2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Impacts › Inequality
Zielinski, ‘18 (Rosella Cappella Zielinski, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Boston University, fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Creativity at Marine Corps University, fellow at the Clements Center for National Security at University of Texas Austin, Foreign Affairs Magazine, October 5, 2018, “U.S. Wars Abroad Increase Inequality at Home” - Emery)
We know how we got here. The United States’ descent, since the late 1970s, into quasi-oligarchic levels of wealth concentration is a story of globalization, declining union membership, and technological change, among other factors. But one explanation is often missing from this list, and that is the fact that the United States is a country at war. The U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan is currently in its seventeenth year. Together with the Iraq war and an array of “War on Terror” operations spanning the globe, such military engagement has cost the United States dearly in both blood and treasure. By one estimate, the United States’ post-9/11 military campaigns have cost the country all of $5.6 trillion. When a bill is that large, the means by which a country chooses to pay it will profoundly affect its economy, to the point of helping determine who gets rich and who stays poor. In the twentieth century, the United States financed some of its biggest wars with direct taxes and bond campaigns. These measures were progressive in nature, distributing the war burden according to citizens’ means. For this reason, many twentieth century wars had an equalizing effect on U.S. society. In recent decades, however, U.S. leaders have preferred to finance war by borrowing money while cutting taxes. This method is politically expedient, but it exacerbates inequality by benefitting wealthy citizens while burdening those with lower incomes. Unfortunately, there is little indication that lawmakers will embrace a different funding method anytime soon. BEG, STEAL...OR BORROW The global “war on terror” that followed the 9/11 attacks ushered in not only a new kind of warfare, but also a stunning shift in the way that war would be financed in the United States. Almost every previous administration had raised taxes during times of war. The George W. Bush administration did the opposite. Having already cut taxes in 2001, Bush doubled down with the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, cutting the government’s revenue by $320 million over the course of a decade. If it was to invade Afghanistan and Iraq, while also creating an anti-terror apparatus with global reach, the U.S. government would need to build up its military. To underwrite this project, Washington relied almost entirely on borrowing money at home and abroad. Bush’s successors did not change this strategy: the Bush-era tax cuts were mostly extended under Barack Obama, and in 2017 the Trump administration lowered taxes even further, particularly for the wealthy. Financing war through debt rather than taxes makes political sense. Borrowing money takes less time than collecting taxes, and this allows the government to gear up quickly for conflict. Deficit spending also keeps leaders from having to choose between military spending and domestic programs when they face budgetary constraints. Officials can more easily manage public opinion and hold on to their posts when they don’t raise taxes or ask citizens to make financial sacrifices. But for all their short-term political advantages, such “credit-card wars” are a recipe for economic inequality. This is especially true when part of the debt is held domestically. The government borrows money from citizens or institutions with the promise of repaying with interest. Those who can afford to extend loans to the government are necessarily wealthy, and these people and institutions will later recover their investments along with interest. Low- and middle-income households, meanwhile, must eventually help pay off government debt, including interest, through taxes. Underwriting war in this way amounts to a significant transfer of wealth from the lower to the upper classes. Adding tax cuts for the wealthy, unsurprisingly, does not make matters any better. Yet raising taxes is not always a preferable option. In fact, paying for war through an increase in indirect taxes, such as sales, value-added, excise, or customs taxes, also exacerbates inequality. Such taxes lead to price increases that particularly hurt low- and middle-income households, for which such spending accounts for a significant percentage of disposable income. The Bush administration may have broken with recent precedent in financing its wars with deficit spending, but the United States had tried similar strategies in the more distant past. The War of 1812, the United States’ first major war after independence, was mostly underwritten by a small circle of wealthy citizens, including through a banking syndicate created by David Parish, Stephen Girard, John Jacob Astor, and Jacob Barker. That syndicate bought up most of the government’s debt. What need remained was met through indirect taxes. The Mexican-American War and the Civil War followed more or less the same formula. All three wars increased economic disparities among U.S. citizens. WHAT YOU CAN DO FOR YOUR COUNTRY History abounds with examples of less destructive ways to pay for war. During the two World Wars and the Korean War, the U.S. government, hoping to combat inflation and to distribute costs of war more evenly, resorted to extremely high progressive income and corporate taxes. For top earners, income taxes reached up to 77 percent (World War I), 94 percent (World War II), and 91 percent (Korean War). Unlike indirect taxes, which would have disproportionately burdened poorer households, these direct taxes increased the burden for the wealthy. And unlike debt, they did not transfer the cost of war to future taxpayers, rich or poor. During World War I and World War II, the government supplemented this tax strategy with war bond campaigns that appealed to poorer citizens with patriotic appeals, including in Disney cartoons. The campaigns encouraged ordinary citizens to save by buying bonds, which were later paid back with interest, in a boon to middle- and low-income households. The combined effect of direct taxes and war bonds was that inequality declined during each war, and in the years immediately after it. The share of income going to the top one percent declined by three percent during World War I, three percent during World War II, and two percent during the Korean War. Those wars differed from today’s in part because they rested on a widespread consensus that the United States was fighting an existential battle that required shared sacrifice. Public acceptance of this belief allowed the government to demand high levels of financial sacrifice, including from the wealthy. During the Korean War, the United States’ only war paid entirely through taxation, poll after poll indicated that citizens were ready to contribute financially to the war effort. In July 1950, a Gallup survey found that a majority of people felt that the government did not ask Americans to make enough sacrifices in support of the war. In another poll that same month, 70 percent of respondents stated that they would be “willing to pay more money in taxes to support a larger army.” A month later, 51 percent agreed that the government must increase federal income taxes immediately to pay for the war. Respondents also clearly indicated that they preferred higher taxes to government borrowing. Yet the U.S. government has not always seen it fit to instill such a sense of emergency in its population. During the Vietnam War, for example, the Lyndon B. Johnson administration actively tried to shield the public from the war’s intensity. For that reason, the administration avoided tapping citizens for direct financial contributions and relied instead on borrowing. U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk explained the government’s logic at a staff conference in October 1967: The Administration made a deliberate decision not to create a war psychology in the United States. There have been no war bond campaigns, etc. The decision was made because it is too dangerous for this country really to get worked up. Maybe this was a mistake; maybe it would have been better to take steps to build up a sense of a nation at war. The course we have taken has meant expecting a great deal of our men in Vietnam, against the background of a home front going about business as usual.” The Bush administration's approach was strikingly similar. Two weeks after September 11, 2001, George W. Bush encouraged families to "go down to Disney World." And in 2003, rather than imploring citizens to make sacrifices, House Majority Leader Tom DeLay stated that "Nothing is more important in the face of war than cutting taxes." A CHANCE FOR THE LEFT Little suggests that a more progressive approach to funding the United States’ wars would run up against public opposition. In fact, recent survey research suggests that citizens' support for war taxes depends in part on whom such taxes target: a regressive national sales tax made people less enthusiastic about going to war, but a progressive tax hike aimed at Americans earning more than $400,000 a year had no adverse effect on public support for war. The United States’ modern, debt-driven warfare is, in other words, a political choice, not a necessity. Yet given the Republican lawmakers’ track record on tax cuts, it is eminently unlikely that they would support an approach relying on higher income taxes. As the left considers what a neo-progressive foreign policy would look like, it should make equitable war finance policy a part of its agenda. Barring such a partisan shift, however, we should expect borrowing to fund America’s wars to continue, exacerbating inequality in the United States for the foreseeable future.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Impacts › Inequality
Tricontinental, ‘22 (Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, international institute and think tank, “seek to bridge academic production and political and social movements in order to promote critical thinking and stimulate debates and research” The TriContinental, October 21, 2022, “The Geopolitics of Inequality: Discussing Pathways Towards a More Just World” - Emery)
I provide comprehensive evidence that the United States has benefited tremendously from the LIO, and show how critics understate both those benefits and the risks of selective disengagement. I also argue, however, that the gains have been unevenly distributed within the United States. The unequal distribution of gains from international economic exchange is a recognized problem in the theoretical literature advocating a liberal economic order.5 Globalization can create an enduring division between winners and losers unless investments are made in education and health, so that new generations can compete, and unless labour market adjustment programmes facilitate workers’ transition from declining to expanding industries. Redistributive policies, including access to post-secondary education, are necessary to ensure that more Americans partake in the gains from international involvement and to shore up the domestic foundations of the LIO. In exploring how economic and political inequality within the United States has impinged on its ability to assert hegemonic leadership, I argue that an ‘us vs them’ sentiment, internationally vis-à-vis other countries, and domestically vis-àvis non-white ethnic groups, was the primary force behind Trump’s electoral triumph. While previous presidents have more or less recommitted the United States to an internationalist foreign policy in the face of rising inequality, Trump detected festering economic and political wounds within the United States. The announcement of an intention to ‘make America great again’ resonated strongly with citizens of a Great Power who hardly felt economically privileged in relation to the rest of the world, and with white non-college-educated voters who were told they benefited from ‘white privilege’ while experiencing economic hardship and political alienation. Thus, contrary to Stiglitz, for example, who sees income inequalities in ‘white America’ as the main threat to the LIO—but does not problematize why white voters voted differently from other Americans in the same income bracket—I see political inequalities, particularly the appeal of ‘white America first’ among the white non-college-educated electorate, as a major threat to the LIO.6 The article is structured as follows. First I present the criticism of the LIO embodied in the ‘America first’ agenda as expressed on the campaign trail and in Trump’s inaugural promises. Second, I draw on International Relations (IR) theory to better understand both criticisms of the LIO and the rise of Trumpism. Third, I propose an alternative reading of the challenges the LIO confronts in both its international and it domestic foundations, as well as the relationship between the two. The final section offers concluding thoughts.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Impacts › Inequality
Tricontinental, ‘22 (Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research, international institute and think tank, “seek to bridge academic production and political and social movements in order to promote critical thinking and stimulate debates and research” The TriContinental, October 21, 2022, “The Geopolitics of Inequality: Discussing Pathways Towards a More Just World” - Emery)
At times, this context of rapid change seems to obscure one of the most obvious and at the same time outrageous issues of our contemporary existence: the abysmal difference between the living standards of the rich and the poor the world over. Evidently, we are living in an era in which global capitalism has managed to sweep under the rug some of the most detrimental results of the process of social exclusion produced by the emergence of neoliberalism and its successive crises. Discourses that time and again reinforce the hegemonic view of concentrated global capital lead us to normalise the production and reproduction of inequality in contemporary societies, as if they were the result of individual decisions by people who do not try hard enough or of bad governments. Even when the World Bank and the various think tanks of neoliberal globalisation try to present themselves ‘with a human face’, they continue to reproduce these analyses, according to which the solution to reduce the extreme inequality in our world is to grant the same opportunities to all. However, the data does not seem to support this simplistic reading. The richest 1% of the world population today holds more than 70% of global wealth. This means that, as of January 2022, the world’s 10 richest men ‘own more than the bottom 3.1 billion people’, according to an OXFAM report.1 The world’s richest, a kind of plutocracy according to some analysts, have incomes that are unthinkable for 80% of the world population. Among the 2,668 billionaires, many of the top earners are familiar names: Elon Musk (the founder and CEO of Tesla, worth $219 billion), Jeff Bezos (the former CEO of Amazon, with a fortune of $171 billion), Bernard Arnault (the CEO of LVMH, with $158 billion to his name), Bill Gates (the former CEO of Microsoft Corp, worth $129 billion), and Warren Buffett (the CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, worth $118 billion).2 How can we understand inequality other than this approach of blaming the poor for being poor? It is worth keeping in mind that the enormous income and wealth gaps we are experiencing do not only have national origins, but that the reason for these gaps lies largely in the logic of polarisation brought about by capitalism as a world system. Therefore, we must differentiate between the global and the national scales to understand why these processes constantly produce an abyss between rich and poor in contemporary capitalism. That is why Tricontinental: Institute for Social Research’s dossier no. 57 is dedicated to discussing the geopolitics of inequality, the conditions of exclusion that the North imposes on the South and that attempt, by all means, to present the idea that this inequality is temporary and that we must make a greater effort to reduce the gaps. Contemporary capitalist trends, especially since 2008, have enormously deepened the dynamics that produce inequality and that have been present since the very origin of capitalism. After a period of relative improvement in working-class incomes, the definitive rupture of the Fordist regimes in the North and of the national-popular systems in the South significantly widened the gap in living conditions between the two extremes. By definition, under this capitalist system, the opulence of the few is the product of the hunger and misery of the millions. The accelerated dynamics of Western financial power; the flexibilisation of forms of contracting, work processes, and working hours; and the relocation of the production of goods and services, among other issues, have been the main driving forces of the increasingly unequal global order since the 1973 oil crisis. Ultimately, as the geographer David Harvey points out, neoliberalism is a project of the ruling class to restore its power and profits on a global scale.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Impacts › Economic Decline
Ministry of Foreign Affairs 23 [US Hegemony and Its Perils, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China, 2/20/23 https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230220_11027664.html]
After World War II, the United States led efforts to set up the Bretton Woods System, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which, together with the Marshall Plan, formed the international monetary system centered around the U.S. dollar. In addition, the United States has also established institutional hegemony in the international economic and financial sector by manipulating the weighted voting systems, rules and arrangements of international organizations including "approval by 85 percent majority," and its domestic trade laws and regulations. By taking advantage of the dollar's status as the major international reserve currency, the United States is basically collecting "seigniorage" from around the world; and using its control over international organizations, it coerces other countries into serving America's political and economic strategy.
The United States exploits the world's wealth with the help of "seigniorage." It costs only about 17 cents to produce a 100 dollar bill, but other countries had to pony up 100 dollar of actual goods in order to obtain one. It was pointed out more than half a century ago, that the United States enjoyed exorbitant privilege and deficit without tears created by its dollar, and used the worthless paper note to plunder the resources and factories of other nations.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Impacts › General – Causes War
Cooper 20’ (Ryan Cooper; A national Correspondent of theweek.com, appeared in The Washington Monthly, The New Republic, and the Washington Post; “Why the Global Hegemony is the Worst Thing that Happened to America”; The Week; 9/14/20)//ahl
I disagree. America's status as global hegemon has been devastating for both ourselves and the world. It is high time the U.S. accustomed itself to normal country status — a great power to be sure, but no longer drastically more powerful than any other. The rise of China as the first peer nation we have had in decades just possibly might remind America of the value of diplomacy, international institutions, and minding our own business.
However, America remaining physically the most powerful single country is not the most important factor in whether China will be able to dominate the globe in future, or continue to roast the biosphere with greenhouse gases. (It currently emits twice what the U.S. does.) China is a nuclear-armed power, so physical might has only limited influence on it anyway. What matters is the political character of China's closest competitors — namely the U.S., the E.U., and India — plus the functioning of the global economy, and the broader diplomatic context.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Impacts › General – Causes War
Ping 22’ (Xin Ping; Global Times, China Daily and other publications on international affairs; “US hegemony: The Culprit of the Ukraine Crisis”; Global times; 3/20/22;
That is what is exactly happening during the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Whether it's the people of war-torn Ukraine, sanction-ridden Russia, or insecurity-ingrained Europe, all have suffered greatly. The US, the culprit of the Ukraine crisis, has been constantly taking advantage of others' misfortune to maintain its hegemony.
Every why has a wherefore. Edward Carr, a leading British scholar of international relations, reminded people more than 80 years ago that the US was a master in using kindness to disguise selfishness. Boasting abundant resources, strong industry and geographical advantage, Ukraine could have achieved development. While the country pursued a relatively balanced policy in the early years of its independence, the US supported and incited the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Square Revolution in 2014 to push for a pro-Western agenda, splitting Ukraine politically from within and geopolitically between Russia and Europe. It is really thought-provoking that the "Gateway to Europe" has become one of the poorest countries in Europe, the frontline of NATO's eastward expansion, and the fault line of "color revolutions" and conflicts.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Impacts › General – Causes War
Nuno Monteiro 14, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, Theory of Unipolar Politics, 2014, pp. 5-7
Second, I show that a unipolar world is not peaceful. Despite frequent U.S. involvement in military conflicts throughout the last two and a half decades, not much has been written on the question of how unipolarity may contribute to interstate war.’4 I claim that unipolarity generates conditions propitious for significant conflict.’ Neither the structure of a unipolar world nor U.S. strategic choices have a clear beneficial impact on the overall prospects for peace. The absence of a global balance of power between two or more states, while eliminating great-power competition, makes room for significant conflict beyond the most powerful stares in the system. Unipolarity will generate abundant opportunities for war between the unipole and recalcitrant minor powers that do not have the capabilities or allies necessary to deter it. It will also make ample room for conflict among minor powers, which are less likely to be disciplined by great-power allies, as would be the case when an overall balance of power is present. As a result, unipolarity will be prone to produce asymmetric and peripheral conflicts.¶ Finally, my argument about grand strategy derives from the claims I make about durability and peace. Because the optimal strategy for a unipole varies depending on specific features of its situation — namely, the costs of war and the benefits it extracts from its power preponderance — that strategy cannot be determined a priori theoretically. Still, it is possible to determine, based on the arguments I make about unipolar peace and durability, what is the optimal strategy for a unipole such as the contemporary United States, for which the costs of war vis-à-vis peripheral states are low relative to the benefits it extracts from its current international position of preponderance. ¶ The United States’ interests are best served by a grand strategy of defensive accommodation, which combines a military strategy aimed at maintaining the international status quo – what I call defensive dominance – with an economic strategy that makes room for accommodating the interests of rising major powers. ¶ For the United States, defensive accommodation has pluses and minuses. On the downside, it will lead to frequent U.S. involvement in peripheral military conflicts. On the upside, it is the only strategy that allows for the durability of U.S. military power preponderance.¶ Militarily, defensive dominance requires the unipole’s regular involvement in conflicts aimed at maintaining the status quo. At the same time, however, it lowers incentives for regional arms races that would lift the power of all competitors relative to that of the United States, undermining the durability of its position. Defensive dominance is therefore conducive to a durable unipolar world. The present circumstances, in which the United States derives non-negligible economic benefits from its preponderant place in the international system, make defensive dominance preferable to disengagement, which would make room for major powers to compete with each other, eventually undermining U.S. power preponderance. Defensive dominance is also a superior strategic option vis-i-vis an attempt to increase the unipole’s global position — what I call offensive dominance. To begin with, offensive dominance is likely to entail even greater U.S. involvement in interstate wars. In addition, when implemented in regions inhabited by major powers that enjoy growing economic capabilities, offensive dominance would prompt them to balance against the unipole in an attempt to guarantee their long-term survival through continued economic growth. Defensive dominance is therefore the best grand-strategic military option of the United States, allowing for the maintenance of its status as primus inter pares.¶ Defensive dominance is not sufficient to guarantee the durability of U.S. power preponderance, however. As a military strategy, it says nothing about the economic posture of the unipole. To give other states incentives to allow the continuation of U.S. military preponderance, the United States must also implement an economic strategy of growth accommodation toward major economic powers. As a consequence, the continuation of the current U.S. position as a unipole is only possible by implementing a strategy that will not only involve U.S. military forces in frequent action but may also eventually make room for other major powers to overtake the U.S. economy. Clearly, the maintenance of U.S. military power preponderance is not free of cost.¶ These arguments highlight the mixed view of unipolarity I lay out ahead. Although military power preponderance certainly allows the unipole to shape the system in ways that are beyond the reach of one great power among several, it is not without peril. Minor powers who find themselves in opposition to the unipole will have great incentives to boost their defensive capabilities. Relations with such powers will be harder to manage and, at least before they acquire greater defensive capabilities, more likely to devolve into armed conflict. At the same time, a unipole must balance the international demands of global management with the domestic investments required to maintain its power preponderance.¶ In this sense, the ironic saying “may god protect us from answered prayers” applies to the U.S. global position after the demise of the Soviet Union.’ Its erstwhile foe long gone, Washington continues to face the consequences of the power vacuum left by Moscow’s demise as a global competitor, which are not an unmitigated boon.¶ At the same time, although the picture I paint in this book is certainly less rosy than most other views of the post—Cold War world, nothing in my argument foreordains the decline of U.S. power. My theory of unipolarity accounts for the possibility of frequent conflict in a nonetheless durable unipolar system. Such is the paradoxical nature of power preponderance. The overall power advantage possessed by the contemporary United States does not mean that it will be able to convert policy preferences into outcomes peacefully. Preponderant power, at least preponderant military power, does not necessarily get states what they want.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Impacts › General – Causes War
Christopher Preble 16, vice president for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute. PhD in History from Temple University. With William Ruger. 2016. “The Problem With Primacy.” In “Our Foreign Policy Choices, Rethinking America’s Global Role” https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=741072022102024090075118113101083026016056000029024069069123111076082080009064093108016120111006027011049007074022115108007102123042042011081092085100005025006088070001052041101115092080116097001012108114029011071004086091092118120095090091004096029029&EXT=pdf
Another key problem is that primacy inadvertently increases the risk of conflict. Allies are more willing to confront powerful rivals, because they are confident that the United States will rescue them if the confrontation turns ugly, a classic case of moral hazard, or what Barry Posen calls "reckless driving." Restraining our impulse to intervene militarily or diplomatically when Our vital national interests are not threatened would reduce the likelihood that Our friends and allies will engage in such reckless behavior in the first place. Libya and Georgia are only two cases of this problem. Plus, a more restrained U.S. foreign policy would provide a powerful incentive for allies to share the burden of defense. Primacy has not stopped rivals from challenging U.S. power. Russia and China, for example, have resisted the U.S. government's efforts to expand its influence in Europe and Asia. Indeed, by provoking security fears, primacy exacerbates the very sorts of problems that it claims to prevent, including nuclear proliferation. U.S. efforts at regime change and talk of an "axis of evil" that needed to be eliminated certainly provided additional incentives for States to develop nuclear weapons to deter U.S. actions (e.g„ North Korea). Meanwhile, efforts intended to smother security competition or hostile ideologies have destabilized vast regions, undermined Our counter- terrorism efforts, and even harmed those we were ostensibly trying to help. After U S. forces deposed the tyrant Saddam Hussein in 211)3, Iraq descended into chaos and has never recovered. The situation in Libya is not much better; the United States helped Overthrow Muammar el-Qaddafi in 2011, but violence still rages. The Islamic State, which Originated in Iraq, has now established a presence in Libya as well. It is clear that those interventions were counterproductive and have failed to make America safer and more secure.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Unsustainable › Ukraine
[Robert A. Manning -- distinguished senior fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy project, Mathew Burrows -- Distinguished Fellow with the Reimagining US Grand Strategy program at the Stimson Center ,”Red Cell: The Fallacy of Perpetual US Primacy,” Stimson, 2-07-2023, , accessed 3-29-2023]
This state of affairs persisted after the Cold War, from 1990 to 2001, but violently ended with 9/11 and the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars. Then the 2007-08 global financial crisis spurred new uncertainties of a post-Cold War multipolar milieu, a redistribution of wealth and power and a time of unfinished transformation.
Enter Ukraine. Ergo, a resurgence of American hegemony standing in the way of tyranny. Certainly, the December 2022 U.S. visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy enthralled Washington and an America much in need of a hero. U.S. support for Ukraine appears popular. President Joe Biden’s success in mobilizing European and Asian allies in support of Ukraine has been impressive, a Cold War-like consensus.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Unsustainable › Ukraine
Steele, 3-20 -- former Moscow correspondent for the Guardian
[Johnathan Steele, “Compare Iraq with Ukraine. It’s clear the era of US global supremacy is over,” The Guardian, 3-20-2023, , accessed 3-29-2023]
It’s a useful coincidence that the 20th anniversary of George W Bush and Tony Blair’s illegal attack on Iraq falls only a matter of weeks after the anniversary of Vladimir Putin’s illegal attack on Ukraine. Neither war was authorised by the UN. Both are marked by massive destruction and huge loss of life.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Unsustainable › Military Decline
[The Wall Street Journal Editorial Board, “The US Military’s Growing Weakness,” The Wall Street Journal, 10-17-2022, , accessed 3-29-2023]
Americans like to think their military is unbeatable if politicians wouldn’t get in the way. The truth is that U.S. hard power isn’t what it used to be. That’s the message of the Heritage Foundation’s 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, which is reported here for the first time and describes a worrisome trend.
Heritage rates the U.S. military as “weak” and “at growing risk of not being able to meet the demands of defending America’s vital national interests.” The weak rating, down from “marginal” a year earlier, is the first in the index’s nine-year history.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Unsustainable › Military Decline
Eaglen, 22 --Senior Fellow at AEI
[Mackenzie Eaglen, “The U.S. Military Is in Decline While China Grows More Powerful,” AEI, 11-08-2022, , accessed 3-29-2023]
Among our military’s senior brass, the chorus of warnings over Chinese military capabilities continues to grow ever louder. Last week, the Commander of US Strategic Command, Admiral Charles Richard, stated that when it comes to America’s ability to deter China, “the ship is slowly sinking.” He added, “it is sinking, as fundamentally they are putting capability into the field faster than we are.”
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Unsustainable › Dollar Heg
Iglesias, ‘23 (Miguel Otero Iglesias PhD, Senior Analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute, Professor at IE School of Global and Public Affairs, Research Associate at the EU-Asia Institute at ESSCA School of Management in France, Lecturer at Oxford Brookes University, PhD in International Political Economy, Senior Fellow at think tanks and research groups across Europe, Royal Institute of Elcano, Spain, “Is US dollar hegemony under threat?” May 30, 2023, - Emery)
More than a decade after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), it is a good moment to reassess power relations in the international monetary system and analyse the state of US dollar hegemony. In the aftermath of the great recession, there was a certain consensus that it had reached its peak. For the first time, Chinese policymakers were openly calling for moving away from the greenback and starting in earnest to promote the renminbi’s (RMB) internationalization. At the same time, the then-fashionable BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), which had weathered the crisis relatively well, also began having regular summits to promote the use of their domestic currencies. And even European leaders like Nicolas Sarkozy took advantage of France’s G20 presidency in 2011 to discuss how to reduce the world’s dollar dependence. Since then, many important geopolitical events have happened. In 2012 the European debt crisis almost ended in Grexit, although the euro finally survived, and the eurozone, thanks to a series of ambitious reforms, became structurally more resilient. In 2016 Trump came to power and pulled out of the Iran deal, pushing the Europeans to find alternative ways to conduct trade and settle energy imports (especially gas) without relying on the dollar. Then, in 2020, came the pandemic, again massive quantitative easing, and in 2022 the war in Ukraine with the consequent freezing of Russian assets in western countries, and in the same year a ‘steep’ hike of interest rates by the Federal Reserve (Fed) to fight their effects. The question, however, is whether these shocks have transformed the international monetary system in a substantial manner. On the one hand, some argue that these episodes have only reinforced the centrality of the dollar. The greenback is still, by far, the global currency of choice, as individuals, corporations and monetary authorities continue to rely heavily on the dollar as a medium of exchange, a unit of account and a store of value. Moreover, the Fed remains the de facto central bank of the world, as evidenced by the enormous liquidity that it provided through its currency swap lines to both developed and developing countries during the COVID-19 lockdowns, as well as the dollar shock unleashed by its rising rate policy in Europe and beyond. However, it is also true that the Trump years, which marked the start of a trade and tech war between the US and China, and the recent sanctions applied on Russia, have accelerated the desire of at least these two powers, but perhaps also of India, Brazil and the Gulf States, to de-dollarise even further and quicker. High inflation and the rise of alternative payment systems, such as the Chinese Cross-Border Interbank Payments System (CIPS), can also chip away at the dollar’s dominance. The recently re-elected President of Brazil, Lula da Silva, summed up well the increasing sentiment (and frustration) in the Global South by stating: ‘Every night I ask myself why all countries have to base their trade on the dollar… why can’t we do trade on our own currencies?’.[1] So, although the US dollar still reigns supreme, is it possible that we are witnessing a slow but structural shift towards a multipolar monetary system? We find that, despite a prolonged fall in dollar reserves, the greenback’s standing across the other functions of money remains high. However, the increased reliance on financial sanctions as a foreign policy tool may discourage its international use by countries who fear falling from America’s grace, particularly in the Global South. Additionally, the slow but steady rise of alternative financial infrastructures could eventually push countries to seek different vehicle currencies, including their own. The efforts by China, in particular, to offer alternatives to dollar hegemony deserve close attention.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Unsustainable › Dollar Heg
Ahmed, ‘23 (Umais Ahmed, International affairs columnist at Modern Diplomacy and The Diplomatic Insight, Bachelor's degree in International Relations at the University of Karachi, Pakistan, “A looming threat to Dollar’s hegemony but an edge to Global Capitalism?” April 15, 2023, - Emery)
The dollar dominance has been steadily shrinking since 1990 and today, as per the IMF’s Currency Composition of Official Foreign Reserves data, the US dollar holds the 60 percent of the world’s reserve currency assets. It has become increasingly problematic for economies worldwide. Therefore, de-dollarization, or moving away from the US dollar as the dominant global reserve currency can potentially have numerous advantages for global capitalism. To begin with, this advancement could help in diminishing the centralization of economic power in the hands of one nation i.e., the United States of America. Moreover, by decentralizing the currency and financial systems, utilized in international trade and finance, nations could reduce their susceptibility to the economic and political risks conjoined with the US dollar, such as US sanctions and market capriciousness, that could easily be discerned in the form of sanctions on Russia. Additionally, de-dollarization could foster financial stability and potency by diminishing the impact of the US dollar and other associated risks on the international financial system. As shown during the financial crisis of 2008, the global financial system’s interconnectivity can cause financial contagion and instability. Therefore, De-dollarization and currency diversification could lessen the probability and severity of future financial crises by promoting a more diverse and decentralized financial system. Moreover, de-dollarization can foster greater economic and financial inclusivity by reducing barriers to entry for countries and businesses that may have been excluded from the US-dominated financial system which would result in ameliorating the competitiveness, leading to better products and services, and lower prices for consumers. This can potentially result in increased economic growth and development, particularly in emerging markets. No doubt, past endeavors to dethrone the dollar ended in whimper and even today, this de-dollarization “will not happen overnight,” as French columnist Le Figaro Girard has rightly argued, but the current trend to dump the greenback is “obviously irreversible”. Therefore, the process of de-dollarization is complex and protracted however, this time, there might exist multiple reasons for a country to move away from using the US dollar as a reserve currency. From the latest developments and factors, it suggests that the US dollar’s hegemony might be under threat and burgeoning challenges to its status could lead to a gradual shift towards a multipolar global financial system or some other alternatives like shifting to multi-currency global economy. Also, while the threat to the dollar’s hegemony is imminent, this won’t afflict global capitalism; rather it would bolster the growth of global capitalism with far-reaching implications. Therefore, as the US continues to grapple with these challenges posed by the contenders, it will be intriguing to see how these developments unfold and shape the future of global capitalism.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Unsustainable › Dollar Heg
Ahmed, ‘23 (Umais Ahmed, International affairs columnist at Modern Diplomacy and The Diplomatic Insight, Bachelor's degree in International Relations at the University of Karachi, Pakistan, “A looming threat to Dollar’s hegemony but an edge to Global Capitalism?”April 15, 2023, -Emery)
The US dollar has been the dominant global reserve currency for decades and during this time, plenty of competitors have emerged and vanquished. Also, it’s a fact, the dominance of dollar has been so widespread that a considerable number of individuals had never contemplated the possible outcomes of forsaking it in favor of an alternative. However, recent developments in international order might suggest that the US dollar’s position is precarious this time. Considering his concerns over eroding away of US dollar’s dominance, Fareed Zakaria, political commentator, in a recent episode of his show on CNN said, “If the US dollar’s global supremacy erodes, America will face a reckoning like none before”. In such circumstances, the recent developments in the international system do insinuate a threat to the greenback, however, it engenders many questions as well. One inevitable question that could not be set aside is: what these developments would mean to global capitalism? Historically, the United States’ dollar has been ruling the financial world since the culmination of World War II and with the subsequent inception of the Bretton Woods System in the mid-1940s as an effort to stabilize the international monetary system. This system created a collective international currency exchange regime pegged to the U.S. dollar which was, in turn, pegged to the price of gold. However, this Bretton Woods system collapsed due to the increasing competitiveness of European and Japanese exports with the US exports, meaning it was importing more than it was exporting. This, coupled with rising inflation and a decrease in US gold reserves, put further pressure on the dollar’s peg to gold. Consequently, In 1971, President Nixon announced his new economic policy, “Nixon Shock”, which ceased the direct convertibility of U.S. dollars to gold that ended both the gold standard and the limit on the amount of currency that could be printed. In spite of this event, the dollar remained the world’s reserve currency or maybe there existed no viable reserve-currency alternatives at that time. However, the situation might seem different today as many nations – Russia, China, Iran, India, Brazil, Argentina, and Saudi Arabia – have accelerated efforts in recent months toward arrangements to reduce their dependence on the dollar. Recently, the Russian president has endorsed “yuan” as the currency of choice at the three-day summit of Chinese president, Xi Jinping. In his talks, Putin said, “We are in favor of using the Chinese yuan for settlements between Russia and the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America”. Apart from this, speculations are being made that the BRICS might come up with “new currency” as a better alternative reserve currency which would be pegged to the value of gold. There could be several reasons behind these clumsy moves, however, one reason that couldn’t be shunned is the Ukrainian war. According to political economists and sanctions analysts, the United States’ dominance over the global financial system and its ability to weaponize it, raises concerns for other nations that the US could anytime use the power of its currency to target them the way it has sanctioned Russia. This maneuvers them to abridge their dependence on the dollar and subsequently, propels them to test other alternatives to reduce the dollar’s hegemony. As these nations trot toward finding other alternatives for the global reserve currency, what edge does it provide to global capitalism?
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Unsustainable › General
Li, ‘22 (Minqi Li, Professor of Political Economy in the Department of Economics at the University of Utah, LuXemburg, October 2022, “The collapse of US hegemony” - Emery)
Measured by market exchange rate, the US share of the global economy declined from 30 percent in 2000 to 25 percent in 2020. During the same period, China’s share of the global economy rose from 4 percent to 17 percent (World Bank 2022). It is widely expected that China will overtake the US to become the world’s largest economy in the next few years. During the previous hegemonic transitions, the new hegemonic power was able to replace the old, declining hegemonic power only after one or two major wars that involved all the major powers at the time. In the next few decades, we are unlikely to observe “World War Three” in the form of a total war between the declining hegemonic power (the United States) and a major challenger (such as China or Russia). This is partly because in the era of nuclear weapons, the costs of a total war between major powers have dramatically increased to include not only the death of millions but also an almost certain mutual destruction of all the major combatants. Despite the decline of the American hegemony, the US is likely to remain the world’s predominant military power in the coming decades (Beckley 2018). This is likely to discourage potential hegemonic challengers from engaging in direct military confrontation against the United States. Even though “World War Three” is not about to break out any time soon, hegemonic decline will have and, in some ways, has already had major consequences. As explained above, in a world system based on inter-state competition, hegemonic power is indispensable to provide “system-level solutions” to “system-level problems.” In the past, maintaining system-wide “peace” mainly had to do with preventing major military conflicts between major powers. But in the era of nuclear weapons, maintaining long-term, sustainable system-wide “peace” also requires effective containment of nuclear proliferation
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Unsustainable › General
Street ‘18 (Paul Street, PhD, professor of US History at the University of Chicago, journalist and historian, PhD in US History, Canadian Dimension, March 1, 2018, “The world will not mourn the decline of US hegemony” - Emery)
But it isn’t just the right-wing that writes and speaks in such terms about how Trump is contributing to the decline of US hegemony. A recent Time magazine reflection by the liberal commentator Karl Vick (who wrote in strongly supportive terms about the giant January 2017 Women’s March against Trump) frets that that Trump’s “America First” and authoritarian views have the world “looking for leadership elsewhere.” “Could this be it?” Vick asks. “Might the American Century actually clock out at just 72 years, from 1945 to 2017? No longer than Louis XIV ruled France? Only 36 months more than the Soviet Union lasted, after all that bother?” I recently reviewed a manuscript on the rise of Trump written by a left-liberal American sociologist. Near the end of this forthcoming and mostly excellent and instructive volume, the author finds it “worrisome” that other nations see the US “abdicating its role as the world’s leading policeman” under Trump—and that, “given what we have seen so far from the [Trump] administration, US hegemony appears to be on shakier ground than it has been in a long time.” For the purposes of this report, I’ll leave aside the matter of whether Trump is, in fact, speeding the decline of US global power (he undoubtedly is) and how he’s doing that to focus instead on a very different question: What would be so awful about the end of “the American Era”—the seven-plus decades of US global economic and related military supremacy between 1945 and the present? Why should the world mourn the “premature” end of the “American Century”? It would be interesting to see a reliable opinion poll on how the politically cognizant portion of the 94 percent of humanity that lives outside the US would feel about the end of US global dominance. My guess is that Uncle Sam’s weakening would be just fine with most Earth residents who pay attention to world events. According to a global survey of 66,000 people conducted across 68 countries by the Worldwide Independent Network of Market Research (WINMR) and Gallup International at the end of 2013, Earth’s people see the United States as the leading threat to peace on the planet. The US was voted top threat by a wide margin. There is nothing surprising about that vote for anyone who honestly examines the history of “US foreign affairs,” to use a common elite euphemism for American imperialism. Still, by far and away world history’s most extensive empire, the US has at least 800 military bases spread across more than 80 foreign countries and “troops or other military personnel in about 160 foreign countries and territories.” The US accounts for more than 40 percent of the planet’s military spending and has more than 5,500 strategic nuclear weapons, enough to blow the world up 5 to 50 times over. Last year it increased its “defense” (military empire) spending, which was already three times higher than China’s, and nine times higher than Russia’s. Think it’s all in place to ensure peace and democracy the world over, in accord with the standard boilerplate rhetoric of US presidents, diplomats and senators? Do you know any other good jokes?
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Unsustainable › General
McCoy, ‘21 (Alfred McCoy PhD, J.R.W. Smail Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, PhD in International Affairs from Yale, The Nation, January 19, 2021, “American Hegemony Is Ending With a Whimper, Not a Bang” - Emery)
When empires decline and fall, they seldom collapse in the sort of sudden apocalypse portrayed in a monumental series of paintings entitled “The Course of Empire” by another denizen of the Catskill Mountains, the renowned artist Thomas Cole. His 1836 painting in that series, now appropriately enough hung at the Smithsonian Museum in Washington, shows a “savage enemy” plundering a grand imperial capital whose inhabitants, debased by years of luxurious living, can only flee in terror while women are raped and buildings burn. Empires, however, usually experience a long, less dramatic decline before they fall in the Roman fashion, thanks to events whose logic only becomes apparent years or even decades later, as historians try to sort through the rubble. So it’s likely to be in what, until mid–last week, was (and still in many ways remains) Donald Trump’s America, where the signs of decline are as erratic as they are omnipresent. The most telling harbinger of that decline, Trump himself, is now in exile at his Mar-a-Lago Club in Florida. Ten years ago in an essay for TomDispatch titled “Four Scenarios for the End of the American Century by 2025,” I suggested that US global hegemony would end not with Thomas Cole’s apocalyptic bang but instead with the whimper of empty populist rhetoric. “Riding a political tide of disillusionment and despair,” I wrote in December 2010, “a far-right patriot captures the presidency with thundering rhetoric, demanding respect for American authority and threatening military retaliation or economic reprisal. The world pays next to no attention as the American Century ends in silence.” Trump’s election in 2016 made all too real what, until then, had only seemed to me a troubling possibility. With a legerdemain worthy of that 19th century showman P.T. Barnum’s bag of bunkum (like the supposed Cardiff Giant or the Fiji Island Mermaid), Trump’s TV show The Apprentice presented The Donald as a self-made billionaire of extraordinary financial savvy. Who better to rescue America from the job losses, stagnant wages, and foreign competition brought on by economic globalization? But Trump had cheated his way into an Ivy League college; many of his businesses had gone bankrupt; and his much-vaunted entrepreneurial flair came down essentially to frittering away a $400 million inheritance from his father. As journalist H.L. Mencken predicted back in 1920, America had finally come to the point where “the plain folks of the land will reach their heart’s desire at last and the White House will be adorned by a downright moron.” Once in office, Trump soon bent the nation (but not the world) to his will, rupturing time-tested alliances, tearing up treaties, denying incontrovertible climate science, and demanding respect for American authority with a thundering, if largely empty, rhetoric that threatened military retaliation or economic reprisals globally. Despite the manifest inanity of his policies, the Republican Party capitulated, corporate tycoons applauded, and nearly half the American public cleaved to their newfound savior. As with all sellout shows, the best was saved for last. When the Covid-19 pandemic struck with full force in March 2020, Trump turned up at the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta, donning a MAGA hat, to proclaim his “natural ability” when it came to medical science, while distinguished doctors stood by like studio extras in mute testimony to his otherwise risible claims. As the pandemic began climbing toward its terrible, still developing toll, Trump hijacked White House briefings by medical experts to promote a succession of crackpot claims—wearing a mask was merely “politically correct”; Covid-19 was just another flu that “becomes weaker with warmer weather”; hydroxychloroquine was a cure; and shining ultraviolet “light inside of the body” or injecting “disinfectant” were possible treatments. A surprising number of Americans started drinking bleach to protect themselves from the virus, forcing months of public health warnings. After nearly a century in which the United States had been a world leader in promoting public health, the Trump administration, to escape blame for its own escalating failures, walked out of the World Health Organization. Lending the country the aura of a failed state, the CDC itself, once the world’s gold standard in medical research, bungled the development of a coronavirus test and so forfeited any serious, nationwide attempt to successfully track and trace the disease (the most effective means of controlling it). While smaller nations like New Zealand, South Korea, and even impoverished Rwanda effectively curbed Covid-19, by the end of Trump’s term the United States already had experienced more than 400,000 deaths and 24 million infections—significantly above any other developed nation’s death rate and a full quarter of the world’s total cases. Meanwhile, Beijing mobilized a rigorous public health campaign that quickly contained the virus to just 4,600 deaths in a population of 1.4 billion. In only four months, China virtually eliminated the virus (despite periodic new local breakouts) and had its economy humming along with a 5 percent increase in gross domestic product, which accounted for 30 percent of global growth last year. Meanwhile, after 11 months of an incessant pandemic, the United States remained mired in a crippling recession. This striking disparity in state performance only accelerated China’s quest to surpass the United States as the world’s largest economy and, with all that financial clout, become its preeminent power. A Tragicomic Encore. It was, however, President Trump’s bid for an encore that would prove truly extraordinary when it came to imperial decline. During its 70 years as a global hegemon, Washington’s public promotion of democracy has been the signature program that has helped legitimate its global leadership (no matter the CIA-style interventions it launched or the colonial-style wars it continually fought). While the Cold War often compromised that commitment in particularly striking ways, following its end Washington has spent 30 years officially promoting fair voting and democratic transitions, with leaders like former president Jimmy Carter flying off to capitals on five continents to oversee and encourage free elections. Suddenly, the world watched in slacked-jaw amazement as, on January 6 on the White House ellipse, the president denounced a fair American election as fraudulent and sent a mob of 10,000 white nationalists, QAnon conspiracists, and other Trumpsters off to storm the Capitol, where Congress was ratifying the transition to a new administration. Adding to this failed-state aura, the country’s once-formidable national security apparatus crumpled like a Third World constabulary as right-wing militiamen breached the frail security cordon around the Capitol and stormed its halls as if they were a lynch mob hunting for congressional leaders. House majority leader Steny Hoyer’s desperate calls to a dawdling Pentagon and Maryland Governor Larry Hogan’s dangerously delayed mobilization of his state’s National Guard, caused by the US military’s compromised chain of command, only seemed to echo the sort of tropical coup scenarios I witnessed in Manila, the capital of the Philippines, during the 1980s. When Congress was finally back in session, the Capitol still rang with Republican calls, in the name of national unity, for forgetting what the president had incited. In that way, Republican congressional representatives seemed to echo the kind of impunity that has long protected fallen military juntas in Asia or Latin America from any accounting for their countless crimes. This attempt, in other words, to perpetuate a would-be autocrat’s power through a (failed) coup was the sort of spectacle that many millions living in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have experienced in their own fragile states but never expected to see in America. Suddenly, our supposedly exceptional nation seemed tragically ordinary. The shimmering dome of the Capitol once symbolized the vitality of this nation’s democracy, inspiring others to follow its principles or at least acquiesce to its power. This country now looks tattered and tired, caught like others before it between forgetting in the name of unity or demanding the powerful be held accountable for high crimes that will otherwise haunt the nation. Instead of aspiring to America’s ideals or entrusting their security to its power, many nations will likely find their own way forward, cutting deals with all comers, starting with China. Despite an aura of overwhelming strength, empires, even ones as powerful as America’s, often prove surprisingly fragile and their decline regularly comes far sooner than anyone could have imagined—particularly when the cause is not Thomas Cole’s “savage enemy” but their own self-destructive instincts.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Unsustainable › General
McCoy, 21 -- Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin-Madison
[Alfred McCoy, “American Hegemony Is Ending With a Whimper, Not a Bang,” The Nation, 1-29-2021, , accessed 3-29-2023]
THE DECLINE AND FALL OF YOU-KNOW-WHICH GREAT POWER
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Bad › Unsustainable › General
Cunningham 2/25
[Finian Cunningham has written extensively on international affairs. He is a Master’s graduate in Agricultural Chemistry and worked as a scientific editor for the Royal Society of Chemistry, Cambridge, England, before pursuing a career in newspaper journalism, “US Collapse – the Spectacle of Our Time,” 2.25.2018, <>//wyo-hdm]
May you live in interesting times, goes the Chinese proverb. Few can doubt that we are indeed living in such an interesting time. Big changes are afoot in the world, it seems. None more so than the collapsing of the American Empire. The US is going through an historic "correction" in the same way that the Soviet Union did some 30 years ago when the latter was confronted with the reality of its unsustainable political and economic system. (That's not meant to imply, however, that socialism is unviable, because arguably the Soviet Union had fatally strayed from its genuine socialist project into something more akin to unwieldy state capitalism.) In any case, all empires come to an end eventually. History is littered with the debris of countless empires. Why should the American Empire be any different? It's not. Only arrogant "American exceptionalism" deludes itself from the reality. The notable thing is just how in denial the political class and the US news media are about the unfolding American crisis. This is partly where the whole "Russiagate" narrative comes into play. Blaming Russia for allegedly destabilizing US politics and society is a cover for denial over the internal rot facing the US. The Mueller Indictment in the 'Russiagate' Scandal Reeks of Hypocrisy Some may scoff at the very idea of an "American Empire". That's something Europeans did, not us, goes the apologist for US power. The quick retort to that view is to point out that the US has over 1,000 military bases in more than 100 countries around the world. If that is not a manifestation of empire then what is? For seven decades since the Second World War, "Pax Americana" was the grandiose name given to US imperial design for the global order. The period was far from peaceful as the vainglorious name suggests. Dozens of wars, proxy conflicts and violent subversions were carried by the US on every continent in order to maintain its empire. The so-called "global policeman" was more often a "global thug". That US empire is now teetering at the cusp of an emerging multipolar world order led by China, Russia and other rising powers. When US leaders complain about China and Russia "reshaping the global order" to reflect their interests what the American leaders are tacitly admitting is the coming end of Washington's presumed hegemony. Rather than accepting the fate of demise, the US is aggressively resisting by denigrating China and Russia's power as somehow illegitimate. It's the classic denial reaction of a sore loser. So, what are the telltale signs that the US is indeed undergoing a seminal "correction" — or collapse? The heyday of American capitalism is well passed. The once awesome productive system is a skeleton of its former self. The rise of massive social poverty alongside obscene wealth among a tiny elite is a sure sign that the once mighty American economy is chronically moribund. The country's soaring $20 trillion national debt is another symptom of chronic atrophy. Recent self-congratulatory whooping by President Trump of "economic recovery" is like the joy felt from looking at a mirage. The roaring stock market is an elite phenomenon which can just as easily slump over night. What the champagne bubbles can't disguise is the structural failing of US capitalism to reverse exploding inequality and endemic poverty across America. The national prowess of US capitalism has been superseded by global capitalism where American corporations among others scour the planet for cheap labor and tax havens. There is no going back to a supposed golden age, no matter how much Trump crows about "America First". The other side of the coin from historic US economic demise is the concomitant rise in its militarism as a way to compensate for its overall loss of power. It is no coincidence that since the end of the Cold War following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, US military interventions around the world have erupted with increased frequency and duration. The US is in a veritable permanent state of war actively deploying its forces simultaneously in several countries, particularly in the oil-rich Middle East. Washington of course gives itself a fig leaf cover by calling its surge in militarism a "war on terror" or "defending allies". But, increasingly, US war conduct is seen for what it plainly is — violation of international law and the sovereignty of nations for the pursuit of American imperial interests. In short, the US is patently lashing out as a rogue regime. There's no disguising that fiendish fact. In addition to waging wars, bombing countries, sponsoring terrorist proxies and assassinating enemies at will with drones, Washington is increasingly threatening others with military aggression. In recent months, North Korea and Iran have been openly threatened based on spurious claims. Russia and China have also been explicitly warned of American aggression in several strategic documents published by the Trump administration. The grounds for American belligerence are baseless. As noted, the real motive is to do with compensating for its own inherent political, economic and social crises. That then amounts to American leaders inciting conflicts and wars, which is in itself a grave violation of international law — a crime against peace, according to Nuremberg principles. The American Empire is failing and flailing. This is the spectacle of our time. The Western mainstream news media are either blind, ignorant or complicit in denying the historic collapse. Such media are indulging reckless fantasies of the US political class to distract from the potential internal implosion. Casting around for scapegoats to "explain" the deep inherent problems, the political class are using Russia and alleged Russian "interference" as a pretext. World history has reached a foreboding cross-roads due to the collapsing of the American Empire. Can we navigate a safe path forward avoiding catastrophic war that often accompanies the demise of empires? A lot, it seems, depends on ordinary American people becoming politically organized to challenge their dysfunctional system run by and for the elites. If the American people cannot hold their elites to account and break their corrupt rule, overhauling it with something more equitable and democratic, then the world is in peril of being plunged into total war. We can only but wish our American brothers and sisters solidarity and success.