Free beta access. 50 free AI tokens each week. Optional top-ups available. See what is included
Open evidence library

Search the archive.

Current and older evidence is free during beta. Sign in for unlimited card access and full source downloads.

Matching cards
2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Oil › Carbon Tax---Link---2NC

Carbon Taxes cause oil demand and prices to drop- leads to oil industry collapse.

Panetta 22 – Economist, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank (Fabio Panetta, “Greener and cheaper: could the transition away from fossil fuels generate a divine coincidence?,” European Central Bank, 11-16-2022, Available Online: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2022/html/ecb.sp221116~c1d5160785.en.html, Accessed: 7-24-2023)//ILake-EN

Today I will examine the possible implications of the green transition for energy prices. I will argue that the pathway to a greener economy does not necessarily imply persistently higher inflation. Much will depend on the policies we adopt to transit away from the most polluting sources of energy. I would even argue that we can reach a “divine coincidence” between price stability and decarbonisation.

The effects of changes in the supply and demand for fossil fuels and renewables

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Oil › Carbon Tax---Link---2NC

Carbon tax would decrease the price of oil. Wrecks the Chinese economy due to high dependence. The tax is only implemented well when prices are low but uniqueness says they’re not

Shu Mo and Tin Wang , 10-30-2022, Shu Mo is Assistant Dean, Director of International Relations. Ting Wang is from School of Management, Guizhou University, and Guizhou Provincial Key Laboratory of Internet Plus Intelligent Manufacturing, School of Mechanical Engineering, Guizhou University "Synergistic Effects of International Oil Price Fluctuations and Carbon Tax Policies on the Energy–Economy–Environment System in China," PubMed Central (PMC), //ecam

A carbon tax would make consuming fossil fuels more expensive and have the effect of reducing energy use. In Scenarios 3 and 4, it is clear that the consumption of coal and oil and natural gas both dramatically decline following the implementation of a carbon price, but to a lesser amount. Consumption of thermal power and clean electricity both rise, with thermal power’s replacement impact being the most prominent. In the long run, the cost of thermal power will quickly grow as a result of the higher carbon tax, and this, along with the rise in the price of thermal energy, will significantly lessen thermal power’s competitive edge when the cost and price of renewable energy both remain the same or slightly fall. The introduction of the carbon pricing policy will ultimately impede the growth of thermal power. The whole cost of utilizing synthetic energy, which includes direct carbon costs and energy prices, is what determines energy consumption. The carbon tax not only accounts for the cost of carbon emissions directly in the cost of production but also indirectly influences changes in energy prices through transmission into the energy sector’s cost of production. To save costs, businesses will develop or use alternative energy sources to replace fossil fuels, which will help China modify its existing energy balance of coal consumption as the major source of energy and oil consumption as a supplement. The effects of a tax on carbon are not evenly distributed. When oil prices go down, the policy of imposing a tax on carbon can cut energy use in a more efficient manner while also offsetting the increase in consumption of fossil fuels that was caused by the rise in oil prices. Therefore, there is a golden opportunity to establish a carbon tax policy when international oil prices are low and continue low.

4.3. Impact Analysis of Scenario Combination on Economy

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Oil › Carbon Tax---Link---2NC

Carbon Taxes cause oil demand and prices to drop- leads to oil industry collapse.

Panetta 22 – Economist, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank (Fabio Panetta, “Greener and cheaper: could the transition away from fossil fuels generate a divine coincidence?,” European Central Bank, 11-16-2022, Available Online: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2022/html/ecb.sp221116~c1d5160785.en.html, Accessed: 7-24-2023)//ILake-EN

Today I will examine the possible implications of the green transition for energy prices. I will argue that the pathway to a greener economy does not necessarily imply persistently higher inflation. Much will depend on the policies we adopt to transit away from the most polluting sources of energy. I would even argue that we can reach a “divine coincidence” between price stability and decarbonisation.

The effects of changes in the supply and demand for fossil fuels and renewables

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Oil › GND---Link---2NC

Green Tech Innovation causes oil demand and prices to drop- leads to oil industry collapse.

Panetta 22 – Economist, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank (Fabio Panetta, “Greener and cheaper: could the transition away from fossil fuels generate a divine coincidence?,” European Central Bank, 11-16-2022, Available Online: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2022/html/ecb.sp221116~c1d5160785.en.html, Accessed: 7-24-2023)//ILake-EN

Today I will examine the possible implications of the green transition for energy prices. I will argue that the pathway to a greener economy does not necessarily imply persistently higher inflation. Much will depend on the policies we adopt to transit away from the most polluting sources of energy. I would even argue that we can reach a “divine coincidence” between price stability and decarbonisation.

The effects of changes in the supply and demand for fossil fuels and renewables

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Oil › GND---Link---2NC

GND will send a signal to oil companies—results in higher prices

Barrabi and Zilber 22 [Thomas Barrabi, Thomas Barrabi is a business reporter for the New York Post, and Ariel Zilber, Ariel Zilber joined The Post as a general assignment reporter for the business section in 2021. He got his start as a journalist in Israel, where he worked for Ha'aretz and The Jerusalem Post. He returned in 2016 to the US, where before joining The Post he did a five-year stint as an online news reporter for the Daily Mail, 3-9-2022, "Why Biden energy policies have contributed to surging oil prices," New York Post, | czx]

If President Joe Biden came out forcefully on the side of increasing US oil production, the price of a barrel could fall quickly, experts told The Post — even if it takes a while to bring that new energy online. Just look at what happened Wednesday in the wake of the United Arab Emirates and Iraq saying they’d up production by an estimated 800,000 barrels a day: The global price of oil dropped by $22 a barrel within minutes. If Biden signaled full-throated support for US drillers to get to work — and perhaps allowed the re-starting of the Keystone XL Pipeline from Canada — global oil prices could similarly fall sharply, the industry experts told The Post. “Biden could go to the oil and gas industry and say, ‘OK, I’ve said we’re going to get off oil and gas and that you guys are yesterday’s industry, but I’m going to drop that,'” surmised Myron Ebell, the director of the Competitive Enterprise Institute’s Center for Energy and Environment. “Part of the run up in oil prices is the psychology of it,” he said. Biden could say to the industry: “‘I need your help,'” Ebell said. But so far, it’s been crickets, according to oil executives who’ve been willing to speak out. Just last week, CEO Rick Muncrief of Devon Energy — a large driller worth around $40 billion — told Bloomberg that he’d be happy to talk to US officials about upping production. But there’s been no call. “I’m a little mystified that there hasn’t been some dialog,” he said. “It’s not been that long ago that we were asked to drill less, not more,” he said. “They need to be talking about what is it they would really like U.S. producers to do.” That’s the kind of inaction that’s keeping prices high — up more than 40% since Russia invaded Ukraine and the war has worsened — and up nearly 90% over the past year when looking at the global Brent crude benchmark, which has risen as high as $123 a barrel in recent days when compared to its level of around $63 a year ago. “There’s an invisible hand in the oil market – If there’s a perception that, ‘Hey, if this guy is going to free up this pipeline, he might start freeing up some leases and stuff,’” then that could help push prices down, said Phil Flynn, senior market analyst at Price Futures Group. Get the latest updates in the Russia-Ukraine conflict with The Post’s live coverage. “It would have an immediate psychological impact on price,” Flynn said – noting a Keystone reboot announcement that would bring oil from the tar sands of Canada could knock off up to $10 from the price of oil just at the stroke of a pen, even if the pipeline were years away from production. The president, meanwhile, blamed Vladimir Putin this week as national average gas prices hit a record $4.25 in response to the US import ban. But US firms have less incentive to produce more oil while facing heavy regulations – meaning they’re more likely to leave the oil in the ground and drill in the future when prices are higher, says Benjamin Zycher of the American Enterprise Institute. He contends under the “Green New Deal” regulatory environment, the atmosphere in Washington is decidedly anti-oil. “If you really believe they’re going to be imposing regulatory and other constraints on the development of fossil fuel resources and investment in fossil fuel infrastructure, then higher prices are the result down the road — and therefore are the result now,” Zycher told The Post. Republicans and other Biden critics say his actions and proposals since taking office – such as canceling the Keystone pipeline, suspension of new federal oil and gas leases, higher drilling fees on federal land and a Democratic-led push for the Federal Reserve to implement climate change policies – have sent a clear signal to US producers. Tom Kloza, the global head of energy analysis for OPIS, noted the Biden administration has developed an “adversarial relationship” with US producers who now face calls to increase their output. “You’ve got diplomacy on Ukraine. You’ve got diplomacy with Iran. Now you’ve got diplomacy with Venezuela,” Kloza said. “You know, it might be advisable to have some diplomacy with oil and gas companies.”

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Oil › Green-Technology---Link---2NC

Green Tech Innovation causes oil demand and prices to drop- leads to oil industry collapse.

Panetta 22 – Economist, Member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank (Fabio Panetta, “Greener and cheaper: could the transition away from fossil fuels generate a divine coincidence?,” European Central Bank, 11-16-2022, Available Online: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2022/html/ecb.sp221116~c1d5160785.en.html, Accessed: 7-24-2023)//ILake-EN

Today I will examine the possible implications of the green transition for energy prices. I will argue that the pathway to a greener economy does not necessarily imply persistently higher inflation. Much will depend on the policies we adopt to transit away from the most polluting sources of energy. I would even argue that we can reach a “divine coincidence” between price stability and decarbonisation.

The effects of changes in the supply and demand for fossil fuels and renewables

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Oil › AT: Price Cap Thumper---Uniqueness---2NC

Rosenberg and Nostrand flows neg- reinforces our impact that TOTAL Russian oil collapse causes WORLDWIDE econ decline- We re-highlight in salmon

Rosenberg and Nostrand 23 – Elizabeth Rosenberg, Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, Eric Van Nostrand, Acting Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy (U.S. Department of the Treasury, “The Price Cap on Russian Oil: A Progress Report,” 5-18-2023, Available Online: https://home.treasury.gov/news/featured-stories/the-price-cap-on-russian-oil-a-progress-report, Accessed: 7-12-2023)// DD- ILake-EN

A year ago at the G7 Summit in Elmau, the leaders agreed to pursue a policy to cap the price of Russian oil to prevent Russia from continuing to earn a wartime premium. The price cap policy is a novel tool of economic statecraft designed to achieve two seemingly contradictory goals: restricting Russia’s oil revenues while maintaining the supply of Russian oil. Meeting these goals would make it harder for Russia to fund its brutal war in Ukraine while keeping energy costs down for consumers and businesses around the world. Nearly six months after implementation, the price cap is achieving both goals. We will continue to monitor dynamics in the global oil market going forward and adjust as necessary in support of these goals.

Russian exports have continued to flow, contributing to global oil market stability. Even as global oil prices have remained stable, the price of Russian oil has fallen significantly—driving down the Kremlin’s revenue. Immediately after the invasion, Russia received windfall profits on an oil price spike created by its war in Ukraine. But today, the price cap policy is taking that windfall off the table, which allows for low- and middle- income countries to purchase oil while at the same time making it increasingly challenging for Russia to finance its aggression.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Oil › AT: Price Cap Thumper---Uniqueness---2NC

Price cap doesn’t work and many countries rely on Russian oil- but plan ruins it

Surran 23 – Editor for energy, utilities, and natural resources, BA at Duke University, MBA from Rollins College (Carl Surran, “Russian crude oil tops $60 price cap for first time in test of Western sanctions,” Seeking Alpha, 7-15-2023, Available Online: https://seekingalpha.com/news/3987854-russian-crude-oil-tops-60-g-7-price-cap-for-first-time-in-test-of-western-sanctions, Accessed: 7-23-2023)//ILake- EN

Russian Urals crude oil prices exceeded the G-7 oil price cap this week for the first time, with oil prices across the board rising as Saudi production cuts begin to take hold while demand moves higher.

Prices for Urals crude hit $62.22/bbl for oil ports in the Baltic Sea, and $63.22/bbl for supplies sent from the Black Sea, according to Argus - higher than the $60 cap for Russian crude imposed in December.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Oil › Russia Oil---Uniqueness---2NC

Russia oil industry is rebounding- but it could easily fall back into decline.

Ilas et al. 23 – Andrei Ilas, Guest Writer; Petras Katinas, Energy Analyst; Isaac Levi, Energy Analyst; Jan Lietava, Data Analyst; Lauri Myllyvirta, Lead Analyst; Meri Pukarinen, Europe-Russia policy officer (Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air, “Russia’s oil revenue rebounds in March–April as price cap enforcement and review are failing – Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air,” Available Online: https://energyandcleanair.org/publication/russias-oil-revenue-rebounds-in-march-april-as-price-cap-enforcement-and-review-are-failing/, Accessed: 7-12-2023)//DD- ILake-EN

Russia’s oil revenues have rebounded in March–April from levels reached in January–February 2023, rising to the highest level since November, even as the G7 leaders stated at the conclusion of the Hiroshima Summit that the price cap is working. The latest analysis from the Centre for Research in Energy and Clean Air (CREA) shows that the price cap policy had a good start after it came into force in December 2022. However, it has since lost traction, integrity and credibility as the members of the Price Cap Coalition failed to revise price levels and enforce the policy.

Our key findings include:

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Oil › High-Prices---Uniqueness---2NC

Oil prices high – and they’re here to stay

Charmaine Jacob, 7-27-2023, is a digital news associate based out of CNBC’s Singapore office. “Oil markets will face ‘serious problems’ as demand from China and India ramps up, IEF secretary general says,” CNBC, //ecam

Oil prices are set to rise in the second half of the year as supply struggles to meet demand, according to the Secretary General of the International Energy Forum.

Oil demand bounced back to pre-Covid levels quickly, “but supply is having a tougher time in catching up,” said Joseph McMonigle, secretary general of the International Energy Forum, adding that the only factor moderating prices right now is the fear of a looming recession.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Oil › High-Prices---Uniqueness---2NC

Oil prices high and they’re on an upwards trend – Saudia Arabia and Russia key drivers

Stephanie Kelly, 7/3-2023, is a correspondent covering the U.S. crude market and member of the energy team since 2018 covering the oil and fuel markets "Oil prices up, hit nearly 3-month high as US inflation eases," Reuters, // ecam

Oil prices rose over 1% on Thursday to their highest in nearly three months after U.S. inflation data suggested interest rates in the world's biggest economy were close to their peak.

Brent crude futures rose $1.25, or 1.6%, to settle at $81.36 per barrel. The session peak was $81.57, the highest since April 25.

2023 Michigan Disadvantage
Oil › Rebounding---Uniqueness---2NC

Oil demand rebounded in early 2023, reaching new highs.

Perkins 23 [Robert Perkins; Robert is a journalist with over 20 years of experience covering finance, business, economics, and energy industry issues; 3-15-2023; "World oil demand to hit fresh highs in 2023 as China rebounds: IEA"; S&P Global; https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/031523-world-oil-demand-to-hit-fresh-highs-in-2023-as-china-rebounds-iea; Accessed 7-11-23; AO]

The International Energy Agency March 15 raised its estimate for global oil demand in 2023 by another 100,000 b/d as rebounding air traffic and pent-up Chinese demand push consumption to record highs. In its latest monthly oil market report, the Paris-based energy watchdog said it now sees global oil demand averaging 102.02 million b/d in 2023, 2 million b/d higher than in 2022. The gains will accelerate over the year, however, rising to 2.6 million b/d year on year in the fourth quarter, from just 710,000 b/d in the current quarter, the IEA estimates. "Global oil demand growth started 2023 with a whimper but is projected to end the year with a bang," the IEA said ".... Rebounding jet fuel use and a resurgent China will see an overall Q1-Q4 ramp-up of 3.2 million b/d, the largest relative in-year increase since 2010 with oil use surging to 103.2 million b/d in second-half 2023." The IEA said the global economic outlook has benefitted from China's economic momentum, with rebounding February Purchasing Managers' Index data and robust air traffic demand. Chinese mobility mostly stabilized after January's "remarkable bounce", the IEA said, adding that Chinese air traffic with domestic flights is now well above prepandemic levels. As a result, the IEA raised its estimate for Chinese jet/kerosene demand by 60,000 b/d. Globally, the IEA said its Q4 2023 forecast for jet/kerosene demand is now at 94% of Q4 2019 levels, representing a 7.5 million b/d year-on-year growth. "This assumes that by the end of 2023, the rebound in air travel will have largely run its course, with organic growth in non-OECD economies lifting overall passenger numbers further beyond 2019 levels," the IEA said. Market balance The report comes a day after OPEC kept its own 2023 global oil demand estimate largely unchanged at 101.90 million b/d, blaming weaknesses emerging in some western economies offsetting expected Chinese growth of 710,000 b/d. Under the IEA's outlook, the market balance looks set to flip into a supply deficit during the second half of the year as global oil demand rebounds with stock draws of over 1 million b/d. "Global demand is set to surge by 3.2 million b/d from Q1 2023 to Q4 2023, taking average growth for the year to 2 million b/d. Matching that increase would be a challenge even if Russia were able to maintain production at prewar levels." the IEA said. S&P Global Commodity Insights oil analysts expect to see global oil stock draws average 1.4 million b/d in H2 2023, putting pressing on prices as demand outstrips supply. The North Sea physical crude benchmark Dated Brent is expected to rise over the coming months to an average of $90/b in September before easing again in 2024, according to S&P Global analysts. Platts, part of S&P Global, assessed Dated Brent at an average of $82.49/b in February, down $0.29/b on the month. Supply growth Despite solid Asian demand growth, the IEA said that the oil markets have been in surplus for three straight quarters, helped by resilient Russian export volumes. Looking ahead, the IEA raised its supply growth estimate for the year by 300,000 b/d to 66.9 million b/d, with the increase led by the US, Brazil, Norway, Canada and Guyana. Global oil supply jumped 830,000 b/d in February, the IEA said, as the US and Canada rebounded strongly from winter storms and other outages. For the year, the IEA expects world oil production to grow 1.6 million b/d, with the US and Brazil dominating growth.

2023 Michigan Evidence
AFF › AT: Russia Diversion---Impact---2AC

Russia won’t initiate another war- they can’t even afford the current one

Ramsay 22 – Member of the Scottish Green party, on the board of Voices for Schotland, and advisory committees for the Economic Change Unit (Adam Ramsay, “ Russia can’t afford its war on Ukraine. Here’s why ,” openDemocracy, 3-24-2022, Available Online: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/russia-ukraine-war-economics-putin/, Accessed: 7-24-2023)//ILake-EN

The invasion of Ukraine began just 77 days after US troops limped out of Iraq, and just six months after the retreat from Afghanistan.

There’s something Putin seems to have failed to learn from these humiliations of the world’s strongest superpower.

2023 Michigan Evidence
AFF › AT: Russia Diversion---Impact---2AC

No Russian diversionary war – the world still relies on Russia for nuclear power.

Suriya Jayanti [March, 15, 23 Jayanti is an Eastern Europe energy policy expert. She served for ten years as a U.S. diplomat, including as the Energy Chief at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv, Ukraine “Russia Is Vital to the Clean Energy Transition. That's a Problem” NPAT]

Nuclear power is the only electricity generation technology that can reasonably satisfy the voracious energy demands of an ever growing world while also not contributing to climate change. There are approximately 440 nuclear reactors operating now, spread across 32 countries and Taiwan. That makes for about 390 gigawatts of electricity, roughly 10% of global demand. Sixty new reactors are currently under construction, mostly in Russia and China, and also India. Another 100 are formally in planning stages, with 300 more under discussion. While much of the activity is in countries with existing nuclear programs, dozens of new ones are jumping in. This nuclear renaissance depends on uranium. Russia has 8% of known deposits. That may not seem like enough of a share to make for market dominance when Australia and Kazakhstan together have 43%, but Russia also has 40% of the world’s uranium conversion capacity and 46% of global enrichment capacity. In 2021, the U.S. bought 14% of its uranium from Russia and used Russian enrichment services for 28% of its needs. For Europe, 20% of its uranium and 26% of enrichment comes from Russia. Most immediately, countries that are already operating Russian VVER nuclear power plants (NPPs), such as Ukraine, have been somewhat stuck because only one company outside Russia makes the necessary fuel. Nor is Russia’s nuclear industry dominance in decline. A full 50% of NPPs currently under construction are Russian models going up in Turkey, Bangladesh, and Hungary, among others. The near future is no less compromised. Much of the new generation of U.S. nuclear technology, on which hopes of the U.S. reclaiming the nuclear vanguard from Russia and China rest, relies on a higher enrichment level fuel called HALEU. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that demand will hit 40 metric tons of HALEU just by 2030. But it is only made in Russia. Bill Gates-backed TerraPower, for one, was forced in 2022 to delay by years the rollout of its Natrium Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor because of the lack of HALEU fuel. With this reality, sanctioning Russia’s nuclear industry remains a fantasy. If the West is serious about fully isolating Russia economically or about the energy transition, it needs to at very least expand its own enrichment capacity. DOE is busily investing in U.S. enrichment aspirations, and the European Atomic Energy Community, Euratom, is also exploring options for the continent. But these things take time. Construction can take years, and the uranium mining, conversion, and enrichment itself takes at least one year. Unfortunately, current global fuel supplies are estimated to be no more than 18 months. Other countries could probably move faster but are precluded by non-proliferation and nuclear safety regimes, which in the U.S. are praised as the “gold standard” of nuclear regulation but which have essentially prevented any commercial scale nuclear development in the U.S. for 40 years. In the meantime, Russian nuclear dominance persists and its keystone position in the world’s nuclear industry continues. The Kremlin’s ongoing energy leverage also encompasses the metals and minerals essential to the energy transition. Wind turbines require several critical minerals, and electric vehicles are heavy in lithium, nickel, cobalt, zinc, and other rare earth commodities. Solar panels also require nickel and zinc, as well as silicon, copper and others. China and Russia are the world’s leading silicon mining countries. Russia is the world’s third biggest nickel exporter, with its Siberian Norilsk Nickel company the world’s largest producer of high-grade nickel. Germany, for one, imports almost 40% of its nickel from Russia. Russia also sells palladium and is a key exporter of copper. Lithium, the key element in the lithium ion batteries that propel electric vehicles, is one of the few energy transition minerals for which Russia is not a big market force. Rosatom, Russia’s State Nuclear Energy Corporation, is working to fix that. Unlike with nuclear, the western world has sanctioned much of Russia’s commodities trade, or imposed high tariffs. But this has only served to make the metals and minerals necessary for the energy transition harder to get and much more expensive. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sent commodities prices soaring, up well over 50% since February 2022. Zinc, nickel, and other metals hit record prices thereafter. These price surges served to prolong some of the energy transition hardships and delays caused by China’s supply chain crunches from its COVID-19 lockdown, which caused global shortages in wind turbines, solar panels, and their component parts. The conundrum this creates for policymakers is twisted. To take action against Russia’s nuclear industry or minerals exports will set back the very diversification of energy sources necessary to minimize Putin’s energy leverage. It will also hurt the momentum towards a nuclear and carbon-free power sector, and slow the energy transition. If Rosatom brings its planned large lithium mine into production, for example, it will support the electrification of transport and further reduce Russian oil and gas revenues. But if Putin is left the ability to hold nuclear power hostage all over the world, as he did Europe with natural gas, odds are that he will use that advantage to the western world’s disadvantage. We can easily imagine countries plunged into darkness by Russia as it demands concessions in exchange for nuclear fuel. It’s not like this hasn’t happened before with other energy sources. If Putin somehow ekes out a win in Ukraine or otherwise holds onto power, the West can expect retribution for supporting Kyiv. This may well include nuclear and commodities manipulation. But if Putin loses power, the prospects of energy sector chaos or even a failed Russian state are just as dangerous. Perhaps the Wagner militia group, which owns extensive mines in Africa, will end up running Russia’s lithium and uranium mines and the enrichment facilities. With Russia already providing nuclear support to Iran, it is not far fetched to imagine weapons-grade uranium enrichment and fabrication cooperation between a future Wagner uranium monopoly in post-Putin Russia and anti-West Islamic fundamentalists or even terrorist groups. This would be a nightmare scenario. Despite best efforts, exactly how the West will wake from the nightmare of Putin, avoid the nightmare of a post-Putin collapse, and also protect the energy transition remains unclear. Hopefully the best minds in governments around the world are looking for a path forward.

2023 Michigan Evidence
AFF › AT: Russia Collapse---Impact---2AC

Turn- Russian Oil Industry Collapse Good- solves Climate

Gordon 21 – Senior principal in RMI’s Climate Intelligence Program, coleader of Oil and Gas Solutions Initiative, started the development of the OCI+, trained chemical engineer and policy analyst (Deborah Gordon, “Russia is Heating Up—Cutting Methane from Oil and Gas is the Cure,” RMI, 10-21-2021, Available Online: https://rmi.org/russia-is-heating-up-cutting-methane-from-oil-and-gas-is-the-cure/, Accessed: 7-20-2023)//iLake-EN

Few have heard of Taymyr, a northern Russian province located at the mouth of the Arctic Ocean. Here, land temperatures have already hurdled past a perilous point by about 4.5°C since 1960.

Despite these alarming numbers, Taymyr is also where Russia is planning to build fifteen new towns, a pair of airports, thousands of kilometers of pipelines and electrical lines, and a seaport to sail a fleet of top ice-class tankers. The goal is for Vostok Oil is to export millions of tons of northern Ural tundra oil.

2023 Michigan Evidence
AFF › AT: Russia Collapse---Impact---2AC

Russian collapse would happen inwards- not outwards

Moty 23 [Alexander J. Moty/ JANUARY 7, 2023 Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. It’s High Time to Prepare for Russia’s Collapse https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/07/russia-ukraine-putin-collapse-disintegration-civil-war-empire/ NPAT]

Ever since Russia’s attempt to take Kyiv and install a puppet government failed in the early days of the war, a defeat for the Kremlin in Ukraine has looked increasingly likely. What’s stunning after almost a year of war, therefore, is the near-total absence of any discussion among politicians, policymakers, analysts, and journalists of the consequences of defeat for Russia. It is a dangerous lack of imagination, considering the potential for Russia’s collapse and disintegration. In fact, the combination of a failed war abroad and a brittle, strained system at home is increasing the likelihood of some sort of implosion with every passing day. Regardless of whether this will be good or bad for the West, it’s an outcome policymakers should prepare for. There are various scenarios for what might happen in Russia after defeat in Ukraine becomes even clearer. Most likely is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s departure from office, followed by a vicious power struggle among the extreme right-wing nationalists who want to continue the war effort and destroy the existing political hierarchy, authoritarian conservatives who have a stake in the system, and a resurgent semi-democratic movement committed to ending the war and reforming Russia. We don’t know who will win, but we can confidently predict that the power struggle will weaken the regime and distract Russia from what remains of its war effort. In turn, a weakened regime, in conjunction with a malfunctioning economy, will invite disgruntled Russians to take to the streets, perhaps even with arms, and encourage some of the non-Russian political units comprising the Russian Federation to opt for greater self-rule; leading candidates include Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chechnya, Dagestan, and Sakha. If Russia survives this turmoil, it’s likely to become a weak client state of China. If it does not, the map of Eurasia could look very different. Given Russia’s vast expanse, long history of restive regions, and large non-Russian ethnicities—all a result of centuries of imperial conquest—the one scenario that deserves much more attention is a disintegration of centralized control and breakup of the federation. There is a rich history of state collapse following wars, revolutions, system breakdowns, economic crises, and other epochal events. Napoleon’s empire collapsed after his disastrous march on Moscow and subsequent defeat at the Battle of Leipzig. In 1918, the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, German, and Russian empires all collapsed in military defeat. Of course, people, decisions, and policies played a role, but ultimately it was war and the attendant economic and social crises that pushed these states over the edge into political chaos and often violence. Consider, as well, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, an outcome very few Russians wanted or even imagined when Mikhail Gorbachev took power as Soviet Communist Party leader in 1985. As late as early 1991, a majority of Soviet citizens voted in a referendum to retain their country. True, all the republics, including Russia, declared sovereignty in 1990 and all, save Russia, declared full independence in the aftermath of the failed hard-liner coup in 1991. But the system collapsed primarily because Gorbachev decided to rejuvenate the Soviet Union by dismantling its core features, totalitarianism and central planning, thereby setting political, social, and economic forces in motion that ultimately compelled most of the republics to seek refuge from the chaos in autonomy and independence. It was perestroika—Gorbachev’s signature policy of economic and political restructuring—that unintentionally killed the Soviet Union. If today’s Russia follows these countries’ footsteps into collapse, it will have little to do with the Russian elite’s will or Western policies. Bigger structural forces are at work. Putin’s Russia suffers from a slew of mutually reinforcing tensions that have produced a state that is far more fragile than his braggadocio would suggest. They include military, moral, and economic defeat in the Ukraine war—but also the brittleness and ineffectiveness of Putin’s hyper-centralized political system; the collapse of his macho personality cult as he faces defeat, illness, and visible age; the gross mismanagement of Russia’s petrostate economy; the untrammeled corruption that penetrates all levels of society; and the vast ethnic and regional cleavages in the world’s last unreconstructed empire. Even though few may want Russia’s dissolution today, it’s not too difficult to imagine a scenario where growing political, economic, and social instability will, at some point, compel Russia’s constituent units to seek safety in independence. When Ukrainian intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov celebrated his birthday earlier this week with a birthday cake showing Russia sliced into several pieces, it was, of course, an epic act of trolling. But the idea behind the image on the icing doesn’t seem all that far-fetched at all. Under today’s conditions, it may only take a trigger to push the system toward collapse. The failed war with Ukraine, which has revealed the weakness of Putin and his state, could very well be the spark that ignites the frayed timbers of Russia’s institutions. Of course, sparks are unpredictable, and Russia could weather the current crisis and survive in its present form, whether under Putin or a successor. But even if it does, it will be severely weakened as a state, and all the structural tensions will remain. Putin may even suspect this. In his 2023 New Year’s address, he invoked the war’s potential threat to Russia’s independence—something he has not said before. But if the spark does come, would a likely Russian collapse be destabilizing and violent, perhaps including civil war? Historian Marlene Laruelle, the director of the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian studies at George Washington University, thinks so. “A collapse would generate several civil wars,” she said, as “new statelets would fight with one another over borders and economic assets.” Meanwhile, Moscow elites “would react with violence to any secessionism.” Similarly, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has argued that “the dissolution of Russia or destroying its ability for strategic policy could turn its territory encompassing 11 time zones into a contested vacuum.” Russian groups might turn on each other and use violence, while outside powers could use force to expand their claims. “All these dangers would be compounded by the presence of thousands of nuclear weapons,” Kissinger wrote. The best course of action, he advised, would be to avoid rendering Russia “impotent by the war,” instead including Russia in a “peace process” whose details and enforceability remain nebulous. Laruelle’s and Kissinger’s prophecies are worst-case scenarios that need to be taken with a huge grain of salt. History shows us that while imperial collapse is often chaotic for the countries doing the collapsing, the outcome is not always bad for their neighbors or the rest of the world. Napoleon’s demise ushered in an era of relative peace in Europe. The breakup of Austria-Hungary saw some initial fighting, including between Poles and Ukrainians, but conditions stabilized after a few years. Even the Soviet collapse was remarkably peaceful—most likely because the newly independent former Soviet republics and the newly sovereign European satellite countries all had recognized borders, functioning administrations, and their own elites ready to build states. On the negative side of the ledger, the Ottoman Empire’s collapse led to horrific fighting between Turks and Greeks; the Russian Empire’s collapse spawned conflict from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean; and the German Empire’s fall in 1918 arguably led straight to World War II. Which of these trajectories might apply if Russia were to collapse? No one—including Laruelle and Kissinger—knows, and the history of empires shows that both relatively peaceful transitions and violent conflagrations are possible. Pessimists will point to the likelihood that a rump Russia would fight wars with all secessionist states. Optimists would counter that Russian forces will be degraded after their defeat in Ukraine and in no position to fight on multiple fronts. Pessimists might argue that new, non-Russian statelets in the North Caucasus or elsewhere would end up fighting one another, while optimists would say that the non-Russians possess administrative boundaries, existing regional governments, and ample economic resources (now drained by Moscow) that would enable them to avoid conflict with their neighbors. Optimists might say that things can’t get any worse compared to the genocidal war Russia just pursued. Pessimists would counter that they could get very much worse indeed and point to Russia’s nuclear arsenal. The only point of agreement between pessimists and optimists is that a rump Russia would be a likely candidate for civil war, not least because of the existence of large and well-armed private armies. The bottom line is that it’s inconsequential whether you’re an optimist or pessimist—we can only observe the unfolding drama of Russia’s likely collapse. Neither Western policies nor Putin himself can do much to stem it. That’s because Russia is already beset by deeply rooted institutional crises, much exacerbated by the man who made Russia brittle and unstable and generated the likely spark to produce its demise: Putin. That doesn’t mean the West should just sit back as Russia degrades. It’s imperative to prepare for a possible disintegration. Laruelle’s and Kissinger’s unlikely worst-case scenarios should inform policymakers as they hope for the best, expect the worst, keep cool heads, and prepare for contingencies. They should avoid repeating the mistakes of the past, such as trying to help a clearly dying Soviet Union survive and prioritizing the needs of Russia over those of its neighbors. The countries along Russia’s border—from the Baltic states to Central Asia—will, if they manage to remain stable and form a cordon sanitaire, be key to containing whatever instability takes place within Russia. They will also be key to helping the Russian Federation’s newly independent successor states stabilize and behave with moderation. Seen in this light, continued strong Western support for Ukraine—and eventually for a free Belarus and key countries like Kazakhstan—is the best guarantee that the aftershocks will be minimized if Putin’s empire comes to an end.

2023 Michigan Evidence
AFF › Russia Instability Thumper---Impact---2AC

Russia unstable now – Ukraine and Wagner invasion prove

Steve Rosenberg, 6-25-2023, is a is an English journalist for BBC News. He has been the BBC's Moscow correspondent almost continuously since 2003. "Russia: Instability ratchets up pressure on Vladimir Putin," BBC News, //ecam

In a TV address, President Vladimir Putin declares the rebellion "a criminal adventure… a grievous crime… treason… blackmail and terrorism." Yet just a few hours later, as part of an agreement with Prigozhin, it's revealed that all criminal charges against the Wagner leader are being dropped.

So much for "grievous crime".

2023 Michigan Evidence
AFF › ME Instability Thumper---Impact---2AC

Instability high now – and 2011 wars thump

Cordesman and Harrington ’18 Anthony H. Cordesman is Emeritus Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He has previously served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, the State Department, and the Department of Energy. Dr Cordesman also served as the national security assistant to Senator John McCain, and he previously held the position of adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Stability in the Middle East: The Range of Short and Long-Term Causes," CSIS , //ecam

The Middle East has long been one of the most unstable regions in the world, and there are no present prospects for change in the near future. This instability is the result of ongoing conflicts and tensions, and a variety of political tensions and divisions. It also, however, is the result of a wide variety of long-term pressures growing out of poor governance, corruption, economic failures, demographic pressures and other forces within the civil sector.

The Short and Long-Term Forces Shaping Stability and Instability

2023 Michigan Evidence
AFF › ME Instability Thumper---Impact---2AC

Terrorist organizations thump ME instability

Shane Vrabel, 5-18-2016, was a Research Assistant Intern at the Hudson Institute’s Center for Political-Military Analysis. Specializing in East Asian affairs, Mr. Vrabel has performed research on a variety of topics ranging from regional studies, to foreign policy, and defense issues. "Ideological challenges and political instability in the Middle East," CGSRS | Centre For Geopolitics & Security in Realism Studies, //ecam

On 29 June 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi established a caliphate in the territory that was under the control of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Throughout the summer of 2014, Western viewers watched on their televisions as members of this terrorist organization rampaged across the region. While in the midst of their campaign of terror, members of ISIL demolished sections of the border that separated Iraq and Syria in a highly symbolic act of unification. In demolishing the border between Iraq and Syria, ISIL succeeded in bringing together their separate holdings in both countries; it also seemed to portend the collapse of the political order that had been created by France and Great Britain at the end of the First World War. Throughout the Cold War era, pan-Arabism had tried and failed to bring the states of the Arab East together, and as a result, many in the region have decided to turn to Islam in order to unify the region. ISIL has seized upon this idea full heartedly, and had established a caliphate in order to challenge the pre-existing Western-based order of the Middle East.

Introduction

2023 Michigan Evidence
AFF › Renewables Inevitable---Link---2AC

Link non-unique. Renewables coming now. Our ev’s best and assumes all their studies.

Sarah Golden, 12-8-2022, "The clean energy transition is happening faster than forecasters thought," //ecam

It is inherently difficult to predict disruptive technologies. Past trends are not a good indication of technology that are poised for exponential growth. Many energy outlooks look conservative in hindsight.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) is no stranger to this dance. This week, the international think tank raised its global forecast for renewable growth in what it calls the "largest ever upward revision."