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2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Innovation Adv › UBI Hurts Economy

UBI is a bad idea for the economy – it imposes distortionary costs.

Acemoglu 19 (Daron, Professor of Applied Economics, Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, “Why Universal Basic Income might not be the answer,” World Economic Forum, 6/26/2019, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/06/why-universal-basic-income-is-a-bad-idea)

But UBI is a flawed idea, not least because it would be prohibitively expensive unless accompanied by deep cuts to the rest of the safety net. In the US (population: 327 million), a UBI of just $1,000 per month would cost around $4 trillion per year, which is close to the entire federal budget in 2018. Without major cost savings, US federal tax revenue would have to be doubled, which would impose massive distortionary costs on the economy. And, no, a permanent UBI could not be financed with government debt or newly printed currency.

Sacrificing all other social programs for the sake of a UBI is a terrible idea. Such programs exist to address specific problems, such as the vulnerability of the elderly, children, and disabled people. Imagine living in a society where children still go hungry, and where those with severe health conditions are deprived of adequate care, because all the tax revenue has gone to sending monthly checks to every citizen, millionaires and billionaires included.

2023 CNDI Negative
UBI NEG › Innovation Adv › UBI Hurts Economy

There are many jobs available, but UBI would lower the labor force, causing a decline in economic growth.

Minogue 18 (Rachel, Senior Analyst on Supply Chain Resiliency, International Trade Administration, “Five Problems with Universal Basic Income,” Third Way, 5/24/2018, https://www.thirdway.org/memo/five-problems-with-universal-basic-income#:~:text=UBI%20has%20the%20potential%20to,resulting%20in%20lower%20overall%20prosperity.)

Many of the most ardent UBI supporters believe the policy is an answer to a world where work is vanishing. This is a popular view in Silicon Valley, where many predict widespread technological unemployment is just around the corner.4 But there is almost no evidence that work is ending. Instead, work is changing.

The US economy employs more people today than ever, with 37 million jobs added since the introduction of Microsoft Windows in 1993 and 190,000 new jobs created per month over the last year on average.5

2023 CNDI Affirmative
At › At: Inflation DA › At: Inflation Impact

Inflation fears sacrifice vulnerable populations for economic mysticism

Prescod 6-24-20

(Paul, HS teacher/Member of the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/06/case-for-job-guarantee-review-pavlina-tcherneva)

The book offers a revealing history on the concept of the natural rate of unemployment. Mainstream economists warn that if unemployment is too low, employers will need to raise wages and prices. They’ve deemed this all-elusive “natural” sweet spot as the Non-Accelerating Rate of Unemployment (NAIRU). Federal Reserve chairman Jerome Powell unintentionally revealed the absurdity of this notion when he said, “We need the concept of a natural rate of unemployment. We need to have some sense of whether unemployment is high, low, or just right.” Since the postwar years the Congressional Budget Office has asserted the “just right” level of unemployment to be between 4.5 percent and 6.5 percent. In other words, if over 13 million workers are unemployed today we should be satisfied with this as “just right.” While traditional economists fret over the costs of inflation, this book paints a vivid picture of the social costs caused by unemployment. People who are out of a job have a more difficult time finding work, especially if they’ve been unemployed long term. It creates a dangerous cycle in the broader economy where people cut back spending and fuel further layoffs from businesses. The loss of stable, blue-collar work is the primary cause of the “deaths of despair” often mentioned when discussing working-class white Americans. Our country is plagued by phenomena like suicide, alcoholism, and depression. Unemployment cuts people off from social networks and a sense of usefulness, creating and fueling all these ills. Creating quality employment for all who want it should be the chief concern of the federal government, not the bogeyman of inflation.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
At › At: Inflation DA › At: Spending Link

Empirics prove fear of government spending is nonsense

Prescod 6-24-20

(Paul, HS teacher/Member of the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/06/case-for-job-guarantee-review-pavlina-tcherneva)

The book adroitly addresses the question of how to pay for such an ambitious proposal. Recent events have already started to answer this question for many Americans. To deal with the economic fallout from the pandemic Congress passed a $2.2 trillion stimulus package, much of it going into corporate slush funds and stock buybacks. Somehow, money is always there for capital when it needs it. Ruling class calls for fiscal restraint are never applied to bank bailouts, tax cuts for the rich, and endless wars. Though the book is not a treatise on Money Monetary Theory (MMT), some of its guiding features are highlighted in order to explain the mechanisms of financing the federal job guarantee. Tcherneva asserts, as other adherents of MMT do, that a monetarily sovereign government like the US cannot really run out of money. But regardless of one’s views on MMT, the book makes a strong argument for the broad-based economic benefits a federal job guarantee could ensure. For one, it would end the pressure for states to fall over themselves offering subsidies to corporations in exchange for jobs. As states compete for investment they lose important tax revenue, and usually jobs bounce from one state to another anyway. A simulation from the Levy Institute found that the budgetary impact of a federal job guarantee would only be 1.5 percent of GDP. Findings also showed it would boost real GDP by half a trillion dollars and increase private sector employment by 3 to 4 million jobs, all without significantly increasing inflation. While a minimum wage increase could cause a one-time hike in prices, that does not constitute inflation because it isn’t continuous. There are historical precedents one can look at to support these conclusions. Tcherneva points out that in 1949 the minimum wage doubled without accelerating inflation. This was also a year when we were as close to full employment as we’ve ever been. Examples like these, along with the recent massive government stimulus, should do away with the idea that there is no money to provide quality employment to everyone.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
At › At: Cap K › At: Climate Reps Link

Learning about climate scenarios galvanizes public concern opens up opportunity for real change and better policy

Kemp et al ‘22

(Kemp, L., Xu, C., Depledge, J., Ebi, K.L., Gibbins, G., Kohler, T.A., Rockström, J., Scheffer, M., Schellnhuber, H.J., Steffen, W. and Lenton, T.M, August 1, 2022, "Climate Endgame: Exploring catastrophic climate change scenarios," PNAS, )

Why do we need to know about the plausible worst cases? First, risk management and robust decision-making under uncertainty requires knowledge of extremes. For example, the minimax criterion ranks policies by their worst outcomes (28). Such an approach is particularly appropriate for areas characterized by high uncertainties and tail risks. Emissions trajectories, future concentrations, future warming, and future impacts are all characterized by uncertainty. That is, we can’t objectively prescribe probabilities to different outcomes (29). Climate damages lie within the realm of “deep uncertainty”: We don’t know the probabilities attached to different outcomes, the exact chain of cause and effect that will lead to outcomes, or even the range, timing, or desirability of outcomes (, 30). Uncertainty, deep or not, should motivate precaution and vigilance, not complacency. Catastrophic impacts, even if unlikely, have major implications for economic analysis, modeling, and society’s responses (31, 32). For example, extreme warming and the consequent damages can significantly increase the projected social cost of carbon (31). Understanding the vulnerability and responses of human societies can inform policy making and decision-making to prevent systemic crises. Indicators of key variables can provide early warning signals (33). Knowing the worst cases can compel action, as the idea of “nuclear winter” in 1983 galvanized public concern and nuclear disarmament efforts. Exploring severe risks and higher-temperature scenarios could cement a recommitment to the 1.5 °C to 2 °C guardrail as the “least unattractive” option (34). Understanding catastrophic climate scenarios can also inform policy interventions, including last-resort emergency measures like solar radiation management (SRM), the injection of aerosols into the stratosphere to reflect sunlight (35). Whether to resort to such measures depends on the risk profiles of both climate change and SRM scenarios. One recent analysis of the potential catastrophic risk of stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI) found that the direct and systemic impacts are under-studied (36). The largest danger appears to come from “termination shock”: abrupt and rapid warming if the SAI system is disrupted. Hence, SAI shifts the risk distribution: The median outcome may be better than the climate change it is offsetting, but the tail risk could be worse than warming (36). There are other interventions that a better understanding of catastrophic climate change could facilitate. For example, at the international level, there is the potential for a “tail risk treaty”: an agreement or protocol that activates stronger commitments and mechanisms when early-warning indicators of potential abrupt change are triggered.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
At › At: Cap K › At: Reformism Link

The aff’s explicit formulation of environmental problems as structurally related to socio-politics is key- it forecloses piecemeal incrementalism in favor of radical change

Erik Swyngedouw in 6 Department of Geography, School of Environment and Development, Manchester University, Impossible “Sustainability” and the Post-Political Condition, Forthcoming in: David Gibbs and Rob Krueger (Eds.) Sustainable Development Guilford Press, New York.

Therefore, as Badiou (2005a) argues, a new radical politics must revolve around the construction of great new fictions that create real possibilities for constructing different socio-environmental futures. To the extent that the current post-political condition, which combines apocalyptic environmental visions with a hegemonic neoliberal view of social ordering, constitutes one particular fiction (one that in fact forecloses dissent, conflict, and the possibility of a different future), there is an urgent need for different stories and fictions that can be mobilised for realisation. This requires foregrounding and naming different socio-environmental futures, making the new and impossible enter the realm of politics and of democracy, and recognizing conflict, difference, and struggle over the naming and trajectories of these futures. Socio-environmental conflict, therefore, should not be subsumed under the homogenizing mantle of a populist environmentalist-sustainability discourse, but should be legitimised as constitutive of a democratic order. In the final paragraphs of this chapter, I shall outline what constitutes for me, the key drivers of conflict and where the possibilities for different fictions, and consequently new environmental futures, might tentatively reside. Processes of socio-physical entanglement (what Marx called metabolic circulation) transform both social and physical environments and produce specific, differentiated and unique social and physical milieus with new and distinct qualities (Swyngedouw, 2006). In other words, environments are combined socio-physical constructions that are actively (both by humans and non-humans) and historically produced, both in terms of social content and physical-environmental qualities. Whether we consider the making urban parks, natural reserves, or skyscrapers, they each contain and express fused socio-physical processes that contain and embody particular metabolic and social relations (see Heynen, Kaika, and Swyngedouw, 2006). There is, in this sense, no single Nature, no One-All, but rather a great variety of distinct and often radically different (if not antagonistic) natures. There is nothing a-priory unnatural or unsustainable, therefore, about produced environments like cities, genetically modified organisms, dammed rivers, or irrigated fields. The world is a Cyborg world, part natural part social, part technical part cultural, but with no clear boundaries, centres, or margins. The type and character of physical and environmental change, and the resulting socio-environmental flows, networks and practices are not independent from the specific historical social, cultural, political, or economic conditions and the institutions that accompany them. All socio-spatial processes are invariably also predicated upon the circulation and metabolism of physical, chemical, or biological components. Non-humans of course play an active role in mobilizing socio-natural circulatory and metabolic processes. It is these circulatory conduits that link often distant places and ecosystems together and permit relating local processes with wider socio-metabolic flows, networks, configurations, and dynamics. These socio-environmental metabolisms produce a series of both enabling and disabling socio-environmental conditions. Of course, such produced milieus often embody contradictory or conflicting tendencies. While environmental (both social and physical) qualities may be enhanced in some places and for some humans and non-humans, they often lead to a deterioration of social, physical, and/or ecological conditions and qualities elsewhere. Processes of metabolic change are, therefore, never socially or ecologically neutral. This results in conditions under which particular trajectories of socio-environmental change undermine the stability or coherence of some social groups, places or ecologies, while their sustainability elsewhere might be enhanced. Social power relations (whether material or discursive, economic, political, and/or cultural) through which metabolic circulatory processes take place are particularly important. It is these power geometries, the human and non-human actors, and the socio-natural networks carrying them that ultimately decide who will have access to or control over, and who will be excluded from access to or control over, resources or other components of the environment and who or what will be positively or negatively enrolled in such metabolic imbroglios. These power geometries, in turn, shape the particular social and political configurations and the environments in which we live. Henri Lefebvre’s ‘Right to the City’ also invariably implies a ‘Right to Metabolism’. Questions of socio-environmental sustainability are fundamentally political questions revolving around attempts to tease out who (or what) gains from and who pays for, who benefits from and who suffers (and in what ways) from particular processes of metabolic circulatory change. Such politicisation seeks answers to questions about what or who needs to be sustained and how this can be maintained or achieved. This includes naming socio-environmental trajectories, enrolling them in a political process that is radically differentiated and oppositional. Clearly, Bush’s notion of and desire for sustainability is not that of a Chinese peasant, a maquiladora woman worker or a Greenpeace activist. It is important to unravel the nature of the social relationships that unfold between individuals and social groups and how these, in turn, are mediated by and structured through processes of socio-ecological change. In other words, environmental transformation is not independent from class, gender, ethnic, or other power struggles. Socio-ecological ‘sustainability’ can only be achieved by means of a democratically (in the sense of a genuine political space) organised process of socio-environmental (re)-construction. The political program is to enhance the democratic content of socio-environmental construction by means of identifying the strategies through which a more equitable distribution of social power and a democratically more genuine mode of the production of natures can be achieved. A radical socio-environmental political programme, therefore, has to crystallise around imagining new ways to organise processes of socio-metabolic transformation. This requires first of all a radical re-politicisation of the ‘economic’ as it is exactly the latter that structures socio-metabolic processes. But this is predicated upon traversing the fantasy that the ‘economic’ is the determining instance of the political. Recapturing the political means foregrounding the political arena as the decisive material and symbolic space, as the space from which different socio-environmental futures can be imagined, fought over, and constructed. This, of course, turns the question of sustainability radically to a question of democracy and the recuperation of the horizon of democracy as the terrain for the cultivation of conflict and the naming of different socio-environmental futures.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
At › At: REMS Turn › At: REMS Turn- No Link

REE mining is inevitable even without green energy --- the disad is fossil fuel industry propaganda and efforts to improve process are underway

Klinger, 23 --- Assistant Professor of Geography at the University of Delaware, where she teaches in the Minerals, Materials, and Society Program (January 23, 2023, Julie Michelle Klinger, “Does Our Sustainable Future Start in the Mine? Rare earth mining will disrupt local climate resilience. Who should pay the price?” https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/our-sustainable-future-starts-in-the-mine/, JMP))

Rare earth elements have reemerged in the news as U.S. anxieties over economic interdependence with China grow. New revelations about social and environmental violence in supply chains, most recently in Myanmar, surface under headlines that have circulated since 2009. They often suggest that rare earth elements are only used for green energy and, thus, that green energy is solely responsible for the devastation wrought by rare earth mining.

Over the past decade, this narrative has profoundly shaped the debate around renewable energy infrastructure and our prospects for mitigating the climate emergency in line with Paris climate goals or Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) guidelines. At the same time, massive efforts are underway globally to diversify rare earth supply chains and movements against green colonialism accelerate apace with movements to remove regulatory checks on industry and fast-track mining operations. The debate over where and how the rare earth mining and refining industry is built outside of China is contentious and polarizing, but the intensity of the debate is a sign of progress. We are now confronting the tough questions around mineral acquisition, no longer content to merely decry the injustice of offshoring environmental harm. To reach a brighter, greener future, communities in the Global North are exploring what it means to be more responsible for their mineral needs.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
At › At: REMS Turn › At: REMS Turn- No Link

REE mining won’t undercut climate goals and there are enough reserves to power clean energy transition

Osaka, 23 (February 2, 2023 at 6:30 a.m. EST, Shannon Osaka, “Minerals are crucial for electric cars and wind turbines. Some worry whether we have enough; Minerals are crucial for electric cars, wind turbines, and solar panels. Some worry whether the future supply can meet the rising demand,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/climate-environment/2023/02/02/critical-minerals-run-out-shortage/, JMP))

Recent research has also shown that the amount of minerals required for the shift to renewable energy is significant — but falls well within the amount of reserves available. A study released recently by scientists at the University of California at Irvine and MIT found that current reserves of minerals like aluminum, copper, manganese, silver and more should support building enough wind and solar power to meet climate targets. What’s more, the mining from those operations would not have an outsize impact on global warming. (One repeated critique of renewable energy is that the intensity of mining might counteract the emissions benefits of wind and solar.) According to the study, the materials required for the transition to low-carbon electricity would take up somewhere between 1 and 9 percent of the remaining carbon budget: a significant amount but one that wouldn’t undercut overall climate goals. “The emissions to produce a refined ton of steel or aluminum to meet all of this demand would not really threaten global carbon budgets,” said Seaver Wang, the co-director of climate and energy at the energy think tank the Breakthrough Institute and the lead author on the paper. (The study focused on electricity generation. The researchers did not look at the mineral requirements for transportation or electric vehicles.)

2023 CNDI Affirmative
At › At: REMS Turn › At: REMS Turn- No Link

Clean energy doesn’t require REE and scarcity spurs adaptions and alternatives including substitution and recycling

Lovins, 21 --- Adjunct Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering at Stanford University, chairman emeritus of RMI (December 8, 2021, Amory Lovins, “Reality Check: Greener, Friendlier Alternatives Exist for Rare Minerals in Batteries,” https://rmi.org/rmi-reality-check-greener-friendlier-alternatives-exist-for-rare-minerals-in-batteries/, JMP))

The Myth For years, commentators have been handwringing about the extraction practices, environmental and social harms, and corporate ownership of mining operations that contribute to clean energy technology, with a focus on cobalt, rare earths, and other rare ingredients of the clean energy transition. Much like governmental, intergovernmental, and private assessments of “critical materials,” these critiques pay far too little attention to how scarcity, usually signaled by price, elicits not only mineral exploration and mine development but also a powerful set of other and faster adaptations and alternatives like efficient use, substitution, and recycling. A major contribution to this genre comes from a New York Times investigative series around cobalt in in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Times’s informative reportage sheds important light on the geopolitical as much as the human-rights ramifications of clean energy. But the Times series, like nearly all prior “critical materials” coverage, rests on a flawed premise: that cobalt is one of the “essential raw materials needed for the production of electric car batteries—and is now critical to retiring the combustion engine and weaning the world off climate-changing fossil fuels.” The Reality That cobalt is an essential raw material needed to produce electric car batteries is true for one class of car-battery chemistries, but others use little cobalt or none at all. Standard-range Tesla cars’ batteries use no cobalt. Battery leaders Samsung and Panasonic are designing out cobalt. The portfolio of these alternatives continues to improve and expand. Several years ago, I wrote about “rare earths” (17 unusual chemical elements that are not geologically rare) in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and why they are not a substantial cause for concern in the transition to clean energy. For the past decade, commentators have warned (and stock speculators hyped) that China’s near-monopoly on supermagnet rare-earth elements could make the growing global shift to electric cars and wind turbines impossible—because their motors and generators, respectively, supposedly required supermagnets and hence rare earths. But that’s nonsense. In the four years since that Bulletin article, one of the key substitutions it mentions—iron-nitride supermagnets using no rare earths but with comparable or potentially greater performance—entered the market. But even without that magnet innovation, everything that permanent-magnet motors and generators do can also be done as well or better using two other innovations that require no rare earth minerals: control software and power electronics made of silicon, the most abundant solid element on Earth. Both kinds of magnet-free machines can do everything required not only in electric cars but also in wind turbines—functions often claimed to be impossible without tons of neodymium. That some wind turbines use rare-earth permanent-magnet generators does not mean others must. It’s better not to, and the word is spreading. Tesla’s car business was built on magnet-free induction motors. Its latest autos use the second magnet-free kind, synchronous reluctance motors, albeit spiced with small magnets. But most commentators on “blood minerals” are not experts on motors, solar cells, electricity, electronics, or even mining. They should talk to more people who are. The Bottom Line Accessible alternatives to “critical materials” can make excellent EV batteries, solar cells, and wind turbines. The US Department of Energy aims to eliminate cobalt in electric-car batteries by 2030; industry is doing it far faster. And a billion batteries in old consumer-electronics devices, many 30-fold richer in cobalt than the remaining cobalt-using car batteries, await recycling in clean and profitable American factories already being scaled up. Brains outpace mines. Let’s not let myths outpace truth.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Case Extensions › Bees Add-On › JG Solves Beekeeping

A Federal Jobs Guarantee solves bees – the program would allow for beekeeping jobs.

Pavlina R. Tcherneva, 2023 (The Job Guarantee: MMT's Proposal for Full Employment and Price Stability, ) #GayFrog

The proposal herein is to design the Job Guarantee as a “National Care Act” that would help fill many social and environmental needs gaps. With input from community groups, localities and municipalities could begin to develop public service employment opportunities in the following three areas: 1) care for the environment; 2) care for the community; and 3) care for the people. A green Job Guarantee that targets environmental and social concerns could create many different kinds of public service employment for years to come, both in large- and small-scale projects, including physical and social infrastructure. A 21st century Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) would help address acute climate-related problems in every community and would aim to prevent, mitigate, and withstand the impact of intensifying hurricanes, tornadoes, fires, and floods. The Job Guarantee would include, monitoring, rehabilitation, and public investment programs. It could tackle soil erosion and flood control, administer environmental surveys, launch species monitoring, park maintenance and renewal programs, remove invasive species, support sustainable agriculture practices, and work to eliminate food and public health deserts in the United States. It could launch mass rural and urban reforestation projects, local fisheries, community supported agriculture (CSA) farms, community and rooftop gardens, community beekeeping projects, fire and other disaster prevention measures, weatherization of homes, and composting. In addition to the environmental challenges, communities experience social and economic problems connected to urban blight and poverty. Since communities are best rebuilt from within, the Job Guarantee could employ existing best practices from the solidarity economy to address them. Projects could include vacant property cleanup, reclamation of materials, and restoration of public spaces. They could build school gardens, playgrounds, urban farms, co-working spaces, solar arrays, tool lending libraries, alongside training and credentialing programs. They can help run restoration of historical sites, community theaters, carpooling programs, recycling, reuse, and water-collection initiatives, food waste programs, oral histories projects, and more.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Case Extensions › Bees Add-On › No Beekeepers in Squo

Beekeeping is expensive, and it is not profitable for many to be able to live off of due to bee’s population decline.

Zach Lazzari, June 11, 2019 (Grants for Starting an Apiary, ) #GayFrog

Bees are vital, and grant money for new apiaries is becoming common to encourage the expansion of hive development and inject much-needed capital into a tight-margin business. Bees are important for honey production, but they are also essential for crop production. So it may not only be the honey and wax profits that are affected. The Importance of Beekeepers Some beekeepers focus exclusively on honey production, while others raise pollinators. The pollinators are critical in the agricultural industry. Without bees to pollinate crops, the yields suffer significant losses. In some cases, less than half of a typical crop yield is achievable without bees. Beekeepers may be stationary or travel the country chasing crop seasons. Mobile beekeepers build hives, transport bees in trucks and set up on crops. A beekeeper might work the almond harvest in California before moving to soy in the Midwest. The business operates year-round, and farmers pay the beekeepers to maintain their end of this important, co-dependent relationship. The beekeeping world has experienced significant difficulties with colony collapse disorder (CCD). CCD causes entire colonies to die off, placing the beekeeper in a challenging financial position. Apiary and Farm Grants General farm and rural development grants are available for aspiring and established beekeepers. Many of these are not intended explicitly for apiaries, and they are open to a variety of uses. Bees, however, are classified as livestock, and they qualify for a wide range of grant programs. The Farmers Market Promotion Program is a substantial grant opportunity at $5,000 to $10,000. You can apply those funds to an apiary. This grant is more suited to honey producers who sell at local farmers markets and through cooperative food programs. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) also offers an excellent opportunity with its Rural Business Enterprise Grant. This large grant ranges from $10,000 up to $500,000 with the stipulation that the business must have fewer than 50 employees and less than $1 million in annual revenue. It functions as the perfect grant for a small business that wants to invest in apiary equipment: An extensive beekeeping operation can be built with this kind of money. Look for Periodic Grants and Local Programs The Rural Income Opportunity Grant is not funded annually, but the funds distributed are often in the five- to six-figure range. Check each year for the status of this intermittently-funded program to determine eligibility. Also, look for programs sponsored by your state or municipality focused on rural development, livestock and farm programs. Expanding beyond the agricultural world and applying for general small business grants that are privately and federally funded can help secure additional capital through grants for an apiary. Search and Apply for Grants After researching the USDA and farm-specific grant programs, search the Grants.gov website or use one of the free grant program search engines. Build a database of opportunities and track your deadlines and annual applications. Writing grant applications is time-intensive, and securing funds for an apiary depends on thoroughly completing the applications to the best of your ability. Use an editor to proofread essays and consider hiring a professional grant writer to assist with the high-value grant programs. If you obtain one of the larger grants, the investment in outside help would be worth your while. Building an apiary to house bees is costly. Grant programs can assist with funds for the raw materials and labor required to complete a project.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Case Extensions › Bees Add-On › Bees Declining Now

Bee populations are in steep decline and a bee extinction causes human extinction – its Jover if there are no more bees.

Ishan Daftardar, 14 Mar 2023, (“Why Bee Extinction Would Mean The End Of Humanity?”, ) #GayFrog

For many of us, bees are annoying. We think that their only purpose is to keep buzzing around and dropping their formic acid-laden stings on random people (this impression will certainly change when we stop getting spoonfuls of sweet honey in our morning cereal). The truth is, bees are crucial elements of our environment, and almost never get the credit that they deserve. If bees didn’t exist, humans wouldn’t either. Out of the 100 crop species that provide us with 90% of our food, 35% are pollinated by bees, birds and bats (source). It’s that simple. Bees are the primary initiators of reproduction among plants, as they transfer pollen from the male stamens to the female pistils. bee polling The pollination process Since 2006, the population of bees has declined considerably. Pesticides, disease, parasites, and poor weather due to global warming have played a major role in this worrying decline. Are Bees Endangered? Bee population has been on a decline in recent years. Some species were added to the endangered list in 2017 (seven species of Hawaiian yellow-faced bees) and 2018 (The rusty-patched bumblebee, Bombus affinis) so as to protect and revive their numbers. There have been a number of reasons for this decline. Let’s take a look at few of them. Why Are Bees Endangered? Bees are going extinct mainly because of two reasons: pesticides and parasites. Pesticides Since the end of World War 2, the use of pesticides in agriculture has increased exponentially. This intense use of pesticides, known as neonicotinoids (a relatively new class of insecticides that affect the central nervous system of insects, resulting in paralysis and death), has had a major role in the bees’ decline (source). When bees are exposed to neonicotinoids, they go into a shock and forget their way home (sort of like the insect version of Alzheimer’s). Parasites Along with pesticides, parasites known as Varrao mites (also called Varrao destructors) are also responsible for their death (source). The Varrao can only reproduce in a bee colony. They are blood-sucking parasites that affect adult and young bees equally. The disease inflicted by these mites can result in bees losing legs or wings, essentially killing them. Beekeepers started reporting a sudden reduction in the number of bees. The adult bees disappeared suddenly and mostly together. The hives were left with just the queen and immature bees. Even the food was present in high quantities. In some cases, few adult bees were found attending to the queen. Reasons mentioned above are two of the many factors that play a role in this disorder. Effects Of Bee Extinction Extinction of bees will affect plants, animals, availability of fuels, topography, clothing and of course, human life. Effects on plants Some plants are pollinated by wind, but that rate is very slow. Insects are the primary pollinators on the planet. Beetles and butterflies also pollinate, but bees are the most efficient insects for this purpose. Without bees, we wouldn’t be able to savor delicious apples, cherries, and many other fruits and veggies (blueberries, avocado, broccoli, most leafy greens, cucumbers, pumpkins, and many more). Almond trees would be among the first casualties. If bees went extinct, there would be a massive decline in the production of crops. Although crops like rice and wheat don’t require insect pollination, can people survive by eating rice and bread all their life? Effects on animals Herbivores, who depend on certain plant species, will be affected first. They would go extinct if plants ceased to exist. For example, many cattle used for milk and meat depend on alfalfa and lupins, both of which depend on insect pollination. If the cow’s food supply declines, then meat and milk production will decrease. This will seriously affect the human diet. Due to the declining population of herbivores, tertiary carnivores will begin to suffer immediately. The only beneficiaries from this scenario would be scavengers (eagles, vultures, ravens etc.) Fuel Canola, which is grown to use as both a fuel and cooking oil, depends highly on pollination. It is also used to produce biofuel. If we were to run out of biofuel, we’d have to rely on fossil fuels completely, thus putting further pressure on the environment. Clothing Cotton is very reliant on pollination. The disappearance of bees will lead to a huge setback in cotton production, as it will significantly reduce our choices in clothes (good luck enduring the humidity of the tropical regions while wearing nylon attire). Topograhy Dry Land This will be a common sight if bees disappear. Since most plants would be unable to grow, grasslands would become barren and large-scale desertification will take place. Landslides would wipe out villages in one sweep. Ultimately, Earth will become one large plastic-laden desert. Effects Of Bee Extinction On Human Life Less production of food crops will ultimately lead to worldwide famine. Hunger and poverty will be very common. Freshwater will start drying up as well as, as there will be less trees for water retention to occur. With less water and diminishing food, humans will die of thirst and starvation. Fertility would also suffer a setback, followed by a drop in the rate of reproduction. Ultimately, we wouldn’t be able to sustain and would be forced into extinction within a few hundred years. Unless scientists build robotic bees to do the jobs that honeybees once did, we’re ultimately doomed. And although this isn’t the most serious repercussion, we would never again taste that sweet, savory honey that we forcibly steal from honeybees every day. The tragic irony of this is that by killing bees, we’re only hurting ourselves. Our survival depends on the health of the planet and its species, and unless we begin to face this fact, we will continue to contribute to our own demise. Unless we take drastic measures to save the bees, the planet’s survival is in doubt.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Case Extensions › Competitiveness/Leadership › AT Cost Too Much

The plan is fiscally feasible and profitable—the neg misunderstands key economic factors

Galvin 20 (Ray Galvin. “Yes, there is enough money to decarbonize the economies of high-income countries justly and sustainably,” Energy Research and Social Science. December 2020. )@ehatt

1. Introduction In this “Perspectives” paper I argue that there is no shortage of money for high-income countries to fund deep decarbonization of their energy and other sectors over the next few decades and to do so in ways that are sustainable, reduce inequalities, make for a more just society, and have positive long-run effects on productivity. I suggest that fundamental misunderstandings about the nature of money, where it comes from and how it is generated are inhibiting bold action in this regard. I also suggest these misunderstandings benefit a non-productive financial sector and lead to misallocation of public funds into their hands. I further argue that just this year – partly due to the coronavirus crisis but not entirely – a unique set of factors have come together, especially for EU countries, to provide an opportunity to shift gear and embark on a bold programme of decarbonization. The bones of my argument are: that countries’ central banks can create as much money as they want to, out of thin air, without cost; that since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, central banks have indeed created trillions of dollars (and other currencies) but have mostly passed it on to the non-productive financial sector which has thereby become substantially richer at the expense of the productive economy; that this pattern has re-emerged in central bank actions during the coronavirus crisis; that it does not have to continue, but instead central banks can put their newly-created billions into the hands of ministries of finance for governments to spend on worthy projects; that government spending on green, just and sustainable projects would likely boost the productive economy long-term, on balance, rather than dampen it; that the European Commission, especially in initiatives this year, is setting an example of developing a framework for bold action to decarbonize European economies via green, just and sustainable projects; that comparable frameworks are being developed by various actors in other countries, such as the US Green New Deal resolution of Congresswoman Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Markey; and that powerful, wealthy elements in the financial sector are likely to forcefully resist any move by central banks to direct their money towards governments rather than the financial sector. In Section 2 I summarize some basic things about money creation. In Section 3 I give a brief outline of central banks’ money creation via “quantitative easing” over the past decade and its implications for government spending on decarbonization. In Section 4 I look at ways quantitative easing could provide more direct investment for a green, just, sustainable future. In Section 5 I add details to this and also outline the European Commission’s recent initiatives to set a framework for a bold and comprehensive decarbonization programme for the EU. In Section 6 I draw on a recent global survey to highlight the positive economic benefits of massive investment in just decarbonization, and in Section 7 I conclude. 2. About money In order to grasp how readily the world can afford to decarbonize, we need to gain a critical understanding of what money is. All money in the modern world is “fiat” money [1], [2], [3]: it is created out of nothing by command of a competent authority and can be dissolved back into nothing by the authority that created it1. Money should not be seen as a material commodity like gold or wheat that has to be obtained from an outside source. It can best be understood as a specific type of social relation [4], [5], at one and the same time an entitlement and an obligation. The person creating the money does so by entering into an obligation to recompense the person to whom the money is paid, for the value of the money created. Meanwhile the person receiving the money gains an entitlement to be recompensed for this amount of value. The money retains its value as long as the obligation can be enforced, including physically if necessary. The “value” of the money is of course self-referential: issuing a $10 note to someone is equivalent to promising to pay them $10, but $10 is nothing other than a $10 note. However, money gains substance when the issuer is a government, because a $10 note issued by a government is the government’s promise to accept that note in payment for $10 worth of taxes, therefore it is tradable throughout the economy [2]. There is a hierarchy of money, from “high-powered” money [6], [7] at the top end, to what may be called “junk money” at the bottom end. High-powered money is the money a government will accept as payment of taxes, fees and fines [2]. It is created by a country’s central bank (sometimes called the “Reserve Bank”; and in the US the “Federal Reserve” or the “Fed”) in consultation with the government’s ministry of finance (often called the “Treasury”). This money is “high-powered” because it has the strongest backing available in the world, a sovereign government. The total amount of high-powered money in circulation usually equates to the portion of the money supply designated as “M1”. Lower-powered forms of money include bank loans, which banks create out of nothing [8], tradeable futures contracts, personal IOUs, shop-store vouchers, and an array of reasonably secure and not-so-secure financial instruments [9], [10]. Different combinations of the more secure forms of money are added to M1 to form what is designated as “M2”, and other less secure forms are added to form “M3”. I am only concerned in this paper with high-powered money, and in particular that which central banks create. For a fuller discussion of lower-powered forms of money see [5] and the Supplemental material to [11]. A stream of scholarship that looks at bank money creation in depth is “endogenous money theory” [12]. It might sound fanciful to say that money is simply created out of nothing. It goes against the grain of folklore (“money doesn’t grow on trees”), while economics textbooks tend to avoid the issue [2], [10], [13], [14]. However, the assertion that money is created out of nothing is not only a compelling theory, but also a factual description of what actually happens in the 21st century. As a formal theory it is usually traced to the German economist Georg Friedrich Knapp’s 1905 work The State Theory of Money, where it is called “chartalism”. It was further developed in British economist John Maynard Keynes’ writings and influence on monetary policy during the Great Depression and the Second World War [15], [16]. Recently a large literature has explored it further. In one stream of scholarship it is called “modern money theory” (e.g. [2], [3], [17], [18], [19], [20]). For readers interested in a wider view of theories of money and how chartalism and fiat money relate to human and social interactions, Ingham’s works are a must [4], [9], [19], [14]. Regardless of one’s view of chartalism, Keynesianism and modern money theory, we see high-powered money being created right before our eyes regularly. For example, central banks’ responses to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and the ongoing coronavirus crisis provide incontrovertible empirical evidence that unlimited amounts of money can be and are regularly created out of nothing. The European Central Bank, which serves the 19 Eurozone countries, created €2,535 billion between October 2014 and December 2018 (over and above its regular topping up of the money supply) to attempt to stabilize Eurozone economies in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, in its “Asset Purchase Programmes”. This was an average of €1.633 billion of newly created money per day for 1,552 days [21]. In concert with other central banks around the world it called this “quantitative easing”. The money was created by being credited to the reserve accounts of the commercial banks that held the accounts of the corporations and other bodies whose financial assets it was buying. The commercial banks simultaneously credited these bodies’ accounts with the same amounts of their own bank-created (lower-powered) money. Then on 18 March 2020 the European Central Bank began another round of quantitative easing in response to weakening economies due to the coronavirus crisis, in its “Pandemic Emergency Purchasing Programme”. It initially planned €750 billion worth of purchases over the next two years but increased this to €1,350 billion on 04 June [22]. To glimpse the dimensions of this, the total amount of high-powered euro money in circulation (M1 of the Eurozone) in December 2019 was €9,500 billion. Hence the European Central bank’s current round of quantitative easing will increase the Eurozone money supply by 14% within a two-year timeframe. In comparison, the Fed (the US Central Bank) created $2,290 billion via quantitative easing between 2008 and 2014. Further money creation brought the US’s M1 to $5,044 billion by May 2020 [23]. Similarly, the central banks of other countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the UK created very large amounts of money out of nothing in response to the Global Financial Crisis and are doing so again in response to the coronavirus crisis. This has contributed to increases in the money supply M1 of these countries far out of proportion to the needs of the productive economy as measured by Gross National Product (GDP). For example, in the Eurozone, M1 increased by 564% from 1996 to 2019, but GDP – the sum total of economic activity in the economy – increased only by 114% [24]. The European Central Bank was creating money five times as fast as the productive economy was demanding it. Most of this money was ending up in the financial markets. It is therefore a simple, empirically verifiable fact that central banks create money out of nothing, and in fact, to my knowledge, no economist denies this. One could suggest that one of the biggest cons of modern times is the prevailing discourse that governments of currency-sovereign countries have to get money from somewhere else before they can spend it – that money is exogenous to governments rather than endogenous. Of course, for much of recorded history there was always the problem of how to verify that money was genuine. Issuing gold coin as money partly solved this, but it also tied money creation to gold acquisition, through mining, piracy and theft from other people such as South Americans [4], [10], [13]. But since US President Nixon took the US off the gold standard in 1971, and because government-issued documents and electronic transactions have become very secure, there are no technical restrictions on how much money governments can make out of nothing – and it is genuine money, not “as good as gold” but even better. 3. Governments, the financial sector and a green recovery Money creation was also common among western countries in the 1930 s-1940 s, largely due to Keynes’ influence [25]. But in the 21st century central banks only began to act on the unlimited scope of their money creation powers in 2008, when the Global Financial Crisis threatened to derail their countries’ economies. This episode in the history of banking is highly relevant to what tends to inhibit us from financing a green recovery from the coronavirus pandemic, because the practices and discourse that developed in that episode have tended to drive central bank approaches and discourse since then. The core of the crisis in 2008 was that the financial sector was in danger of collapse. The “financial sector” is a set of structures, practices and activities, which exists alongside the productive economy and that intersects with it at many points but is only loosely part of it. The productive economy consists of things like the building industry, education, the military2, governance, transport, electricity production, clothing factories, ICT manufacturing and sales, etc. The total amount of economic activity in a country’s productive sector is its gross national product (GDP). We noted above that the Eurozone’s GDP grew by 114% in 1996–2019 but that M1 grew five times as fast. This is largely because of rampant growth of the financial sector and the demands it makes on central banks for money creation. The bloating of the financial sector compared to the productive economy is a global phenomenon that has been happening since the liberalization of economies in the 1970 s and 1980 s. From 1980 to 2009 the number of people employed in the financial sector in 21 high-income countries3 increased, on average, 3.33 times as fast as the number employed in these countries’ productive sectors [26]. In that period and beyond, the income share of these countries’ financial sectors, compared to incomes overall, also increased more or less steadily [27]. A raft of studies show that this excessive growth of the financial sector has a negative effect on GDP, i.e. on productivity, and that it leads to economic inequality (see reviews in [28], [29]). As is well known, the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and subsequent years was triggered by a collapse in value of particular types of financial instrument that were based on high-interest, precariously low-security mortgages which were packaged together with more secure debt and sold on to investors as composite and untransparent financial instruments. These failures had a cascading effect that threatened a collapse of the banking system, as many bank customers defaulted on their mortgages and other loans. Banks therefore drastically reduced their lending to solvent households and productive businesses which rely on everyday rollover loans to operate. Good businesses started to fail, and otherwise solvent households defaulted on mortgage and other debt. The effect was that by June 2009 in the US, GDP (the value of the productive economy) had fallen by about 4.3%, while the value of financial assets had fallen by 17.3% [30], [31], with comparable falls in other high-income countries [32]. Central bankers in the US, UK and other currency-sovereign countries like Australia, Canada and New Zealand – who knew full well that they could create as much money as they liked – asked themselves and their countries’ finance ministries, how they could save these businesses and households. They reasoned that to do so they should save the financial sector, in the hope that it would save the banks, in the hope that the banks would save the businesses and households. As the Bank of England noted, this strategy (quantitative easing) “works by making it cheaper for households and businesses to borrow money – encouraging spending” [33]. The European Central Bank began its programme of quantitative easing some years later, delayed by the fiscal conservatism of powerful Eurozone members such as Germany [34], [35]. The success or otherwise of this approach has been the subject of much debate (e.g. [36], [37]). Some have questioned why it was seen as morally unproblematic to put hundreds of billions of dollars, euros, pounds, etc. into the hands of financiers but morally questionable to put hundreds of millions into the hands of struggling households and businesses [38], [39], [40]. However, in 2020 the constellation shifted, with a different type of economic downturn in the coronavirus crisis. Here the trigger was not a failure in the financial system but a slump in real productive economic activity caused by lockdowns and people’s (justified) fears of mixing with others in shops, theatres, the workplace etc. The wobbliness of financial markets during the crisis has been essentially a consequence of this, not a cause [41]. Many investors and others who play the financial markets began to withdraw large swathes of money from shares, stock options, credit default swaps, futures and other sophisticated financial instruments due to fear that the real economy underlying some of these would collapse. 4. Where should central bank money be aimed? One would think a sensible way to address this kind of crisis would be to distribute the bulk of the rescue money directly to businesses and households, since their plight is the cause of the whole system’s slump. To a relatively small extent governments have done this, with furlough payments for workers, etc., but the big money has gone to the financial markets, just as in the Global Financial Crisis [21], [22]. Once again, the rationale is that if the financial markets are supported, the banks, which are intricately interwoven with this sector, will have their balance sheets boosted and will more liberally lend to businesses and households [42]. As the European Central Bank expressed it, their rationale is “to counter the serious risks to the monetary policy transmission mechanism and the outlook for the euro area posed by the outbreak and escalating diffusion of the coronavirus, COVID-19” [22] (italics added by author). The result has been that, despite an initial plunge, the financial sector has come back strongly, while the real productive economy has continued to stagnate. The Standard and Poor’s (US) share-market index, for example, at first fell from 3,373 on 20 February 2020 to a low of 2,236 on 23 March, but after the new US quantitative easing programme began it steadily rose again to 3,232 on 08 June and has hovered at about that level since then [43]. This is a net fall of only 4.2%. The German DAX share-market followed a similar trajectory, falling from its peak of 13,783 on 19 February to a low of 8,442 on 18 March and rising again to reach 12,845 by 05 June, a net fall of 6.8%. The UK FTSE index has followed almost the same trajectory. Comparing this with the productive economy, in the first quarter of 2020 in most OECD countries GDP was down by around 20%, and for the full 2020 year the OECD is forecasting falls of 11.4%-14.1% for France, 11.5%-14.0% for the UK, 9.1%-11.5% for the Eurozone and 7.3%-8.5% for the US [44]. Although it is problematic to compare a six-month change in share-market values with a 12-month forecast for the productive economy, it seems clear that the productive economy has not been rescued to anything like the same degree as the financial sector. The quantitative easing during the corona crisis has clearly been more beneficial to the financial sector than to the productive sector, even though the overtly stated aim of this round of quantitative easing has been to benefit the productive sector. Whatever the motives or pressures on central banks to rescue the financial sector rather than the productive sector, it seems fair to say that aiming hundreds of billions at the financial sector, when the productive sector is the primary area under siege, is at best a financially inefficient approach, at worst a catastrophic misallocation of public money. There is an alternative approach, namely for a central bank to fund its ministry of finance. The ministry can then direct the money where it is most needed in the productive economy, thereby bypassing the financial sector altogether. A straightforward way to do this would be for governments to issue bonds and the central bank to buy them and hold them in perpetuity [45]. This effectively gives the newly created money to the government rather than the financial sector. Since the central bank is owned by the government, the government is then only in debt to itself. This kind of approach would not only be a sensible response to the coronavirus crisis, it is precisely what would be needed to finance a massive, comprehensive decarbonization programme. There are of course inherent dangers in governments having access to unlimited money to spend, such as inflation and corruption, and there would need to be strict and effective controls and guarantees that the money would be spent on a properly worked out green, just, sustainable recovery plan [45], a point I develop below. The idea of the central bank creating money for the government to spend is not an inherently controversial approach, as the UK’s central bank, the Bank of England, did precisely that in 2009–2010 by purchasing over £100 billion of UK government bonds. The Bank of England was thereby effectively financing the UK government for free [46] (though it also bought swathes of financial assets on the open market). New Zealand is currently doing a watered-down version of this type of government funding. The central bank (the Reserve Bank of New Zealand) is currently creating $NZ60 billion and using it to buy New Zealand Government bonds and local government bonds ($NZ30 billion worth each) “on the secondary market”, i.e. bonds the government and municipalities previously issued and which are currently held by other bodies such as commercial banks [47]. The orthodox side of this is that it puts more liquidity (hard cash) into the banking system. The less orthodox side is that the Reserve Bank of New Zealand can hold these government bonds in perpetuity or write them off, thereby effectively giving free money to central and local government. The arithmetic effect on government coffers would be the same if the Reserve Bank were to buy government bonds directly from the government, bypassing the financial markets altogether. In this context the relationship between the Ministry of Finance and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is instructive. This was set out in an act of Parliament called the Public Finance Act 1989, but recently a memorandum of understanding was added which sets out the process by which the Bank and the Ministry communicate and agree to an asset purchase programme, such as the $NZ60 billion programme outlined above. The memorandum explicitly states that the Bank’s economic objectives are “monetary policy's best contribution to the prosperity and well-being of New Zealanders, and to a sustainable and productive economy” [48]. There is nothing here about the economic health of the financial system itself. Instead the emphasis is on wellbeing and prosperity for New Zealanders together with a “sustainable” and “productive” economy. An alternative approach, which many countries are currently pursuing, is debt funding, where governments borrow money from the private sector by issuing bonds on the financial markets [45], [49], [50], [51]. The reasoning is that interest rates on government debt are currently very low. The US Congressional Budget Office, for example, expects interest rates on US government debt to remain at or below 1% until at least 2021 [52]. Leading economist Paul Krugman argues that borrowing therefore makes good economic sense, because if governments invest the money in the productive economy and this leads to GDP growth above the interest rate, this is a positive long-term investment [53]. Others such as Kenneth Rogoff warn, however, that we cannot rule out the possibility of interest rates going high in the medium-long term and saddling governments with increasing bills [54]. For example, the European Commission is currently borrowing €750 billion on the financial markets to part-finance its Corona Recovery Programme but not planning to pay the loans back until 2028–2058 [55]. A greater problem with this approach is that it feeds the financial shadow-economy. Because government debt is the most secure type of financial instrument available, it effectively undergirds more flaky financial markets and gives them a solid base to float their more exotic instruments on: their credit default swaps, futures contracts, junk bonds, etc. This “misallocation of funds” [51] to the financial markets enables that sector to continually expand, outpacing the productive economy, drawing financial resources away from productive investment, inflating housing markets and giving excessive power to corporations due to their huge and burgeoning fortunes [5]. It is one of the reasons the money supply has increased at 3–5 times the rate of the real productive economy over the past few decades. But the main problem with this approach for currency-sovereign countries like the UK, the US, Australia and Canada is that it ignores the most obvious, straightforward and safe way to get money: the central bank can create the money and lend it in perpetuity to the ministry of finance. 5. How to proceed with a green, just and sustainable transition For currency-sovereign countries such as the US, the UK, Canada, New Zealand, India, Australia and many others a way to proceed can be as follows (there are variations for the Eurozone, on which see below): (a) The government in consultation with stakeholders decides what needs to be done to decarbonise the economy in such a way that poverty is simultaneously eliminated, the wellbeing of citizens and residents is enhanced, and social and environmental sustainability are prioritised. (b) The resulted programme is costed and enshrined in legislation. (c) The government requests its central bank to supply the needed amounts of money in regular payment steps. Parliament might first need to modify the legislation that sets down the relationship between the central bank and the ministry of finance, to enable this to happen. (d) The central bank creates the money as needed (e.g. monthly) by crediting it to the ministry of finance’s account at the central bank. The central bank demands government bonds in return, and these are held by the central bank in perpetuity as a form of surety that the government will use the money only for the agreed programme. (e) The government spends the money strictly according to the agreed programme. If it deviates from this significantly, the central bank has the legal option of ceasing to continue to fund the programme and/or starting to sell the bonds which were to be held in perpetuity, thereby putting the government in debt for the money it has misallocated. As this process is enshrined in legislation it would be subject to judicial review4. (f) The government monitors inflation throughout the programme. If inflation rises above an agreed threshold, the government withdraws money from the economy by (i) increasing the top tax rate on the highest earners and/or instituting a wealth tax on the largest fortunes; and/or (ii) asking the central bank to sell some of the government debt which it holds in perpetuity, to private citizens and residents only (not to banks, financiers or corporations). In both cases the incoming money is dissolved into nothing. It is important to note that governments do not need to raise taxes to get money, since their central banks can create it for them. Instead, one of the functions of taxation is to dampen inflation [11], [56]. For the Eurozone the procedure would be different, since these 19 countries have their own ministries of finance but only quasi-central banks. The European Central Bank is the one institution that can create and dissolve euros for them. A source of endless and ongoing controversy is that the Eurozone ministries of finance cannot therefore request a central bank to create euros for them when they calculate that they need extra funds [57], [58]. They can however issue bonds to borrow money on the financial markets, but only up to a certain limit. For step (a) above, a way forward would be for the Eurozone countries to first agree on a long-term strategy for decarbonizing justly and sustainably. They are already a step ahead in that the European Commission, which links to all 19 Eurozone countries plus the other 8 EU member states, announced its “European Green Deal” on 11 December 2019 [59] and began to fill out the details in a series of press releases and papers as from 11 January 2020 [55], [60], [61]. It expanded on this in its Coronavirus Recovery Plan on 27 May 2020 and in subsequent documents [62], [63], [64], [65]. It also proposed legislation for a greatly boosted version of the European Hydrogen Strategy [66] which had been gathering impetus over the past year [67], [68]. The hydrogen strategy is an essential link in its plan for decarbonizing the EU countries because there is now widespread support among key stakeholders, scientists and technology actors for moving ahead rapidly with the development of “green” hydrogen infrastructure as a basis for decarbonizing the electricity, transport, heating and chemicals sectors. It is not an exaggeration to say that this combination of packages represents a major breakthrough in the social and political momentum to move ahead into technically credible and feasible decarbonization of the productive economy in ways that are just and sustainable. An important criticism of the EU programme, however, it that the money allocated towards it is far from adequate [69]. Because the European Commission is not a sovereign government and has no facilities for money creation, it is relying on (a) a €7.5 billion increase in funding from EU member states; (b) a loan from the financial markets of €750 billion; (c) shifting of monies from existing EU funds to others; and (d) the private and governance sectors to invest their own monies in designated green projects with incentives and seed funding from the European Commission. A problem that will need to be addressed here is what is often called the “transition financing gap”, whereby commercial banks are often reluctant to lend to decarbonization projects because they are less sure of the stability of framework conditions, due to possible swings in government policy, than they are of the stability of more traditional ventures [70], [71]. The uncertainties of indirect financing approaches such as these give weight to the view that direct government investment in decarbonization projects, funded by the central bank with newly created money, are by far the surest way to drive decarbonization. How much is it likely to cost, then, to decarbonize the EU’s economies? In the US context, studies indicate that the US Green New Deal as proposed by Congresswoman Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Markey [72] would cost about $16 trillion over the next 15 years [11], [56]. Based on this and Storm’s [69] critique of the European Green Deal and the population difference between the US and the EU, I would very roughly estimate that the decarbonization program proposed by the European Commission could cost about €1.3 trillion per year over 15 years. This is about five times the €260 billion allocated in the European Green Deal and several times as high as the total allocation for this and the Coronavirus Recovery Plan together, depending on when the €750 billion in loans will be repaid. The obvious solution would be for the European Central Bank to be the main funding source by creating money, at least for the 19 Eurozone members. Alternatively, a solution long advocated by leading French economist Thomas Piketty and others would be for the Eurozone to reform itself into something closer to a federal state, with a joint ministry of finance [57], [58], though it would not be wise to make decarbonization depended on this ever happening. There are already successful moves to apportion some of the European Central Bank’s own created money to member states, despite initial opposition from Austria, the Netherlands and to some extent Germany [73]. It is institutionally not so easy for the Eurozone but much more straightforward for currency-sovereign countries like the US, the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and many others, plus of course the eight EU countries who do not use the euro and have their own central banks and sovereign currencies. Although the focus in this paper is on high-income countries with resilient currencies, the question arises as to whether such an approach could support or be used by developing countries and/or countries with less resilient currencies and thereby accelerate the achievement of sustainable development goals. Although such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth mentioning that work is already being done in this direction. Lagoarde-Segot [12], for example, maps in some detail how an “endogenous money” approach could function here. A key emphasis is moving from loan moneys, with the huge risks these can bring for developing countries, to endogenous money – money created specifically for the investment at hand. 6. Would decarbonization be economically efficient? Decarbonizing modern economies involves a raft of major projects in all major sectors, for example: • Electricity: transitioning to renewable electricity generation and upgrading the grid to cope with fluctuating renewables like wind and solar • Transport: shifting from fossil-based to green fuels like green hydrogen and green methanol, transitioning to electric vehicles and constructing a charging network • Mass thermal retrofitting of existing buildings to very high thermal standards • Agriculture: using green fuels in agricultural machinery, transitioning from meat to vegetable-based protein • Chemicals industry: transitioning to green hydrogen as a basic fuel source, developing catalysation for making liquid fuels from hydrogen These are all extremely ambitious if we are to fully decarbonize within the next 30 years; even more if our deadline is 2035. To gauge current expert opinion on likely economic implications of undertakings such as these, Hepburn et al. [45] recently surveyed 231 central bank officials, finance ministry officials, development bank officials and other economic experts from G20 countries, on how they rated the relative performance of 25 major fiscal recovery “archetypes” (i.e. funding actions that governments have undertaken for specific sectors and subsectors of the economy) across four dimensions: speed of implementation, long-run macroeconomic effect, climate impact potential, and overall desirability. The 25 “archetypes” included buildings upgrades, clean energy infrastructure, airline bailouts and worker retraining (see full list in footnote5). The respondents had experience of quantitative easing and other forms of government or central bank-led bailouts and fiscal stimulus packages. From the respondents’ replies the authors identified five policies “with high potential on both economic multiplier and climate impact metrics: clean physical infrastructure, building efficiency retrofits, investment in education and training, natural capital investment, and clean R&D” (ibid: 3). They did this by combining their respondents’ assessments of the long-run macroeconomic effects of each archetype; its potential climate impact; and the speed with which it could be implemented. Archetypes which scored high in both climate change mitigation impact and positive long-run macroeconomic effects were: clean energy infrastructure investment; clean and general R&D spending; connectivity infrastructure investment (e.g. E-car charging networks; 5G broadband networks); educational investment; healthcare investment; and worker retraining. Building energy efficiency upgrades and green spaces and natural infrastructure investment scored very high in climate change mitigation impact and modestly high in positive long-run macroeconomic effects. Direct provision of basic needs, and targeted direct cash transfers and temporary wage increases scored high on positive long-run macroeconomic effects but neutral on climate impacts, while liquidity support for households, start-ups and small-to-medium enterprises scored even higher on macroeconomic effects. Airline bailouts scored extremely negative on climate impacts and extremely low on positive long-run macroeconomic effects. Interestingly, liquidity support for large corporations – which verges on propping up the financial sector – scored negative on climate impacts and low on long-run economic benefits. The authors also checked respondents’ answers against their professions, which included finance and treasury ministry officials; G20 central bank officials; global development bank officials; and global leading academics. The differences were not particularly marked, though central bank officials perceived airline bailouts a little less negatively than others and were more positive about the long-run macroeconomic benefits of bailing out large corporations. This could partly explain why central banks so readily aim money at the financial sector while others criticize this approach. It is important to point out that “long-run macroeconomic effect” here means the long-term money value multiplier effect of a government spending action. When a government spends on a project, such as building a new bridge or creating jobs in the health service, this can result in GDP increasing by more than the amount the government spends. Hepburn and colleagues found that investment in green infrastructure developments often had multiplier effects of 2.5 to 3, meaning that each dollar spent on these brings a $2.50-$3.00 gain to the economy. This was more or less confirmed by the respondents in the survey. The value of this survey is that it taps into the accumulated knowledge of people who have been at the forefront of government-led investment in the productive sector as well as quantitative easing over the past decade, who have gathered statistics of this investment’s effects and analysed and interpreted them. It gives confidence that the kinds of government investment that will be required to bring about a decarbonized, just and sustainable society are on balance positive for the economy. They boost the economy rather than being a drag on it. Further, because there is overall a strong macroeconomic money multiplier effect for climate friendly and socially progressive investment, this would put downward pressure on inflation. Each dollar spent results in more goods and services available, so we do not get the inflationary effects of more and more money chasing the same amount of goods and services. Of course, some of the needed projects have low multiplier effects and some could be inflationary, but overall we are not looking at a dangerously inflationary undertaking. 7. Conclusions The elements discussed above combine to provide an economic rationale for a just, sustainable, decarbonized economy. To begin with, the US government would need to spend some $16 trillion over the next 15 years, $1.07 trillion per year, to achieve this, equivalent to about 24% of the 2019 US Federal budget or 5% of GDP. The EU might need to spend €1.32 per year over 15 years, equivalent to about 7.8% of its GDP. The figure of 5–8% of GDP per year could be a useful rule-of-thumb for high-income countries but it will vary depending on their current progress in decarbonization and economic wellbeing, especially among their poorest people. Secondly, there is more or less a consensus among finance ministry and central bank officials, together with development bankers and leading academics in the field, that government investments in climate-positive, sustainable and socially just projects and mega-projects mostly have positive long-run macroeconomic effects: they build up the economy rather than dragging it down. By comparison, giving money to airlines and large corporations is bad for the climate and not as good for the economy. Thirdly, there is plenty of money available for such an undertaking. Governments do not have to borrow it from the private sector, thereby putting themselves deeper and deeper in debt to private and corporate financiers at the risk of future interest rate hikes and payback periods well into the future. Their central banks can make the required money out of thin air (as they do every day for other purposes) and lend it to their ministries of finance in perpetuity, with strict legislative caveats to protect against misuse, misallocation and corruption. Fourthly, if this approach leads to inflation, governments can increase the top tax rate on the highest earners, since it is today at historically low levels in almost all high-income countries. If that is not sufficient, there are the options of a wealth tax on the largest fortunes, plus government bonds issued to private citizens and residents, to claw back money and dampen spending. Note, however, that these taxes and bonds would not be implemented “to raise revenue”, since currency-sovereign governments have unlimited revenue at their disposal. Carbon taxes can have the double benefit of dampening inflation while disincentivizing climate-damaging activities, but these would have to be used cautiously because of their negative effects on low-income households [75]. Fifthly, there is currently renewed impetus for a serious, ambitious decarbonization programme, partly due to the European Commission’s new initiatives, partly due to widespread calls for a green, just recovery from the coronavirus crisis, and probably also due to a lingering effect of recent movements such as Fridays for Future. These elements represent a confluence of factors which could at last lead to a credible and genuine decarbonizing of some of the world’s leading economies. Finally, we cannot expect such a project to go forward without a fight. Financial markets have long benefited from free or almost free trillions of dollars that central banks have showered them with and are currently doing so again. Many financial market actors have enormous power due to their wealth and networking with banks and policymakers [76], [77]. Similar can be said about fossil fuel-based industries [40]. Aside from their lobbying power and influence, one of their most potent instruments is control of public discourse. As long as they can keep people thinking that money doesn’t grow on trees, that free markets are the gospel truth, and that the only route to save the productive economy is to hyper-fund financial markets, decarbonizing is highly unlikely to happen. These are all untruths, and we need to confront them and dissolve them with sound and solid argument.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Case Extensions › Competitiveness/Leadership › AT Cost Too Much

The GND would not cost much and would instead drive up Economic activity by trillions – Estimates from multiple theories and studies prove

Galvin and Healy 20 Ray Galvin - Department of Architecture, Cambridge University UK; ERC RWTH-Aachen University Germany, Noal Healy Professor Noel Healy’s research, teaching, and community engagement focuses on the socio-political aspects of rapid climate change mitigation, climate justice, public policy and inequality, fossil fuel politics, and economic and racial justice in climate and energy policy. Dr. Healy is a contributing author for the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change “The Green New Deal in the United States: What it is and how to pay for it,” Energy Research & Social Science Volume 67, September 2020, ///Mgal

3. Will the Green New Deal be inflationary? The GND resolution is in the form of an outline of intended policy initiatives and does not include detailed costing. As noted above, however, Sanders’ GND is costed item by item and serves as our case study. We begin by noting that Sanders’ GND costing does not include universal health care, which is one of the features of the GND resolution. Instead, his “Medicare for All” is structured separately from his GND [54] and he maintains his restructuring of health care will actually save the Federal government as much as $5.1 trillion over 10 years, which amounts to about 2.7% of GDP. Most independent estimates agree that Medicare for All would bring a net saving [55,56, 60], and in the light of these, Nersisyan and Wray [46] suggest a conservative estimate is a saving of 3.7% of GDP, which amounts to about $0.7 trillion per year, or $7 trillion over 10 years. However, in our analysis below we will err on the safe side by refraining from subtracting likely gains through healthcare reform from the cost of the GND. We will also consider the effects of Palley's claimed increase in health care in our analysis. Aside from heath care, Sanders’ $16.3 trillion GND plan aims to “pay for itself over 15 years” through generating revenue (or, as Keynesian economists might express it, through withdrawing money from circulation) from the following sources: (a) $3.085 trillion by eliminating all fossil fuel subsidies, increasing taxation of fossil fuel companies and increasing polluter fines and litigation; (b) $1.215 trillion from reducing military expenses related to protecting oil-shipping routes; (c) $6.4 trillion from selling energy via power marketing authorities; and (d) $2.3 trillion from income taxes on the 20 million new jobs created. Sanders also argues his GND will: (a) save $1.31 trillion by reducing the need for what the US currently spends on public assistance programs, due to the creation of 20 million new jobs; and (b) raise a further $2 trillion by making the wealthy and large corporations pay “their fair share” of taxes [57] .10 $16.3 trillion spent over 15 years is about 5.7% of GDP annually. What do critics and commentators say about figures such as these? One of the GND's most persistent critics working within a Keynesian framework is Thomas Palley [44], whose earlier critiques of green new deals in general [36,37] were in turn critiqued by a number of economists (e.g. Smithin [38], Timoigne and Wray [43]). Palley accepts the Keynesian tenets outlined in Section 2. Working within this framework he argues that “simple arithmetic” proves that the amount of extra government spending required for the GND would increase the money supply so much as to require unacceptably high taxes to keep inflation down. Since his is probably the most systematically thought-through economic critique, we outline his numbers and the steps in his argument below. We relegate explanations of technical terms to footnotes. First, Palley [44] calculates an additional expenditure for Medicare for All at 8.6% of GDP ($ 1.76 trillion per year), free college tuition for all at 1.7% of GDP ($0.35 trillion per year) and the GND itself at 2% of GDP ($0.41 trillion per year), less relief saving11 at 1% of GDP, a net increase of 11.3% of GDP ($2.32 trillion per year). He then includes a “Keynesian expenditure multiplier effect”12 of 1.5, implying that GND expenditure will result in a total increase in economic activity of $3.49 trillion per year (1.5 x $2.32 trillion) or 17% of GDP. We note that Palley's estimate of the cost of the GND itself is lower than Sanders’, at 2% of GDP compared to 5.7%. Second, Palley “generously” assumes the “full employment unemployment rate” is 2%, i.e. that “full” employment would actually see 2% of the employable workforce still unemployed, since unemployment has never been below 2% in post-WW2 years. Since the official unemployment rate was 3.9% (6.3 million persons) at the time of his critique, he maintains that this implies there is only room for reducing unemployment by 1.9% (3.1 million persons). He then uses an “Okun coefficient”13 of 0.5, to calculate that the economy has spare capacity of twice this percentage, i.e. 3.8% of GDP. He takes this to mean the economy could absorb an increase in economic activity of 3.8% of GDP without inflationary pressure due to job creation. Third, he points out that this 3.8% is well below the 17% increase that (he calculates) would result from the GND and associated social welfare programs. The difference, 13.2% of GDP, represents the excess of demand that cannot be absorbed by the fall in unemployment. He therefore concludes that the government would have to increase the tax take by 13.2% of GDP, or about $2.7 trillion, to mop up extra spending power and stave off high inflation. Current tax take is $3.48 trillion (equal to about 17% of GDP), so, he concludes, the total tax take would have to increase by about 77%. How sound is Palley's critique? We will apply Palley's approach to Sanders’ own estimates for GND funding (given in Table 2), which does not include Sanders’ estimated reduction in the cost of healthcare. The total cost of $16.36 trillion amounts to $1.636 trillion per year if condensed into 10 years. Sanders plans to spread the cost over 15 years, bringing it to $1.1 trillion per year, but we follow Palley for now and use the 10-year horizon. Sanders’ GND figures omit the cost of additional new housing, of $1.48 trillion [58], or $0.148 trillion per year over 10 years, as he intends to finance this through a national housing trust. However, we include it here so as to accord with Palley's approach, bringing the total annual cost to $1.784 trillion per year. Following Palley's approach by using a Keynesian expenditure multiplier effect of 1.5, this amounts to an increase in economic activity of $2.676 trillion on an annual basis. This is 13.1% of the 2018 GDP figure of $20.5 trillion [59], substantially lower than Palley's figure of 17%. Using Palley's assumptions for the minimum unemployment rate, this would result in an excess stimulus of 13.1 −3.8 = 9.3% of GDP, which could not be absorbed by further increase in employment. Using Palley's methodology on this figure the total tax take would therefore have to increase by 9.3% of GDP, or $1.907 trillion, an increase of 54.5%. This contrasts with Palley's figure of 77% and Sanders’ own figure of 40%. We note that if we were to remove health care costs from Palley's estimate, the required tax increase in his calculation would be much lower than 77%. . It is worth re-running Palley's approach to accord with Sanders’ plan to spread costs out over 15 years, bringing a total annual expenditure of $1.19 trillion per year. With a Keynesian multiplier of 1.5 this gives an increase in economic activity of $1.785 trillion, or 8.7% of GDP. Again assuming a dampening effect of 3.8% of GDP from the jobs scheme, this would require tax increases equivalent to 4.9% of GDP, or $1.00 trillion, to eliminate the inflationary effects of the GND. This would be equivalent to an increase in the total tax take of 28.6%, somewhat lower than Sanders’ estimate of 40%. We conclude, then, that Palley's figure of a 77% tax increase could only hold true if the GND were to be paid for within 10 years, the cost of Medicare for All were very large and positive rather than small or negative, and the new housing costs were accounted for within the GND plan – none of which is feasible. Indeed, even including the housing costs and assuming high costs for Medicare for All, the 15-year time frame would bring the required tax increase down to around 51%. We note, however, that a new, very robust study of US healthcare concludes that Medicare for All would save the US economy $450 billion per year [60]. Sanders’ proposed increase in the tax take by 40% is therefore reasonable, even perhaps an overestimate. It would amount to $1.4 trillion per year, a calculation that accords with Nersisyan and Wray's estimates [46, p.40], and this would reach $1.79 trillion with a tax increase of 51%. If this contingency did arise, the gap of $0.39 trillion could be covered by compulsory and voluntary savings. These would include the pension schemes associated with government-created jobs as well as war-type bonds aimed to mature at staggered intervals after the GND period, similar to how the US ran war bonds in the 1940s [61]. Hence, even using Palley's methodology on Sanders’ own figures and allowing for a portion of excess funds to be withdrawn from circulation via government bonds, we find that Sanders’ GND would require tax increases only a few percent higher than Sanders himself claims. Further, a major difficulty with Palley's approach is his non-dynamic assumptions about the unemployment rate. He assumes that increases in job opportunities do not stimulate people who are currently in economically non-productive roles to move into the workforce. Mroz and Savage [62] argue that creating more well-paid jobs actually increases the number looking for regular work as they turn away from activities like study, housekeeping or zero-hours contract work. This would provide scope for yet more government expenditure and act as downward pressure on inflation. There might still be 2% registered as unemployed, but many of these would represent new jobseekers entering the job market. The above line of argument, then, leads to an estimate for the required tax increase (for a GND of the form explicated in detail by Sanders) as lying close to Sanders’ figure of 40%. The question to be faced, therefore, is whether US society would find tax increases of around 40% acceptable. During WW2 total government expenditure – financed by taxes, fees, fines and bonds – rose to a peak of 45% of GDP in 1943–44 [59]. Clearly the US public found this acceptable in wartime. Interestingly, it then fell rapidly as the war continued, reaching 14% of GDP in 1946 and bottoming out at 10% in 1947. Further, inflation never went higher than 11% in the war years and averaged about 5% during that period [63] – despite government expenditure reaching 45% of GDP. In conclusion, Sanders’ GND proposal does not seem to break any vital economic rules and would not necessarily lead to inflation if managed sensibly. The main unanswered question is whether US society would accept 1940s-70s-style tax rates on its wealthiest citizens. One approach to this question is to consider tax rates in recent US history. The graph in Fig. 1, from data gathered by Thomas Piketty and used in his new book, Capital et idéologie [28] helps to address this question. It shows the proportion of different US groups’ income paid as tax, including all taxes less social welfare transfers and food stamps – i.e. the net proportion of persons’ income paid in tax. It is here clearly seen that prior to about 1981, the top earners in the US paid at least 40% more tax than today, as did the next highest band prior to about 1957. There are therefore many years of recent historical precedent for increasing tax rates for the very wealthy. Further, recent polls show significant support for a wealth tax and a 70% top income tax rate, across party lines [64,65].

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Case Extensions › Competitiveness/Leadership › GND Solves Leadership/Comp

GND is key to US competitiveness and leadership

Freeman ‘20 — [Robert, the author of The Best One Hour History series which includes World War I, The InterWar Years, The Cold War, and other titles. He is the founder of The Global Uplift Project which builds small-scale infrastructure projects in the developing world to improve humanity’s capacity for self-development. “How the Green New Deal can save Joe Biden,” 11-20-2020, Red, Green, and Blue, http://redgreenandblue.org/2020/11/20/green-new-deal-can-save-joe-biden-america/, JFan]

The Green New Deal operationalizes both the economic motive and the ecological imperative to move to a new energy substrate to power industrial civilization across the globe. This means that massive sectors of the U.S. economy will be rebuilt to use renewable energy. Automobiles will rapidly move from being powered by oil to being powered by electricity. The implications for batteries, machine tooling, and manufacturing, to say nothing of “gas” stations and repair shops will be epochal. If automobiles were integral to U.S. culture and economic dominance in the 1900s, their new incarnation will be pivotal to transformation and survival in the 2000s. Energy generation and distribution will be similarly revolutionized. If you drive north from Indianapolis or east from San Francisco or south from Abilene, you encounter thousands of industrial-scale windmills spanning hundreds of square miles. Wind generation in the U.S. doubled between 2008 and 2017 and its pace of growth is accelerating. It is telling that three of the five largest wind farms in the U.S. are located in Texas, the largest oil-producing state. Tens of millions of buildings, from homes to commercial structures, will have to be retrofitted to utilize energy more efficiently. This will require the employment of millions of skilled tradesmen. Local energy production, through solar collectors, will also grow exponentially, again, employing millions of skilled workers. All manner of common and civic structures generally lumped under the heading of “infrastructure” will need to be modernized. This includes everything from the national electricity distribution grid to transit systems, public buildings, water and gas distribution networks, highways, and more. Once again, this will require the retraining and employment of millions of skilled tradesmen. The question necessarily arises: how will this once-in-a-century transformation be paid for? There are several sources, some direct, some indirect. Their totality more than pays for the Green New Deal, indeed, makes it a net income and wealth generator over coming decades. Most importantly, leadership by the government and targeted investment incentives will incent private capital to fund the bulk of the transition. This is how the government helped midwife the transition to oil and automobiles in the twentieth century. It built millions of miles of modern roads and interstate highways without which high-powered automobiles would have been useless. One of the second-order effects was the vast panoply of culture that we know of as suburbia, almost all of it built from private capital. The first round of “seed money” from the government can come from taxing the income of the top 10% of income earners. In the 40 years between 1977 and 2007, their share of national income grew from 34% to 47%, a staggering increase over a relatively short period of time, much of it unearned but “gifted” to them by the sole artifice of lower income taxes. If all we did was to increase taxes on this class even a little bit, it would yield trillions of dollars of funding to underwrite the tens of millions of high-paying jobs needed to carry out the buildout. Much of the funding would come from increased tax revenues generated from millions of skilled tradesmen being re-employed in high-earning jobs across the entire spectrum of the U.S. economy. Their higher incomes and spending would also generate greater economic activity in its own right. This is what occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, often known of as “the golden age of capitalism.” Government investments in the foundations of the economy led to many times more private investment and many multiples more, again, of private spending. Much of the funding will be secured by reducing military spending, now clocking in at nearly a trillion dollars a year. This would be possible by reducing the need for oil, and, therefore, the need for the U.S. to garrison the Middle East. In the past two decades, the U.S. has spent more than $6 trillion on ill-conceived, failed, and counterproductive wars in the Middle East. This amount, alone, would be enough to pay for the whole of the Green New Deal and would make the world, and, therefore, the U.S., safer from international terror. With lower-cost energy powering more and more economic activity, the economy as a whole would become increasingly competitive in global markets. Right now, the U.S. runs trade deficits in excess of $600 billion a year. That is $600 billion a year that is shipped directly out of the U.S. to other countries. The cost of funding those deficits raises the cost of borrowed money, and therefore the cost of everything in the economy that is bought or operated on borrowed money, which is to say almost everything. A more efficient and productive economy would also mean that the U.S. government itself would have to borrow less to keep the economy working. Over the past 40 years, the government has borrowed $26 trillion, the cumulative increase in the national debt over that period. It is an almost inconceivable and definitely unsustainable sum, a sign of just how much damage Supply Side Economics has inflicted on the economy. As with trade deficits, lowered annual budget deficits would result in lower interest rates in the economy as a whole, making everything bought on borrowed money cheaper. A final, indirect source of funding would come from reduced damage incurred from climate change. The fires afflicting the west, the floods in the Midwest, the hurricanes in the south, Hundred Year Freezes in the northeast, crop damage throughout the country; these have real economic costs that are not less because they are not explicitly tallied to climate change. They cost hundreds of billions of dollars a year and are growing wildly. Simply reducing their incidence would effectively free up hundreds of billions of dollars a year for use in the private economy. Making the U.S. economy more competitive in global markets would help maintain its status as one of the leading countries of the world. Not making this transition and keeping the economy dependent on a twentieth century energy substrate while the rest of the world—including our greatest adversary, China—is moving onto future energy systems, is an ironclad prescription for technological stagnation, economic atrophy, and national decline. It is far less a choice of whether, than the choice of how to, and how quickly.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Case Extensions › Competitiveness/Leadership › GND Solves Leadership/Comp

The plan is crucial to restore US leadership- every criticism of the GND is wrong when we consider the scale of the problem

Robinson, Pulitzer Prize Winner, 19

(Eugene, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/yes-the-green-new-deal-is-audacious-but-we-have-no-choice-but-to-think-big/2019/02/18/40ee4d02-3098-11e9-8ad3-9a5b113ecd3c_story.html , 2-18)

Since the 14-page resolution was introduced in Congress this month by Sen. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.) and Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-N.Y.), critics have been falling over themselves to denounce the Green New Deal’s policies as prohibitively expensive, totally unworkable or somehow Venezuelan. If those opponents would stop shouting long enough to actually read the document, they’d see that it’s not a compendium of concrete policies at all, but rather a set of goals. And they are the right goals. The Green New Deal seeks to outline a national project for our time — not just a response to a grave environmental threat, but a framework for enhanced growth, opportunity and fairness. The laudable aim is to play offense, not defense, in the fight to limit climate change. We are going to have to wage that battle one way or another. Why not do it on our terms, before Miami slips underwater and the yet-unburned parts of California go up in flames? The best historical analogy is not the New Deal but World War II, when mobilization of the nation’s vast productive capacity not only defeated Germany and Japan but also generated unprecedented domestic economic growth, hugely expanding the middle class. Once again, the planet faces a dire threat. Once again, the United States can help lead the world to victory. It’s a massive overreach, critics of the Green New Deal say. But any effort to address climate change that is commensurate with the scale of the problem is going to look like an overreach. Worldwide emissions of carbon dioxide and other heat-trapping gases — the cause of global warming — are beginning to level off, but they need to start falling, and fast, if we are to spare our grandchildren and great-grandchildren an ecological nightmare. Can we really shift entirely to clean energy sources within 10 years, as the resolution pledges? Well, certainly not if we don’t try. In 1961, when President John F. Kennedy announced the goal of sending an American to the moon and back by the end of the decade, NASA scientists had only a vague idea how to do such a thing. They figured it out, and succeeded in 1969. Breakthroughs will be needed, for example, in solar energy technology and battery storage. Why should China — now the world’s biggest producer of solar panels — be allowed to make these innovations and reap the resulting economic benefits? Why not the United States? It’s too expensive, naysayers complain. They point to a clause in the resolution that calls for “upgrading all existing buildings in the United States” to make them more energy-efficient. That sounds absurd — until you remember the massive blackout drills that took place across the country during World War II. People participated. It was their patriotic duty. Windows, roofs, doors, appliances — all have to be replaced every once in a while, and all can be made less wasteful of energy. And as for goals such as making sure every American has “high-quality health care” and “affordable, safe and adequate housing,” well, those have been Democratic Party positions for a very long time. Acting alone would be pointless, skeptics say. Indeed, China is now by far the world’s biggest carbon emitter, with the United States second and India a fast-rising third. What would be the point of going to great effort to reduce U.S. emissions while others just burn more coal? Think about it, though. We are, after all, the second-biggest emitter, which means that any substantial reduction would indeed have measurable impact. Also, officials in China and India, unlike those in the Trump administration, understand and accept the conclusions of climate scientists. China may be adding coal-fired power plants, but it is also making massive investments in clean energy. Do you really want Beijing to lead the way into the future? Shouldn’t it be Washington? That’s a rationale for the Green New Deal that the Make America Great Again crowd should embrace. If you believe in American exceptionalism, you believe that the United States has a duty to lead at moments of crisis. This is such a moment. Look at the big picture. Unless you deny the science of climate change, you have to believe that we need to take bold action. Stop all the nitpicking. Enough with the posturing. Let’s talk about what to do.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Case Extensions › Competitiveness/Leadership › Leadership !- Extinction

US leadership on climate change is key to resolve a host of global existential threats

Rep. Casten 5-2-19

(Sean, https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/05/02/house-passes-climate-bill-economic-opportunity-us-leadership-column/3642769002/)

If you find yourself in a hole, stop digging. We have a decade to figure out how to reverse global warming if we ever want to ensure a habitable planet for our children. It’s going to take a full, species-wide effort to figure out how to do so in a way that minimally disrupts our quality of life. And yet, under the Trump administration, we have reversed course. It’s time to stop digging. For too long, our nation has lacked conviction, settling for partial steps, struggling to reconcile economic and environmental pressures. But those delays, while inexcusable, pale next to President Donald Trump’s active sabotage of our environment. Continuing on this path is a risk to national security, public health and the welfare of future generations. And that is why I am so pleased to be a part of a new majority whose leadership is not afraid to recognize the hole we are in — the new majority that, on Thursday, stopped digging and passed H.R. 9, the Climate Action Now Act. I am proud to serve as a co-lead of H.R. 9 that would prevent this administration from making the United States the only nation on Earth not party to the Paris Climate Accords. H.R. 9 also challenges the Trump administration to step up and show us their plan for combating climate change. H.R. 9 rebukes the reckless attitudes of this president and brings us back to the global bargaining table to participate in the critical discussion over how to turn the tide and embrace a low carbon economy before it is too late. But, ultimately, H.R. 9 merely pauses the digging. And that raises the question — what’s next? Stop hand-wringing and start innovating As a former CEO of a clean energy company, I humbly submit that, contrary to much of the hand-wringing that seems to deter this body from acting: There are no economic or technical barriers preventing us from profitably reducing greenhouse gas emissions. All we have to do is recognize that lowering fossil fuel use also lowers fossil fuel expense. Replacing our old, dirty energy infrastructure with new, efficient and clean infrastructure isn’t a cost to be feared but an investment we should be eager to make. Lowering fossil fuel use will make our energy bills lower, our manufacturers more profitable, our wallets a little fuller and our planet safer. Climate change is a threat we should fear. But addressing climate change is an economic opportunity to be embraced. Our failure to seize that opportunity so far speaks only to the inefficiencies and distortions in our regulations that create needless barriers to capital deployment. But we can fix those laws! And by embracing the goals of the Paris Climate Accord, we can unleash the innovation of our manufacturers, businesses and regulators to drive those investments forward. US must not ignore existential climate threat This is a once-in-a-generation opportunity for transformative economic growth. It is on a scale with the industrial and information revolutions. Americans should be leading the way on combating climate change and developing the clean energy economy of tomorrow, not running from the challenge. American leadership is not kowtowing to despots, it’s not declaring phony emergencies to build unnecessary walls, and it’s not ignoring the single most serious threat to the existence of human life on Earth. From Normandy to the Cold War, American leadership has been about identifying long-term existential threats to the entire population and then leading the rest of the world to mobilize around a shared set of goals and values. H.R. 9 is the first opportunity in over a decade for our Congress to reclaim America's leadership role on climate, and I am proud to be part of passing it Not because it’s enough. But because the world depends on American leadership, and if the White House refuses to lead, the House will. Onward.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Case Extensions › Competitiveness/Leadership › China !- War

U.S.-China war goes nuclear.

Talmadge 18, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. (Caitlin, 10/15/18, "Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control", Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option)

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a “no first use” pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate pressures to escalate—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations endangered or damaged China’s nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly conclude that limited nuclear escalation—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—was a viable option to defend itself. STRAIT SHOOTERS The most worrisome flash point for a U.S.-Chinese war is Taiwan. Beijing’s long-term objective of reunifying the island with mainland China is clearly in conflict with Washington’s longstanding desire to maintain the status quo in the strait. It is not difficult to imagine how this might lead to war. For example, China could decide that the political or military window for regaining control over the island was closing and launch an attack, using air and naval forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard the island. Although U.S. law does not require Washington to intervene in such a scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Were Washington to intervene on Taipei’s behalf, the world’s sole superpower and its rising competitor would find themselves in the first great-power war of the twenty-first century. In the course of such a war, U.S. conventional military operations would likely threaten, disable, or outright eliminate some Chinese nuclear capabilities—whether doing so was Washington’s stated objective or not. In fact, if the United States engaged in the style of warfare it has practiced over the last 30 years, this outcome would be all but guaranteed. Consider submarine warfare. China could use its conventionally armed attack submarines to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bomb the island, or to attack U.S. and allied forces in the region. If that happened, the U.S. Navy would almost certainly undertake an antisubmarine campaign, which would likely threaten China’s “boomers,” the four nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines that form its naval nuclear deterrent. China’s conventionally armed and nuclear-armed submarines share the same shore-based communications system; a U.S. attack on these transmitters would thus not only disrupt the activities of China’s attack submarine force but also cut off its boomers from contact with Beijing, leaving Chinese leaders unsure of the fate of their naval nuclear force. In addition, nuclear ballistic missile submarines depend on attack submarines for protection, just as lumbering bomber aircraft rely on nimble fighter jets. If the United States started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the very force that protects China’s ballistic missile submarines, leaving the latter dramatically more vulnerable. Even more dangerous, U.S. forces hunting Chinese attack submarines could inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer instead. After all, at least some Chinese attack submarines might be escorting ballistic missile submarines, especially in wartime, when China might flush its boomers from their ports and try to send them within range of the continental United States. Since correctly identifying targets remains one of the trickiest challenges of undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within shooting range of a Chinese submarine without being sure of its type, especially in a crowded, noisy environment like the Taiwan Strait. Platitudes about caution are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when Chinese attack submarines might already have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to shoot first and ask questions later. Adding to China’s sense of vulnerability, the small size of its nuclear-armed submarine force means that just two such incidents would eliminate half of its sea-based deterrent. Meanwhile, any Chinese boomers that escaped this fate would likely be cut off from communication with onshore commanders, left without an escort force, and unable to return to destroyed ports. If that happened, China would essentially have no naval nuclear deterrent. The situation is similar onshore, where any U.S. military campaign would have to contend with China’s growing land-based conventional ballistic missile force. Much of this force is within range of Taiwan, ready to launch ballistic missiles against the island or at any allies coming to its aid. Once again, U.S. victory would hinge on the ability to degrade this conventional ballistic missile force. And once again, it would be virtually impossible to do so while leaving China’s nuclear ballistic missile force unscathed. Chinese conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are often attached to the same base headquarters, meaning that they likely share transportation and supply networks, patrol routes, and other supporting infrastructure. It is also possible that they share some command-and-control networks, or that the United States would be unable to distinguish between the conventional and nuclear networks even if they were physically separate. To add to the challenge, some of China’s ballistic missiles can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, and the two versions are virtually indistinguishable to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a war, targeting the conventional variants would likely mean destroying some nuclear ones in the process. Furthermore, sending manned aircraft to attack Chinese missile launch sites and bases would require at least partial control of the airspace over China, which in turn would require weakening Chinese air defenses. But degrading China’s coastal air defense network in order to fight a conventional war would also leave much of its nuclear force without protection. Once China was under attack, its leaders might come to fear that even intercontinental ballistic missiles located deep in the country’s interior were vulnerable. For years, observers have pointed to the U.S. military’s failed attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1990–91 Gulf War as evidence that mobile missiles are virtually impervious to attack. Therefore, the thinking goes, China could retain a nuclear deterrent no matter what harm U.S. forces inflicted on its coastal areas. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles are larger and less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, and they are harder to move without detection. The United States is also likely to have been tracking them much more closely in peacetime. As a result, China is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in Iraq nearly 30 years ago as reassurance that its residual nuclear force is safe today, especially during an ongoing, high-intensity conventional war. China’s vehement criticism of a U.S. regional missile defense system designed to guard against a potential North Korean attack already reflects these latent fears. Beijing’s worry is that this system could help Washington block the handful of missiles China might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. attack on its arsenal. That sort of campaign might seem much more plausible in Beijing’s eyes if a conventional war had already begun to seriously undermine other parts of China’s nuclear deterrent. It does not help that China’s real-time awareness of the state of its forces would probably be limited, since blinding the adversary is a standard part of the U.S. military playbook. Put simply, the favored U.S. strategy to ensure a conventional victory would likely endanger much of China’s nuclear arsenal in the process, at sea and on land. Whether the United States actually intended to target all of China’s nuclear weapons would be incidental. All that would matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them threatened. LESSONS FROM THE PAST At that point, the question becomes, How will China react? Will it practice restraint and uphold the “no first use” pledge once its nuclear forces appear to be under attack? Or will it use those weapons while it still can, gambling that limited escalation will either halt the U.S. campaign or intimidate Washington into backing down? Chinese writings and statements remain deliberately ambiguous on this point. It is unclear which exact set of capabilities China considers part of its core nuclear deterrent and which it considers less crucial. For example, if China already recognizes that its sea-based nuclear deterrent is relatively small and weak, then losing some of its ballistic missile submarines in a war might not prompt any radical discontinuity in its calculus. The danger lies in wartime developments that could shift China’s assumptions about U.S. intentions. If Beijing interprets the erosion of its sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a deliberate effort to destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps even as a prelude to a nuclear attack, it might see limited nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict. For example, China could use nuclear weapons to instantaneously destroy the U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal. It could also launch a nuclear strike with no direct military purpose—on an unpopulated area or at sea—as a way to signal that the United States had crossed a redline.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Case Extensions › Competitiveness/Leadership › Econ Comp k2 beat China

US Power checks Chinese revisionism – without it, China will invade Taiwan and take over the Pacific

Brands ’20 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 10-1-21; "The End of China’s Rise”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-10-01/end-chinas-rise; Foreign Affairs; accessed 6-23-2022; AH]

RING OF FIRE Eurasia has often been a deathtrap for aspiring hegemons: there are too many nearby enemies that can make common cause with offshore superpowers. For almost 40 years, a rising China avoided strategic encirclement by downplaying its global ambitions and maintaining friendly relations with the United States. But that period is over. As Beijing has become more aggressive in the South China Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and elsewhere, it has engendered hostility nearly all around. Over the past five years, the United States has abandoned engagement and embraced neo-containment. Washington has carried out its largest naval and missile expansion in a generation, imposed its most aggressive tariffs since World War II, and implemented its tightest restrictions on foreign investment since the Cold War—all directed at China. Arms sales and military support to frontline states have increased; U.S. technological sanctions are threatening to destroy Huawei and other Chinese firms. In 2021, China’s deputy foreign minister complained that “a whole-of-government and whole-of-society campaign is being waged to bring China down.” The United States’ turn against China has contributed to a broader backlash against Beijing’s power. In Northeast Asia, Taiwan has become more determined than ever to maintain its de facto independence, and the government has approved a bold new defense strategy that could make the island extremely hard to conquer. Japan has agreed to cooperate closely with the United States to fend off Chinese aggression in the region. Through its own belligerence, Beijing has given the U.S.-Japanese alliance an explicitly anti-China cast. The countries around the South China Sea are also starting to hedge against China. Vietnam is acquiring mobile shore-based missiles, Russian attack submarines, new fighter aircraft, and surface ships armed with advanced cruise missiles. Singapore has quietly become a significant U.S. military partner. Indonesia increased its defense spending 20 percent in 2020 and another 21 percent in 2021. Even the Philippines, which courted China for most of President Rodrigo Duterte’s term, is now reiterating its claims in the South China Sea and ramping up air and naval patrols. China’s ambitions are provoking a response beyond East Asia, too, from Australia to India to Europe. Everywhere Beijing is pushing, a growing cast of rivals is pushing back. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—a strategic partnership that includes Australia, India, Japan, and the United States—has emerged as a focal point of anti-China cooperation among the most powerful democracies in the Indo-Pacific. The new AUKUS (Australia–United Kingdom–United States) alliance unites the core of the Anglosphere against Beijing. The United States is forging overlapping mini-coalitions to ensure that advanced democracies stay ahead in key technologies, while the G-7 and NATO are staking out tougher positions on Taiwan and other issues. To be sure, counter-China cooperation remains a work in progress, because many countries still rely on trade with Beijing. But these interlocking partnerships could eventually form a noose around Beijing’s neck. FLAMING OUT China is a risen power, not a rising one: it has acquired formidable geopolitical capabilities, but its best days are behind it. That distinction matters, because China has staked out vaulting ambitions and now may not be able to achieve them without drastic action. The CCP aims to reclaim Taiwan, dominate the western Pacific, and spread its influence around the globe. Xi has declared that China seeks a “future where we will win the initiative and have the dominant position.” Yet that dream is starting to slip away, as growth slows and China faces an increasingly hostile world.

2023 CNDI Affirmative
Case Extensions › Competitiveness/Leadership › Econ Comp k2 beat China

Economic competitiveness key to counter Chinese hegemony- strong base gives the US military power and diplomatic influence

Atkinson 22, Robert D. Atkinson is the founder and president of the Information Technology and Innovation Foundation as well as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. He has served in advisory roles in the Clinton, George W. Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations and is the author of four books, including Innovation Economics: The Race for Global Advantage., “How to Win the US-China economic war”, Foreign Policy, November 8, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/11/08/us-china-economic-war-trade-industry-innovation-production-competition-biden/.//Isim

It is dawning on the United States that China is not just a military adversary but an economic one. The two countries are at war for primacy in both innovation and production capacity as much of Beijing’s economic gain in advanced industries comes at Washington’s loss—and vice versa. This trend is likely to continue. Chinese President Xi Jinping acknowledged as much last year when he stated, “Technological innovation has become the main battleground of the global playing field, and competition for tech dominance will grow unprecedentedly fierce.” Economic war is distinct from economic competition. Canada and the United States, for example, compete economically, but both nations understand that trade is conducted on the basis of a mutually beneficial comparative advantage. By contrast, China has launched massive frontal assaults on U.S. technology and industry capabilities. Beijing’s 2006 National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology can be considered an initial strike in this conflict, followed in 2015 by Xi’s “Made in China 2025” strategy. Both identified key technologies in which China sought to achieve self-sufficiency, and both are backed by restrictions on foreign firms’ market access in key industries, widespread intellectual property theft, forced technology transfers, enormous subsidies for Chinese firms, and much more. The latter document also added numerical targets for China’s market share in leading industries. Economic war is not unprecedented. From 1900 to 1945, Germany used a wide array of unfair trade practices to gain economic and political power globally, ultimately in service of its military power. But Beijing has taken economic war to another level. China’s long-standing and increasing attacks are designed to crush its competitors—and make the United States an economic vassal state. Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s trade war was a response—albeit a poorly formulated one—to China’s long assaults on U.S. industrial and technological capabilities. At the time, most experts in Washington ascribed this to Trump’s protectionist proclivities rather than a recognition that the United States was in a full-scale economic war. It is only in the last few years that the intent and extent of China’s economic aggression has become more widely understood. U.S. President Joe Biden’s new export ban on advanced chips and semiconductor equipment to China is evidence that he and some people in his administration have caught on. Despite Biden’s ban, the United States remains largely unprepared for a protracted economic war with China. Beijing’s innovation-mercantilist practices—which seek to gain a large share of advanced industry output by using tactics considered illegal by the World Trade Organization—go far beyond the industrial policies of other nations. Ignoring them and believing that China will change course—or assuming that China can’t succeed because it is not a democratic, free market country or has an aging population, as many U.S. policymakers do—is akin to putting its head in the sand and hoping for the best. The stakes are high: Winning the war will boost domestic wages, competitiveness, and economic and national security. Losing will do the opposite. The U.S. national security establishment takes planning for military war seriously. It spends significant resources on war-gaming exercises and supporting the U.S. Defense Department. It has numerous war colleges to study combat. It enlists endless consultants to advise on every aspect of war. It employs historians to learn from prior conflicts. And it coordinates with agencies from across the federal government. Such a system is largely absent for economic warfare. There is no planning. No assessment. No strategy. No economic security system. At best, there are individual programs and initiatives that fail to constitute a whole-of-government strategy or system. Absent an invasion of Taiwan, it seems there is no Chinese economic attack that could awaken Washington from its slumbers. Most of Washington does not—at least yet—see economic relations with Beijing in win-lose terms. Although policymakers understand that foreign adversaries can and do attack vital U.S. national security interests, they are less willing to acknowledge that the same can be true when it comes to vital U.S. economic interests. Indeed, most economic advisors still proffer the notion of comparative advantage, where trade is a mutually beneficial win-win. The United States, they say, might be good at producing passenger jets, whereas China is good at producing 5G equipment. But China’s massive subsidies and other unfair practices used to build up advanced domestic industries—in telecommunications equipment, high-speed rails, construction equipment, aerospace, semiconductors, biotechnology, clean energy, automobiles, computing, artificial intelligence, and more—have nothing to do with comparative advantage. They reflect a desire for dominance through industrial predation: boosting their own firms while crushing foreign competitors’ ability to compete. This is why there is a strong negative correlation between the change in the respective shares of global output that China and the United States held in advanced industries from 1995 to 2018. In other words, China gained shares in the industries the United States lost. Washington also persists in holding on to the free market doctrine that firms maximize economic welfare when they act in their own interests without government aid or strategic direction. Yet even the most devoted follower of economists Adam Smith or Friedrich Hayek believes that market forces alone will not generate a nation’s needed military capabilities. That’s why governments must intervene and plan. But too many experts in Washington don’t extend that logic to capabilities for economic war. To be sure, economic war and military war are different; there are few, if any, direct casualties from economic war, and battles take place over a much longer period of time. But both ultimately threaten the ability of the state to exist autonomously.