2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › Secular stagnation defense
Asha Banerjee and Josh Bivens ‘22, August 4, “Will secular stagnation return? The stakes for current economic debates and fiscal policy,” ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, https://www.epi.org/publication/will-secular-stagnation-return-the-stakes-for-current-economic-debates-and-fiscal-policy/
If inequality was (as we think) a prime driver of secular stagnation, the economy will only be free and clear of this growth drag if inequality begins to stabilize or even reverse. Further, other influences that have been highlighted as potential drivers of secular stagnation are at least as deep-seated and unlikely to change as the rise in inequality (Teulings and Baldwin 2014; Eichengreen 2015). For example, some experts have argued that demographic change is behind secular stagnation, with demand depressed by an older population looking to save more to finance retirement (Gottfries and Teulings 2015). Others have argued that the “global savings glut” is a prime driver. The global savings glut is a large surplus of desired savings over planned investment, most particularly in East Asian countries like China and wealthy resource-rich economies like the Gulf states (Bernanke 2015b). Given that these national savings imbalances are fundamental parts of the economic development strategies of these countries, it is hard to simply assume they will evaporate once the pandemic economic shock relents. Other researchers have posited that secular stagnation is in part driven by technological change that has made key investment goods (computers and related equipment, in particular) cheaper over time (Basso and Jimeno 2019). The reasoning behind this theory is that because less and less money is needed to finance a given amount of real investment, a mismatch arises between the financing firms need for these investments and the desired savings of households looking to build wealth. Again, simply assuming a long-run technological trend will reverse and making plans based on this assumption seems unwise.
2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › Racism defense
Barndt, pastor in the Bronx in New York City and co-director of Crossroads, 2007 (Joseph Barndt, a, a ministry working to dismantle racism, 2007, “Understanding and Dismantling Racism: The Twenty-First Century Challenge to White America,” p. 10, Google Books)
While dealing with the subject of racism, we need to be aware that racism is not the only social problem of our society. The dross of our Happiness Machines produce other “isms” such as sexism, heterosexism, classism, nationalism, militarism, anti-Semitism, and environmental pollution—all of which cause tremendous suffering and endanger humanity’s existence. The same fable could be used to describe the social reality of poverty-stricken people, women and children, gays and lesbians, oppressed religions, and political domination throughout the world. All of these social problems are interwoven into a single fabric of oppression, and they are not easily disentangled from each other. However, it is not possible to simply analyze and resist “oppression in general.” Just as this book addresses racism, each of these other “isms” must be separately analyzed and addressed.
2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › Poverty impact defense
Krugman Nobel Prize winning economist 13
(Paul, New York Times, “The Jobless Trap,” , 4/21/2013)
Well, the famous red line on debt, it turns out, was an artifact of dubious statistics, reinforced by bad arithmetic. And America isn’t and can’t be Greece, because countries that borrow in their own currencies operate under very different rules from those that rely on someone else’s money. After years of repeated warnings that fiscal crisis is just around the corner, the U.S. government can still borrow at incredibly low interest rates. But while debt fears were and are misguided, there’s a real danger we’ve ignored: the corrosive effect, social and economic, of persistent high unemployment. And even as the case for debt hysteria is collapsing, our worst fears about the damage from long-term unemployment are being confirmed. Now, some unemployment is inevitable in an ever-changing economy. Modern America tends to have an unemployment rate of 5 percent or more even in good times. In these good times, however, spells of unemployment are typically brief. Back in 2007 there were about seven million unemployed Americans — but only a small fraction of this total, around 1.2 million, had been out of work more than six months. Then financial crisis struck, leading to a terrifying economic plunge followed by a weak recovery. Five years after the crisis, unemployment remains elevated, with almost 12 million Americans out of work. But what’s really striking is the huge number of long-term unemployed, with 4.6 million unemployed more than six months and more than three million who have been jobless for a year or more. Oh, and these numbers don’t count those who have given up looking for work because there are no jobs to be found. It goes without saying that the explosion of long-term unemployment is a tragedy for the unemployed themselves. But it may also be a broader economic disaster. The key question is whether workers who have been unemployed for a long time eventually come to be seen as unemployable, tainted goods that nobody will buy. This could happen because their work skills atrophy, but a more likely reason is that potential employers assume that something must be wrong with people who can’t find a job, even if the real reason is simply the terrible economy. And there is, unfortunately, growing evidence that the tainting of the long-term unemployed is happening as we speak. One piece of evidence comes from the relationship between job openings and unemployment. Normally these two numbers move inversely: the more job openings, the fewer Americans out of work. And this traditional relationship remains true if we look at short-term unemployment. But as William Dickens and Rand Ghayad of Northeastern University recently showed, the relationship has broken down for the long-term unemployed: a rising number of job openings doesn’t seem to do much to reduce their numbers. It’s as if employers don’t even bother looking at anyone who has been out of work for a long time. To test this hypothesis, Mr. Ghayad then did an experiment, sending out résumés describing the qualifications and employment history of 4,800 fictitious workers. Who got called back? The answer was that workers who reported having been unemployed for six months or more got very few callbacks, even when all their other qualifications were better than those of workers who did attract employer interest. So we are indeed creating a permanent class of jobless Americans.
2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › Poverty impact defense
Page, Professor of economics at the University of California at Davis 14 (Marianne Page, and the deputy director of the Center for Poverty Research, “Are Jobs the Solution to Poverty?,” Stanford Center on Poverty and Inequality, Summer 2014, , *fc)
Skill compatibility: Why, then, is job growth reducing poverty less than it once did? It’s partly because the economy is not delivering the types of jobs that poor people can fill. As David Autor has shown, most of the job growth since the late 1980s has occurred within either the low-skill or high-skill sectors, with a consequent hollowing out of opportunities in the middle.2 One reason is that technological advances have led to the automation of (and ultimately to the displacement of) many jobs that involve “routine” tasks. Manufacturing jobs, which used to provide opportunities for workers with moderate levels of education (such as a high school diploma), have sharply declined. The Great Recession has exacerbated this trend, as employment losses have been most severe in middle-skill jobs, both in the white-collar and blue-collar sectors. The higher prevalence of jobs at the bottom should help the poor, but what’s unclear is whether the associated hollowing out in the middle is a countervailing force that increases the competition between the poor and those who had before secured middle-class jobs. All else being equal, this competition may increase unemployment at the bottom of the labor market or lower wages among those who do get jobs.
Wage adequacy: Even if a low-skill job is acquired, it won’t be poverty-reducing unless it delivers enough in the way of wages (or transfers) to push the recipient over the poverty threshold.4 Over the last 40 years, the wages of low-skill jobs have been stagnant for a number of reasons, including, for example, the declining real value of the minimum wage. Between 1975 and 1995, the 20th percentile of the weekly wage distribution declined from $473 to $386, resulting in fewer jobs that provided an above-poverty wage. Recent studies have shown that a $100 reduction in the real weekly wage among workers in the bottom 20 percent of the income distribution reduces the annual probability of escaping poverty by about 15 percent.5 The declining payoff to work could also reduce the incentive to work at all, which may in turn lead to a deterioration of skills, further reducing the likelihood of escaping poverty.
2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › Poverty impact defense
McVeigh Chief reporter at the Observer, 2013 (Tracy McVeigh, , “World poverty is shrinking rapidly, new index reveals,” The Guardian, 16 March 2013, , *fc)
Some of the poorest people in the world are becoming significantly less poor, according to a groundbreaking academic study which has taken a new approach to measuring deprivation. The report, by Oxford University's poverty and human development initiative, predicts that countries among the most impoverished in the world could see acute poverty eradicated within 20 years if they continue at present rates.
It identifies "star performer" nations such as Rwanda, Nepal and Bangladesh as places where deprivation could disappear within the lifetime of present generations. Close on their heels with reductions in poverty levels were Ghana, Tanzania, Cambodia and Bolivia.
2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › Poverty impact defense
The Economist 2013 (News site providing analysis of global economics and politics, “Towards the end of poverty,” The Economist, 1 June 2013, , *fc)
The world’s achievement in the field of poverty reduction is, by almost any measure, impressive. Although many of the original MDGs—such as cutting maternal mortality by three-quarters and child mortality by two-thirds—will not be met, the aim of halving global poverty between 1990 and 2015 was achieved five years early.
The MDGs may have helped marginally, by creating a yardstick for measuring progress, and by focusing minds on the evil of poverty. Most of the credit, however, must go to capitalism and free trade, for they enable economies to grow—and it was growth, principally, that has eased destitution.
2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › Poverty impact defense
Gilbert, Professor of Geography at University College London, in ‘9
[Alan, Extreme Thinking About Slums and Slum Dwellers: A Critique, SAIS Review, Vol 29 no. 1, winter-spring]
Further over-generalization relates to the main causes of urban poverty. Neo-liberalism and capitalism are supposedly the forces generating “. . . powerful market forces [that] are pushing the majority of the poor further to the margins of urban life.”17 Neo-liberalism is a fair target but surely not when the argument is exemplified by the case of slum demolition in Myanmar; whatever that distressed country suffers from it is surely not neoliberalism! Similarly, structural adjustment programs are a reasonable target, but is Venezuela a good example given that, since the riots of 1989, there has been little application of neo-liberalism in that country? Outside Hong Kong, [End Page 39] Singapore, and China, “the idea of an interventionist state strongly committed to social housing and job development seems either a hallucination or a bad joke, because governments long ago abdicated any serious effort to combat slums and redress urban marginality.”18 But, have there not been major improvements in the provision of electricity, water, and sanitation in large numbers of cities across the globe? The alternatives to neo-liberalism are also questionable: Davis praises Cuba’s housing program without any mention of Fidel Castro’s own mea culpas about the revolution’s failures in this field.
2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › Poverty solvency defense
BERK ÖZLER Lead Economist, Development Research Group, World Bank|FEBRUARY 27, 2017. “Fact checking universal basic income: can we transfer our way out of poverty?” WORLD BANK BLOGS, https://blogs.worldbank.org/impactevaluations/fact-checking-universal-basic-income-can-we-transfer-our-way-out-poverty
So, my plea to media outlets covering this topic: consider requesting an interview with a few researchers who spent their entire careers worrying about poverty reduction (like this professor or this one, both of whom won awards for their work on poverty). There are a lot of reasons for us to consider UBI in the portfolio of possible policy choices towards poverty reduction. But, a little restraint and sticking to the existing research and facts would go a long way in creating a healthy debate.
P.S. It so happens that I co-authored a similar paper, which was published in the Journal of Development Economics 10 years ago. Below, please find Tables 2 & 4 borrowed from that paper, which show remarkably similar findings to those in Brown et al. (2016), but using geographic targeting (poverty maps) instead of PMT. Not only the poverty reduction via UBI vs. targeting methods is very similar (24% vs. 49% in the last column of Table 4 immediately below), but note the cost savings achieved by geographic targeting vs. UBI to achieve the same amount of poverty reduction.
2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › Poverty solvency defense
BERK ÖZLER Lead Economist, Development Research Group, World Bank|FEBRUARY 27, 2017. “Fact checking universal basic income: can we transfer our way out of poverty?” WORLD BANK BLOGS, https://blogs.worldbank.org/impactevaluations/fact-checking-universal-basic-income-can-we-transfer-our-way-out-poverty
However, to come even close to eliminating poverty today (a claim made by Michael Faye of GiveDirectly in the same article), we would need much much more than half of the world’s foreign aid budget. Suppose that we gave 75 cents per day to everyone in the world, which would not eliminate extreme poverty, how much money would we need? If I am counting zeros correctly, about 2 trillion dollars, or about 30 times more than the $66 billion figure cited in the NYT article. Take away a couple of billion people in North America, Europe, Australia, and New Zealand: we’re still not close. And, that scheme would not eliminate poverty, even setting the poverty line at $1.9/day. What if we wanted people to actually live on closer to $8-10 per day…
2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › Poverty solvency defense
Scott Sumner ’19, August 31, “A UBI will not eliminate poverty,” ECONLOG POST, https://www.econlib.org/a-ubi-will-not-eliminate-poverty/
I agree with much of that, but not the part about eliminating poverty. If I thought a UBI would eliminate poverty, then I’d support the program. Instead, I favor low wage subsidies.
There are at least three ways of thinking about poverty, and in each case a UBI program would fall short.
2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › Poverty solvency defense
BERK ÖZLER Lead Economist, Development Research Group, World Bank|FEBRUARY 27, 2017. “Fact checking universal basic income: can we transfer our way out of poverty?” WORLD BANK BLOGS, https://blogs.worldbank.org/impactevaluations/fact-checking-universal-basic-income-can-we-transfer-our-way-out-poverty
Well, I don’t know about you, but that paragraph makes me think that if we just were able to divert 50% of the current foreign aid budget towards cash transfers, we would eliminate extreme poverty. But, is that really true? The answer is: “not even close.”
See, that calculation assumes that we know exactly who is poor, how far below the poverty line each person exactly is, give them that precise amount, etc. (Actually, Zhang, Chandy, and Noe outline their simplifying assumptions in footnote 2 of this post.) How close are we to that in reality? Again, far away – at least in developing countries.
2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › Populism defense
Ravi Venkatesan, Chief Executive Officer at Cantaloupe, ’20, April 24, “Universal Basic Income is a threat to Human Dignity,” accessed July 3, 2023,
I recently saw a Science Fiction series called Expanse on Amazon Prime. It shows a society where a majority of the population is on “basic support”. They get basic housing, basic food, healthcare etc., but have no access to higher education, no prospect of social mobility, no ability to improve their lot by working hard. A small portion of the population that is not on basic support, controls everything. They have all the luxuries you can imagine, and the ability to work hard and improve their lot. The people on basic support resent the people that are not on it, for everything they have. The people not on basic support resent the people on it, for being free loaders and living off the taxes that they pay. Crime is a huge challenge, and society is excessively policed.
While this is fiction, it can very quickly and easily become reality. At a fundamental level, humans don’t just want to have their needs met. They aspire to be better, to grow, to learn, to improve, and to contribute. Taking this away would be taking human dignity away. So instead of creating a security blanket through UBI, we should create one through Universal Basic Employment. Target zero unemployment. If the Government can print seemingly limitless amounts of money, in a crisis like the current one, why not increase investments in infrastructure and other areas. Do it in a manner that ensures employment for everyone fit to work.
2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › Happiness defense
James Francis McCullough Cornwell, ‘14, “The Principled Pursuit of Happiness: Virtue’s Role in Moral Psychology,” Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, accessed: 6-22-2023, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwibs-3qgdj_AhVBBTQIHVe4AHoQFnoECA0QAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Facademiccommons.columbia.edu%2Fdoi%2F10.7916%2FD8H99CJX%2Fdownload&usg=AOvVaw2srbnXnj7qPARn_PMzO0cl&opi=89978449
The major take-away point of this discussion is that happiness is a very slippery concept that often means much more than only those things measured in any particular psychology study. Therefore, any attempt to simply maximize any of these measures of happiness could very likely overlook other important aspects of what it means to flourish. We have made tremendous advances in what we know about human flourishing, but the existing literature, including the present studies, represent only the beginning of such advances.
2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › Economy defense
Elad Segev et al. ‘21. Tel Aviv University AND Atsushi Tago and Kohei Watanabe, Waseda University. "Could Leaders Deflect from Political Scandals? Cross-National Experiments on Diversionary Action in Israel and Japan". TAYLOR & FRANCIS, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/03050629.2022.2044326
The diversionary theory of war is one of the best-known conflict initiation theories focusing on democratic leaders’ incentives. According to the theory, democratic leaders who face greater electoral challenges, either due to political scandals or an economic downturn, are more likely to choose provocative foreign policies and seek to lead the country into diplomatic crises, in hopes of inciting nationalistic sentiments that will boost their approval ratings via the so-called “rally around the flag” effect (e.g. Gaines 2002; Hetherington and Nelson 2003; Mueller 1973).
Despite the intuitive appeal of this theory, empirical studies have been largely unable to find consistent evidence to corroborate the purported theoretical mechanisms. Findings from observational studies have been quite mixed. The fact that a diverse set of findings have been reported from observational studies suggests that unobservable confounders arising from strategic interactions greatly hinder our ability to tease out the causal effect of electoral hardship on conflict behaviors.
2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › Economy defense
Daniel Drezner ’14, January, professor of International Law at Tufts, The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, online
The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder.
The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."45
2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › Dignity defense
Marco Annunziata, Senior Contributor to Forbes, ’18, July 27, “Universal Basic Income: A Universally Bad Idea,” FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/sites/marcoannunziata/2018/07/27/universal-basic-income-a-universally-bad-idea/?sh=41e7673a3269
More thoughtful proponents will tell you: “we need UBI so everyone can pursue their passion. If you are guaranteed enough to live with dignity, you can take a risk, become an entrepreneur or an artist.”
This sounds almost reasonable, but it clashes with two unpleasant truths:
2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › Dignity defense
Ravi Venkatesan, Chief Executive Officer at Cantaloupe, ’20, April 24, “Universal Basic Income is a threat to Human Dignity,” accessed July 3, 2023,
The COVID-19 crisis has brought the question of Universal Basic Income (UBI) into conversations again. Fortunately, neither President Trump nor Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden are in favor of this.
I am pained by the accelerating inequality in the world and our country. However, UBI will make this worse not better, and here is why.
2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › China defense
Andrew Nathan '22, March/April, Class of 1919 Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, "A Rival of America’s Making? The Debate Over Washington’s China Strategy," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-02-11/china-strategy-rival-americas-making
The country’s geographic position is also unfavorable. Along its land and sea borders, China confronts distrustful neighbors. Among them are seven of the 15 most populous countries in the world (India, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam) and five countries with which China has fought wars within the past 80 years (India, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and Vietnam). None of China’s neighbors is culturally Chinese or ideologically aligned with the Chinese Communist Party. All may cooperate with China at various times and to varying degrees for strategic or economic reasons, but all seek to hedge against Chinese domination, often by cultivating relations with the United States. As Chinese behavior has become more assertive, this counterbalancing behavior is growing more evident. India has compromised its traditional strategic autonomy in order to participate in joint military exercises with Australia, Japan, and the United States as part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, known as the Quad. Japan has taken the unprecedented step of officially declaring stability in the Taiwan Strait to be a national interest. And Australia has reaffirmed its U.S. alliance by accepting help in acquiring nuclear-powered submarines under the 2021 AUKUS agreement. China is unlikely to achieve anything like hegemony over any but the smallest of its neighbors.
Geography helps explain another Chinese weakness: its lack of allies other than North Korea. There are countries that are nearby enough to receive substantial help from China in the case of a military conflict, but they all fear China more than they fear any other state. The lack of allies is more a liability than an asset, for it deprives China of ways to multiply the pressure it can put on uncooperative neighbors and of the ability to position sizable military forces around the world. To be sure, none of the United States’ 60-some allies and partners has interests identical to Washington’s. None can be counted on to follow every component of U.S. strategy toward China. But U.S. alliances and partnerships still complicate China’s military calculations, increase the pressure on Beijing to comply with the international norms preferred by other states, and expand the alternatives available to countries considering whether to accept Chinese investments.
2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › Care work defense
Simon Szreter, Professor of History and Public Policy at Cambridge University, ’22, July 11, “How Seriously Should we Take Universal Basic Income?” https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-923X.13169
It can be—and it was—argued by the feminists of the US National Welfare Rights Organisation of 1966–75 that a ‘guaranteed income’ would provide an emancipatory wage for the unpaid caring work provided by so many women.17 A UBI also arguably increases—from a very low base—the bargaining power of the poorest casual and nonunionised workers, who are no longer absolutely compelled to work, provided they are comfortable to subsist on a UBI. Both of these aspects of a UBI do address specific aspects of the inequalities suffered by these two groups, but they do not fully address the structural dynamics of capitalism's power to continue to promote inequality.
2023
GDI
Affirmative
NEG › ***CASE NEG*** › Wealth tax fails
Balfour 23, Brian Balfour is Senior Vice President of Research for the John Locke Foundation, 2023
[Brian, 3/28/23, American institute for economic research, “Why Progressive Taxes Are Especially Harmful to Productivity and Harm the Poor,” https://www.aier.org/article/why-progressive-taxes-are-especially-harmful-to-productivity-and-harm-the-poor/, 6/24/23, PE]
Included in President Joe Biden’s recently released budget proposal are several tax increases, among them an increase to the top marginal income tax rate. While the rate change, from 37 percent to 39.6 percent for income above $400,000 for single filers and $450,000 for married filers, appears minor, it nevertheless provides opportunity to explain why progressive marginal tax rates can be particularly harmful to the economy. Advocates typically express support for progressive income taxes couched in the language of “asking the rich to pay their fair share” and “equity.” It is fair for high income to be taxed at a steeper rate, supporters say, because the wealthy can afford to pay it. Moreover, taxing high income levels at a higher rate helps to equalize after-tax income. Combined with a welfare state that redistributes the income from rich to poor, progressives view this as a means to bring about greater income equality. But what if progressive taxes served as an especially harmful disincentive to work and productivity, and as a result would harm the poor more than help? Poverty is reduced through increased productivity, and in no other way. When productivity, and the resulting economic growth is stunted, it is the poor who are harmed disproportionately. With the guidance of a sound analytical framework provided by marginal analysis, we can understand why progressive taxes are extraordinarily problematic for productivity gains. Let’s take the example of Alex. For simplicity’s sake we’ll say he has a weekly income of $1,000. At a flat tax rate of 25 percent, his take home pay will be $750. Naturally, Alex will use this $750 to satisfy his highest-ranking goals that can be achieved with that amount of money, such as rent, groceries, and other vital utilities. On the flip side to that coin, assuming a 40-hour work week, Alex will have 128 hours of leisure time per week. Just like his salary, Alex will use these 128 hours of leisure time to satisfy his most urgently ranked goals for leisure, such as sleep, time with family, exercise, and the like. Now say Alex has an opportunity to work another 10 hours and earn another $250 of income. If the tax rate on that additional income was also 25 percent, Alex could take home an additional $187.50 after taxes. Sticking with our analysis based on marginal utility, we know that Alex will use that additional money to satisfy lower-ranking goals that can be achieved with money, ends not already satisfied with his original $750 paycheck. But he will also have to give up ten hours of leisure, and with each of those additional ten hours he forgoes, he will be giving up the satisfaction of a more-urgent goal he could have accomplished with his leisure time. The first additional hour of leisure he forgoes may not be that important to him, but giving up, say, the eighth, ninth, and tenth additional hours of leisure time will cause him to forgo an activity quite valuable to him. But even with that consideration, to Alex, the goals he can satisfy with the additional $187.50 may still be more valuable than what he could have done with those additional 10 hours of leisure. But what if the additional income fell into a higher tax bracket on the progressive income tax structure? Perhaps the tax rate applied on Alex’s extra hours was 75 percent. In other words, the additional $250 of income was taxed at a rate of 75 percent, leaving him just $62.50 in exchange for his extra ten hours of work. Alex may not find the $62.50 more valuable to him than what he must give up by foregoing another ten hours of leisure time – recall that he must do without more and more valuable goals, the more leisure time he forgoes. Additionally, in this scenario, we can say that the “price” to Alex of the additional 10 hours of leisure is reduced to only $62.50 due to the tax (he would only be forgoing $62.50 in order to enjoy 10 additional hours of leisure). At such a low “price,” Alex will tend to consume more leisure. This effect is especially likely given that the additional potential income would be used to satisfy progressively lower-ranking ends, while additional leisure time he would need to forego would have been dedicated to increasingly valuable ends. From this example, we can see that “progressive” tax rates are especially discouraging to people deciding whether to attain higher income through more work or higher salaries, because the additional income may be taxed at such a high rate that the worker decides it is not worth giving up additional leisure time. Using marginal analysis, we discover that the additional – or marginal – amount of money Alex earns through working more hours will be devoted toward satisfying less-urgent desires. Meanwhile, each additional – or marginal – hour of leisure he must forego requires him to miss out on increasingly important goals he wishes to accomplish with his leisure time. In sum, “progressive” taxes impose a particularly strong disincentive for more productive work. Depriving the economy of greater productivity curtails the alleviation of poverty, and as a result disproportionately harms the poor.