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2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 2AC Case Cards---Growth Advantage › UQ---Economy Down Now

Economic growth is slow now

Natalie Sherman 23. Business reporter, New York, 4-27-23. "US economic growth slows as firms cut investment," https://www.bbc.com/news/business-65414174.

The US economy slowed in the first three months of the year, as businesses reduced investments in the face of higher borrowing costs.

The economy grew 1.1% on an annualised basis, the Commerce Department said.

2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 2AC Case Cards---Growth Advantage › AT: Econ Turn---UBI Causes Inflation

UBI doesn’t drive inflation, which is already high for other reasons.

The Economic Times 23. PTI, 3-20-2023. "Universal Basic Income does not cause inflation," https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/universal-basic-income-does-not-cause-inflation/articleshow/98801058.cms?from=mdr.

Giving people largely unconditional, predictable forms of income to satisfy their basic needs has been identified as means of restoring social security, increasing equality and supporting growth in areas of countries that have been left behind by development and promoting public health overall.

There is, however, widespread belief that any monetary intervention stimulates hyper-inflation of the form found in 1920s Germany, 1990s Argentina and 2000s Zimbabwe.

2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 2AC Case Cards---Growth Advantage › AT: Econ Turn---Tax Hikes Kill the Economy

Tax hikes don’t hurt the economy.

Chye-Ching Huang 12. Staff at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 4-24-2012. "Recent Studies Find Raising Taxes on High-Income Households Would Not Harm the Economy," https://www.cbpp.org/research/recent-studies-find-raising-taxes-on-high-income-households-would-not-harm-the-economy.

Many policymakers and pundits assume that raising federal income taxes on high-income households would have serious adverse consequences for the economy. Yet this belief, which has been subject to extensive research and analysis, does not fare well under scrutiny. As three leading tax economists recently concluded in a comprehensive review of the empirical evidence, “there is no compelling evidence to date of real responses of upper income taxpayers to changes in tax rates.”[1] The literature suggests that if the alternative to raising taxes is larger deficits, then modest tax increases on high-income households would likely be more beneficial for the economy over the long run.

The debate over the economic effects of higher taxes on people with high incomes has focused on a number of issues — how increasing taxes at the top would affect taxable income and revenue as well as the effects on work and labor supply, saving and investment, small businesses, entrepreneurship, and, ultimately, economic growth and jobs. Here is a summary of what the evidence shows.

2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 2AC Case Cards---Growth Advantage › AT: Econ Turn---UBI Reduces Labor Supply/Incentive to Work

They’re wrong---Prefer our evidence.

Manuela A. de Paz-Báñez et al. 20. Professor, Economics Department, Universidad de Huelva, with María José Asensio-Coto,Celia Sánchez-López and María-Teresa Aceytuno, 11-13-2020. "Is There Empirical Evidence on How the Implementation of a Universal Basic Income (UBI) Affects Labour Supply? A Systematic Review," https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/22/9459.

The objective of this article is to determine, as conclusively as possible, if the implementation of a Universal Basic Income (UBI) would lead to a significant reduction in the working age population labour supply. If this were true, implementation of a UBI may not be sustainable. To do this, we will compile empirical evidence from studies over the last few decades on the effects of implementation of a UBI on employment. We apply the PRISMA methodology to better judge their validity, which ensures maximum reliability of the results by avoiding biases and making the work reproducible. Given that the methodologies used in these studies are diverse, they are reviewed to contextualize the results taking into account the possible limitations detected in these methodologies. While many authors have been writing about this issue citing experiences or experiments, the added value of this article is that it performs a systematic review following a widely tested scientific methodology. Over 1200 documents that discuss the UBI/employment relationship have been reviewed. We found a total of 50 empirical cases, of which 18 were selected, and 38 studies with contrasted empirical evidence on this relationship. The results speak for themselves: Despite a detailed search, we have not found any evidence of a significant reduction in labour supply. Instead, we found evidence that labour supply increases globally among adults, men and women, young and old, and the existence of some insignificant and functional reductions to the system such as a decrease in workers from the following categories: Children, the elderly, the sick, those with disabilities, women with young children to look after, or young people who continued studying. These reductions do not reduce the overall supply since it is largely offset by increased supply from other members of the community.

2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 2AC Case Cards---Automation Advantage › UBI Solves Government Trust---XT

UBI creates a societal foundation for trust in government

Scott Santens 20. Founding member of the Economic Security Project, an adviser to the Universal Income Project, a founding committee member of Basic Income Action, committee member of the US Basic Income Guarantee Network, and founder of the BIG Patreon Creator, 9-23-20. "Editorial: We need UBI because we all need money, power, and trust," https://basicincometoday.com/editorial-we-need-ubi-because-we-all-need-money-power-and-trust/.

Finally, the next not so obvious reason we need UBI immediately is trust.

We are living through a crisis of mistrust. We feel our institutions are failing us. We feel we are being constantly lied to. We don’t know what to believe, and so we clutch for whatever we can find to give us some sense of control. We fall for misinformation and disinformation. We fall for conspiracies. We stop voting. We lose faith in the project of self-government, and we lose faith in each other.

2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 2AC Case Cards---Automation Advantage › UBI Solves Government Trust---XT

UBI meaningfully boosts trust in government---Finland proves.

Tera Allas et al. 20. Director of Research and Economics, McKinsey London, with Jukka Maksimainen, James Manyika, and Navjot Singh, 9-15-20. “An experiment to inform universal basic income.” https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/public-and-social-sector/our-insights/an-experiment-to-inform-universal-basic-income

At a societal level, Finland’s basic-income experiment promoted another interesting virtuous cycle, around trust. Trust in others and institutions is a fundamental building block of well-functioning societies. When researchers look for determinants of both well-being and economic prosperity, trust regularly crops up as a key variable. Indeed, Finland is a case in point: it ranks at the top of global measures of happiness8 and also boasts the second-highest rating on trust in other people, after Norway (Exhibit 3).

When people trust institutions, such as the police, the judiciary, and public services, their trust in others also tends to increase,9 so it isn’t trivial that Finland’s basic-income program improved that level of trust. At the end of the two years, basic-income recipients registered elevated levels of trust in other people and institutions, such as Finland’s politicians, political parties, parliament, judiciary, and social-security system. One explanation could be that the basic-income experiment did not involve bureaucracy, another that the recipients felt society—or “the system”—was not neglecting people who had fallen on hard times.

2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 2AC Case Cards---Automation Advantage › UBI Solves Automation---XT

UBI secures popular support for key measures to deal with technological change

Matt Kilcoyne 18. Deputy Director of the Adam Smith Institute, 1-19-18. “RISING EVIDENCE FOR UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME.” https://www.adamsmith.org/news/rising-evidence-basic-income

New report suggests a Universal Basic Income (UBI) is the answer to large-scale change from globalisation and automation

New trials in countries such as Canada, Finland, Uganda and Kenya highlight growing interest in Universal Basic Income across the world

2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 2AC Case Cards---Automation Advantage › UBI Solves Automation---XT

UBI enables everyone to share the benefits of automation

Yanis Varoufakis 17. Former finance minister of Greece, leader of the MeRA25 party and Professor of Economics at the University of Athens, 2-27-2017. "A Tax on Robots?," https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/bill-gates-tax-on-robots-by-yanis-varoufakis-2017-02.

But why make life under capitalism more complicated than it already is? There is an alternative to a robot tax that is easy to implement and simple to justify: a universal basic dividend (UBD), financed from the returns on all capital.

Imagine that a fixed portion of new equity issues (IPOs) goes into a public trust that, in turn, generates an income stream from which a UBD is paid. Effectively, society becomes a shareholder in every corporation, and the dividends are distributed evenly to all citizens.2

2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 2AC Case Cards---Automation Advantage › UBI Solves Automation---XT

UBI solves automation problems

Joel Leonard 22. PhD, Group of Economy and Development, Division of Society and Politics (DSP), The BASE, Chapel Hill, NC, with Wein K. Solos, “On the Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Economy.” Science Insights, 2022 June 30; Vol. 41, No. 1, pp.551-560.

Implementing a “Universal Basic Income” (UBI) policy is an effective response to the surge of automation induced by AI and robotics. The concept of a universal basic income, in which all citizens receive regular, unconditional payments from the gov- ernment, is not novel. Friedman introduced the concept of “neg- ative income tax” in his 1962 book, “Capitalism and Freedom” (46), which proposes that the government replace the present welfare system with a negative income tax and punish house- holds with incomes beyond a specific threshold. Since then, this plan has evolved into a policy for a universal basic income. A key advantage of the universal basic income policy compared to other welfare systems is that it provides all citizens with a fixed amount of unconditional transfer payments, which may be used for any purpose. Automation will provide immense wealth and value for society as a whole, but a universal basic income policy can ensure that everyone achieves a suitable quality of life, even if they are not employed. The amount of UBI is usually set in a moderate way, and it could be set at or below the poverty level.

There is still much dispute about the UBI policy. Propo- nents of this strategy said that it may be adopted to maintain high levels of consumption, reduce unemployment, ameliorate extreme poverty and inequality, and stimulate corporate activity. In addition to reducing unemployment caused by automation, UBI policies may also advance gender equality, promote work-life balance, enhance job quality, and better equip indi- viduals, particularly young people, to meet the more severe in- stability factor. Furthermore, the UBI program will also benefit users’ physical and mental health (47). In addition, the universal basic income policy will pose a number of challenges, such as how the government will be able to fund such a large amount of annual expenditure, whether this policy can meet the fundamen- tal needs of residents, and how to coordinate this policy with the existing welfare policy.

2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 2AC Case Cards---Automation Advantage › UBI Solves Automation---XT

UBI solves automation-driven inequality

Oliver Bendel 19. Professor of Information Systems, Information Ethics, Machine Ethics and Robophilosophy at the University of Applied Sciences and Arts Northwestern Switzerland. “Are Robot Tax, Basic Income or Basic Property Solutions to the Social Problems of Automation?” AAAI Spring Symposium: Interpretable AI for Well-being (2019). http://ceur-ws.org/Vol-2448/SSS19_Paper_Upload_214.pdf

The question of where the money for unconditional basic income will have to come from is answered differently. One could start with making taxation more equitable, for example by drying up tax havens and by persecuting and punishing tax refugees. It is possible to trim the state slimmer, to dismantle the debt mountain and to carry out expropriation – this will be addressed below. Alternatively, one could invade countries, which is not, of course, an internationally accepted measure and is associated with fear, terror and death. Another answer could be to raise a robot tax (Abbott and Bogenschneider 2018). This seems to be a plausible approach, especially if the unconditional basic income is to absorb the consequences of automation, autonomization and digitization.

2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 2AC Case Cards---Automation Advantage › UBI Solves Automation---XT

UBI protects against the detrimental effects of automation

Thomas Hannah 20. Researcher at the London School of Economics Department of Health Policy, with Rocco Friebel, 11-20-2020. "Stop preserving doomed jobs and bring in Universal Basic Income," https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/covid19/2020/11/20/stop-preserving-doomed-jobs-and-bring-in-universal-basic-income/.

The rise of the gig economy is antithetical to every aim of UBI, providing little or no certainty about future earnings. The inflation of educational attainment means many jobs now require degrees, and it becomes increasingly challenging to access ‘good’ jobs without the prior accumulation of substantial personal debt. For people who are in employment, technological progress means up to 30% of them will be displaced through automation by 2030. While it is popular to talk of the need for people to retrain in new careers, it is unclear how or if this is possible. In the US, five million manufacturing jobs have been lost since 2000 mainly because of automation, with 44% of these displaced workers having never returned to employment, instead staying permanently on state welfare. It appears unrealistic to expect large numbers of people to retrain when the shift is to jobs that require more specialised and demanding skills than ever. At the same time, the quantity of these specialised jobs becomes fewer, not least due to the cyber revolution. Simply consider how many people Facebook requires to create a unit of output compared to a company like Toyota or Topshop.

UBI can protect against the detrimental effects of this changing and uncertain landscape, as it removes any notion of means and worthiness as a product of its universality. It prevents suffering of those most affected by change, and the removal of the fear of absolute poverty could invigorate a spirit of entrepreneurship described as “hyper-capitalism with hyper-socialism” by the mathematician Eric Weinstein. We should also factor in the benefits of UBI as a way to improving population health, through addressing deaths of despair, stagnating or even falling life expectancy, and a decline in hope for the future.

2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 2AC Case Cards---Automation Advantage › UBI Solves Automation---XT

UBI solves automation-driven inequality

Aaron Berger 17. Research scientist specializing in pattern recognition, domestic and foreign current events, and technology trends under the lens of existential risk, CEO of Asymmetrical Solutions, 7-21-17. "Let the robots take our jobs and pay for a universal basic income," https://qz.com/1034358/ubi-and-automation-could-be-the-symbiotic-solution-for-displaced-workers.

UBI, an economic proposition in which a sum of money is regularly paid to a population, could be a vital bulwark against the unintended consequences of automation in the workforce. Companies will profit significantly from workforce automation, so the private sector will be able to afford shouldering this burden, while at the same time still making greater profits.

Automation will save companies money and boost profits

2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 2AC Case Cards---Automation Advantage › UBI Solves Inequality---XT

Solves inequality

Jeremy Rosen 21. Director of Economic Justice at the Shriver Center on Poverty Law, 6-21-2021. "Guaranteed Income: An Economic Support Whose Time Has Come," https://www.povertylaw.org/article/guaranteed-income/.

A guaranteed income can dramatically reduce poverty and improve families’ long-term well-being. Across the country, pilot programs offering a guaranteed income to local residents have measurably improved participants’ financial stability. Participants in these programs are using funds in ways that benefit their families’ long-term economic health—by paying for rent in a better school district, taking a community college course to improve job skills, saving to cover the expenses of starting a small business, or eliminating old debts that would otherwise trap a family in perpetual poverty. For example, in Stockton, California, 125 residents living at or below median income were given a $500 monthly stipend with no strings attached for 24 months. Not only did recipients’ quality of life improve, but researchers found that their participation in full-time employment jumped from 28 to 40 percent.

In the Shriver Center’s home state of Illinois, several guaranteed income initiatives and pilot programs are underway. At the local level, Chicago Alderman Gilbert Villegas has proposed a pilot program to provide $500 per month for a year to 5,000 low-income residents of the city, to be funded with $30 million of the city’s $1.9 billion in American Rescue Plan funds. Other pilot programs supported by private philanthropy are also underway. Cook County plans to build on a successful initiative that gave direct payments to families facing financial hardship during the pandemic with a similar program in 2021. And at the state level, a broad coalition of community-based and grass tops organizations is working together to study the results of Illinois pilot programs, educate legislators, and ultimately advocate for legislation to establish a statewide guaranteed income program.

2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 2AC Case Cards---Automation Advantage › UBI Solves Inequality---XT

UBI solves inequality---pilots prove.

Peter H. Diamandis 16. Founder and Executive Chairman of the XPRIZE Foundation, executive founder of Singularity, 12-12-16. “Is Universal Basic Income the Answer to an Automated Future?” https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/universal-basic-income-peter-diamandis/

While the implementation of UBI at scale is still in its early days, the results are promising.

Early results in the India experiment show nutrition was improved as measured by the average weight-for-age of young children (World Health Organization z-score), and more so among girls.

2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 2AC Case Cards---Automation Advantage › UBI Solves Inequality---XT

UBI stabilizes social inequality

Giuseppe Allegri 21. Independent and freelancer researcher, consultant, teacher and trainer in Public and Constitutional Law, Ph. D. in Theory of the State, with Renato Foschi, “Universal Basic Income as a Promoter of Real Freedom in a Digital Future.” World Futures: The Journal of New Paradigm Research, Volume 77, 2021 - Issue 1. Taylor & Francis.

By now, the UBI has become a theme in mainstream American political science journals and has attracted the interest of researchers of the millennial generation. It is considered a protective factor in the case of job insecurity and unemployment, a stabilizer of social inequality, and a promoter of the freedom of the worker to defend himself from the monotonous, weary, or underpaid gigs in the digitized economy. These factors seem to be increasing rather than decreasing in the technological and digitized society, especially because present and future automation seems destined to totally replace certain professional figures, distribution of goods or some specific, highly specialized work tasks (Bidadanure, Citation2019). The use of artificial intelligence therefore seems to determine a decrease in the working hours necessary for production, which has as a consequence an impoverishment of the working middle class. In the coming years, this situation will lead to a labor market that will need personnel to perform AI-related tasks or that will involve creative and relational skills that are difficult to reproduce by means of AI (Ernst et al., Citation2019).

These new scenarios challenge the Protestant work ethic based on positive or negative individuals; the former builds their own destinies; the latter are idle and unproductive, undeserving of success. Giving all individuals a universal income is totally contrary to these assumptions. It is therefore heresy with respect to Protestant ethics.

2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 1AC › 1AC---Solvency

Restructuring the federal tax code is essential.

Naomi Zewde et al., 21. Assistant Professor in the Graduate School of Public Health and Health Policy at the City University of New York, with Kyle Strickland, Kelly Capatosto, Ari Glogower, and Darrick Hamilton, May 2021. “a guaranteed income for the 21st century.” https://kirwaninstitute.osu.edu/sites/default/files/Guaranteed%20Income%20for%20the%2021st%20Century.pdf

Current tax and fiscal policies fall far short of fostering economic inclusion, social equity, and civic engagement to all households. To the contrary, many of the most important structural features of our tax code privilege those with existing wealth, instead of creating new pathways for wealth-building opportunities for lower- and middle- income families.

Decline of Progressive Taxation

2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 1AC › 1AC---Solvency

UBI solves---there’s no negative effect on the labor supply.

Manuela A. de Paz-Báñez et al. 20. Professor, Economics Department, Universidad de Huelva, with María José Asensio-Coto,Celia Sánchez-López and María-Teresa Aceytuno, 11-13-2020. "Is There Empirical Evidence on How the Implementation of a Universal Basic Income (UBI) Affects Labour Supply? A Systematic Review," https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/12/22/9459.

We have verified in this article that there is no scientific evidence that confirms that a UBI causes a reduction in the labour supply at a general level, but rather the opposite. We have verified that only in particular cases does a small setback occur due to various causes that, to a great extent, improve individual, family, and general conditions of the economy. All this leads us to firmly deny this objection to the implementation of a UBI, despite the limitations of the methodologies in use.

Although it is not the subject of this systematic review, we have also found positive effects in other labour aspects: The improvement in working conditions in the worst jobs seems related to a greater capacity for labour negotiation; the increase in formal employment for lower jobs, especially if this measure replaces conditional transfers, due to the possibility of combining formal employment and benefit. Changes towards better jobs and entrepreneurship have also been observed. Another aspect of interest is the change in labour demand.

2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 1AC › 1AC---Solvency

Federal UBI funded by progressive taxation is feasible and solves.

Nezih Guner et al. 23. Researcher At The Autonomous University Of Barcelona, Associated To Cepr and Iza, with Remzi Kaygusuz(Economics Professor At Sabanci University In Turkey) & Gustavo Ventura (Economics Professor At Arizona State University), 5-27-2023. "'With a proportional income tax, the best universal basic income can be more generous'," https://www.lemonde.fr/en/opinion/article/2022/06/29/with-a-proportional-income-tax-the-best-universal-basic-income-can-be-more-generous_5988397_23.html.

The universal basic income (UBI), a government transfer given to all individuals without any conditions, is a popular topic. According to some, UBI is a potential solution to growing income inequality and the inadequacy of existing transfers.

For others, it is a way to reduce inefficiencies in the existing transfer system, which is typically a patchwork of multiple programs run by an extensive bureaucracy. Public social expenditure or the welfare state is about 20% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) across the OECD countries. It is about 30% in France, the highest among OECD countries, but relatively lower in the US, about 18%. Health and pensions take the lion’s share, and the rest, 8.1% of GDP in France and around 2.7% in the US, are transfers to the working-age population. Such transfers are typically means-tested, i.e., only individuals below a certain income level can receive them. They can be monetary, such as cash payments or tax credits, or in-kind services, such as social housing or government-provided childcare.

2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 1AC › 1AC---Growth Advantage

Federal UBI is key---it solves geographic inequality, which is key to stimulate demand and create jobs.

Sebastion Johnson 17. Economic Security Project, 10-11-17. "Could a Universal Basic Income Make Small Town America Great Again?," https://economicsecurityproject.org/news/could-a-universal-basic-income-make-small-town-america-great-again%EF%BF%BC/.

As I highlighted in my recent TEDx talk on the universal basic income (UBI), geographic inequality is the elephant in the room. According to one 2015 study of the richest counties in America, four of the five richest are in the Greater Washington, DC area, a fact that increases outrage and mistrust of government in small town America. Further research shows an economy increasingly concentrated in big cities and along our coasts.

What policy, then, would “square the circle” between long-run economic growth and short-term need? In my view, it’s time we transitioned from place-based development to people-based development. And that comes in the form of UBI.

2023 ENDI Affirmative
AFF › 1AC › 1AC---Growth Advantage

Slow growth collapses the liberal international order AND causes global hotspot escalation---extinction.

Michael Oppenheimer 21. Clinical Professor, Center for Global Affairs, New York University. Senior Consulting Fellow, Scenario Planning at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Former Executive Vice President, The Futures Group. Member, Council on Foreign Relations. Member, The Foreign Policy Roundtable at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs. Member, The American Council on Germany, The Future of Global Affairs: Managing Discontinuity, Disruption and Destruction. “The Turbulent Future of International Relations.”

Four structural forces will shape the future of International Relations: globalization (but without liberal rules, institutions, and leadership)1; multipolarity (the end of American hegemony and wider distribution of power among states and non-states2); the strengthening of distinctive, national and subnational identities, as persistent cultural differences are accentuated by the disruptive effects of Western style globalization (what Samuel Huntington called the “non-westernization of IR”3); and secular economic stagnation, a product of longer term global decline in birth rates combined with aging populations.4 These structural forces do not determine everything. Environmental events, global health challenges, internal political developments, policy mistakes, technology breakthroughs or failures, will intersect with structure to define our future. But these four structural forces will impact the way states behave, in the capacity of great powers to manage their differences, and to act collectively to settle, rather than exploit, the inevitable shocks of the next decade. Some of these structural forces could be managed to promote prosperity and avoid war. Multipolarity (inherently more prone to conflict than other configurations of power, given coordination problems)5 plus globalization can work in a world of prosperity, convergent values, and effective conflict management. The Congress of Vienna system achieved relative peace in Europe over a hundred-year period through informal cooperation among multiple states sharing a fear of populist revolution. It ended decisively in 1914. Contemporary neoliberal institutionalists, such as John Ikenberry, accept multipolarity as our likely future, but are confident that globalization with liberal characteristics can be sustained without American hegemony, arguing that liberal values and practices have been fully accepted by states, global institutions, and private actors as imperative for growth and political legitimacy.6 Divergent values plus multipolarity can work, though at significantly lower levels of economic growth-in an autarchic world of isolated units, a world envisioned by the advocates of decoupling, including the current American president.7 Divergent values plus globalization can be managed by hegemonic power, exemplified by the decade of the 1990s, when the Washington Consensus, imposed by American leverage exerted through the IMF and other U.S. dominated institutions, overrode national differences, but with real costs to those states undergoing “structural adjustment programs,”8 and ultimately at the cost of global growth, as states—especially in Asia—increased their savings to self insure against future financial crises.9 But all four forces operating simultaneously will produce a future of increasing internal polarization and cross border conflict, diminished economic growth and poverty alleviation, weakened global institutions and norms of behavior, and reduced collective capacity to confront emerging challenges of global warming, accelerating technology change, nuclear weapons innovation and proliferation. As in any effective scenario, this future is clearly visible to any keen observer. We have only to abolish wishful thinking and believe our own eyes.10 Secular Stagnation This unbrave new world has been emerging for some time, as US power has declined relative to other states, especially China, global liberalism has failed to deliver on its promises, and totalitarian capitalism has proven effective in leveraging globalization for economic growth and political legitimacy while exploiting technology and the state’s coercive powers to maintain internal political control. But this new era was jumpstarted by the world financial crisis of 2007, which revealed the bankruptcy of unregulated market capitalism, weakened faith in US leadership, exacerbated economic deprivation and inequality around the world, ignited growing populism, and undermined international liberal institutions. The skewed distribution of wealth experienced in most developed countries, politically tolerated in periods of growth, became intolerable as growth rates declined. A combination of aging populations, accelerating technology, and global populism/nationalism promises to make this growth decline very difficult to reverse. What Larry Summers and other international political economists have come to call “secular stagnation” increases the likelihood that illiberal globalization, multipolarity, and rising nationalism will define our future. Summers11 has argued that the world is entering a long period of diminishing economic growth. He suggests that secular stagnation “may be the defining macroeconomic challenge of our times.” Julius Probst, in his recent assessment of Summers’ ideas, explains: …rich countries are ageing as birth rates decline and people live longer. This has pushed down real interest rates because investors think these trends will mean they will make lower returns from investing in future, making them more willing to accept a lower return on government debt as a result. Other factors that make investors similarly pessimistic include rising global inequality and the slowdown in productivity growth… This decline in real interest rates matters because economists believe that to overcome an economic downturn, a central bank must drive down the real interest rate to a certain level to encourage more spending and investment… Because real interest rates are so low, Summers and his supporters believe that the rate required to reach full employment is so far into negative territory that it is effectively impossible. …in the long run, more immigration might be a vital part of curing secular stagnation. Summers also heavily prescribes increased government spending, arguing that it might actually be more prudent than cutting back – especially if the money is spent on infrastructure, education and research and development. Of course, governments in Europe and the US are instead trying to shut their doors to migrants. And austerity policies have taken their toll on infrastructure and public research. This looks set to ensure that the next recession will be particularly nasty when it comes… Unless governments change course radically, we could be in for a sobering period ahead.12 The rise of nationalism/populism is both cause and effect of this economic outlook. Lower growth will make every aspect of the liberal order more difficult to resuscitate post-Trump. Domestic politics will become more polarized and dysfunctional, as competition for diminishing resources intensifies. International collaboration, ad hoc or through institutions, will become politically toxic. Protectionism, in its multiple forms, will make economic recovery from “secular stagnation” a heavy lift, and the liberal hegemonic leadership and strong institutions that limited the damage of previous downturns, will be unavailable. A clear demonstration of this negative feedback loop is the economic damage being inflicted on the world by Trump’s trade war with China, which— despite the so-called phase one agreement—has predictably escalated from negotiating tactic to imbedded reality, with no end in sight. In a world already suffering from inadequate investment, the uncertainties generated by this confrontation will further curb the investments essential for future growth. Another demonstration of the intersection of structural forces is how populist-motivated controls on immigration (always a weakness in the hyper-globalization narrative) deprives developed countries of Summers’ recommended policy response to secular stagnation, which in a more open world would be a win-win for rich and poor countries alike, increasing wage rates and remittance revenues for the developing countries, replenishing the labor supply for rich countries experiencing low birth rates. Illiberal Globalization Economic weakness and rising nationalism (along with multipolarity) will not end globalization, but will profoundly alter its character and greatly reduce its economic and political benefits. Liberal global institutions, under American hegemony, have served multiple purposes, enabling states to improve the quality of international relations and more fully satisfy the needs of their citizens, and provide companies with the legal and institutional stability necessary to manage the inherent risks of global investment. But under present and future conditions these institutions will become the battlegrounds—and the victims—of geopolitical competition. The Trump Administration’s frontal attack on multilateralism is but the final nail in the coffin of the Bretton Woods system in trade and finance, which has been in slow but accelerating decline since the end of the Cold War. Future American leadership may embrace renewed collaboration in global trade and finance, macroeconomic management, environmental sustainability and the like, but repairing the damage requires the heroic assumption that America’s own identity has not been fundamentally altered by the Trump era (four years or eight matters here), and by the internal and global forces that enabled his rise. The fact will remain that a sizeable portion of the American electorate, and a monolithically proTrump Republican Party, is committed to an illiberal future. And even if the effects are transitory, the causes of weakening global collaboration are structural, not subject to the efforts of some hypothetical future US liberal leadership. It is clear that the US has lost respect among its rivals, and trust among its allies. While its economic and military capacity is still greatly superior to all others, its political dysfunction has diminished its ability to convert this wealth into effective power.13 It will furthermore operate in a future system of diffusing material power, diverging economic and political governance approaches, and rising nationalism. Trump has promoted these forces, but did not invent them, and future US Administrations will struggle to cope with them. What will illiberal globalization look like? Consider recent events. The instruments of globalization have been weaponized by strong states in pursuit of their geopolitical objectives. This has turned the liberal argument on behalf of globalization on its head. Instead of interdependence as an unstoppable force pushing states toward collaboration and convergence around market-friendly domestic policies, states are exploiting interdependence to inflict harm on their adversaries, and even on their allies. The increasing interaction across national boundaries that globalization entails, now produces not harmonization and cooperation, but friction and escalating trade and investment disputes.14 The Trump Administration is in the lead here, but it is not alone. Trade and investment friction with China is the most obvious and damaging example, precipitated by China’s long failure to conform to the World Trade Organization (WTO) principles, now escalated by President Trump into a trade and currency war disturbingly reminiscent of the 1930s that Bretton Woods was designed to prevent. Financial sanctions against Iran, in violation of US obligations in the Joint Comprehensive Plan Of Action (JCPOA), is another example of the rule of law succumbing to geopolitical competition. Though more mercantilist in intent than geopolitical, US tariffs on steel and aluminum, and their threatened use in automotives, aimed at the EU, Canada, and Japan,15 are equally destructive of the liberal system and of future economic growth, imposed as they are by the author of that system, and will spread to others. And indeed, Japan has used export controls in its escalating conflict with South Korea16 (as did China in imposing controls on rare earth,17 and as the US has done as part of its trade war with China). Inward foreign direct investment restrictions are spreading. The vitality of the WTO is being sapped by its inability to complete the Doha Round, by the proliferation of bilateral and regional agreements, and now by the Trump Administration’s hold on appointments to WTO judicial panels. It should not surprise anyone if, during a second term, Trump formally withdrew the US from the WTO. At a minimum it will become a “dead letter regime.”18 As such measures gain traction, it will become clear to states—and to companies—that a global trading system more responsive to raw power than to law entails escalating risk and diminishing benefits. This will be the end of economic globalization, and its many benefits, as we know it. It represents nothing less than the subordination of economic globalization, a system which many thought obeyed its own logic, to an international politics of zero-sum power competition among multiple actors with divergent interests and values. The costs will be significant: Bloomberg Economics estimates that the cost in lost US GDP in 2019- dollar terms from the trade war with China has reached $134 billion to date and will rise to a total of $316 billion by the end of 2020.19 Economically, the just-in-time, maximally efficient world of global supply chains, driving down costs, incentivizing innovation, spreading investment, integrating new countries and populations into the global system, is being Balkanized. Bilateral and regional deals are proliferating, while global, nondiscriminatory trade agreements are at an end. Economies of scale will shrink, incentivizing less investment, increasing costs and prices, compromising growth, marginalizing countries whose growth and poverty reduction depended on participation in global supply chains. A world already suffering from excess savings (in the corporate sector, among mostly Asian countries) will respond to heightened risk and uncertainty with further retrenchment. The problem is perfectly captured by Tim Boyle, CEO of Columbia Sportswear, whose supply chain runs through China, reacting to yet another ratcheting up of US tariffs on Chinese imports, most recently on consumer goods: We move stuff around to take advantage of inexpensive labor. That’s why we’re in Bangladesh. That’s why we’re looking at Africa. We’re putting investment capital to work, to get a return for our shareholders. So, when we make a wager on investment, this is not Vegas. We have to have a reasonable expectation we can get a return. That’s predicated on the rule of law: where can we expect the laws to be enforced, and for the foreseeable future, the rules will be in place? That’s what America used to be.20 The international political effects will be equally damaging. The four structural forces act on each other to produce the more dangerous, less prosperous world projected here. Illiberal globalization represents geopolitical conflict by (at first) physically non-kinetic means. It arises from intensifying competition among powerful states with divergent interests and identities, but in its effects drives down growth and fuels increased nationalism/populism, which further contributes to conflict. Twenty-first-century protectionism represents bottom-up forces arising from economic disruption. But it is also a top-down phenomenon, representing a strategic effort by political leadership to reduce the constraints of interdependence on freedom of geopolitical action, in effect a precursor and enabler of war. This is the disturbing hypothesis of Daniel Drezner, argued in an important May 2019 piece in Reason, titled “Will Today’s Global Trade Wars Lead to World War Three,”21 which examines the preWorld War I period of heightened trade conflict, its contribution to the disaster that followed, and its parallels to the present: Before the First World War started, powers great and small took a variety of steps to thwart the globalization of the 19th century. Each of these steps made it easier for the key combatants to conceive of a general war. We are beginning to see a similar approach to the globalization of the 21st century. One by one, the economic constraints on military aggression are eroding. And too many have forgotten—or never knew—how this played out a century ago. …In many ways, 19th century globalization was a victim of its own success. Reduced tariffs and transport costs flooded Europe with inexpensive grains from Russia and the United States. The incomes of landowners in these countries suffered a serious hit, and the Long Depression that ran from 1873 until 1896 generated pressure on European governments to protect against cheap imports. …The primary lesson to draw from the years before 1914 is not that economic interdependence was a weak constraint on military conflict. It is that, even in a globalized economy, governments can take protectionist actions to reduce their interdependence in anticipation of future wars. In retrospect, the 30 years of tariff hikes, trade wars, and currency conflicts that preceded 1914 were harbingers of the devastation to come. European governments did not necessarily want to ignite a war among the great powers. By reducing their interdependence, however, they made that option conceivable. …the backlash to globalization that preceded the Great War seems to be reprised in the current moment. Indeed, there are ways in which the current moment is scarier than the pre-1914 era. Back then, the world’s hegemon, the United Kingdom, acted as a brake on economic closure. In 2019, the United States is the protectionist with its foot on the accelerator. The constraints of Sino-American interdependence—what economist Larry Summers once called “the financial balance of terror”—no longer look so binding. And there are far too many hot spots—the Korean peninsula, the South China Sea, Taiwan—where the kindling seems awfully dry. Multipolarity We can define multipolarity as a wide distribution of power among multiple independent states. Exact equivalence of material power is not implied. What is required is the possession by several states of the capacity to coerce others to act in ways they would otherwise not, through kinetic or other means (economic sanctions, political manipulation, denial of access to essential resources, etc.). Such a distribution of power presents inherently graver challenges to peace and stability than do unipolar or bipolar power configurations,22 though of course none are safe or permanent. In brief, the greater the number of consequential actors, the greater the challenge of coordinating actions to avoid, manage, or de-escalate conflicts. Multipolarity also entails a greater potential for sudden changes in the balance of power, as one state may defect to another coalition or opt out, and as a result, the greater the degree of uncertainty experienced by all states, and the greater the plausibility of downside assumptions about the intentions and capabilities of one’s adversaries. This psychology, always present in international politics but particularly powerful in multipolarity, heightens the potential for escalation of minor conflicts, and of states launching preventive or preemptive wars. In multipolarity, states are always on edge, entertaining worst-case scenarios about actual and potential enemies, and acting on these fears—expanding their armies, introducing new weapon systems, altering doctrine to relax constraints on the use of force—in ways that reinforce the worst fears of others. The risks inherent in multipolarity are heightened by the attendant weakening of global institutions. Even in a state-centric system, such institutions can facilitate communication and transparency, helping states to manage conflicts by reducing the potential for misperception and escalation toward war. But, as Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu argues in his chapter on the United Nations, the influence of multilateral institutions as agent and actor is clearly in decline, a result of bottom-up populist/nationalist pressures experienced in many countries, as well as the coordination problems that increase in a system of multiple great powers. As conflict resolution institutions atrophy, great powers will find themselves in “security dilemmas”23 in which verification of a rival’s intentions is unavailable, and worst-case assumptions fill the gap created by uncertainty. And the supply of conflicts will expand as a result of growing nationalism and populism, which are premised on hostility, paranoia, and isolation, with governments seeking political legitimacy through external conflict, producing a siege mentality that deliberately cuts off communication with other states. Finally, the transition from unipolarity (roughly 1989–2007) to multipolarity is unregulated and hazardous, as the existing superpower fears and resists challenges to its primacy from a rising power or powers, while the rising power entertains new ambitions as entitlements now within its reach. Such a “power transition” and its dangers were identified by Thucydides in explaining the Peloponnesian Wars,24 by Organski (the “rear-end collision”)25 during the Cold War, and recently repopularized and brought up to date by Graham Allison in predicting conflict between the US and China.26 A useful, and consequential illustration of the inherent challenge of conflict management during a power transition toward multipolarity, is the weakening of the arms control regime negotiated by the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Despite the existential, global conflict between two nuclear armed superpowers embracing diametrically opposed world views and operating in economic isolation from each other, the two managed to avoid worst-case outcomes. They accomplished this in part by institutionalizing verifiable limits on testing and deployment of both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Yet as diplomatically and technically challenging as these achievements were, the introduction of a third great power, China, into this twocountry calculus has proven to be a deal breaker. Unconstrained by these bilateral agreements, China has been free to build up its capability, and has taken full advantage in ramping up production and deployment of intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles, thus challenging the US ability to credibly guarantee the security of its allies in Asia, and greatly increasing the costs of maintaining its Asian regional hegemony. As a result, the Intermediate Nuclear Force treaty is effectively dead, and the New Start Treaty, covering strategic missiles, is due to expire next year, with no indication of any US–Russian consensus to extend it. The US has with logic indicated its interest in making these agreements trilateral; but China, with its growing power and ambition, has also logically rejected these overtures. Thus, all three great powers are entering a period of nuclear weapons competition unconstrained by the major Cold War arms control regimes. In a period of rapid advances in technology and worsening great power relations, the nuclear competition will be a defining characteristic of the next decade and beyond. This dynamic will also complicate nuclear nonproliferation efforts, as both the demand for nuclear weapons (a consequence of rising regional and global insecurity), and supply of nuclear materials and technology (a result of the weakening of the nonproliferation regime and deteriorating great power relations) will increase. Will deterrence prevent war in a world of several nuclear weapons states, (the current nuclear powers plus South Korea, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Turkey), as it helped to do during the bipolar Cold War? Some neorealist observers view nuclear weapons proliferation as stabilizing, extending the balance of terror, and the imperative of restraint, to new nuclear weapons states with much to fight over (Saudi Arabia and Iran, for example).27 Others,28 examining issues of command and control of nuclear weapons deployment and use by newly acquiring states, asymmetries in doctrines, force structures, and capabilities between rivals, the perils of variable rates in transition to weapons deployment, problems of communication between states with deep mutual grievances, the heightened risk of transfer of such weapons to non-state actors, have grave doubts about the safety of a multipolar, nuclear-armed world.29 We can at least conclude that prudence dictates heightened efforts to slow the pace of proliferation, while realism requires that we face a proliferated future with eyes wide open. The current distribution of power is not perfectly multipolar. The US still commands the world’s largest economy, and its military power is unrivaled by any state or combination of states. Its population is still growing, despite a recent decline in birth rates. It enjoys extraordinary geographic advantages over its rivals, who are distant and live in far worse neighborhoods. Its economy is less dependent on foreign markets or resources. Its political system has proven—up to now—to be resilient and adaptable. Its global alliance system greatly extends its capacity to defend itself and shape the world to its liking and is still intact, despite growing doubts about America’s reliability as a security guarantor. Based on these mostly material and historical criteria, continued American primacy would seem to be a good bet, if it chooses to use its power in this way.30 So why multipolarity? The clearest and most frequently cited evidence for a widening distribution of global power away from American unipolarity is the narrowing gap in GDP between the US and China. The IMF’s World Economic Outlook forecasts a $0.9 trillion increase in US GDP for 2019–2020, and a $1.3 trillion increase for China in the same period.31 Many who support the American primacy case argue that GDP is an imperfect measure of power, that Chinese GDP data is inflated, that its growth rates are in decline while Chinese debt is rapidly increasing, and that China does poorly on other factors that contribute to power—its low per capita GDP, its political succession challenges, its environmental crisis, its absence of any external alliance system. Yet GDP is a good place to start, as the single most useful measure and long-term predictor of power. It is from the overall economy that states extract and apply material power to leverage desired behavior from other states. It is true that robust future Chinese growth is not guaranteed, nor is its capacity to convert its wealth to power, which is a function of how well its political system works over time. But this is equally the case for the US, and considering recent political developments is not a given for either country. As an alternative to measuring inputs—economic size, political legitimacy, technological innovation, population growth—in assessing relative power and the nature of global power distribution, we should consider outputs: what are states doing with their power? The input measures are useful, possibly predictive, but are usually deployed in the course of making a foreign policy argument, sometimes on behalf of a reassertion of American primacy, sometimes on behalf of retrenchment. As such, their objectivity (despite their generous deployment of “data”) is open to question. What is undeniable, to any clear-eyed observer, is a real decline in American influence in the world, and a rise in the influence of other powers, which predates the Trump administration but has accelerated into America’s free fall over the last four years. This has produced a de facto multipolarity, whether explainable in the various measures of power—actual and latent—or not. This decline results in part from policy mistakes: a reckless squandering of material power and legitimacy in Iraq, an overabundance of caution in Syria, and now pure impulsivity. But more fundamentally, it is a product of relative decline in American capacity—political and economic—to which American leadership is adjusting haphazardly, but in the direction of retrenchment/restraint. It is highly revealing that the last two American presidents, polar opposites in intellect, temperament and values, agreed on one fundamental point: the US is overextended, and needs to retrench. The fact that neither Obama nor Trump (up to this point in his presidency) believed they had the power at their disposal to do anything else, tells us far more about the future of American power and policy—and about the emerging shape of international relations—than the power measures and comparisons made by foreign policy advocates. Observation of recent trends in US versus Russian relative influence prompts another question: do we understand the emerging characteristics of power? Rigorously measuring and comparing the wrong parameters will get us nowhere at best and mislead us into misguided policies at worst. How often have we heard, with puzzlement, that Putin punches far above his weight? Could it be that we misunderstand what constitutes “weight” in the contemporary and emerging world? Putin may be on a high wire, and bound to come crashing down; but the fact is that Russian influence, leveraging sophisticated communications/social media/influence operations, a strong military, an agile (Putin-dominated) decision process, and taking advantage of the egregious mistakes by the West, has been advancing for over a decade, shows no sign of slowing down, and has created additional opportunities for itself in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, Latin America, the Arctic. It has done this with an economy roughly the size of Italy’s. There are few signs of a domestic political challenge to Putin. His external opponents are in disarray, and Russia’s main adversary is politically disabled from confronting the problem. He has established Russia as the Middle East power broker. He has reached into the internal politics of his Western adversaries and influenced their leadership choices. He has invaded and absorbed the territory of neighboring states. His actions have produced deep divisions within NATO. Again, simple observation suggests multipolarity in fact, and a full explanation for this power shift awaiting future historians able to look with more objectivity at twenty-first-century elements of power. When that history is written, surely it will emphasize the extraordinary polarization in American politics. Was multipolarity a case of others finding leverage in new sources of power, or the US underutilizing its own? The material measures suggest sufficient capacity for sustained American primacy, but with this latent capacity unavailable (as perceived, I believe correctly, by political leadership) by virtue of weakening institutions: two major parties in separate universes; a winnertake-all political mentality; deep polarization between the parties’ popular bases of support; divided government, with the Presidency and the Congress often in separate and antagonistic hands; diminishing trust in the permanent government, and in the knowledge it brings to important decisions, and deepening distrust between the intelligence community and policymakers; and, in Trump’s case, a chaotic policy process that lacks any strategic reference points, mis-communicates the Administration’s intentions, and has proven incapable of sustained, coherent diplomacy on behalf of any explicit and consistent set of policy goals. Rising Nationalism/Populism/Authoritarianism The evidence for these trends is clear. Freedom House, the go-to authority on the state of global democracy, just published its annual assessment for 2020, and recorded the fourteenth consecutive year of global democratic decline and advancing authoritarianism. This dramatic deterioration includes both a weakening in democratic practice within states still deemed on balance democratic, and a shift from weak democracies to authoritarianism in others. Commitment to democratic norms and practices—freedom of speech and of the press, independent judiciaries, protection of minority rights—is in decline. The decline is evident across the global system and encompasses all major powers, from India and China, to Europe, to the US. Right-wing populist parties have assumed power, or constitute a politically significant minority, in a lengthening list of democratic states, including both new (Hungary, Poland) and established (India, the US, the UK) democracies. Nationalism, frequently dismissed by liberal globalization advocates as a weak force when confronted by market democracies’ presumed inherent superiority, has experienced a resurgence in Russia, China, the Middle East, and at home. Given the breadth and depth of right-wing populism, the raw power that promotes it—mainly Russian and American—and the disarray of its liberal opponents, this factor will weigh heavily on the future. The major factors contributing to right-wing populism and its global spread is the subject of much discussion.32 The most straightforward explanation is rising inequality and diminished intergenerational mobility, particularly in developed countries whose labor-intensive manufacturing has been hit hardest by the globalization of capital combined with the immobility of labor. Jobs, wages, economic security, a reasonable hope that one’s offspring has a shot at a better life than one’s own, the erosion of social capital within economically marginalized communities, government failure to provide a decent safety net and job retraining for those battered by globalization: all have contributed to a sense of desperation and raw anger in the hollowed-out communities of formerly prosperous industrial areas. The declining life expectancy numbers33 tell a story of immiseration: drug addition, suicide, poor health care, and gun violence. The political expression of such conditions of life should not be surprising. Simple, extremist “solutions” become irresistible. Sectarian, racial, regional divides are strengthened, and exclusive identities are sharpened. Political entrepreneurs offering to blow up the system blamed for such conditions become credible. Those who are perceived as having benefited from the corrupt system—long-standing institutions of government, foreign countries and populations, immigrants, minorities getting a “free ride,” elites—become targets of recrimination and violence. The simple solutions of course, don’t work, deepening the underlying crisis, but in the process politics is poisoned. If this sounds like the US, it should, but it also describes major European countries (the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic), and could be an indication of things to come for non-Western democracies like India. We have emphasized throughout this chapter the interaction of four structural forces in shaping the future, and this interaction is evident here as well. Is it merely coincidence that the period of democratic decline documented by Freedom House, coincides precisely with the global financial and economic crisis? Lower growth, increasing joblessness, wage stagnation, superimposed on longer-term widening of inequality and declining mobility, constitute a forbidding stress test for democratic systems, and many continue to fail. And if we are correct about secular stagnation, the stress will continue, and authoritarianism’s fourteen-year run will not be over for some time. The antidemocratic trend will gain additional impetus from the illiberal direction of globalization, with its growth suppressing protectionism, weaponization of global economic exchange, and weakening global economic institutions. Multipolarity also contributes, in several ways. The former hegemon and author of globalization’s liberal structure has lost its appetite, and arguably its capacity, for leadership, and indeed has become part of the problem, succumbing to and promoting the global right-wing populist surge. It is suffering an unprecedented decline in life expectancy, and recently a decline in the birth rate, signaling a degree of rot commonly associated with a collapsing Soviet Union. While American politics may once again cohere around its liberal values and interests, the time when American leadership had the self-confidence to shape the global system in its liberal image is gone. It may build coalitions of the like-minded to launch liberal projects, but there will be too much power outside these coalitions to permit liberal globalization of the sort imagined at the end of the Cold War. In multipolarity, the values around which global politics revolve will reflect the diversity of major powers, their interests, and the norms they embrace. Convergence of norms, practices, policies is out of the question. Global collective action, even in the face of global crises, will be a long shot. To expect anything else is fantasy Unbrave New World and Future Challenges At the outset of this chapter we described these structural forces as interacting to produce more conflict and diminished prosperity. We also predicted a world with shrinking collective capacity to address new challenges as they arise. What specifically will such a world look like? We address below three principal challenges to global problem solving over the next decade. Interstate Conflict In the world experienced by most readers of this volume, conflict is observed within weak states, sometimes promoted by regional competitors, by terrorist groups, or by great powers, acting through surrogates or by indirect means. Sometimes, as in Syria, this conflict spills over to contiguous states and contributes to regional instability, and challenges other regions to respond effectively, a challenge that Europe has not met. Much of this will continue, but the global significance of such local conflicts will be greatly magnified by increasing great power conflict, which will feed—rather than manage or resolve—local instabilities and will in turn be exacerbated by them. Great powers will jockey for advantage, support their local partners, escalate preemptively. Conflicts initially confined to failing states or unstable regions will be redefined by great powers as global in scope and significance. This tendency of states to view local conflicts in the context of a zero-sum, global struggle for power is familiar to students of the Cold War, but now with the additional challenges to collective action, expanded uncertainty and worst-case thinking associated with the power transition to multipolarity. We can easily observe increased conflict in US–China relations, as we will in US–Russia relations as future US administrations try to make up for ground lost during the Trump presidency, especially in the Middle East. We can observe it among powerful states with mutual historical grievances, now with a weakening presence of the hegemonic security guarantor and having to consider the renationalization of their defense: Japan-South Korea, Germany-France. We can observe it among historical rivals operating in rapidly changing security landscapes: India-China. We can observe it within the Middle East, as internal rivalries are appropriated by regional powers in a contest for regional dominance. We can observe it clearly in Syria, where the regime’s violent suppression of Arab Spring resistance led to all-out civil war, attracted outside support to proxy forces by aspiring regional hegemons Saudi Arabia and Iran, enabled the rise of ISIS, and eventually to great power intervention, principally by Russia. In a world of effective great power collaboration or American primacy, the Syrian civil war might have been settled through power sharing or partition, or if not, contained within Syria. The collapse of Yugoslavia, occurring during a period of US “unipolarity” and managed effectively, demonstrates the possibilities. Instead, with the US retrenching, Middle East rivals unconstrained by great powers, and great power competition rising, the Syria civil war was fed by outside powers, then metastasized into the region, and—in the form of refugee flows—into Europe, fundamentally altering European politics. Libya may be at the early stages of this scenario. This is not the end of the Syria story. Russia has established itself as a major player in Syria and the Middle East’s power broker, the indispensable country with leverage throughout the region. China is poised to reap the financial and power benefits of Syrian reconstruction. The US has just demonstrated, in its act of war against the Iranian regime, its willingness, without consultation, to put its allies’ security in further jeopardy, accentuating the risks of security ties with Washington and generating added opportunities for Russia and China. The purpose here is not to critique US policy, but to point out the dramatically shifting power balance in a critical region, toward multipolarity. The dangers of such a shift will become apparent as some future US president attempts to reassert US influence in the region and finds a crowded playing field. Can a multipolar distribution of power among several states whose interests, values, and political practices are divergent, all experiencing bottom-up nationalist pressures, all seeking advantages in the oversupply of regional instability, be made to work? I think not. Will this more dangerous world descend into direct military confrontation between great powers, and could such confrontation lead to use of nuclear weapons? Here the question becomes, what will this more dangerous world actually look like; what instruments of coercion will be available to states as technology change accelerates; how will states employ these instruments; how will deterrence work (if at all) among several states with large but unequal levels of destructive capacity, weak command, and control, disparate— or opaque—strategies and simmering rivalries; can conflict management work in a world of weak institutions? The collapse of the Cold War era nuclear arms control regime, the threat to the Non-Proliferation Treaty represented by the demise of the JCPOA, and multiple indications of an accelerating nuclear arms race among the three principle powers, augurs badly. Given the structural forces at play, and without predicting the worst, we are indeed entering perilous times. Global Poverty and Inequality Despite the challenges of volatility and disruptive change inherent in globalization, the world under American liberal leadership has managed a dramatic reduction of extreme poverty. According to World Bank estimates, in 2015, 10 percent of the world’s population lived on less than $1.90 a day, down from nearly 36 percent in 1990.34 In fact, as of September 2018, half the world is now middle class or wealthier.35 The uneven success of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) exemplifies this achievement, and demonstrates what is possible when open markets are managed through strong global institutions, effective leadership and interstate collaboration. What this liberal hegemonic system did not achieve, however, was a fair distribution of the gains from globalization within states, and among those states that for various reasons were not full participants in this system. This record of partial achievement leaves us with a full agenda for the next fifteen years, but without the hegemonic leadership, strong institutions, ascendant liberalism or robust global growth that enabled previous gains. There are powerful reasons to question the sustainability of these poverty reduction gains, leading to doubts about the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals, which have replaced the MDGs as global development targets.36 (See Jens Rudbeck’s chapter and Sidhu’s UN chapter for SDGs). Skeptics have pointed to slowing global growth, specifically in China, whose demand for imported commodities was a major factor in developing country growth and job creation; growing protectionism in developed country markets, fueled by bottom-up forces of nationalism, and from top-down by a weakened global trading regime and increased geopolitical rivalry; the effects of accelerating climate change on agriculture, migration and communal conflict in poor countries; and the growth burst among poor countries from the rapid transition to more efficient use of resources, a transition that is now slowing down.37 Perhaps the greatest concern in this scenario is a general deterioration in the developing country foreign investment climate. Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been a major contributor to growth, job creation, and poverty alleviation among poor countries. It has incentivized growthfriendly policies, reduced corruption, introduced technology and effective management practices, and linked poor countries to foreign markets through global supply chains.38 It has stimulated growth of indigenous manufacturing and service companies to supply new foreign investments. It has been the major cause of economic convergence between rich and poor countries. From 2000 to 2009, developing economies’ growth rates were more than four percentage points higher than those of rich countries, pushing their share of global output from just over a third to nearly half.39 However, FDI flows into poor countries are imperiled by the structural forces discussed here. Political instability arising from slower growth and environmental stress will increase investors’ perception of higher risk, reinforcing their developed country bias. Protectionism among developed countries will threaten the global market access upon which manufacturing investment in developing countries is premised, causing firms to pare back their global supply chains. As companies retrench from direct investment in poor countries, the appeal to those countries of Chinese debt financed infrastructure projects, under the Belt-Road Initiative with little or no conditionality, but at the risk of “debt traps,” will increase. Global Warming The question posed at the beginning of this section is whether the international system, evolving toward multipolarity and rising nationalism, will find the collective political capital to confront challenges as they arise. Global warming is the mother of all challenges, and the weakness in the system’s capacity to respond is clear. With the two major political/economic powers and greenhouse gas emitters locked in deepening geopolitical conflict (and with one of them locked in climate change denial, possibly through 2024), the chances of significantly slowing global warming or even ameliorating its effects are very slim. We are reduced to the default option, nation-specific adaptation to climate change, which will impose rising human, political and economic costs on all, and will widen the gap between rich countries with adaptive capacity (of varying degrees), and the poor, who will suffer deteriorating economic, political, and social conditions. (For a contrary, optimistic view see Michael Shank’s chapter, which credits new actors—like cities—as playing a more constructive role in climate mitigation.) This would bring to a close liberal globalization’s greatest achievement; the raising of 1.1 billion people out of extreme poverty since 1990,40 with all its associated gains in quality of life (in the WHO Africa region, for example, life expectancy rose by 10.3 years between 2000 and 2016, driven mainly by improvements in child survival and expanded access to antiretrovirals for treatment of HIV).41 Several forces are at work here. The problem itself is graver—in magnitude and in rate of worsening—than predicted by climate scientists. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the major source of information on global warming, has consistently underpredicted the rate of climate deterioration. This holds true even for its “worst-case scenarios,” meaning that what was meant as a wake-up call has in fact reinforced complacency.42 (see Michael Shank’s chapter for further discussion of climate change). The IPCC, in its 2019 report, has tried to undo the damage by emphasizing the acceleration in the rate of warming and its effects, the only partially understood dynamic of climate change, and—given wide uncertainty—the possibility of unpleasant surprises yet to come. This strengthens the scientific case for urgency—to both severely limit greenhouse gas emissions, and to increase investment in ameliorating the effects. Unfortunately, the crisis comes at a moment when the climate for collective action is ice cold. Geopolitical competition incentivizes states to out produce each other, regardless of the environmental effects. Multipolarity complicates collective action. Economic stagnation mandates job creation, making regulation politically toxic. Bottom-up nationalism/populism causes states to pursue “relative gains,” meaning that if the nation is seen as gaining in a no-holds-barred economic competition with others, the negative environmental effects can be tolerated. A post-Trump presidency would help, with the US rejoining the Paris Agreement, and lending its weight to tighter regulation, increased R and D, and stronger economic incentives to reduce carbon emissions. Keep in mind, however, that President Obama was fully behind such efforts, but in a deeply polarized America was unable to implement measures needed to fulfill the Paris obligations through legislation, and his executive orders to do this were swiftly overturned by Trump. Conclusion It may be tempting to hope that post-Trump, the US can regain its global leadership and exert its considerable power in a liberal direction, but with enough self-awareness of its relative decline to share responsibility with others. This was, I believe, the broad direction of the Obama strategy, evidenced by the JCPOA and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: liberal, collective solutions to global problems, as US dominance receded. This would constitute an optimistic scenario, and it confronts two major problems: can US internal politics support it (can, for example, the country legislate controls on carbon, essential for the global credibility and durability of such commitments); and is the world ready to reengage with American leadership, given the damage to its reputation and the structural forces discussed in this chapter? My educated guess is no, on both counts. The rot within is extensive, the concrete evidence clear in the economic inequality/immobility numbers, the life expectancy numbers, the deep political polarization, between the two major parties, between regions, between cities and rural areas. We are in fact a long way from fitness for global leadership, and the recognition of this by others will accelerate the decline of American influence. The rest of the world is well on its way toward adjusting to post-American hegemony, some by renationalizing their defense, or by cutting deals with adversaries, by building new alliances or by seizing new opportunities for influence in the vacuum left by American retrenchment. The evidence for this will accumulate. Observe the current and emerging Middle East, where all these post-hegemonic strategies are visible.