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Stretton ’19 [Tim; October 16; Director of the Congressional Oversight Initiative, MA in Diplomacy at Norwich University, BA in Political Science at University of Southern Maine; Project On Government Oversight, “Independence of the Federal Reserve,” ], wm
Over the past year, the president of the United States has publicly criticized his appointed leader of the Federal Reserve (the Fed), the United States’ central bank. In August 2019, President Donald Trump even tweeted questioning whether the Fed chairman was a bigger enemy of the United States than the president of China, all because the chairman spoke at an annual central bank symposium about how the economy has “continued to perform well overall” but acknowledged “trade policy uncertainty seems to be playing a role in the global slowdown.” So does refusing to follow the wishes of a president mean the Fed chairman is an enemy of the state? The answer: No. It means he’s simply following the mandate the Fed was given by Congress to be an independent entity of the federal government, insulated from undue political pressure. Past economic crises have shown the long-term harm that can occur when monetary policy is dictated by short-term political considerations, and the need to insulate the Federal Reserve from political pressure. By granting the Fed independence, Congress has helped ensure that the Fed can effectively pursue its statutory goals based on objective analysis and data, and not political considerations. Critical Characteristics of Independence. Composed of 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks, the Fed is overseen by a Board of Governors in Washington, DC, and is tasked with crafting and implementing the nation’s monetary policy to promote maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest rates. Congress granted the Fed unique characteristics which help ensure its independence from both the executive and legislative branches: A significantly longer length of terms for members than those of most agencies, staggered over multiple administrations and Congresses, and its own funding mechanism that makes the Fed independent from congressional appropriations. Length of Terms. The Fed’s governors have staggered and lengthy nonrenewable 14-year terms, its chairman has a four-year term, and board members are nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate without regard to political affiliation. In comparison, commissioners of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), also an independent agency, serve five-year terms, and are chosen based on their political affiliation, despite the commission officially being nonpartisan. Commission rules state that no more than three commissioners may belong to the same political party. The statutory language means that at all times the commission is at a 3-2 split. In other words, since members of the SEC are chosen based on their political affiliation, the SEC is inherently partisan; the Fed is not, since Fed governors are not chosen based on their political affiliation. Without its autonomy, the Fed could be influenced by politicians focused on upcoming elections and might enact an excessively expansionary monetary policy to lower unemployment with the goal of getting those politicians elected or reelected. While this may reduce unemployment in the short term, this could lead to high inflation, and in turn, fail to control unemployment over the long term. According to former Fed Chairman Marriner Eccles, who headed the Fed from 1934 to 1948 and after whom the Fed’s headquarters is named, if “people were appointed to operate the system for purely political reasons, rather than with reference to their qualifications, and they were made to feel subservient to the point where their best judgment was not exercised, then of course the system, under those conditions, would be badly and inefficiently and ineffectively operated.” It is essential that the Federal Reserve continue to manage the nation’s monetary policy in a nonpartisan way that is independent and free from undue political interference. Congressional Appropriations. Unlike most federal agencies, the Fed’s budget is not subject to congressional appropriations. Instead, the Fed is self-funded, primarily through the interest earned on the securities it owns, as well as the fees it receives for services it provides to depository institutions such as check-clearing, fund transfers, and automated clearinghouse operations. The financial arrangement is key to the independence of the Fed, allowing it to operate independently of day-to-day partisan political pressures. If the Fed was under the normal appropriations process, it could be pressured to make certain decisions not because they constitute good monetary policy, but rather because the governors feared that their funding would be stripped. It’s worth noting that over the years, there have been several bills in Congress that would subject the Fed’s nonmonetary policy functions to appropriations while maintaining the current funding stream strictly for its monetary functions. By not including monetary functions in these bills, Congress is again signaling the need to keep monetary policy independent from political influence. Accountability. While ensuring independence of the Fed is critical to maintaining monetary policies that are free from undue political interference, ensuring the accountability of the Fed, as well as all other government agencies, is equally important. Although the Fed is independent of the legislative and executive branches, it is still accountable to Congress. The Fed is statutorily required to testify semiannually before and present a written report to the House Financial Services Committee and the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee. As Fed Chairman Jerome Powell told the Senate Banking Committee on July 11, 2019, the Fed’s “independence brings with it an obligation for transparency so that you and the public can hold us accountable.” These hearings provide an opportunity for Congress to conduct oversight of monetary policy, regulatory policy, and a variety of other issues in a manner that is open for the public to see. In addition, the Fed has an Office of Inspector General that is tasked with providing oversight by conducting audits, investigations, and other reviews related to programs at the Fed. By establishing the Federal Reserve and the various mechanisms that ensure its independence, Congress has made clear it does not want monetary policy affected by undue political interference. The Fed serves the American people and the American economy, not politicians. Furthermore, as is the case with all federal agencies, it’s critical that the Federal Reserve continue to be accountable to Congress and the American people. History of Reforms at the Federal Reserve. In the wake of the financial panic of 1907—when the stock market collapsed, banks failed, and credit evaporated—Congress realized the need for a central bank and created the Federal Reserve System in 1913. The recovery after World War I brought about a period of economic prosperity and growth, in part due to the monetary policies of certain reserve banks. The economy and stock market grew quickly during this time, resulting in wild speculation that, in turn, led to stocks exceeding their real value by the end of the decade. A decline in production and wages combined with a rise in unemployment and debt soon followed. Thus the economic expansion quickly came to an end, with the stock market crashing in 1929 and a series of banking and financial crises shortly thereafter. The Federal Reserve’s reaction to the crises varied across the districts, as the reserve banks were decentralized and operated independently of one another. As a result, the Fed was blamed for failing to stem speculative lending that led to the Great Depression, and for not pursuing uniform monetary economic policies that could have lessened the depth of the worst economic downturn in U.S. history. Over the next few years, Congress made several reforms to the Fed’s structure and independence in order to improve its ability to prevent future crises and to promote national economic goals. The Banking Act of 1933, among other things, better positioned the Federal Reserve Board as the supervisor of the regional reserve banks, a response to the earlier efforts of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to position itself as the leader of the entire Federal Reserve System. Before that law, the Fed did not have as much influence as the individual reserve banks, and simply approved the interest rates that individual reserve banks charged commercial banks. The New York Fed had been particularly powerful. In trying to head off a recession after World War I, it began engaging in what’s known as “open market operations.” Open market operations is the practice of purchasing large amounts of government securities as a means of managing the amount of money in the U.S. economy, thus affecting interest rates. The New York Fed also worked with foreign central banks, and its monetary policies helped stabilize prices in the United States and abroad, which in turn led to rapid U.S. economic growth throughout the early and mid-1920s. The New York Fed and its governor, Benjamin Strong Jr., demonstrated the significance open market operations can have in influencing the availability of credit in the banking system, and drew worldwide praise for their actions. These efforts were effective and had a lasting impact on the future of the Fed’s activities and structure, including being the beginning of the Fed’s practice of using open market operations as a means of stabilizing the economy and domestic prices. The banking crises of 1930 and 1931 demonstrated how the different open market operations strategies among the reserve banks had varying effects on the economy. Open market operations have been the main method the Fed uses to fulfill its lender-of-last-resort function, which is the practice of a central bank providing credit when funds are not available from any other source. Beginning in November 1930, banks began to fail as customers started withdrawing their deposits, and the banks didn’t have enough reserves on hand to meet the withdrawals. Some districts such as the Reserve Bank of Atlanta acted as a lender of last resort to both member and non-member banks, and some districts such as the Reserve Bank of St. Louis only acted as a lender of last resort to member banks. After the crisis, in the Atlanta district the economic contraction slowed and recovery began, while in the St. Louis district hundreds of banks failed, lending declined, business faltered, and unemployment rose. The inconsistent actions by the district reserve banks demonstrated the power of open market operations, as well as the negative economic effect that can occur when open market operations are not undertaken when they should be. The success of the New York Fed in the 1920s and the varied responses of the decentralized district reserve banks to the banking crises during the Great Depression highlighted the need for a system with greater coordination, collaboration, and supervision. Realizing the value of open market operations, Congress created the Federal Open Market Committee, which is the policymaking body of the Federal Reserve System and assesses the risks to the Fed’s long-term goals of price stability and sustainable economic growth. The new system-wide monetary policy committee aimed to address the failures of the decentralized reserve system that had made it difficult to devise a national monetary policy when banks began to fail leading up to the Great Depression. The Banking Act of 1935 increased the Fed’s independence from the executive branch. Among other things, the Act removed from the Federal Reserve Board the secretary of the treasury, who had served as the chairman, and the comptroller of the currency, who had served as a member. Removing these offices from the board helped to minimize partisan political influence over monetary policy. During hearings before the Senate Banking Committee during the bill’s consideration, then-Fed Chairman Eccles told the committee that the Fed “should not be considered a political body,” adding that “the law makes the Board a nonpartisan body, on which political parties are not represented.” Moreover, the Banking Act of 1935 moved the Fed’s meetings from the Treasury Department to a new building, further signaling the independence of the Fed from the Treasury. That law also created the Federal Open Market Committee’s modern structure, consisting of seven members of the Board of Governors, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the presidents of four other banks on a rotating basis. This modern structure further enabled regional banks’ participation and coordination in a unified national monetary policy.
2023
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Interest Rates DA – MNDI Updates › Neg › Internal Link – AT “Fed Not Independent”
Authers ’21 [John; November 22; Senior Editor for Markets at Bloomberg, former Chief Markets Commentator and Editor at the Financial Times; Bloomberg, “The Fed Has Risen Too Far Above Political Control,” ], wm
“Fundamentally,” President Biden said as he nominated Jerome Powell for another four years as the world’s most powerful central banker, “we need stability and independence at the Federal Reserve.” He’s probably right about that. The problem is that the need for stability — and for avoiding shocks for the markets, and for independence — cuts across the desire to exert more democratic control over central banks. Far more powerful than it was ever designed to be, and critical in the fight against inflation, the Fed now transcends democratic control. Powell’s decisions on inflation could decide the political fate of Biden and his party. And yet Powell’s inflation strategy seems to have been virtually irrelevant to Biden’s decision to re-nominate him. Not only that, but the only other candidate considered, Vice Chairwoman-designate Lael Brainard, has never failed to vote in line with Powell on monetary policy in the seven years they have served as Fed governors. If there were any significant differences between their plans for the future (the market, very questionably, assumed that Brainard would be less aggressive about tightening policy and raising rates), these were never given a public airing. In any case, over the the past three years, Powell has been as activist and dovish as it’s possible to imagine. It’s doubtful that Biden was able to hear two contesting views and decide between them, and certain that neither the electorate nor the legislature got to do so. To compound the sense of institutional capture, Biden judged the risk of ratcheting up uncertainty so great that the only candidates he considered had already spent many years at the institution. He judged that any attempt to bring in “fresh blood” would have been too risky, and would have left the Fed looking like a partisan body. He’s probably right about this. But his judgment implies that the Fed is now so powerful that elected politicians cannot touch it. That is terrifying. It’s no surprise that the role of the Fed is one of many contemporary issues where the libertarian right and the populist left make common cause against the status quo. The electorate gets to express, with its votes, an opinion on more or less every other aspect of economic policy — taxes, fiscal strategy, tariffs and the rest — but not on monetary policy. The chair of the Fed must be given freedom of action, but the key opportunity that comes once in each presidential term for elected politicians to set the direction of monetary policy has just come and gone, without any input from voters. That does seem hopelessly undemocratic. There is a counterargument. What some might call a more “democratic” institution, others would describe as “politicized.” One of the most influential macroeconomists of his time, Rudiger Dornbusch of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, went so far as to say in 1999 that “there is no such thing as a responsible politician, democratic money is bad money.” He was talking about the creation of the European Central Bank, but he reflected the importance that central bank independence had taken on. Independent central banking is a relatively new phenomenon. In the years after the war, the Fed had to keep rates low to ease the burden of war debts. In the U.K., the Bank of England left crucial decisions on interest rates to the chancellor of the exchequer, an elected politician who also controlled fiscal policy until 1997. But central banking independence has taken on overwhelming importance as it is now the de facto replacement for the gold standard. After Richard Nixon loosed the last remaining tie of the dollar to gold in 1971, inflation took off. It came under control again only after the Fed under Paul Volcker aggressively proved its independence, hiking rates in a way few democratic politicians would ever permit. Ironically, Jimmy Carter, who appointed Volcker, suffered a landslide defeat because voters had lost trust in him to control inflation. Since then, independent central banks targeting inflation have taken the role previously held by gold. They are the anchor for the financial system, the guarantors of stability. Democratic crosscurrents would make it impossible for them to play this role. This month, Turkey has shown just how bad democratic money can be. Under pressure from President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the central bank has cut rates three times even as inflation shoots into double figures. This month alone, the Turkish currency has lost 16% compared to the dollar. Political meddling has created a crisis. Nobody wants the rest of the world to return to that. But what central banks did last year goes far beyond acting as an anchor for the system. It thus grows harder to sustain giving Powell another four years without some much greater democratic process. As Columbia University’s Adam Tooze puts it in his recent book Shutdown, financial crises had converted central bankers from “ringmasters to ever more frantic jugglers of liquidity.” As Tooze writes: “While the central banks remained the key actor in the drama, they were doing precisely those things the prohibition of which was central to founding central bank independence in the 1970s and 1980s.” It had always been taken as axiomatic that central banks could not monetize government deficits by simply buying government bonds. Such a practice is directly inflationary, and yet this is what they were doing. “The shift from a world in which central bank independence was founded on not buying government debt to one in which central banks around the world warehoused trillions of dollars in debt,” says Tooze, “was bewildering.” Powell’s actions last year, mirrored by other central banks, showed that central banks had become the world’s key economic actors. They had freedom of action and didn’t have to wait for voters or legislators. That was already clear after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 2008, when the initial vote in Congress not to go ahead with the Troubled Assets Relief Program caused a market crash. Eventually, the TARP would prove critical in restoring confidence in U.S. banks, but in the meantime the Fed had no alternative but to step into the vacuum left by the politicians. In 2012, European politicians failed to clear up a sovereign debt crisis driven by bad fiscal policy decisions at the national level, and it was left to Mario Draghi of the ECB to resolve the situation by promising to do “whatever it takes.” In all these cases, central bankers took critical decisions on the issues of wealth distribution and inequality. The market rally that the Fed spurred last year has been spectacular; it’s also been profoundly unequal. It’s easy, but unfair, to describe this as a “power grab.” Central bankers themselves worry that they do not have the democratic authority to play their current role. Sir Paul Tucker, former deputy governor of the Bank of England, said: “This is partly our elected legislators sitting back, leaving central banks with little choice but to reinvent themselves as the U.S. cavalry.” With polarized and gridlocked political systems across the western world and coherent fiscal policy lacking, central banks were the only players left standing. The problem is that politicians could delegate power to them, but not legitimacy. “They can earn legitimacy by how well they do their task,” Tucker said, “but then what’s their task? Voting them out is precisely what you cannot do with me and my tribe. So we need to be very careful about what we delegate to these bodies insulated from day-to-day politics.” Central bankers now get the same kind of personal pressure and vilification that elected politicians get — Christine Lagarde of the ECB, for one, was lambasted this month as “Madame Inflation” in a German tabloid, in a piece that went through her wardrobe and accessories. Central bankers could survive without democratic legitimacy when they were technicians overseeing a currency convertible into gold. As the principal drivers of the economy, their lack of legitimacy is more costly. In his book Unelected Power, an ambitious attempt to deal with these problems, Tucker suggested setting up a system in which the president and Congress could give the Fed clear and ranked objectives. This would have been a huge task, and might well be impossible in today’s polarized environment. But with clear priorities on issues like inflation and equality, central bankers would much more clearly have been stewards of the common good. This might have restored trust in an institution that, according to the latest consumer survey by the University of Michigan, is fast losing it. Momentous decisions lie ahead for Powell and his colleagues before there will be another chance to fix the Fed’s democratic deficit.
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Dominic Pino, 10/19/21, National Review, “Preserve the Fed’s Independence above All Else,” https://www.nationalreview.com/2021/10/preserve-the-feds-independence-above-all-else/, mm
Central bankers have become more effective due to the accumulated lessons of past successes and failures, according to Boston College economics professor Peter Ireland. “They developed a better understanding about how inflation could be stabilized by a policy that, even if it didn’t follow a mechanical rule, it is rule-like in the sense that it is systematic and predictable. All of that learning process has led to better outcomes,” Ireland tells National Review. The catch is that even economies with an independent central bank don’t sink or swim on monetary policy alone. When the U.S. economy thrived from the late ’80s to the early ’00s, for instance, it had other factors working in its favor, among them a significantly less-polarized politics. “It’s easy to do the right thing when everything is going well,” Ireland says. “Now, the question is can they keep doing the right thing when times are tough.” Jerome Powell has proven himself to be immune to political pressure. Powell was nominated to the Fed Board of Governors by Barack Obama in 2011, and then nominated to chair the board by Donald Trump in 2017. That alone is a mark of Powell’s independence: He stayed at the Fed and earned a promotion even as the presidency changed parties. But despite his survival, the concerns of electoral politics have still started to encroach on his turf. Trump attacked Powell repeatedly, going so far as to write on Twitter that “China is not our problem, the Federal Reserve is!” And though Joe Biden has not done the same since he took office, other members of his party have. The “squad” of progressive members of Congress has demanded that Powell not be renominated, and Elizabeth Warren called him “dangerous” during a Senate hearing while promising to vote against him if he is renominated. Powell seems blissfully unaffected by all of this. “The bedrock of independence is how much the people at the helm of these institutions care about their public and professional reputation for delivering their mandate over the medium term,” Sir Paul Tucker, a former deputy governor of the Bank of England and the author of the book Unelected Power, tells NR. By all accounts, Powell takes great pride in the Federal Reserve as an institution, and he values being a good central banker more than being praised by politicians.
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Interest Rates DA – MNDI Updates › Neg › Link – MMT -> Inflation
Kellen Jones, 9/8/22, Foundation for Economic Education, “How the Modern Monetary Theory Experiment Lost (Badly) to Basic Economics,” https://fee.org/articles/how-modern-monetary-theory-experiment-lost-badly-to-basic-economics/, mm
The most fundamental principle of MMT is that our government does not have to watch its wallet like everyday Joes. MMT contends that the government can spend as much as it wants on various projects because it can always print more money to pay for its agenda. Soon after MMT became fashionable in the media, the once dissident economic theory leapt from being the obscure fascination of tweedy professors smoking pipes in universities to the seemingly deliberate policy of the United States government. When the Pandemic Hit, many argued that MMT was the solution to the pandemics problems. Books like The Deficit Myth by Dr. Stephanie Kelton became New York Times bestsellers, and the United States embarked on a massive spending spree without raising taxes or interest rates. Attempting to stop the spread of Covid, state and federal governments coordinated to shut down nearly every business in the United States. Then, following the model of MMT, the federal government decided to spend, and spend, and spend, to combat the shutdown it had just imposed. Both Republican and Democrat-controlled administrations and congresses enacted trillions of dollars in Covid spending. It is not hard to see that this spray and pray mentality of shooting bundles of cash into the economy and hoping it does not have any negative consequences was ripe for massive inflation from the beginning. Despite what MMT proponents may want you to believe, there is no way to abolish the laws of supply and demand. When there is a lot of something, it is less valuable. Massively increasing the supply of money in the economy will decrease the value of said money. MMT economists seemed woefully unaware of this reality prior to the pandemic. Lecturing at Stoney Brook University, Kelton attempted to soothe worries about inflation by explaining that (in the modern economy) the government simply instructs banks to increase the number of dollars in someone’s bank account rather than physically printing the US Dollar and putting it into circulation. Somehow–– through means that were never entirely clear–– this fact was supposed to make people feel better. In reality, there is no difference between changing the number in someone’s bank account or printing money. In both cases, the result is the same, the supply of money has increased. Evidence of MMTs inflationary effects are now everywhere. Prices are skyrocketing. The most striking monuments to the failures of MMT are the price tags on every good you pick up at the grocery store. The Consumer Price Index has recorded an 11 percent increase in the price of food and a 33 percent increase in the price of energy. Housing prices are through the roof, while every economic indicator signals that the US economy is sliding into a recession. The once “transitory” inflation has become a long-term state of malaise for the economy. Ironically, now that MMT has been implemented, no one wants to talk about it anymore. Since the first signs of inflation began to surface in late 2020 and early 2021, there has been a nosedive in the discussion of MMT. According to Nexis Uni, there were around 5,000 mentions of MMT in the news and academic articles et al. between 2019 and the end of 2021. This year, there have only been around 700 mentions. The economic fashion de jure has quickly become the emperor’s new clothes.
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Interest Rates DA – MNDI Updates › Neg › Link – MMT -> Inflation
Farah Imran and Mark Elmer, March 2021, (Orman is a former policy analyst at C.D. Howe Institute & Elmer is a former deputy superintendent of financial institutions at OSFI and a senior fellow at C.D. Howe Institute), C.D. Howe Institute, Commentary No, 593, “Deficits Do Matter: A Review of Modern Monetary Theory,” https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4094414, mm
Finally, although MMT proponents acknowledge the need to control inflation, they are keen to allocate that task to elected officials and fiscal authorities. They are not so keen to continue the current delegation of that task to central banks. This reflects the thinking of theorists on employment in relation to stable prices, as discussed in the context of the job guarantee in footnote 5. MMT proponents challenge the way central banks conduct monetary policy – notably, their tendency to tighten their monetary policy stance to contain inflationary pressures before the labour force is fully employed. More specific to the United States, MMT proponents claim that the Federal Reserve has been biased toward overtightening monetary policy in order to contain the inflationary risk of labour market shortages even before inflation rises above target or becomes an issue. They believe this unnecessarily “locks” people out of employment and creates significant output and real losses, such as the depreciation of human capital and adverse effects on families and physical and mental health. The result of this line of thinking is MMT’s proposal for a federal job guarantee program that achieves full employment and acts as a non-discretionary automatic fiscal stabilizer – when the economy is growing, the government spends less on guaranteed wages as people shift to the non-government sector, and vice versa – with the wage offered at the national minimum wage acting as an inflation anchor (see Kelton 2020, chap. 2). It is important to note that this way of thinking emerged before the Federal Reserve’s August 2020 announcement that it will be targeting average inflation and maximum employment. The Fed’s statement more particularly specifies that its policy decisions will be informed by its assessment of the shortfall, rather than the deviation, of employment from its maximum level. This reflects the Fed’s renewed understanding that high employment might not necessarily lead to uncontrollable inflation, and its willingness and commitment to sustain a robust job market at maximum employment alongside stable prices (Powell 2020). Would MMT proponents consider the Bank of Canada guilty of the same charge? Inflation in Canada has been largely below target since the global financial crisis – indeed, advanced economies across the world have experienced low inflation over the past decade. A scan of the Bank of Canada’s Monetary Policy Reports since 2010 suggests that, when inflation was consistently below target and when the Bank judged the downward risks to inflation dominated upward risks, the Bank often made reference to imbalances in the household sector – particularly citing buoyant housing markets and record-high debt levels. This suggests the Bank might have been reluctant to allow the economy to run hotter when it had room to do so, due to its concerns about household debt and other growing macro financial imbalances. If this is indeed true, it would be understandable, and perhaps even prudent, on the part of the Bank. MMT’s policy prescription is to “demote” monetary policy and “elevate” fiscal policy, putting the onus of stabilizing prices, and the macro economy more generally, on elected officials and fiscal authorities (Kelton 2020, chap. 8). This prescription follows from MMT’s views on the capabilities of a monetary sovereign government, and is parallel to the functional finance approach discussed above – prioritizing a balanced economy over a balanced budget – with the non-discretionary nature of job guarantee wages acting as a barrier to political exposure. MMT deduces this would ensure full employment and automatic stabilization independent from the political process, and allow monetary sovereign governments to focus on better outcomes for their citizens and deploy their full fiscal capacities to achieve them. According to MMT, until the economy starts pushing on its real resource constraint, governments could focus on priorities such as universal income or other measures that reduce inequality, rather than worry about budget outcomes. However, as the economy approaches its potential output and inflationary pressures emerge, MMT prescribes tax hikes or spending cuts to contain these pressures. The role of a central bank in MMT, therefore, is simply to clear financial markets and to stand ready to buy government debt and keep (nominal) interest rates low, while elected officials are tasked with maintaining full employment and stable prices. Left unsaid by MMT is the impact on private sector interest rates. The central bank’s ability to affect them would be only indirect at best, unless the central bank stood ready to buy that debt, too. We find this prescription for fighting inflation to be at odds with MMT’s claim that government debt does not pose a burden on future generations. There is a natural limit on how much spending and debt can increase the economy’s real capacity before driving nominal aggregate demand above it. This is particularly true when considering Ricardian equivalence – the idea that households take into account government spending decisions when making their own. When the government increases its spending and debt, households will anticipate future tax increases, and will therefore save more and spend (and invest) less. Once inflationary pressures arise, MMT’s prescription to cut spending or raise taxes in effect would place a burden on the generations paying the higher taxes or facing program cuts (Buiter and Mann 2020). More important, however, is our scepticism about MMT’s thinking around the role of an independent central bank.16 This strikes us as a step backwards. Canada’s economic performance, and thus Canadians’ standard of living, has benefited tremendously over the past 25 years from having an explicit inflation target and tasking the Bank of Canada to conduct monetary policy in pursuit of that target, which is public and jointly set by the government and the Bank. Much has been written on the macroeconomic benefits of having an independent central bank with an inflation-targeting framework, in Canada and other advanced economies (see, for example, Debelle et al. 1998; Dodge 2002; Laidler and Robson 2004; Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 2007; Parkin 2016; Koeppl and Kronick 2020). These benefits include low, stable and predictable inflation, improved functioning of markets and allocation of resources and, most important, establishing transparency, credibility and accountability in monetary policy. We saw how the lack of a transparent and credible monetary anchor in Canada during the early 1990s – a period of rising uncertainty and public and private debt – increased the perceived risk of fiscal unsustainability and inflation and destabilized financial markets and the Canadian dollar (see Box 1). Only when the Bank of Canada established credibility and convinced the public that it was committed to pursuing its transparent monetary anchor was it successful in stabilizing the economy and financial markets (Thiessen 2001). Even if everything prescribed under MMT were true, inflation could still spin out of control if the government balked at raising taxes or cutting spending when the time came to control inflation and/or investors lost confidence in the currency and in the government’s ability to control inflation and service its debts.17 The main benefit of a central bank’s conducting monetary policy in pursuit of an inflation target is that it delivers superior inflation control. This also helps promote confidence in the currency and avoid potential exchange-rate crises by giving comfort that the Bank will act to ensure that the inflation target is achieved if fiscal policy on its own is not consistent with that target. Tasking the government to control inflation exposes the process to political risk: would a government want to deal with the backlash from raising taxes or cutting spending in response to rising prices? These considerations might jeopardize investors’ confidence, causing both domestic and foreign investors to favour foreign markets, devaluing the government’s currency in international markets, destroying productive capacity and, eventually, creating runaway inflation. This is particularly important in the current circumstances, when both private and public indebtedness are on the rise, exacerbated by the response to the COVID-19 pandemic, with governments in Canada and all over the world engaging in unprecedented fiscal stimulus to bridge businesses and households through the crisis. In the meantime, fiscal anchors such as the debt-to-GDP ratio have been set aside, facilitated in the short run by low interest rates and falling borrowing costs. In the medium and long run, however, having credible and transparent fiscal and monetary anchors will help to keep inflation expectations under control and give investors and the public more generally confidence that monetary policy will do what is necessary to keep inflation on target (Kronick, Zelmer, and Dodge 2020).
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Interest Rates DA – MNDI Updates › Neg › Link – Medicare for All
Robert Moffit, Ph.D, 6/3/22, The Heritage Foundation, “Think Inflation is Bad Now? Imagine if the Left Wins on Health Policy,” https://www.heritage.org/budget-and-spending/commentary/think-inflation-bad-now-imagine-if-the-left-wins-health-policy, mm
Washington’s deficit spending has fueled punishing inflation, but self-styled “progressives” in Congress remain fully committed to ratcheting up federal spending and debt even more. Vermont Sen. Bernie Sanders recently chaired a Senate Budget Committee hearing on his “Medicare for All” proposal. Like his earlier version, the Senate bill would abolish virtually all private and employer-sponsored health insurance, eliminate Medicaid and even Medicare itself, and establish a “single payer” system of national health insurance. Most House Democrats are co-sponsoring similar legislation. Their basic proposition is that their legislation, which will upend coverage of 90 percent of the population, will guarantee higher quality care for all at lower national and personal costs. The Sanders bill, like the House Democrats’ companion bill, is especially notable not for what it contains but for what is missing: the crucial financing provisions. Without specifying the kind or the size of taxes required to fund the program, neither the Congressional Budget Office [CBO] nor independent economists can score the bill and provide anything close to a precise estimate of its effect on the federal budget, the economy or taxpayers. The economic effect is mostly left to educated guesswork. Educated guess-workers exist. Testifying before the Senate Budget Committee, CBO Director Phillip Swagel reported that the agency had not analyzed Sanders’ bill but had previously conducted an analysis of five versions of the “single payer” universal coverage program. Replacing current programs with any of the five “single payer” options would, according to the CBO analysis, require massive taxpayer subsidies: between $1.5 trillion and $3 trillion in 2030 alone. Moreover, new demand would outstrip the limited supply of medical services, resulting in “congestion” in the system and “delays and foregone care.” Curious what that looks like? Check out Britain and Canada. Americans will be left poorer, too. Whether the government health program is financed by an income tax or payroll tax, according to CBO, America’s gross domestic product, the nation’s total production of goods and services, would be “approximately 1 percent to 10 percent lower by 2030” than under current law. Why? Says CBO: “The net reductions in GDP would occur primarily because of the effects of increased taxes on labor and capital income. Taxes on labor income reduce after-tax wages, so they reduce the return on each additional hour worked. … In CBO’s assessment, therefore, higher labor taxes tend to reduce the number of hours worked in the economy. Higher taxes on capital income, such as dividends and capital gains, lower the average after-tax rate of return on private wealth holdings (or the return on investment), which reduces the incentive to save and invest and leads to reductions in the capital stock. Those effects lead, in turn, to lower income.” Printing money to cover the cost is a dead end. Says CBO: “Perpetually financing any of the single-payer systems CBO analyzed through increased borrowing—without a corresponding increase in revenues or a reduction in other spending at some point in the future—would be unsustainable.” And forget “soaking the rich.” Even they aren’t rich enough to cover the ballooning bills racked up under Medicare for All. Testifying at the same Senate hearing, Dr. Charles Blahous, a former trustee of the Medicare program and scholar at the Mercatus Center, said that to provide “Medicare for All” level of benefits and services would require spending between $32.6 trillion and $38.8 trillion, or about $120,000 per person, above and beyond any administrative cost-cutting measures. Even at the lower estimate, Blahous observed, a “doubling of all currently projected federal individual and corporate income taxes would be insufficient to finance the added federal costs of enacting M4A” (“Medicare for All”). The congressional “progressives” assure us, however, that individuals and families—no longer paying private insurance premiums and deductibles—would still come out ahead with a tax-financed government health program. Don’t bet on it. Examining previous “Medicare for All” legislation, Heritage Foundation analysts concluded that a “single-payer” program would require a tax of 21.2 percent of earnings (on top of current federal, state and local taxes), hitting nearly two-thirds of American households, meaning that 73.5 percent of Americans would pay more for healthcare than they do today.
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Smith 19 (Noah Smith; March 11, 2019; “A Federal Job Guarantee Is Asking for Trouble,” “Bloomberg,” URL: https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-03-11/u-s-economy-federal-job-guarantee-would-hurt-private-employers)//NTG
I was once very supportive of the idea of a federal job guarantee, but I’ve changed my mind. Although the economics of the idea are sound, the implementation of the program matters crucially. And it’s becoming clearer that the politics surrounding the job guarantee would lead to significant problems. The basic idea of having the federal government act as the country’s employer of last resort is a good one. Although the economy occasionally puts the entire labor force to work, regular recessions mean that there are usually lots of people who want to find jobs but can’t. This can be seen by looking at a broad measure of unemployment: U6 and the Labor Force Total unemployed, plus all marginally attached workers plus total employed part time for economic reasons
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
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Interest Rates DA – MNDI Updates › Neg › Link – Green New Deal – AT “The Fed Would Update Its Mandate”
Lyle Niedens, 1/10/23, Investopedia, “Fed’s Powell Speaks Out On Central Bank’s Mission, Role in Climate Change,” https://www.investopedia.com/powell-speaks-on-fed-independence-climate-change-7093320, mm
The Federal Reserve must remain an independent body and should focus on its dual mandate of promoting maximum employment and price stability, avoiding trying to set policy to achieve societal goals, Fed Chair Jerome Powell said today. In prepared remarks at the Symposium on Central Bank Independence in Stockholm that didn't include any reference to the Fed's approach to fighting inflation, Powell emphasized the need for the Fed to remain insulated from political influence. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. "Panel on 'Central Bank Independence and the Mandate—Evolving Views.'" Powell's comments, as the Fed battles to control inflation, come as the central bank draws pressure from across the political spectrum to either expand its historical role or to stick to it more closely. "Restoring price stability when inflation is high can require measures that are not popular in the short term as we raise interest rates to slow the economy," Powell said. "The absence of direct political control over our decisions allows us to take these necessary measures without considering short-term political factors." Powell said the Fed remains "tightly focused" on achieving the dual mandate Congress has established for it. That means it doesn't intend to expand its role to address other societal challenges such as climate change. "We should 'stick to our knitting' and not wander off to pursue perceived social benefits that are not tightly linked to our statutory goals and authorities," Powell said, adding that the Fed's only narrow role in climate change concerns its oversight of banks and the expectation that they "appropriately manage" their material risks, including financial risks tied to climate change. "Decisions about policies to directly address climate change should be made by the elected branches of government and thus reflect the public's will as expressed through elections," he said. "Without explicit congressional legislation, it would be inappropriate for us to use our monetary policy or supervisory tools to promote a greener economy or to achieve other climate-based goals. We are not, and will not be, a 'climate policymaker.'"
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Interest Rates DA – MNDI Updates › Neg › Link – Deficit Spending
Lubik 22 (Thomas A. Lubik; September 2022; Thomas A. Lubik is a senior advisor in the Research department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond and holds a PhD from Yale, “Analyzing Fiscal Policy Matters More Than Ever: The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level and Inflation,” Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Brief, URL: https://www.richmondfed.org/publications/research/economic_brief/2022/eb_22-39)//NTG
The fiscal theory of the price level is a theoretical framework for understanding how monetary and fiscal policies interact in the determination of macroeconomic outcomes. The key insight is that future fiscal conditions determine the current price level, whereby monetary and fiscal policy are connected by the government budget constraint. The fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) is a recent approach to explaining price level determination in an economy. In contrast with other monetary theories, it may not be well known even among economists, although it has prominent exponents such as Christopher Sims (winner of the Nobel prize in economics), Michael Woodford and John Cochrane. However, the FTPL is often seen as a quite obscure economic theory without much interest to economists and policymakers. In this article, I discuss what the FTPL is and how it can be used to think about the effects of monetary and fiscal policy on prices and inflation. They key insight is that the FTPL always operates in the background and is central to our understanding of a modern economy. What Is the Fiscal Theory of the Price Level? The FTPL, as the name implies, is an economic theory of price level determination that gives fiscal policy a central role. The aggregate price level measures the purchasing power of its currency in terms of a basket of goods.1 Older theories of price level determination — such as the quantity theory of money — posit that the price level is determined by the quantity of money circulating in the economy. While the FTPL is consistent with the quantity theory, it takes a more encompassing view of a modern economy where monetary and fiscal policies are intertwined via the so-called government budget constraint (GBC). The GBC tracks the evolution of debt issued by the federal government as a function of its revenue and its expenditure. The difference between these two is the surplus (if positive) or the deficit (if negative). If the government runs a deficit, it must close the gap by issuing debt (that is, by borrowing from the public). The debt instruments (Treasury notes, bills and bonds with different maturities) are sold on the open market in an auction format to willing investors at a rate reflecting supply and demand. Persistent deficits thereby lead to an increasing debt load for the government and the country. The GBC is an accounting identity. It is turned into an economic theory by making behavioral assumptions about the economic actors involved, namely investors and monetary and fiscal policymakers.2 The key word in the preceding paragraph is willing: Investors voluntarily purchase government debt — that is, they lend money to the fiscal authority — only if they expect to be repaid in terms of principal and interest due. The key determinant for this willingness is an expectation that the government will create enough fiscal resources in the future to cover such payments. This idea is captured by the concept of an intertemporal GBC (IGBC), which is the "present-value" version of the GBC. More specifically, the IGBC stipulates that the value of outstanding government debt is the (discounted) sum of future surpluses. Investors willingly buy and hold outstanding government debt only if they expect the IGBC to be in force. In other words, outstanding debt has value today because it will be repaid by future revenue net of expenditures. Where Does the Price Level Come Into Play? Almost all U.S. government debt is nominal. That is, it is issued with a face value in U.S. dollars. The real value (or purchasing power) of such debt is computed by dividing the value of nominal debt outstanding by the price level. The IGBC then describes the real value of debt as determined by the real value of future surpluses. If we think of the IGBC as an equality, then changes on the right-hand side (namely, increases or decreases in future fiscal variables) imply changes on the left-hand side (namely, real debt). The variable that adjusts is the price level, since the nominal value of debt outstanding is predetermined.3 Why Is This a Fiscal Theory? For one, the theory is based on the idea of the GBC, which tracks key fiscal variables. More importantly, the theory rests on the assessment of fiscal policy measures in terms of government expenditure and government revenue: The former covers items such as defense, infrastructure and health care. The latter is essentially income and corporate tax revenue.4 The current price level therefore depends on the evolution of current and future fiscal variables. For instance, higher federal infrastructure spending today needs to be balanced by higher future tax revenue via tax hikes. If it's not, there would be an impact on the residual variable, namely the price level. The FTPL then simply postulates that the price level is determined by and moves around based on the fiscal choices that the government makes. What About Money? It may be regarded as controversial that the FTPL discusses nominal quantities without reference to currency or monetary policy. This is not the case, however, since there is a revenue component of the GBC that depends directly on monetary policy. The Fed's excess earnings from its operations — including seigniorage from issuing the U.S. dollar — are transferred annually to the Treasury. In addition, there is revenue generated from the inflation tax: Inflation is revenue for the fiscal authority, because it is a tax on the holders of nominal government liabilities, debt and currency. Surprise inflation reduces the value of nominal assets and therefore improves the fiscal position of the government. In other words, if the monetary authority does not provide enough revenue or if there is an inflation surprise, then something else has to adjust so that the IGBC holds for a given path of government expenditure and fiscal revenue — and this is the price level.5 The FTPL thus rests crucially on the interplay between monetary and fiscal policymakers, since either institution can supply resources to back outstanding debt. When there is a deviation from anticipated plans, the price level remains as the equilibrating variable. Consequently, the FTPL is a fiscal theory only insofar it is centered on the GBC, while monetary policy still plays a powerful role. The Games People Play: Monetary-Fiscal Interactions The interplay between monetary and fiscal policy can also be formalized by thinking more about the rules and boundaries of their interaction. This is described in the seminal 1991 paper "Equilibria Under 'Active' and 'Passive' Monetary and Fiscal Policies," which categorizes whether such policies are active or passive: A passive policy is designed to ensure that the IGBC holds. That is, debt holders can be confident that their loans to the government are paid back. An active policy pursues other objectives. The typical presumption6 is that monetary policy is active while fiscal policy is passive. The Fed's behavior is prescribed by the Federal Reserve Act of 1977, which sets as goals maximum employment and price stability, with no mandate for maintaining intertemporal budget balance. Instead, it is commonly expected that Congress is tasked with being the guardian of U.S. fiscal solvency and debt stability. However, Congress has the legislative power to change the behavior of the Fed, mandating it to be a "passive" policy institution designed to supply enough revenue via the inflation tax or its excess earnings to preserve budget balance while Congress would be free to pursue its own fiscal objectives. Such a policy arrangement fits well within the logic of the monetary policy interactions literature in preserving macroeconomic stability. It may not even be inflationary because, as discussed above, what moves the price level is the lack of expected intertemporal budget balance. However, the historical record shows that hyperinflations — even just prolonged persistent high inflation episodes — typically start with the central bank giving up the monetary reins.7 Is the FTPL Testable? The preceding discussion thus raises the questions of whether the FTPL is actually a good theory for guiding policymakers and whether it can be validated. Economists think of a theoretical model as testable when it delivers predictions for how observed economic variables behave with respect to each other or over time. This is clearly the case here, as a long body of research has theoretically and empirically demonstrated.8 At the same time, identification of the specific policy mix is tenuous and can require the use of external information, such as policymaker statements or dramatic changes in the economic environment. The difficulty with testing the FTPL or identifying the policy mix is that the power of the theory rests in a forward-looking present-value relationship. That is, current outcomes depend on expectations of the future path of fiscal revenue and expenditures. These can be assessed from an extrapolation of current policy behavior when it is rules-based, but this is by necessity fraught with uncertainty. In addition, the future paths of interest rates matter, too, as they provide the discounting in the present value calculations. Despite these empirical challenges, the FTPL nevertheless provides a framework for assessing surprise fiscal policy actions, as the following example demonstrates. A Practical Example The Biden administration announced that it would "cancel" up to $10,000 in federal student loan debt (or $20,000 for some borrowers), subject to certain income limits. Although details remain scarce at this point, the debt forgiveness can be considered as an expense of the federal government. The debt cancellation and the subsequent reduction in loan payments is a reduction in tax revenue. In any case, this would constitute a transfer of resources and consequently an increase in the net primary deficit. The fiscal impact would be drawn out over several years because of the impact of the missing loan repayments and other provisions in the debt forgiveness that alters income-based repayment plans. The overall cost of this debt forgiveness is estimated to be between $440 billion and $600 billion in present value terms. This presents a sizeable impact on the U.S. federal debt position. According to estimates by the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, it would also wipe out any presumed savings under the Inflation Reduction Act. In fact, as the FTPL suggests, student loan forgiveness would have an inflationary impact. At the end of June, total outstanding federal debt amounted to $30.6 trillion, while the primary deficit stood at $0.3 trillion. Since this student loan cancellation program is unfunded, it can therefore be thought of as a fairly clean policy experiment where the present value of future net surplus has declined. In the absence of changes on the right-hand side of this ledger — namely higher revenue from the Fed (unlikely if it persists in raising rates to combat inflation and a declining balance sheet) or higher tax revenue compared to the path before the administration's announcement — what has to equilibrate this imbalance is the price level. Based on the fraction of outstanding debt the cancelled debt likely represents, a quick back-of-the-envelope calculation reveals that student loan forgiveness could raise the price level by as much as 1.6 percent as of July 2022.9 Conclusion The FTPL may seem like an arcane concept interesting only to economists and therefore may not be of much interest even to an interested public. However, the FTPL is always operating in the background as a valuation equation for U.S. government debt. It provides a key context for assessing and understanding the soundness and solvency of the U.S. financial system and the health of the economy. While the policymakers and the public may not show much interest in the FTPL, the FTPL is certainly interested in them.
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RJ Fulton, 6/28/23, The Motley Fool, “Navigating Inflation: Is the US truly out of the Woods?” https://www.fool.com/investing/2023/06/28/navigating-inflation-is-the-us-truly-out-of-the-wo/, mm
Evidence shows that inflation in the United States might be cooling, but the road ahead remains arduous. Amid the ongoing challenges posed by inflation, there are increasing reasons for prudent optimism. Recent data suggests that inflation is displaying signs of cooling to such an extent that the U.S. Federal Reserve decided to put a temporary pause on the raising of interest rates. But before the war on inflation is won, policymakers will likely need to navigate a new set of factors adding to the complexity of the situation. Despite a decrease in inflation to 4% from its peak of 8%, the measures implemented by several first-world countries to address this issue, such as raising interest rates, have inadvertently heightened the risk of deflation and the potential for a recession. This presents a formidable challenge for the Federal Reserve, as they must delicately balance the task of reining in inflation while also ensuring a smooth economic transition that avoids a downturn. While there are reasons to believe that a soft landing may be achievable, another obstacle that could hinder progress looms on the horizon. Throughout history, there are two recurring themes of countries that have experienced persistent inflation and at times eventually spiraled into hyperinflation: economic uncertainty and mounting debt. Economies such as Hungary and Greece in the aftermath of WWII, or France following their costly war campaign during the 18th-century revolution, not only faced shaky economic conditions but also experienced severe bouts of inflation as deficits continued to widen. Unfortunately, a similar pattern seems to be emerging on the Federal Reserve's balance sheet. Since the initial measures were implemented in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020, the national debt of the U.S. has surged by nearly one-third, reaching an astounding record of $32 trillion today. This ever-growing burden could potentially add further inflationary pressure on the economy, placing the Federal Reserve in an extremely delicate position as it seeks to implement policies that not only curb inflation and achieve a soft landing but also address the pressing issue of a mounting debt crisis. The reasons for this are threefold. First, when a country has a significant amount of debt, it can create challenges for the central bank in managing inflation through traditional methods. Typically, central banks raise interest rates or implement measures to reduce the amount of money circulating in the economy to control inflation. But this strategy of raising rates creates a dilemma as it can make it more expensive to pay off debt. In some situations, when a government has difficulty repaying its debts, it may resort to a process called debt monetization. This means the government's central bank starts financing government expenses by creating new money, a method recently employed by the Federal Reserve. However, debt monetization can have consequences as it can potentially lead to an increase in the overall money supply. If this increase isn't matched by an increase in the production of goods and services, it can contribute to rising inflation. Perhaps most problematic is the situation between soaring debt levels and the erosion of confidence in a country's fiscal stability. If investors and the public perceive that the government's ability to manage its debt is questionable, it can lead to higher inflation expectations. These expectations can become self-fulfilling as individuals and businesses adjust their behavior in anticipation of rising prices, exacerbating inflationary pressures. To counter the portrayal of the current inflationary environment as borderline dire, it is important to note that the U.S. does hold distinct advantages compared to infamous scenarios of hyperinflation seen in the Weimar Republic in Germany during the 1920s and more recently among countries like Venezuela, Zimbabwe, or Argentina. One advantage is that the U.S. dollar remains the global reserve currency, providing a level of stability and confidence in its value. Additionally, the Federal Reserve has a relative degree of independence compared to other central banks, which can act as a safeguard against extreme inflationary scenarios. While the U.S.'s position as a leader in the global economy certainly helps in combating inflation, it's crucial to acknowledge the additional challenges posed by rising debt. The task of achieving a soft landing could become even more difficult when coupled with an expanding debt burden. It would be unwise to become complacent and assume that inflation will continue to decline steadily, or that the worst is behind us. Reason for optimism exists, but the U.S. has not fully emerged from the inflationary challenges it currently faces.
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The Economist, 12/15/22, “The insidious threats to central-bank independence,” https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2022/12/15/the-insidious-threats-to-central-bank-independence, mm
The final threat stems from government spending. Economists’ models say that the ability of central banks to control inflation depends on sound public finances, which Eric Leeper of the University of Virginia has called the profession’s “dirty little secret”. Should governments borrow without restraint, they undermine the credibility of monetary policy without so much as a phone call to the technocrats who set interest rates. All it takes to produce self-fulfilling expectations of inflation is a belief that the government will one day choose to inflate away some of its debts. Central bankers should thus look nervously at the increasing tendency of governments to borrow and spend, for example on vast energy subsidies, as in Europe. They should also fear the intense pressure on budgets that is forecast for the coming decades as ageing populations push up spending on health care and pensions. Politicians today are very different from Nixon. The independence of monetary policy from politics looks wobbly nonetheless.
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Ed Ballard 5/24/22, The Wall Street Journal, “Efforts to expand global carbon pricing run into economic headwinds,” https://www.wsj.com/articles/efforts-to-expand-global-carbon-pricing-run-into-economic-headwinds-11653408191, mm
Companies are paying more for their greenhouse-gas emissions than ever before, but prices aren’t high enough to curb global warming and economic headwinds could deter governments from raising them, the World Bank said. Around the world, revenue from carbon-pricing policies such as carbon taxes and emissions-trading systems surged to around $84 billion in 2021, up 60% from 2020. This was largely driven by the rising cost of pollution allowances on emissions markets in the European Union, California and elsewhere, according to a World Bank report published on Tuesday. Nearly 23% of global greenhouse-gas emissions are now covered by a carbon price of some kind, up from 21.5% last year, the report said, but prices are generally too low to motivate low-carbon investments that could reduce reliance on fossil fuels, it said. “The past year has seen some very positive signs, such as the significant increase in revenue that can be invested in communities and in supporting the low-carbon transition,” the World Bank said. But “the price in most jurisdictions remains well below the levels required to deliver on the Paris Agreement temperature goals,” it said. The bank warned that making emissions more expensive could be unpalatable for policy makers concerned about inflation and a potential economic downturn. Meanwhile, policies aimed at protecting vulnerable consumers, such as energy price caps, could undermine incentives to cut emissions. “Adopting carbon prices remains politically challenging, particularly amid rising inflation and energy prices,” the report said. “Ensuring carbon pricing is fair, and seen to be fair, will be crucial in building and maintaining public support.”
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Jonathan Lesser, 10/10/19, (Lesser has a PhD and is an adjunct fellow at the Manhattan Institute and is the president of Continental Economics), Manhattan Institute, “The painful realities of carbon tax-and-dividend schemes,” https://manhattan.institute/article/the-painful-realities-of-carbon-tax-and-dividend-schemes, mm
Late last month, Climate Leadership Council President Ted Halstead and Exelon CEO Christopher Crane touted their carbon tax-dividend scheme, under which they promise “the vast majority of Americans will be economic winners.” The plan sounds too good to be true — ever-higher carbon taxes providing ever-greater economic benefits — because it is. In reality, such a tax would cripple the economy and set off trade wars with the rest of the world that would dwarf our current dispute with China. And to top it off, the proposal would have no measurable impact on global climate. The CLC proposal starts with a $40 per ton tax on carbon dioxide emissions, increasing at least 5% above the rate of inflation annually. At current CO2 emissions levels, that’s about $200 billion per year. If inflation averaged just 2% per year, by 2025 the tax would increase to $56/ton. For gasoline, that would mean a tax of $0.55/gallon. Except the tax would increase inflation rates because energy is used to produce virtually all goods and services. For example, the OPEC oil embargoes in the 1970s were a key contributor to the high inflation rates of that decade. Hence, the carbon tax would increase far faster than advertised, increasing the economic harm. The plan sounds simple. But the Climate Action Rebate Act, which proposes this same tax-and-dividend scheme, illustrates the messy realities of such climate sausage-making. Under CARA, 70% of the money raised would be returned to families making less than $130,000 per year. Those dividends would be treated as taxable income, so the benefits to families would be much less than advertised. The remaining 30% — around $60 billion based on a $40/ton tax — would be doled out to politically-favored constituents and used by the government to pay for administering the tax. Businesses would not be eligible to receive any rebates. Their costs would rise and be passed on to consumers. This would damage American businesses’ global competitiveness by increasing the costs of exports.
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Soyres, et. al 22 (Francois M. de Soyres, Ana Maria Santacreu, and Henry Young; July 15, 2022; Francois M. de Soyres holds a PhD in economics from Toulouse School of Economics and is the Principal Economist of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Ana Maria Santacreu holds a PhD from NYU and a Research Officer at the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis, Henry Young is a PhD student in economics at the University of Michigan, “Fiscal policy and excess inflation during Covid-19: a cross-country view,” FEDS Notes – Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, URL: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/fiscal-policy-and-excess-inflation-during-covid-19-a-cross-country-view-20220715.html )//NTG
The recent surge in inflation in many countries around the world and the fiscal stimulus provided in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic has renewed interest in analyzing the potential role of large fiscal spending as a driver of price increases. In this note, we examine how fiscal support impacted the balance between supply and demand across countries during the COVID-19 crisis. Our findings suggest that fiscal stimulus boosted the consumption of goods without any noticeable impact on production, increasing excess demand pressures in good markets. As a result, fiscal support contributed to price tensions. Indeed, focusing on inflation through February 2022 which does not capture many disruptions associated with the war in Ukraine, we show that countries with large fiscal stimulus, or with high exposure to foreign stimulus through international trade, experienced stronger inflation outbursts. Our back-of-the-envelope illustrative calculations suggest that U.S. fiscal stimulus during the pandemic contributed to an increase in inflation of about 2.5 percentage points (ppt) in the U.S and 0.5 ppt in the United Kingdom. 1. The Covid Crisis and fiscal policy responses around the world The COVID-19 pandemic greatly disrupted economic activity all over the world. Due to a mix of government-imposed restrictions and voluntary personal decisions, mobility levels, as measured by Google's geo-location tracking data from smartphones, collapsed in March 2020. Since then, mobility has improved, although with some volatility that tracked closely the successive waves of the pandemic (see figure 1). Figure 1. Mobility Note: Mobility is a simple average of Google's grocery, workplace, retail, recreation, and transportation mobility. Series are smoothed using a 7−day moving average and aggregates are weighted by population. Aggregates are constructed using Federal Reserve Board country classifications. AFE comprise of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, and the United Kingdom. EME comprise of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. Series end on March 26, 2022. The pandemic affected both the supply and demand side of the economy, hampering firms' ability to produce, as well as consumers' ability to consume. Unlike previous recessions, consumption of goods and services behaved very differently (see figure 2). In advanced economies, where the data allow real consumption expenditures across goods and services to be discernible more easily, consumption of services fell dramatically and then started recovering slowly as containment policies eased and vaccines were made widely available.2 In contrast, goods consumption fell by less during the beginning of the pandemic and experienced a strong recovery thereafter. Industrial production, however, was slow to adjust, creating a discrepancy between supply and demand in the goods' markets that likely played a role in the depletion of inventories and ultimately in recent price tensions.3 Figure 2. Real Consumption and Industrial Production during the Pandemic Note: All series end in 2021 Q4. Industrial production data are aggregated to the quarterly frequency by taking the respective average of the monthly values. Aggregates are constructed using real GDP weights. Total industrial production excluding construction series are used when possible, but some series use manufacturing industrial production instead due to data availability. The Advanced Foreign Economies aggregate comprise of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom. To mitigate the health and economic fallout of the pandemic, many governments engaged in massive fiscal support programs. Using the IMF's data, we define each country's total fiscal stimulus as the percent change in cumulative spending above the country-specific pre-pandemic trend. As shown in figure 3, the extent of fiscal support is large and heterogeneous across countries. Figure 3. Estimated Pandemic Fiscal Support for Selected Countries Note: Deviation from projected spending is constructed by calculating the percent change between each government's fiscal spending in 2020 against a 2020 projected value. The projected value is calculated by taking the average fiscal spending growth rate between 2015−2019 and forecasting out a year. Federal Reserve Board country classifications are used to group countries into Advanced Economy and Emerging Market Economy categories. 2. Fiscal Support, Consumption, and Production During Recovery Periods of the Pandemic While the pandemic and associated public health restrictions were the main drivers of economic fluctuations over the past two years, fiscal stimulus policies might have shaped the response of consumption and production to changes in mobility. Here, we investigate the association between the size of total fiscal stimulus and the path of consumption and Industrial Production during the COVID-19 pandemic, by evaluating: (i) the elasticity of demand and supply to lockdowns, and (ii) the impact of fiscal stimulus on this elasticity. Empirical Setup. Our empirical strategy consists of projecting quarterly real consumption and production growth on the growth rate in mobility in the same quarter. We also interact these variables with country-specific 2020 fiscal stimulus. Our objective is to analyze how fiscal support affected the country-level consumption and production in response to mobility fluctuations.4 On the one hand, in periods of mobility decline, we expect fiscal support to help household's "soften the blow" of the activity reduction, and hence expect a smaller decline in consumption in countries with large stimulus. Hence, in these periods, fiscal support is expected to counterbalance the effect of mobility, which means that the interaction term takes an opposite sign compared to the standalone mobility one. On the other hand, in periods of economic reopening and mobility rebound, we expect fiscal support to amplify the consumption increase, which implies that the interaction term takes the same sign as mobility. Baseline Results. We find that governments that provided generous fiscal support mitigated the drop in goods consumption in periods of lockdowns, while boosting consumption in periods of increased mobility. The effect of fiscal stimulus on services consumption, however, is insignificant. Finally, our results reveal that generous fiscal spending did not significantly contribute to supply expansion: countries with larger fiscal support did not have a significantly different association between mobility and Industrial Production. In other words, supply did not adjust quickly enough to meet the sharp increase in demand for goods. Using our point estimates and country-specific values of fiscal support, figure 4 quantifies the role of fiscal support in shaping the response of goods consumption to fluctuations in mobility. The United States is the most impacted country, with consumption decreasing significantly less when mobility drops and rebounding significantly more when mobility increases. Figure 4. Change in the Growth Rate of Goods Consumption in response to mobility changes Note: Aggregates are constructed using real GDP weights. The AFE aggregate comprise of 19 countries and the EME aggregate comprise of 24 countries. Countries are classified using Federal Reserve Board country classifications. 3. Fiscal Support and Inflation The previous section highlighted that fiscal support boosted goods consumption demand without any noticeable impact on the supply of goods. Hence, the large increase in demand triggered by the fiscal stimulus policy, together with the slow pace of adjustment in production, likely contributed to the current imbalance in the goods market, resulting in the depletion of inventories, pronounced bottlenecks, and ultimately inflation. The steep surge in goods consumption in countries with large fiscal support may have also created extra demand in other countries through an increase in demand for imports. This demand surge was met by limited supply capacity. Indeed, while both production, transportation and shipping capacity have adapted to increasing global value chain participation over the past few decades, the necessary infrastructure appeared to be quite inelastic in the short run. To further investigate this intuition, we turn to a cross-country regression analysis. For each country, we compute "excess inflation" by taking the 2021Q4 12-months inflation rate and subtract the average rate of inflation each country experienced during the 2015-2019 period. We then construct several measures of exposure to domestic and foreign fiscal stimulus and project excess inflation on such measures. First, Exposure to Domestic Fiscal Stimulus captures each country's fiscal support, as presented in figure 3. Second, Exposure to Foreign Fiscal Stimulus measures a country's exposure to foreign stimulus and contains two parts: (i) a "vertical" component which is defined as a trade-weighted average of other countries' stimulus measures, and (ii) an "horizontal" component capturing the exposure of each country's import-partners to third countries' fiscal stimulus. Intuitively, the United States can be exposed to fiscal stimulus from Canada, both through a high import share (i.e, imported inflation) and through a high export share (i.e., higher demand from Canada). This captures vertical foreign exposure. Moreover, the price of Canada's exports to the United States may be pushed up by Canada's exposure to Mexico's fiscal stimulus. This captures horizontal foreign exposure. We find that excess inflation is significantly correlated with each country's domestic stimulus, as well as with exposure to foreign stimulus. When taken separately or when used in conjunction with domestic fiscal stimulus, both vertical and horizontal exposure to foreign stimulus appear to be significantly correlated with domestic excess inflation. Moreover, our results show that excess inflation is also strongly related to our aggregated measure of Foreign Exposure. Before describing our results further, we need to acknowledge several limitations in our analysis. Our estimation relies on the association between excess inflation and exposure to domestic and foreign fiscal stimulus, but it might be the case that countries that engaged in larger fiscal support are also those that have been the worst hit by the pandemic and thus had a greater recovery. In such a case, and if the severity of the pandemic is itself positively correlated with excess inflation in the recovery period over and beyond the effect of fiscal support, then we would suffer from an omitted variable issue bias. Moreover, the bias would be positive because our fiscal stimulus variable would capture both the direct effect of the pandemic and the effect of the fiscal spending. Future work on this topic would gain from addressing such concern. For the moment, the results should be viewed as illustrative, highlighting perhaps the higher end of potential price pressures from fiscal stimulus during the pandemic. Back-of-the-Envelope Calculation: Quantifying the Impact of Fiscal Stimulus on Inflation. Keeping in mind the caveats described above, figure 5.1 presents the impact of domestic and foreign exposure on excess inflation for several regions, based on our regression estimates. The impact of domestic fiscal stimulus on inflation is highest in the United States. Canada, a country with strong trade links with the U.S., features a high level of excess inflation related to exposure to foreign fiscal stimulus. In large economies, not surprisingly, domestic stimulus is a more important driver of excess inflation than foreign stimulus. For example, domestic stimulus is associated with a 2.5 (ppt) in excess inflation in the United States, 1.8 ppt in the Euro Area. Figure 5. Fiscal Stimulus and Excess Inflation Aggregates are constructed using real GDP weights. The Euro area comprise of France, Germany, italy and Spain. EMEs comprise of 32 countries using Federal Reserve Board country classifications. Conversely, smaller economies are relatively more sensitive to foreign stimulus. In figure 5.2, we derive a measure of "international spillover" of U.S. fiscal stimulus. In particular, we isolate the share of U.S. stimulus in foreign exposure for several countries and compute the associated excess inflation in those countries. Our estimation implies that US fiscal stimulus was associated with an excess inflation of about 0.5 percentage points in the United Kingdom.
2023
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Interest Rates DA – MNDI Updates › Neg › Link – Expansionary Fiscal Policy
Gaspar, et. al 4/3 (Vitor Gaspar, Carlos Eduardo Goncalves, Paolo Mauro, and Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro; April 3, 2023; Vitor Gaspar is the Director of the Fiscal Affairs Department at the IMF since 2014. He was also Portuguese Minister of State and Finance from 2011–13 and holds a PhD from Universidade Nova de Lisboa in economics, Carlos Eduardo Goncalves is a Senior Economist in the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, Paolo Mauro is a Deputy Director in the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department, Marcos Poplawski-Ribeiro is a Deputy Division Chief in the IMF’s Fiscal Policy and Surveillance Division of the Fiscal Affairs Department and holds a PhD in economics from the University of Amsterdam URL: https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2023/04/03/fiscal-policy-can-help-tame-inflation-and-protect-the-most-vulnerable)//NTG
High inflation can impose serious and lasting costs on the economy and people. But the distributive effects of inflation—the way it transfers money from some individuals to others—are complex. To respond effectively to the sharpest upsurge in inflation in three decades and to address the damage done to households, policymakers should have a better understanding of how inflation affects various segments of society in different places. In our April 2023 Fiscal Monitor, we study the effects of (unexpected) inflation on people’s well-being from mid-2021 to mid-2022—a period when food and energy prices rose earlier and faster than other prices. The chapter offers several lessons for policymakers on the impact of inflation on households’ budgets and how fiscal policy can help curb inflation while supporting the vulnerable. Impact on public finances Analyzing how inflation affects public finances, our main finding is that unexpected inflation—such as in the recent episode—erodes the real value of government debt at the expense of bondholders. For countries with debt exceeding 50 percent of GDP, each percentage point of unexpected (“surprise”) increase in inflation reduces public debt by 0.6 percentage points of GDP, with the effect lasting for several years. As inflation becomes persistent and better anticipated, however, it stops contributing to declining debt ratios. Likewise, deficit-to-GDP ratios initially decline as spending fails to keep pace with the rise in the monetary value of the economy’s output. But such effects fade even quicker. Impact on households Based on public surveys of thousands of households in six economies (Colombia, Finland, France, Kenya, Mexico, and Senegal), we find that inflation from mid-2021 to mid-2022 impacted people through three main channels: their consumption patterns; their income from wages, pensions, or transfers; and their assets and liabilities. The below chart displays the estimated effects of these channels to a developing economy (Kenya) and to an advanced economy (France), prior to any new government intervention in support of households. Although the impact varies across countries (and across income groups), the surveys reveal that: The faster rise in food prices compared to other prices hurt poor families disproportionately because food represents a higher share of their total consumption. This effect was most pronounced in low-income countries. Inflation eroded real incomes in commodity-importing countries, as wages across all income groups did not keep pace with prices. As inflation eroded the monetary value of assets and liabilities, families with negative net worth benefitted at the expense of creditors, particularly in countries with developed financial and credit markets. Redistributive wealth effects of inflation were also influenced by the age of the head of household: young families, which tend to be net borrowers, experienced gains through the wealth channels, whereas old households saw their wealth eroded. Curbing inflation while protecting the vulnerable Fiscal policy can support monetary policy in dealing with inflation because it also affects aggregate demand. Our statistical evidence suggests that fiscal policy’s impact on inflation has changed over the decades. For advanced economies we find that, since 1985, reducing public expenditure by 1 percentage point of GDP lowers inflation by half a percentage point. In addition, fiscal policy can also help protect the vulnerable. The economic model used in the chapter incorporates inequality in incomes, consumption, and asset holdings. It shows that when central banks act alone—without the support of fiscal policy—they need to hike interest rates substantially to fight inflation. Fiscal tightening makes it possible to increase interest rates by less to contain inflation.
2023
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Interest Rates DA – MNDI Updates › Neg › Link – Fiscal Redistribution/Taxes
Florin Bilbiie, Tommaso Monacelli, and Roberto Perotti, May 2021, (Bilbiie is an economics researcher at the University of Lausanne while Monacelli and Perotti are economics researchers at Bocconi University). “Stabilization vs. Redistribution: the Optimal Monetary-Fiscal Mix,” Center for Economic Policy Research, https://repec.cepr.org/repec/cpr/ceprdp/DP15199.pdf, mm
In the public discourse on macroeconomic policy monetary and fiscal policy are typically described as two different entities. With few important exceptions discussed below, this holds for the academic debate as well. For instance, the standard representative-agent New Keynesian framework (henceforth RANK, Woodford 2003, Galí 2008) assumes a stark separation between monetary and fiscal policy.1 In this paper we show that, in a setting with heterogenous agents and imperfect insurance, monetary and fiscal policy are instead inextricably linked in their optimal design for stabilization and redistribution purposes. The core argument of our analysis is that, with imperfect insurance, movements in inequality - induced for instance by transfers across agents - are inherently inefficient. A transfer to financially constrained agents reduces inequality, and viceversa. However those variations in inequality generate an inefficiency even under flexible prices, i.e., even in the absence of a nominal rigidity distortion. In order to offset fluctuations in inequality so as to attempt restoring perfect insurance requires using the central bank’s leverage over real activity through inflation variations. There is therefore a inherent tension between stabilizing real activity so as to minimize supply-side, price-stickiness distortions and demand-side, imperfect-insurance distortions. The tax-financing of government spending is a natural setting in which a distributional channel is activated. When government spending is financed by taxation with an asymmetric incidence on the distribution of income (i.e., either progressive or regressive taxation) it creates inefficient fluctuations in income inequality (away from the first-best benchmark of full insurance) even in the absence of a nominal rigidity distortion. To understand this point, suppose that government spending evolves exogenously and is financed with taxes that fall disproportionately more on the share of the population that is unconstrained (i.e., progressive taxation). In that case a rise in government spending generates an implicit transfer to constrained agents, who have a higher marginal propensity to consume. The result is a fall in inequality but in fact an inefficient (i.e., too high) redistribution of income from unconstrained to constrained agents, and a too large aggregate demand expansion, which is tackled by the policymaker via a monetary contraction (aka a deflation). A symmetric result applies in the case in which higher government spending is financed via regressive taxation. In that case, inequality inefficiently rises and the policy authority needs to engineer the optimal degree of monetary accommodation, i.e., to strike a balance between higher inflation and a negative output gap. In other words, and because they give rise to inefficient fluctuations in inequality, exogenous variations in government spending generate a tradeoff between insurance—i.e., minimizing the fluctuations in inequality—and the typical goal of stabilizing aggregate demand and inflation. To be clear, and in the well-known New Keynesian jargon, government spending disturbances act either as "cost-pull" or "cost-push" depending on the degree of progressivity/regressivity in the tax system. In these cases, unless a symmetric distribution of taxes exactly preserves full insurance, the policymaker cannot simultaneously stabilize inflation, the output gap and inequality at their respective efficient levels.
2023
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Interest Rates DA – MNDI Updates › Neg › UQ – Inflation
Peter Hannam, 6/26/23, The Guardian, “Why the last mile on the road to low inflation may yet prove to be the toughest,” https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/jun/27/why-the-last-mile-on-the-road-to-low-inflation-may-yet-prove-to-be-the-toughest, mm
The world’s rich economies have only completed the easy part of restraining inflation and it will be the “last mile” that could be the hardest to travel, the Bank for International Settlements said in its annual economic statement. Known colloquially as the central banks’ central bank, the BIS detailed why inflation may be stickier than expected – particularly if authorities don’t stay the course. Inflation appears to have peaked in 2022 in most nations and has been “falling quite notably in most cases”. About 95% of central banks have responded by hiking interest rates since early 2021 in “the most synchronised and intense monetary policy tightening in decades”, the BIS said. The ratio exceeded the 80% proportion of coordinated action during the oil price shocks of the 1970s. And in dealing with risks of bank collapses – such as Silicon Valley Bank in the US and Credit Suisse in the Switzerland – authorities had “responded forcefully to contain contagion and deployed a number of crisis management tools to curb systemic risks”. Despite the positive results so far, the BIS warns that “even stronger headwinds may lie ahead”, with “a material risk of further financial stress” as economies slow. While inflation may have moderated, it remained too high, the BIS said in language that has peppered the Reserve Bank’s statements for months. Indeed, the “last mile” to cover on the disinflation journey may prove to be much tougher than the distance travelled so far. Goods and services that soared in price because of supply shocks (such as Covid and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine) mostly haven’t come down, with impacts spilling over into other sectors. And the longer inflation stays high, the more we all become inured to it, slowing its decline. “Households and firms may adjust to persistently higher inflation by trying to recoup previous losses and then seeking to avoid future expected ones through their wage- and price-setting decisions,” the BIS said.
2023
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Interest Rates DA – MNDI Updates › Neg › UQ – Inflation
Elisabeth Buchwald, 6/27/23, CNN, “Bank of America CEO: Inflation could hit Fed’s 2% target by 2025,” https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/27/business/bank-of-america-ceo-federal-reserve-inflation/index.html, mm
US inflation could hit the Federal Reserve’s 2% target in 2025, Bank of America CEO Brian Moynihan told CNN in an exclusive interview Tuesday. “We think it will take [Fed officials] all of this year and all of next year and into 2025 before they get inflation in line with their long term target,” Moynihan told CNN’s Poppy Harlow on “CNN This Morning.” The Fed is currently projecting an inflation rate of 2.1% that year, down from the current level of 4.4%. Already, consumers are cutting back on spending to a level that is consistent with 2% inflation, Moynihan said, citing Bank of America customer data. That’s both “good and bad,” he added. “Good in that’s what the Fed needs to see inflation under control. Not so good because it does mean we have a higher probability of a mild recession coming true.” Moynihan said he thinks the Fed could raise rates “a couple more times this year” to get inflation closer to its target. He also predicts the Fed will then hold rates steady until May of next year before cutting. That’s in line with traders’ forecasts, according to the CME FedWatch Tool. But around a fifth of traders think a rate cut could come in March 2024.
2023
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Interest Rates DA – MNDI Updates › Neg › UQ – Interest Rates
Howard Schneider and Anna Saphir, 6/22/23, Reuters, “Fed’s Powell says rate hikes will come at a ‘careful pace’ from here,” https://www.reuters.com/markets/us/feds-powell-tells-senate-democrats-inflation-hardest-working-families-2023-06-22/, mm
U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Jerome Powell said on Thursday the central bank would move interest rates at a "careful pace" from here as policymakers edge towards a stopping point for their historic round of monetary policy tightening. "We're at least close to where we think our destination is...and it only makes common sense to move...at a careful pace," Powell said at a hearing before the Senate Banking Committee. "The point" of holding rates steady at the Fed's meeting last week, Powell said, was precisely to slow the speed with which the Fed was raising borrowing costs. After having raised rates at 10 straight meetings, sometimes by as much as three quarters of a point at a time, the Fed skipped the June meeting. Investors now expect rate hikes to resume in July, with the Fed perhaps evaluating the need for further increases at every other session - a pace common in prior tightening cycles. "We don't want to do more than we have to...Overwhelmingly people on the (Federal Open Market) Committee do think that there's more rate hikes coming but we want to make them at a pace that allows us to see incoming information." Powell did not specify his own view on when and how high rates should move. Most policymakers see at least two more quarter-point rate increases by the end of this year. But Powell did say he shared the broad economic outlook of his colleagues for modest economic growth, a slight rise in unemployment, and slowly declining inflation over the rest of the year. It's that outlook, Powell said, which led most policymakers to feel that one or two more rate increases would be adequate to finish the Fed's inflation fight.
2023
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Interest Rates DA – MNDI Updates › Neg › UQ – Interest Rates
Jeanna Smialek, 6/21/23, The New York Times, “Fed Chair Sees ‘Long Way to Go’ on Inflation Fight,” https://www.nytimes.com/2023/06/21/business/economy/powell-inflation-federal-reserve.html, mm
Jerome H. Powell, the chair of the Federal Reserve, told House lawmakers that the United States remains a “long way” away from low and stable inflation even 15 months into the central bank’s campaign to cool the economy and wrestle down rapid price increases. Mr. Powell testified before the House Financial Services Committee on Wednesday. He told lawmakers that the labor market remained very tight and that inflation — while it has come down notably from its peak last summer — was still too fast. In light of that, the Fed could raise interest rates even higher than their current level of just above 5 percent. “Inflation has moderated somewhat since the middle of last year,” Mr. Powell said. “Nonetheless, inflation pressures continue to run high, and the process of getting inflation back down to 2 percent has a long way to go.” Fed officials left interest rates unchanged last week following 10 straight increases. But central bankers have been adamant that the decision to hit pause did not amount to a declaration of victory over inflation. Instead, moving more gradually will give policymakers time to assess how well higher rates are working to slow the economy as they try to strike a delicate balance of doing enough to cool growth without doing too much. “Given how far we’ve come, it may make sense to move rates higher, but to do so at a more moderate pace,” Mr. Powell said in response to a lawmaker’s question, explaining that it was like moving from a highway to more local roads. “As you get closer to your destination, as you try to find that destination, you slow down even further.” Central bankers forecast in their fresh economic projections last week that they will probably raise interest rates to around 5.6 percent this year, which would amount to two more quarter-point rate increases. Mr. Powell said during his news conference following the decision last week that the Fed’s July 25-26 meeting will be “live,” meaning that a rate increase is possible at that gathering. “I think that’s a pretty good guess of what will happen if the economy performs as about as expected,” Mr. Powell said Wednesday, referring to Fed officials’ forecast for two more rate moves this year. Mr. Powell’s comments prompted a slight pullback in stock prices, though they ultimately did little to shift market expectations of future rate increases. Investors expect the Fed to raise rates once more this year, less than what most Fed policymakers anticipate.