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Affirmative Answers › --- XT: No Escalation
Simhoney '22 – PhD, previously the director of counterextremism at the political consultancy firm TRD Policy and a research fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies [Limor, 4/1/22; "NATO Intervention in Ukraine Won’t Spark World War III," https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/01/nato-intervention-in-ukraine-wont-spark-world-war-iii/]
The main concern is any such escalation could lead to World War III. There are two reasons that this is unlikely. The first is that Russia’s military capabilities are poor relative to those of Western armies. Their forces are not sufficiently trained; their equipment and weapons are dated and inferior; they experience major logistical, operational, and tactical difficulties; and their soldiers have low morale.
Damaging economic sanctions also mean that Russia may not be able to fund a wider war. The expectation that Moscow will be able to escalate the war into other theaters in an effective way, especially by conventional means, is unrealistic. It is possible that if the Russian military continues to struggle, Russian President Vladimir Putin will deploy chemical or even nuclear weapons to increase gains and deter the West from interfering—but that is unlikely.
2023
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Affirmative Answers › --- XT: No Escalation
McGee '23 [Luke; 1/28/23; "Does the West’s decision to arm Ukraine with tanks bring it closer to war with Russia?"; https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/28/europe/nato-is-not-at-war-with-russia-intl-cmd/index.html]
The West’s decision to finally send tanks to Ukraine has caused some to ask the uncomfortable question: Does this mean that NATO is now in direct conflict with Russia?
This narrative, which is being pushed hard by the Kremlin, undoubtedly helps Russian President Vladimir Putin and his allies deflect from the fact that Russia launched an unprovoked attack on Ukraine and illegally occupied parts of a sovereign state.
2023
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Affirmative Answers › 2ac AT: Ukraine / Russia Impact – Not Nuclear
McGee '23 [Luke; 1/28/23; "Does the West’s decision to arm Ukraine with tanks bring it closer to war with Russia?"; https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/28/europe/nato-is-not-at-war-with-russia-intl-cmd/index.html]
The reason long-term Putin-watchers think there is little threat of Russia escalating to the point of provoking NATO to respond with force is simply that Moscow knows it couldn’t survive the confrontation.
“One of the few objectives that the Russian and US leadership share at the moment is avoiding a direct conflict between the two powers,” says Malcolm Chalmers, deputy director general at the Royal United Services Institute think tank in London.
2023
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Affirmative Answers › 2ac AT: Ukraine / Russia Impact – Not Nuclear
Shinkman '23 – National Security Correspondent @ US News & World Report [Paul; 2/24/23; "Putin’s Hollow Nuclear Threat;" https://www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2023-02-24/why-ukraine-wont-lead-putin-to-nuclear-war]
“The likelihood of Russia choosing – or Putin choosing – to use nuclear weapons directly against the West is astronomically low. It should not even be seriously considered at this stage,” says Katherine Lawlor, senior intelligence analyst at the independent Institute for the Study of War, which has fastidiously tracked Russia’s military movements since it first invaded Ukraine.
“Putin would love it if Western leaders believed that he might. He is many things, but he is not suicidal,” Lawlor says. She adds that Putin ultimately does not want war with NATO – particularly given the current state of the Russian army. “He couldn’t even win a conventional war in Ukraine.”
2023
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Affirmative Answers › AT: Natural Gas = Stable Energy
Malik, 6/27/2023 -- Energy Reporter @BloombergNews (June 27, 2023 at 5:00 AM EDT, Naureen, “America’s Biggest Power Source Wasn’t Built for Extreme Weather; Natural gas plants, now the top source of electricity in the US, are to blame for a disproportionate share of outages when the weather gets rough,” https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2023-natural-gas-biggest-us-power-source-also-most-vulnerable/, Y.H.)
In the 15 years since the American fracking boom unleashed a torrent of abundant, cheap and domestically available natural gas, the country has leaned into the fuel — and hard. Hundreds of new, state-of-the-art gas power plants have come online with tens of billions in Wall Street backing in what’s now the biggest gas-producing nation in the world. Given its reputation for low-cost, clean and stable generation, gas dethroned coal in 2016 as the US’s No. 1 source of electricity. This year, it will make up a record 41% of power production, more than solar, wind, hydro and coal combined.
The grid’s newfound reliance on natural gas was for more than a decade hailed as a breakthrough. It’s now one of its biggest vulnerabilities.
2023
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Affirmative Answers › --- XT: Natural Gas => Climate Change
Radtke, 23 – Prize-winning senior journalist and editor with more than 20 years of experience in daily journalism [Pam, March 20th 2023, The Guardian, “‘Ukraine is a false justification’: America’s destructive new rush for natural gas,” https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2023/mar/20/ukraine-is-a-false-justification-americas-destructive-new-rush-for-natural-gas, Y.H.]
As the war in Ukraine sent natural gas prices skyrocketing, liquid natural gas (LNG) plants are springing up all along the fragile Gulf Coast – seriously harming not just local communities but the world’s ability to keep the entire climate crisis at bay
30 miles south of New Orleans, a construction site visible from space is rising. Sandwiched between the Mississippi River and disappearing wetlands, the 256-hectare (632-acre) site is visited by a stream of tipper trucks and concrete mixers that stir up dust on Louisiana 23, the state highway that goes down to Venice, the last spot of land before the river’s water flows into the Gulf of Mexico.
2023
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Affirmative Answers › --- XT: Natural Gas => Climate Change
Chandler, 2019 – Institute Writer (nuclear science/engineering, materials science/engineering, civil and environmental engineering) [David, Dec. 16, 2029, MIT News, “The uncertain role of natural gas in the transition to clean energy” https://news.mit.edu/2019/role-natural-gas-transition-electricity-1216, Accessed on 6/22/2023, Y.H.]
A new MIT study examines the opposing roles of natural gas in the battle against climate change — as a bridge toward a lower-emissions future, but also a contributor to greenhouse gas emissions.
Natural gas, which is mostly methane, is viewed as a significant “bridge fuel” to help the world move away from the greenhouse gas emissions of fossil fuels, since burning natural gas for electricity produces about half as much carbon dioxide as burning coal. But methane is itself a potent greenhouse gas, and it currently leaks from production wells, storage tanks, pipelines, and urban distribution pipes for natural gas. Increasing its usage, as a strategy for decarbonizing the electricity supply, will also increase the potential for such “fugitive” methane emissions, although there is great uncertainty about how much to expect. Recent studies have documented the difficulty in even measuring today’s emissions levels.
2023
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Affirmative Answers › --- XT: Natural Gas => Climate Change
Kemfert et al, 22 --- Energy, Transportation, Environment Department, German Institute of Economic Research, Berlin, Germany (Claudia Kemfert, Fabian Präger, Isabell Braunger, Franziska M. Hoffart & Hanna Brauers, July 4 2022, Nature.com, “The expansion of natural gas infrastructure puts energy transitions at risk,” https://www.nature.com/articles/s41560-022-01060-3, BDP)
In a recent report, researchers for the Climate Action Tracker, an independent scientific project that monitors governments worldwide, warn: “This reaction to the energy crisis is an overreach that must be scaled back. As the world’s largest oil and gas producer, the US should show the way beyond fossil fuel extraction – but unfortunately it is now doing exactly the opposite.”
Abstract
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Affirmative Answers › 2ac Natural Gas => Climate Change
Distracts from more durable solutions to promote energy security in both the U.S. and the EU
LNG exports from U.S. not enough to replace Europe’s imports from Russia – better to focus on demand
LNG investments tradeoff with clean energy
2023
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Affirmative Answers › 2ac Domestic Clean Energy => LNG Exports
Erickson, 22 --- Climate Policy Program Director at Stockholm Environment Institute US (1 April 2022, Peter, “The US can provide Europe with LNG while advancing climate goals; The US stepping in to offset European reliance on Russian liquefied natural gas may seem counterintuitive to advancing climate goals, but they can work in tandem, says SEI Senior Scientist Peter Erickson,” https://www.sei.org/perspectives/us-europe-russia-lng-climate/, JMP))
On 25 March 2022, the US and the EU announced a partnership to help Europe get off Russian natural gas. This move would both punish Russia for invading Ukraine and protect the EU from the possibility that Russia may restrict gas flows to the continent. Under the new program, Europe would reduce its demand for Russian gas by up to two-thirds, while the US would help make up the remainder by supplying about 50 billion cubic metres (bcm) of natural gas annually over the next few years to the EU.
Where will this new gas come from? If the US simply shifts existing liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply from other buyers to EU buyers, it could trigger even further supply shortages and price spikes in the global LNG market, which is already under-supplied. Prices at the import hub in the Netherlands have averaged about $30 per million British thermal units (MMBtu) in recent months, more than five times higher than pre-pandemic levels.
2023
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Affirmative Answers › 2ac Renewable Natural Gas
Underwood, 19 [April 25, 2019, Joanna; Joanna D. Underwood is founder of Energy Vision, whose mission is to analyze and promote ways to make a swift transition to pollution-free renewable energy sources and to the clean, petroleum-free transportation fuels of the future.; “A Green New Deal for Natural Gas, Why ultral-low-carbon biomethane, aka renewable natural gas, deserves more attention from policy makers” https://www.greenbiz.com/article/green-new-deal-natural-gas, LK]
The U.S. Senate voted against the Green New Deal, but its interlinked climate, job and social justice goals are still percolating. Among the issues supporters and opponents alike have flagged is what role the natural gas industry should play in advancing them.
Natural gas long has been considered a "bridge fuel" to renewables. During the Green New Deal debate, former Department of Energy leaders from both parties argued that natural gas is part of the clean energy future, because it burns cleaner than coal or oil, reduces coal use and smoothes out the variability of solar and wind generation.
2023
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Affirmative Answers › 2ac AT: Green New Deal Link
Colman, 2-4-19 [Zach Colman, February 4, POLITICO, "Green New Deal Won't Call for End to Fossil Fuels" www.politico.com/story/2019/02/04/green-new-deal-fossil-fuels-1142544, Accessed on June 23, NP]
The first effort by congressional climate advocates to define their “Green New Deal” will omit one of the most ambitious goals its supporters have demanded, sources told POLITICO on Monday: a firm date for ending oil, gas and coal development in the U.S.
The change is a compromise that may make the proposal more politically palatable for many of the Democrats’ presidential contenders in 2020, as well as for labor groups that compose a powerful portion of the party’s base. But it will disappoint many of the progressives who have rallied and staged sit-ins in the Capitol in recent months to demand swift action on climate change.
2023
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Affirmative Answers › 2ac Non-Unique – Renewables Now
Isaacs-Thomas ’22 [Bella, 8/17/22, PBS, “What the Inflation Reduction Act does for green energy” https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/what-the-inflation-reduction-act-does-for-green-energy, Accessed on 6/23/22, JR]
The legislation, signed Aug. 16 by President Joe Biden, does a lot of things, including tackling deficit reduction, health care access and prescription drug pricing, but addressing the energy industry and climate change is one of its most significant aims.
“This is very much climate legislation,” said Brian Murray, interim director of the Nicholas Institute for Energy, Environment & Sustainability at Duke University, who added the bill offers “a significant bump” in the nation’s projected ability to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions.
2023
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Affirmative Answers › 2ac Non-Unique – Biden Hurting Oil & Gas
Eberhart, 23 --- CEO of Canary, LLC (Feb 24, 2023,09:41am ES, Dan, “Ukraine War Illustrates Importance Of American Energy Dominance,” https://www.forbes.com/sites/daneberhart/2023/02/24/ukraine-war-illustrates-importance-of-american-energy-dominance/?sh=2cfd961570a6, JMP))
It’s why the previous administration pursued an “energy dominance” agenda – to ensure Americans were insulated from shocks to the energy market and help address global supply crises when they arise.
The Biden administration continues to treat the domestic oil and gas industry as the villain in recent events, accusing it of price-gouging, war profiteering, and, ironically, underinvesting in exploration and development of new supply despite federal policies that thwart domestic production at every turn. President Biden remains committed to a “Keep It in The Ground” strategy despite his rhetoric against high energy prices.
2023
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Affirmative Answers › 2ac Natural Gas Production Decreasing
McCormick, 6-26-23 – US energy correspondent [Myles, 26 June 23, Financial Times, "US Shale Oil and Gas Producers Pull Back after Commodity Price Drop" www.ft.com/content/26bd3376-c4b4-4257-98e1-93b29706d2d8, Accessed on June 28 2023, NP]
The prolific US shale oil and gas industry is decelerating in the face of weakening commodity prices, suggesting production growth will stall at a time of booming demand.
Evidence of stagnating activity is mounting. A survey by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas posted a score of zero for business activity growth in the second quarter among some 150 oil and gas groups in its region — suggesting any expansion had hit a wall. It was the lowest score since 2020, when an oil price crash during the coronavirus pandemic forced operators to slash headcounts and idle drilling rigs.
On Friday, data showed that the number of drilling rigs deployed across the country had fallen for the eighth week in a row, according to Baker Hughes, an oilfield services company.
2023
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Aff › AT Impact – AT Turns Warming
Prerana Bhat, Swathi Nair, and Milounee Purohit. 9/28/22, Reuters, “Rising interest rates only a mild snag in climate battle,” https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/rising-interest-rates-only-mild-snag-climate-battle-2022-09-28/, mm
Rising interest rates present no significant barrier to the world's transition to net zero emissions by 2050 despite the high levels of investment in green energy needed, according to a strong majority of climate economists polled by Reuters. The July 1-Sept. 13 survey's finding goes against a widely cited concern that rising borrowing costs could discourage investment in capital-intensive clean energy projects, which for over a decade have enjoyed access to historically cheap debt. Multi-decade-high inflation this year has pushed nearly every central bank around the world to raise interest rates, abruptly ending a generation of easy money. Rates are set to keep rising well into next year. But top world experts from nearly every corner of the planet in the rapidly growing field of climate economics overwhelmingly do not see this as a major barrier to progress. Nearly three-quarters of climate economists polled - 50 of 68 - said rising borrowing costs would have a mild or very mild impact on reaching net zero carbon emissions by 2050. Seventeen said it would be severe and only one said it would have no impact. Scientists resoundingly agree the planet must reach that milestone to limit the average rise in global temperature, already more than 1 degree Celsius above pre-industrial times, to well below 2 degrees, and preferably closer to 1.5. That will prevent even more catastrophic damage from climate change. These same climate economists, in a Reuters poll taken ahead of the United Nations COP26 Summit late last year, agreed that spending 2%-3% of world output per year would be the price, far less costly than doing nothing. "Higher borrowing costs may well be temporary, and in most advanced economies, they are firmly negative in real terms," said Brian Davidson, head of climate economics at Fathom Consulting, referring to the fact inflation is still much higher than benchmark interest rates across most economies. "Green investment has not become any more expensive relative to investment in fossil fuels." While that is true, like all new technologies implemented at scale, a greener economy requires much higher initial investment. There have been pockets of good news on that front. The world's largest economy and second-largest polluter passed the biggest piece of climate legislation in U.S. history last month. According to the International Energy Agency, cumulative investment in green energy by the end of this year is expected to top $1.4 trillion since the 2015 Paris Accords. But that is nowhere close to the near-$44 trillion that economists estimated was required to reach net zero by mid-century. "The transition to date has benefited from historically low interest rates. Although real interest rates remain negative, the capital-intensive nature of the investing in net-zero and resilience means there are risks of added burdens," said Nick Robins, professor in practice for sustainable finance at the London School of Economics. "This is something central banks should be investigating as a matter of urgency." The problem is central banks' late scramble this year to fight off soaring inflation has meant the amount of time they have to spend on tackling the risks of climate change to the economy has diminished. While some, like the European Central Bank, Bank of England and People's Bank of China, have initiated climate stress tests and launched green bond programmes, not much else has been done to make their policies greener. While most climate experts surveyed agreed central banks could do a lot more, they were divided on what to prioritise. Over 40% of respondents, 29 of 67, said they should focus on developing policies on green finance while 12 said they should improve data transparency to avoid "greenwashing," where investments that aren't green are still labelled that way. Nine said they should prioritise model-based assessments of the economic cost of climate change and five said it would be best to deliver reliable climate-related indicators. Twelve respondents said central banks should prioritise other things, including some who said they should just focus on the economy. What nearly everyone agrees on is that not enough is being done. Nearly 90% of respondents, 62 of 69, said progress on goals agreed at COP26 has been insufficient, including 21 who said it had fallen well behind. Seven said it was broadly meeting expectations, while none said it was exceeding them. "The process of turning targets into clear policies is the most politically difficult part of the transition - and the lack of action post-COP26 has proved this yet again," said Jon Stenning, associate director and head of environment at Cambridge Econometrics.
2023
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Aff › AT Impact – AT Banking Crisis – AT Ukraine
Gideon Rose, 4/25/22, Foreign Affairs, “Why the War in Ukraine Won’t Go Nuclear,” https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2022-04-25/why-war-ukraine-wont-go-nuclear, mm
Early analyses of the war in Ukraine emphasized several unique, case-specific factors such as the region’s complex history, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s complex psychology, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s charismatic leadership. The conflict seemed shockingly new and scarily unpredictable, the end of one era and the start of another, with contours yet unknown. As the fighting grinds on, however, the war is looking more familiar and increasingly resembles many other conflicts over the last seven decades. This suggests that general, structural features of the situation are imposing themselves on the belligerents, guiding their choices into surprisingly well-worn grooves. Ukraine, in short, is following the pattern of limited war in the nuclear age, echoing a script written in Korea and copied many times since. This is not a new era, only a new phase in the old one. And even the new phase is playing by the same old rules—with significant implications for the remainder of the war and beyond. In the late 1940s, U.S. policymakers faced an unprecedented problem: what do you do with weapons that can destroy the world? Throughout history, states had settled their biggest differences through war. But over time, the wars had gotten more and more destructive, culminating in the total war just ended—which had itself culminated in the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, destroying entire cities in a single blast. Nobody knew what would come next. Breaking the cycle of war seemed impossible. Continuing it seemed unthinkable. Tensions ratcheted up further when the Soviet Union got the bomb in 1949. And then, in June 1950, North Korean forces invaded South Korea. Washington and its allies quickly jumped in on Seoul’s side, facing off against Moscow, which along with Beijing was backing Pyongyang. How would war play out in the nuclear age? Now the question would be answered. For three years, as brutal fighting raged up and down the Korean peninsula, the two sides gradually felt each other out and tacitly settled on rules of the road for the new epoch. Neither of the nuclear powers wanted another total war, so both put strict limits on the conflict’s means, ends, and scope. They chose not to use nuclear weapons. They chose not to attack each other’s territory or regime, keeping the fighting to the Koreas. And beyond that, the war was allowed to proceed conventionally, as viciously as the belligerents wanted. These rules weren’t read out of a book or arrived at through negotiations. They weren’t followed out of faith, or hope, or charity. They were rooted in practicality. Policymakers in Moscow and Washington had to make crucial decisions in real time about how to pursue their objectives during the war, and the logic inherent in the situation made some courses of action much more attractive than others. Nuclear weapons, for all their power—because of all their power—turned out to be surprisingly powerless. Using them would carry many costs and bring few benefits. It would create more problems than it solved. And so neither superpower did it. A decade later, the Cuban missile crisis reinforced the growing taboo against nuclear use and left the parties still more risk averse. Then Vietnam followed the same pattern as Korea. None of the nuclear powers, now including China, used nuclear weapons. None attacked another nuclear power’s territory or regime. And beyond that, anything went. The same rules held in the Gulf War, the Iraq War, and the Soviet and American wars in Afghanistan. They held for conflicts involving nuclear powers elsewhere (apart from some minor skirmishing). And they are holding now in Ukraine. Russia’s plan A was to conquer Ukraine quickly, install a friendly government, and present the world with a fait accompli. When that was blocked by determined military resistance, Moscow turned to plan B, pounding cities from a distance and trying to crush Ukrainian morale. When that didn’t work either, the Kremlin turned to plan C, abandoning the attempt to seize the whole country and refocusing on trying to capture and hold a swath of territory in the east and south. The coming battles in the Donbas will be crucial in shaping the outcome, but already much can be said about how this war will end. The struggle will either conclude with a negotiated settlement involving a territorial status quo ante, or it will subside into a frozen conflict along the armies’ stalemated line of contact in the east. That is, the war’s end will resemble those in the Korean and Gulf Wars or the situation in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. Either way, as in Korea, the shock of the initial aggression has galvanized a broader balancing coalition that will remain even when the fighting stops. Russia chose a hot war and will get a cold one in the bargain. Whatever some interpretations of Russian military doctrine might suggest, Moscow will not use nuclear weapons during the conflict. Since 1945, every leader of a nuclear power, from homespun politicians such as U.S. Presidents Harry Truman and Lyndon Johnson to mass-murdering sociopaths such as Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong, has rejected the use of nuclear weapons in battle for excellent reasons. Putin will be no exception, acting not from a soft heart but a hard head. He knows that extraordinary retaliation and universal opprobrium would follow, with no remotely comparable strategic upsides to justify them—not to mention the fact that the radioactive fallout from such use might easily blow back onto Russia itself.
2023
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Aff › AT Impact – AT Banking Crisis – AT Ukraine
Katherine Fung, 3/16/23, Newsweek, “Banking Crisis Gives Putin Something to Smile About,” https://www.newsweek.com/banking-crisis-gives-putin-smile-1788370, mm
European frustrations over Ukrainian spending amid other financial worries would not be a new challenge for the EU. In the fall, roughly 70,000 people protested elevated energy costs in Prague, Czech Republic, while other demonstrators in Italy, Germany and Spain all took to the streets over similar concerns. Despite those pressures, Kimmage and Rebucci said it's unlikely that Western powers would sway from their support for Ukraine, given that the last year has indicated their positions on the war are not driven by economic factors but rather political considerations. "I can't imagine that President Biden or any Western European leaders changing their calculus on the war based on a series of bank failures, which are of course significant, but still local to SVB and Switzerland at this point," Kimmage said.
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Aff › AT Internal Link – AT Fed Independence – Politically Biased
Emre Kuvvet, Fall 2022, The Independent Review, “Political Affiliations of Federal Reserve Economists,” https://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_27_2_01_kuvvet.pdf, mm
Overall, the Democrat to Republican ratio for the economists at the Federal Reserve System is 10.4 to 1. In other words, for every Republican economist at the Federal Reserve System, there are ten Democrats. Economists in the Federal Reserve System are considerably left-leaning. At the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, there are ninety-seven Democrat economists and only two Republican economists. Thus, the Democrat to Republican ratio for the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is 48.5 to 1. Economists at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System are overwhelmingly left-leaning. I also examine the political affiliations of the Federal Reserve banks. The Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco has twelve Democrat and one Republican economist. The Democrat to Republican ratio is 12 to 1. It is the most liberal Federal Reserve bank among all Federal Reserve districts. The role of leadership could explain why there is considerable variation in the partisan balance across the Federal Reserve banks. Leaders of some Federal Reserve banks such as the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco are more outspoken about politically charged issues such as climate change, gender, race, and inequality. A partisan leadership can encourage economists to conduct seminars and conferences and publish research on these politically charged topics. In fact, numerous types of conferences on these topics have taken place at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. If an economist does not share the outspoken political ideologies of the leadership of a Federal Reserve bank, he or she might refrain from working there. As a result, some Federal Reserve banks could become more partisan over time. The Dallas Bank has sixteen Democrat and two Republican economists, and its Democrat to Republican ratio for its economists is 8 to 1. It is the second most liberal Federal Reserve bank. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia has thirty-nine Democrat and five Republican economists. The Democrat to Republican ratio is 7.8 to 1. It is the third most liberal Federal Reserve bank. The fourth most liberal regional bank, the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, has a Democrat to Republican ratio of 5 to 1. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York has a Democrat to Republican ratio of 4.6 to 1. The Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland has twelve Democrat and four Republican economists. Its Democrat to Republican ratio is 3 to 1. Even though it still leans to the left, it is the most politically diverse district among all Federal Reserve banks. Finally, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta has a Democrat to Republican ratio of 4 to 0 – a small sample, but an infinite ratio. In total, there are 111 Democrat and eighteen Republican economists at the regional Federal Reserve banks. Thus, the Democrat to Republican ratio for Federal Reserve banks is 6.17 to 1. Economists at regional Federal Reserve banks are also heavily left-leaning. Economists in leadership positions play prominent roles in the Federal Reserve System and oversee the work of other economists. They provide the research direction and establish research priorities for the economists in the Federal Reserve System. Table 3 shows the political affiliations of Fed economists in leadership and nonleadership positions. There are eighty-nine Democrat and four Republican economists in leadership positions in the Federal Reserve System. Thus, the Democrat to Republican ratio for the economists in leadership positions in the Federal Reserve System is 22.25 to 1. There are also 119 Democrat and sixteen Republican economists in nonleadership positions in the Federal Reserve System. The Democrat to Republican ratio for the economists in nonleadership position in the Federal Reserve System is 7.44 to 1. I find that economists in leadership positions in the Federal Reserve System are noticeably more left-leaning than economists in nonleadership positions. There are forty-four Democrat and only three Republican economists in leadership positions at all regional Federal Reserve banks. Thus, the Democrat to Republican ratio for the economists in leadership positions at all regional banks is 14.67 to 1. There are sixty-seven Democrat and fifteen Republican economists in nonleadership positions at all regional Federal Reserve banks. The Democrat to Republican ratio for the economists in nonleadership positions at all regional banks is 4.47 to 1. At the regional Federal Reserve banks, economists in leadership positions are considerably more left-leaning than those in nonleadership positions. Apart from Atlanta, where the ratios are the same, the Democrat to Republican ratio is much higher for the economists in leadership positions than in nonleadership positions for every Federal Reserve bank. The Federal Reserve Banks of Dallas, Boston, Atlanta, and Cleveland do not have any Republican economists in leadership positions. At the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, there is only one Republican economist in a leadership position, whereas there are forty-five Democrat economists in leadership positions. Thus, the Democrat to Republican ratio for the economists in leadership positions at the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is 45 to 1. Table 4 presents the political affiliations of Fed economists by age. Column (1) shows the age range of the economists for the Federal Reserve System. The Democrat to Republican ratio for the economists who are forty years old or younger is 20.33 to 1. Thus, younger economists are overwhelmingly left-leaning. The Democrat to Republican ratio for the economists over forty years but younger than fifty-one is 15 to 1. Conversely, the Democrat to Republican ratio for the economists over fifty years but younger than sixty-one is 6.5 to 1. And the Democrat to Republican ratio for economists over sixty years is 7 to 1. Although still very left-leaning, senior economists are not as uniformly left-leaning as their younger counterparts. These results suggest that younger economists who will replace senior ones in the Federal Reserve System are considerably more left-leaning. Table 5 shows the political affiliations of the Federal Reserve System by the sex of the economists. The Democrat to Republican ratio for male economists at the Federal Reserve System is 8.5 to 1, while the Democrat to Republican ratio for female economists is 27.5 to 1. Thus, the results suggest that female economists are substantially more left-leaning than male economists in the Federal Reserve System. Research and speeches by the Fed economists are increasingly focusing on climate change, gender, race, and inequality. Regional Federal Reserve banks and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve have been conducting numerous seminars and conferences and publishing research papers on politically charged topics. The previous literature provides indirect evidence of the politization of the Fed. In this paper, I extend the literature by showing the political affiliations of the Fed economists. My results indicate that political and value judgments in publications and analysis by the Fed’s economists could be linked to their ideological backgrounds. This is concerning, as the political homogeneity of Fed economists can undermine the legitimacy of their policy recommendations and analysis in the eyes of the public. That is, the public may see the Fed as a political institution, undermining the nonpartisan and independent nature of the Fed. In addition, scholarly works often reflect the political biases of the scholars in specific fields and highlight the ideological uniformity of scholars in those fields.8 Thus, economists at the Fed who do not share the majority political view might refrain from expressing dissenting views in their research and policy recommendations, resulting in a lack of competition in new ideas on monetary and financial policies at the Fed.
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Aff › AT Internal Link – AT Fed Independence
Hogan ‘22 [Thomas; May 5; Senior Research Faculty at AIER, former Chief Economist for US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs; American Institute for Economic Research, “The Renewed Politicization of the Federal Reserve,” ], wm
Economic research shows that monetary policy works best when conducted by an independent central bank. After Fed chairs in the 1960s and ‘70s caved to pressure from American Presidents, those who followed sought, at least to some degree, to reestablish the Fed’s independence. Until now, that is. Since 2019, the Fed has politicized its activities in virtually every way: through its monetary policy goals, the use of its enhanced balance sheet, its regulatory actions, and its emergency lending activities. Each of these changes has pushed the Fed further from being an effective and independent central bank toward becoming a purely political institution, which prevents it from choosing the best policies for Americans and the US economy. Monetary Policy: “Inclusive” Employment and (Flexible) Average Inflation Targeting. Fed officials, including current Chair Jerome Powell, have acknowledged that monetary policy is a broad tool that cannot be used to address the problems of racial and income inequality. Despite this admission, however, the Fed has injected the issue of inequality into its monetary policy goals. In August of 2020, the Fed rewrote its statement of goals and strategy to emphasize employment ahead of inflation. The new language described the maximum employment goal as “a broad-based and inclusive goal that is not directly measurable.” Chair Powell cited racial differences in unemployment rates as a motivation for the change. This shifted the Fed’s goal from focusing on the best outcome for most Americans to a purely discretionary target, which the Fed admits is impossible to measure. At the same time, the new objectives stated that the Fed would target a rate of two percent inflation averaged over time, giving Fed officials greater ability to deviate from the prescribed rate of two percent annual inflation. Moreover, Fed officials have since revealed that they only intend to seek an average two percent when it has previously been below target. When inflation is above target, in contrast, the Fed will allow it to remain so and will not bring it down enough to return to the previous price-level trend. Taken together, these two changes relax the traditional constraints on the Fed’s ability to engage in overly-expansionary monetary policy. When warned that policy is too loose, they can point to their expanded employment goal to justify the policy. Then, when inflation rises above two percent, they can claim that it is temporary and will not affect the average rate of inflation in the future. The irony is that such an approach would likely produce exactly the opposite of what is intended. To the extent that emphasizing maximum employment (in the broader sense) and ignoring temporary periods of above-average inflation results in overly-expansionary monetary policy, it risks recessionary corrections and even lower employment than would have occurred had the Fed stuck with its previous policy. In early 2021, for example, Chairman Powell testified that the Fed planned to keep its interest rate targets near zero until the economy reached maximum employment, a policy it maintained throughout 2021 despite record inflation. Powell now says the US labor market is “unsustainably hot,” but the Fed has taken only minimal action to calm the labor market or bring down inflation. Many commentators are already expressing concerns about a looming recession. Balance Sheet Activities: Fiscal Accommodation. Through the use of large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs), also known as quantitative easing (QE), the Fed has massively expanded its balance sheet from less than $1 trillion in 2008 to almost $9 trillion today. While the federal government increased fiscal spending by $5 trillion in response to the Coronavirus pandemic, the Fed bought up more than $3.4 trillion in Treasury securities since 2019, effectively monetizing a large portion of the fiscal deficit. While some economists applauded the Fed’s fiscal accommodation, debt monetization is not a prudent action of a responsible central bank. Those that engage in such activities encourage profligate spending by their fiscal authorities, which often end up in fiscal default. Such massive purchases of Treasury securities were enabled by the Fed’s enlarged balance sheet and would not have been possible in the pre-2008 system. Emergency lending: Everyone Gets a bailout! One traditional function of central banks is that they act as emergency lenders in times of financial crises. Although the Fed’s 2008 emergency lending deviated from the rules of the classical lender of last resort, former Fed Chairs Bernanke and Yellen respected the limits of the Fed’s authority as understood by economists and stated in the Federal Reserve Act. Not so for Jerome Powell. Despite the fact that 2019 was not a case of “unusual and exigent” circumstances in terms of bank failures or shortages of financial liquidity, the Fed initiated a variety of emergency lending facilities beyond those of the 2008 crisis. The Fed lent to non-financial companies and state and local governments, which former Fed chairs said it should never do. These actions disturb the efficient allocation of capital in the financial system and further heighten the Fed’s political profile. Regulation: Climate and Industrial Policies. Bank regulators have increasingly used their regulatory powers to discourage banks from supporting politically unpopular industries, such as oil and gas, firearms, and medical marijuana. These punitive measures often take the form of discretionary enforcement actions, which lack the transparency and immutability of rules passed through the regulatory process. Fed regulators have now turned their sights to climate change and the supposed threat it poses to US banks. The Fed subjects banks to “climate stress tests” and has joined international central banks’ Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), whose stated goal is to “support the transition toward a sustainable economy.” While these changes are ostensibly made in the name of limiting banks’ risk exposure, their result in practice will be to harm the US economy by preventing banks from lending for specific purposes such as the production of energy and fossil fuels. The Fed’s Politics Threatens Its Independence. Fed officials have gone beyond policy discretion into overt political activism. President of the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Bank Neel Kashkari has been reprimanded by Senator Pat Toomey for his recent political actions. In 2020, former New York Fed President Bill Dudley argued that “Fed officials should consider how their decisions will affect the political outcome” by potentially withholding monetary accommodation in order to prevent the re-election of President Donald Trump. Such actions reveal these officials to be political opportunists rather than independent central bankers. Independent central banks tend to deliver better monetary policy. But independence can only be maintained by focusing on the narrow goals assigned by Congress. By straying from its mandate, Fed officials have chosen to base their decisions on politics rather than on sound economics.