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2023 Michigan Counterplan
JRY – State/Local Govt DA › Uniqueness › Hiring ↑

State and local governments drove an increase in public sector jobs.

Lesprom, 7-7-2023, ("U.S. adds 209,000 jobs in June, unemployment rate steady at 3.6%," Lesprom Network, https://www.lesprom.com/en/news/U_S_adds_209_000_jobs_in_June_unemployment_rate_steady_at_3_6_108550/)

The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics released the latest jobs report, which says total nonfarm payrolls in the country increased by 209,000 jobs in June after  by 339,000 jobs in May. The unemployment rate remained largely unchanged at 3.6%, The report highlights steady job growth in sectors such as government, healthcare, social assistance, and construction. According to the household survey , both the unemployment rate and the number of unemployed individuals saw little change in June. The unemployment rate for Whites declined to 3.1%, while the jobless rates for adult men, adult women, teenagers, Blacks, Asians, and Hispanics remained relatively stable. The number of long-term unemployed individuals, defined as those jobless for 27 weeks or more, remained unchanged at 1.1 million, accounting for 18.5% of the total unemployed. The labor force participation rate held steady at 62.6% for the fourth consecutive month, and the employment-population ratio remained unchanged at 60.3%. The report also revealed an increase in the number of persons employed part-time for economic reasons, which rose by 452,000 to 4.2 million in June. This increase partially reflected a rise in the number of individuals whose hours were reduced due to slack work or business conditions. Additionally, the number of persons not in the labor force but still seeking employment remained relatively unchanged at 5.4 million. In the establishment survey data, it was observed that total nonfarm payroll employment grew by 209,000 jobs in June. The government sector experienced an increase of 60,000 jobs, primarily driven by growth in state and local government employment. Health care added 41,000 jobs, with job growth seen in hospitals, nursing and residential care facilities, and home health care services. Employment in construction continued to trend up in June (+23,000). Employment in the industry has increased by an average of 15,000 per month thus far this year, compared with an average of 22,000 per month in 2022. In June, employment in residential specialty trade contractors continued to trend up (+10,000). The report noted that employment in leisure and hospitality showed little change for the third consecutive month. Retail trade employment experienced a slight decline of 11,000 jobs, primarily in building material and garden equipment and supplies dealers and furniture, home furnishings, electronics, and appliance retailers. Other major industries, including transportation and warehousing, mining, quarrying, oil and gas extraction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, information, financial activities, and other services, showed little to no change in employment levels.Average hourly earnings for all employees on private nonfarm payrolls increased by 12 cents, or 0.4%, to $33.58 in June. Over the past 12 months, average hourly earnings have risen by 4.4%. Average hourly earnings of private-sector production and nonsupervisory employees rose by 11 cents, or 0.4%, to $28.83.The average workweek for all employees on private nonfarm payrolls edged up by 0.1 hour to 34.4 hours in June. The manufacturing sector maintained an average workweek of 40.1 hours, with overtime remaining unchanged at 3.0 hours. The average workweek for production and nonsupervisory employees on private nonfarm payrolls remained at 33.8 hours. The report also included revisions to previous months' data. The change in total nonfarm payroll employment for April was revised down by 77,000, and the change for May was revised down by 33,000. As a result, employment in April and May combined was 110,000 lower than previously reported.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
JRY – State/Local Govt DA › Uniqueness › Hiring ↑

State and local governments increased hiring.

Sabri Ben-Achour, 7-7-2023, ("State, local government hiring has bounced back," Marketplace, https://www.marketplace.org/2023/07/07/hiring-by-state-and-local-governments-has-bounced-back-big-time/)

The federal  that came out Friday gave us a snapshot of employment conditions. The economy  — less than economists were expecting, surveys show, but still a strong number. Not a small chunk of that growth came from jobs created by state and , which have dramatically ramped up hiring in the past year. Governments from Hawaii to Maryland have been collectively hiring 57,000 people per month, on average, this year. That is more than double last year’s rate. “The number of new faces I see around Corvallis, it’s a big number,” said Patrick Rollens with the city of Corvallis, Oregon, population 59,000. The city hired 312 people to work part- and full-time jobs, increasing the municipal workforce by 60% over the past fiscal year. A lot of it was in service jobs.  “So public works, parks and recreation, a lot in public safety, so police and fire,” Rollens said. During the pandemic, public places like libraries and pools shut down or needed fewer workers, then ramped back up. “This is still actually cities, counties, recovering from the pandemic,” said Mike Bartlett, a program manager with the National League of Cities. A lot of local governments had to spend more during the pandemic — think handing out laptops to school kids — while . Local government jobs shrank by 4.5%, which Bartlett said is much greater than the private sector’s loss. The recovery isn’t complete. “We are down about 10% of our workforce from pre-pandemic levels,” said Brian Platt, the city manager of Kansas City, Missouri. Platt said Kansas City has become leaner and more efficient during the pandemic and doesn’t need as many workers as it did before, but it still needs to hire. “We’ve got positions open everywhere. It could be city planners, attorneys, but also labor employees out picking up trash and plowing snow,” Platt said.Local government employment has rebounded faster than in previous economic downturns, said Kate Bahn of the Urban Institute. “And this is a marked difference from the recovery from the Great Recession, where public-sector work really, really lagged for years and years in the recovery,” Bahn said. Uncle Sam chipped in a lot more this time with . One of the lessons from the Great Recession is that getting local governments back on their feet financially helps economic recovery overall.  

2023 Michigan Counterplan
JRY – State/Local Govt DA › 1NC

Extinction.

Kiseong Kim et al. 21. Department of Bio and Brain Engineering, KAIST; R&D Center, BioBrain Inc.; Department of ICT Convergence System Engineering, Chonnam National University; Bio-Synergy Research Center; Moon Soul Graduate School of Future Strategy. “Network Analysis to Identify the Risk of Epidemic Spreading.” Applied Sciences, vol. 11, no. 7, 7, Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute, 01/2021, p. 2997

Several epidemics, such as the Black Death and the Spanish flu, have threatened human life throughout history; however, it is unclear if humans will remain safe from the sudden and fast spread of epidemic diseases. Moreover, the transmission characteristics of epidemics remain undiscovered. In this study, we present the results of an epidemic simulation experiment revealing the relationship between epidemic parameters and pandemic risk. To analyze the time-dependent risk and impact of epidemics, we considered two parameters for infectious diseases: the recovery time from infection and the transmission rate of the disease. Based on the epidemic simulation, we identified two important aspects of human safety with regard to the threat of a pandemic. First, humans should be safe if the fatality rate is below 100%. Second, even when the fatality rate is 100%, humans would be safe if the average degree of human social networks is below a threshold value. Nevertheless, certain diseases can potentially infect all nodes in the human social networks, and these diseases cause a pandemic when the average degree is larger than the threshold value. These results indicated that certain infectious diseases lead to human extinction and can be prevented by minimizing human contact. 1. Introduction The emergence of a pandemic is one of the various scenarios frequently discussed as a human extinction event, and it is listed as one of the global catastrophic risks in studies regarding the future [1,2,3]. In particular, several pandemics, such as the Black Death [4,5], Spanish flu [6], and those caused by smallpox [7], severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) [8], and Ebola [9], have affected a large population throughout history. The risk of pandemics increases with an increase in population mobility between cities, nations, and continents, thereby threatening humankind [10,11,12]. It is essential to analyze the epidemic spread in society to minimize the damage from epidemic disasters; however, extinctive epidemic spreading experiments have limitations in real-world situations, as they predict stochastic effects on the spread without considering the structure of human society. Network-based approaches have been proposed to overcome these limitations and perform epidemic spreading simulations by considering the network structure of numerous real-world connections [13,14,15]. These methods use various models of epidemic spreading, such as the susceptible–infectious–susceptible (SIS) [16,17,18], susceptible–infectious–recovered (SIR) [19,20,21], and Watts threshold models [22]. While these methods are mathematically convenient, they are epidemiologically unrealistic for various infections because they require exponentially distributed incubation and infectious periods [23,24,25]. Moreover, previous epidemic studies did not perform quantitative assessment of the pandemic risk depending on the network connectivity in individuals and fatality rate of various diseases [26]. In the present study, we applied an SIR epidemic model to a scale-free network with Monte Carlo simulation to identify the quantitative relationship between infectious diseases and human existence. Our fundamental hypothesis states that when the epidemic spreads to all nodes of the network and the fatality rate is 100%, it can increase the pandemic risk. To address this, we initially constructed a scale-free network to simulate a society. Moreover, for the epidemic spreading simulation, an SIR model was applied to the network to describe the immune state of an individual after infection. From the simulation study, we found that the mean degree of a scale-free network was an essential factor in determining whether epidemics threaten humans. This approach provides important insights into epidemic spreading analysis by investigating the relationship between epidemic and scale-free network parameters. Furthermore, it highlights the necessity of determining information flow during an epidemic. 2. Materials and Methods We designed an epidemic simulation process to identify the relationship between pandemic risk and network parameters. This study was performed in four steps (Figure 1): (i) generating a scale-free network model to reflect real-world conditions; (ii) applying an SIR model to the scale-free network for epidemic spreading simulations; (iii) adapting the Monte Carlo method to reflect the stochastic process in the node status of the SIR model; and (iv) iteratively performing simulation for every parameter set and analyzing the results. We have provided the source code and sample results of epidemic simulation in Supplementary Materials.

Figure 1. Overview of epidemic simulation process based on the Monte Carlo method. (A) We generated scale-free networks for a fixed population (N = 1,000,000) and various node degrees (k = 2, 5, 7, and 10). (B) Epidemic spreading was simulated by applying a susceptible–infectious–recovered (SIR) model to the scale-free network. We set the epidemic parameters, β and γd. β represents the spreading rate of epidemics, and γd is the reciprocal of γ and reflects the time interval between infection and recovery. Randomly, 0.05% of nodes were initially infected. (C) We adapted the Monte Carlo method to determine the status of the transition from the infection node to immunization node. Repeated simulations were performed until a steady state was achieved. (D) For every parameter set, 10,000 simulations were performed. 2.1. Network Generation Based on a Scale-Free Model We constructed a network model for the epidemic spreading simulation (Figure 1). The nodes and edges of the network represent people in the society and their physical contacts, respectively. We used a scale-free network model, which follows the preferential attachment property observed in numerous real-world networks, such as social networks, physical systems, and economic networks [27,28,29]. In the scale-free network, when a node is added to the network, its likelihood of connecting to existing nodes increases with an increase in the node’s degree. Hub nodes, which lead to fast and vast spreading of epidemics, exist. Two characteristic parameters, including N and k, affect the form of scale-free networks. The parameter N denotes all nodes in the network. In the real world, N indicates the whole population size. The parameter k is the average degree of the network, which determines the degree of the newly attached node for each step during network generation. Following the characteristics of the network model, we generated scale-free networks representing human contacts for epidemic spread. The scale-free network was generated by the Barabasi–Albert graph distribution, in which the network is constructed from a cycle graph with three vertices, followed by the addition of k edges at each construction step [30]. The k edges are randomly attached to the vertex based on the degree distribution of the vertex. After network generation, we investigated the degree distribution properties of the network (Figure 2). The results indicate that the degree distributions have similar tendency for networks with varying number of nodes and edges. This study constructed scale-free networks with the largest number of nodes considering computational complexity (N = 1,000,000). [FIGURE 2 OMITTED] Figure 2. Degree distribution of the scale-free network. We analyzed the degree distribution of the network based on the number of nodes (N) and mean degree (k). 2.2. Epidemic Spreading Based on the SIR Model For the epidemic spreading simulations, we applied an SIR model to the generated scale-free network. The classical SIR model can be expressed by the following nonlinear differential equations [21]: [EQUATIONS OMITTED] where S, I, and R represent susceptible, infected, and recovered compartments, respectively, in the whole population. S represents people who have not been infected yet but can be infected in future. I represents infected people who can spread the epidemic to susceptible people through physical contact. R denotes people who have recovered or died from the epidemic and who no longer participate in the epidemic spreading process. The sum of the S, I, and R values represents the whole population size N. Epidemics have two parameters in the SIR model, transmission rate (β) and recovery rate (γ), which arise from the basic reproduction number R0 (Figure 1B). The basic reproduction number is the number of infections caused by one infective node [31,32,33]. If the R0 is more than 1, the infection can spread in a population, whereas if R0 is less than 1, the infection cannot spread. We express the basic reproduction number as R0 = β/γ, where β represents the spreading rate of epidemics between infective nodes and adjacent susceptible nodes and γ represents the probability of recovery from infection [34]. We mainly used γd, which is the reciprocal of γ and reflects the time interval between infection and recovery. 2.3. Investigation of Epidemic Status Based on the Monte Carlo Method The epidemic simulation was performed for a time series event by constructing epidemic status matrix (z) to represent the status of the nth node at time step t. For each node, the value of epidemic status matrix at time step t can be 0, 1, or 2, indicating that a node is susceptible, infective, or recovered, respectively. We initially (t = 0) set every value of epidemic status matrix to 0 because all nodes are susceptible before the epidemic spreads. At the initial infection stage, randomly selected 0.05% of nodes were infected. At every time period, we performed immunization and observed the infection stages (Figure 3). [FIGURE 3 OMITTED] At the immunization stage, we identified infective nodes and determined whether these nodes would be recovered in the next time step. To calculate the transition probability of infected and recovered phenomena, the Monte Carlo method was applied [35,36]. When infection and recovery parameters are provided, it is possible to investigate whether a node transitions from an epidemic state to another state. To accomplish this, we compared the method revealing the change in each population in every compartment over time (Figure 4). [FIGURE 4 OMITTED] The final steady state of the epidemic spreading simulation model indicates the total number of casualties of the epidemic who either are dead or have recovered from the disease. Infective nodes at time t (zn [t] = 1) are transformed to recovered nodes at time t + 1 (zn [t + 1] = 2) when 1/γd is larger than a random real number between 0 and 1. We determined whether the neighbor nodes of the infection node would be infected by identifying susceptible nodes adjacent to the infective nodes at time t (zn [t] = 0, with the adjacent infective node) (Figure 5). When β is larger than a random real number between 0 and 1, a susceptible node becomes an infective node at time t + 1 (zn [t + 1] = 1); this scenario represents epidemic spread. For each time step, we recorded the number of susceptible, infective, and recovered nodes during epidemic spread. [FIGURE 5 OMITTED] 2.4. Simulation Parameters We carried out simulation trials for various mean degrees of networks (k = 2, 5, 7, and 10). Each network considered the following epidemic parameters: β ranges from 0.05 to 0.95 and γd ranges from 1 to 10. The Monte Carlo model was repeatedly simulated to observe saturation of the recovery process. Considering that the simulation pipeline contains random processes such as initial infection and Monte Carlo trials, we performed the simulation iteratively until the status of nodes remained unchanged. After simulation, time series data from every simulation were interpolated in the time domain. The fatality rate determines the ratio of deceased and recovered individuals in the final population [37,38,39]. If the fatality rate is below 100%, the recovered population contains both dead and recovered individuals. Such a situation does not always cause a pandemic. In this simulation, we assumed a 100% fatality rate. To accomplish this, we enumerated the recovered nodes as dead for considering the pandemic risk. 3. Results Through our method, we obtained epidemic spreading data with various network and epidemic parameter sets. In the present study, we focused on the case where the epidemic infects all nodes and defined this phenomenon as “extinctive spread”. Diseases causing extinctive spread are potential candidates of high pandemic risk. In the real world, extinctive spreading indicates that the disease will infect every person in the society. From the simulation data, we calculated the extinctive spread score by dividing the total number of simulation trials by the number of extinctive spread cases. Thereafter, we identified that the number of extinctive spread cases is mainly influenced by spreading speed, which is determined by β, γd, and k (Figure 6). [FIGURE 6 OMITTED] The extinctive spread region (brown area in Figure 6) is expanded as the value of mean degree of network (k) is increased, thereby indicating that the area of extinctive spread becomes noticeably wider in a dense network than in a sparse network. Thus, the more contact between people, the higher the risk of epidemics. Moreover, high γd and high β cause extinctive spread across a large region, indicating that the high spreading rate and short time interval between infection and recovery are risk factors of epidemic diseases. In contrast, the infective nodes recover before they transmit the disease to their neighbors in low β and low γd scenarios, thus disconnecting the network and preventing extinctive spread. This occurs because the infective nodes need more time to transmit the disease in low β and high γd scenarios. Therefore, the disease begins to subside due to a lack of new infective nodes. Furthermore, we investigated the range of β and γd for existing epidemics of the common cold [40,41] and fatal diseases, namely, cholera [42,43], Marburg [44,45], Ebola (Congo and Uganda) [46,47,48,49], SARS [50], and MERS [51] (Table 1). We selected diseases with relatively well-known epidemic parameters, such as average duration of infection and basic number of reproductions from previous studies. Transmission rates were calculated using the mean duration of infectious periods and basic reproduction numbers of the epidemics. Different studies reveal multiple values of infectious period and transmission rate for some of these diseases; we considered these values separately [40,41,42,43,46,47,48,49]. For example, the infectious period of a common cold is from 3 to 7 days and that of Ebola is 6.5 days. Next, we placed the possible regions of these epidemics as a disease band for various k values (colored lines in Figure 6). When k > 5, fatal diseases have an opportunity to cause a pandemic. Even when k = 5, diseases such as cholera and Ebola (Congo) can be threatening in regions of low γd and high, thus demonstrating that the knowledge of network parameters of the society and the characteristics of epidemic diseases can aid in quantifying the risk of epidemics. [TABLE 1 OMITTED] 4. Discussion Many previous studies have made stochastic SIR models to analyze the dynamics or stability of epidemic diseases. They investigated the distribution of susceptible, infected, and removed populations for specific epidemic disease spreading, such as cholera, SARS, Marburg, and MERS, based on mathematical modelling [52,53,54,55]. However, they did not conduct a quantitative assessment of pandemic risk taking into account physical contact between people. To solve this limitation, we performed epidemic spreading simulations by applying an SIR model to scale-free networks with Monte Carlo simulation. In the simulation, we consider various connectivity and disease characteristics on scale-free networks. For each network and epidemic parameter set, the probability of extinctive spread was calculated. The results revealed that certain infectious diseases can lead to extinction. Moreover, even if the disease band extends over the extinctive spread regions, it does not indicate that human extinction results from the disease, as the fatality rate is below 100%; however, in the case of 100% fatality, the disease can cause a human extinction event. The risk of infectious disease is influenced by the network structure. A dense network has a higher risk of spreading infectious disease than a sparse network, as we observed in the extinctive spreading maps. According to our results, when the average degree of human social networks is below the risk threshold, i.e., less than 4 in this study, human society is safe from an extinctive outbreak based on our knowledge regarding the epidemic parameters of the infectious disease. Nevertheless, in other cases, human extinction is possible. For example, if the population is 1,000,000 and there are 4 or more instances of physical contact between people, human extinction events may occur, depending on the fatality rate of the epidemics. Hence, physical contact between people is closely related to an extinction event of infectious diseases. Eventually, from a public health perspective, lowering the average contact level of society is an appropriate way to increase the robustness of strategies against the occurrence of extinction. In the real world, reducing network density can be accomplished by epidemic prevention activity, such as isolation and quarantine treatment. This action prevents epidemic risk to the society, thereby avoiding human extinction. Additional considerations may improve our analysis. First, large population size and various proportions of initial infective nodes were not considered in the experiments. We have confirmed that the result was consistent when the proportion of initial infective nodes was 0.05% of the total population; however, this can vary depending on the distinct proportion of initial infective nodes in a different population. To achieve robust results, we need to perform additional experiments for various parameters; however, we could not address this issue due to computational complexity. Second, we did not consider numerous known epidemic diseases. We calculated the transmission rates of epidemic diseases using the known infectious periods and reproduction numbers of the epidemics from evidence in the literature. In the present study, we only considered five epidemic diseases, since the information on infectious periods and reproduction numbers of diseases was mostly unavailable for other epidemic diseases. Third, this study only considers the SIR model on scale-free networks in epidemic simulation. Since the dynamics of epidemic diseases can be varied in different models or networks, it is important to experiment in various simulation environments to confirm the robustness of the results. Nevertheless, these limitations can be considered in future experiments or using improved computational methods. With these further improvements, our approach can be used as a computational tool to analyze the risk of epidemic diseases. 5. Conclusions In this study, we analyzed the risk of epidemic diseases by creating an epidemic simulation on a scale-free network. Based on the simulation results for various epidemic parameters, we confirmed that certain infectious diseases can lead to extinction and can be prevented by minimizing human contact. We believe that identifying potential candidate diseases that may lead to human extinction is crucial in addressing epidemic prevention activities such as quarantine.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
JRY – State/Local Govt DA › 1NC

State and Local employment key to prevent disease spread and food, water, air safety.

Rose Khattar, 1-3-2022, (”Investments in the State and Local Government Workforce Will Deliver Crucial Services and Create Economic Security," Center for American Progress, )

State and local government employees deliver critical services to constituents every day. They operate the nation’s buses and trains; deliver essential safety net services, such as housing, cash assistance, and health and unemployment insurance; teach and care for children; and contain infectious diseases and protect the safety of the nation’s water, food, and air. Yet the state and local government workforce has struggled to regain pandemic-related job losses, with 695,000 fewer people employed compared with pre-pandemic numbers. Its labor market recovery has been notably slower than that of the private sector, despite infusions of federal funds. A slower recovery in state and local government jobs not only affects constituents who directly rely upon their services but also has devastating impacts on the economic security of those most likely to work in these jobs, disproportionately women and workers of color.This report provides an overview of why investing in the local and state government workforce is critical for direct service provision and economic security. It includes new analysis showing that the occupations that experienced the largest job losses in 2021 compared with pre-pandemic levels facilitate direct service delivery to constituents. It also includes recommendations for how state and local governments can create a sustainable workforce in the long term through investments in hiring, recruitment, training, and compensation. It is imperative that governments work to address these job losses and strengthen this critical workforce. Investing in state and local government jobs is critical for service delivery and economic security. Delivering essential services State and local governments deliver the services that most Americans interact with every day. These sectors have significant control and impact in many areas: Public health infrastructure

State universities

2023 Michigan Counterplan
JRY – State/Local Govt DA › 1NC

State and Local governments would not be able to match a JGs wages causing brain drain.

Dolan 2019(Ed Dolan, Ph.D. in economics from Yale University, https://www.salon.com/2019/06/13/the-economics-of-a-job-guarantee-wage-and-employment-effects/)

Another caveat is that the minimum wage literature is mainly concerned with effects on private-sector employment. However, a JG wage of $15 an hour plus benefits would also have a big impact on workers in state and local government and in the nonprofit sector. Together, these sectors employ almost 35 million workers, many of them in the same kinds of public-service jobs that a JG program would offer. The migration of even a small percentage of these workers to newly created guaranteed jobs could be quite disruptive. As of 2019, state governments employed some 5.3 million people and local governments 14.7 million. According to from the CEPR by John Schmitt, when differences in age and education are taken into account, those jobs pay about 4 percent less than jobs in the private sector. JG advocates recognize the potential conflict between existing government jobs and newly created, guaranteed public-service positions. PDH, for example, caution that “it is vital that the program is designed to avoid state and local governments utilizing the program to pay for existing state and local government jobs which would normally be financed through local tax revenues.” In practice, though, it might not be easy to maintain a clean wall between the existing state and local workers and newly created guaranteed jobs. For example, it is hard to imagine that currently employed teachers’ aides or custodians would continue to work contentedly at $11 per hour, elbow-to-elbow with newly hired JG workers doing similar work for $15 an hour and more generous benefits. What is more, unlike a fast-food restaurant or retail stores, state and local governments could not simply raise the wages of existing employees and then pass the increase along to customers. Instead of customers, the sources of government revenues are voters. Voters might not agree to having their taxes raised in order to allow states and localities to raise wages to match those of federally-funded guaranteed jobs. A similar situation exists in the nonprofit sector. Nonprofits currently employ some 14 million workers, nearly as many as local government. Although some workers in this sector are well paid — for example, health care professionals at nonprofit hospitals and professors at private colleges — others are not. According to , pay is especially low in the large social-assistance sector, which includes community, food, child and youth, elderly, and disabled services, and in arts and entertainment organizations. The reported average pay for such workers falls well short of that envisioned by the PDH and Levy Institute JG proposals. Yet JG advocates specifically single out this sector as a source of employment opportunities. Like state and local governments, nonprofits would be unable simply to pass the cost of higher wages and benefits through to their customers. Instead, they would have to solicit additional donations, a task that might be no easier than for state and local governments to raise taxes.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
JRY – State/Local Govt DA › 1NC

Local government employment has been on the rise.

Mission Square Research Institute 2023

[No author; “State and Local Government Employment Trends, 2023”; Mission Square Research Institute; ]

Various occupations employing high percentages of women experienced steep pandemic-related declines. These included staff in education impacted by school closures and those who left the workforce for family reasons. While both local and state government initially saw employment among women decline slightly more than total employment, by the end of 2022, employment among women rebounded more than the overall total (see Figures 6 and 7). Overall state employment is projected to decrease by 6% by 2031, while local employment is projected to increase by 1.4% (see Figure 8). The change in individual occupations varies more significantly. Among maintenance fields, for example, landscaping positions are projected to increase by 14%, and highway maintenance by 9%, while water/ wastewater and general maintenance and repair would decrease by 6.5%. Automation forms a backdrop to many occupational projections. For some fields, like customer service, clerical work, meter reading, or parking enforcement, that impact has already started. Correctional staffing is a field that is projected to decline for a combination of reasons, such as the further implementation of technology-based alternatives to incarceration. These changes started before the pandemic, with Figure 9 showing for select occupations how employment declined from 2016-2021, and the cumulative projected decline from 2016-2031. As seen in both Figure 8 and 9, management roles such as for agency chief executives are also projected to decrease — at the local level from 14,400 to 12,700 jobs, and at the state level from 9,200 to 7,500 jobs. For other fields like transit, self-driving buses are just beginning their initial trials. While major employment disruptions may be on the horizon, they are not yet apparent in the projected 3.9% increase in bus driver employment.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
FJG GND PIC › Solvency › FJG -> Fraud + Unproductive Labor

GND FJG leads to unproductive and fraudlent labor that private industry won’t be able to fill in.

Carney 12’ [John Carney, 1-4-2012, "The Trouble with a Job Guarantee," CNBC, //bobo]

The Jobs Guarantee has now become a major point of debate on several finance and economic blogs. It’s a conversation that I think I helped kick-off, so it’s nice to see how much interest it has generated. At the end of this post, I’ll provide a pretty comprehensive list of links to the most recent debate. For now I want to focus on the strengths and weaknesses of the MMT Job Guarantee. Perhaps the greatest strength of the Jobs Guarantee is its directness.Instead of trying to balance the economy through the usual channels of fiscal policy—which typically just means lining the pockets of banks, defense contractors and big corporations with close government ties—the Job Guarantee spends into the economy directly through individuals. This isn’t a program that enriches the crony capitalists clients of the Predator State. It’s direct in another fashion as well: it’s based on fiscal spending rather than interest rate manipulation. Typically, policy makers attempt to address unemployment indirectly. Ever since the Great Depression, policy makers in the United States have attempted to use monetary policy to achieve something called “full employment.” The idea is to loosen monetary policy enough to spur more demand in the economy, which would increase employment. The main problem with this is that there was little reason to think that the additional demand created would be for the skills and services the unemployed possessed. If the cause of unemployment was not just a lack of demand but a lack of demand for what the unemployed could do, job growth would not result. What would happen instead was that there would be more money chasing the goods and services actually in demand. This created the potential for high unemployment and high inflation. Here’s how Friedrich Hayek put it in his 1950 essay “Full Employment, Planning and Inflation”:If expenditure is distributed between industries and occupations in a 'proportion different from that in which labour is distributed; a mere increase in expenditure need not increase employment. Unemployment can evidently be the consequence of the fact that the distribution of labour is different from the distribution of demand. In this case the low aggregate money income would have to be considered as a consequence rather than as a cause of unemployment. Even though, during the process of increasing incomes, enough expenditure may "spill over" into the depressed sectors temporarily there, to cure unemployment, as soon as the expansion comes to an end, the discrepancy between the distribution of demand and the distribution of supply will again show itself. Where the cause of unemployment and of low aggregate incomes is such a discrepancy, only a re-allocation of labour can lastingly solve the problem in a free economy. In other words, the core problem of most unemployment is a distribution problem. The distribution of labor did not match the distribution of demand. Increasing aggregate demand would not necessarily decrease unemployment. What is typically required to actually decrease unemployment is relocation and retraining of workers, something which many of the temporary measures intended to ameliorate the effects of unemployment actually interfere with. The Job Guarantee gets around one of these problems: it guarantees that anyone who comes to the government employment office ready, willing, and able to work will be able to get work for pay and benefits. The problem of mismatch is seemingly solved since the government will just supply the demand for something the unemployed can do. Direct hiring works better, in this sense, than trying to jigger the knobs of monetary policy. But is the problem of mismatch really solved? I do not think it is. The jobs created under the Job Guarantee are specifically not supposed to compete with the private sector, which means that they supply goods and services for which there is not a market demand. The total output of the economy might increase, but much of this output is non-productive—that is, it doesn’t actually improve our lives. Now some people will say that this is fetishizing the market. Aren’t there things that improve our lives other than what the market will pay for? I don’t want to argue that there are not. I do not think, for instance, that these days we could pay for the Sistine Chapel but our lives are greatly improved by its existence. The problem is that there is no reason at all to think that people laboring in Job Guarantee positions will supply meaningful improvements rather than holes in the ground. The Job Guarantee folks seem to think that there are plenty of meaningful jobs that aren’t getting done but that could be done by the unemployed. I don’t think this is correct. In fact, I cannot really think of many at all. Sometimes things like caring for the elderly or constructing bridges and roads are nominated as candidates. But these are not jobs that can be done just by anyone. They require a certain sort of person with a certain set of skills. Most jobs do. So the Job Guarantee actually falls prey to that old problem of the distribution of labor. Unless the skills, talents and dispositions of the unemployed miraculously match the jobs the government would like done, it doesn’t actually work much better than the “full employment” monetary policy. This creates the inflation problem I wrote about when I first addressed the Job Guarantee. The MMTers claim that their approach isn’t inflationary. In fact, they like to call it “Full Employment and Price Stability.” But if they are creating jobs that put more money into people’s hands without creating more supply of that which is actually demanded, then prices are likely to increase. Businesses may be able soak up some of the extra-demand by increasing their output—but this has limits, especially if there is a labor-demand mismatch. The productivity of existing workers can only be increased so far. Because the workers without skills demanded by the private sector have jobs and earn income, their incentive to retrain and relocate is diminished—which means that the labor mismatch persists and businesses may not be able to increase output to match rising demand. It would be possible, of course, to diminish or eradicate the inflationary effect by tightening other government expenditures, raising taxes, or making sure the Jobs Guarantee wages were so low that the increased demand generated would be minimal. The MMTers argue that the Job Guarantee positions will be so low-paying that workers will not be incentivized to stay in them. But I’m not sure this is correct. Do we really understand how workers will react to a job they cannot lose? Will there be some people who prefer to work just enough to get by, showing up at the Job Guarantee office every now and then, working for a few weeks, then going back to their personal hobbies? Yes. There will be. And some of these people will be very intelligent, even diligent people. I know people like this in New York City, who go through long periods of voluntary unemployment during which they paint, act, and write. They are enabled in this lifestyle by unemployment insurance and rent-control. Some of these people used to be computer engineers but found that they preferred more leisure and the income from unemployment insurance to less leisure and income from a private sector jobs. It’s a wonderful life, really. But if it were too popular it would obviously be economically stagnating. I can see the possibility of The Job Guarantee inviting this type of economic stagnation at a whole new level. Work a week per month, earn enough to pay your for your rent-controlled apartment, then spend the next three weeks painting. Work every other day. Work half days. Whatever. There's always a job waiting for you the next day. Get sick? Go down to the Job Guarantee office, take a job, then use the health insurance to pay for the medicine you need. We do not know that this is what would happen. But that’s part of the point. Nothing on this scale has ever been tried before. It is bound to produce unexpected and unintended outcomes. Pretending as if we know the economic and social consequences of this kind of revolution in the way Americans work is a dangerous conceit. As Cullen Roche at Pragmatic Capitalism points out, we know that we can have prosperity with unemployment. We don’t know we can have it without unemployment because we’ve never tried it and our economic models will always fall short. The maps aren’t the territory. You’ll notice that in my story of my arty NYC friends above I pointed out that unemployment interacts with rent control in ways that many people have never considered. The Job Guarantee will not come into an economy unencumbered by regulation. It will become part of an extremely complex web of regulations enacted during the last hundred and fifty years. It is impossible for anyone know how the Job Guarantee will interact with the rest of the regulatory state. The Job Guarantee is an elegant economic model that holds out the promise of price stability and full employment. Unfortunately, despite over a decade of discussion, serious flaws persist in the model.nPerhaps these will eventually be addressed. For now, however, the risks are too great to embark on a project this ambitious. A Guide To The Jobs Guarantee Debate I started things off with “Monetary Theory, Crony Capitalism and the Tea Party” noting that I believed the Jobs Guarantee was a distraction from the parts of Modern Monetary Theory that I like. Warren Mosler posted it on his blog, where it generated 71 comments. Tom Hickey also posted a link and excerpt at Mike Norman Economics, generating a round of debate in the comments section. Bob Wenzel, who is a prolific blogger coming from the Austrian Economic perspective, didn’t like me playing nice with the MMT folks.I responded by arguing that there was common ground between MMT and Austrian economics(mostly over the foolishness of using monetary policy to solve economic problems). Cullen Roche entered the discussion by pointing out what he considers the“fundamental difference” between Austrians and MMTers: the origin of money.Later I respondedby saying that I think this difference can be synthesized. Cullen’s post also noted that he agreed with me on the Job Guarantee.Bill Mitchell, the Australian economists who says he invented the Job Guarantee, weighed in with a post arguing that the Job Guarantee couldn’t—or shouldn’t—be separated from the rest of MMT. Oh, and then the Economist got on board with an article about MMT, Austrian Economics and Market Monetarism. In response to the Mitchell and Wray posts, I decided to explicitly address what I saw as the defects with the Job Guarantee—and explain to readers what the debate was about. Mitchell responded here. Cullen waded back into the debate with a post arguing that the descriptive elements of MMT should be—or at least can be—separated from the prescriptive elements. Ed Harrison at Credit Writedowns, who is influenced by both the Austrian and MMT traditions, explained that he thought the whole debate was a bit silly. After all, the idea of the US government guaranteeing everyone a job is a political “non-starter.” Neil Wilson described the Job Guarantee as “put option.” (A topic I hope to eventually get around to addressing.)And, finally: you just read this post. Congratulations! If you got this far, you’ve just become part of one of the most esoteric debates the economic corner of the internet has had for quite a long time.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
FJG GND PIC › Solvency › FJG Detracts Emission cuts

FJG unnecessary and detracts from Emission cuts.

Hohmann, Long, and Mitra 2019

[James Hohmann, a Washington Post editorial writer and columnist specializing in domestic policy and politics and a Stanford University lecturer, teaching courses on campaigns and Congress; Heather Long, BA in economics, Oxford University master's in financial economics; Mili Mitra, Brown University, BA in Public Policy and Economics; “Want a Green New Deal? Here’s a better one.”; The Washington Post; 2/24/19; https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/want-a-green-new-deal-heres-a-better-one/2019/02/24/2d7e491c-36d2-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html; accessed 7/23/23] CK

WE FAVOR a Green New Deal to save the planet. We believe such a plan can be efficient, effective, focused and achievable. The Green New Deal proposed by congressional Democrats does not meet that test. Its proponents, led by Sen. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) and Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-N.Y.), are right to call for ambition and bold action. They are right that the entire energy sector must be reshaped. But the goal is so fundamental that policymakers should focus above all else on quickly and efficiently decarbonizing. They should not muddle this aspiration with other social policy, such as creating a federal jobs guarantee, no matter how desirable that policy might be. And the goal is so monumental that the country cannot afford to waste dollars in its pursuit. If the market can redirect spending most efficiently, money should not be misallocated on vast new government spending or mandates. The Green New Deal that some Democrats have embraced is case in point. In its most aggressive form, the plan suggests the country could reach net-zero greenhouse-gas emissions by 2030, an impossible goal. Christopher Clack, the CEO of analysis group Vibrant Clean Energy, estimates it would cost $27 trillion to get there by 2035 — a yearly price tag of about 9 percent of 2017 gross domestic product. (Total federal spending is currently a bit more than 20 percent of GDP.) Put another way, that would be more spent every three years than the total amount the country spent on World War II. The plan’s proposal to retrofit all existing buildings is also astonishing in its implied scale, and its promise to invest in known fiascos such as high-speed rail reveal deep insensitivity to the lessons of recent government waste. At the same time, the Democratic plan would guarantee every American “high-quality health care” and “a job with a family-sustaining wage, adequate family and medical leave, paid vacations, and retirement security.” These expensive aspirations, no matter how laudable, would do nothing to arrest greenhouse-gas emissions. As ostensible parts of a Green New Deal, they divert money and attention from the primary mission: rapidly eliminating emissions between now and midcentury.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
FJG GND PIC › Solvency › Green Invest Solves Jobs

Green energy leads to job creation.

Ram, et al,2019, ("Job creation during the global energy transition towards 100% renewable power system by 2050," Science Direct, https://sci-hub.ru/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.)

Aside from reducing the energy sector's negative impacts on the environment, renewable power generation technologies are creating new wealth and becoming important job creators for the 21st century. Employment creation over the duration of the global energy transition is an important aspect to explore, which could have policy ramifications around the world. This research focuses on the employment impact of an accelerated uptake of renewable electricity generation that sees the world derive 100% of its electricity from renewable sources by 2050, in order to meet the goals set by the Paris Agreement. An analytical job creation assessment for the global power sector from 2015 to 2050 is estimated and presented on a regional basis. It is found that the global direct jobs associated with the electricity sector increases from about 21 million in 2015 to nearly 35 million in 2050. Solar PV, batteries and wind power are the major job creating technologies during the energy transition from 2015 to 2050. This is the first global study presenting job creation projections for energy storage. The results indicate that a global energy transition will have an overall positive impact on the future stability and growth of economies around the world.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
FJG GND PIC › Solvency › Green Invest Solves unemployment

Jobs generated from green energy transition alleviate persistent unemployment.

Ram, et al,2019, ("Job creation during the global energy transition towards 100% renewable power system by 2050," Science Direct, https://sci-hub.ru/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.)

North America is comprised of the major economic centres of the world, the USA, Canada and a rapidly emerging economy in Mexico, with a 19% share of global GDP (IMF, 2017), and is one of the largest energy consumption centres across the world, with total electricity consumption of around 5284 TWh in 2015. This is estimated to rise to 7069 TWh by 2050, mainly driven by the rapid growth of Mexico as well as stable electricity demands from the USA and Canada (IEA, 2016; Aghahosseini et al., 2017). Renewable energy has been on the rise in the recent years across all the 3 countries. By the end of 2017, the USA had installed capacities of 91 GW of wind and 52 GW of solar in its power mix. There has been a steady rise in the share of renewable power generation in Canada and the latest power generation auctions in Mexico yielded some of the lowest bids, with an average in the range of 17–18 €/MWh (Bellini, 2017; Rabson, 2017). Mexico has set a target of at least 35% of total electricity generation by 2024 to be from renewable energy sources (REN21, 2017). The trend is set to continue in the USA and Canada too, and a combination of wind, solar PV, hydropower and battery storage are seen as the most economical power generation sources by 2050 (Ram et al., 2017a). Similarly, solar PV (1.62 million jobs in 2025) along with wind (762 thousand jobs in 2025) emerge to be the dominant job creating sectors during the transition period as shown in Fig. 10. Additionally, hydropower (180 thousand jobs by 2050) and bioenergy (180 thousand jobs by 2050) create a stable share of jobs through the transition period. Storage led by batteries begin to create jobs from 2025 onwards with a stable share until 2050 with 330 thousand jobs in the battery sector. Whereas, coal and gas power generation associated jobs are seen to decline rapidly. Overall, jobs are set to increase from around 1.8 million in 2015 to nearly 3.8 million, with the rapid ramp up in installations up to 2025 and then a steady decline towards nearly 2.7 million by 2050. The category-wise distribution of jobs in North America during the transition period is shown in Fig. 10. Manufacturing, construction and installation of renewable energy technologies create a significant share of jobs enabling the rapid ramp up of capacity until 2030, beyond this period there are stable number of jobs created in these sectors up to 2050. Furthermore, manufacturing includes both for local use as well as for exports to the other regions as indicated by Table A3 in the Appendix. The share of manufacturing jobs along with a marginal share of exports initially rise up to 2025 (21% and 1% of total jobs respectively), beyond which they decline. As manufacturing is predominantly to cater to the local power markets across North America with domestic manufacturing having a share of 11% of total jobs by 2050 and only 4 thousand jobs for exports. Fuel jobs continue to decline through the transition period reaching just 2% of total jobs by 2050, as capacities of conventional power plants continue to decline. On the contrary, operation and maintenance jobs continue to grow through the transition period and become the major job creating segment by 2050 with 64% of total jobs. As operation and maintenance jobs last through the lifetime of power plants, they offer relatively stable long-term job prospects. This has the potential to create a positive effect in many parts of the USA that suffer from persistent unemployment (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018). The electricity demand specific jobs initially increase from 339 jobs/TWhel in 2015 to 666 jobs/TWhel in 2025 with the rapid ramp up in renewable energy installations. Beyond 2025, it declines steadily to 374 jobs/TWhel by 2050 as highlighted in Fig. 10.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
FJG GND PIC › Solvency › Green Invest Solves

Green investment alone solves transition and jobs without crushing biz con.

Jaeger, et al ’21 [Joe, et al; writing for the World Resources Institute; October; World Resources Institute “THE GREEN JOBS ADVANTAGE: HOW CLIMATEFRIENDLY INVESTMENTS ARE BETTER JOB CREATORS” https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/101753588/the-green-jobs-advantage-how-climate-friendly-investments-are-better-job-creators-libre.pdf?1683054778=&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DThe_Green_Jobs_Advantage_How_Climate_Fri.pdf&Expires=1690149530&Signature=GhxORYSxiToKNiAwGWerBBl3rDXfDQK2zEwca9iR1Rvqio99e45fP6yo5m5nw62PlGJKfQwOayfSV4gAC9MgvfmYT3QJYw13n-aiVusse4GbLrJfbDAOhzrCNUuD4cnRAjGizL~a-C3-aZ3Qr8QO9lqgvZqQxNBjo~NoIVj3D8LWk53~iL2H2iKeAJRJcLssrkJX0NKTfAXTPKvm1y9LoIBDNRahnUqqg6xrb-~SDnFZ7ia2nNLDygRgfQgFdB7GVhOFgL8dnAAow2DuDAuqkp2UlkicEAoklqFGT4tcw3rjB4mn6EzcixbKRvN2gWSGfRcMYOHWnQBJxxMNvhjOaw__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA acc 7/23/2023 EB]

The previous sections analyze jobs impacts in specific sectors, but there are also national modeling studies that evaluate the job impacts of climate action and green investments across multiple sectors. Some examples include the following: Brazil: Modeling from WRI Brasil shows scenarios where transitioning to a more efficient and resilient economy could deliver a net increase of more than two million jobs compared with business as usual. This is accomplished by investing in quality infrastructure, promoting new low-carbon technologies, and transitioning to sustainable agriculture. Restoration of degraded pasturelands would allow deforestation-free expansion of agriculture while contributing to reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, depending on how the restored land is used. Investing in low-carbon public transport such as electric buses would reduce air pollution, which causes approximately 20,000 premature deaths per year (Romeiro et al. 2020). China: By pursuing the climate action needed to meet its 2060 carbon neutrality goal, China could generate almost ¥6.5 trillion ($1 trillion) in net social and economic benefits by 2050. In the Yangtze River Delta region alone, compared with business as usual, a green economic strategy could create nearly 3.8 million additional jobs by 2025. The modeling shows that this could be achieved by increasing incorporation of renewables and moving away from coal, improving energy efficiency within the industrial sector, electrifying transportation, and removing carbon from the atmosphere (WRI China 2020). European Union: Public and private investment of €200 billion ($235 billion) in 1,000 short-term, shovelready green projects in the European Union (EU) (focused on energy, building efficiency, land use, industry, and transport) has the potential to support 2.8 million jobs over the two-year timeframe of the projects. These projects represent only 10 percent of total green projects under development in the EU (EY & Associés 2020). Indonesia: Modeling by the Indonesian Ministry of National Development Planning shows that a low-carbon development path in Indonesia could deliver 15.3 million additional greener and better-paid jobs by 2045 compared with business as usual. Such a path would also decrease poverty rates and close regional and gender opportunity gaps. This could be achieved by increasing energy efficiency and the use of renewables, protecting and restoring forests and wetlands, and increasing agricultural productivity. Transitioning away from coal could improve air quality and avoid 40,000 deaths each year (BAPPENAS 2019). South Africa: Modeling of COVID-19 recovery options shows that implementing green policies— including subsidies for clean energy, early decommissioning of coal plants, and financing for the power sector—would return gross domestic product to what it would have been sans the pandemic as well as generate positive net effects on employment greater than conventional policies alone. Job losses in the coal sector would be offset by new jobs in the renewables supply chain, but support is needed for coal workers and their communities for a just transition (KissDobrony et al. 2021). United Kingdom: Clean recovery investments in the United Kingdom worth £85 billion ($118 billion) could create 1.24 million jobs over the next two years. The projects with the highest job creation potential include building new social housing and retrofitting existing social housing (500,000 jobs), expanding and upgrading railroads (120,000 new jobs), and investing in the electrification of transport (59,000 jobs) (TUC 2020). United States: One study found that investing $320 billion per year in clean energy and agriculture programs over 10 years would create 4.5 million gross jobs per year over that period (Beachy et al. 2020). Another study found that achieving total electrification of the economy by investing about $300 billion per year for 10 years, mostly through loans, would support up to 25 million goodpaying jobs per year over the next 15 years and 5 million sustained jobs by mid-century (Griffith et al. 2020). 7. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS A robust green economic recovery is an opportunity to create a just and equitable transition to a future that is climate resilient and inclusive. Green investments should be a core part of stimulus spending and longer-term economic strategies. They are necessary to meet climate goals and, as this paper shows, often effective job creators compared with unsustainable alternatives. Yet governments continue to invest heavily in unsustainable sectors in their COVID responses, beyond what is strictly needed. Investments need to shift decisively to green sectors to take advantage of job opportunities and set the world on course for emissions reductions and climate-resilient societies. This should be paired with macroeconomic and industrial policies to fast track a green structural transformation. Stepping up green investments is only part of the picture. Governments need to increase their investments in the care economy, public health, education, and services. These are foundational to improve the health and skills of workers, create jobs, allow parents and other caregivers to return to the workforce, and increase the resilience of the economy. Governments also need to strengthen social safety nets to respond to COVID and protect vulnerable people from future crises. WORKING PAPER | October 2021 | 23 The Green Jobs Advantage Governments need to work with unions and employers to ensure that green investment strategies enhance job quality and contribute to the empowerment of both workers and communities. Public investments involving largescale construction projects like renewable energy installations or public transit should set wages and benefits at family-supporting levels. Incentive programs like subsidies for building efficiency retrofits should also ensure fair wages and benefits, compliance with labor laws, minimum skill standards, and health and safety standards. Funding should support and incentivize industry-led training programs and apprenticeship programs to allow for career advancement and opportunities to shift to longer-term contracts. Governments should ensure that members of historically excluded communities, and especially women, are benefitting from such investment and support. Measures to improve job quality should not be limited to green sectors. Governments need to put in place broader policies to enhance job quality for the entire economy, addressing minimum wages, labor rights, occupational health and safety, and decent working hours. Future research should continue to explore green job multipliers, particularly for developing countries and for less studied investment types like sustainable transportation and nature-based solutions. A greater variety of methods beyond input-output analysis is needed, including more ex-post analysis. Future job quality research should further consider the levers needed to improve green job quality.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
FJG GND PIC › FJG PIC › 1NC

GND without a Job’s Guarantee is sufficient to solve the Aff.

Stilwell, The University of Sydney, Australia, 2021(Frank, From green jobs to Green New Deal: What are the questions? The Economic and Labour Relations Review, 32(2), 155–169. Sage Journals,

Green jobs In popular discourse, ‘jobs versus the environment’ is a recurrent theme, implying that attempts to alleviate climate change and other environmental problems adversely affect employment prospects. Predictably, this framing makes many people wary of proposals for stronger environmental policies: indeed, one may infer that this is what motivates the relentless dissemination of ‘jobs versus environment’ ideology. However, an alternative ‘jobs and environment’ approach developed strong roots in Australia during the Green Bans of the 1970s, leading to Jack Munday’s formation of ‘Environmentalists for Full Employment’ (Burgmann and Burgmann, 1998; Munday, 1981). Although initially slow to influence the labour movement, the latter type of thinking had increasing impact during the next two decades. In 1994, the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) cooperated with the Australian Conservation Foundation (ACF) to produce a Green Jobs in Industry research report, and the two bodies returned to the topic with the joint publication of Green Gold Rush (ACF/ACTU, 2008). Political economists began to focus on what could be done – through industry policies and skill development – to create additional ‘green’ or ‘green-collar’ jobs (Pearce and Stilwell, 2008: 120). However, the concept of green jobs, although influential, has always been contestable. The general inference is that work is ‘green’ if it does not add to, and preferably reduces, ecological stress. This implies less depletion of non-renewable resources and/or less waste products emitted into the air, water or on land. Any change in work towards those characteristics may therefore be regarded as ‘greening’. Seen in this light, it is the process of change that is more central than the categorisation of jobs as either green or not green. The latter is hard, if not impossible, because neither occupation nor industry are inadequate identifiers. Whether plumbers, for example, do ‘green jobs’ depends on the specific tasks they undertake, whether installing solar-heating panels or gas-fired heating systems, for example. Some social scientists, grappling with these issues of definition, have developed typologies of green jobs by distinguishing deep-, mid- and light-green categories (Crowley, 1999; Goods, 2011). Others have posited that, to qualify as green, the jobs also need to meet criteria such as providing secure employment, good wages and career prospects (Masterman-Smith, 2010; Pollin and Wicks-Lim, 2008). Although this adds to the difficulties of definition, such concerns have a strong bearing on workers’ responses to green jobs advocacy. The shift from ‘green jobs’ to advocacy of a more broadly based GND may be interpreted partly as a response to these concerns, reflecting the importance of greens jobs being both ecologically and economically sustainable. It also reflects a push for ‘just transition’ – rather than just a transition – to ensure that specific groups of workers do not bear disproportionate costs of change. More than that though, it has been driven by the changed macroeconomic conditions, particularly the problems of unemployment and instability that the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the Global Coronavirus Crisis (GCC) have accentuated. From an environmental perspective, the former provided some temporary breathing space because the sudden economic downturn caused carbon emissions to dip (Spies-Butcher and Stilwell, 2009). In Australia, the Rudd government’s home-insulation programme also gave a glimpse of how green jobs could contribute to economic recovery. However, the main effect of the GFC was to shift the dominant policy focus towards stabilising the financial institutions and monetary reform. Short-term economic considerations dominated over concerns about longer-term ecological sustainability. Some similar tendencies have been evident during the current GCC: a dip in emissions, some temporary ‘sandbagging’ of the economy and a dominant government policy emphasis on trying to ‘return to normal’. Meanwhile, warnings about the dire consequences of climate change have become increasingly strong, precipitating more vigorous policy commitments in many countries, although conspicuously not in Australia during the last decade. It is in this context that we can understand the advent of a GND as a more comprehensive approach to seeking harmonisation of economic and environmental goals. GND: Origins and characteristics The New Economics Foundation (NEF, 2009) and its chief economist Ann Pettifor began to advocate a GND in the UK at the time of the GFC, developing from earlier work on ‘alternative futures’ (Henderson, 1978) and a ‘new economic agenda’ (Inglis and Kramer, 1985). A report by the Worldwatch Institute (2009) generated further international momentum for the idea. More recently, a GND was championed in the USA by Congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and embraced by Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth Warren during their ultimately unsuccessful campaigns to be the Democratic Party’s Presidential candidate. Canadian author and public speaker Naomi Klein (2019) continues to be a vigorous international proponent, as does Jane Fonda (2020) whose Hollywood fame draws attention to her climate change activism. The case recently made for a GND by Noam Chomsky and Robert Pollin (2020) adds a powerful political economic perspective. Institutions are also beginning to respond. In December 2019, the European Union (EU) outlined a Green Deal that aims to make the EU as a whole climate neutral by 2050. In the same month, the Australian Greens committed to a GND (Di Natale, 2019). The GCC has given more recent impetus to the push for a GND. Unlike the GFC, there is no substantial debate about its immediate cause – the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the economic lockdowns that followed. So, the focus this time is almost exclusively on the appropriate policy responses for recovery. For many people, the post-pandemic ‘return to normal’ that conservative politicians promise seems to have a hollow – even pitiful – sound. This is because the pre-pandemic ‘normal’ was not impressive anyway, even by mainstream economic standards. Pervasive problems that are widely perceived in Australia have included growing inequality and stagnant wages (Quiggin, 2020; Rosewarne, 2020), alongside the impact of climate change on increasingly severe weather events, accentuating bushfires and coastal erosion. Not surprisingly therefore, the period of the pandemic has been productive of proposals for deeper economic, social and environmental reforms – exploring possibilities for ‘surging forward’ rather than ‘snapping back’ (e.g. Bennett, 2020; Chalmers, 2020; Denniss, 2020; Heenan and Sturman, 2020; Johnson, 2020; Macklin, 2020; Pennington and Stanford, 2020; Rudd, 2020). Most of these proposals point to scenarios in which improved health, ecological and economic outcomes result from significant structural changes, driven by comprehensive reforms of public policy. Could a GND become the leading contender for meeting these goals? Exploring this question requires clarity about its nature and purpose. While there is no single, universally accepted model – nor need there be – the introduction to the new book by Chomsky and Pollin (2020: ix) is helpful in identifying the four central ambitions, paraphrased as follows: • Reducing greenhouse gas emissions to at least achieve the targets set in 2018 by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change – a 45% reduction in global emissions by 2030 and net zero emissions by 2050; • Making dramatic improvement in energy efficiency and expanding the supply of solar, wind and other renewable energy sources; • Creating a green transition that does not expose workers in the fossil fuel industry and other vulnerable groups to joblessness and the anxieties of economic insecurity; • Unifying climate stabilisation with the goals of expanding job opportunities and raising living standards for working people and the poor throughout the world. Couched in these terms, the GND is an essentially global project. To attain that goal, however, progress must come through policies enacted within individual state jurisdictions, taking account of local conditions and possibilities. In the Australian case, we therefore need to explore how a GND could deal concurrently with the problems of a faltering economy, adverse environment impacts, growing social inequality and the vulnerability of marginalised groups. These interconnected issues can be explored sequentially according to the ‘four Es’ of employment, environment, equity and empowerment. Employment Employment has always been central to the notion of a ‘new deal’. This reflects the term’s origin in the social struggles in the United States (USA) during the Great Depression of the 1930s when the official unemployment rate soared over 20%, as it also did in Australia. Responding to the swelling grass-roots social discontents and pressures for reform, President FD Roosevelt introduced an array of job-creation schemes known collectively as the New Deal. Public works projects were the principal focus for getting the millions of unemployed people back to work. Although not a consciously ‘Keynesian’ economic policy, it implemented the principal practical lesson from the theories being developed at the same time by JM Keynes – that the scourge of unemployment could be tackled effectively by government intervention. A simplified form of Keynesian economics subsequently became part of the new policy orthodoxy during the long boom that followed the Second World War – in tandem with, but never replacing, the still-dominant microeconomic theory of market efficiency. Notwithstanding the subsequent neoliberal interregnum, a similar view resounded strongly in 2020 as the responses to the Coronavirus pandemic jolted the economy into recession. Even right-wing politicians normally espousing ‘free market’ rhetoric and promising budget surpluses had to recognise the need for massive state-initiated fiscal deficits to stimulate economic activity and prevent unemployment reaching levels that could threaten the reproduction of social order. The pertinent question is whether the stimulatory policy approach should be just a short-term response to economic crisis or become more deeply embedded. The Australian government clearly took the former view at an early stage of the GCC in 2020, offering a mix of temporary supports, business incentives and regressive tax changes. The financial supports included the JobKeeper programme that provided payments to businesses to keep previously employed people on their payrolls, but only for the initial year of the crisis. The new JobSeeker payment for people out of work was set initially at double the previous Newstart payment, but it was already being pared back before the end of 2020. Among the various business incentives announced in the 2020–2021 budget, the most substantial was the investment allowance for spending on capital equipment. Although accompanied by government rhetoric about how it would encourage firms to create jobs, significantly, the subsidy was not made conditional on hiring additional workers. The rate of job creation could even decline over time if the investment allowance encourages firms to use less labour intensive technologies, as capital subsidies tend to do. The cuts to income tax rates announced in the 2020–2021 federal budget are similarly problematic because they gave most benefit to people on high incomes and are unlikely to substantially boost consumer spending. At a time of such pervasive uncertainty, the propensity to save is predictably strong, as shown by the reported AUD 100 billion increase in bank deposits in Australia during the first 8 months after the pandemic began (Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) cited in Wright, 2020). The tax cuts, while certain to increase post-tax inequality, were never likely to generate substantial macroeconomic stimulus nor produce a jobs surge. The more certain effect is further deepening of Federal budget deficits, already ratcheted up sharply by the government spending that the GCC triggered. Accordingly, the long-standing ambition of the major political parties to get the budget into surplus has had to be indefinitely postponed, if not abandoned. That at least is overdue. However, the current policy settings do nothing to create structural economic changes that would be necessary for more employment and income growth in the longer term. Would a GND provide a more effective means of creating sustainable employment opportunities? If so, that would give it strong appeal not only to the labour movement but to all who are worried about the consequences of continuing economic stagnation, unemployment and the other social consequences of the temporary fiscal stimulus being wound back. So, how might that job-creation occur? Expanding public employment is the most direct route, especially focused on sectors like public health, education, child-care and elderly care that have been stress points for workers during the pandemic. While some might regard jobs like these as less explicitly ‘green’ than, say, jobs in solar energy, their emphasis on nurturing and care is thoroughly consistent with refocusing the economy onto socially useful work and long-term sustainability rather than short-term profitability (as argued by Heenan and Sturman, 2020). The version of the GND being advanced by the Australian Greens also includes embrace of the job-guarantee (JG) model, a long-standing post-Keynesian proposal (as advocated, for example, by Mitchell, 2000). This policy evidently appeals to those who think that government should be employer-of-last-resort in a capitalist economy that is otherwise incapable of ensuring full employment. Other reform proponents have been pushing for the introduction of Basic Income (BI), sometimes in conjunction with JG, as a means of reducing poverty and expanding social choice while partially decoupling receipt of income from people’s availability for formal paid work (FitzRoy and Gin, 2018; Spies-Butcher et al., 2020; Stilwell, 2019: 200–205). However, the GND does not depend crucially on either having a JG or BI: its minimum requirement is a ‘green jobs’ element in the job-creation process. Thus, the central task remains to shift economic activity into forms of production, consumption and transportation that use less environmentally damaging energy sources and technologies. If that can be achieved, the effects of a GND would contrast sharply with a purely crisis-driven re-embrace of Keynesian stimulus policies.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
FJG GND PIC › FJG PIC › 1NC

FJG kills jobs and cannot solve the aff.

Dolan’20 [Ed; PhD from Yale University; February 4. Can We Put Everyone to Work? — The Alternatives to a “Job Guarantee.” - Niskanen Center. Niskanen Center. https://www.niskanencenter.org/can-we-put-everyone-to-work-the-alternatives-to-a-job-guarantee/]

Can we put everyone to work? In a way, it seems like an odd time to be asking the question. After all, the official unemployment rate is at a 50-year low and the U.S. economy has added jobs for a record 110 consecutive months. Still, broader indexes show much greater labor market slack. Those indexes include some 4.4 million people who are working part time but would like to work full time, and an additional 4.4 million who say they want a job, but are neither working nor looking. What is more, the labor force participation rate, even for prime-age workers, is not yet back to its prerecession level and is even farther below the rates of the 1990s. But how to do it? How to get more people to work – and better yet, at a living wage? In what follows I will discuss four proposals. The first two – guaranteed jobs, from the left, and work requirements, from the right – I view skeptically. The other two are wage subsidies and basic income. I see those as more promising, and more promising still if combined. Guaranteed Jobs A job guarantee (JG) is one of the three main pillars of the Green New Deal, along with clean energy and universal health care. Under a JG, anyone who wanted could get a full- or part-time job just by showing up. They would be directly employed by state or local governments and nonprofit organizations, while the cost would be borne by the federal government. The jobs would pay a living wage of something like $15 per hour, plus full benefits. Jobs would be created to match workers’ skills and places of residence, so they could start immediately without retraining or relocation. According to two detailed descriptions [1] [2], guaranteed jobs would be taken up by some 10 to 15 million workers, even with the job market as tight as it is now. Including wages, benefits, payroll taxes, and supplies, the total cost per job would be something like $45,000 to $56,000. The gross cost to the federal budget would be $409 billion to $543 billion per year, some 9 to 11 percent of current federal spending. The net cost could be substantially lower because of taxes paid by workers and budget savings on existing welfare programs, however. Nevertheless, although the cost of a full job guarantee, even with offsets, would make such a program a hard sell in Congress, cost is not the biggest reason I am skeptical. Three things particularly concern me. First, even though guaranteed jobs would be designed not to compete directly with the private sector, a JG would still be disruptive. Private employers would lose workers if they did not match a job-and-benefit package worth some $20 per hour. JG advocates are confident that private employers have enough slack to raise wages without cutting employment, but I am not so sure. JG jobs would not only offer good wages and benefits, but also, as advocates promise, they would be more accommodating than many private sector jobs to workers’ personal schedules, family needs, and disabilities. A large outflow from private employment to guaranteed jobs could raise the cost of the program sharply. Second, I think advocates overstate the ease of creating 10 to 15 million meaningful new public service jobs. To avoid competing with the private sector, they could not be jobs in hotels or factories. They could not require advanced skills or investments in heavy equipment, which would mean JG workers could play a limited role in projects like replacing aging bridges or building green energy infrastructure. When we read advocates’ descriptions of JG jobs, they talk about things like teachers’ aides, recycling, and planting trees on vacant lots. How many workers could be absorbed in such jobs before they became mere make-work? Third, many of those who remain out of work in today’s booming economy are, almost by definition, among the “hard to employ.” Those include people with criminal records, unstable housing, substance abuse issues, family situations that interfere with regular work schedules, and borderline mental and physical conditions that fall short of full disability but still create problems on the job. Programs that try to find work for the hard-to-employ are not a new idea. Many existing programs are well run. Still, their experience shows that lasting success requires intensive, one-on-one casework to help with things like soft job skills and support with personal issues. Even then, success rates are far from 100 percent. The leading JG proposals do not, in my view, come close to budgeting enough for administration, counseling, and support services.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Affirmative › No scale up

Psychoanalysis can’t be scaled up to explain society or politics – they can’t explain our impacts and definitely can’t solve

Sharpe 10 – Lecturer, Philosophy and Psychoanalytic Studies, and Goucher, Senior Lecturer, Literary and Psychoanalytic Studies at Deakin University Matthew and Geoff, Žižek and Politics: An Introduction, p. 182-185

Can we bring some order to this host of criticisms? It is remarkable that, for all the criticisms of Žižek’s political Romanticism, no one has argued that the ultra- extremism of Žižek’s political position might reflect his untenable attempt to shape his model for political action on the curative final moment in clinical psychoanalysis. The differences between these two realms, listed in Figure 5.1, are nearly too many and too great to restate – which has perhaps caused the theoretical oversight. The key thing is this. Lacan’s notion of traversing the fantasy involves the radical transformation of people’s subjective structure: a refounding of their most elementary beliefs about themselves, the world, and sexual difference. This is undertaken in the security of the clinic, on the basis of the analysands’ voluntary desire to overcome their inhibitions, symptoms and anxieties. As a clinical and existential process, it has its own independent importance and authenticity. The analysands, in transforming their subjective world, change the way they regard the objective, shared social reality outside the clinic. But they do not transform the world. The political relevance of the clinic can only be (a) as a supporting moment in ideology critique or (b) as a fully- fl edged model of politics, provided that the political subject and its social object are ultimately identical. Option (b), Žižek’s option, rests on the idea, not only of a subject who becomes who he is only through his (mis) recognition of the objective sociopolitical order, but whose ‘traversal of the fantasy’ is immediately identical with his transformation of the socio- political system or Other. Hence, according to Žižek, we can analyse the institutional embodiments of this Other using psychoanalytic categories. In Chapter 4, we saw Žižek’s resulting elision of the distinction between the (subjective) Ego Ideal and the (objective) Symbolic Order. This leads him to analyse our entire culture as a single subject–object, whose perverse (or perhaps even psychotic) structure is expressed in every manifestation of contemporary life. Žižek’s decisive political- theoretic errors, one substantive and the other methodological, are different (see Figure 5.1) The substantive problem is to equate any political change worth the name with the total change of the subject–object that is, today, global capitalism. This is a type of change that can only mean equating politics with violent regime change, and ultimately embracing dictatorial government, as Žižek now frankly avows (IDLC 412–19). We have seen that the ultra- political form of Žižek’s criticism of everyone else, the theoretical Left and the wider politics, is that no one is sufficiently radical for him – even, we will discover, Chairman Mao. We now see that this is because Žižek’s model of politics proper is modelled on a pre- critical analogy with the total transformation of a subject’s entire subjective structure, at the end of the talking cure. For what could the concrete consequences of this governing analogy be? We have seen that Žižek equates the individual fantasy with the collective identity of an entire people. The social fantasy, he says, structures the regime’s ‘inherent transgressions’: at once subjects’ habitual ways of living the letter of the law, and the regime’s myths of origin and of identity. If political action is modelled on the Lacanian cure, it must involve the complete ‘traversal’ – in Hegel’s terms, the abstract versus the determinate negation – of all these lived myths, practices and habits. Politics must involve the periodic founding of entire new subject–objects. Providing the model for this set of ideas, the fi rst Žižekian political subject was Schelling’s divided God, who gave birth to the entire Symbolic Order before the beginning of time (IDLC 153; OB 144–8). But can the political theorist reasonably hope or expect that subjects will simply give up on all their inherited ways, myths and beliefs, all in one world- creating moment? And can they be legitimately asked or expected to, on the basis of a set of ideals whose legitimacy they will only retrospectively see, after they have acceded to the Great Leap Forward? And if they do not – for Žižek laments that today subjects are politically disengaged in unprecedented ways – what means can the theorist and his allies use to move them to do so?

2023 Michigan Kritik
Affirmative › Psycho not scientific

Psychoanalysis does not function like a scientific method, recent evidence proves that psychoanalysis does not give any coherent response to any criticism.

Paris 17 (Joel Paris obtained his psychiatric training at McGill. His current research interests include a project carrying out a controlled study of the outcome of stepped care treatment for BPD. HE is a Professor, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University. He is also a Research Associate, Department of Psychiatry, Jewish General Hospital, and an Associate Psychiatrist at the McGill University Health Center. “Is Psychoanalysis Still Relevant to Psychiatry?” 1/31/17 https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0706743717692306) //Sajad

Psychoanalysis claimed to be a science but did not function like one. It failed to operationalize its hypotheses, to test them with empirical methods, or to remove constructs that failed to gain scientific support.1 In this way, the intellectual world of psychoanalysis more closely resembles the humanities. Today, with few psychiatrists or clinical psychologists entering psychoanalytic training, the door has been opened to practitioners with backgrounds in other disciplines, including the humanities. This trend is related to a hermeneutic mode of thought,50 which focuses on meaningful interpretations of phenomena, rather than on empirical testing of hypotheses and observations. Since the time of Freud, the typical psychoanalytic paper has consisted of speculations backed up with illustrations, similar to the methods of literary theory and criticism. One model currently popular in the humanities is “critical theory.”51 This postmodernist approach uses Marxist concepts to explain phenomena ranging from literature to politics. It proposes that truth is entirely relative and often governed by hidden social forces. In its most radical form, in the work of Michel Foucault,52 critical theory and postmodernism take an antiscience position, denying the existence of objective truth and viewing scientific findings as ways of defending the “hegemony” of those in power. Some humanist scholars have adopted the ideas of Jacques Lacan, a French psychoanalyst who created his own movement and whose eccentric clinical practice resembled that of a cult leader.53 Moreover, recruitment of professionals and academics with no training in science could lead to an increasing isolation of the discipline. While only a few contemporary psychoanalysts have embraced postmodernism, the humanities have made use of psychoanalytical concepts for their own purposes as a way of understanding literature and history. Conclusions In 2009, the British Journal of Psychiatry published a debate about whether the journal should accept psychoanalytic case reports.54 The debate pitted a biologist, Lewis Wolpert, against a psychoanalyst-researcher, Peter Fonagy. Wolpert argued that psychoanalytic case reports should be excluded because they are in no way scientific. Fonagy, while conceding some of his opponent’s points, defended analysis by pointing out that research is possible and is now beginning to be conducted. But while Fonagy himself is committed to empiricism, he represents a very small minority in a field that lacks that commitment. Unfortunately, the modern revisions of psychoanalysis do not offer a coherent response to critics. It is difficult to see how any of the current responses to criticism can save psychoanalysis from a continued and lingering decline. Analysis has separated itself from psychiatry and psychology by teaching its method in stand-alone institutes. The field may only survive if it is prepared to dismantle its structure as a separate discipline and rejoin academia and clinical science. Whatever its limitations, psychoanalysis left an important legacy to psychiatry. It taught a generation of psychiatrists how to understand life histories and to listen attentively to what patients say. In an era dominated by neuroscience, diagnostic checklists, and psychopharmacology, we need to find a way to retain psychotherapy, whose basic concepts can be traced back to the work of Freud, as part of psychiatry.55

The “Lack” is a lie—critics are silenced and threatened

2023 Michigan Kritik
Affirmative › Psycho not scientific

Nonfasifiability, lack of prediction, lack of rules and regulations, being impossible to test all ensure psychoanalysis will inevitably fail, and reinforces the idea that psychoanalysis is illegit.

Beystehner 98 (Kristen M. Beystehner graduated from University of Georgia School of Law, and Northwestern University, BA, with honors "Psychoanalysis: Freud's revolutionary approach to human personality." 1998 http://www.personalityresearch.org/papers/beystehner.) //Sajad

Finally, many people feel that a major flaw of psychoanalysis is that, according to Farrell (1981), "it appears to encourage analytic and psychodynamic practitioners to overlook the place and great importance of ordinary common sense" (p. 216). Because psychoanalysis deals chiefly with unconscious motives and repressed emotions, common sense no longer seems to be applicable. Farrell (1981) and other critics believe that it is increasingly important for analysts to be aware of common sense and the role that it can, should, and does play in psychoanalysis (p. 216). Criticisms of the Principles of Psychoanalysis

Storr (1981) insists, "Only a few fundamentalist psychoanalysts of an old-fashioned kind think that Freud was a scientist or that psychoanalysis was or could be a scientific enterprise," and that, "...to understand persons cannot be a scientific enterprise" (p. 260). Although many psychoanalysts themselves would undoubtedly consider psychoanalysis to be a science, many critics would disagree.

2023 Michigan Kritik
Affirmative › Psycho not scientific

Psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience with no scientific backing -- turns the K

Zepf 18 (Siegfried Zepf, MD, is a Training analyst (DPG, DGPT) and the former director of the Institute of Psychoanalysis, Psychotherapy and Psychosomatic Medicine, University of Saarland Germany. He is the author of numerous publications on epistemological, psychosomatic, socio-psychological, and psychoanalytical topics. “Psychoanalysis Today—A Pseudoscience? A Critique of the Arbitrary Nature of Psychoanalytic Theories and Practice” 2/26/18 https://doi.org/10.1521/pdps.2018.46.1.115) //Sajad

Neuroses are the outcome of unfavorable and socially determined measures, corresponding to a given historical milieu and necessary in this milieu ... The contradictions of a society are reflected in its education, and later in the neuroses of the educated individuals. (p. 586)

This indicates that the essential conditions of neurotic disturbances are not situated in individuals but inherent in the social system they grow up and live in. If this holds true, then by neglecting that societal critique the crucial etiological conditions of neurotic diseases remain a blind spot in the field of clinical vision.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › AT: NIT Solve Growth

NIT does not improve the economy’s growth rate

Angyridis and Thompson 2016

(Constantine Angyridis, Ph.D., University of Toronto, and Brennan Scott Thompson, brennan@ryerson.ca “Negative income taxes, inequality and poverty.” https://www-jstor-org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/stable/pdf/24915800.pdfrefreqid=excelsior:b8f3249dd5e2755190f8bd30be6bdf9c&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1)

From the government's flow budget constraint (8), it is clear that by keeping the debt- and government spending-to-output ratios constant, a rise in the demogrant-to-output ratio will cause an increase in the tax rate, r. Indeed, by increasing the demogrant-to-output ratio from zero to 20%, we find that the tax rate rises monotonically from 27.9% to 51.3% (see table 2 for a summary of our results). It is interesting to note that at a demogrant-to-output ratio of 20%, 48.8% of the population is faced with a non-positive tax liability (the demogrant is greater than or equal to the tax paid on the wage and interest income of these agents). The increase in the tax rate distorts the labour-leisure choice and results in a fall in aggregate labour supply from 0.380 to 0.280 as the demogrant-to-output ratio is increased from zero to 20%. This reduction in labour supply causes an increase in the pre-tax wage rate from 1.843 to 2.497. On the other hand, the increase in the tax rate is sharp enough that the post-tax wage rate falls from 1.329 to 1.217. Similarly, the rising tax rate caused by the increase in the demogrant-to-output ratio distorts investment, resulting in lower asset accumulation. Specifically, the assets-to-output ratio falls from 3.522 to 3.045 as the demogrant-to-output ratio is increased from zero to 20%. Due to the decrease in investment, the pre-tax interest rate increases sharply from 3.0% to 5.1%. However, despite the large increase in the tax rate, the post-tax interest rate rises only slightly, from 2.2% to 2.5%. As a result of the large decreases in both the labour supply and investment, output at a demogrant-to-output ratio of 20% is only 68.2% of its level with a demogrant-to-output ratio of zero. Moreo demogrant-to-output ratio of 20% is reduced compared to a demogrant-to-output ratio of z mean lifetime utility does not decrease m to-output ratio (as output does). Indeed, mean demogrant-to-output ratio of 5.0%. We now turn to the redistributive effects of ratio. In figure 2a, we plot the Lorenz curv to demogrant-to-output ratios of zero (sol that the Lorenz curves for pre- and post-tax worked, are all identical since they are constan the distribution of wage income at a demogra dominates that of wage income at a demogr implies an unambiguously higher level of inequ We also confirm this numerically for all inte output ratio. Indeed, the Gini coefficient curve, is the same pre- and post-tax) monotonically increases from 0.580 to 0.680 as the demogrant-to-output ratio is increased from zero to 20%. This unambiguous and substantial increase in wage income inequality can be explained by the fact that, although all individuals reduce the number of hours they work, higher productivity individuals reduce their labour supply by a lesser amount compared to lower productivity individuals. Similarly, although investment in assets falls for all individuals, it falls by slightly less for the higher productivity individuals who work more relative to the lower productivity individuals and, thus, have relatively higher disposable income to invest. Figure 2b displays the Lorenz curves for interest income corresponding to demogrant-to-output ratios of zero (solid line) and 20% (dashed line). Note that the Lorenz curves for pre- and post-tax interest income, as well as for wealth, are all identical since they are constant multiples of one another. Although it is difficult to detect visually, the distribution in interest income at a demogrant-to output ratio of zero Lorenz-dominates that of the interest income at a demogrant to-output ratio of 20% (again, we confirmed this numerically for all intermediate cases). This is also reflected in the behaviour of the Gini coefficient for interest income, which, as seen in table 3, increases slightly from 0.425 to 0.441 as the demogrant-to-output ratio is increased from zero to 20%. Of course, since interest income is just a multiple of asset holdings, the Lorenz curve for asset holdings is identical to that shown for interest income in figure 2b. In contrast to what we saw for wage and interest income, the Lorenz curves for pre- and post-tax total income are different from one another. The reason for this is the inclusion of the demogrant in total income, which makes post- total income an affine function of pre-tax total income. However, the Lo curves, and thus the Gini coefficients, for pre- and post-tax total income equal when the demogrant-to-output ratio is zero. In figures 2c and 2d, we pl the Lorenz curves for pre- and post-tax total income, respectively, correspon to demogrant-to-output ratios of zero (solid line) and 20% (dashed line). As demogrant-to-output ratio is increased, the resulting pre-tax total income distribution is always Lorenz-dominated by the existing one. However, the resulting post-tax total income distribution always Lorenz-dominates the existing one. The increase in pre-tax total income inequality follows directly from the com bined increase in both wage and capital income inequality. On the other hand, the effect of the increasing demogrant is strong enough to cause the level of inequal ity in post-tax total income to fall. This result is consistent with the theoretical result of Davies and Hoy (2002), where the number of hours worked is fixed. Furthermore, it implies that the Gini coefficient for pre-tax total income is rising, from 0.504 to 0.564, while for post-tax total income it is falling from 0.504 to 0.383. Generalized Lorenz curves for post-tax total income corresponding to demo grant-to-output ratios of zero (solid line) and 20% (dashed line) are shown in figure 3 (the distributions of wage income, interest income, and pre-tax total in come at a demogrant-to-output ratio of zero clearly dominate the corresponding distributions at any higher demogrant-to-output ratio in the generalized Lorenz order). Note that, in computing these generalized Lorenz curves, the mean level of post-tax income has been scaled by the relative output level (i.e., the mean level of post-tax income is multiplied by 0.682 when the demogrant-to-output ratio is 20%). It is interesting to note that, at a demogrant-to-output ratio of 20%, the generalized Lorenz curve for post-tax total income lies above that correspond ing to a demogrant-to-output ratio of zero for all p up to 0.600. Accordingly, we can conclude that the (post-tax) income of the poorest individuals actually increases as the demogrant-to-output ratio rises, thereby producing an improvement under the Rawlsian maxi-min cr has important implications for the lev we now turn. Figure 4 displays the Foster et al. (1984) poverty measures, Po (solid li P\ (dashed line) and Pj (dash-dotted line), for post-tax total income (see a table 2). We consider both relative (figure 4a) and absolute (figure 4b) pov lines. As noted in section 1, the relative poverty line is set equal to one half of median level of post-tax income (a level widely used in studies of relative pover see Smeeding 2006). The absolute poverty line is fixed at the level of the relat poverty line when the demogrant-to-output ratio is equal to zero. Changes in level of absolute poverty thus reflect both the redistributive effects and the ou effects of the change in tax policy. From figure 4, it is clear that all of these poverty measures are falling stantially as the demogrant-to-output ratio is increased. This is consistent wi the static partial equilibrium results of Thompson (2012). It is interesting to that, while the headcount ratio is equal to 29.1% when the demogrant-to-outp ratio is zero, relative poverty is entirely eliminated (i.e., P( — 0 for any e) when demogrant-to-output ratio is 19.7%, which corresponds to a tax rate of 50 Moreover, despite the large decreases in output, absolute poverty is substanti reduced as the demogrant-to-output ratio is increased: the headcount ratio (i.e the proportion of the population that is poor) is 19.8% at this threshold of the demogrant-to-output ratio, while it is 29.1% with a demogrant-to-outp ratio of zero Note also that the effect of relatively small increases in output ratio on both relative and absolute poverty is even mor the higher order poverty measures, P\ and Pj. This is becaause place a greater weight on "extreme" poverty. The demogrant e a minimum income guarantee, significantly increasing the inc est individuals. Nevertheless, one needs to take into account th demogrant-to-output ratio reduces the incomes of many no as is clear from the generalized Lorenz curves shown in figure 4.1. Sensitivity analysis We now consider the sensitivity of our results with respec of relative risk aversion, //. The inverse of ß is the intertemp substitution. As a consequence, it is a key parameter that affe consumption/saving and labour supply decisions. Specificall higher values of ß, namely 2.0 and 2.5, and compare them wit value of ß — 1.5. Qualitatively, the results of increasing the demogrant-to-ou variables of interest are the same as in the benchmark model. to preserve space, we limit our attention to only the minim output ratio that eliminates relative poverty. We denote this th demogrant-to-output ratio by x* As is seen in table 3, higher values of ß require a larger dem ratio (and therefore a higher tax rate) in order to eliminate rela ever, these increases are not large. Specifically, in increasing ß only increases from 19.7% to 22.0%. Thus, this particular qu quite robust to the value of ß. Table 3 also shows that the redu X* are slightly larger at higher values of ß, while the reduction utility are substantially larger at higher values of at. We have shown that increases in the demogrant-to-output ratio (between zero and 20%) reduce the level of inequality, and both relative and absolute poverty (all measured in terms of post-tax total income). However, these reductions in inequality and poverty are accompanied by a significant contraction in output and, beyond a demogrant-to-output ratio of 5.0%, a fall in mean lifetime utility. The model that we considered assumes an exogenously determined growth rate for labour-augmenting technological progress. As a consequence, the redistribu tive policies that we studied had no impact on the economy's long-run growth rate. The effect of these policy changes on the growth rate could be examined using an endogenous growth model as in Cassou and Lansing (2004, 2006) for example. Another possible extension is to incorporate differential taxation be tween capital and labour, as in Ventura (1999) and Conesa et al. (2009), or a progressive income tax schedule, as in Hsu and Yang (2013) and H eathcote et al. (2014). We intend to pursue such extensions in future research.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › AT: NIT Increase Jobs/Productivity

NIT increases cost of labor, which in turn increases unemployment

Lages Dos Santos, 04 (Perdo, French economist from Universite du Havre, 9/9,04, CERENE, “Negative Income Tax, Employment and Welfare”, , Rosado)

The increase of the probability of separation between employer/employees has for direct effect to raise the number of unemployed people but also to decrease the number of vacant jobs making lower the tightness in labour market. Moreover, as it involves a diminution of the expected jobs’ life duration, the increase of s has for effect to raise wage that workers claims leading to an increase in λ to keep implicitly jobs profitability. As a consequence, average productivity as average wage decrease. We have to note that the probability to fill a vacant job rises since λ increases but also because there are less vacant jobs for more applicants. However, even if it is not possible to determine the effect on the hiring probability, the evident increase of the term s/p involves, because of flow equilibrium condition, an increase of unemployment. 4.2.2.3. Vacant job cost. The increase of the costs of creation and maintenance of vacant job has for consequence to decrease the number of these because they are less profitable. So it appears that it has a negative effect on the tightness in labour market. Concerning the effect on matching limit, λ, combining equation (28) and (33), we deduce that the diminution of θ induces a diminution of equilibrium value of less efficient job productivity y(λ) and, as a consequence, means an increase in λ (remind that y(λ) is decreasing in λ). This increase in limit λ has for direct effect to decrease the equilibrium average values of productivity and wage. Moreover, the probability of filling a vacant job raises seeing that the tightness on market is lower ant the investigation area is more important. However, taking into account equations (28) and (33), we show that the increase of the cost of a vacant job leads to a diminution of the probability p to be hired and consequently, an increase of the level of unemployment and a diminution of global production. 5. SIMULATIONS 5.1. Presentation In this 5th part, we initiate simulations in order to specify the results we obtained with theoretical analysis but also and mainly in order to determine the effect of the measure on θ. Consequently, for these simulations, in addition to the hypothesises already held, we consider as an explicit function of workers productivity a simple linear function of the form: y l = y − dl 0 )( As we have already precised, the budget constraint imposes us: ∫ = )0( ( ) ( ) 0 W w t w dw λ If we consider a tax function of the form t(w) = -α + γw and given that w(λ)<w(0), the financing of this measure imposes : γ λ α = + 2 w( ) w )0( These simulations, made with the software “Matlab”, permit us to study particularly the effects of the reform on unemployment rate, on production and on surplus. 5.2. The results The simulations gave the results presented in tables 2, 3 and 4. Case 1 corresponds to the reference situation that is the reform’s setting up. Consequently, cases 2, 3, 4 and 5 present the results of the implementation of a Negative Income Tax. In all the cases, we held the following parameters: β=0,5 ; d=0,5 ; s=0,05 ; x=0,9 ; c=0,5 ; N=1 and y0 = 0,5. Besides, in addition to the other variables already defined, Y represents global production, SC, the collective surplus and ,0( 544) WE, the utility of the worker initially the poorest.

2023 Michigan Counterplan
Aff Answers › AT: NIT Increase Jobs/Productivity

NIT decreases productivity

Amine and Santos 2013

(Samir Amine, Egyptian-French Marxian economist, political scientist and world-systems analyst, and Pedro Lages Dos Santos, Université du Havre · Département AES/Economie PHD. “TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICES AND LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION: NEGATIVE INCOME TAX”. DOI: 10.14208/eer.2013.03.02.001) AH

The rise in the tax credit for low income workers (i.e. low-skilled workers) encourages all active workers of all qualification levels to reduce their reservation wage and negotiate lower wages (equation (14)).¶ Given that taxation only concerns workers, firms benefit from this reform, taking a larger share of the collective surplus by reducing the qualification threshold for hiring (reduction of zˆ ). This negative impact on¶ firms' selectivity is explained analytically by the equilibrium equation (20)¶ stating that the increase in the tax credit results in a direct decrease in minimum productivity (zy ˆ .)¶ The second effect concerns the characteristics of the jobs firms will¶ create. Firms have become less selective, and since they are sure they will hire more low-skilled workers, they adapt their job offers to that category of worker by making them less complex (reduction in a).¶ However, although introducing a NIT policy can encourage recovery¶ in the labor market by increasing the proportion of workers considered¶ active and consequently raising labor market participation, the decline in the qualification threshold and job complexity is reflected in a deterioration of matching quality. The tax credit reduces the average productivity, and consequently the average wage.¶ As for the effect on job creation, NIT has a negative effect on labor¶ market tightness. Analytically, this is explained by the equilibrium equation¶ (27). Although firms take a larger share of the total surplus, the deterioration in average job quality makes market entry, and consequently job creation, less profitable. The probability p )( of finding a job falls, while vacant jobs¶ are rapidly filled (rise in q  )( ). Then, although labor market participation¶ rises, lower market tightness accentuates the unemployment rate in this economy.