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2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › UQ › AT Alt Causes – Leftism

Wokeness is not hurting military recruitment – it helps.

LOLITA C. BALDOR February 12, 2023 Lolita C., 2-12-2023, "Army sees safety, not 'wokeness,' as top recruiting obstacle," AP NEWS, https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-politics-military-and-defense-race-ethnicity-6548adcb0fee590f3427771d1e1eeea7 gac

Army leaders said very few say they are deterred from enlisting due to “wokeness.” In fact, concerns about discrimination against women and minorities is seen as a bigger issue, along with a more general distrust of the military. “Wokeness” is a slang term that originally described attentiveness to issues of racial and social justice. Some people and groups, especially conservatives, now use it in a derogatory sense implying what they see as overreactions. ADVERTISEMENT Republicans in Congress, including Rep. Jim Banks, chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on military personnel, have pledged to target “wokeness” this year. Banks, R-Ind., has said “exposing and dismantling the Biden administration’s woke agenda that is driving down military recruitment and retention” will be a top priority for him this year. His spokesman, Buckley Carlson, said combating “wokeness” at the Defense Department will be a key issue for the congressman. Banks and others have complained about the Pentagon’s efforts to target extremism in the military, provide courses in critical race theory and other efforts to expand diversity. They say focusing on partisan issues pushed by the left takes away from the Pentagon’s core missions, weakens the military and turns off recruits. But the Army says that on average, only 5% of the respondents in the surveys listed “wokeness” as an issue, compared with 13% who say they believe that women and minorities will face discrimination and not get the same opportunities.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › UQ › AT Alt Causes – Interest & Eligibility

Economic incentives are key to enlistment—interest and eligibility have been low for decades without impact

Jackson 23

Jon, Associate Editor. “Will U.S. Military Recruitment Struggles Cripple Response to Wars?” Newsweek. 3/10/23. LJS

The United States military is facing hardship in recruiting new members, which has elicited worry about the nation's security should the U.S. find itself at war. Last month, U.S. Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said during a discussion at George Washington University that the Army fell short of its recruiting target last year by about 15,000. Due to the Army projecting that it would again not meet its recruitment goals for 2023, Wormuth and Chief of Staff General James McConville recently said $1.2 billion would be shifted to initiatives related to enlistments. The other U.S. military branches have also reported difficulty in reaching their recruitment targets. The topic was taken up during a September congressional hearing, during which Senator Kirsten Gillibrand, a New York Democrat, warned that by the end of 2022, "the active U.S. military will be at its smallest size since the creation of the all-volunteer force." U.S. military recruitment down Michael Bloomberg, former New York City mayor and presidential candidate, wrote about the topic on his media company's website in an August op-ed that ran under the headline "Military Recruitment Woes Endanger National Security." In the article, he offered suggestions on how to improve enlistments while arguing that "[c]ombating the threats to global order requires an American military that's second to none." Joining Bloomberg in this sentiment are John Ferrari and John Kem, both retired Army major generals. In a November story for Army Times, they characterized the Army's enlistment issues as "a major threat to our national security." "Calling the Army recruiting shortfall a crisis is like saying that the Titanic had a 'small' problem in its crossing of the Atlantic," Ferrari and Kem wrote. Rose Riley, spokesperson for the U.S. Air Force, told Newsweek that the branch had made its recruitment goals for the 2022 fiscal year by "a narrow margin" but weekly accessions continue to fall short in 2023. "Record-low unemployment rates and steadily declining familiarity with the U.S. military today leaves us uncertain whether we can achieve our goals this year," Riley said in an emailed statement. "We are starting to see some positive results of our training programs, policy changes and our enhanced marketing efforts, but military recruiting will remain a long-term challenge." Sergeant First Class Anthony Hewitt, an Army spokesperson, also told Newsweek of some of the reason why the Army has struggled to meet recruitment goals. "The Army is facing unprecedented recruiting conditions due to a combination of factors including the current robust labor market, intense competition for talent with the private sector, and an ongoing decline in the segment of America's youth that are qualified and interested in serving in the military," Hewitt said in an emailed response. Marine Corps Recruiting Command spokesperson Jim Edwards told Newsweek that while the Marines continue "to experience one of the most challenging recruiting environments since the establishment of the all-volunteer force," the Marine Corps nonetheless "remains on-track to accomplish the Fiscal Year 2023 accession mission." The U.S. Navy was also contacted by Newsweek for this story but did not respond as of press time. Dr. Beth Asch, senior economist at RAND who has studied military recruitment for nearly 40 years, told Newsweek that military branches who said they've made their targets might have recently lowered their recruitment goals. "There is a little bit of adjustments to make things look more positive than maybe they actually were," she said. Asch also spoke about some of the things that could be—and some things that likely aren't—affecting recruitment. "There are some things that are being blamed in the media for these problems, which are probably red herrings," Asch said. "You might have heard military leaders, pundits and observers say, 'Well, it's because less than a quarter of American youth are eligible for military service and enlistment standards.'" She said the fraction who qualify for military service has been low for years, so "while it's certainly an area of concern," that explanation can't explain why the Army missed its recruiting mission "by historic proportions." Asch said another factor that's being wrongly blamed is "positive propensity." The Department of Defense measures the propensity for how likely young people are to join the military, and some pundits have mentioned that the positive percentage—those who say they will enlist—is only 10 percent. However, she said propensity has been low for decades and that when survey data is merged with enlistment records, the results show that "most of the recruits who enlist actually come from the negatively propensed group."

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › UQ › AT Alt Causes – Abortion

Military crafted new policies to limit the damage from abortion bans.

Michael Bennet, 3-28-2023, "Opinion: The cruel twist that harms women in the military," CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2023/03/28/opinions/military-service-women-abortion-access-bennet/index.html Editor’s Note: Michael Bennet, a Democrat, is the senior US senator from Colorado. The views expressed in this commentary are his own. View more opinion on CNN. Gac

To help address these challenges, the Pentagon recently announced three policies. The first two authorize travel allowances and absences without leave for service women to access reproductive care if it’s unavailable in their duty station. This matters because service members may not be able to afford to travel, which is why the Pentagon covers travel for other procedures that aren’t locally available. The third policy gives service members more time before they must tell their commanding officer they’re pregnant, providing women in uniform more space and privacy to decide if they want to carry a pregnancy to term – a decision that’s become a lot more complicated after Dobbs. I applaud the Biden administration for these steps to protect access to care for the service women who protect us, but the administration should go further. In the wake of Dobbs, the Pentagon still has no policy to account for the harm of moving a base from a state that protects access to reproductive care to a state that does not.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › UQ › AT Alt Causes – Brink

Alt causes are brink arguments for us—numbers are hanging on by a thread

Wolfgang 6/21

Ben, staff writer. “As U.S. military recruiting crisis worsens, armed forces find competition around every corner.” The Washington Times. 6/21/2023. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/jun/21/recruiting-crisis-worsens-military-finds-competiti/ LJS

The U.S. military is in a bitter fight to attract and retain recruits, and its most potent enemies are around every corner. “It’s Wendy’s. It’s Carl’s Jr. It’s every single job that a young person can go up against because now they are offering the same incentives we are offering. That’s our competition right now,” said Army Command Sgt. Maj. Marco Irenze, the head of the Nevada Army National Guard recruiting and retention battalion. Sgt. Maj. Irenze and other National Guard officials briefed reporters Wednesday on the recruiting crisis confronting America’s armed forces. Guard and active-duty service leaders say they face one the worst recruiting environments in the 50-year history of the country’s experiment with an all-volunteer force. With the exception of the Marine Corps, each service expects to fall short of its recruiting goals in fiscal 2023. The Army expects to be about 10,000 soldiers short of its recruiting goal, service officials told Congress in April. The Navy is on track to be about 6,000 short. The Air Force will miss its mark by about 10,000, officials said. The Army, Navy and Air Force offer enlistment bonuses to entice recruits. Incentives that once made military service attractive are now matched by private-sector employers equally desperate to fill job vacancies. “We used to be the sole entity … that said, ‘Hey, we’ll pay for your college,’” Command Sgt. Maj. John Foley of the U.S. Army Recruiting Command recently told the Military Times. “Now lots of organizations, lots of companies out there are doing the same.” The crisis has extended to National Guard units, where officials describe a brutal competition against private-sector companies pulling out all the stops to attract workers as the economy struggles to rebound from the COVID-19 pandemic. “This is the most challenging recruiting environment the Department of Defense has probably ever faced, and that reaches across all components,” Air Force Col. Anthony Pasquale, chief of the Air National Guard‘s recruiting and retention division, said during Wednesday’s briefing. The Air National Guard, Col. Pasquale said, is at about 96.7% of its end strength goal, though he stressed that the summer months — traditionally the most fertile season for recruiting — will get the Guard closer to its targets. He said his projections show the Air National Guard landing 3,000 to 4,000 service members short of its goal.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › 1NC › FJG 1NC

Readiness key to block revisionist powers, prevent terrorism, and deter great power war

Kagan 2017 - Senior Fellow @ Brookings Robert, "Backing Into World War III," Feb 6, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/02/06/backing-into-world-war-iii-russia-china-trump-obama/

Think of two significant trend lines in the world today. One is the increasing ambition and activism of the two great revisionist powers, Russia and China. The other is the declining confidence, capacity, and will of the democratic world, and especially of the United States, to maintain the dominant position it has held in the international system since 1945. As those two lines move closer, as the declining will and capacity of the United States and its allies to maintain the present world order meet the increasing desire and capacity of the revisionist powers to change it, we will reach the moment at which the existing order collapses and the world descends into a phase of brutal anarchy, as it has three times in the past two centuries. The cost of that descent, in lives and treasure, in lost freedoms and lost hope, will be staggering. Americans tend to take the fundamental stability of the international order for granted, even while complaining about the burden the United States carries in preserving that stability. History shows that world orders do collapse, however, and when they do it is often unexpected, rapid, and violent. The late 18th century was the high point of the Enlightenment in Europe, before the continent fell suddenly into the abyss of the Napoleonic Wars. In the first decade of the 20th century, the world’s smartest minds predicted an end to great-power conflict as revolutions in communication and transportation knit economies and people closer together. The most devastating war in history came four years later. The apparent calm of the postwar 1920s became the crisis-ridden 1930s and then another world war. Where exactly we are in this classic scenario today, how close the trend lines are to that intersection point is, as always, impossible to know. Are we three years away from a global crisis, or 15? That we are somewhere on that path, however, is unmistakable. And while it is too soon to know what effect Donald Trump’s presidency will have on these trends, early signs suggest that the new administration is more likely to hasten us toward crisis than slow or reverse these trends. The further accommodation of Russia can only embolden Vladimir Putin, and the tough talk with China will likely lead Beijing to test the new administration’s resolve militarily. Whether the president is ready for such a confrontation is entirely unclear. For the moment, he seems not to have thought much about the future ramifications of his rhetoric and his actions. China and Russia are classic revisionist powers. Although both have never enjoyed greater security from foreign powers than they do today — Russia from its traditional enemies to the west, China from its traditional enemy in the east — they are dissatisfied with the current global configuration of power. Both seek to restore the hegemonic dominance they once enjoyed in their respective regions. For China, that means dominance of East Asia, with countries like Japan, South Korea, and the nations of Southeast Asia both acquiescing to Beijing’s will and acting in conformity with China’s strategic, economic, and political preferences. That includes American influence withdrawn to the eastern Pacific, behind the Hawaiian Islands. For Russia, it means hegemonic influence in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which Moscow has traditionally regarded as either part of its empire or part of its sphere of influence. Both Beijing and Moscow seek to redress what they regard as an unfair distribution of power, influence, and honor in the U.S.-led postwar global order. As autocracies, both feel threatened by the dominant democratic powers in the international system and by the democracies on their borders. Both regard the United States as the principal obstacle to their ambitions, and therefore both seek to weaken the American-led international security order that stands in the way of their achieving what they regard as their rightful destinies. It was good while it lasted Until fairly recently, Russia and China have faced considerable, almost insuperable, obstacles in achieving their objectives. The chief obstacle has been the power and coherence of the international order itself and its principal promoter and defender. The American-led system of political and military alliances, especially in the two critical regions of Europe and East Asia, has presented China and Russia with what Dean Acheson once referred to as “situations of strength” that have required them to pursue their ambitions cautiously and, since the end of the Cold War, to defer serious efforts to disrupt the international system. The system has checked their ambitions in both positive and negative ways. During the era of American primacy, China and Russia have participated in and for the most part been beneficiaries of the open international economic system the United States created and helps sustain; so long as that system functions, they have had more to gain by playing in it than by challenging and overturning it. The political and strategic aspects of the order, however, have worked to their detriment. The growth and vibrancy of democratic government in the two decades following the collapse of Soviet communism posed a continual threat to the ability of rulers in Beijing and Moscow to maintain control, and since the end of the Cold War they have regarded every advance of democratic institutions — especially the geographical advance of liberal democracies close to their borders — as an existential threat. That’s for good reason: Autocratic powers since the days of Klemens von Metternich have always feared the contagion of liberalism. The mere existence of democracies on their borders, the global free flow of information they cannot control, the dangerous connection between free market capitalism and political freedom — all pose a threat to rulers who depend on keeping restive forces in their own countries in check. The continual challenge to the legitimacy of their rule posed by the U.S.-supported democratic order has therefore naturally made them hostile both to that order and to the United States. But, until recently, a preponderance of domestic and international forces has dissuaded them from confronting the order directly. Chinese rulers have had to worry about what an unsuccessful confrontation with the United States might do to their legitimacy at home. Even Putin has pushed only against open doors, as in Syria, where the United States responded passively to his probes. He has been more cautious when confronted by even marginal U.S. and European opposition, as in Ukraine. The greatest check on Chinese and Russian ambitions has been the military and economic power of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. China, although increasingly powerful, has had to contemplate facing the combined military and economic strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers linked by alliance or common strategic interest — including Japan, India, and South Korea, as well as smaller but still potent nations like Vietnam and Australia. Russia has had to face the United States and its NATO allies. When united, these U.S.-led alliances present a daunting challenge to a revisionist power that can call on few allies of its own for assistance. Even were the Chinese to score an early victory in a conflict, such as the military subjection of Taiwan or a naval battle in the South or East China Sea, they would have to contend over time with the combined industrial productive capacities of some of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations and the likely cutoff of access to foreign markets on which their own economy depends. A weaker Russia, with its depleted population and oil- and gas-dependent economy, would face an even greater challenge. For decades, the strong global position enjoyed by the United States and its allies has discouraged any serious challenge. So long as the United States was perceived as a dependable ally, Chinese and Russian leaders feared that aggressive moves would backfire and possibly bring their regimes down. This is what the political scientist William Wohlforth once described as the inherent stability of the unipolar order: As dissatisfied regional powers sought to challenge the status quo, their alarmed neighbors turned to the distant American superpower to contain their ambitions. And it worked. The United States stepped up, and Russia and China largely backed down — or were preempted before acting at all. Faced with these obstacles, the best option for the two revisionist great powers has always been to hope for or, if possible, engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within, either by separating the United States from its allies or by raising doubts about the U.S. commitment and thereby encouraging would-be allies and partners to forgo the strategic protection of the liberal world order and seek accommodation with its challengers. The present system has therefore depended not only on American power but on coherence and unity at the heart of the democratic world. The United States has had to play its part as the principal guarantor of the order, especially in the military and strategic realm, but the order’s ideological and economic core — the democracies of Europe and East Asia and the Pacific — has also had to remain relatively healthy and confident. In recent years, both pillars have been shaken. The democratic order has weakened and fractured at its core. Difficult economic conditions, the recrudescence of nationalism and tribalism, weak and uncertain political leadership and unresponsive mainstream political parties, and a new era of communications that seems to strengthen rather than weaken tribalism have together produced a crisis of confidence not only in the democracies but in what might be called the liberal enlightenment project. That project elevated universal principles of individual rights and common humanity over ethnic, racial, religious, national, or tribal differences. It looked to a growing economic interdependence to create common interests across boundaries and to the establishment of international institutions to smooth differences and facilitate cooperation among nations. Instead, the past decade has seen the rise of tribalism and nationalism, an increasing focus on the Other in all societies, and a loss of confidence in government, in the capitalist system, and in democracy. We are witnessing the opposite of Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history.” History is returning with a vengeance and with it all the darker aspects of the human soul, including, for many, the perennial human yearning for a strong leader to provide firm guidance in a time of confusion and incoherence. The Dark Ages 2.0 This crisis of the enlightenment project may have been inevitable, a recurring phenomenon produced by inherent flaws in both capitalism and democracy. In the 1930s, economic crisis and rising nationalism led many to doubt whether either democracy or capitalism was preferable to alternatives such as fascism and communism. And it is no coincidence that the crisis of confidence in liberalism accompanied a simultaneous breakdown of the strategic order. Then, the question was whether the United States as the outside power would step in and save or remake an order that Britain and France were no longer able or willing to sustain. Now, the question is whether the United States is willing to continue upholding the order that it created and which depends entirely on American power or whether Americans are prepared to take the risk — if they even understand the risk — of letting the order collapse into chaos and conflict. That willingness has been in doubt for some time, well before the election of Trump and even before the election of Barack Obama. Increasingly in the quarter century after the end of the Cold War, Americans have been wondering why they bear such an unusual and outsized responsibility for preserving global order when their own interests are not always clearly served — and when the United States seems to be making all the sacrifices while others benefit. Few remember the reasons why the United States took on this abnormal role after the calamitous two world wars of the 20th century. The millennial generation born after the end of the Cold War can hardly be expected to understand the lasting significance of the political, economic, and security structures established after World War II. Nor are they likely to learn much about it in high school and college textbooks obsessed with noting the evils and follies of American “imperialism.” Both the crises of the first half of the 20th century and its solution in 1945 have been forgotten. As a consequence, the American public’s patience with the difficulties and costs inherent in playing that global role have worn thin. Whereas previous unsuccessful and costly wars, in Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and previous economic downturns, such as with the energy crisis and crippling “stagflation” of the mid- to late 1970s, did not have the effect of turning Americans against global involvement, the unsuccessful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the financial crisis of 2008 have. Obama pursued an ambivalent approach to global involvement, but his core strategy was retrenchment. In his actions and his statements, he critiqued and repudiated previous American strategy and reinforced a national mood favoring a much less active role in the world and much narrower definition of American interests. The Obama administration responded to the George W. Bush administration’s failures in Iraq and Afghanistan not by restoring American power and influence but by further reducing them. Although the administration promised to “rebalance” American foreign policy to Asia and the Pacific, in practice that meant reducing global commitments and accommodating revisionist powers at the expense of allies’ security. The administration’s early attempt to “reset” relations with Russia struck the first blow to America’s reputation as a reliable ally. Coming just after the Russian invasion of Georgia, it appeared to reward Moscow’s aggression. The reset also came at the expense of U.S. allies in Central Europe, as programs of military cooperation with Poland and the Czech Republic were jettisoned to appease the Kremlin. This attempt at accommodation, moreover, came just as Russian policy toward the West — not to mention Putin’s repressive policies toward his own people — was hardening. Far from eliciting better behavior by Russia, the reset emboldened Putin to push harder. Then, in 2014, the West’s inadequate response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea, though better than the Bush administration’s anemic response to the invasion of Georgia (Europe and the United States at least imposed sanctions after the invasion of Ukraine), still indicated reluctance on the part of the U.S. administration to force Russia back in its declared sphere of interest. Obama, in fact, publicly acknowledged Russia’s privileged position in Ukraine even as the United States and Europe sought to protect that country’s sovereignty. In Syria, the administration practically invited Russian intervention through Washington’s passivity, and certainly did nothing to discourage it, thus reinforcing the growing impression of an America in retreat across the Middle East (an impression initially created by the unnecessary and unwise withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Iraq). Subsequent Russian actions that increased the refugee flow from Syria into Europe also brought no American response, despite the evident damage of those refugee flows to European democratic institutions. The signal sent by the Obama administration was that none of this was really America’s problem. In East Asia, the Obama administration undermined its otherwise commendable efforts to assert America’s continuing interest and influence. The so-called “pivot” proved to be mostly rhetoric. Inadequate overall defense spending precluded the necessary increases in America’s regional military presence in a meaningful way, and the administration allowed a critical economic component, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, to die in Congress, chiefly a victim of its own party’s opposition. The pivot also suffered from the general perception of American retreat and retrenchment, encouraged both by presidential rhetoric and by administration policies, especially in the Middle East. The premature, unnecessary, and strategically costly withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, followed by the accommodating agreement with Iran on its nuclear program, and then by the failure to hold the line on threats to use force against Syria’s president, was noticed around the world. Despite the Obama administration’s insistence that American strategy should be geared toward Asia, U.S. allies have been left wondering how reliable the U.S. commitment might be when facing the challenge posed by China. The Obama administration erred in imagining that it could retrench globally while reassuring allies in Asia that the United States remained a reliable partner. Nature abhors a vacuum The effect on the two great revisionist powers, meanwhile, has been to encourage greater efforts at revision. In recent years, both powers have been more active in challenging the order, and one reason has been the growing perception that the United States is losing both the will and the capacity to sustain it. The psychological and political effect of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in the United States, which has been to weaken support for American global engagement across the board, has provided an opening. It is a myth, prevalent among liberal democracies, that revisionist powers can be pacified by acquiescence to their demands. American retrenchment, by this logic, ought to reduce tensions and competition. Unfortunately, the opposite is more often the case. The more secure revisionist powers feel, the more ambitious they are in seeking to change the system to their advantage because the resistance to change appears to be lessening. Just look at both China and Russia: Never in the past two centuries have they enjoyed greater security from external attack than they do today. Yet both remain dissatisfied and have become increasingly aggressive in pressing what they perceive to be their growing advantage in a system where the United States no longer puts up as much resistance as it used to. The two great powers have differed, so far, chiefly in their methods. China has until now been the more careful, cautious, and patient of the two, seeking influence primarily through its great economic clout and using its growing military power chiefly as a source of deterrence and regional intimidation. It has not resorted to the outright use of force yet, although its actions in the South China Sea are military in nature, with strategic objectives. And while Beijing has been wary of using military force until now, it would be a mistake to assume it will continue show such restraint in the future — possibly the near future. Revisionist great powers with growing military capabilities invariably make use of those capabilities when they believe the possible gains outweigh the risks and costs. If the Chinese perceive America’s commitment to its allies and its position in the region to be weakening, or its capacity to make good on those commitments to be declining, then they will be more inclined to attempt to use the power they are acquiring in order to achieve their objectives. As the trend lines draw closer, this is where the first crisis is likely to take place. Russia has been far more aggressive. It has invaded two neighboring states — Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 — and in both cases hived off significant portions of those two nations’ sovereign territory. Given the intensity with which the United States and its allies would have responded to such actions during the four decades of the Cold War, their relative lack of a response must have sent quite a signal to the Kremlin — and to others around the world. Moscow then followed by sending substantial forces into Syria. It has used its dominance of European energy markets as a weapon. It has used cyberwarfare against neighboring states. It has engaged in extensive information warfare on a global scale. More recently, the Russian government has deployed a weapon that the Chinese either lack or have so far chosen not to deploy — the ability to interfere directly in Western electoral processes, both to influence their outcomes and more generally to discredit the democratic system. Russia funds right-wing populist parties across Europe, including in France; uses its media outlets to support favored candidates and attack others; has disseminated “fake news” to influence voters, most recently in Italy’s referendum; and has hacked private communications in order to embarrass those it wishes to defeat. This past year, Russia for the first time employed this powerful weapon against the United States, heavily interfering in the American electoral process. Although Russia, by any measure, is the weaker of the two great powers, it has so far had more success than China in accomplishing its objective of dividing and disrupting the West. Its interference in Western democratic political systems, its information warfare, and its role in creating increased refugee flows from Syria into Europe have all contributed to the sapping of Europeans’ confidence in their political systems and established political parties. Its military intervention in Syria, contrasted with American passivity, has exacerbated existing doubts about American staying power in the region. Beijing, until recently, has succeeded mostly in driving American allies closer to the United States out of concern for growing Chinese power — but that could change quickly, especially if the United States continues on its present trajectory. There are signs that regional powers are already recalculating: East Asian countries are contemplating regional trade agreements that need not include the United States or, in the case of the Philippines, are actively courting China, while a number of nations in Eastern and Central Europe are moving closer to Russia, both strategically and ideologically. We could soon face a situation where both great revisionist powers are acting aggressively, including by military means, posing extreme challenges to American and global security in two regions at once. The dispensable nation All this comes as Americans continue to signal their reluctance to uphold the world order they created after World War II. Donald Trump was not the only major political figure in this past election season to call for a much narrower definition of American interests and a lessening of the burdens of American global leadership. President Obama and Bernie Sanders both expressed a version of “America First.” The candidate who spoke often of America’s “indispensable” global role lost, and even Hillary Clinton felt compelled to jettison her earlier support for the Trans-Pacific Partnership. At the very least, there should be doubts about the American public’s willingness to continue supporting the international alliance structure, denying the revisionist powers their desired spheres of influence and regional hegemony, and upholding democratic and free market norms in the international system. Coming as it does at a time of growing great-power competition, this narrowing definition of American interests will likely hasten a return to the instability and clashes of previous eras. The weakness at the core of the democratic world and the shedding by the United States of global responsibilities have already encouraged a more aggressive revisionism by the dissatisfied powers. That, in turn, has further sapped the democratic world’s confidence and willingness to resist. History suggests that this is a downward spiral from which it will be difficult to recover, absent a rather dramatic shift of course by the United States. That shift may come too late. It was in the 1920s, not the 1930s, that the democratic powers made the most important and ultimately fatal decisions. Americans’ disillusionment after World War I led them to reject playing a strategic role in preserving the peace in Europe and Asia, even though America was the only nation powerful enough to play that role. The withdrawal of the United States helped undermine the will of Britain and France and encouraged Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia to take increasingly aggressive actions to achieve regional dominance. Most Americans were convinced that nothing that happened in Europe or Asia could affect their security. It took World War II to convince them that was a mistake. The “return to normalcy” of the 1920 election seemed safe and innocent at the time, but the essentially selfish policies pursued by the world’s strongest power in the following decade helped set the stage for the calamities of the 1930s. By the time the crises began to erupt, it was already too late to avoid paying the high price of global conflict. In such times, it has always been tempting to believe that geopolitical competition can be solved through efforts at cooperation and accommodation. The idea, recently proposed by Niall Ferguson, that the world can be ruled jointly by the United States, Russia, and China is not a new one. Such condominiums have been proposed and attempted in every era when the dominant power or powers in the international system sought to fend off challenges from the dissatisfied revisionist powers. It has rarely worked. Revisionist great powers are not easy to satisfy short of complete capitulation. Their sphere of influence is never quite large enough to satisfy their pride or their expanding need for security. In fact, their very expansion creates insecurity, by frightening neighbors and leading them to band together against the rising power. The satiated power that Otto von Bismarck spoke of is rare. The German leaders who succeeded him were not satisfied even with being the strongest power in Europe. In their efforts to grow still stronger, they produced coalitions against them, making their fear of “encirclement” a self-fulfilling prophecy. Give ‘em an inch, they’ll take a mile This is a common trait of rising powers — their actions produce the very insecurity they claim to want to redress. They harbor grievances against the existing order (both Germany and Japan considered themselves the “have-not” nations), but their grievances cannot be satisfied so long as the existing order remains in place. Marginal concession is not enough, but the powers upholding the existing order will not make more than marginal concessions unless they are compelled to by superior strength. Japan, the aggrieved “have-not” nation of the 1930s, did not satisfy itself by taking Manchuria in 1931. Germany, the aggrieved victim of Versailles, did not satisfy itself by bringing the Germans of the Sudetenland back into the fold. They demanded much more, and they could not persuade the democratic powers to give them what they wanted without resorting to war. Granting the revisionist powers spheres of influence is not a recipe for peace and tranquility but rather an invitation to inevitable conflict. Russia’s historical sphere of influence does not end in Ukraine. It begins in Ukraine. It extends to the Baltic States, to the Balkans, and to the heart of Central Europe. And within Russia’s traditional sphere of influence, other nations do not enjoy autonomy or even sovereignty. There was no independent Poland under the Russian Empire nor under the Soviet Union. For China to gain its desired sphere of influence in East Asia will mean that, when it chooses, it can close the region off to the United States — not only militarily but politically and economically, too. China will, of course, inevitably exercise great sway in its own region, as will Russia. The United States cannot and should not prevent China from being an economic powerhouse. Nor should it wish for the collapse of Russia. The United States should even welcome competition of a certain kind. Great powers compete across multiple planes — economic, ideological, and political, as well as military. Competition in most spheres is necessary and even healthy. Within the liberal order, China can compete economically and successfully with the United States; Russia can thrive in the international economic order upheld by the democratic system, even if it is not itself democratic. But military and strategic competition is different. The security situation undergirds everything else. It remains true today as it has since World War II that only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical advantages to provide global security and relative stability. There is no stable balance of power in Europe or Asia without the United States. And while we can talk about “soft power” and “smart power,” they have been and always will be of limited value when confronting raw military power. Despite all of the loose talk of American decline, it is in the military realm where U.S. advantages remain clearest. Even in other great powers’ backyards, the United States retains the capacity, along with its powerful allies, to deter challenges to the security order. But without a U.S. willingness to maintain the balance in far-flung regions of the world, the system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers. Part of that willingness entails defense spending commensurate with America’s continuing global role. For the United States to accept a return to spheres of influence would not calm the international waters. It would merely return the world to the condition it was in at the end of the 19th century, with competing great powers clashing over inevitably intersecting and overlapping spheres. These unsettled, disordered conditions produced the fertile ground for the two destructive world wars of the first half of the 20th century. The collapse of the British-dominated world order on the oceans, the disruption of the uneasy balance of power on the European continent as a powerful unified Germany took shape, and the rise of Japanese power in East Asia all contributed to a highly competitive international environment in which dissatisfied great powers took the opportunity to pursue their ambitions in the absence of any power or group of powers to unite in checking them. The result was an unprecedented global calamity and death on an epic scale. It has been the great accomplishment of the U.S.-led world order in the 70 years since the end of World War II that this kind of competition has been held in check and great power conflicts have been avoided. It will be more than a shame if Americans were to destroy what they created — and not because it was no longer possible to sustain but simply because they chose to stop trying.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › 1NC › FJG 1NC

Enlistment key to US military readiness—modern warfare and great power competition

Tiron 22

Roxana, staff writer. “US Military Faces Biggest Recruiting Hurdles in 50 Years (1).” Bloomberg Government. 9/21/2023. https://about.bgov.com/news/us-military-services-face-biggest-recruiting-hurdles-in-50-years/ LJS

The US military is facing the greatest recruiting challenge in almost half a century, since the inception of the volunteer service, Pentagon leaders are warning Congress. “The Department anticipates we will collectively miss our recruiting mission despite accessing more than 170,000 remarkable young men and women” in the fiscal year that ends Sept. 30, Stephanie Miller, deputy assistant secretary of defense for military personnel policy, said Wednesday in prepared testimony before the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee. “This constitutes an unprecedented mission gap and is reason for concern.” While all the military services struggle to attract new recruits, the Army’s hurdles in particular paint a troubling picture for Pentagon leaders. Despite reducing its recruiting goals, the largest military service is falling more than 10,000 soldiers short this year, and is projecting a gap of at least 21,000 active-duty troops in 2023. The US depends on strong, all-volunteer forces to carry out its foreign policy and defend strategic interests. Military leaders often say their services are only as good as their people. With operations shifting to the realms of cyber, artificial intelligence, and hypersonic weapons, and China and Russia challenging US leadership globally, the lack of qualified recruits could become a fundamental national security handicap [impediment]. Military services have had to contend with recruiting hurdles such as mental and physical health posed by the coronavirus pandemic, and now must compete in a tight labor market against private companies that often offer more alluring benefits. “There is no sunlight on the horizon,” said Sen. Thom Tillis (N.C.), the panel’s top Republican. “It’s becoming clear the all-volunteer force that has served our country well over the last 50 years is at an inflection point.”

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › 1NC › FJG 1NC

A job guarantee wrecks enlistment—high vs low unemployment trends

Crow 19

Mark J., Academy Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York and the Director of the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis. “Economic and Social Determinants of Military Labor Supply: Essays on the Effects of Local Labor Market Conditions and the Opioid Crisis and Service in the U.S. Army.” University of Michigan. 2019. Pp 103-105. LJS

Overall, my results suggest that the employment-to-population ratio is strongly related to the number of individuals expressing interest in enlisting in the military. Specifically, my findings show a decreasing employment-to-population ratio results in more individuals applying to the military which directly results in more individuals entering onto active duty (accessions). However, there is also a concomitant increase in the rate of those disqualified. This implies the individuals being influenced to apply for military service by worsening labor market conditions are relatively less qualified to serve on active duty. When examining my results by applicant quality, the differential impact of the employment-to-population ratio on enlistment behavior becomes clearer: the overall increase in applicants and accessions is driven by increases in both high and low-quality individuals with low-quality responding at higher rates. These results suggest that the sensitivity of low-quality individuals to labor market conditions, previously uninvestigated, is larger than for high quality individuals. Specifically, decreases in the employment-to-population ratio increase the rate of low-quality applicants and accessions more than the rate of high-quality applicants and accessions by factors of six and two, respectively. This is consistent with the notion that low-quality individuals might be the most vulnerable in periods of increasing unemployment and likely have the fewest civilian labor market options. This, however, does not comport with a “crowding out” story where the ability of low-quality recruits to enlist during periods of economic contraction is impacted by the number of high-quality individuals expressing interest in the military (Ellwood and Wise 1987).84 The causal estimates in my findings, while similar in sign, are larger than the OLS estimates I report and that have been found in previous studies. This indicates that existing literature that neglected the correlation between changes in labor supply and economic conditions likely underestimated the effect of labor demand shocks on the enlistment response of both high and low-quality individuals.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Neg › 1NC › FJG 1NC

Military recruiting is on the brink—numbers are low, but not catastrophic

AP 6/11

Associated Press. “Uncle Sam wants migrants. Facing shortages, military recruiters trade citizenship for service.” Business Insider. 6/11/2023. https://www.businessinsider.com/us-military-recruitment-shortage-target-immigrants-migrants-citizenship-army-navy-2023-6 LJS

Struggling to overcome recruiting shortfalls, the Army and the Air Force have bolstered their marketing to entice legal residents to enlist, putting out pamphlets, working social media and broadening their outreach, particularly in inner cities. One key element is the use of recruiters with similar backgrounds to these potential recruits. "It is one thing to hear about the military from locals here, but it is something else when it's from your fellow brother, from the country you're from," said Bidari, who was contacted by Army Staff Sgt. Kalden Lama, the Dallas recruiter, on a Facebook group that helps Nepalese people in America connect with one another. "That brother was in the group and he was recruiting and he told me about the military." The military has had success in recruiting legal immigrants, particularly among those seeking a job, education benefits and training as well as a quick route to becoming an American citizen. But they also require additional security screening and more help filling out forms, particularly those who are less proficient in English. Both the Army and the Air Force say they will not meet their recruiting goals this year, and the Navy also expects to fall short. Pulling more from the legal immigrant population may not provide large numbers, but any small boosts will help. The Marine Corp is the only service on pace to meet its goal. The shortfalls have led to a wide range of new recruiting programs, ad campaigns and other incentives to help the services compete with often higher-paying, less risky jobs in the private sector. Defense leaders say young people are less familiar with the military, are drawn more to corporate jobs that provide similar education and other benefits, and want to avoid the risk of injury and death that service in defense of the United States could bring. In addition, they say that little more than 20% meet the physical, mental and character requirements to join.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Aff Answers › Alt › Author Indict – Agamben

Reject Agamben’s theory of the state of exception- he’s an anti-vaxxer whose scholarship gets coopted by the alt right

Bratton 21 [Benjamin Bratton, Professor of Philosophy of Technology and Speculative Design at the University of California, San Diego, July 28, 2021, “Agamben WTF, or How Philosophy Failed the Pandemic”, Verso, https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/news/5125-agamben-wtf-or-how-philosophy-failed-the-pandemic, JMH]

As yet another wave of infection blooms and the bitter assignment of vaccine passes becomes a reality, societies are being held hostage by a sadly familiar coalition of the uninformed, the misinformed, the misguided, and the misanthropic. They are making vaccine passports, which no one wants, a likely necessity. Without their noise and narcissism, vaccination rates would be high enough that the passes would not be needed. But it is not simply the “rabble” who make this sad mess, but also some voices from the upper echelons of the academy. During the pandemic, when society desperately needed to make sense of the big picture, Philosophy failed the moment, sometimes through ignorance or incoherence, sometimes outright intellectual fraud. The lesson of Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben, in part tells us why. Famous for critiques of “biopolitics” that have helped to shape the Humanities’ perspectives on biology, society, science and politics, Agamben spent the pandemic publishing over a dozen editorials denouncing the situation in ways that closely parallel right-wing (and left-wing) conspiracy theories. Over the past two decades, the soft power influence of his key concepts in the Humanities - homo sacer, zoē /bios, the state of exception, etc. - has been considerable. This has also helped to cement in a stale orthodoxy suspicious of any artificial governing intervention in the biological condition of human society as implicitly totalitarian. In the name of being “critical”, the default approach to any biotechnology is often to cast it as a coercive manipulation of the sovereignty of the body and lived experience. If one were to imagine Alex Jones not as a Texas good ol’ boy, but rather as a Heideggerian seminary student, this would give a sense of how Agamben himself approached the requests for public comment on the COVID-19 pandemic. Beginning in February 2020, with “The Invention of an Epidemic”, he called the virus a hoax and the belated lockdowns in Italy a “techno-medical despotism”. In “Requiem for the Students”, he denounced Zoom seminars as acquiescence to a Silicon Valley concentration camp condition (his words). In “The face and death”, he derided the use of masks as sacrificing the ritual humanity of the naked face. Each short essay was more absurd and strident than the last. Upon publication of the earliest of these, Agamben’s friend, the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy, warned us to ignore him, and that if he himself had followed Agamben’s medical advice discouraging a heart transplant that saved his life, that he would be dead. Earlier this month, Agamben went all in, directly and explicitly comparing vaccine passes to Nazi ‘Juden’ stars. In a short piece called, “Second class citizens”, he connects the fates of those who refuse vaccination to that of Jews under fascism and concludes that “The ‘green card’ (Italy’s vaccine pass) constitutes those who do not have it in bearers of a virtual yellow star.” After picking up my jaw, I cannot help but compare Agamben’s analysis to that of QAnon-influenced United States congressperson, Marjorie Taylor Greene, who beat him to the punch when she tweeted back in May that “Vaccinated employees get a vaccination logo just like the Nazi's forced Jewish people to wear a gold star.” In this ongoing performance, Agamben explicitly rejects all pandemic-mitigation measures on behalf of an ‘embrace tradition, refuse modernity’ conviction which denies the relevance of a biology that is real regardless of the words used to name it. Something seems to have recently cracked open for him, and yet at the same time, re-reading his foundational texts in the light of the pandemic pieces is illuminating. His position has not suddenly changed. It was there all along. Romanticism has been a permanent passenger on the flights of Western Modernity, and its mourning for ‘lost objects’ always just-out-of-reach vacillates between melancholia and revolt. Romanticism’s aesthetic disgust with rationality and technology finally has less to do with their effects than with what they reveal about how differently the world really works from how it appears to myth. Its true enemy is less alienation than demystification, and so it will always accept collaboration with Traditionalists. It is not surprising then that Agamben earned the thanks of both Lega Nord and the anti-masker/vaccine movements. His conclusions are also similar to those of the Brazilian populist president Jair Bolsonaro, who sees the virus as an over-blown plot by techno-medical globalists to undermine traditional authority and natural bodily and communitarian coherency. What is the lost object? Agamben’s contributions are, at their core, an elaborate defense of a pre-Darwinian concept of the human and the mystical attachments it provided. Ultimately, he is not defending life, he is refusing it. As of today, Agamben’s biggest online supporters are not his many long time readers but rather a squad of new fans, primarily a Based coalition of wounded contrarian man-childs. From vitalist Reactionaries quoting Julius Evola and Alexander Dugin to the anti-vaxxer roommate who puts energy drinks in his bong, these and other lonely anti-heroes are doomed by their burden to see clearly through the hypocrisies of our Matrix reality. For them, Agamben’s principled stand unites them with the legacy of Romanticist glorious and occult refusals. At work is perhaps less a horseshoe theory of Red-Brown alliance, than the tender bond between outcasts and idiots.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Aff Answers › Alt › Fails – Cede Political

The alternative’s essentializing thesis dooms it to irrelevancy and causes deep aporia

Boukalas 14 (Christon Boukalas PhD - researcher in Cardiff Law School, “No exceptions: authoritarian statism. Agamben, Poulantzas and homeland security”, Critical Studies on Terrorism, 26 February 2014, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17539153.2013.877667, MG)

Eighth, the analytical relevance of Agamben’s account of power for contemporary politics is doubtful. Agamben’s thesis does not allow us, but forces us, to examine the Roman Republic, Nazi Germany and homeland security (and, literally, everything in between) with the same analytical tools – because, strictly speaking, they are the same thing, differentiated only by the degree in which the true nature of power is revealed in each case (see Scheuerman 2006, 69). Its disengagement from socio-historical specificity deprives it of the capacity to discuss the reasons for, and the processes through which, the state of exception is triggered; bios is reduced to bare life, and the sovereign conducts its power/violence. This results in deep aporia when the exception thesis confronts actuality – including that of homeland security. For instance, while the decision is taken by the sovereign, we do not know who the sovereign is. Even when specified by law, there is no guarantee that the specified entity does indeed determine action. What if the sovereign’s mobilisation in the exception results in a coup by the army against its political overlord? Is that an exception within the exception, or a displacement of the seat of sovereign power, and if so, when does this displacement end and how do we know it has ended? More importantly, is the President of the United States of America “sovereign”? Is the executive branch (or its armed forces) over which he presides a singular, unitary entity or has he to overcome, repress and reconcile internal divisions and antagonisms? Does this affect the capacity and quality of sovereign action in an emergency? What is the range of the sovereign decision? Is everyone equally affected by it? Moreover, is the sovereign a subject with its own will and interests, or does it pertain to interests and antagonisms in the broader society? If the former, then what motivates the sovereign? Is this motivation the same for all sovereigns at all times? If the latter, is it possible that the sovereign acts on behalf of “powerful men” operating in his institutional shadow? Would the character of their interests influence the modalities, intensity, expanse, duration and purpose of the exception – or whether the exception is triggered at all? Would an exception declared by a sovereign “captured” by big petroleum companies be “the same” with that of a sovereign “captured” by school teachers? (And why does the former scenario seem more plausible than the latter?). Furthermore, even if conceivable, is reduction to bare life (the stripping of the individual from legal mediation and political capacity) the moment where sovereign power is constituted or the moment it collapses? (Boukalas 2012a, 292–293). And, finally, why does normality exist at all? Why does the bearer of awesome power use it only occasionally? (see Colatrella 2011). It is not clear as to where this leaves the exception thesis. It seems that, by abstracting his concepts from social and historical content, Agamben does not provide structures that can be populated by any/every specific socio-historical reality. On the contrary, socio-historical content crashes these empty structures: the price for essentialism is irrelevance to any/every existing social reality

2023 CNDI Kritik
Aff Answers › Impacts › No Impact – Sovereign

Democracy changes the sovereign from the executioner to the professor – failure to account for democracy undermine it and guarantee the state goes back into the business of killing

Colatrella 11 (Steven Colatrella - teaches Government for the University of Maryland University College, “Nothing Exceptional: Against Agamben”, University of Maryland University College, 2011, http://www.jceps.com/wp-content/uploads/PDFs/09-1-05.pdf, MG)

The democratic movements have broken down the sterile and false separation between the oikos and the polis argued for by Hannah Arendt40, and the similar separations between everyday life and social reproduction and public life, between zoe and bios. This is not by chance: slave plantations were private homes; the family enterprise studied by Marx was considered virtually an extension of the owners’ household; the needs of working families for subsistence or health care, or the infant mortality rate, unwanted pregnancies and their impact on women’s lives and the mortality rate of women in childbirth were all considered private affairs, not public or political ones. It was the accomplishment of the modern workers and women’s movements, of modern democracy, to change this state of affairs. Agamben sneeringly dismisses, indeed scarily demonizes this accomplishment as “biopolitics”: What comes to light in order to be exposed apud Westminster is, once again, the body of homo sacer, which is to say, bare life. This is modern democracy’s strength, and at the same time, its inner contradiction: modern democracy does not abolish sacred life but rather shatters it and disseminates it into every individual body, making it into what is at stake in political conflict. And the root of modern democracy’s secret biopolitical calling lies here: he who will later appear as the bearer of rights, and according to a curious oxymoron, as the new sovereign subject…can only be constituted as such through the repetition of the sovereign exception and the isolation of corpus, bare life, in himself. If it is true that law needs a body in order to be in force, and if one can speak, in this sense, of “law’s desire to have a body”, democracy responds to this desire by compelling law to assume the care of this body.41Agamben goes on to argue, incredibly, that the very right of habeas corpus by requiring the sheriff to exhibit the body of the accused undermines the liberty of the accused, an interpretation unique in the thousand-year history of habeas corpus rights whose defense has quite rightly underpinned many oppositions to Bush administration tactics in the War on Terror, and whose history has recently been provided a radical defense and materialist interpretation by Linebaugh already cited. The long process of democracy “compelling law to assume the care of the body” instead is the accomplishment of centuries of struggles by ordinary people precisely to move the state out of the business of killing and into the business of providing health care and education. This is what led Ernest Gellner to state, while overstating the case, “"At the base of the modern social order stands not the executioner but the professor… The monopoly of legitimate education is now more important, more central than the monopoly of legitimate violence.42” That the European social democratic welfare state coincided with the European Union’s one great accomplishment, the end of wars between the nation-states of Europe should give us pause for thought43. That the abolition of the death penalty followed these developments should make the relationship clear. What seals the argument is that the revived militarism, political repression and demonization of unpopular minority groups in Europe follow upon the efforts directed by the EU Commission and signed on to by every EU member government to privatize, liberalize markets, overcome workers’ resistance to “flexible” work organization, and impose neoliberal globalization44. The relationship between the democratic class struggle to defend subsistence and basic needs and the defense of individual rights and limitation of state power should be clear. That it isn’t should be attributed to an elitist, too-sophisticated by half approach to the state, democracy and class struggle that appears radical but in fact undermines the very foundations of democracy and social welfare by not making these struggles an integral part of its analysis. The movements for democracy, the class and gender struggles that brought it about and have continued to try to extend it to more spheres of life are, as Marx explained to the First International, not extensions of state power, but partial transformations of the state from a police apparatus and killing machine for the ruling class into a set of functions whose institutions and cadre now concern themselves with caring for the needs of society’s members, with all the contradictions and flaws that studies of the welfare state have demonstrated but with all its benefits too:

2023 CNDI Kritik
Aff Answers › Impacts › No Impact – Biopolitics

Societal changes are impossible – their critique ignores how governments act rationally, and provide security while assuaging anxiety – there is no impact to biopolitics

Parry 05 (John T. Parry - Associate Dean of Faculty & Edward Brunet Professor of Law Lewis & Clark Law School, ““SOCIETY MUST BE [REGULATED]”: BIOPOLITICS AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE IN GONZALES V. RAICH”, Lewis and Clark Law Review, 6 December 2005, https://law.lclark.edu/live/files/9655-lcb94parrypdf, MG)

That said, I want to close by suggesting that biopolitics, while perhaps not necessarily good, is at least not wholly bad. Absent realistic alternatives, this claim is certainly worth considering. Foucault, for example, never charted a way out of biopolitics beyond developing an individual aesthetic of selfdiscipline and regulation—the “care of the self.”94 Other writers speak of achieving something like a “new politics,” which usually means some combination of personal freedom that includes the substance—but often not the legal baggage—of individual human rights, combined with an ideal of community that fits uneasily with the ideal of personal freedom (thus the “politics,” which are likely to be anything but new), as well as a more egalitarian economic arrangement and the social safety net of the modern welfare state, but without the modern state itself. Even assuming this vision is desirable, no one has any practical idea how to make it happen.95 My basic assertions are that the ills laid at the feet of biopolitics are not entirely its fault and that they are in any event the costs of “progress.” Consider, first, the charges. Critics point out that in the modern, centralized, biopolitical state, our individuality is suppressed to the larger goal of managing the population. As a result, we become detached and alienated, even as we are disciplined and regulated. At best we can resort to coping strategies, but larger transformation of our social environment is impossible.96The flaw in this diagnosis is that it treats the alienated individual as problematic, as if there were an acontextual, dehistoricized thing known as “an individual” that is capable of being alienated or not, with the result that we should try to make it less, rather than more, alienated. Far more likely is that the idea of the individual developed in the modern period along with the modern state and that alienation is part of what defines an individual. To the extent the “problem” of the alienated individual has significance in the contemporary world, in other words, it is a direct consequence of the enlightenment and can only be solved through biopolitics. Indeed, biopolitics simply reflects the enlightenment project of promoting reason in place of “superstition” and arbitrary power. Social structures have become rationalized, so that governments are more likely to operate by articulated policy instead of fiat, the rule of law instead of whim, and democracy instead of hereditary rule or warlordism. The creation of the individual—a rational, rights-bearing but also alienated entity—is critical to all of these developments. Importantly, under this account, these changes may not be liberating in any objective sense, because the freedoms they create come with real costs—the costs of being free in this way as well as the consequences of being part of a power structure in which these particular freedoms are defined, managed, and subject to suspension. Still, this process leads not only to centralization and state violence but also to rights that channel the exercise of state power, to pervasive regulation of our lives and environment but also to a significant amount of predictability and security for many people. Our modern anxiety can be imperfectly assuaged by the comforts that flow from management and technology, and there is no reason to believe we are any less happy than people were in the past—although neither is it clear that we are any happier.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Aff Answers › Impacts › No Impact – Bare Life

Agamben’s theory of bare life and sovereign power is inherently flawed and has come under increased criticism with his over-simplifications and gross distortions of the Covid pandemic

Prozorov 21 Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä [Sergei Prozorov, Law Critique November 26 “A Farewell to Homo Sacer? Sovereign Power and Bare Life in Agamben’s Coronavirus Commentary” IV] https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8625667/

The 2020 coronavirus pandemic quickly became the object of commentary by philosophers and social theorists. Giorgio Agamben has offered highly controversial comments on the subject in a series of short vignettes at the Quodlibet blog, most of which were subsequently collected into a book, entitled Where Are We Now? The Epidemic as Politics (Agamben 2021). Agamben is best known for his theory of biopolitics, developed in the multi-volume Homo Sacer series, which traced the subjection of life to sovereign power in the Western political tradition from the antiquity onwards. It is therefore hardly surprising that Agamben would address the Covid-19 pandemic as the paradigmatic case of biopolitical governance, which in the argument of his theory proceeds through the inclusive exclusion of bare life in the state of exception, where it ends up exposed to the pure force of the law (Agamben 1998, 2005). Yet, most of his readers were hardly prepared for the virulence of his criticism of the governmental efforts to stop the spread of the pandemic. Agamben began by questioning the very existence of the pandemic, downplaying the seriousness of the coronavirus infection and presenting it as a pretext for the expansion and the intensification of the state of exception: ‘Once terrorism ceased to exist as a cause for measures of exception, the invention of an epidemic offers the ideal pretext for widening them beyond all known limits’ (Agamben 2021, p. 13). In a subsequent text ‘Clarifications’, Agamben proceeded to infer from the alleged panic about the virus the fact that ‘[our] society no longer believes in nothing more than bare life. It is now obvious that Italians are ready to sacrifice practically everything—their life conditions, their social relationships, their work, even their friendships, as well as their religious and political convictions—to the danger of getting sick’ (2021, p. 17). This willingness of the society to suspend its interactions and relationships for the sake of survival enables the proliferation of exceptional governmental interventions that make the state of exception the ‘new normal’: ‘[People] have been so used to living in conditions of perennial crisis and emergency that they seem not to realize that their life has been reduced to a purely biological state. A society that exists in a constant state of emergency cannot be free’ (2021, p. 18). In later comments Agamben continued with this dual line of criticism, addressing various ways, in which the fear of the coronavirus reduces our social lives to the preoccupation with bare life, which in turn legitimizes the emergency measures undertaken by governments. He also issued damning invectives against the church, which allegedly betrayed its mission ‘to keep watch over human dignity’, the lawyers who remained silent in the face of the proliferation of states of exception, and, finally, medicine itself, which he accused of having become a new religion (Agamben 2021, p. 34–37; p. 49–54). Agamben’s invectives have been received critically by numerous interlocutors, including such fellow philosophers as Jean-Luc Nancy (2020) and Roberto Esposito (2020). Critics have noted the uncanny proximity of Agamben’s position to that of Covid denialists or skeptics, from Bolsonaro to Trump, and questioned the conspiratorial tone of his claims about the ‘invention’ of the epidemic (see Christiaens 2020; van den Berge 2020). While we are largely in agreement with this line of criticism, our objective in this article goes beyond the adjudication of Agamben’s writings on the coronavirus as to their veracity or political correctness. We are more interested in analyzing these writings in order to illuminate some fundamental issues with Agamben’s political thought that might have otherwise remained obscure. It is important to stress that we do not intend to infer from Agamben’s opinion pieces a disqualification of Agamben’s philosophical approach, as if a philosopher must be correct in their every opinion for their philosophy to merit any consideration. And yet, it would also be incorrect to try to rigorously separate these opinion pieces from Agamben’s political philosophy, if only because in the former he applies and refines the concepts developed in the latter. While Where Are We Now? might understandably lack the methodological rigour of Agamben’s more academic works, it nonetheless offers a powerful exemplar or paradigm of Agamben’s reasoning and is therefore a legitimate object of critical analysis.The focus of this article is on the relation between two fundamental concepts in Agamben’s political thought that he continued to rely on in his coronavirus writings: sovereign power, exercised in the form of the state of exception, and bare life included in this state only as negated or excluded. His claims above about the pandemic reducing our social life to bare life and enabling governance by exceptional measures are not merely empirical observations that could be refuted by pointing to contrary examples—e.g. of altruist and solidarist behaviours observable throughout the pandemic, or the hurried lifting of many of the restrictions that, Agamben argued, would be maintained even after the pandemic ends. These claims rather recall much earlier theoretical theses about the relation of sovereign power to life that date back to Agamben’s articles from the 1990s and the first volume of the Homo Sacer series that preceded and, some might say, prophesied the rise of exceptional or emergency governance measures worldwide (Agamben 1998, 2000). Similarly, the response to Agamben’s coronavirus statements as overly exaggerated only brings to mind a similarly incredulous reception of the claims in Homo Sacer about us all being ‘virtually homines sacri’ and the camp as the ‘nomos of the modern’ (Agamben 1998, p. 155; 166), which led to Agamben being accused of ‘jarringly disconcerting claims’ (La Capra 2007, p. 133), ‘wild statements’ (Laclau 2007, p. 22) and ‘unregulated decisions’ (Norris 2005, p. 273). It would thus be incorrect to read Agamben’s coronavirus statements as polemical exaggerations at odds with the measured tone of his more academic writings. Polemical exaggerations were abundant in the latter writings as well, which permits us to raise the question of whether this tendency towards hyperbole and exaggeration might not be an individual idiosyncrasy, but instead arises from the conceptual logic at work in Agamben’s political theory, particularly the relation between sovereign power and bare life. In this article we shall therefore venture a critical reconstruction of this logic, drawing on both Agamben’s theoretical texts and his coronavirus commentary, in order to point out its problematic features and outline a pathway of the resolution of these problems from within the framework of the theory itself. We shall neither attempt to insulate Agamben’s political theory from his incidental commentary on current affairs nor infer from the problematic nature of this commentary the need to discard this theory as a whole, but rather use this commentary as an occasion for immanent criticism of the central tenets of the theory. Thus, while we shall argue that Agamben’s articulation of the relation of sovereign power and bare life in Homo Sacer 1 is fundamentally flawed, we shall also demonstrate how these flaws may be remedied with the help of Agamben’s own theoretical logic, particularly the idea of non-relation, which first appeared in Homo Sacer 1 but is most fully elaborated in The Use of Bodies, the final volume of the Homo Sacer series.Homo Sacer famously begins with a forceful assertion of the relation between sovereign power and bare life: ‘The inclusion of bare life in the political realm constitutes the original—if concealed—nucleus of sovereign power. It can even be said that the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power’ (Agamben 1998, p. 6). By suspending the law in the state of exception, sovereign power is able to access and capture not merely some particular form of life but life as such. The entire trajectory of Western politics consists in the encounter of power devoid of all normative content with life devoid of its form. This is why for Agamben the paradigmatic space of modern politics, in which this trajectory culminates, is the camp: ‘Insofar as its inhabitants were stripped of every political status and wholly reduced to bare life, the camp was also the most absolute biopolitical space ever to have been realized, in which power confronts nothing but pure life, without any mediation.’ (1998, pp. 170–171) This conceptual structure forms the basis of Agamben’s critical response to the governance of the coronavirus pandemic. The pandemic is problematic insofar as it brings sovereign power and bare life ever closer together. On the one hand, the introduction of the state of emergency in Italy and many other European countries has reduced the exercise of power to its pure form of sovereignty, revealing the dependence of the law on its apparent opposite: We have been accustomed for some time to the ill-advised use of emergency degrees through which executive power effectively replaces legislative power, abolishing the separation-of-powers principle that democracy is defined by. In this case, however, all limits have been overstepped: it seems that the words pronounced by the Prime Minister and by the head of the Civil Protection Department have the immediate validity of law (as was once said of the words of the Führer. (Agamben 2021, p. 36) On the other hand, the ascent of the coronavirus to the top of the political agenda has reduced political life to mere ‘survival’ (Agamben 1999, pp. 132–135), as good life has been sacrificed for the protection of the bare life that sustains it. ‘[Bare] life, and the fear of losing it, is not something that unites people; rather, it blinds and separates them. What are human relationships becoming in a country that has resigned itself to the idea of living like this for the foreseeable future? And what is a society that values nothing more than survival?’ (Agamben 2021, p. 18). It is as if Agamben’s theory, initially developed in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, has finally been fully vindicated: what we observe globally is the reduction of politics to exceptional sovereign government of life stripped of its form and reduced to bare survival. From this perspective, even relatively innocuous measures, from compulsory face masks in public places to the shift to online education, exemplify the far more ominous tendency towards the articulation of the law devoid of content with the life devoid of form, whose paradigmatic site is the camp and whose exemplary figure is homo sacer. This is why Agamben is able to argue that a ‘country that decides to renounce its face, to cover with masks the faces of its citizens everywhere’ has ‘purged itself of any political dimension’ (2021, p. 87) or that ‘[professors] who agree to subject themselves to the new online dictatorship and to hold all their classes remotely are the exact equivalent of those university professors who, in 1931, swore allegiance to the Fascist regime’ (2001, p. 74). Rather than simply dismiss these admittedly preposterous statements as exaggerations, in this article we shall pose the question of whether the conceptual logic at work in them can be sustained as such, even in a more moderate version. We shall argue that the articulation of sovereign power and bare life, first posited in Homo Sacer 1 and reaffirmed in Where Are We Now?, is problematic due to the belonging of the two concepts to different planes, respectively empirical and transcendental. It is only by extending their field of application beyond these planes that Agamben is able to conceive of their articulation. In the following section we shall demonstrate how his account of the sovereign state of exception collapses a plurality of empirical states of emergency into a zone of indistinction between different exceptional states and the normal state and then elevates this very indistinction to the transcendental condition of intelligibility of politics as such. In the third section we shall analyse the inverse move of recasting bare life, originally posited as the transcendental condition of possibility of positive forms of life, as an empirical figure, whose sole form is the absence of form. In the final section we shall argue that the resulting articulation of the empirical and the transcendental, whose concrete exemplar is homo sacer, is fundamentally flawed insofar as it establishes as the inescapable horizon of Western politics the relation that appears highly dubious and contrived. While this criticism does target the central tenet of the first volume of Homo Sacer, it does not extend to the entirety of the Homo Sacer series or Agamben’s wider project, which instead provides us with conceptual resources for an alternative approach that would highlight non-relation between sovereign power and bare life—a notion that has remained rather obscure in Agamben’s thought (see McLoughlin 2009).

2023 CNDI Kritik
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The 1AC is an instance of positive biopolitics that uses institutions to build collective social responsibility against emerging threats.

Bratton 21 [Benjamin Bratton, Professor of Philosophy of Technology and Speculative Design at the University of California, San Diego, July 28, 2021, “Agamben WTF, or How Philosophy Failed the Pandemic”, Verso, https://www.versobooks.com/blogs/news/5125-agamben-wtf-or-how-philosophy-failed-the-pandemic, JMH]

In my book, The Revenge of The Real: Politics for a Post-Pandemic World, I consider the origins and doomed future of Agamben’s brand of negative biopolitics. “While Agamben’s own worldview is classically Europeanist, dripping with lurid Heideggerian theology, his influence on the Humanities is much wider and deeper” and so the reckoning due goes well beyond revised syllabi. “The question is how much of the philosophical traditions to which Agamben has been attached over the last decades will also need to be shelved. What then to do with the artifacts of Agamben’s life work? It is a traditionalist, culturalist, locally embedded doctrinal edifice, protecting the ritual meaningfulness of things against the explicit nudity of their reality: like the defiant monologues of a Southern preacher, his sad, solemn theory is undeniably beautiful as a gothic political literature, and should probably be read only as such” Even so, the reckoning with legacies of his and other related projects is long overdue. His mode of biopolitical critique blithely ventures that science, data, observation and modeling are intrinsically and ultimately forms of domination and games of power relations. Numbers are unjust, words are beautiful. To accept that real, underlying processes of biochemistry are accessible, and generative of both reason and intervention, is presumed naive. It's a disposition also found in different tones and hues in the work of Hannah Arendt, Michel Foucault, and especially Ivan Illich, who died from a facial tumor he refused to treat as doctors recommended. Even here at University of California, San Diego, a hub of interdisciplinary biotechnology research, many colleagues insist that the “digitalization of Nature” is “an impossible fantasy”, even as they accept an mRNA vaccine based on a prototype bioprinted from a computational model of the virus’ genome uploaded from China before the actual virus even made it to North America. As I have suggested elsewhere, this orientation is exemplary of the drawn-out influence of Boomer Theory. The baby boomers have tyrannised the Left's imagination - bequeathing tremendous capacities to deconstruct and critique authority but feeble capacities to construct and compose. Perhaps the ‘68 generation’s last revenge upon those who inherit their messes, is the intellectual axiom that structure is always more suspicious than its dismantling and composition more problematic than resistance, not just as political strategies but as metaphysical norms. Their project was and remains the horizontal multiplication of conditional viewpoints as both means and ends, via the imaginary dismantling of public reason, decision and structuration. This is how they can at once fetishize “the Political” while refusing “governmentality.” I grew up in this tradition, but the world works very differently than the one imagined by soixante-huitards and their secretaries. I hope that philosophy will not continue to fail those who must create, compose and give enforceable structure to another world than this one. Agamben’s pandemic outbursts are extreme but also exemplary of this wider failure. Philosophy and the Humanities failed the pandemic because they are bound too tightly to an untenable set of formulas, reflexively suspicious of purposeful quantification, and unable to account for the epidemiological reality of mutual contagion or to articulate an ethics of an immunological commons. Why? Partially because the available language of ethics is monopolized by emphasis on subjective moral intentionality and a self-regarding protagonism for which “I” am the piloting moral agent of outcomes. The pandemic forced another kind of ethics. The Idealist distinction between zoē and bios as modes of “life” around which Agamben builds his biopolitical critique is a conceit that snaps like a twig in the face of the epidemiological view of society. Why did we wear masks? Because of a sense that our inner thoughts would manifest externally and protect us? Or was it because we recognize ourselves as biological organisms among others capable of harming and being harmed as such? The difference is profound. As we pass by a stranger, how do the ethics shift from subjective intention of harm or endearment to the objective biological circumstance of contagion? What is then the ethics of being an object? We will find out. But when presented with the need for intensive sensing and modeling in the service of highly granular provision of social services to those in need, many public intellectuals choked, only able to offer hollow truisms about “surveillance”. At stake is not just some obscure academic quarrel, but rather our ability to articulate what it means to be human, that is to be all together homo sapiens, in connection with all the fraught histories of that question. I argue that we need instead a positive biopolitics based on a new rationality of inclusion, care, transformation and prevention, and we need a philosophy and a humanities to help articulate it. Fortunately, in many ways we already do. A short and very incomplete list of such might include Sylvia Wynter’s mapping of “who counts” as Human in Colonial Modernity in ways that open the category to reclamation: “We” have been defined by exclusion. It includes those studying the microbiome including the role of microbial life inside of human bodies to keep us alive: The human is already inclusive of the non-human. It includes those studying Anthropogeny and common evolutionary origins of the human species and planetary future: The human is continuous, migratory and changing. It includes those studying experimental Astronautics and the limit conditions of survival in a fragile artificial environment: At thresholds of survivability the human is like a fish discovering water. It includes those studying CRISPR and other re-weaving technologies for genetic therapy: The human can recompose itself at the deepest levels. The affirmation or negation of what the human is also plays out through what humans can be. This animates the cultural controversies over gender reassignment therapies and techniques. The human is also a contingent, complex and pluralistic assemblage available to self-fashioning so that one may finally feel at home in their own skin. But the general availability of synthetic androgens, estrogens and progesterone draws on Modern laboratory biotechnology that Agamben’s biopolitics sees as invasive and unnatural. If Philosophy and the Humanities are to claim due legitimacy for present and future challenges, the collective conception of another positive biopolitics –based in the reality of our shared technical and biological circumstances–is absolutely essential. Toward that, I conclude with another passage from The Revenge of The Real: “A laissez-faire vitalism for which “life will find a way” is not an option; it is a fairy tale of a comfortable class who don’t live with the daily agency of sewage landscapes and exposed corpses…” Instead, “(This positive) biopolitics is inclusive, materialist, restorative, rationalist, based on a demystified image of the human species, anticipating a future different from the one prescribed by many cultural traditions. It accepts the evolutionary entanglement of mammals and viruses. It accepts death as part of life. It therefore accepts the responsibilities of medical knowledge to prevent and mitigate unjust deaths and misery as something quite different from the nativist immunization of one population of people from another. This includes not just rights to individual privacy but also social obligations to participate in an active, planetary biological commons. It is, adamantly, a biopolitics in a positive and projective sense.” The pandemic is, potentially, a wake-up call that the new normal cannot be just the new old normal. This means a shift in how human societies —which are always planetary in reach and influence— make sense of themselves, model themselves and compose themselves. This is a project that is as philosophical as it is political. Failure is not an option.

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The best way to resolve bare life is with a political-ontological approach

Abbot 12 (Mathew Abbot PhD - lecturer in philosophy at the University of Ballarat, “NO LIFE IS BARE, THE ORDINARY IS EXCEPTIONAL: GIORGIO AGAMBEN AND THE QUESTION OF POLITICAL ONTOLOGY”, Parrhesia Journal, 2012, http://parrhesiajournal.org/parrhesia14/parrhesia14_abbott.pdf, MG)

In a critique of Agamben that would be devastating if it didn’t make the category mistake I am trying to identify, Andrew Norris writes the following: If the Bush-Cheney administration is simply providing the sovereign decisions that are metaphysically necessary to maintain public order in the United States, one cannot fault it for acting tyrannically. Conversely, if it is indeed acting tyrannically, this is something that requires not metaphysical analysis and political theology, but practical, political resistance and institutional change.60 A political ontological approach, which undermines the very idea of ‘metaphysical necessity,’ will dissolve the terms of this dilemma. For if bare life and the exception are not metaphysically necessary, then we should respond to it with a both/and rather than an either/or. In other words: Guantanamo Bay is metaphysically contingent, and that is part of why it is tyrannical (it is not only a political, juridical, and ethical monstrosity; it is also based on a violent metaphysical logic). As such we can agree with Schmitt when he writes that “metaphysics is the most intensive and clearest expression of an epoch”; that monarchy was “self-evident” as a form of political organisation in the 17th Century because it was “in accord with the structure of metaphysical concepts” in play at the time.61 The mistake, however, would lie in underestimating the complexity of the relationship at work here, refusing to recognise the real intertwining of politics and ontology that it represents. Political ontology does not mistake theory for practice, falling into a kind of magical thinking where the former is somehow taken to have the capacity to change the world; rather it insists on the mutually determining relation between ontology and politics, on the claim that truly radical change in one area means change in the other (there is no vulgar claim of one-way causality at work here). The practise of thought and the critique of metaphysics have political stakes, just as properly revolutionary political action is not only concerned with ontic political change, but also with challenging the very figure of the world as we know it. “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things.”62 Political ontology does not hold up another world as an ideal to which the present one should be made to conform; instead it demands the abolition of the present metaphysical scheme of things, in which the natural sweetness of life, the sharing of the gratuity of the world, are voided. A political movement cognisant of this would be on that insists on—indeed one that demonstrates in practise—the truth of the claims that no life is bare and the ordinary is exceptional. These are ontological laws, but they are also ethical laws; they are real ontological claims, but they also make a normative demand on us. Gershom Scholem writes that “[m]etaphysics is a legitimate theory in the subjunctive form. This is the best definition I have found so far; it says everything.”63 Though Scholem uses the term ‘metaphysics’ here, exchanging it for ‘political ontology’ will see his point sit perfectly with this project. Political ontology is a mode of thought in which the distinction between fact and value collapses, such that what is shown to be valuable is the fact of existence itself. As such, a politics in-keeping with political ontology would be a subjunctive politics,64 a politics informed by an exigency.

2023 CNDI Kritik
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Perm: Labor power resistance still exists even in the most biocapitalist of systems

Karakilic 19 (Emrah Karakilic, senior researcher at Nottingham Trent University and pHD in sociology from Goldsmiths University of London, “Acting Up with Hardt and Negri: Capitalism in the Biopolitical Context,” M@n@gement, Vol. 22, 3-2019, https://www.cairn.info/revue-management-2019-3-page-496.htm) SM

In the main, it designates the fabric of social production, defining the period of post-industrial capitalism. Namely, it defines ‘cognitive capitalism’ (Moulier-Boutang, 2011; Vercellone 2007) in which ‘capital… presents [itself] as biopower’ (Negri, 2008b: 4). By biopolitical context, it is suggested, on the one hand, that ‘capitalist power has invested social relations in their entirety’ (2008b: 235). This precisely corresponds to ‘the total subjection of life to the economic political rules’ (2008b: 172). Nevertheless, it is in this very context, on the other hand, that the totalitarian self-assertion of biopower is ‘no longer able to hold back biopolitical productivity… by new subjects and by new social and political configurations’ (2008b: 230-243). The biopolitical context is thus characterised by ‘capital’s wholesale invasion of life but, at the same time, by the resistance and reaction of [biopolitical] labour power against capital’ (2008b: 182). The biopolitical context is, therefore, ‘both a mark of the most endemic control and a sign of a new insurgency’ (Toscano, 2007: 112). It is precisely in this biopolitical context that both the impasse and possibility of crossing the threshold of cognitive capitalism are intelligible. Allow me to break this down a little. According to Negri, capital in the contemporary capitalism expresses itself as biopower, to wit a eugenic command and control upon the entirety of life from top. It increasingly orients itself towards integrating the entire productive potential of subjects into valorisation process. Capital, in other words, ‘traverses imperiously (and attempts to configure) all the moments which produce value’ (Negri, 2008b: 75). And it does so by ‘regulating social life from its interior, following it, interpreting it, absorbing it, and rearticulating it’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 23). By capitalist biopower, then, one might think of ‘the power [of capital] that acts to destroy humanity in order to put it at the service of productivity and profit’ (Negri, 2008b: 32). For the sake of accumulation ad infinitum, capital ‘invests the dimensions of the economic, those of the political, [and] those of consciousness’ (2008b: 172, emphasis added). Capitalist biopower is therefore ‘another name for the real subsumption of society under capital’ (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 365). 13The” culmination” of real subsumption of society under capital corresponds to such a level of capitalist invasion that not only does it concern the synchronisation of industrial production with everyday life (i.e. social factory) but also capital’s attempt to subsume the social bios itself, that is, the ways of life, the mode of living: ‘the entire life made of needs and desires’ (Negri, 1997: 37). In other words, it concerns the subsumption of all social forces under capital. At this level, Hardt and Negri argue, ‘there is nothing, no “naked life”, no external standpoint, that can be posed outside this field permeated by money; nothing escapes money [read as money-capital]’ (2000: 32). The tendency of capital’s invasion of bios, the-becoming-of-capital-biopower, has informed Morini and Fumagalli (2010), Fumagalli (2011), and Fumagalli and Lucarelli (2011) to introduce the concept of biocapitalism, referring to ‘a process of accumulation that is… founded on the exploitation of the entirety of human faculties’ (Morini and Fumagalli, 2010: 235). The formula of today’s capitalist production is polemically argued to be ‘the production of money by means of the commodification of bios, M-C (bios)-M’ (Morini and Fumagalli, 2010: 239).

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Perm: Even if the Aff is biopolitical, the duality of biopolitics ensures subjective resistance exists

Karakilic 19 (Emrah Karakilic, senior researcher at Nottingham Trent University and pHD in sociology from Goldsmiths University of London, “Acting Up with Hardt and Negri: Capitalism in the Biopolitical Context,” M@n@gement, Vol. 22, 3-2019, https://www.cairn.info/revue-management-2019-3-page-496.htm) SM

In this way, Negri and Hardt bring forward a polemical argument that biopolitics and biopower are actually within an antagonistic relationship, or better biopolitics is biopower’s antagonist: ‘history is determined by the biopolitical antagonisms and resistances to biopower’ (Hardt and Negri, 2009: 31). In other words, the entire development of humanity ‘is dominated by this insubordination of life (the power of life) against Power (the domination of life)’ (Negri, 2008c: 207). What we have here then is a distinction between the categories of biopower and biopolitics at a level which is not close to Foucault’s own. Negri speaks of biopower as ‘the big structures and functions of power’ imposing ‘command over life its technologies and its mechanisms of power [from the top]’ (2008a: 73). And, he speaks of biopolitics ‘when the critical analysis of command is done from the viewpoint of experiences of subjectivation and freedom, in short, from the bottom’ (2008a: 73-4). In brief, as Toscano summarises, ‘biopower is on the side of subjection and control, while biopolitics is rethought in terms of subjectivity and freedom’ (2007: 118).

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FJG counters biopolitical control — it offers people work if they want which removes the fear of unemployment which sustains apparatuses of control.

Venn ’09 [Couze Venn, Emeritus Professor in the Media and Communications Department at Goldsmiths, University of London, and a Research Associate at the University of Johannesburg (VIAD) for ten years, “Neoliberal Political Economy, Biopolitics and Colonialism: A Transcolonial Genealogy of Inequality,” Theory, Culture, & Society, December 2009, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/249726198_Neoliberal_Political_Economy_Biopolitics_and_Colonialism_A_Transcolonial_Genealogy_of_Inequality] [A.G]

From the point of view of neoliberal government of conduct by way of the constitution of ‘man as enterprising subject’, one could note that the dispositif of police as well as classical political economy took the question of individual conduct and ‘public happiness’ to be key targets. This effec- tively refigured the relation of the state to the population and to every indi- vidual – both legal subjects and non-juridical subjects such as women and children – within the wider framework of a moral economy, the principal aim of which was the institution of norms of conduct conducive to individ- ual well-being, as well as the general good measured in terms of an economy (Pasquino, 1978). A moral economy can thus be seen to be central to bio- politics (e.g. 2003: 246). Foucault’s genealogy of liberalism shows that, alongside the discourse of political economy and its normative supports, one finds other discourses: about health, indigence, sexuality, pauperism and so on, explored as part of the dispositifs of disciplinary society, but that are effectively about the state taking charge of the process of individuation as an integral aspect of wealth creation. Thus, several discourses became correlated that continue to shape the relation of the economic to the social: on the one hand, those of ‘police’, ‘pastoral power’ and a moral economy, that is, key elements of biopolitics, and, on the other hand, the discourse of political economy; we find their congruence, interestingly, in the work of Adam Smith whose Wealth of Nations was preceded by his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), concerned with the positive institutions that would encourage ‘frugality’, industriousness, ‘useful labour’, i.e. the conducts conducive to enjoying ‘a greater share of the necessaries and conveniences of life’ (Smith, 1812 [1776]: 18). Today new apparatuses and techniques manage conduct in terms of framework-setting, a strategy in which the law, finance and the government of conduct function as the determining mechanisms, backed up by the production of fear: of the unemployed, of losing one’s job, of criminality, of indeterminate ubiquitous risks (see also Lazzarato, 2009).

2023 CNDI Kritik
Alt › Solvency › A2 “Does Nothing”

The alt isn’t passive analysis but active resistance of neoliberal structures.

LaMothe 22 [Ryan LaMothe, December 2022, “Giorgio Agamben and Resistance: bridging the consultation room and the political in the Anthropocene Age”, Free Association: Psychoanalysis and Culture, Media, Groups, Politics Number 87, https://freeassociations.org.uk/FA_New/OJS/index.php/fa/article/view/426, JMH]

While human beings do not unfold like a programmed mechanism, their subjectivities, as Agamben recognizes, are nevertheless shaped by social, political, and economic apparatuses (Prozorov, 2014, p.24). This is where the concept of inoperativity comes into play. For Agamben, “inoperativity” means to deactivate the functioning of the apparatuses, which does not mean that these apparatuses do not continue to operate or do not continue to have effects (pp.31-34). Put another way, inoperativity vis-à-vis the subject means that she is not captive to the grammar of the apparatuses, even if they continue to have their effects. Bartleby, for instance, rendered inoperative the capitalistic apparatuses by choosing not to actualize his potentiality (impotentiality), though the end result was tragic. I want to stress that inoperativity is, for Agamben (2004), not passive (p.134). That is, inoperativity or “preferring not” does not “affirm inertia, inactivity or apraxia…but [is] a form of praxis that is devoid of any telos or task, does not realize any essence and does not correspond to any nature” (p.33). Inoperativity, then, is any action of impotentiality that does not actualize what is expected by society’s apparatuses. Bartleby’s “I would prefer not” is one example. Martin Luther King’s (and others’) nonviolent protests is another illustration of rendering inoperative the violence of racist apparatuses. In other words, King’s nonviolent actions were acts of impotentiality in that he was not allowing racist apparatuses to determine his subjectivity; that is, to actualize or act on his fear and hatred. Other recent examples of the impotentiality of inoperativity, with regard to climate change, are eco-villages, where people prefer not to operate out of the apparatuses of neoliberal capitalism. While Agamben does not use the term “resistance,” it is possible to interpret inoperativity as a form of resistance that preserves, in the case of Bartleby, his potentiality by way of living out his impotentiality. Bartleby, in preferring not to, resists his employer and capitalist apparatuses. This said, Agamben’s philosophical discussion does not include addressing how people come to actualize potentiality or impotentiality, which leads me to turn to a developmental perspective that offers a way of thinking about the emergence of resistance as inoperativity.

2023 CNDI Kritik
Alt › Solvency › Climate Change

Their environmental conservation rhetoric upholds a racist and violent cycle of life management while failing to actually protect anything—only analysis of the aff’s climate scenarios through the lens of biopolitics allows us to break down panoptical structures toward a successful environmentalist movement

Biermann and Mansfield 14 (Christine Biermann and Becky Mansfield (ohio state university). “Biodiversity, Purity, and Death: Conservation Biology as Biopolitics,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space. 2014. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275321026_Biodiversity_Purity_and_Death_Conservation_Biology_as_Biopolitics ) @ehatt

This paper examines modern conservation science through the lens of biopower, which Michel Foucault conceptualized as the power to “make live and let die” (Foucault, 2003, page 241). We posit not just that biopower is a useful analytical tool for understanding governance of human–nonhuman relationships but that failure to understand how nonhuman life has been the object of biopolitical concern risks privileging scientific knowledge and management as purely objective and apolitical—that is, as outside the reach of power. Here, we renarrate core conservation knowledge, practices, and policies in the US as a form of liberal biopolitical rule. With its emphasis on making nature live, conservation science marks a shift from a sovereign form of rule that emphasized subduing and controlling nature. We focus on key concepts in conservation biology, such as populations, evolution, extinction, and biological diversity and purity, to demonstrate that acts of truth-telling about nature occur within, and are necessarily shaped by, the context of liberal biopolitical rule. By truth-telling we refer not to the discovery of objective facts but rather to the ways in which particular ideas about nature are designated normal, natural, and true through the circulation of scientific discourses (Foucault, 1990; 2008).(1) In particular, we show that modern conservation science is shaped by a biopolitical logic that emphasizes distinctions between biological kinds and develops interventions based on these distinctions—a logic that also informs racial, biological distinctions among humans. Ideas of abnormality and normality are produced and reproduced through racial projects, most of which are not racist per se but nonetheless engage in racial signification (Omi and Winant, 1994). In other words, biopolitical strategies rely on “logics of racial difference” (Moore et al, 2003, page 18) to delineate between their target population and others. Even as such sharp biological distinctions (ie, between races) are called into question when applied to human populations, distinctions between biological kinds are generally deemed both appropriate and scientific when applied to nonhuman populations. Conservation science is built upon distinctions between life forms, as it is these distinctions that constitute biodiversity and therefore must be defended and maintained. In the next section, we review the concept of Foucauldian biopower and discuss emerging scholarship on the biopolitics of nature. We add to this literature an explicit emphasis on racial differentiation and biological aberrance, arguing that understanding the let die part of biopolitics requires greater attention to the categorization of bodies. We then turn to conservation science to consider the underlying biopolitical logic and truth discourses of the field. Expanding on four themes—populations in crisis, evolution and its future orientation, extinction as death that is necessary for life, and diversity as purity— we illustrate key assumptions, concepts, and practices (statistical and material) that work to secure biodiversity. The final section briefly discusses the implications of contemporary conservation’s biopolitical logic, including the continued relevance of sovereign power in biopolitical nature–society relations. Toward a biopolitics of nature, society, and race According to Foucault, the emergence of biopower—the power to “make live and let die”— in modern states in the 17th and 18th centuries marked a gradual and incomplete shift away from sovereign power, or the power to “take life or let live” (Foucault, 2003, page 241). Sovereign power was commonly manifest through the right of seizure: “of things, time, bodies, and ultimately life itself; it culminated in the privilege to seize hold of life in order to suppress it” (1990, page 136). This authority over life and death—this right to literally seize and suppress life—is justified by the need to defend the sovereign against any and all threats. It can be an “indirect power”, as when the sovereign conscripts subjects to war, thereby “exposing their life” without directly taking it; it can also be a “direct power”, as with state-sanctioned punishment, which can include death (1990, page 135). Sovereign power continues to exist today, though permeated with new social meanings and justifications. Importantly, sovereign power does not necessitate a ruler in the traditional political sense of the word. The sovereign is also the slave owner (Oberprantacher, 2010), the head of the family, and, as we demonstrate, the American pioneer who possesses the ‘right of the sword’ over nature. Biopower, too, is power over life and death, but while sovereign power is manifest through seizure, biopower attempts to manage, even foster, life itself at both the level of the individual (anatomo-politics) and the level of the population (biopolitics) (Foucault, 1990). Anatomo-politics refers to technologies of the self that discipline bodies and behavior; such disciplinary technologies are not imposed upon individuals from above, but rather arise from complex networks of institutions, discourses, and practices, of which the individual is a key part. Biopolitics refers to the nondisciplinary management of entire populations, nations, or races. Through biopolitics, states began to exert power at the level of the population, using techniques such as statistics on birth and death rates and disease infection rates to establish norms and bring biological life under the purview of law. In Society Must Be Defended (2003), Foucault writes, “the new nondisciplinary power is applied not to man-as-body but to the living man, to man-as-living-being; ultimately, if you like, to man-as-species” (page 242). The point is not that anatomo-politics and biopolitics are completely separate; indeed, they are mutually constitutive (Mansfield, 2012a). The point is that biopolitics is about generalizing rather than individualizing. Human beings are viewed through this lens as a “global mass that is affected by overall processes characteristic of birth, death, production, illness, and so on” (Foucault, 2003, page 243). Biopolitical strategies seek not necessarily to use death as a means of control but to bring death into the fold, to accept it as part of life and to account for it through the calculus of demography: “Death was no longer something that suddenly swooped down on life—as in an epidemic. Death was now something permanent, something that slips into life, perpetually gnaws at it, diminishes it, and weakens it” (Foucault, 2003, page 244). Death is always present in life, and to make live does not mean to avoid death altogether but rather to manage death at the level of the population. In a biopolitical regime death is transformed into a rate of mortality, which is open to intervention and management. This transformation erases the fact that not all life is equally promoted. In this way, biopolitical technologies that aim to manage, protect, and promote life have at their core a profound ambivalence toward life itself. We return to this ambivalence below, drawing on scholarship on the role of race in differentiating the life being fostered. Before doing so, we bring the nonhuman into these questions of biopower and life. Biopower and nonhuman life Most scholarship on biopower refers to power/knowledge relationships that target human populations, but recent literature has begun to put biopower into conversation with several variants of posthumanism, including actor-network theory (Latour, 2005; Law and Hassard, 1999) and feminist studies of science (Haraway, 2003; 2008). This emerging literature, most of which focuses on human–animal relations, suggests that we have an anemic understanding of biopower if we look only at human life (eg, Hinchliffe and Bingham, 2008; Holloway et al, 2009; Lorimer and Driessen, 2013; Rutherford, 2007; 2011; Shukin, 2009). This scholarship shows not only that biopower enrolls the nonhuman in diverse and dynamic ways, but also that biopower is a set of relationships through which nature and society coproduce one another. For example, Holloway and colleagues call for “the formulation of more relational conceptions of biopower in which people work on nonhuman others as part of their work on themselves” (2009, page 398). In other words, efforts to improve or optimize nonhuman nature—whether through cattle breeding (Holloway et al, 2009; Lorimer and Driessen, 2013), protesting timber harvests (Braun, 2002), or materially and discursively enrolling the honeybee in the US ‘war on terror’ (Kosek, 2010)—are often connected to efforts to improve the individual and collective self. At the same time, biological life is not merely a “terrain for the exercise of power” (Moore et al, 2003, page 1) but also an active agent that an never be fully integrated into social relations. Foucault himself states that “it is not that life has been totally integrated into techniques that govern and administer it; it constantly escapes them” (1990, page 143). Life is therefore a source of resistance to dominant forms of power/knowledge.(2) In this sense, Foucault’s view of biological life as constantly escaping technologies of power is strikingly similar to the posthumanist emphasis on the agency of nonhumans. Together, these perspectives underscore that the messy realities of the material world are not impediments to the circulation of power; rather, it is in these messy realities that biopower is constituted (Law, 2004; Rutherford, 2007). Including nonhuman nature in discussions of biopower raises key questions regarding conservation and management of nature. So doing challenges both the preservationist logic that nature is an inherently valuable external realm that must be protected by humans from humans and the capitalist logic that nature is a set of commodities with exchange values determined by the free market. That is, extending biopower to consider human–nonhuman relations allows us to understand the preservationist and capitalist logics not merely as opposing forces but as connected through the vast networks in which power circulates. In particular, considering the role of nonhuman nature in relations of biopower offers geographers a way to work through “the panoptic nature of the green project” (Rutherford, 2007, page 295). Certainly it is not new to say that environmental projects are not innocent of power relations, as this has been a central message of political ecology (eg, Hecht and Cockburn, 1990; Kosek, 2006; Turner, 1993). But looking at conservation through the lens of biopolitics makes possible a series of new questions regarding the truth discourses, underlying logics, and calculative technologies by which distinctions among humans and nonhumans are “made, and made meaningful” (Mansfield, 2003, page 332). Who is able to assess, manage, and protect nature, and through what techniques are different forms of nature made both legible and lively? How do the truths that experts tell about nature relate to truths told about people? Such questions are exemplified in Rafi Youatt’s analysis of biologist EO Wilson’s proposed global biodiversity census (Youatt, 2008). Youatt argues that the biodiversity census, and particularly its emphasis on identifying yet unknown neotropical species, justifies the panopticism of global biodiversity conservation and draws on colonialist discourses of exploration, discovery, and mastery of nature, despite its emphasis on protection rather than domination. Through the biodiversity census and its processes of identification, collection of specimens, and subsequent research, nonhuman nature is packaged neatly into discrete species—a designation that paves the way not only for conservation but also for commodification and capitalization. Youatt explains: “Postmodern capitalism may protect nature materially even as it commodifies it semiotically, as in the case of protecting the Amazon rainforest for its pharmaceutical potentials” (2008, page 398). By analyzing biodiversity conservation using a framework that combines biopolitics with the posthumanist attention to the nonhuman, Youatt treats the biodiversity census as a form of biopolitical calculation. As with the rise of demographic statistics described by Foucault, nonhuman life is grasped in terms of distinct populations to be counted and managed as statistical entities; in other words, we see clearly the biodiversity census as a form of biopolitical making live. Biopower, race, and nature Less clear in analyses such as Youatt’s, however, is the ambivalence toward life that we mentioned above, in which death is brought into the fold as a means to foster life. Understanding the let die part of biopolitics requires additional analytical tools regarding the differentiation and categorization of bodies. In their biopolitical critique of liberalism and war, Michael Dillon and Julian Reid argue that promoting the emergence of life involves “ assaying life since not all life is equally productive of life and, indeed, not all life is productive of the kind of life which promotes life” (2009, page 87). That is, biopolitical rule must not only arbitrate the classification of life into species and populations, but also decide “whom to correct and whom to punish, as well as who shall live and who shall die, what life-forms will be promoted and which will be terminated” (2009, page 87). These decisions rely on distinctions between normalcy and aberrance, between biological advantages and threats. But not only must biopower distinguish between good and bad, it must also “maximize the good circulation by diminishing the bad” (Foucault, 2007, page 18). The division between what must be maximized, or made to live, and what must be diminished, or allowed to die, is based not on inherent value of an organism but rather on its supposed relation to the population. Foucault (2003) explains: “The enemies who have to be done away with are not adversaries in the political sense of the term; they are threats, either external or internal, to the population and for the population” (page 256). Foucault explicitly calls this process of differentiation “racism”, which he defines as “the break between what must live and what must die. … [It] is a way of fragmenting the field of the biological that power controls” (2003, pages 254–255). Indeed, not only is race the fragmentation of the biological, but, drawing on ideas of evolution, such fragmentation is about biologically improving life as a whole: “ racism justifies the death-function in the economy of biopower by appealing to the principle that the death of others makes one biologically stronger insofar as one is a member of a race or population, insofar as one is an element in a unitary living plurality” (2003, page 258). In her genealogy of race Ladelle McWhorter expands on this, explaining that racism in its modern incarnation is “racism against the abnormal”, the fundamental concern of which is not skin color but abnormality more broadly (2009, page 42). Racism is “ a set of power relations that produce effects we call anti-Semitism and white supremacy. But racism is not identical with and exhausted by attitudes and actions that hurt people of color or Jews, as so many people suppose. It encompasses these phenomena, but it also exceeds them” (McWhorter, 2009, page 34). The construction of race is hinged on a broader notion of biological abnormality, which is conceptualized as threats to the norm. Racism is therefore about reducing these threats, whether through complete eradication or, more likely, through forms of management, calculation, surveillance, and punishment. It seems, then, that the theory of evolution was central to the development of biopolitics; it was used to underwrite new forms of state racism, which sanctioned death in order to protect life. Race becomes the technology for distinguishing between biological normalcy and threat. The role of race in differentiating nonhuman life has received limited attention, and not all of it in biopolitical terms (see Baldwin et al, 2011; Brechin, 1996; Kosek, 2006; Mansfield, 2012b; Moore et al, 2003). We focus here on the mutual constitution of ideas of race and abnormality, ecological knowledge, and the biophysical world to argue that conservation science, as it developed in the 20th century, is fundamentally rooted in these racialized notions of evolutionary fitness that separate biological advantage from aberrance. Clearly conservation is biopolitical in that it shifts from controlling individuals to statistically managing populations and species. Even more so, it is biopolitical in that it extends the racialized logic of abnormality and death in its core notions of biological diversity, evolution, and extinction.