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2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › Turns Econ

Natural gas and oil are key to the economy

Burgum 23 --- masters of business administration from Stanford 1980, governor of North Dakota since 2016 (March 7, 2023, Doug “Studies underscore oil and gas industry’s significant impact on North Dakota’s economy, communities” North Dakota, https://www.governor.nd.gov/news/studies-underscore-oil-and-gas-industrys-significant-impact-north-dakotas-economy-communities//CHC-MHT ☢️)

BISMARCK, N.D. – The oil and gas industry in North Dakota remains a powerhouse for the state’s economy, accounting for more than $42.6 billion in gross business volume, nearly 50,000 jobs and $3.8 billion in state and local tax revenues in 2021, according to two studies highlighted today by Gov. Doug Burgum, researchers from North Dakota State University and industry officials.

“The oil and natural gas industry continues to be a game-changer for North Dakota,” Burgum said. “Taxes and royalties paid by the industry support our state’s significant investments in infrastructure, schools, communities, tax relief and the Legacy Fund, among other areas. The industry’s resiliency in the face of challenges such as the pandemic, extreme weather, volatile prices and misguided federal policies, demonstrates that it will continue to play a critically important role in North Dakota’s economy for generations to come.”

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › Turns Econ

America’s natural gas workforce is vital for huge portions of U.S. GDP and jobs

API, 23 [5/16/2023 [American Petroleum Institute; API is a leader in the development of petroleum and petrochemical equipment and operating standards covering topics that range from drill bits to environmental protection. These embrace proven, sound engineering and operating practices and safe, interchangeable equipment and materials. Many have been incorporated into state and federal regulations and adopted by ISO for worldwide acceptance; API; “America’s Abundant Natural Gas and Oil Resources Deliver Americans Nearly $2 Trillion in Economic Trade & Job Benefits,” https://www.api.org/news-policy-and-issues/news/2023/05/15/abundant-natural-gas-oil-resources-deliver-americans-nearly-2-trillion-economic-trade-job-benefits LK]  

WASHINGTON, May 16, 2023 — The American Petroleum Institute (API) today released new analysis on the growing economic contributions of America’s natural gas and oil industry in all 50 states, including investment in America ranging from taxes and workforce wages paid to indirect and induced jobs in retail, manufacturing, agriculture and other sectors throughout the energy supply chain. The study, commissioned by API and prepared by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), showed that the industry supported 10.8 million jobs and contributed nearly $1.8 trillion to the U.S. economy in 2021. 

“Natural gas and oil delivers growing economic contributions to America that were nearly equivalent to Canada’s annual GDP last year. From Pennsylvania to California, America’s natural gas and oil workforce is the backbone of communities, supporting nearly 11 million careers throughout the energy supply chain,” API President and CEO Mike Sommers said. “America’s economic outlook is brighter when we are leading the world in energy production and this analysis serves as a reminder that we need policies and regulations that encourage investment and enable development.” 

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › ! – Energy Insecurity

Energy insecurity causes nuclear war

Neil King ‘8, global economics editor for the WSJ, Peak Oil: A Survey of Security Concerns, Center for a New American Security, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Working%20Paper_PeakOil_King_Sept2008.pdf

Many commentators in the United States and abroad have begun to wrestle with the question of whether soaring oil prices and market volatility could spark an outright oil war between major powers—possibly ignited not by China or Russia, but by the United States. In a particularly pointed speech on the topic in May, James Russell of the Naval Postgraduate School in California addressed what he called the increasing militarization of international energy security. “Energy security is now deemed so central to ‘national security’ that threats to the former are liable to be reflexively interpreted as threats to the latter,” he told a gathering at the James A. Baker Institute for Public Policy at Houston’s Rice University.6 The possibility that a large-scale war could break out over access to dwindling energy resources, he wrote, “is one of the most alarming prospects facing the current world system.”7 Mr. Russell figures among a growing pool of analysts who worry in particular about the psychological readiness of the United States to deal rationally with a sustained oil shock. Particularly troubling is the increasing perception within Congress that the financial side of the oil markets no longer functions rationally. It has either been taken over by speculators or is being manipulated, on the supply side, by producers who are holding back on pumping more oil in order to drive up the price. A breakdown in trust for the oil markets, these analysts fear, could spur calls for government action—even military intervention. “The perceptive chasm in the United States between new [oil] market realities and their impact on the global distribution of power will one day close,” Mr. Russell said. “And when it does, look out.”8 The World at Peak: Taking the Dim View For years, skeptics scoffed at predictions that the United States would hit its own domestic oil production peak by sometime in the late 1960s. With its oil fields pumping full out, the U.S. in 1969 was providing an astonishing 25 percent of the world’s oil supply—a role no other country has ever come close to matching. U.S. production then peaked in December 1970, and has fallen steadily ever since, a shift that has dramatically altered America’s own sense of vulnerability and reordered its military priorities. During World War II, when its allies found their own oil supplies cut off by the war, the United States stepped in and made up the difference. Today it is able to meet less than a third of its own needs. A similar peak in worldwide production would have far more sweeping consequences. It would, for one, spell the end of the world’s unparalleled economic boom over the last century. It would also dramatically reorder the wobbly balance of power between nations as energy-challenged industrialized countries turn their sights on the oil-rich nations of the Middle East and Africa. In a peak oil future, the small, flattened, globalized world that has awed recent commentators would become decidedly round and very vast again. Oceans will reemerge as a hindrance to trade, instead of the conduit they have been for so long. An energy-born jolt to the world economy would leave no corner of the globe untouched. Unable to pay their own fuel bills, the tiny Marshall Islands this summer faced the possibility of going entirely without power. That is a reality that could sweep across many of the smallest and poorest countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, reversing many of the tentative gains in those regions and stirring deep social unrest. Large patches of the world rely almost entirely on diesel-powered generators for what skimpy electricity they now have. Those generators are the first to run empty as prices soar. A British parliamentary report released in June on “The Impact of Peak Oil on International Development” concluded that “the deepening energy crisis has the potential to make poverty a permanent state for a growing number of people, undoing the development efforts of a generation.”9 We are seeing some of the consequences already in Pakistan – a country of huge strategic importance, with its own stash of nuclear weapons – that is now in the grips of a severe energy crisis. By crippling the country’s economy, battering the stock market, and spurring mass protests, Pakistan’s power shortages could end up giving the country’s Islamic parties the leverage they have long needed to take power. It’s not hard to imagine similar scenarios playing out in dozens of other developing countries. Deepening economic unrest will put an enormous strain on the United Nations and other international aid agencies. Anyone who has ever visited a major UN relief hub knows that their fleets of Land Rovers, jumbo jets and prop planes have a military size thirst for fuel. Aid agency budgets will come under unprecedented pressure just as the need for international aid skyrockets and donor countries themselves feel pressed for cash. A peaking of oil supplies could also hasten the impact of global climate change by dramatically driving up the use of coal for power generation in much of the world. A weakened world economy would also put in jeopardy the massively expensive projects, such as carbon capture and storage, that many experts look to for a reduction in industrial emissions. So on top of the strains caused by scarce fossil fuels, the world may also have to grapple with the destabilizing effects of more rapid desertification, dwindling fisheries, and strained food supplies. An oil-constricted world will also stir perilous frictions between haves and have-nots. The vast majority of all the world’s known oil reserves is now in the hands of national oil companies, largely in countries with corrupt and autocratic governments. Many of these governments—Iran and Venezuela top the list—are now seen as antagonists of the United States. Tightened oil supplies will substantially boost these countries’ political leverage, but that enhanced power will carry its own peril. Playing the oil card when nations are scrambling for every barrel will be a far more serious matter that at any time in the past. The European continent could also undergo a profound shift as its needs—and sources of energy—diverge all the more from those of the United States. A conservation-oriented Europe (oil demand is on the decline in almost every EU country) will look all the more askance at what it sees as the gluttonous habits of the United States. At the same time, Europe’s governments may have little choice but to shy from any political confrontations with its principal energy supplier, Russia. An energy-restricted future will greatly enhance Russia’s clout within settings like the UN Security Council but also in its dealings with both Europe and China. Abundant oil and gas have fueled Russia’s return to power over the last decade, giving it renewed standing within the UN and increasing sway over European capitals. The peak oil threat is already sending shivers through the big developing countries of China and India, whose propulsive growth (and own internal stability) requires massive doses of energy. For Beijing, running low on fuel spells economic chaos and internal strife, which in turn spawns images of insurrection and a breaking up of the continent sized country. Slumping oil supplies will automatically pit the two largest energy consumers—the United States and China—against one another in competition over supplies in South America, West Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia. China is already taking this competition very seriously. It doesn’t require much of a leap to imagine a Cold War-style scramble between Washington and Beijing—not for like-minded allies this time but simply for reliable and tested suppliers of oil. One region that offers promise and peril in almost equal measure is the Artic, which many in the oil industry consider the last big basin of untapped hydrocarbon riches. But the Artic remains an ungoverned ocean whose legal status couldn’t be less clear, especially so long as the United States continues to remain outside the international Law of the Sea Treaty. As the ices there recede, the risk increases that a scramble for assets in the Artic could turn nasty.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › ! – Energy Insecurity

Energy dominance solves global energy wars with Russia, China, and the Middle East

Sarah Ladislaw and Nikos Tsafos 19, Ladislaw is senior vice president and director and senior fellow of the Energy Security and Climate Change Program, where she leads CSIS’s work in energy policy, market, and technology analysis, Tsafos is a senior fellow with the Energy Security and Climate Change Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Energy Spheres of Influence,” 9/13/19, .

For several decades, energy security has been defined and pursued in a multilateral world with relatively open markets and technology transfer, where energy relations have become increasingly commodified. But that world may soon disappear—energy relationships might become more political, open trade might give way to friction, and great powers might leverage energy relations or energy technology to gain an edge over each other. For decades the United States has promoted a rules-based, multilateral order, supported by shared gains from free trade and deeper economic and political integration within and among countries. Energy security, the ability to secure affordable and reliable supplies of energy, has been widely recognized as common good promoted by this system. As the world’s largest consumer and importer of energy, it was squarely in the United States’ national interest to support this approach through domestic and international energy policy as well as foreign policy. Today, this multilateral order is being challenged. The world is experiencing a new era of competition for greater geographic and economic power driven by the shifting center of gravity of the global economy, the realignment of relationships between and among countries, and rapid technological change. Energy is poised to play an important role in this upheaval and will be affected by these changes. The United States is no longer the largest consumer or importer of energy. Instead, it is now the largest producer of oil and natural gas and will soon be a net exporter of energy. The energy world also is changing rapidly, with renewable energy resources like solar and wind making up the fastest growing and largest source of new supplies and global imperatives like climate change challenging the role of status quo fuels. These changes have heralded a reexamination of the United States’ national interest regarding energy in this changing global system. The United States has important decisions to make about its position in this new environment. Can energy play an influential role in achieving U.S. foreign policy objectives in various regions of renewed geopolitical competition? Is any country or group of countries poised to dominate a given energy market or fuel and might that negatively affect U.S. national security interests? How does this changing global dynamic in which countries are vying for greater geographic and economic spheres of influence affect our approach to global energy security? Will the energy sector become fundamentally more mercantilist, and will the United States be competitive if it does? Greater insight about each of these questions is a prerequisite to the formulation of U.S. foreign and energy policy. So far, the United States has grappled with these questions by pursuing “energy dominance,” a strategy in which energy represents (1) a tool for gaining geopolitical influence in a given region and (2) an area of competitive and strategic economic advantage for the United States. But other global powers, like China and Russia, pose strong competition for this U.S. strategy. Energy features prominently in the economic, foreign, and national security strategies of all three countries but in different ways. And although all three recognize the importance of maintaining affordable and reliable energy supplies for the good of the global economy as well as their own economic well-being, they also recognize the influence of energy in the execution of foreign policy at the global and regional level. The issue for the international energy community is whether the multilateral approach to shared energy security, supported by the promotion of free and integrated markets, is breaking down into regional and economic spheres of influence more mercantile in nature—and if so, how the United States should respond. Shifting Balance of Power Power structures within and among nation-states are shifting. A decade ago, Zbigniew Brzezinski foreshadowed the upheaval as the result of a “global political awakening” in which “for the first time in history almost all of humanity is politically activated, politically conscious and politically interactive” and the result is a “quest for cultural respect and economic opportunity in a world scarred by memories of colonial or imperial domination.”1 Much of this awakening is enabled by technology, which has connected and informed society in ways previously not possible. Today, this struggle is playing out at multiple levels, including the great power politics of nation-states. In 2016, Henry Kissinger spoke about the nature of the changing world order, saying that for the first time in decades: “Practically all the actors in the Middle East, China, Russia, and to a certain extent Europe are facing major strategic decisions. . . . to settle some fundamental directions of their policies. China, about the nature of its place in the world. Russia, about the goals of its confrontations. Europe, about its purpose, through a series of elections. America, about giving a meaning to its current turmoil in the aftermath of the election.”2 The balance of power is shifting, the global order is being renegotiated. The culmination of both has led to an era of intense competition. Within countries, political competition has brought new parties to power. Widespread displeasure over inequality and an unlevel playing field threaten to disrupt the global trading regime and have led to intensified economic competition among firms and strategic economic competition among states. The advent of new technological horizons and the rise of developing countries have sparked new frontiers of competition. Against this backdrop, great powers are looking to expand their reach and refresh their strategies to achieve geostrategic gains. As countries look to expand their spheres of influence, energy can play a role as both a target and tool of that expansion. Although much of the world’s energy development and trade occurs in the sphere of normal commerce, energy infrastructure, investment, and control over resources can also play a role in establishing or challenging the relationships between and among countries. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, there is genuine strategic rivalry among the world’s great powers. China’s rise has created a web of economic and political relationships in all continents. Russia is reasserting itself in places from which it had retreated. The United States is aggressively renegotiating its existing relationships with allies and adversaries. New areas of strategic competition have opened up in resource-rich areas like the Arctic and the emerging economies of Africa.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › Taiwan Risk High

Threat of Taiwan invasion is high now – uncertainty and force capabilities means the US needs to be extra committed.

Toosi & Seligman ’22 (Nahal and Lara are Politico reporters, “The U.S. overestimated Russia’s military might. Is it underestimating China’s?” 06/15/2022, https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/15/china-military-00039786)-mikee

Island of uncertainties Under China’s President Xi Jinping, who has consolidated power within the communist apparatus to an unusual degree, Beijing has been increasingly clear that it wants to bring Taiwan under control of the mainland by 2050, and that any threat to that goal could lead it to use force. “Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions. ... And I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next six years,” Adm. Philip Davidson, then-commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, told Congress last year. Beijing’s statements suggest that China could move on Taiwan at any moment, if it believes the conditions are right. “It’s dangerous to say that 2027 or 2030 or 2035 is some heightened date,” the former Defense Department official said. “You are actually ignoring the risk that tomorrow something could happen.” An invasion of Taiwan would likely begin with an air assault and amphibious landing, analysts and former officials say, but what happens next is a mystery. How long can China continue launching missiles and aircraft, for example? What capacity does Beijing have to maintain and repair equipment in a fight? How will China’s military fare if the conflict turns into urban warfare? How will Beijing grapple with mass casualties or displaced civilians? Unlike with Russia, which has been fighting in Ukraine and Syria over the past decade, there is less recent history to draw from for China. Beijing has not fought a war since 1979, and its air force has not participated in a major conflict since 1958, Garafola noted. “The harder thing to measure, of course, is how they would perform in combat in a complex environment where things don’t go entirely as planned,” said Randy Schriver, a top Asia policy official in the Pentagon during the Trump administration. “It’s questionable that, even as they’ve improved their training, whether or not they are training at complex enough levels to be able to handle unintended or unknown developments.” The United States also has limited insight into how the different arms of the Chinese military apparatus would work together in a high-end campaign, analysts said. The U.S. military long ago began emphasizing “jointness” in its training exercises and operations, meaning integrating its air, sea, space, maritime and cyber capabilities. It’s unclear Beijing can do the same in a real-world operation. “There’s a lot of talk about cyber — we know how they use cyber for theft of information and intelligence, but we know less about how they might use cyber integrated into a war plan,” Schriver said. One area which the current reviews of foreign military assessments are paying close attention to is China’s supply lines if it attacks Taiwan, the Biden administration official said. Taiwan is an island, making resupplying invading forces a tougher task than what Russia faces in its overland routes to Ukraine. China’s economic and diplomatic initiatives across the Pacific also offer puzzles for American officials wondering if the efforts have a military angle. Chinese military officers and diplomats recently gathered alongside their Cambodian counterparts for a groundbreaking ceremony at Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand. China has pledged to upgrade the base, which sits near the South China Sea, in exchange for the Chinese military having access to part of it, a Chinese official confirmed to The Washington Post. Chinese Ambassador to Cambodia Wang Wentian said at the ceremony that the work was “not targeted at any third party, and will be conducive to even closer practical cooperation between the two militaries.” The deal recalls Beijing’s 2017 establishment of a logistics port in Djibouti in eastern Africa, a facility leased close to an American base in the tiny country at the mouth of the Red Sea. China has about 2,000 troops manning the base, which is a logistics hub for wider Chinese interests on the continent. Satellite image from shows a Cambodian naval base. This satellite image from Planet Labs PBC shows a Cambodian naval base in Ream, Cambodia, April 25, 2022. Cambodian and Chinese officials will break ground this week on the expansion of a port facility that the U.S. and others have worried will be used by Beijing a naval outpost on the Gulf of Thailand. | Planet Labs PBC via AP Photo Wrong now, right later? The U.S. intelligence community’s misjudgments of Russian and Ukrainian troops’ performance stood in stark contrast to what appeared to be far more accurate forecasts about Vladimir Putin’s plans to invade and some of the disinformation tactics he intended to use. The United States appears to have better intelligence about top-level Russian decision-making than it has for China. President Joe Biden and his aides also chose to publicize some of the intelligence in a bid to thwart Putin’s plans. FBI Director Christopher Wray testifies during a Senate Intelligence Committee hearing about worldwide threats. When asked about why one aspect of the intelligence — Putin’s intentions — was right, while the other — his military’s battlefield performance — was off-base, some U.S. and foreign officials said it’s likely because it’s a safer bet for an analyst to forecast that a military will do well and be wrong than to say it will do poorly and be wrong. And until that military is actually fighting, it’s impossible to know with absolute certainty how it will do. “You err on the side of caution when it comes to defense intelligence,” James Cleverly, a top British official, said when POLITICO asked about the issue earlier this year. Putin appeared to believe he could quickly take out Ukraine’s government, while his troops would be greeted as liberators as they stormed the whole country. His entire battle plan appeared premised on such notions. But in the face of Western-backed Ukrainian resistance, he’s had to recalibrate, focusing on Ukraine’s east and south for now. Some Russia-focused analysts, while acknowledging that early expectations that Moscow would defeat Ukraine quickly were wrong, say that, as the war drags on, Russia could get its act together and ultimately prove correct some of their predictions about its capabilities. “We overestimated the Russian military, but the jury is still out on the lessons from this war,” said Michael Kofman, a Russia analyst with CNA. If anything, the United States should avoid the trap of underestimating Chinese abilities after overestimating that of the Russians, some foreign affairs hands say. During the hearing earlier this year, senators asked Haines and Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, what lessons China was taking away from Russia’s war in Ukraine. “We’re not really sure what lessons Xi Jinping is taking away from this conflict right now. We would hope they would be the right ones,” Berrier said, adding later that one lesson could be “just how difficult a cross-strait invasion might be and how dangerous and high risk that might be.” Sen. Josh Hawley, however, wondered if that was optimistic. After all, efforts to deter the Russian invasion didn’t work. “We pretty dramatically overestimated the strength of the Russian military,” the Missouri Republican acknowledged. He added, however, “Don’t you think we’re dealing with a significantly more formidable adversary in China?” To which Berrier replied: “I think China is a formidable adversary.”

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › ! – China War

Asia war outweighs, threatens extinction

Mead 10, senior fellow @ the Council on Foreign Relations (Walter, American Interest, “Obama in Asia,” )

The decision to go to Asia is one that all thinking Americans can and should support regardless of either party or ideological affiliation.  East and South Asia are the places where the 21st century, for better or for worse, will most likely be shaped; economic growth, environmental progress, the destiny of democracy and success against terror are all at stake here.  American objectives in this region are clear.  While convincing China that its best interests are not served by a rash, dash for supremacy in the region, the US does not want either to isolate or contain China.  We want a strong, rich, open and free China in an Asia that is also strong, rich, open and free.  Our destiny is inextricably linked with Asia’s; Asian success will make America stronger, richer and more secure.  Asia’s failures will reverberate over here, threatening our prosperity, our security and perhaps even our survival. The world’s two most mutually hostile nuclear states, India and Pakistan, are in Asia.  The two states most likely to threaten others with nukes, North Korea and aspiring rogue nuclear power Iran, are there.  The two superpowers with a billion plus people are in Asia as well.  This is where the world’s fastest growing economies are.  It is where the worst environmental problems exist.  It is the home of the world’s largest democracy, the world’s most populous Islamic country (Indonesia — which is also among the most democratic and pluralistic of Islamic countries), and the world’s most rapidly rising non-democratic power as well.  Asia holds more oil resources than any other continent; the world’s most important and most threatened trade routes lie off its shores.  East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia (where American and NATO forces are fighting the Taliban) and West Asia (home among others to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and Iraq) are the theaters in the world today that most directly engage America’s vital interests and where our armed forces are most directly involved.  The world’s most explosive territorial disputes are in Asia as well, with islands (and the surrounding mineral and fishery resources) bitterly disputed between countries like Russia, the two Koreas, Japan, China (both from Beijing and Taipei), and Vietnam.  From the streets of Jerusalem to the beaches of Taiwan the world’s most intractable political problems are found on the Asian landmass and its surrounding seas. Whether you view the world in terms of geopolitical security, environmental sustainability, economic growth or the march of democracy, Asia is at the center of your concerns.  That is the overwhelming reality of world politics today, and that reality is what President Obama’s trip is intended to address.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › ! – China War

U.S.-China war goes nuclear.

Talmadge 18, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University. (Caitlin, 10/15/18, "Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-Chinese War Could Spiral Out of Control", Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option)

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic com­munity tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a “no first use” pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate pressures to escalate—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations endangered or damaged China’s nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly conclude that limited nuclear escalation—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—was a viable option to defend itself. STRAIT SHOOTERS The most worrisome flash point for a U.S.-Chinese war is Taiwan. Beijing’s long-term objective of reunifying the island with mainland China is clearly in conflict with Washington’s longstanding desire to maintain the status quo in the strait. It is not difficult to imagine how this might lead to war. For example, China could decide that the political or military window for regaining control over the island was closing and launch an attack, using air and naval forces to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bombard the island. Although U.S. law does not require Washington to intervene in such a scenario, the Taiwan Relations Act states that the United States will “consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” Were Washington to intervene on Taipei’s behalf, the world’s sole superpower and its rising competitor would find themselves in the first great-power war of the twenty-first century. In the course of such a war, U.S. conventional military operations would likely threaten, disable, or outright eliminate some Chinese nuclear capabilities—whether doing so was Washington’s stated objective or not. In fact, if the United States engaged in the style of warfare it has practiced over the last 30 years, this outcome would be all but guaranteed. Consider submarine warfare. China could use its conventionally armed attack submarines to blockade Taiwanese harbors or bomb the island, or to attack U.S. and allied forces in the region. If that happened, the U.S. Navy would almost certainly undertake an antisubmarine campaign, which would likely threaten China’s “boomers,” the four nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines that form its naval nuclear deterrent. China’s conventionally armed and nuclear-armed submarines share the same shore-based communications system; a U.S. attack on these transmitters would thus not only disrupt the activities of China’s attack submarine force but also cut off its boomers from contact with Beijing, leaving Chinese leaders unsure of the fate of their naval nuclear force. In addition, nuclear ballistic missile submarines depend on attack submarines for protection, just as lumbering bomber aircraft rely on nimble fighter jets. If the United States started sinking Chinese attack submarines, it would be sinking the very force that protects China’s ballistic missile submarines, leaving the latter dramatically more vulnerable. Even more dangerous, U.S. forces hunting Chinese attack submarines could inadvertently sink a Chinese boomer instead. After all, at least some Chinese attack submarines might be escorting ballistic missile submarines, especially in wartime, when China might flush its boomers from their ports and try to send them within range of the continental United States. Since correctly identifying targets remains one of the trickiest challenges of undersea warfare, a U.S. submarine crew might come within shooting range of a Chinese submarine without being sure of its type, especially in a crowded, noisy environment like the Taiwan Strait. Platitudes about caution are easy in peacetime. In wartime, when Chinese attack submarines might already have launched deadly strikes, the U.S. crew might decide to shoot first and ask questions later. Adding to China’s sense of vulnerability, the small size of its nuclear-armed submarine force means that just two such incidents would eliminate half of its sea-based deterrent. Meanwhile, any Chinese boomers that escaped this fate would likely be cut off from communication with onshore commanders, left without an escort force, and unable to return to destroyed ports. If that happened, China would essentially have no naval nuclear deterrent. The situation is similar onshore, where any U.S. military campaign would have to contend with China’s growing land-based conventional ballistic missile force. Much of this force is within range of Taiwan, ready to launch ballistic missiles against the island or at any allies coming to its aid. Once again, U.S. victory would hinge on the ability to degrade this conventional ballistic missile force. And once again, it would be virtually impossible to do so while leaving China’s nuclear ballistic missile force unscathed. Chinese conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles are often attached to the same base headquarters, meaning that they likely share transportation and supply networks, patrol routes, and other supporting infrastructure. It is also possible that they share some command-and-control networks, or that the United States would be unable to distinguish between the conventional and nuclear networks even if they were physically separate. To add to the challenge, some of China’s ballistic missiles can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, and the two versions are virtually indistinguishable to U.S. aerial surveillance. In a war, targeting the conventional variants would likely mean destroying some nuclear ones in the process. Furthermore, sending manned aircraft to attack Chinese missile launch sites and bases would require at least partial control of the airspace over China, which in turn would require weakening Chinese air defenses. But degrading China’s coastal air defense network in order to fight a conventional war would also leave much of its nuclear force without protection. Once China was under attack, its leaders might come to fear that even intercontinental ballistic missiles located deep in the country’s interior were vulnerable. For years, observers have pointed to the U.S. military’s failed attempts to locate and destroy Iraqi Scud missiles during the 1990–91 Gulf War as evidence that mobile missiles are virtually impervious to attack. Therefore, the thinking goes, China could retain a nuclear deterrent no matter what harm U.S. forces inflicted on its coastal areas. Yet recent research suggests otherwise. Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles are larger and less mobile than the Iraqi Scuds were, and they are harder to move without detection. The United States is also likely to have been tracking them much more closely in peacetime. As a result, China is unlikely to view a failed Scud hunt in Iraq nearly 30 years ago as reassurance that its residual nuclear force is safe today, especially during an ongoing, high-intensity conventional war. China’s vehement criticism of a U.S. regional missile defense system designed to guard against a potential North Korean attack already reflects these latent fears. Beijing’s worry is that this system could help Washington block the handful of missiles China might launch in the aftermath of a U.S. attack on its arsenal. That sort of campaign might seem much more plausible in Beijing’s eyes if a conventional war had already begun to seriously undermine other parts of China’s nuclear deterrent. It does not help that China’s real-time awareness of the state of its forces would probably be limited, since blinding the adversary is a standard part of the U.S. military playbook. Put simply, the favored U.S. strategy to ensure a conventional victory would likely endanger much of China’s nuclear arsenal in the process, at sea and on land. Whether the United States actually intended to target all of China’s nuclear weapons would be incidental. All that would matter is that Chinese leaders would consider them threatened. LESSONS FROM THE PAST At that point, the question becomes, How will China react? Will it practice restraint and uphold the “no first use” pledge once its nuclear forces appear to be under attack? Or will it use those weapons while it still can, gambling that limited escalation will either halt the U.S. campaign or intimidate Washington into backing down? Chinese writings and statements remain deliberately ambiguous on this point. It is unclear which exact set of capabilities China considers part of its core nuclear deterrent and which it considers less crucial. For example, if China already recognizes that its sea-based nuclear deterrent is relatively small and weak, then losing some of its ballistic missile submarines in a war might not prompt any radical discontinuity in its calculus. The danger lies in wartime developments that could shift China’s assumptions about U.S. intentions. If Beijing interprets the erosion of its sea- and land-based nuclear forces as a deliberate effort to destroy its nuclear deterrent, or perhaps even as a prelude to a nuclear attack, it might see limited nuclear escalation as a way to force an end to the conflict. For example, China could use nuclear weapons to instantaneously destroy the U.S. air bases that posed the biggest threat to its arsenal. It could also launch a nuclear strike with no direct military purpose—on an unpopulated area or at sea—as a way to signal that the United States had crossed a redline.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › ! – Ukraine Loss (Democracy)

Ukraine outcome controls trajectory of global democracy

Philip Wasielewski, 6-9-2022, Templeton Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is a former Paramilitary Case Officer who had a 31-year career in the Directorate of Operations of the Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/06/the-evolving-political-military-aims-in-the-war-in-ukraine-after-100-days/, "The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days," (ermo/sms, Acc:6-29-2022)

Both nations have suffered severe losses and need to regenerate military strength. The winner will be the one who is quickest to reconstitute its combat forces at the tactical level and whose leader best motivates his country to fight and manages to enlarge and equip his armed forces, and the logistics to sustain those forces, at the strategic level.

Twenty-first century Russia is using twentieth-century weapons to fight a nineteenth-century war of attrition, combined with eighteenth-century pillaging. Currently, Russia’s numerical advantage in Donbas allows it to grind out a slow advance toward a pointless objective. Even if Russian forces advance to the administrative borders of both oblasts, it will not end the war as long as Ukraine still has the will to fight and the means to do so. If Putin plans to declare victory once his army has cleared Ukraine out of Donbas, he is building on sand. Unlike Georgia or Moldova, Ukraine has the resources and international support to refuse to accept a “frozen conflict.” Instead, the incoming tide of a rebuilt and expanded Ukrainian army will eventually wash those gains away—be it months or years from now.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › ! – Ukraine Loss (Democracy)

Specifically, continued Ukrainian aid is key to cement alliances and stop global autocratic wars.

Farrington, 3/10 (Keegan, Global Policy MA student at the University of Maine’s School of Policy and International Affairs and research intern in US-Russia relations at the American Security Project, "How continued US aid to Ukraine enhances America's credibility," American Security Project, ) DGW

Russian missiles killed at least five people in Western Ukraine’s Lviv region in the early morning hours of March 9th, 2023. These attacks, which targeted residential areas, demonstrate Russia’s ability to continue threatening Ukraine well beyond its setbacks in the east. As Russia’s aggression shows no sign of ending, the United States’ continuing commitment to Ukraine is vital for defending democracy worldwide and reaffirming the U.S.’ credibility as a dependable ally.

President Biden’s speeches in Kyiv and Poland oozed with principles like freedom, liberty, and, most importantly—commitment. He assured Ukraine that the United States and the NATO alliance were more unified than ever and committed to a Ukrainian victory. To some, these speeches elicited memories of John F. Kennedy’s 1963 “Ich bin ein Berliner” speech or Ronald Reagan’s 1987 demand for the USSR to “tear down” the Berlin Wall. To others, it lacked the force and memorability of those historic speeches. Though the Biden administration’s response to the invasion of Ukraine has regained some of the United States’ credibility with its allies and reputation with its adversaries, its continued aid to Ukraine is now facing a tougher path forward with a divided House of Representatives. Still, the U.S. must continue to stand resolutely behind Ukraine to send a powerful message to autocracies worldwide, especially China.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › ! – Ukraine Loss (Russia)

Russia winning would re-ligitimize it and make them unstoppable

RUKHADZE, VASILI ’22, Lecturer of political science at the University of Pittsburgh, specializing in post-communist and post-Soviet politics and international relations. “What Happens If Russia Wins or Loses in Ukraine?” The Defense Post, 25 Mar. 2022, www.thedefensepost.com/2022/03/24/russia-wins-loses-ukraine/.

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the subsequent massive Western sanctions, many predicted the ultimate doom of Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian regime and of Russia in general.

However, what various pundits mostly missed is the premise that the final impact of this war, as well as of the punishing sanctions, mainly depends on whether Putin wins his war in Ukraine and how decisive this victory will be.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › IMPACTS › ! – Ukraine Loss (Russia)

Russia defeating Ukraine is catastrophic for both the US and Europe – It creates complete Russian hegemony and influence and escalates conflicts with China

Al-Ketbi ’23 (Salem al-Ketbi is an Emirati political analyst and a former candidate to the UAE’s Federal National Council) “What if Russia wins?” 2/13/23, JNS, https://www.jns.org/what-if-russia-wins/)

Many official reports and media accounts speak of heavy Russian casualties in the Ukraine war, both economic and military, especially in terms of the estimated number of Russian army casualties. The New York Times, in a recent report citing U.S. and Western officials, put these losses at nearly 200,000 Russian soldiers. These losses, incurred in only about 11 months, exceed U.S. losses in Afghanistan over two decades by a factor of eight. Other reports have addressed Russia’s economic and strategic losses. An objective analysis suggests that the losses in their totality, if accurate and despite the severity of the numbers, will not mean much to the Russian side. It is difficult to compare the U.S. and Russia in terms of the impact of battlefield losses on decision-making because the political systems of the two countries differ. In the West’s relentless drive to break Russia’s will in the Ukraine war, its plans from the beginning have focused on a number of objectives, including the need to defeat Russia. In this context, a number of statements and positions by Western politicians and officials are worth noting. President of the European Council Charles Michel said in March 2022 that Russian President Vladimir Putin must be defeated, pointing out that this is a matter of security for the future of Europe and the world. Former British Prime Minister Liz Truss said that her strategy was to defeat Putin in Ukraine. Many other Western positions and statements echo the same sentiment. Meanwhile, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger advised the West to stop trying to defeat Russian forces in Ukraine. He argued that doing so would have serious consequences for the long-term stability of Europe and warned the West not to give in to the “mood of the moment”—that is, the idea of defeating Russia. Kissinger argued that the West’s negotiating goal should be a return to the status quo ante before the outbreak of war and recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In my view, much of the motivation of the United States and its NATO allies to defeat, or at least weaken, Russia in the Ukraine war is related to the long-term confrontation with China, which is not far off. An important part of the struggle for influence and dominance in the coming world order revolves around making headway in wooing Russia, both from China and the West. The West, certain of the failure of efforts to partner with Russia over the past decade, has embraced the idea of weakening Russia, especially after seeing the war in Ukraine as an opportunity to achieve this important goal. In fact, it seems very difficult to defeat Russia for several reasons. Not only because Putin and the Russian elite firmly and absolutely reject the idea of defeat, but also because even the Western instruments Russia faces in the Ukrainian arena are not sufficient to achieve this goal. Economic measures and sanctions have not had the desired effect either. Western military support for Ukraine does not appear to be sufficient to bring it closer to a complete military victory over Russian forces. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the war will be decided in Russia’s favor strategically rather than militarily. That is, Russia’s goals in this conflict will have been achieved: Recognition of Russia’s control over Ukrainian territory and perhaps the neutralization of Ukraine and the prevention of NATO expansion towards Russian borders. This would be a strategic victory for Russia in the ongoing conflict with the West, regardless of the economic and human losses that might occur on the Russian side. It is also the most likely scenario to occur and will have significant negative implications for the West, not only in terms of possible new strategic positions in the post-Ukraine order, but also in terms of managing the strategic conflict with China, which is watching events in Ukraine very closely. To put it in a nutshell: A military or strategic victory by Russia would have enormous consequences for the West and especially for Europe. It will help draw a new political map of Europe, both at the level of political parties and blocs and at the level of the cohesion of the European Union itself. It will further lead to a massive erosion of American influence and hegemony.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › INTERNALS › AT: Plan Increase Exports

Biden’s political support for natural gas key to expand LNG --- plan obviously flips the script

Investments, LNG export contracts and European import capacity

Soraghan & Anchondo, 22 (03/28/2022 07:05 AM EDT, Mike Soraghan, Carlos Anchondo, “Biden’s LNG deal with Europe jolts gas critics,” https://www.eenews.net/articles/bidens-lng-deal-with-europe-jolts-gas-critics/, JMP))

Natural gas producers are applauding President Biden’s pledge to export more U.S. gas to Europe as environmental groups fume that the trans-Atlantic deal undercuts Biden’s commitment to address climate change.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › INTERNALS › AT: Plan Increase Exports

LNG exports to Europe require regulatory certainty and strong domestic production to be successful

U.S. LNG cleanest in the world – helps Europe meet climate goals

Baker, 22 (March 28, 2022, Andrew, “Plan to Send More U.S. LNG to Europe Met With Optimism by Natural Gas Industry,” https://www.naturalgasintel.com/plan-to-send-more-u-s-lng-to-europe-met-with-optimism-by-natural-gas-industry/, JMP)

The oil and natural gas industry praised the Biden administration’s announcement last week of a joint U.S.-European Union (EU) task force to increase liquefied natural gas (LNG) supply to Europe.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › INTERNALS › AT: Plan Increase Exports

Oil and gas production likely to increase through 2050 and facilitates LNG exports but less availability will increase prices and cause exports to decline

U.S. Energy Information Administration, 3-3-2022 [U.S. Energy Information Administration, 27 April, U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Annual Energy Outlook 2022” https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/narrative/production/sub-topic-01.php Accessed on 23 June, NP]

We project U.S. consumption and production of petroleum and other liquids to grow through 2050. Domestic consumption and production levels of petroleum and other liquids remain relatively close to one another through most of the projection period in the Reference case. Consumption increases by 15%, and production increases by 17% from 2021 to 2050. However, consumption and production of specific petroleum products vary. We also project consumption and production of natural gas to grow through 2050. During the projection period, natural gas production grows by almost 24%, approximately twice as fast as consumption. Much of this growth in natural gas production is exported as liquefied natural gas (LNG). By 2050, we project that approximately 25% more natural gas will be produced than consumed in the United States. Together, these Reference case trends highlight the continued growth in demand for U.S. natural gas and petroleum products.

NATURAL GAS EXPORTS INCREASE WITH PRODUCTION, DRIVEN BY GLOBAL DEMAND AND CONTINUED CONSTRUCTION OF NEW LNG EXPORT FACILITIES

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › INTERNALS › CCS Good

CCSU tech. extract millions of tons of C02 each year – which can be used later on to boost the environment.

Herzog, 1/23 - (Howard Herzog, a Senior Research Engineer in the MIT Energy Initiative."Carbon Capture," MIT Climate Portal, 01-20-2023, accessed 7-15-2023, https://climate.mit.edu/explainers/carbon-capture)//SK

Today, CCS projects are storing almost 45 million tons of CO2 every year, which is about the amount of CO2 emissions created by 10 million passenger cars. Capture generally takes place at large stationary sources of CO2, like power plants or industrial plants that make cement, steel, and chemicals. Most current carbon capture projects use a liquid to chemically remove the CO2 before it goes out the smokestack, but several new types of capture processes are under development. The captured CO2 gas is then compressed so it becomes liquid-like and transported to a storage site, generally through a pipeline. Ship transport is more expensive than using pipelines, but it is being considered in both Europe and Japan. Once at the storage site, the CO2 is pumped more than 2,500 feet down wells into geological formations like used-up oil and gas reservoirs, as well as formations that contain unusable, salty water. Using the CO2 CCS is sometimes referred to as CCUS, where the “U” stands for utilization. Enhanced oil recovery (EOR) is the major use of CO2 today. EOR is where CO2 is injected into active oil reservoirs in order to recover more oil. Other possible uses of CO2 include making chemicals or fuels, but they require large amounts of carbon-free energy, making the costs too high to be competitive today. For large-scale implementation of CCS, utilization is projected to use less than 10% of the captured CO2. Utilization We emit so much CO2 into the atmosphere that, if carbon capture is going to play any significant part in the fight against climate change, we will have to store most of the captured CO2 underground. But “utilization”—selling the CO2 as a valuable product—could help create markets for carbon capture, and make it cheaper for companies to invest in capturing their CO2 emissions. The main use for CO2 today is enhanced oil recovery: pumping CO2 into oil wells to help flush out hard-to-extract oil. Pure CO2 is also used in greenhouses to grow plants. Most CO2 used for these purposes today is extracted from the earth, but captured CO2 works just as well. CO2 could also be made into useful products. Companies and labs are working on turning CO2 into plastics, building materials like , fuels, futuristic materials like carbon fibers and graphene, and even household products like baking soda, bleach, antifreeze, inks and paints. Some of these products are already being sold, but none in very large amounts. Or we could use the CO2 to grow algae or bacteria. This can then be the basis for making , , or animal feed. Capturing CO2 from the air There has also been considerable interest recently in using CCS technologies to remove CO2 from the atmosphere. One option is with CCS (BECCS), where biomass (like wood or grasses) removes CO2 from the air through photosynthesis. The biomass is then harvested and burned in a power plant to produce energy, with the CO2 being captured and stored. This creates what is called “negative emissions” because it takes CO2 from the atmosphere and stores it. Another negative emission option is called direct air capture (DAC), where CO2 is removed from the air using a chemical process. However, the concentration of CO2 in the air is about 300 times less than in the smokestacks of power plants or industrial plants, making it much less efficient to capture. Because of this, DAC is quite expensive today.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › INTERNALS › CCS Good

CCUs solve C02 emissions

IEA (2020),

The Oil and Gas Industry in Energy Transitions, IEA, Paris https://www.iea.org/reports/the-oil-and-gas-industry-in-energy-transitions, License: CC BY 4.0

Gas processing facilities and hydrogen production at refineries are the main opportunities to deploy CCUS along the oil and gas value chains Globally, we estimate that just over 700 Mt CO2 of scope 1 emissions from oil and gas operations could be avoided using CCUS. Many of these reductions could be realised at relatively low cost, particularly emissions from natural gas processing and refining processes that yield highly concentrated CO2 streams. Over 250 Mt CO2 emissions could be avoided at a cost of less than USD 50/t CO2. One of the key opportunities to capture CO2 emissions from the gas value chain is during natural gas processing. Underground deposits of natural gas can contain significant quantities of naturally occurring CO2 and this must be removed to meet technical specifications before the gas can be sold or used. CO2 removed in gas processing facilities is typically vented, and we estimate that around 150 Mt CO2 is vented globally in this way. However, there are a number of projects that capture this CO2, such as the Sleipner projects in Norway. One key advantage of capturing CO2 from natural gas processing is that the separation process results in a very concentrated stream of CO2 that can easily be purified prior to transport and storage. Since the CO2 content of gas that is transported as LNG has to be extremely low, liquefaction facilities are another stage along the gas value chain where highly concentrated CO2 emissions could potentially be captured. There are two major LNG facilities in operation today that are equipped with CCUS units to capture CO2: the Gorgon project in Australia and the Snøhvit project in Norway. At Gorgon, the natural gas flowing to this facility contains around 15% CO2, which has to be removed prior to liquefaction; the aim is to capture these CO2 emissions that would otherwise be vented. Qatar has also announced its intention to step up CCUS deployment in its gas operations. Applying CCUS to refining operations will be a key mechanism to reduce emissions from the oil value chain. Refineries tend to consist of a variety of scattered CO2 emission sources across different processing units, making it difficult to capture all emissions from a plant. However, there are some units and systems that could be equipped with capture units. This includes hydrogen production units using steam methane reforming (which are the source of around 20% of total CO2 emissions from a refinery), fluid catalytic cracking units and co-generation systems. Refineries are one of the largest users of hydrogen today, and demand for hydrogen is set to grow as regulations on the sulphur content of final products tighten. Hydrogen production units in refineries result in highly concentrated CO2 streams, offering one of the lowest-cost opportunities to apply CCUS. Fluid catalytic cracking units also generate a flue gas containing CO2 in relatively high concentrations. The adoption of co-generation systems in refineries not only generates energy efficiency benefits but also centralises emissions sources, making CO2 capture more viable. A number of refineries have installed units to capture CO2 emissions. For example, a large portion of the emissions from the 400 kb/d Pernis refinery in Rotterdam are captured, transported and used in nearby greenhouses, and there are a number of other demonstration CCUS projects in refineries elsewhere.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › INTERNALS › AT: Europe Doesn’t Need Russia

Europe is trying to cut purchases of Russian LNG now, but needs a fill in, otherwise Russia uses profit to finance war in Ukraine

Abnett et al 4-12

Kate Abnett, Marwa Rashad, Gabriela Baczynska, 4-12-23, "Analysis: LNG imports test EU resolve to quit Russian fossil fuel," Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/lng-imports-test-eu-resolve-quit-russian-fossil-fuel-2023-04-12/

BRUSSELS/LONDON, April 12 (Reuters) - Political pressure is building within the European Union to tackle the daunting challenge of closing a loophole in its efforts to stop using Russian fossil fuels: liquefied natural gas (LNG).

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › INTERNALS › IL – Europe Security

US LNG is key to maintaining global natural gas stability – keeps Europe independent of Russian exports.

Eberhart ‘23 - (Dan Eberhart, CEO of Canary, LLC “Ukraine War Illustrates Importance Of American Energy Dominance," Forbes, 2-24-2023, accessed 7-13-2023, https://www.forbes.com/sites/daneberhart/2023/02/24/ukraine-war-illustrates-importance-of-american-energy-dominance/?sh=4f7fdcb470a6)//SK

The year-old war in Ukraine has had far-reaching impacts on energy markets over the past year, redrawing the global map of oil and gas flows and creating a new boom market for U.S. producers. Europe has shown that it can live without Russian oil and gas, reducing Russian imports to below 20% of total consumption. The EU primarily has the United States to thank for the flexibility to achieve that rapid transition without throwing the continent’s economy into chaos. U.S. exports of crude oil, refined products, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) have been critical to the success of Europe’s effort to wean itself off Russian energy – a transition that is nearly complete. U.S. LNG shipments to European ports more than doubled in 2022 from 2021, accounting for more than half of Europe’s imported LNG. Those shipments helped the region weather a 54% plunge in piped gas shipments from Russia – and made the United States the world’s largest LNG exporter. U.S. LNG exporters to the EU to more than 55 billion cubic meters in 2022, a 150% increase from 2021 levels, according to the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis. U.S. LNG exports increased last year even though one of the country’s top export facilities, , was knocked offline after an accident last summer, making America’s contribution to global supplies all that more impressive. The story for oil is similar. U.S. crude exports to Europe increased roughly 70% from the previous year, reaching 1.75 million barrels daily. That helped Europe reduce its dependence on Russian oil from importing approximately 2.3 million barrels a day before the kickoff of the war against Ukraine to a proverbial trickle today. Moscow now must ship its oil to China and India at a 40% discount instead of piping it directly into European homes. The dramatic rewiring of the global oil and gas markets would not have been possible if America had not built itself into an energy powerhouse during the last 15 years. Without the American shale boom of the previous decades, Europe would be at the mercy of the OPEC+ cartel, which still counts Russia as a critical member. Many lessons can be taken from Russia’s war on Ukraine, but perhaps the most crucial is that energy security – and the blessings of America's energy abundance – should not be taken for granted. And while energy prices have fallen, this is no time to become complacent. Continued fears about the possible onset of a global recession and a mild winter help explain the recent retreat in oil and gas prices, but supply constraints remain a genuine concern. Energy supplies are a global commodity. The analogy of a giant bathtub is often used to explain how a reduction of energy supply anywhere in the world reduces the amount available on the market and increases competition – and the price – for that supply everywhere. Moscow recently announced a 500,000-barrel-per-day production cut to take effect next month. Removing those barrels from the market will increase the price of oil. There are also concerns about the impact of years of by oil and gas companies in the United States on supply. Goldman Sachs is warning clients of potential later this year, including in energy where it sees Brent rising to $105 a barrel and LNG rising to $55 per million Btu. That poses a potentially massive problem to the global economy, which is still grappling with high inflation and has not seen demand fully return to pre-pandemic levels. The importance of abundant U.S. energy resources has come to the forefront over the past year on the world stage as a calming, balancing force for markets rudely jolted by geopolitical unrest. It’s why the previous administration pursued an agenda – to ensure Americans were insulated from shocks to the energy market and help address global supply crises when they arise. The Biden administration continues to treat the domestic oil and gas industry as the villain in recent events, accusing it of , , and, ironically, underinvesting in exploration and development of new supply despite federal policies that thwart domestic production at every turn. President Biden remains committed to a “Keep It in The Ground” strategy despite his rhetoric against high energy prices. The approach of Biden and his Democratic coalition on Capitol Hill to leasing federal lands and waters, permitting new pipelines, general reform of the federal permitting system, or any initiative that encourages domestic production continues to frustrate U.S. energy security goals. Biden continues to double down on the energy transition, a decision that may pay off in the long run. In the immediate future, though, America – and the world – will continue to depend on oil and gas to run their economies. Until tanks run on solar power, petroleum will continue to define energy security – and energy security is national security. After the bloody events of the past year, Americans should take heart in North America’s resource abundance. Still, they should be equally concerned about the direction of U.S. energy policy and the unnecessary risk it poses to the nation. Because while no one denies that a transition to a lower carbon economy is underway, it will take decades to accomplish. In the meantime, America must maintain its status as an energy superpower capable of rescuing its allies – or the entire global energy market – in turbulent times.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › INTERNALS › IL – Europe Security

Reducing natural gas production hurts Europe and helps Russia.

Gross ’22 (Samantha Gross, Director of Energy Security and Climate Initiative) “Now is not the time to limit U.S. natural gas exports,” Brookings, 2/18/22 https://www.brookings.edu/articles/now-is-not-the-time-to-limit-u-s-natural-gas-exports/

Americans have no idea how good we have it with respect to energy prices. Although we are suffering through the worst inflation since 1982, with higher energy prices as a component, we still enjoy much lower energy prices than our friends in Europe. American natural gas (as liquified natural gas, or LNG) is flowing toward Europe in response to their very high prices — a good business deal for U.S. companies, a counterweight to Russia’s power over European energy supply, and a gesture of good will toward our staunchest allies. Although several members of Congress are calling for limiting U.S. natural gas exports in response to inflation at home, it is a terrible idea, harmful to U.S. foreign policy and useless in lowering prices for American consumers. Europeans are suffering through a supply crunch in natural gas, translating into extremely high prices. At its high point late in 2021, the European wholesale natural gas price was more than six times its level at the same time in the previous year. Prices have fallen a bit since then, but are still six and a half times their level in the United States. For average Europeans, this translates into very high prices for home heating and electricity and even shutdowns in some industries that rely on gas. Curtailment in Russian gas supply is an important part of the European supply crunch. In addition to the massive military buildup on Ukraine’s border, Russia is weaponizing its natural gas supply to Europe. Pipelines carrying Russian gas generally supply around 35% of Europe’s natural gas; today that share is only 17%. Since the fall of 2021, Russia has met its contractual obligations to supply gas to Europe, but nothing more, amounting to a halving of its usual supply. Gazprom also did not fill its European storage facilities to their usual level in advance of the winter, especially in Germany, which lacks the specialized port facilities that are needed to receive LNG imports as an alternative. Combine these Russian shortfalls with decreasing production from Europe’s own gas fields, lower inventories owing to a cold spring, and lower-than-usual production of wind power, and you have a recipe for a severe supply crunch. Increased LNG imports have been making up some of the difference. In January 2022, European LNG imports to were nearly triple their level from one year ago. U.S. LNG exports are a crucial part of stabilizing Europe’s gas market. According to Andrew Light of the U.S. Department of Energy, as of last week, 60 cargoes of U.S. LNG had reached Europe in 2022 or were on the way, making up about half of the extra LNG supplied to Europe during this difficult time. U.S. LNG producers have been going all-out in response to high European prices and the United States became the world’s largest LNG exporter in January. Nonetheless, in a letter dated February 3, 11 U.S. senators pushed Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm to “take swift action to limit U.S. natural gas exports” to lessen the impact of rising prices on American consumers. This suggestion is not only mean-spirited, but also potentially undermines U.S. foreign policy. The ability to bring replacement gas into Europe lessens the impact of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s natural gas weapon. For this reason, we’ve seen U.S. President Joe Biden work to find LNG for Europe beyond what the United States can supply, meeting with Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani and convincing Japan to divert some LNG to Europe. Reducing demand for gas by curtailing production of gas-intensive products during cold snaps could also help Europe get through this difficult winter. However, over the longer run Europe clearly needs to move away from its reliance on Russian pipeline gas to reduce Moscow’s leverage. The transition toward renewable sources of electricity is a big step in the right direction. In addition to undermining U.S. foreign policy, cutting back on LNG exports is unlikely to make much difference in prices at home. The United States consistently enjoys some of the world’s lowest natural gas prices. U.S. LNG export capacity is expanding, but the United States has huge natural gas reserves and production is likely to expand along with export capacity. The world will eventually move away from natural gas as it transitions to a zero-carbon energy system, but the United States is likely to enjoy its price advantage in natural gas for the foreseeable future, even with expanding exports. The request to limit gas exports is a political response to crushing inflation in an election year. But there is plenty of gas to go around in the United States, and supply is recovering after a dip during the pandemic. The Biden administration is making the right call to focus on the larger issues at hand — keeping Europe warm and opposing Russian aggression. One of the advantages of energy supplies from the United States on the world market is that they are much less subject to political manipulation than those from state-owned companies; instead individual companies are making their own business decisions. Despite the pain of today’s inflation, now is not the time to change.

2023 CNDI Disadvantage
Natural Gas DA – CNDI 23 › INTERNALS › IL – Ukraine Victory

Maintaining natural gas exports is key to Russia deterrence and victory in Ukraine.

Collins, et. al, 22 --- Baker Botts Fellow in Energy & Environmental Regulatory Affairs (August 4, 2022, Gabriel Collins, Anna Mikulska - Fellow in Energy Studies & Baker Institutes, Steven R. Miles - Fellow in Global Natural Gas & Baker Institute, “Winning the Long War in Ukraine Requires Gas Geoeconomics,” https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/winning-long-war-ukraine-requires-gas-geoeconomics)

If the United States is serious about facilitating a Ukrainian victory, it needs to help European partners lock down their gas security. Russia had already waged war against Ukraine for 8 years when it took things to a new, bloodier level in February 2022 and the conflict could plausibly endure for multiple winters more. Europe faces an acute gas crisis in the winter of 2022 but absent much larger and faster investment in new gas sourcing and transport infrastructure, continued energy manipulation by Russia will be the Continent’s plight for many winters to come.iii It is a high-order national security issue and one that deserves close attention in the United States as well, given four decades of policy aimed at preventing hostile powers from weaponizing energy resource flows against U.S. allies and partners.iv Europe’s dependence on Russian gas (more than 1/3 of the global pipeline cross-border [?] gas trade) means that Russia’s war in Ukraine is also an energy war against Europe at a scale unseen since the 1973 Arab Oil Embargo. Gazprom’s pre-covid supply levels to Europe suggest it withheld approximately 30 billion cubic meters of gas, equal to about 5% of Europe’s actual gas consumption in 2021 (with the figure of actual gas withheld by Russia in 2022 dramatically higher). While 5% may not sound significant at first glance, it is. The 1973-1974 Arab Oil Embargo reduced crude oil supplies by an amount equal to about 7% of global consumption and caused oil prices to rapidly quadruple—like gas prices in Europe over the past 18 months. v Russia’s gas supply machinations target adversary countries’ leadership to create a sense of despair and promote negotiation on Russian terms.vi As the Kremlin’s armies stall, it increasingly banks on forcing democratically-elected Western governments to confront a high-cost “Long War” that induces crisis fatigue among votersin the EU and US. There is potentially fertile ground for this strategy. Consumer confidence in both places has already dropped to historical lows— exceeding even the depths plumbed during the stagflation of the late 1970s and early 1980s (Figure 1). Gas price spikes and physical shortages are especially pivotal when timed to coincide with decision points that lock in years of subsequent consequences and in some cases, determine the outcome of a war—for instance, “whether or not to concretely act against buildup of an invasion force,” and now, “whether or not to push Ukraine toward territorial concessions” and “whether or not to continue—or expand—supplies of heavy weaponry Kyiv would need to eject Russian invaders and restore its sovereignty.” Policymakers’ visceral aversion to the potential short-term losses caused by a gas supply cutoff or a politically driven price increase expose them to manipulation, undermine their resolve to stand up to Russian revanchism in and near Europe, and, ultimately, divide and weaken the EU and NATO. Gas provides less than 7% of Russia’s federal budget revenue (as compared to more than 35% for oil and refined products) but flows through Russian-fed pipelines account for 1/3 of Europe’s gas supply and nearly 8% of Europe’s primary energy use.2 Its loss creates a cascading energy polycrisis in Europe and beyond, potentially for many quarters to come absent drastic interventions—most of which, like rationing, have major consequences. By manipulating gas deliveries, Russia can thus subject itself to bearable financial pain and in exchange, destabilize Europe in ways that left unabated, could be existential for the current political, economic, and security architecture across the Continent over the next 5 years. This asymmetric interdependence vii invites coercive exploitation; a tactic that Russia has used quite frequently in the post-Soviet realm over the last three decades. They also demand a wartime mindset on the part of policymakers in both the EU and the US, given the Continent’s importance to American national security. To help provide a practical policymaking roadmap forward, this Brief walks readers through (1) how gas insecurity would likely facilitate further Russian territorial conquest in Ukraine, (2) how Europe wound up in the current gas predicament, and (3) how, with sufficient political will, Europe and the United States can leverage Gas Geoeconomics to chart a more secure future.