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MSDI States CP › Aff Answers › No Solvency – Medicare for All
Studebaker ’17 (Benjamin Studebaker – PhD candidate in Politics and International Studies @ the University of Cambridge, MA @ the University of Chicago, “Why Single Payer Works Better at the National Level than the State Level,” 2 June 2017, https://benjaminstudebaker.com/2017/06/02/why-single-payer-works-better-at-the-national-level-than-the-state-level/)
A federal single payer program covers the entire healthcare sector, so it’s a true monopoly. What goes wrong when a single state tries to do single payer? Well, a single US state has problems in both these areas. Many individual US states have balanced budget amendments, preventing them from borrowing large amounts of money to facilitate a gradual transition. Even the ones that don’t have balanced budget amendments would struggle to get access to the kind of credit available to the federal government. And crucially, individual US states cannot exercise a true monopoly on demand. If one state tries to slash healthcare spending significantly, its best doctors can simply run to neighboring states, producing doctor shortages and reducing quality of care. This makes individual states afraid to use the cost-cutting leverage which single payer gives them. If they don’t use the cost-cutting leverage and don’t borrow money, they have to raise taxes high enough to cover healthcare spending which will support a national spending figure of 17% of GDP. This means that they end up raising much more tax revenue than the Europeans do to continue propping up a healthcare sector which is too big to fail. This prevents citizens from getting the healthcare relief we promise them–their premiums disappear, but their taxes rise too much for them to get the full benefits of single payer. In the long-run, people are unlikely to continue to support that kind of system, and when they give up on it the right will attempt to use the failure as evidence in national debates about single payer, even though the policy is much more workable at the federal level. There is no other rich democracy American doctors can emigrate to which will pay them the extraordinarily bloated wages they receive in the United States. For the feds, it’s simply a question of whether they prefer to borrow a lot of money facilitating a gradual transition or to profoundly disrupt the healthcare sector to save Americans huge amounts of money very quickly. In sum, the hardest thing about single payer is the fact that it’s replacing a system that has accustomed millions of people who work in the healthcare sector to unrealistic and unsustainable levels of compensation. If we cut their pay to reduce costs and give them somewhere to run, they’ll run. If we cut their pay very quickly, we’ll produce a significant increase in unemployment and disrupt many people’s lives. If we cut their pay gradually, we need to be able to borrow money in the short-term to avoid raising taxes too much. The federal government has the resources and the potential market power to get these things done. The states don’t. It’s hard to wrap our heads around just how wasteful our healthcare system is. It’s a problem that is far too big for any one state to handle. We need the feds–without them, we risk handing the right undeserved propaganda coups, enabling the private system to go on flushing our hard earned money down the drain.
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MSDI States CP › Aff Answers › No Solvency – Medicare for All
MAR. 9, 2022, AT 6:00 AM More States Are Proposing Single-Payer Health Care. Why Aren’t They Succeeding? https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/more-states-are-proposing-single-payer-health-care-why-arent-they-succeeding/
Health care policy researchers Erin C. Fuse Brown and Elizabeth McCuskey introduced in state legislatures across the country from 2010 to 2019, finding a sharp uptick in bills introduced since 2017. During each of those three years, at least 10 single-payer proposals were introduced, according to Brown and McCuskey’s research, for the first time since 2013. In total, state legislators proposed more single-payer bills from 2017 to 2019 than in the previous seven years combined. And for 2021, we’ve identified 10 single-payer bills that legislators introduced across the country, from liberal states like and to more conservative ones including and . What do all these proposals have in common? They’ve all universally failed. In fact, Vermont, the only state that managed to pass single-payer health care in 2011, ended up . It makes sense why single-payer advocates have tried to take these fights to the states. States have traditionally been seen as the “,” and some advocates of single-payer health care have argued that liberal states to advance single-payer health care. But as I’ll explain, passing single-payer health care at the state level is next to impossible, as states are particularly limited in how they can allocate federal and private health care funds. There is, however, evidence that Americans may have an appetite for a public option, or government-run health insurance that people can opt into at the state level. (Colorado, Nevada and Washington) have already passed a public option. It’s not single-payer health care reform, but it’s possible that we might see more states adopt their own public-option reforms. One big reason single-payer proposals haven’t caught on at the state level is because finding a reliable way to pay for such a program is challenging. Single-payer advocates originally envisioned a federal proposal that would cover all Americans under of a preexisting program — that is, Medicare, but now for all. Doing this state-by-state would require each state to divert federal funds used for Medicare, Medicaid and Affordable Care Act exchanges to be used for their own single-payer plans. And that’s tricky because the Department of Health and Human Services has wide discretion to approve or deny states’ requests, which makes any proposal highly dependent on the national political climate. This isn’t just a theoretical debate either: Trump’s administrator for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Seema Verma said in 2018 that she would , while Biden’s Health and Human Services Secretary Xavier Becerra . Almost all single-payer proposals depend on these waivers and states don’t often have fallback plans for if this federal funding gets denied. Employer-sponsored health insurance plans, which , are another hurdle for states trying to pass single-payer health care. Federal law employer-provided health insurance, so states can’t just stop employers from offering their own health care benefits. The exact scope of this law has been , but suffice it to say that it’s successfully put the kibosh on many statewide health care reforms. Single-payer health insurance is particularly tricky as there’s no way to get everyone onto the plan without first changing how private insurance works. States have tried to address this through measures like increasing payroll taxes or restricting providers’ ability to accept reimbursement from private insurance plans. But the more elaborate these mechanisms get, the more complicated it becomes to implement — and the more people that could slip through the cracks. Finally, another big financial barrier is that state governments to increase budgetary spending. That means tax increases, which come with their own political challenges, are often necessary for states to secure the funding they need.
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MSDI States CP › Aff Answers › No Solvency – Green New Deal
C.J. Polychroniou, interview with the national director of the Green New Deal Network, Kaniela Ing TRUTHOUT Published March 6, 2023 https://truthout.org/articles/the-path-to-a-green-new-deal-must-involve-a-series-of-separate-bills/
The Green New Deal was always meant to be a series of legislation, an all-of-government approach to climate justice that cuts across issues, geographies and sectors. The climate investments we have thus far secured are a down payment on the bolder bills we know we need Congress, state and local governments to pass in order to reach the vision of a thriving future. A recent study by Evergreen and the Natural Resources Defense Council found that the Inflation Reduction Act’s investments will result in 66 percent of the U.S. being powered by clean energy by 2030. However, if we plan to mitigate the climate crisis once and for all, we need to meet President Biden’s goal of 100 percent clean energy by 2035 and 80 percent by 2030. In addition to falling short of our full climate goals, the Inflation Reduction Act and Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act also neglect investing at scale (or entirely) in other key sectors where Americans are facing immense challenges. From the housing crisis exacerbated by high utility bills, to inaccessible care services where caregivers are expected to work without paid or sick leave, people all across the country need our government to take a holistic approach to tackle the overlapping challenges our communities experience. At its foundation, the Green New Deal should simultaneously be investing in modernizing all sectors of the economy because our families do not simply experience one crisis at a time. Finally, a true Green New Deal does not pander to fossil fuel corporations and throw lifelines to the fossil fuel industry. In order to tackle the climate crisis, we can’t continue to toss tax dollars and create government-mandated pathways for the development of dirty energy when the science is clear: our overreliance on fossil fuels led us to the climate and environmental justice crisis we are facing and the reality is that the clock is rapidly running out on mitigating catastrophe.
2023
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MSDI States CP › Aff Answers › No Solvency – Green New Deal
Andrew Chatzky and Anshu Siripurapu UPDATED Last updated February 1, 2021 7:00 am (EST) Envisioning a Green New Deal: A Global Comparison https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/envisioning-green-new-deal-global-comparison
The Green New Deal is a contested concept, but all of its various versions center on a common vision of a government-led, society-wide effort to dramatically reduce U.S. greenhouse gas emissions and quickly shift the U.S. economy to be less carbon intensive. The term might have originated in a 2007 New York Times column by Thomas Friedman, and by 2018 the concept had become a rallying cry in Democratic Party politics. In February 2019, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) and Senator Ed Markey (D-MA) introduced a nonbinding resolution [PDF] in support of the idea. Their version is essentially a statement of principles backing a ten-year “national mobilization.” The resolution is notable for going far beyond climate change, aspiring to a broad-based industrial policy that would reshape the U.S. economy. It aims for a sweeping social transformation reminiscent of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal, which was an unprecedented application of the power of the federal government to dig the United States out of the Great Depression in the 1930s. The goals of the Green New Deal involve: Emissions: cutting net greenhouse gas emissions to zero over ten years. Manufacturing: spurring “massive growth in clean manufacturing.” Power use: meeting all U.S. power demand “through clean, renewable, and zero-emission energy sources.” Agriculture: sharply reducing emissions and other pollution from agriculture. Infrastructure: upgrading infrastructure, including transportation and housing, and ensuring all infrastructure bills considered by Congress address climate change. Jobs: guaranteeing a job with a “family-sustaining wage” for everyone. Welfare and social justice: providing everyone in the United States with high-quality health care, affordable housing, economic security, clean water, clean air, and healthy food, while addressing systemic social exclusion and injustice. The specific means to carry all this out are left open, but the resolution stresses that it should be a duty of the federal government and should include public financing, technical expertise, public investment in research and development, stronger enforcement of trade rules relating to the environment, antitrust enforcement, and the expansion of workers’ rights.
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MSDI States CP › Aff Answers › No Solvency – Follow On
Weil 8 – Alan, Executive Director of the National Academy for State Healthy Policy, “How Far Can States Take Health Reform?”, Health Affairs, 3, http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/27/3/736.full
If we rely upon states to test bold strategies for reform but fail to give them the tools or resources to implement the reforms, we may conclude that certain policies are ineffective despite the fact that under the right circumstances they would perform quite well. We could easily draw the wrong conclusions from failures—blaming the overall strategy such as play-or-pay, a tax credit approach, or an individual mandate—rather than the specific circumstances facing the state. A series of state failures could even lead to the conclusion that "nothing works," thereby motivating the nation to adopt more radical, untested changes that involve unnecessary risk. It is also possible that a few state successes would become an excuse for prolonged federal inaction. Pushing the nation’s most pressing domestic problem onto the states gives federal politicians permission to avoid making the difficult decisions health reform requires.
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MSDI States CP › Aff Answers › No Solvency – Follow On
Aaron K. Chatterji, 1-11-2015, "Opinion," New York Times, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/12/opinion/dont-look-to-states-for-new-ideas.html?_r=0
The problem is, just when we need their innovative energies, the states are looking less and less likely to be fountainheads of new federal policy over the next generation. What has changed? First, state politics have become much more partisan. After the 2014 elections, 60 percent of the states are completely controlled by a single party. The power of state policy innovations is that they traditionally had bipartisan fingerprints, allowing an enterprising national politician from either party to lay claim to them. In the new world of single-party states, very little bipartisan legislation will emerge. We will see no Democrat willing to adopt the radical tax reforms of Gov. Sam Brownback, Republican of Kansas, and surely no Republican could champion the Safe Act that Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo, a Democrat, got passed in New York — one of the strictest gun control bills in the nation. Of course, these ideas may diffuse to other like-minded states. But more likely, these new initiatives will be at one end of the political spectrum or the other, limiting the potential for federal adoption.
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MSDI States CP › Aff Answers › No Solvency – Follow On
Chatterji ‘15 (Aaron; 1/11/15; Ph.D. in Business Administration from the University of California at Berkeley, B.A. in Economics from Cornell University, Associate Professor of Strategy in the Fuqua School of Business at Duke University, Associate Professor of Public Policy at the Sanford School of Public Policy, Visiting Associate Professor at the Harvard Business School, former senior economist with the White House Council of Economic Advisers; New York Times, “Don’t Look to States for New Ideas,”
The problem is, just when we need their innovative energies, the states are looking less and less likely to be fountainheads of new federal policy over the next generation. What has changed? First, state politics have become much more partisan. After the 2014 elections, 60 percent of the states are completely controlled by a single party. The power of state policy innovations is that they traditionally had bipartisan fingerprints, allowing an enterprising national politician from either party to lay claim to them. In the new world of single-party states, very little bipartisan legislation will emerge. We will see no Democrat willing to adopt the radical tax reforms of Gov. Sam Brownback, Republican of Kansas, and surely no Republican could champion the Safe Act that Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo, a Democrat, got passed in New York — one of the strictest gun control bills in the nation. Of course, these ideas may diffuse to other like-minded states. But more likely, these new initiatives will be at one end of the political spectrum or the other, limiting the potential for federal adoption. Second, it has become clear that “scaling” successful state policies is harder than it appears, because of both political forces and policy realities. Every technocrat in Washington dreams of finding a successful policy at the state level, an early childhood education program in North Carolina or a creative prison reform initiative in Texas, and using it as a model for federal legislation. The logic is that once a state “laboratory” has tested and approved a particular policy innovation, it will have the same “treatment” effect in the other 49 states. But that hasn’t been the case. Increasingly, efforts to “federalize” state innovations have been hobbled [impeded] by political backlash. The Obama administration’s Race to the Top program used billions of dollars of prize money to persuade states to adopt several education policy reforms that had been proven to work around the nation. Part of the package was Common Core, which, in part because of President Obama’s imprimatur, is now toxic on the right (and, because of opposition from some teachers, is just as toxic on the left). Of course, despite their zeal for federalism, many conservatives never really agreed with Justice Brandeis’s nostrum to begin with. They worry that successful state policies might not translate well to the federal level, even under ideal conditions — witness the skepticism with which Congressional Republicans greeted President Obama’s announcement last week of a new initiative to help students attend community college, based on a program in Tennessee. And they have a point: It turns out scaling a successful state program often ends up with a one-size-fits-all policy that might work well in Ohio but fall flat in Arizona. An economic development program centered on promoting entrepreneurship might work in Silicon Valley, Boston or Austin, Tex., but fail miserably in an area without leading universities and a highly educated work force. Moreover, federal mandates, in which Washington sets up rules and the states run with them, hopefully innovating along the way, have not fared much better. The Medicaid expansion was intended to be a core pillar of the Affordable Care Act, but following a 5-to-4 Supreme Court decision, many states chose to opt out. Finally, all politics aside, while tax revenues have been increasing recently, many states remain cash-strapped since the Great Recession, limiting their ability to initiate significant economic or social programs of any kind. Taken together, these forces mean that while states might experiment with numerous policies over the coming years, very few will ever go national. For those of us frustrated with federal gridlock, the states will provide little comfort going forward. The 50 laboratories of democracy will produce many so-called cures, but none of them will go down very well in our nation’s capital.
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MSDI States CP › Aff Answers › No Solvency – Follow On
Herrera 13 (Dr. Richard, Professor of Political Science at Arizona State University, PhD from University of California, Santa Barbara, and Dr. Karen Shafer, Professor at Walden University, PhD in Political Science from Arizona State University, “Governors’ Policy Agendas Over the Long Haul: State Priorities in a National Context”, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 9/1/2013, )
Evidence that the states are influenced by the federal government’s policy agenda is mixed. In the area of social welfare policy recent research shows little influence (Heidbreder 2008). Welch and Thompson (1980), however, do find some evidence that states respond to positive federal incentives in a variety of policy areas. Specifically, states are stimulated to act faster when provided incentives than when policies are not so accompanied. Similarly Daley and Garand, using environmental policies related to hazardous waste, found some modest support for the hypothesis that “States that receive higher funding for environmental programs are somewhat more likely…to adopt stringent hazardous waste regulations that mimic federal Superfund program” (2005, 634-35). They conclude “signals from the federal government” will prompt states to act in this policy area (Daley and Garand 2005, 631). Barrilleaux, et al. (2002), also find that states react to federal activities in the area of welfare spending. These studies show federal influence on state policies driven by federal incentives specifically designed to trigger state action. In their study of anti-smoking policies, Shipan and Volden (2006) examine three types of diffusion, local-state, state-state, and national-state and find evidence of national-state pressures resulting in policy adoptions that do not always rely on federal incentives. Evidence the federal government is taking cues from the states is also mixed. Boekelman (1992) examined a variety of federal laws for state influences and found limited effects mostly in the areas of redistributive policies such as child care, homeless aid, and welfare reform. Using 5 interviews with federal policy makers, Mossberger (1999) found some inadvertent state-federal diffusion in the area of enterprise zones. Respondents in her study were aware of trends in state policy making and Mossberger concludes that any influence from the states is limited (1999, 49). In their study of vertical diffusion in the area of health policy, Weissert and Scheller (2008) find some indication of influence, but conclude that the story is complicated due to a lack of policy learning. As they state, “Federal health officials are considering and often adopting policies in health areas in which state actions have occurred. But the federal actions show little recognition of state experiences” (Weissert and Scheller 2008, S171). Thompson and Burke (2007) examined health policy as well and found modest evidence of state policies leading federal ones. The recent work by Lowery, et al. (2011), using a variety of policy areas from state level bill introductions finds no evidence of bottom up effects. Our study differs from others on policy diffusion in the following respects. Most other studies tend to focus on a single issue such as health care (Weissert and Scheller 2008) or environmental policy (Daley and Garand 2005) or make no distinctions among varying policy types (Lowery et al. 2011). Most studies are not longitudinal. And, most studies concentrate on a single step in the policymaking process. We consider three policy areas – education, economics and health - separately, over a period of 20 years and examine varying stages of the federal policymaking including congressional hearings, State of the Union addresses, the passages of public laws.
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MSDI States CP › Aff Answers › No Solvency – States (general)
Robert A. Schapiro Professor of Law, Emory University 2020, States of Inequality: Fiscal Federalism, Unequal States, and Unequal People, 108 Calif. L. Rev. 1531 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3724405
As a historical matter, the states preceded the national government established by the Constitution of the United States. The national government did not divide a unitary nation into administrative regions. From the perspective of the residents of the various states, however, that history does not lessen the impact of inequality. To be sure, the ability of states to allocate their resources differently from other states is generally considered to be a feature, not a bug, of federalism. Federalism allows the states to tailor their taxing and spending decisions to match the preferences of their citizens. Those preferences, however, operate in a framework of dramatically differing capacities. States' divergent tax [*1535] bases mean that a given level of taxation will yield much more revenue in some states than in others. These financial constraints impose varying limits on citizens' choices, depending on where they live. When it comes to raising revenue and investing in schools, roads, or other priorities, citizens of poorer states have fewer options than citizens of richer states. Not only are the interstate disparities unfair, but they also undermine the values generally associated with federalism. 14Certain states have less ability than others to offer a broad range of choices to their citizens, or even a minimum level of support to all of their inhabitants. As discussed below, compared with citizens of poorer states, such as Mississippi and West Virginia, citizens of wealthier states, such as Connecticut and Delaware, have access to resources that are one and a half to two times as large, depending on the measure chosen. 15I argue that greater financial equality is essential for a well-functioning federal system. In a federal democracy, the principle of equality does not require that citizens receive equal levels of government services without regard to where they live or their particular preferences. That promise of uniformity is not consistent with federalism. 16 Equality does, however, require that citizens have equal opportunity to receive equal levels of government services. The current system of federalism in the United States does not honor that principle.
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MSDI States CP › Aff Answers › No Solvency – States (general)
Brian Highsmith Skadden Fellow, National Consumer Law Center. 2019, "The Implications of Inequality for Fiscal Federalism (or Why the Federal Government Should Pay for Local Public Schools)" 67 Buff. L. Rev. 407 https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol67/iss2/5/
Many have missed the deep implications of economic inequality for core tenants of fiscal federalism. This framework shows that debates about the proper assignment of redistribution assume a different character depending on the preexisting level of inequality within the political community. Specifically, economic inequality raises the stakes of "fiscal splintering" for redistributive outcomes and possibilities: where economic resources are unevenly distributed across geography, the spatial definition of fiscal units takes on great significance. And the presence of economic inequality places a ceiling on local governments' ability to provide public goods or achieve redistribution, absent centrally-coordinated fiscal transfers.
Traditional models of fiscal federalism overlook this important relationship. Orthodox models of decentralization argue that location-mobility of residents is a disciplining measure for local governments. The consensus view is that mobility limits the ability of local governments to achieve redistribution, because high-income people will exit when it is attempted. 97 Others point to evidence showing that locations decisions are relatively inelastic to support their conclusion that redistribution can happen at the local level.98 I show that this debate does not need to be settled in order to conclude that rising levels of economic inequality support moving redistribution to higher levels of governance.
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MSDI States CP › Extension › A2: Puerto Rico Disad
Evette Ocasio May 2022 , https://via.library.depaul.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1262&context=jsj, " Puerto Rico's Second-Class Statehood: The Impact of Restricted Access t Access to Federal Public Benefits Pr al Public Benefits Programs on Puer ams on Puerto Rico's Economic Recovery " DePaul Journal for Social Justice Volume 15 Issue 1 Winter/Spring '21-'22 Article 6 (ermo/sms, Acc:7-5-2023)
Although restricted access to federal benefits is not the root cause of economic disparity on the island, it has exacerbated the conditions of poverty and hindered its economic recovery. If Puerto Rico is granted the same access to federal funding and federal public benefit programs as states in the mainland are, there would be improved disaster planning, a quicker response for disaster relief, and an increase in economic assistance and work training resources that could bring Puerto Rican residents out of poverty. This paper examines the limited access Puerto Rico’s residents have to federal benefits such as SNAP, SSI, and Federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) to determine how these limitations have exacerbated the high poverty rate in Puerto Rico and impacted postHurricane Maria relief efforts on the island. Part II briefly discusses the poverty statistics in Puerto Rico pre- and post- Hurricane Maria. Next, Part III identifies the differences between federal public benefits programs implemented in Puerto Rico and the contiguous U.S. Finally, Part IV analyzes how implementing SNAP, Federal EITC, or statehood would improve the economic recovery of the island.
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MSDI States CP › Extension › A2: Puerto Rico Disad
Pr51st, 10-29-2021, https://www.pr51st.com/what-would-puerto-rico-statehood-look-like/, "What Would Puerto Rico Statehood Look Like?," Puerto Rico 51st (ermo/sms, Acc:7-5-2023)
The figures above suggest that Puerto Rico would receive a lot more federal funds as a state than as a territory. However, that’s not the whole story.
“Statehood could result in dynamic economic and fiscal changes for Puerto Rico, changes that could ultimately impact the level of federal spending in Puerto Rico, and the revenue collected from residents of, and corporations in, Puerto Rico,” the GAO pointed out “However, the precise nature of how such changes would affect federal spending and revenue is uncertain.”
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MSDI States CP › Extension › A2: Puerto Rico Disad
Juan GonzáLez, 5-9-2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/05/09/puerto-ricos-123-billion-bankruptcy-is-the-cost-of-u-s-colonialism/, "Puerto Rico’s $123 Billion Bankruptcy Is the Cost of U.S. Colonialism," Intercept (ermo/sms, Acc:7-5-2023)
While the contending bondholder groups battle in the courts, the PROMESA board has now sided with the Puerto Rico government that bondholders will have to accept major reductions in payments.
“From current revenues, the Commonwealth and its instrumentalities cannot satisfy their collective $74 billion debt burden and $49 billion pension burden and pay their operating expenses,” the fiscal control board concluded last week after months of poring over Puerto Rico financial records.
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MSDI States CP › Extension › A2: Puerto Rico Disad
Juan GonzáLez, 5-9-2017, https://theintercept.com/2017/05/09/puerto-ricos-123-billion-bankruptcy-is-the-cost-of-u-s-colonialism/, "Puerto Rico’s $123 Billion Bankruptcy Is the Cost of U.S. Colonialism," Intercept (ermo/sms, Acc:7-5-2023)
The old commonwealth is effectively dead. Absent a huge infusion of U.S. public dollars to prop up its collapsing economy, a scenario that is nearly impossible with a Trump White House and a Republican-controlled Congress, that relationship cannot be revived. Political leaders in both Washington and San Juan, whether they like it or not, are being propelled to fashion a new political and economic status for the territory. They will have to finally decide whether to completely annex Puerto Rico as the 51st state or acknowledge that it still remains a distinct nation, with the right to its own sovereignty and independence.
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MSDI States CP › Extension › A2: Puerto Rico Disad
Puerto Rico Report 12-13-2021. ( Puerto Rico Report. "The End of Puerto Rico as a Tax Haven?." PUERTO RICO REPORT. Web. 12-13-2021. accessed 7-5-2023. < https://www.puertoricoreport.com/the-end-of-puerto-rico-as-a-tax-haven/ >. Phops)
Corporations all over the world can avoid taxes by increasing their costs in high-tax jurisdictions and increasing profits in low-tax jurisdictions. Puerto Rico’s corporate tax rate is officially 37.5%, but it can be as low as 0% for some types of businesses. A business-to-business service company which sells its services to people in the States can expect to pay a 4% corporate tax rate, compared with 21% (plus state tax in most States) in the States. The rate for “strategic” services is 3%. Dividends and profit distributions are tax exempt, too, so business owners can finesse quite a bit of their income. There is also a 75% property tax exemption. This is the result of Act 20, now Chapter 3 of Act 60. Companies under this law must hire one full-time employee in Puerto Rico if they have revenue of $3 million or more, and that “employee” can be the owner of the company. Entrepreneurs can move to Puerto Rico, hire themselves as their one employee, sell their services in the States, and pay almost no taxes at all. Larger companies do not have to live or even be headquartered in Puerto Rico, and they too can have just one employee on the Island. They simply need to source their revenue in Puerto Rico. Often this is done by establishing a Puerto Rico-based subsidiary and declaring that this subsidiary owns intellectual property, such as software or a drug patent. The main company can pay a licensing fee to the subsidiary to use the intellectual property. All the money paid to a Puerto Rico-based subsidiary counts as income in Puerto Rico –not in the stateside home of the corporation. The goods and services sold may or may not be produced in Puerto Rico. There may be buildings and workers, but they aren’t necessary. Offices in tax havens often have just one employee, who may be responsible on paper for millions of dollars in income. Transfer pricing, the practice of selling something from one part of a company to another part of a company, allows corporations to move profits out of a higher tax jurisdiction like New Jersey to a lower tax jurisdiction like Puerto Rico. The corporation will put costs, such as buildings and workers, in New Jersey to get the highest possible tax deductions, and put profits in Puerto Rico, in order to pay the least taxes on those profits. This is not illegal.
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MSDI States CP › Extension › A2: Puerto Rico Disad
GAO, Public Debt Outlook - 2023 Update GAO-23-106045 Published: Jun 29, 2023. Publicly Released: Jun 29, 2023.https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-106045
The 5 U.S. territories that are permanently inhabited borrow through financial markets, as needed, to fund things like infrastructure projects. We review the territories' public debt every 2 years.
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MSDI States CP › Extension › A2: Puerto Rico Disad
May 9 2017, 9:23 a.m. PUERTO RICO’S $123 BILLION BANKRUPTCY IS THE COST OF U.S. COLONIALISM https://theintercept.com/2017/05/09/puerto-ricos-123-billion-bankruptcy-is-the-cost-of-u-s-colonialism/
First, the colonial relationship that has prevailed between the U.S. and Puerto Rico since 1898 is no longer viable. Puerto Rico is the largest overseas territory still under the sovereign control of the United States, and it is the most important colonial possession in this nation’s history. That relationship produced uncommon profits for American subsidiaries on the island for more than a century, even as the federal government kept claiming that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, created in 1952, was a self-governing territory. But now, with a Washington-appointed board directly overseeing the island’s economy, and with a pivotal Supreme Court decision last year affirming that Congress continues to exercise over Puerto Rico, the mask of self-governance has been removed.
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MSDI States CP › Extension › A2: Perm do the CP
U.S. Legal 16 – U.S. Legal, Organization offering legal assistance and attorney access. “United States Federal Government Law and Legal Definition”, U.S. Legal, , xx-xx-2016
The United States Federal Government is established by the US Constitution. The Federal Government shares sovereignty over the United Sates with the individual governments of the States of US. The Federal government has three branches: i) the legislature, which is the US Congress, ii) Executive, comprised of the President and Vice president of the US and iii) Judiciary. The US Constitution prescribes a system of separation of powers and ‘checks and balances’ for the smooth functioning of all the three branches of the Federal Government. The US Constitution limits the powers of the Federal Government to the powers assigned to it; all powers not expressly assigned to the Federal Government are reserved to the States or to the people.
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MSDI States CP › Extension › A2: Perm
Prasad and Munch 12 [Monica Prasad, Department of Sociology and Institute for Policy Research at Northwestern University AND Steven Munch, Department of Sociology, “State-level renewable electricity policies and reductions in carbon emissions”, 3/8, ]
These state policies are surprising in many ways. For example, they are often driven by bipartisan coalitions, and, perhaps because of their lower visibility, they seem to have escaped the partisan wrangling that has limited national-level policy. Both George W. Bush and Christine Todd Whitman were pioneers of alternative energy policy at the state level, as governors of Texas and New Jersey respectively, before they went on to obstruct environmental policy at the federal level as president and head of the EPA (Rabe, 2004: 1). Texas, a state that produces reliably conservative and anti-environmental contingents at the national level, is a leader in wind energy (Rabe, 2004: 50).
2023
SDI
Counterplan
MSDI States CP › Extension › A2: Perm
Jonathan Adler 2011 – Professor of Law, Director of the Center for Business Law and Regulation “Cooperation, Commandeering, or Crowding Out? : Federal Intervention and State Choices in Health Care Policy,” Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy. Volume 20. Number 2. 2011. p. 216-237. http://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1593&context=faculty_publications
The effect of crowding out is not simply that states will intervene less if the federal government is involved. The more troubling possibility is that federal intervention will discourage states from adopting better or more protective policies than that established by the federal “floor.” Further, insofar as federal intervention may have this effect, it can discourage state-level policy innovation, as there will be less incentive for state policymakers to devote their efforts to developing new policy initiatives in areas dominated by the federal presence. This is particularly true if a set of policy interventions is subject to diminishing marginal returns. In such a case, the federal government is likely to displace the most cost-beneficial state efforts. For instance, the creation of health insurance exchanges may discourage states from experimenting with alternative ways of meeting the same underlying policy goals. Because of crowding out, there may be less government intervention and policy innovation than had the federal government not intervened at all. The adoption of a federal “floor” may actually prevent further and future upward progress. Crowding out occurs, in part, because there are significant fixed costs to policy change. Therefore, federal interventions that reduce the net positive benefits of state action on the margin may reduce the likelihood of state action at all because state policymakers are only likely to act where the benefits of policy change are greater than the total costs of such change. The inevitable inertia that affects all policymaking processes combines with the federal involvement to discourage net beneficial state-level policy changes that would have otherwise been enacted. An implication of crowding out is that federal intervention does not necessarily increase the net amount of government involvement in a given policy space over time. Further, when the crowding out effect is combined with the signaling effect discussed above, the likelihood that federal intervention could cause a net decline in the aggregate level of regulatory protection increases. At the very least, the possibility of signaling and crowding out threaten to reduce the net benefits of federal intervention in a given policy sphere. V. CONCLUSION The ACA is not the last word on health care reform. It is but the latest chapter in a decades-long debate over the proper federal role in the provision and regulation of health care services. Substantial federal intervention in health care markets may be justified, but such intervention is never without its costs. Among other things, federal action can discourage complementary state efforts or incite federal-state conflict. Failure to consider the practical and constitutional limitations on federal power to intervene in health care can result in counterproductive policies and make it more difficult to achieve national health care goals. The federal and state governments are capable of working together, but they can also work apart.