2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Good › China › AT: China Rise
Stephen G. Brooks is a Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and a Guest Professor at Stockholm University. William C. Wohlorth is Daniel Webster Professor at Dartmouth College. “The Myth of Multipolarity, American Power’s Staying Power”
The best way to measure technological capacity is to look at payments for the use of intellectual property—technology so valuable that others are willing to spend money on it. This data shows that China’s extensive R & D investments over the past decade are bearing fruit, with Chinese patent royalties having grown from less than $1 billion in 2014 to almost $12 billion in 2021. But even now, China still receives less than a tenth of what the United States does each year ($125 billion), and it even lags far behind Germany ($59 billion) and Japan ($47 billion).Militarily, meanwhile, most analysts still see China as far from being a global peer of the United States, despite the rapid modernization of Chinese forces. How significant and lasting is the U.S. advantage? Consider the capabilities that give the United States what the political scientist Barry Posen has called “command of the commons”—that is, control over the air, the open sea, and space. Command of the commons is what makes the United States a true global military power. Until China can contest the United States’ dominance in this domain, it will remain merely a regional military power. We have counted 13 categories of systems as underlying this ability—everything from nuclear submarines to satellites to aircraft carriers to heavy transport planes—and China is below 20 percent of the U.S. level in all but five of these capabilities, and in only two areas (cruisers and destroyers; military satellites) does China have more than a third of the U.S. capability. The United States remains so far ahead because it has devoted immense resources to developing these systems over many decades; closing these gaps would also require decades of effort. The disparity becomes even greater when one moves beyond a raw count and factors in quality. The United States’ 68 nuclear submarines, for example, are too quiet for China to track, whereas China’s 12 nuclear submarines remain noisy enough for the U.S. Navy’s advanced antisubmarine warfare sensors to track them in deep water.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Good › China › AT: China Rise
Wang, ’22 (Orange Wang, covers the Chinese macroeconomy, global market and financial news ,focus on new technologies and their influences on economic growth and society, worked as a Shanghai Correspondent for ET Net, a Hong Kong financial news agency, South China Morning Post, January 19, 2022, “China ‘not interested’ in becoming world’s No 1 economy or global hegemony, says vice foreign minister” -Emery)
“Exceeding the US in GDP, we are not interested in it, and this is not what we are going after,” he told a forum held by the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies at the Renmin University of China in Beijing. “To meet the people’s desire for a better life, this is what the Communist Party of China aims for.” Vice foreign minister Le Yucheng says China is not pursuing US-style hegemony. The World Bank estimated the US economy grew by 5.6 per cent last year. That meant the Chinese economy was likely to have been 80 per cent of its size, up from 70 per cent one year earlier, according to South China Morning Post calculations. When asked whether China would become the next superpower, Le said the country was not pursuing global hegemony. “We should oppose the Cold War mentality of unilateralism, interference in internal affairs, making coterie and group politics,” he said. Bilateral tensions between the US and China have escalated in recent months, despite a virtual summit between President Xi Jinping and US counterpart Joe Biden that tried to find a way to improve ties. China-US relations face “great difficulties” but responsibility lay with Washington, Le said. “The crux of the problem lies in the US’s wrong China policy, wrong understanding of China, wrong views of the times and world,” he said at the forum. “China and the US should not play a boxing game, we should play a track and field competition … that is to say, to win the game and the future by becoming a better self.”
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Good › China › AT: China Rise
Wang, ’18 (Yanan Wang, BA from Yale, Doctor of Law from New York University, received Osborn Elliott Prize for Excellence in Journalism in Asia, The Associated Press, December 18, 2018, “China will ‘never seek hegemony,’ Xi says in reform speech” -Emery)
BEIJING (AP) — China will never pursue hegemony, President Xi Jinping said Tuesday as global concerns persist over the country’s growing economic influence. During a speech to mark 40 years of market reforms, Xi repeated China’s commitment to a multilateral trading system and further opening of its economy. However, he did not announce any new initiatives to counter a slowing economy and trade frictions with the United States. The Chinese leader said China would not develop “at the expense of other countries’ interests.” China’s expanding footprint worldwide — from Asia-Pacific to Africa and beyond through a broad network of infrastructure projects called the Belt and Road Initiative — has led some nations to raise the alarm over what they call China’s long arm of influence, which has been criticized for being political as well as economic. While Xi said China is “increasingly approaching the center of the world stage,” he also noted that the country pursues a defensive national defense policy. “China’s development does not pose a threat to any country,” Xi said. “No matter how far China develops, it will never seek hegemony.”
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Good › China › AT: China Rise
Beauchamp, ’15 (Zack Beauchamp, senior correspondent at Vox, Pulitzer Prize for crisis reporting, Master’s in International Relations from The London School of Economics and Political Science, The Week, January 8, 2015, “China has not replaced America — and it never will” -Emery)
This facile assumption is wrong. China is not replacing the United States as the global hegemon. And it never will. China faces too many internal problems and regional rivals to ever make a real play for global leadership. And even if Beijing could take the global leadership mantle soon, it wouldn't. China wants to play inside the existing global order's rules, not change them. Start with the obvious military point: The Chinese military has nothing like the global reach of its American rival's. China only has one aircraft carrier, a refitted Russian vessel. The U.S. has 10, plus nine marine mini-carriers. China's first homemade carrier is slated for completion in 2018, by which time the U.S. will have yet another modern carrier, and be well on its way to finishing another. The idea that China will be able to compete on a global scale in the short to medium term is absurd. Even in East Asia, it's not so easy for China. In 2012, Center for Strategic and International Studies experts Anthony Cordesman and Nicholas Yarosh looked at the data on Chinese and Taiwanese military strength. They found that while China's relative naval strength was growing, Taiwan had actually improved the balance of air power in its favor between 2005 and 2012 — just as China's economic growth rate, and hence influx of new resources to spend on its military, was peaking. China's equipment is often outdated, and its training regimes can be comically bad. A major part of its strategic missile force patrols on horseback because it doesn't have helicopters. This isn't to deny China's military is getting stronger. It is. And one day, this might require the United States to rethink its strategic posture in East Asia. But Chinese hard power is nowhere close to replacing, or even thinking about challenging, American military hegemony. And look at China's geopolitical neighborhood. As a result of historical enmity and massive power disparities, Beijing would have a tough time convincing Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan that its military buildup is anything but threatening. Consequently, the smaller East Asian states are likely to get over their mutual disagreements and stick it out together in the American-led alliance system for the foreseeable future. To the north and west, China is bordered by Russia and India. China fought each of them as recently as the 1960s, and both are likely to be threatened by any serious Chinese military buildup. Unlike the United States, bordered by oceans and two friendly states, China is surrounded by enemies and rivals. Projecting power globally is hard when you've got to worry about defending your own turf. But what happens when China's GDP passes America's? Well, for one thing, we're not really sure when that will be. Realizing that current growth rates were economically and ecologically unsustainable, the Chinese government cut off the investment spigot that fueled its extraordinary 10 percent average annual growth. Today, China's growth rate is about half of what it was in 2007. One analysis suggests China's GDP may not surpass America's until the 2100s. Moreover, China's GDP per capita is a long way off from matching Western standards. In 2012, the World Bank assessed China's at $6,009; the United States' was $57,749. The per-person measure of wealth matters in that it reflects the government's capacity to pay for things that make its citizens happy and healthy. That's where China's internal headaches begin. The Chinese government has staked its domestic political legitimacy on delivering rapid, massive improvements in quality of life for its citizens. As growth slows, domestic political dissent may rise. Moreover, growth's worst side effect to date — an unprecedented ecological crisis — is also a source of massive discontent. China has 20 of the world's 30 most polluted cities; environmental cleanup costs may hoover up 3 percent of China's GDP. That's throwing 30 percent of its yearly average growth (during the pre-2013 boom years!) down the drain. The mass death and poisoning that follow as severe pollution's handmaidens threaten the very foundations of the Communist Party's power. American University China scholar Judith Shapiro writes that environmental protests — which sometimes "shut down" huge cities — are "so severe and so central to the manner in which China will 'rise' that it is no exaggeration to say that they cannot be separated from its national identity and the government's ability to provide for the Chinese people." That's hardly the only threat to the Chinese economy. China's financial system bears a disturbing resemblance to pre-crisis Wall Street. Its much-vaunted attempt to move away from an unsustainable export-based economy, according to Minxin Pei, may break on the rocks of massive corruption and other economic problems. After listing a slew of related problems, Pei suggests we need to start envisioning a world of "declining Chinese strength and rising probability of an unexpected democratic transition in the coming two decades." But even if this economic gloom and doom is wrong, and China really is destined for a prosperous future, there's one simple reason China will never displace America as global leader: It doesn't want to. Chinese foreign policy, to date, has been characterized by a sort of realist incrementalism. China has displayed no interest in taking over America's role as protector of the global commons; that's altogether too altruistic a task. Instead, China is content to let the United States and its allies keep the sea lanes open and free ride off of their efforts. A powerful China, in other words, would most likely to be happy to pursue its own interests inside the existing global order rather than supplanting it.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Good › China › AT: China Rise
Walt, ’23 (Stephen M. Walt, professor of international relations at Harvard University, taught at Princeton University and the University of Chicago, Master of the Social Science Collegiate Division, Deputy Dean of Social Sciences, Resident Associate of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, Guest Scholar at the Brookings Institution, served as a consultant for the Institute of Defense Analyses, the Center for Naval Analyses, and the National Defense University, regular columnist and member of the editorial board at at Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, May 31, 2023,, “Stop Worrying About Chinese Hegemony in Asia” -Emery)
Regional hegemony may be desirable in theory, but history suggests that it is an elusive goal. As Jonathan Kirshner points out, several different great powers have launched bids for regional dominance in the modern era and all but one of these attempts ended in disaster. France failed under Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte, Germany was beaten decisively in both world wars, and Japan’s attempt to establish a hegemonic order in Asia ended in total defeat as well. Only the United States managed to pull off becoming the sole great power in its region. In the modern world, in short, the success rate is less than 20 percent. Furthermore, the failures were not just minor setbacks: They were unmitigated disasters for the countries that made the attempt. Perhaps a million Frenchmen lost their lives in the Napoleonic Wars, and Bonaparte died in exile on a remote island in the South Atlantic. Germany suffered mightily in both world wars and ended up divided into separate states for more than 40 years. Japan was firebombed in World War II, had two cities destroyed by atomic bombs, and its political order was remade by a foreign occupier. Being a regional hegemon might be desirable, but trying to become one almost always makes a state less, rather than more, secure. Bids for hegemony fail for two main reasons. First, as defensive realists have long emphasized, there is a powerful tendency for major powers to balance against threats. When a powerful state is nearby, when its military forces seem tailored to project power against others, and when it seems to have revisionist ambitions, nearby powers typically band together to deter or defeat them. If a would-be hegemon reveals its aims by starting a war, balancing behavior becomes even more pronounced and effective. The second barrier to regional hegemony is nationalism. As Napoleon discovered when he invaded Spain, as the Soviet Union and United States both learned in Afghanistan, and as Moscow is now being reminded in Ukraine, local populations will make enormous sacrifices to repel invaders. Even nations that have been temporarily vanquished often remain restive and eager to throw off an aspiring hegemon’s yoke. The dissolution of the European colonial empires during the 20th century further illustrates how the spread of nationalist doctrines has strengthened resistance to foreign dominance. The United States is the one exception to this recurring tendency: It is the only regional hegemon in the modern era. Other would-be hegemons faced coordinated opposition from formidable and well-organized nation-states, but the United States was an ocean away from the other great powers and able to expand across North America without having to fight another major power or overcome a balancing coalition. The Indigenous population tried to resist, but it was weakened by its susceptibility to European diseases and divided into many loosely organized tribes and nations. Although Indigenous opposition to American expansion persisted until the late 19th century, the native tribes faced insurmountable collective-action problems and a dwindling population and were eventually swamped by an irresistible demographic tide. To put it plainly, the United States got lucky. Could China Become a Regional Hegemon Today? The conditions that allowed the United States to dominate the Western Hemisphere and exclude other major powers do not exist in Asia today. China may be stronger than any of its neighbors, but several of them are major industrial powers with considerable potential to check Chinese power, and the world’s other major power—the United States—remains committed to helping defend them. India’s population is now larger and significantly younger than China’s and its economy is growing more rapidly. Many of China’s neighbors are already balancing more energetically: Defense budgets are rising sharply, and Australia, India, and Japan are coordinating with each other and with the United States. The greater their fear of Chinese hegemony, the more vigorous such responses will be. In addition, India already has a nuclear arsenal and Japan or South Korea could acquire a nuclear deterrent if the need arose. Officials in Tokyo and Seoul have previously made it clear that they see this as a viable option should circumstances require, and possessing their own deterrent would further limit China’s ability to intimidate them. If China does not want more of its neighbors to acquire nuclear weapons, therefore, it should limit its ambitions and make such a step unnecessary. Nor are Asian powers likely to be swayed by Chinese President Xi Jinping’s suggestion that “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia.” Such statements are obviously intended to make the U.S. role in Asia seem less legitimate, but the belief that a shared “Asian” identity will override each individual state’s self-interest ignores the power of modern nationalism, which did not exist when the pre-modern, Sino-centric tributary system was in place. Nationalism is a powerful force in China, of course, but also in India, South Korea, Japan, Australia, and Vietnam. It is hard to imagine any of these states preferring subordination to Beijing to national autonomy. Lastly, modern surveillance and communications technology makes it much easier for states to identify threatening powers and coordinate defensive responses. A Chinese bid for hegemony in Asia would be impossible to disguise, and states threatened by this attempt could share concerns, pool resources, and formulate a collective response quickly. As the rapid and vigorous Western response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine illustrates, countries facing a common danger can act with surprising swiftness when necessary.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Good › China › AT: China Rise
Mueller, ‘22 (John Mueller, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, member of the political science department and senior research scientist with the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at the Ohio State University, Cato Institute, January 11, 2022, “China Has Been a Failure at Hegemony, So Let’s Just Chill” - Emery)
Many in the U.S. foreign policy establishment and elsewhere are sounding an alarm over concerns that, as China develops, it will become the dominant power in its region, a “hegemon” that will have too much “influence” there and do damage to U.S. security interests. For example, in 2017 the National Intelligence Council opined that “geopolitical competition” was on the rise and the Chinese sought “to exert more sway over their neighboring regions and promote an order in which U.S. influence does not dominate.” Accordingly, as it is often suggested, military hardware must be deployed to somehow keep that from happening. However, to a degree, we already know what Chinese “hegemony” looks like. Over the last decade, China has established a major military and especially economic presence, and it has tried to convert this condition into influence. These experiments in hegemony — China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which has stressed construction loans to countries across Eurasia, and its rather belligerent “wolf diplomacy” antics — have substantially foundered and have, if anything, proved to be counterproductive. The experience does not bode well for future efforts, and it does not justify alarm. From the foundering Belt & Road Initiative to its so‐called ‘wolf warrior’ strategy, Beijing is just not the threat we make it out to be. Its much‐hyped Belt and Road Initiative was once deemed by some to be a key element of a plot by the Chinese to “rule the world.” However, from the beginning there were warnings from Chinese scholars and business leaders questioning the economic rationale for many of the investments. In addition, economist Barry Naughton of the University of California at San Diego notes that the idea was in part economically misguided, and Tufts University’s Michael Beckley has estimated that the scheme would “probably exacerbate China’s woes” by funding “hundreds of financially dubious projects in unstable countries, more than half of which have credit ratings below investment‐grade.” These suggestions have proved to be justified. Expenditures of hundreds of billions on the project have failed to deliver either returns for investors (including state‐run banks) or political returns for China, notes Taiwan‐based analyst Tanner Green. The project was there, he says, “only because it is the favored brainchild of an authoritarian leader living in an echo chamber” — for other Chinese to attack BRI is “to attack the legitimacy of the party itself.” By 2019, BRI lending by China had fallen from a peak of $75 billion in 2016 (at a time when its promulgating author, Chinese President Xi Jinping, was touting BRI as “a project of the century”) to just $4 billion. Although some of these projects will likely succeed, there were reports by the end of 2020, like this one by James Kynge and Jonathan Wheatley at the Financial Times, that the money had often been doled out “with a combination of hubris, ambition, and naivete.” Descriptors like “unravelling,” “fallen off a cliff,” and “ill‐conceived” were being applied by experts, including Matt Ferchen at Merics, a Berlin‐based think‐tank, who wrote that China was now “mired in debt renegotiations with a host of countries.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Good › China › AT: China Rise
Jessica Chen Weiss is an author and China expert at Cornell University, “Even China Isn’t Convinced It Can Replace the U.S.” The New York Times, May 4, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/04/opinion/china-us-world-order.html
There’s a hardening view in Washington that China seeks to supplant the United States as the leading world power and remake the international system in its illiberal image. China has of course fed these fears by building up its military, partnering with a revanchist Russia,(and) pressing disputed territorial claims, and with its own rhetoric. President Xi Jinping of China has vowed to thwart what he views as U.S.-led efforts to “contain, encircle and suppress” China and has said “capitalism will inevitably perish and socialism will inevitably triumph.” But such ideological proclamations are in part motivated by insecurity — most Communist states have collapsed, and the Chinese leadership fears being next — and are meant more to instill domestic confidence and loyalty to the party than to reflect actual policy or fixed beliefs. Ideology in China is itself malleable, rather than a rigid cage that determines policy and has been continually tweaked to justify the maintenance of one-party rule through decades of great change. Under Mao, for instance, capitalists were persecuted as “counterrevolutionaries.” But under President Jiang Zemin the Chinese Communist Party abandoned a core Marxist belief in 2001 by accepting private entrepreneurs as party members. China’s economy today is more capitalist than Marxist and highly dependent on access to world markets. Assessments of China based on cherry-picked phrases from party propaganda overlook the frequent gap between rhetoric and reality. In 2018, for example, China cracked down on Marxist student groups and labor organizers, possibly because — as the labor scholar and sociologist Eli Friedman has noted — the young activists embodied “the Marxist principles the C.C.P. has long since abandoned in practice.” Likewise, Beijing has for years emphasized the sanctity of national sovereignty and noninterference in a country’s domestic affairs, yet has provided diplomatic cover for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Leading Chinese intellectuals openly acknowledge the difficulty of reconciling what China says with what it does. “Even we don’t believe much of what we say,” the Chinese economist Yao Yang, who is known for his pragmatic views, has said. “Our goal is not to defeat liberalism, but instead to say that what we have can be as good as what you have.” Jiang Shigong, a legal scholar and apologist for Mr. Xi’s political philosophy, has written that “‘socialism’ is not ossified dogma, but instead an open concept awaiting exploration and definition.” China’s long-term ambitions are difficult to know with certainty, and they can change. But it is far from clear that it can — or even seeks to — replace the United States as the world’s dominant power. Mr. Xi and the C.C.P. apparently see the United States as trying to keep China perpetually subordinate and vulnerable, opposing whatever China does or advocates in an international system that Beijing believes favors the United States and developed democracies. But at a minimum, China seems more intent on modifying aspects of a system under which it has prospered — making it safer for autocracy — rather than replacing it. Mr. Xi often couches this effort in his political slogans like the “China dream” and a “shared future for humankind.” But there is continuing debate in China over what these visions really mean and what costs and risks China should accept in seeking global leadership. China’s overseas development largess, for example, is limited by the imperative of addressing its own persistent development needs at home, research by the scholar Min Ye has shown. Same for other key Chinese strategies for widening its influence: Its efforts to internationalize the renminbi and reduce dollar dominance are constrained by the tight grip it keeps on the currency’s value, as well as other capital controls. These policies help stabilize its economy and prevent capital flight, but they limit the renminbi’s global appeal. U.S. concerns often center on the legitimate fear that China could attack Taiwan. But despite menacing Chinese military exercises meant to deter the self-ruled island from moving closer to formal independence, many experts believe that Beijing still prefers to achieve its longstanding objective of “peaceful reunification” through measures short of war. China could lose in a war and face international sanctions and supply chain disruptions. These would be economically and politically devastating, jeopardizing Mr. Xi’s prime objectives of regime security, domestic stability and national rejuvenation. Doubts are growing that China, facing economic headwinds and a shrinking population, can achieve its goal of surpassing the United States as the world’s largest economy, let alone other metrics of global leadership. There is broad recognition in China that it remains militarily, economically and technologically weaker than the United States and that further modernization depends upon continued access to international technology, capital and markets within a stable economic order. “It is impossible for America to contain the rise of China,” the influential Chinese scholar Huang Renwei has noted, “and it is equally impossible for China to quickly surpass America.” Chinese rhetoric about global governance reform has resonated in many developing countries that also see international institutions as tilted against them. But there is little reason to believe that the C.C.P.’s self-serving, nationalist ideology will captivate the world, especially as Mr. Xi feeds mistrust with his authoritarian ways, coercive tactics against foreign businesses and trading partners, and policies that increasingly smack of paranoia. China tends to be viewed more favorably in parts of the developing world. But that owes more to economics than to ideas, and its overseas investments have often been criticized for lacking transparency, saddling poor countries with debt, as well as environmental and other concerns. The United States must continue to discourage and hedge against more threatening Chinese behavior, including bolstering Taiwan’s capacity to resist coercion. But Washington should resist being guided solely by fear, which threatens the openness and dynamism responsible for American technological and scientific leadership. Policymakers should pair deterrent threats with more robust efforts to seek a constructive relationship with China, while also protecting the core values and interests of an inclusive international order and calling on Beijing to offer more credible reassurances of its intentions. There is no doubt that China — whatever its trajectory — poses a huge and complex policy challenge for America. But exaggerating fears of an “existential struggle” increases the likelihood of conflict, crowds out efforts to tackle shared challenges like climate change and creates a with-us-or-against-us framing that could alienate the United States from allies and much of the world. Worse, reflexively maneuvering to outcompete or thwart China only validates hard-liners in Beijing who believe that America is implacably hostile and that the only response lies in undermining the United States. By continuing on that road, the world’s two most powerful countries may end up turning each other into the enemies that they fear.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Good › Sustainability › Heg Inevitable
Kagan, 11-- Brooking senior foreign policy fellow,
(Robert, "The Price of Power" Weekly Standard, 1-24, )
In theory, the United States could refrain from intervening abroad. But, in practice, will it? Many assume today that the American public has had it with interventions, and Alice Rivlin certainly reflects a strong current of opinion when she says that “much of the public does not believe that we need to go in and take over other people’s countries.” That sentiment has often been heard after interventions, especially those with mixed or dubious results. It was heard after the four-year-long war in the Philippines, which cost 4,000 American lives and untold Filipino casualties. It was heard after Korea and after Vietnam. It was heard after Somalia. Yet the reality has been that after each intervention, the sentiment against foreign involvement has faded, and the United States has intervened again. Depending on how one chooses to count, the United States has undertaken roughly 25 overseas interventions since 1898: That is one intervention every 4.5 years on average. Overall, the United States has intervened or been engaged in combat somewhere in 52 out of the last 112 years, or roughly 47 percent of the time. Since the end of the Cold War, it is true, the rate of U.S. interventions has increased, with an intervention roughly once every 2.5 years and American troops intervening or engaged in combat in 16 out of 22 years, or over 70 percent of the time, since the fall of the Berlin Wall. The argument for returning to “normal” begs the question: What is normal for the United States? The historical record of the last century suggests that it is not a policy of nonintervention. This record ought to raise doubts about the theory that American behavior these past two decades is the product of certain unique ideological or doctrinal movements, whether “liberal imperialism” or “neoconservatism.” Allegedly “realist” presidents in this era have been just as likely to order interventions as their more idealistic colleagues. George H.W. Bush was as profligate an intervener as Bill Clinton. He invaded Panama in 1989, intervened in Somalia in 1992—both on primarily idealistic and humanitarian grounds—which along with the first Persian Gulf war in 1991 made for three interventions in a single four-year term. Since 1898 the list of presidents who ordered armed interventions abroad has included William McKinley, Theodore Roose-velt, William Howard Taft, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush. One would be hard-pressed to find a common ideological or doctrinal thread among them—unless it is the doctrine and ideology of a mainstream American foreign policy that leans more toward intervention than many imagine or would care to admit. Many don’t want to admit it, and the only thing as consistent as this pattern of American behavior has been the claim by contemporary critics that it is abnormal and a departure from American traditions. The anti-imperialists of the late 1890s, the isolationists of the 1920s and 1930s, the critics of Korea and Vietnam, and the critics of the first Persian Gulf war, the interventions in the Balkans, and the more recent wars of the Bush years have all insisted that the nation had in those instances behaved unusually or irrationally. And yet the behavior has continued. To note this consistency is not the same as justifying it. The United States may have been wrong for much of the past 112 years. Some critics would endorse the sentiment expressed by the historian Howard K. Beale in the 1950s, that “the men of 1900” had steered the United States onto a disastrous course of world power which for the subsequent half-century had done the United States and the world no end of harm. But whether one lauds or condemns this past century of American foreign policy—and one can find reasons to do both—the fact of this consistency remains. It would require not just a modest reshaping of American foreign policy priorities but a sharp departure from this tradition to bring about the kinds of changes that would allow the United States to make do with a substantially smaller force structure. Is such a sharp departure in the offing? It is no doubt true that many Americans are unhappy with the on-going warfare in Afghanistan and to a lesser extent in Iraq, and that, if asked, a majority would say the United States should intervene less frequently in foreign nations, or perhaps not at all. It may also be true that the effect of long military involvements in Iraq and Afghanistan may cause Americans and their leaders to shun further interventions at least for a few years—as they did for nine years after World War I, five years after World War II, and a decade after Vietnam. This may be further reinforced by the difficult economic times in which Americans are currently suffering. The longest period of nonintervention in the past century was during the 1930s, when unhappy memories of World War I combined with the economic catastrophe of the Great Depression to constrain American interventionism to an unusual degree and produce the first and perhaps only genuinely isolationist period in American history. So are we back to the mentality of the 1930s? It wouldn’t appear so. There is no great wave of isolationism sweeping the country. There is not even the equivalent of a Patrick Buchanan, who received 3 million votes in the 1992 Republican primaries. Any isolationist tendencies that might exist are severely tempered by continuing fears of terrorist attacks that might be launched from overseas. Nor are the vast majority of Americans suffering from economic calamity to nearly the degree that they did in the Great Depression. Even if we were to repeat the policies of the 1930s, however, it is worth recalling that the unusual restraint of those years was not sufficient to keep the United States out of war. On the contrary, the United States took actions which ultimately led to the greatest and most costly foreign intervention in its history. Even the most determined and in those years powerful isolationists could not prevent it. Today there are a number of obvious possible contingencies that might lead the United States to substantial interventions overseas, notwithstanding the preference of the public and its political leaders to avoid them. Few Americans want a war with Iran, for instance. But it is not implausible that a president—indeed, this president—might find himself in a situation where military conflict at some level is hard to avoid. The continued success of the international sanctions regime that the Obama administration has so skillfully put into place, for instance, might eventually cause the Iranian government to lash out in some way—perhaps by attempting to close the Strait of Hormuz. Recall that Japan launched its attack on Pearl Harbor in no small part as a response to oil sanctions imposed by a Roosevelt administration that had not the slightest interest or intention of fighting a war against Japan but was merely expressing moral outrage at Japanese behavior on the Chinese mainland. Perhaps in an Iranian contingency, the military actions would stay limited. But perhaps, too, they would escalate. One could well imagine an American public, now so eager to avoid intervention, suddenly demanding that their president retaliate. Then there is the possibility that a military exchange between Israel and Iran, initiated by Israel, could drag the United States into conflict with Iran. Are such scenarios so farfetched that they can be ruled out by Pentagon planners? Other possible contingencies include a war on the Korean Peninsula, where the United States is bound by treaty to come to the aid of its South Korean ally; and possible interventions in Yemen or Somalia, should those states fail even more than they already have and become even more fertile ground for al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. And what about those “humanitarian” interventions that are first on everyone’s list to be avoided? Should another earthquake or some other natural or man-made catastrophe strike, say, Haiti and present the looming prospect of mass starvation and disease and political anarchy just a few hundred miles off U.S. shores, with the possibility of thousands if not hundreds of thousands of refugees, can anyone be confident that an American president will not feel compelled to send an intervention force to help? Some may hope that a smaller U.S. military, compelled by the necessity of budget constraints, would prevent a president from intervening. More likely, however, it would simply prevent a president from intervening effectively. This, after all, was the experience of the Bush administration in Iraq and Afghanistan. Both because of constraints and as a conscious strategic choice, the Bush administration sent too few troops to both countries. The results were lengthy, unsuccessful conflicts, burgeoning counterinsurgencies, and loss of confidence in American will and capacity, as well as large annual expenditures. Would it not have been better, and also cheaper, to have sent larger numbers of forces initially to both places and brought about a more rapid conclusion to the fighting? The point is, it may prove cheaper in the long run to have larger forces that can fight wars quickly and conclusively, as Colin Powell long ago suggested, than to have smaller forces that can’t. Would a defense planner trying to anticipate future American actions be wise to base planned force structure on the assumption that the United States is out of the intervention business? Or would that be the kind of penny-wise, pound-foolish calculation that, in matters of national security, can prove so unfortunate? The debates over whether and how the United States should respond to the world’s strategic challenges will and should continue. Armed interventions overseas should be weighed carefully, as always, with an eye to whether the risk of inaction is greater than the risks of action. And as always, these judgments will be merely that: judgments, made with inadequate information and intelligence and no certainty about the outcomes. No foreign policy doctrine can avoid errors of omission and commission. But history has provided some lessons, and for the United States the lesson has been fairly clear: The world is better off, and the United States is better off, in the kind of international system that American power has built and defended.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Good › Sustainability
Kagan ’18 – Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute
[Friedman Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy, Foreign Policy Brookings Program, written several books regarding the international order and U.S. hegemony, contributing columnist to the Washington Post, 9-18-2018, “The Jungle Grows Back: American and Our Imperiled World,” accessed 3-2-2020]
Despite everything that has happened, if we reject the counsels of the new “realism” and resume our support for the liberal world order, it is still within our capacity to defend it and put off its collapse, perhaps for some time. Today the order remains intact, despite the hostility of the present administration and the weakness of the last. The international structures supporting it are durable. This is partly because they rest on geographical realities and a distribution of power that still favor the liberal order and still pose obstacles to those who would disrupt it. It is also because liberal values, though under assault, remain a force that binds the democratic nations of the world together. Authoritarianism also has its appeal and will always compete with liberalism, but the authoritarian governments do not feel the same sense of commonality as the monarchies and aristocracies of the early nineteenth century. The Chinese and Russians are not adversaries, but they are not allies either. They share little except their antipathy to liberalism. The democratic nations, however, are bound together by more than common adversaries, as the post–Cold War era has proved. America’s alliances in Europe and Asia have so far held, therefore, despite the weakening of America’s commitment under two administrations. There is still a liberal world order to be salvaged, if the American people decide it is worth salvaging.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Good › Sustainability
Terhalle 13 Maximilian Terhalle studied international politics , history and international law, he received his master's degree in political science, modern history and constitutional and international law. He attended the Summer School in International Politics at the University of Cambridge and received his Master’s in International and National Middle Eastern Politics, “Is Unipolarity Peaceful?”, ResearchGate, Aug 5, 2013,
Unipolarity is more peaceful than what theorists predict. In causal terms, its dynamics might be less unidirectional than what is often assumed. First, contrary to Monteiro’s assumption, the character of today’s aggregation mechanisms is not adversarial. This is because the nature of polarity has changed over time. Second, in contrast to domestic alliance aspects, Monteiro’s structural inclinations lead him to overlook the importance of domestic politics when analyzing the targets of the unipole’s ‘temptation to re-engineer the system’. Third, since Monteiro believes that wars against smaller states are very likely, he seems to assume a deterministic stance, thereby leaving no room for US diplomacy to reject such determinism at opportune moments. Finally, neglecting economic aspects, Monteiro does not recognize the socio-political effects of the security-economics nexus on smaller states. For more than ten years, William Wohlforth’s (1999) contributions to the study of unipolarity have, generally speaking, defined the debate—notwithstanding the substantial criticism his arguments have encountered (see Layne, 2006). Nuno Monteiro (2011–12) has now taken a fresh look at Wohlforth’s central proposi-tions. At its core, his highly original piece asks whether or not unipolarity will be peaceful, thereby critically complementing the existing analyses focusing on its durability.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Good › Sustainability
Ikenberry 22 (Gilford John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University, “Why American Power Endures: The U.S.-Led Order Isn’t in Decline”, Foreign Affairs, November 1, 2022, ) [CC]
The merits of the U.S.-led order don’t just lie in what Washington made but in how it brought this order into being. The United States did not become a great power through conquest. Rather, it stepped opportunistically into geopolitical vacuums created at the ends of major wars to shape the peace. These moments occurred after the two world wars and the Cold War, when upheavals in great power relations left the global system and the old world of empires in tatters. At these junctures, the United States demonstrated the ability to build coalitions of states to hammer out the new terms of world order. During the twentieth century, this settlement-oriented, coalitional approach to order building overwhelmed the aggressive efforts of rival illiberal great powers to shape the future. The United States worked with other democracies to produce favorable geopolitical outcomes. This method of leadership continues to give the United States an edge in shaping the terms of world order today. At three pivotal moments during the last century—after the end of World War I, again in the wake of World War II, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union—the United States found itself on the winning side of major conflicts. The old order was in ruins, and something new had to be built. In each case, Washington aimed to do more than merely restore the balance of power. The United States saw itself in a struggle with illiberal great-power aggressors, contesting world order principles and defending the liberal democratic way of life. In each case, the mobilization for war and great-power competition was framed as a contest of ideas and visions. U.S. leaders sent a message to their citizens: if you pay the price and bear the burdens of this struggle, we will endeavor to build a better United States—and a more hospitable world order. The United States sought to better organize the world when the world itself was turned upside down. The United States chose to exercise its power in these crucial moments by working with other democracies. In 1919, 1945, and 1989, the United States was the leading member of a coalition of states (the Allies, the United Nations, the “free world,” respectively) that won the war and negotiated the terms of the subsequent peace. The United States provided leadership and material power that turned the tide in each war. U.S. officials emphasized the importance of building and strengthening the coalition of liberal democracies. A slew of U.S. presidents, including Wilson, Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and George H. W. Bush, argued that the country’s survival and well-being had to be premised on building and maintaining a critical mass of similarly disposed partners and allies. In a world of despotic, hostile, and powerful rivals, the United States and other liberal democracies have repeatedly concluded that they are safer working as a group than alone. As Roosevelt put it in January 1944, “We have joined with like-minded people in order to defend ourselves in a world that has been gravely threatened by gangster rule.” Of course, liberal states have always been willing to ally with nondemocracies within larger coalitions. During the Cold War and again today, the United States has allied itself and partnered with authoritarian client states around the world. Nonetheless, in these eras, the core impulse has been to build U.S. grand strategy around a dynamic core of liberal states in East Asia, Europe, North America, and Oceania. Democratic solidarity also creates a setting for generating progressive ideas and attracting global support. Collective security (defined by Wilson in his Fourteen Points speech as “mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike”), the Four Freedoms (Roosevelt’s goals for postwar order: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear), and the UN’s Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for instance, are all grand ideas forged out of great-power contests. The world order contest underway between the United States and its autocratic rivals China and Russia offers a new opportunity to advance liberal democratic principles around the world.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Good › UQ › AT: Multipolarity Now
Brooks 23 (Stephen Brooks, Professor of Government at Dartmouth College and a Guest Professor at Stockholm University, and William Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor at Dartmouth College, 4/18/23, )
In the 1990s and the early years of this century, the United States’ global dominance could scarcely be questioned. No matter which metric of power one looked at, it showed a dramatic American lead. Never since the birth of the modern state system in the mid-seventeenth century had any country been so far ahead in the military, economic, and technological realms simultaneously. Allied with the United States, meanwhile, were the vast majority of the world’s richest countries, and they were tied together by a set of international institutions that Washington had played the lead role in constructing. The United States could conduct its foreign policy under fewer external constraints than any leading state in modern history. And as dissatisfied as China, Russia, and other aspiring powers were with their status in the system, they realized they could do nothing to overturn it. That was then. Now, American power seems much diminished. In the intervening two decades, the United States has suffered costly, failed interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, a devastating financial crisis, deepening political polarization, and, in Donald Trump, four years of a president with isolationist impulses. All the while, China continued its remarkable economic ascent and grew more assertive than ever. To many, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine sounded the death knell for U.S. primacy, a sign that the United States could no longer hold back the forces of revisionism and enforce the international order it had built. According to most observers, the unipolar moment has come to a definitive end. Pointing to the size of China’s economy, many analysts have declared the world bipolar. But most go even further, arguing that the world is on the verge of transitioning to multipolarity or has already done so. China, Iran, and Russia all endorse this view, one in which they, the leading anti-American revisionists, finally have the power to shape the system to their liking. India and many other countries in the global South have reached the same conclusion, contending that after decades of superpower dominance, they are at last free to chart their own course. Even many Americans take it for granted that the world is now multipolar. Successive reports from the U.S. National Intelligence Council have proclaimed as much, as have figures on the left and right who favor a more modest U.S. foreign policy. There is perhaps no more widely accepted truth about the world today than the idea that it is no longer unipolar. But this view is wrong. The world is neither bipolar nor multipolar, and it is not about to become either. Yes, the has become less dominant over the past 20 years, but it remains at the top of the global power hierarchy—safely above China and far, far above every other country. No longer can one pick any metric to see this reality, but it becomes clear when the right ones are used. And the persistence of unipolarity becomes even more evident when one considers that the world is still largely devoid of a force that shaped great-power politics in times of multipolarity and bipolarity, from the beginning of the modern state system through the : balancing. Other countries simply cannot match the power of the United States by joining alliances or building up their militaries. American power still casts a large shadow across the globe, but it is admittedly smaller than before. Yet this development should be put in perspective. What is at issue is only the nature of unipolarity—not its existence. During the Cold War, the world was undeniably bipolar, defined above all by the competition between the United States and the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the world turned , with the United States clearly standing alone at the top. Many who proclaim multipolarity seem to think of power as influence—that is, the ability to get others to do what you want. Since the United States could not pacify Afghanistan or Iraq and cannot solve many other global problems, the argument runs, the world must be multipolar. But polarity centers on a different meaning of power, one that is measurable: power as resources, especially military might and economic heft. And indeed, at the root of most multipolarity talk these days is the idea that scholarly pioneers of the concept had in mind: that international politics works differently depending on how resources are distributed among the biggest states.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Good › UQ › Yes - Dollar Heg
Zoffer 20 Joshua P. Zoffer is a student at Yale Law School. His writing on U.S. economic leadership has appeared in the Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, and The National Interest. “To End Forever War, Keep the Dollar Globally Dominant” The New Republic, February 3, 2020,
In addition, the dollar’s role offers a potent alternative to kinetic military action as a means of pursuing foreign policy objectives. The dollar’s broad use means access to dollar liquidity—which in turn requires access to the U.S. financial system—is essential for foreign governments and businesses. For foreign banks, especially, being cut off from dollar access is essentially a death sentence. That makes sanctions that do so a powerful tool in the international arena. In 2005, for example, the U.S. used the dollar to strike a devastating blow against North Korea without firing a single shot or even formally enacting sanctions. Using authority provided by Section 311 of the Patriot Act, the Department of the Treasury crippled Banco Delta Asia, a bank accused of facilitating illegal activity by the North Korean government, by merely threatening to cut off its access to the American financial system. Deposit outflows began within days; within weeks the bank was placed under government administration to avoid a full collapse. Pyongyang was hit hard, as other banks ceased their business with it to avoid meeting the same fate. Similarly, though the Trump administration has worked hard to undo it, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran to limit the development of nuclear weapons was made possible, in part, by painful dollar sanctions that brought Iran to the table. Far from being a proximate cause of military conflict, the dollar’s central global role has often been used to contain adversaries without military intervention. Still, skeptics are right to point out that the dollar’s role has indirectly funded American interventionism and that dollar sanctions have been overused, provoking the ire of American allies. But these facts suggest we should use our dollar power to forge a more progressive U.S. order, not abandon the advantage altogether. America’s exorbitant privilege need not fund warships and missiles: The same low-interest borrowing could be used to fund a new universal health care system, expand access to higher education, or pursue any number of large-scale social policy objectives, including financing global public goods that no other country or consortium of countries is prepared to fund, such as climate change mitigation. Domestically, the chief argument against the dollar’s role is that the same overvaluation that makes imports cheap also makes exports expensive, contributing to the hollowing-out of the American manufacturing sector. But again, dollar deficit-spending could be used to address this economic hazard by covering the costs of relocation, job training, or even paying salaries through a federal work program. Calling out military adventurism as a reason to abandon dollar hegemony is like saying you should lose your credit card for racking up charges on junk food. The better solution is to change your diet, not cut off your access to credit. It isn’t even clear that the U.S. could “end” the dollar’s dominance, even if it wanted to. The dollar’s use in trade and payments reflects the decisions of many global actors, including but not limited to foreign governments. Companies and financial institutions overwhelmingly choose to use dollars because of the unrivaled depth and liquidity of the dollar financial market; at present, no other currency is ready to play this role. The only way the U.S. could change this would be to dramatically contract its borrowing, which would likely cause a global recession. Adler and Bessner’s argument gets at a dilemma at the heart of international monetary politics. Since Bretton Woods, the dollar has played two roles that sometimes end up at cross-purposes: It is the domestic money for the U.S. and the international unit of account for the globalized economy. No other country has been willing to allow its currency to be used in this way (or issued a currency capable of it). But without some currency playing this role, economic globalization as we know it cannot continue. Leaders in Russia, Venezuela, and other nations have spoken with bravado about ending the petrodollar for years but are no closer to making that change a reality. Iran’s Oil Bourse has accomplished little: OPEC still prices its members’ oil in dollars. The petroyuan lacks the market liquidity to compete with the petrodollar. Notorious opacity of Chinese financial markets aside, the capitalization of U.S. equity and debt markets is more than four times that of their Chinese counterparts. De-dollarization is more rhetoric than reality, as it has been for decades. A more multipolar currency system may offer greater stability decades down the road if the U.S. share of global economic output continues to shrink, but we aren’t there yet. I recently traveled to Beijing and Tokyo to speak with finance officials on exactly this issue. All agreed that for the foreseeable future, getting off the dollar is essentially impossible. In the words of Sun Tianqi, chief accountant of China’s State Administration of Foreign Exchange, which manages China’s dollar reserves, “the role of [a] currency is mostly determined by markets, not governments. Governments cannot simply choose to end [the] dollar’s role.” The U.S. cannot end the dollar’s dominance, and it shouldn’t want to. Ending forever wars does not require renouncing an exorbitant privilege that, if used properly, could be the source of so much good.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Good › UQ › Yes - Dollar Heg
Zoffer 20 Joshua P. Zoffer is a student at Yale Law School. His writing on U.S. economic leadership has appeared in the Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, and The National Interest. “To End Forever War, Keep the Dollar Globally Dominant” The New Republic, February 3, 2020,
In early 2016, Obama Treasury Secretary Jack Lew cautioned that the dollar’s dominance as a global currency rested, in part, on the U.S. government’s reluctance to fully weaponize it. If foreign markets and governments “feel that we will deploy sanctions without sufficient justification or for inappropriate reasons,” he warned, “we should not be surprised if they look for ways to avoid doing business in the United States or in U.S. dollars.” Lew’s case stemmed from the more fundamental view that the dollar’s international role is “a source of tremendous strength for our economy, a benefit for U.S. companies and a driver of U.S. global leadership”—in other words, a role worth keeping. This view is emblematic of American financial governance since the Second World War. U.S. economic analysts, especially at the Treasury, have jealously guarded the dollar’s role and the many benefits it offers: the ability to run large deficits at low cost and disproportionate influence over the structure of the global economy, among others. Yet in their recent article in The New Republic, David Adler and Daniel Bessner argue the U.S. should abandon these advantages. In their view, the dollar’s role has encouraged American militarism and should be relinquished to curb such behavior. Dollar hegemony is not without cost, but to renounce it would be a profound mistake. Adler and Bessner’s view neglects the sizable economic benefits the dollar’s role confers on the U.S., as well as its possible use as an antidote to military adventurism. It ignores the enormous good that can be done with deficit spending, much of which has gone to the American military but could instead fund progressive programs. And it elides the inability of the U.S. and its global trading partners to shift away from dollar dominance without creating worldwide financial distress. Adler and Bessner are right that the U.S. has misused its privilege, but Washington should not abandon it; rather, American leaders should seek to transform it. Generations of American policymakers have been right to protect the dollar’s key currency role for economic reasons. Most notably, dollar hegemony affords the U.S. the ability to run large and prolonged budget and balance-of-payments deficits. The dollar represents 62 percent of allocated foreign exchange reserves, is used to invoice and settle roughly half of world trade, and accounts for 42 percent of global payments. Because governments, banks, and businesses worldwide need lots of dollars, the world market always stands ready to absorb new U.S.-dollar-denominated debt without charging higher interest rates Adler and Bessner correctly point out that the rest of the world considers the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency to be an “exorbitant privilege,” a term coined in the 1960s by then French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard D’Estaing. The ability to spend beyond its means has enabled the U.S. to fund its impressive military might, whether one views that power as the fountainhead of Pax Americana or the source of illegitimate military adventurism. But these economic benefits go beyond just deficits. The demand for dollars also pushes up the dollar’s value against other currencies, enhancing American purchasing power and offering consumers access to imports on the cheap. The dollar’s role also means American firms rarely need to do business in foreign currencies, reducing transaction costs and exchange-rate risks. More broadly, America’s central economic role gives it outsize influence at crucial moments. At the height of the financial crisis that began in 2008, the Federal Reserve was able to inject vital liquidity into the global financial system by selectively offering dollar swap lines to trusted foreign central banks. Dollar hegemony enabled the U.S. to act swiftly, effectively, and on its own terms.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Good › UQ › Yes - Dollar Heg
Cowen 4/13 Tyler Cowen is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist. He is a professor of economics at George Mason University and writes for the blog Marginal Revolution. His books include “The Complacent Class: The Self-Defeating Quest for the American Dream.” “What De-Dollarization? The Dollar Rules the World” Bloomberg, April 13, 2023,
By one estimate, the dollar is a part of 88% of all international transactions. Some people fear this dominance cannot last, while others question whether it should: Doesn’t a stronger dollar hurt US exports, and thus US workers? The good news, for Americans at least, is that dollar hegemony is beneficial for the US, its government and most of its citizens. Furthermore, it is likely to last for the foreseeable future. The issue has become more topical lately. Because of sanctions, Russia is cut off from many dollar-based networks. Other nations, such as Brazil, India and Saudi Arabia, have made at least cosmetic moves toward “de-dollarization,” hoping to rely less on the dollar for their international exchanges. Think of “a sound and focal dollar” as a good or service that the US produces, just as China manufactures phones or Japan makes cars. When Americans trade dollars for foreign goods and services, that measures as a US trade deficit, but it can also be seen as America exporting dollars and “dollar services.” The US brands and markets its dollar, just as Zara or the Gap brands and markets clothing. So the much-vaunted US trade deficit can be reconceptualized as a form of barter: One service (dollar stability) is being exchanged for another good or service (e.g., whatever America buys from China). In essence, branding and selling dollars so effectively — also known as “buying things” — enables US consumers to have a higher standard of living. To be clear, sometimes selling a particular good or service can be a negative, or at least a mixed blessing. Venezuela’s economy is very dependent on oil revenue, for example, and with unstable oil prices, its revenues are unreliable. Demand for US dollars is not unstable in the same manner. In fact, with conflict in Ukraine and increasing Chinese ambitions, the dollar seems to have a secure future as a safe haven currency — maybe too secure, from a broader point of view. If there is any danger here, it is that the forthcoming debate in Washington over the debt ceiling somehow results in a US default. Even if that were to happen, however, it would not be an argument against dollar hegemony, nor evidence that dollar hegemony must end. It would just be more proof of the stupidity of America’s politics. To the extent the US dollar is strong, that does make it harder for America to export other goods and services. But there is nothing special or undesirable about this reality. If South Korea were to export more Samsung phones, for instance, that would boost South Korean wages and the won, and in turn make it harder for Korea to export alternatives such as K-pop. In any given country, different economic activities have to compete for resources, funding and attention. That’s simply an illustration of the basic economic fact of scarcity. If US dollars are so much in demand, it is testament to America’s history as a beacon of relative stability — which may be a stronger draw than, say, the quality of US tractors or movies. How far is the talk of de-dollarization going to proceed? Probably not very. The US has the world’s deepest and most liquid financial markets, and they remain relatively open, in spite of some restrictions on Chinese investment in industries sensitive for national security. There are strong reasons to have a dominant currency in international markets, just as there are strong reasons for having a dominant currency in domestic transactions within the US. Liquidity for a currency begets further liquidity, whether at home or globally. With the dollar estimated at 88% of all international transactions, the euro at 31% is only a modest competitor (since a transaction may involve two currencies, the total may exceed 100%). The euro, unlike the dollar, will never be tied to a single national government, and the European Union does not come close to the military might of the US. The yuan is estimated at only 7% of that total of international transactions, and China seems unwilling to open up its capital markets, as that could lead to rapid capital outflows and possibly a financial crisis. But without open capital markets, the yuan is not a strong contender for a global reserve currency. Economics can sometimes be complicated or hard to explain. When it comes the US dollar, it is neither. The dollar will retain its focal role, which is good for the US, and the reasons are simple and intuitive.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Good › UQ › Yes - Dollar Heg
Norrlöf 23 (Dr. Carla Norrlöf, professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, “Dollar dominance: Preserving the US dollar’s status as the global reserve currency," Atlantic Council, ) [CC]
Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, geopolitical blowback is widely seen as threatening dollar dominance. To fully grasp what today’s turbulence means for the dollar system, we must however move beyond the motivations of countries targeted by sanctions. Many countries benefit from US currency coercion because they share the core principles behind US sanctions. Countries supporting sanctions on Russia have strong geopolitical incentives to continue holding and using dollars for international reserve and payment purposes. Supporting the dollar reinforces the constraining impact of the sanctions and helps ensure their future effectiveness. The economic incentives these governments previously had to diversify away from traditional currencies, particularly the US dollar must now be weighed against their geopolitical incentives to hold dollars. Together, the coalition arrayed against Russia accounts for more than ninety percent of global currency reserves, approximately eighty percent of global investment, and sixty percent of world trade and world economic output. Overcoming that dominance would be difficult even if every country that has declined to sanction Russia fell in line behind an organized anti-dollar coalition. Moreover, countries not participating in sanctions against Russia do not necessarily disagree with the goals behind them: ending the war in Ukraine and deterring future territorial aggression. The coalition behind the sanctions against Russia is broad, wealthy, and militarily powerful, and its objective of ending Russia’s barbarous war is widely shared, even by those not participating in the sanctions. Geopolitically induced dollar support is rather likely to stabilize dollar holdings.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Good › UQ › General
Fried 22 (Daniel Fried, Weiser Family Distinguished Fellow, Former US Ambassador to Poland, "Why US global leadership keeps surviving partisanship," Atlantic Council, , 8-5-2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/why-us-global-leadership-keeps-surviving-partisanship/)[CC]
The US Senate’s overwhelming ratification on Wednesday of Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO was a vote of confidence in those countries, in the Alliance itself, and in the US role as leader of the free world—just as two authoritarian powers, Russia and China, are challenging the international system the United States has led since 1945. Bringing the two Nordic nations into NATO will not only strengthen transatlantic security amid threats from Russian strongman Vladimir Putin, but also signal the continuing political viability—regardless of the bipartisan doldrums on the home front—of American leadership in the free world. Time and again, that leadership has faced serious trials. The first US bid for this global role—President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points speech of 1918, which offered a grand strategy rooted in universalist values to supplant European imperial thinking—failed in spectacular fashion when the Senate rejected the League of Nations. Right- and left-wing variants of isolationism kept the United States passive as Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin rose to power. When the United States was finally thrust into World War II, its late start effectively forced the country to seek an alliance with Stalin to defeat Hitler. President Franklin D. Roosevelt tried to reboot Wilson’s universalist vision, but it was his successor, Harry Truman, who put together the political underpinnings for modern US global leadership: a coalition of liberal internationalists and conservative anti-communists who swept away the discredited isolationists on both sides of the aisle. That coalition produced the Marshall Plan, supported what later became the European Union, created a web of international economic institutions to mitigate the cycles of capitalist speculation and collapse, and built a security architecture aimed at containing would-be continental dictators. The first years of that new international order were not exactly smooth. Early disasters—the Soviet atomic bomb, Stalin’s consolidation of control over Eastern Europe, communist victory in China, and the Korean War—led to a backlash from the right that came to be known as McCarthyism. Losing the Vietnam War led to a backlash from the left. Then, the economic stresses of the 1970s—“stagflation” and an Arab oil embargo—left many Americans, regardless of their political leaning, demoralized about the United States’ ability to influence the world for the better. From the right, President Ronald Reagan advanced Truman’s Cold War strategy—and more successfully, since the Soviet Union’s internal weaknesses had by then hollowed out its power. From the center-right and -left, respectively, Presidents George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton advanced Roosevelt’s strategy from the 1941 Atlantic Charter to push for NATO enlargement—something even the highly partisan Clinton impeachment of 1998 did not derail. And later, President George W. Bush enjoyed Democratic support for continuing the NATO-enlargement strategy despite intense acrimony over the Iraq War. President Donald Trump revived the tradition and some of the rhetoric of rightist isolationism (such as “America First”), including its old hostility to an alliance with Europe and to a universalist strategy more generally. Missouri Republican Sen. Josh Hawley, the sole vote against NATO accession for Finland and Sweden, made that point explicit Wednesday when he said on the Senate floor that the United States did not face major security threats from Europe and, moreover, that while some “think American foreign policy is about creating a liberal world order… they’re wrong.” But that was just one Senator’s vote. Once again, US international leadership has persisted and prevailed. It has done so because it has mostly worked for the American people, who have witnessed decades of growing prosperity and general peace—and because when it didn’t, it still looked better than the alternatives: Soviet Communism in its time, or re-booted nationalism and spheres of influence enforced through expansionist aggression and war. Facing these challenges, working with allies looks far better than working alone. The current bitterness of US domestic politics, including the rise of authoritarian politics, leaves little to be proud of. But on Wednesday, the bipartisan tradition of support for internationalism, alliances, and sober US leadership—all embodied by NATO—scored a win.
2023
CNDI
Evidence
Hegemony Good › UQ › General
Caroll 21 (Richard E. Caroll, retired economist, published in Real Clear Defense, International Policy Digest, and Foreign Policy News, “Why the United States is the Once and Future Unipolar Superpower,” The National Interest, May 26, 2021, ) [CC]
The famous Iron Chancellor of Germany, Otto Von Bismarck, once said of the United States, “God protects fools, drunkards and the United States of America.” While said perhaps in jest or frustration, his remarks have proved prophetic throughout the years. The United States from the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to the beginning of the Iraq War, enjoyed a moment of unipolarity in international affairs. For the first time in recorded human history, one country occupied the high ground of international affairs by itself. When the United States became involved in the Iraq War, which soon became a quagmire, its two closest competitors on the world stage, China and Russia, began to extend their influence in world affairs at the expense of the United States. However, when one looks at the entirety of the world situation, unless there is a dramatic change in the internal affairs of the United States, the United States has a good chance of regaining its unipolarity in world affairs. Part of the reason for the apparent durability of the ability of the United States to maintain its great power status is its geographical location. With an ocean on both coasts, friendly nations to its north and south, and a climate that provides some of the best farmland in the world, coupled with navigable rivers which provides ease of transportation of goods and services from its heartland, the United States is blessed with natural advantages. In addition, the United States is energy independent thanks to the development of oil fracking. An additional reason for U.S. staying power is the enduring legacy of the U.S. Constitution, which so far has provided for a stable transfer of political power between various political antagonists, notwithstanding the riot and possible attempt at insurrection on January 6, 2021. With its history of stable courts and a friendly business environment, the United States has been an oasis of stability in the world so far. Combined with the physical and non-physical advantages discussed above, U.S. demographics provide an internal manufacturing and consumer market advantage that no other nation has. While it is true that the annual growth rate of the American population is approaching stagnation levels, it can be argued that the previous Trump administration depressed demographic growth by severely limiting immigration. Coupled with the Covid-19 pandemic, the growth rate for the American population is anemic. Current estimates of demographic growth range from between 376 million to 404 million people by 2060. This would still make the United States a manufacturing and consumer market. And while the United States did achieve a moment of unipolarity from the end of the Cold War to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, it still has the potential to return to unipolarity based not only on its advantages, but also with the poor governance and negative demographic growth of its nearest competitors—Russia and China.
2023
CNDI
Topicality
Topicality – CNDI 23 › Basic Income › Universal
Stanford Basic Income Lab ND, “What is Basic Income?,” Stanford, https://basicincome.stanford.edu/about/what-is-ubi/#:~:text=Basic%20income%20is%20a%20regular,work%20requirement%20of%20other%20conditions.
Basic income is a regular cash payment to all members of a community, without a work requirement of other conditions.
2023
CNDI
Topicality
Topicality – CNDI 23 › Basic Income › Universal
Yamamori ’22
Yamamori, Toru. “The 6th ‘Clarification of the Basic Income’s Definition’ (CBID) Open Forum: 12.30 PM GMT (1.30 Pm London), Tuesday 28 June 2022.” BIEN - Basic Income Earth Network, basicincome.org/news/2022/05/the-6th-clarification-of-the-basic-incomes-definition-cbid-open-forum-12-30-pm-gmt-1-30-pm-london-tuesday-28-june-2022/#:~:text=Seoul%2C%20Korea%20Wed.-,Basic%20Income,means%2Dtest%20or%20work%20requirement. Accessed 5 July 2023.
A Basic Income is ‘a periodic cash payment unconditionally delivered to all on an individual basis, without means-test or work requirement’ (Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN)). It is always that: but within that definition there has been a significant number of variants during the past two centuries—in relation to how often, how much, to whom, and so on. This paper will explore those variants and the reasons for them, both historically and in the context of today’s lively global debate. The paper will also discuss those tax and benefits policies that are sometimes regarded as variants of Basic Income but in fact are not, and will briefly outline their histories, their relevance to the history of ideas of Basic Income, and their relationship to the current debate.