and is actively rolling back federal GHG regulations. Despite this, some argued that a congressional push for tax reform could provide an opportunity to pursue a carbon tax.9 The theory of change is that a carbon tax could provide revenue to cover the costs of such an endeavor. The enactment of a major deficit-funded tax cut package at the end of 2017, however, suggests the window for such a trade (to the extent to which it ever existed) is likely now closed. Meanwhile, the administration and Congress are advancing infrastructure legislation that, if not also deficit financed, will either require cutting current spending on popular programs or a new source of revenue.10 While some continue to explore how a carbon tax could potentially serve as the source of revenue as part of bipartisan legislative compromise under the current administration, others are considering how a carbon tax could serve as a key component of a Democratic campaign platform in the 2020 presidential elections. While the likelihood or timing of serious congressional consideration of a carbon tax is unclear, there are important design questions policy makers will need to grapple with if such consideration occurs. The first paper in the Center on Global Energy Policy’s (CGEP) Carbon Tax Research Initiative11 identified and discussed these questions in detail.12 This paper analyzes the energy and emissions impact of some of the most important carbon tax design choices. The US energy system is in a state of flux. The shale boom has expanded the role of natural gas, boosted crude oil production to record levels, and put the United States on track to be a net energy exporter. The dramatic reduction in wind and solar costs is transforming the electric power sector. A rapidly growing menu of electric vehicles has the potential to upend transportation and US oil demand. All this makes predicting the future more challenging than ever, let alone predicting how that future will be altered by a carbon tax–driven change in relative prices. If Congress does consider a carbon tax, it will almost certainly ask the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) to analyze its impact on energy production, consumption, prices, and emissions. EIA has been called upon to analyze most major energy and environmental legislation, including previous carbon pricing legislative proposals like the Waxman-Markey bill, which passed the House of Representatives in 2009.13 EIA analysis of any future carbon tax legislation will play a central role in the congressional and public debate over the merits of such a proposal. For its annual long-term forecasts14 and major energy and environmental policy analysis, EIA uses the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS).15 NEMS is a highly detailed energyeconomic model with individual, interconnected modules for macroeconomic activity; coal, oil and gas, nuclear, and renewable energy production; power generation; petroleum refining and natural gas transmission and distribution; and energy consumption in the residential, commercial, industrial, and transportation sectors. Like all models, NEMS has its strengths and its limitations. It is one of the few detailed economy-wide models of the US energy system, and the only such model that is publicly available, fully documented, and with completely transparent modeling parameters and input assumptions. For these reasons, combined with the fact that it will almost certainly be the modeling platform EIA will use to assess any future carbon tax proposal, we selected it for this analysis. Doing so also provides an opportunity to identify areas where the leading government energy model may need refinement to better reflect technology deployment and consumer behavior under a carbon tax, and it complements recent carbon tax analysis produced using other modeling platforms.16 This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review recent US GHG trends and project future emissions under current policy. In section 3, we briefly discuss key carbon tax design elements relevant to this analysis and present the analytical approach used in this study. Section 4 discusses the impact of a carbon tax on GHG emissions in diferent sectors and for the US economy as a whole. We explore why some sectors are likely to be more responsive to a carbon tax than others, and why additional GHG reduction policies may be necessary in certain sectors to achieve economy-wide emission reduction goals. Section 5 covers the impact of a carbon tax on US energy production, consumption, prices, and expenditures. Section 6 provides 10-year federal budget revenue estimates under diferent carbon tax rates. We ofer some headline conclusions for consideration in section 7. The energy and emissions outputs from this paper have been provided to the Tax Policy Center and the Baker Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, which will be analyzing the distributional and macroeconomic impacts of both a carbon tax and diferent revenue allocation options, in papers that will also be released as part of CGEP’s Carbon Tax Research Initiative.
2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Cobalt DA › Uniqueness
Uberti 7-22 [Uberti, David; Hoyle, Rhiannon; reporters at the Wall Street Journal ; 7-22-2023; "The Energy Transition Will Require Cobalt. America’s Only Mine Can’t Get Off the Ground."; WSJ; https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-energy-transition-will-require-cobalt-americas-only-mine-cant-get-off-the-ground-e5ea91f1; Accessed 7-24-2023; ARy]
Etched into a mountain in the Idaho wilderness, at an elevation of roughly 8,000 feet, a cobalt mine three decades in the making demonstrates how America’s clean-energy ambitions are clashing with market realities. Miners have spent years traveling the 42-mile dirt road to the site, pushing the project forward in fits and starts while confronting wildfire, permitting fights, market swings and a corporate takeover. Those fortunes were finally supposed to turn this spring with the launch of what the project’s Australian owner billed as the only cobalt mine of its kind in the U.S. China dominates the processing of cobalt, a metal used in cellphones, jet engines, munitions, and, increasingly, electric-vehicle batteries. But Jervois Global recently suspended operations and cut hundreds of workers just weeks before the mine was set to produce its first pound of cobalt. The market had shifted at a key moment, cratering prices for the lustrous silvery metal around the world. Economists and executives warn similar challenges lie ahead in the race to build renewable-energy infrastructure. Many of the richest deposits of commodities required lie elsewhere, while firms extracting them in the U.S. or its allies face higher environmental standards, greater labor costs and limited interest from Wall Street. At the same time, China has developed much of the refining capacity for metals such as copper, lithium and nickel, backing mines in low-income countries where cheap costs drive down prices. U.S. officials warn China’s clout poses risks ranging from export controls to fallout from armed conflicts abroad. It has created a puzzle as the Biden administration tries to accelerate electric-vehicle adoption that is key to curbing America’s appetite for fossil fuels. The president’s climate law will offer tax credits to buy models with fewer components and minerals from China, but some automakers warn that many cars won’t qualify. Officials are also trying to expand trade deals to diversify supplies and tapping new or rarely used programs to shower Jervois and other firms with cash. In relatively small markets for critical minerals, it remains unclear if Washington will be able to jump-start investment or have to settle for subsidizing projects that can’t stand up on their own, said Rod Eggert, an economics professor at the Colorado School of Mines. The danger is that giving priority to self-sufficiency could raise costs and slow the energy transition. “Let’s think really carefully,” Eggert said. “How high of a priority is this?” Washington has nevertheless started opening the spigot on what a senior White House official said is the greatest investment in upstream mining production since the Korean War—a push that could hinge on small firms such as Jervois. The Pentagon awarded the company $15 million last month to keep drilling in Idaho and study a potential domestic refinery. Also in June, Finland’s government awarded Jervois a grant equal to roughly $13 million to expand a processing facility there. “We believe in what we’re doing ideologically in terms of protecting Western supply chains,” Jervois Chief Executive Bryce Crocker said. That ideology has its limits. Cobalt, which traded for almost $40 a pound as recently as May 2022, has fallen to roughly $15 as China’s reopening faltered, global output increased and automakers pushed to cut batteries’ reliance on the metal. Now, Crocker said Jervois plans to sit tight until it can get prices that yield a sufficient payoff—$25 or above—even if it takes years. “We’re a company that has shareholders that expect an economic return,” Crocker said, adding that the Idaho mine’s break-even price is about $17.50 a pound. “We’re not a public policy instrument.” Many investors have grown skeptical in recent months. The firm’s shares have dropped 94% from their April 2022 high, to the equivalent of 4 cents apiece, and are among the most heavily shorted in Australia. A $100 million bond issued in 2021 at a 12.5% coupon is now trading on secondary markets for about 90 cents on the dollar. In June, Jervois said it was raising $50 million to shore up its balance sheet as it waits out the downturn. Still, Jervois’s biggest shareholder, pension fund AustralianSuper, backed the freeze of the Idaho site. Analysts agreed it makes sense to keep cobalt in the ground until EVs eventually push up prices, even if each battery uses less cobalt. “You only get to mine it once,” said Luke Smith, senior portfolio manager at the pension fund. The project is currently estimated to produce cobalt for only seven years once operational. Demand for the metal will triple by 2050 if the global energy sector achieves net-zero emissions, according to the International Energy Agency. But the organization said in a July report that an investment boom has so far failed to diversify production. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, which boasts the world’s most prolific cobalt deposits, some mines extract as much cobalt each month as Jervois expects in a year. The country produced nearly 70% of the world’s supplies in 2022, U.S. officials say, with the industry long drawing accusations of child labor and unsafe working conditions. Aided by loans and infrastructure investments by China, the Congolese mining sector continued expanding despite cobalt prices plunging over the past year. Projects there can produce cobalt as a byproduct from mining for much more widely used copper. “Even if they lose money on cobalt production, they don’t care because they can cash in on the copper,” said Susan Zou, an analyst at consulting firm Rystad Energy. Much of those materials eventually head to China for processing. The U.S. has meanwhile shunned new mines given the spotty environmental records of their predecessors. At precious and base metals deposits discovered domestically since 1980, just three projects opened between 2002 and 2023, according to S&P Global. The average time to production was 13 years. The project in the so-called Idaho Cobalt Belt, one of the few parts of the U.S. endowed with the metal, has taken more than double that amount of time. After a wildfire scorched the area in 2000, the project faced a yearslong string of challenges, said Scott Bending, who co-founded the Canadian firm that originally aimed to develop the site. Permitting took the better part of a decade amid environmental reviews and appeals by rival miners. The stop-and-go process made it difficult to cobble together capital at the right time, when commodity prices were high. “In these kinds of mines, you really need to catch a good window,” he said. Potential customers were also loath to pay extra for domestic cobalt. “They were more than happy to buy from us if we gave it to them at the same price as the Russians or Chinese,” added Bending, who left the project in 2014. Jervois bought the Idaho site five years later and has since funneled about $155 million to finish construction—almost double what it anticipated. Executives blamed the overruns in part on inflationary pressures at the remote locale, which is covered with snow much of the year and where many workers lived in a 102-bed camp. At times, labor turnover topped 20% a week. On top of those challenges, Jervois didn’t have an offtake agreement in place to lock in sales before cobalt prices plunged. “We thought we would have a significant period of time before a downturn of this nature occurred, just because of the rise of EVs,” Crocker said, adding that he believes customers will eventually pay a premium for ethical or geopolitically minded supplies. The delayed launch has left many of the jobs projected to Idaho officials unfilled and state tax rebates unused. Australian bank Macquarie projects cobalt prices won’t rebound to $22 a pound—still below Jervois’s target—until 2027. The senior White House official said even the purchasing power of the U.S. government can’t prop up prices and that one mine’s struggle won’t stymie its broader strategy. For now, a skeleton crew maintains the Idaho site, where machinery sits idle and underground tunnels are quiet. Upkeep costs: about $1 million a month. The company has applied for an Energy Department loan and held talks with the Export-Import Bank on additional financing. The start of the Pentagon-funded drilling project is subject to regulatory approval, which is expected in August, said Crocker.
2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Carbon Tax › AT: BAT
Jon Ford 23, State Senator. "Guest Coiumn: Carbon border adjustment tax bad for Hoosiers," Terre Haute Tribune-Star, https://www.tribstar.com/opinion/columns/guest-coiumn-carbon-border-adjustment-tax-bad-for-hoosiers/article_48e1f328-edd2-11ed-b5b8-df7871111256.html, accessed 7-24-2023 | AKG
Democrats in Congress have introduced dozens of proposals to enact a carbon border adjustment tax, or BAT, which would impose a tax on imported goods from countries that do not meet U.S. environmental standards. This tax, indistinguishable from a tariff, would raise costs for American consumers and risk starting a dangerous trade war. That’s why I’m urging Senator Braun to put a stop to these types of policies.
The carbon border adjustment tax is wrong for Hoosier farmers, families and businesses. The tax would disadvantage domestic oil and gas production and raise prices at the pump for middle-class Americans. Under the current economic conditions, we cannot afford to stifle innovation and increase costs for consumers on everything from cars to appliances. This catastrophic plan, championed by the left, would increase taxes on goods including aluminum, paper, steel, and gas. Democrats in Congress argue that the tax would impose environmental standards on the world, and place penalties on countries that do not meet U.S. carbon standards, thus helping to create positive environmental change. They also argue that the BAT will reduce carbon emissions and generate revenue. The reality is far different. Experts note that the tax will do little to effectively reduce emissions while generating minimal revenue. Here’s the truth: the carbon border adjustment tax doesn’t work because the problem doesn’t exist. Democratic proposals, like the FAIR Transition and Competition Act, are designed to reduce so-called “carbon leakage,” which results from production moving to foreign countries to avoid U.S. environmental regulations. But evidence shows there is minimal proof that carbon leakage is a problem, while a study by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concludes that carbon leakage is insubstantial. In addition to driving U.S. businesses overseas, the carbon border adjustment tax would drive up costs for American businesses. Overhead costs would increase with an additional tax on raw materials, transportation, and feedstock. This additional cost would come at a time when businesses are still struggling to survive after the pandemic and amidst a potential recession. In turn, higher costs toward business overhead would be passed on to the consumer, cripple innovation, and threaten American jobs. Conservatives in Congress need to stand up against policies that would burden America’s businesses and raise costs for American consumers. While Democrats and the White House have allowed inflation to run amok, conservatives should not be helping them raise costs in the domestic market. We should value common-sense fiscal policy and the carbon border tax fails the test. I’ve heard from voters in Vigo County who are struggling to put food on the table because of inflation. I’ve heard from families in Terre Haute who can’t afford to buy a new car, and business owners who can’t keep up with rising costs. Many of my constituents have supported Senator Braun and would feel betrayed to know he’s supporting a tax that would make it more difficult to grapple with rising costs. I know my constituents, and I know that they would oppose an unnecessary and costly tax increase. Republicans should not consider ill-thought-out solutions for problems that do not exist, especially when they threaten the livelihoods of our constituents. The carbon border adjustment tax is bad for business, bad for America’s trade relationships, and wrong for Indiana. I urge Senator Braun to oppose any carbon border tax proposals that would raise costs for Indiana families.
2023
Michigan
Disadvantage
Aff & Neg---Renewables-GreenTech-Oil DAs/AFFs Supplement---Classic BLP › Carbon Tax › AT: BAT
Gregory Meyer and David Sheppard 17, deputy US news editor based in the New York bureau, runs the FT’s energy and environmental coverage reporting on companies as they navigate the energy transition, oil and gas markets, Opec, and the powerful trading houses that move the world’s natural resources. "Why a US border adjustment tax would matter for the oil price," No Publication, https://www.ft.com/content/d5283a64-e707-11e6-967b-c88452263daf, accessed 7-24-2023 | AKG
The oil industry is zeroing in on a prospective tax shift in Washington that has the potential to upend energy flows around the world.
The “border adjustment tax” (BAT) put forth by Republican lawmakers and embraced sporadically by President Donald Trump would radically change the way companies are levied, taxing imports and exempting exports in the world’s biggest economy.