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2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › Solvency › Transition

Transitory jobs guarantees that engage both ‘green’ and ‘brown’ energy sectors are the only effective solution – most recent models prove.

Yajima, research scholar at Levy Institute, 2023 (Giuliano Toshiro Yajima, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Macro-Modeling Team and coauthor of its Strategic Analysis reports, published 3-6-2023, “Beyond Job Guarantee: The Employer of Last Resort Program as a Tool to Promote the Energy Transition,” Review of Political Economy, https://doi.org/10.1080/09538259.2022.2156221, GDI-MAM)

In this article we investigated the policy package known as the Green New Deal and, in particular, its proposal to tackle the problem of involuntary unemployment using the ‘employer of last resort’ program inspired by Minsky (1965, 1968, 1994) and MMT scholars (Mitchell, Wray, and Watts 2019; Mosler 1997; Wray 2015; Wray et al. 1998). After a brief outline of their core ideas, we highlighted some of the weaknesses in their analysis, with respect to both the standard and the green JG. Since an ambitious plan aiming at improving energy efficiency requires a rigorous estimation of all its components to avoid double counting, as acknowledged also by its proponents Nersisyan and Wray (2021), we adopted the SFC methodology to implement a scenario analysis of the transition to a carbon-neutral economy. In particular, for our model we drew upon Godin (2013) and Sawyer and Passarella (2021), as we proposed a multi-sectorial stylized economy with a detailed description of both the financial sector and the monetary policy transmission mechanism. We proposed five policy combinations designed to either reduce energy demand and/or reduce (alleviate) unemployment. The best policy mix to achieve full employment and environmental sustainability appears to be that in scenario 6 (green JG + public expenditure in capital formation). Neither the pure ‘brown’ (scenarios 2 and 3) nor the pure ‘green’ (scenarios 4 and 5) policies manage to hit the two targets foreseen by the GND: in the former, the rebounding effect is not taken into account; in the latter, the ELR penalizes to too great an extent the energy sector and, in fact, the entire economy. In short, the green JG cannot do the ‘job’ alone; rather, it requires expenditure in the productive sectors. The real advantage of the JG over cash transfers is that it prevents job losses when energy transition is undertaken. In this sense, our results are at variance with those of Godin (2013), as the total effect of a green ELR program does not depend on the labor intensity of the energy industry relative to that of the consumption goods industry; rather, it depends on the size and composition of autonomous demand, even assuming the extreme case of a JG to all the unemployed.

Finally, some observations are in order: first, the ELR program simulated in our exercise departs from the traditional BSE mechanism, since (i) endogenous fluctuations are not inspected and (ii) the scope of the tasks performed in this program goes beyond even the JG put forward by Nersisyan and Wray (2021). In fact, the uncertainties about the short-term length of the program, pointed out earlier, are removed as the program takes on the bulk of the energy efficiency efforts instead of working on secondary projects. Can we still compare it one to one to Minsky’s (1965) original idea? Certainly not, as it resembles Colacchio and Forges Davanzati’s (2020) proposal for the State to be the ‘innovator of first resort’ when it comes to greening the productive structure. Second, as we are reminded by Kalecki (1943), Epstein (2019) and Vernengo and Perez Caldentey (2020), while there are no real problems with financing the debt of a sovereign country, there are limits to how much a government can push up, politically speaking, public debt and in particular the interest rate burden. For a small open economy that needs to attract foreign capital, higher interest rates are a necessity even though they imply a redistribution to financial rentiers. In other words, the deficit may not be an issue, but only for these wealthier individuals; other social groups may bear this higher burden via reduction in social expenditure, higher taxes and so on. For these countries, a successful progressive policy should also work to relax the balance of payments constraint by developing, over time, the technology they import themselves. In fact, a policy mix such as that in scenario 6 may become even more effective so long as it tackles the dependency upon imported intermediate inputs. Third, for the same aforementioned reasons, moving towards a carbon-neutral footprint may trigger even stronger resistance from those industries negatively affected by green policies. Any progressive, environmentally-friendly coalition should regard energy transition as a likely positive-sum game for the economy, as indicated by our model.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › Adv. – Green Jobs › ! – Climate Change

Climate change causes extinction – it is a threat multiplier that disrupts adaptation efforts.

Beard et al. 21 (S.J. Beard; Senior Research Associate and Academic Programme Manager at the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, S.J. Beard, Lauren Holt, Asaf Tzachor, Luke Kemp, Shahar Avin, Haydn Belfield; Centre for the Study of Existential Risk research associates, Phil Torres, Assessing climate change’s contribution to global catastrophic risk, Futures Volume 127, March 2021, 102673, !, accessed September 2022, GDI-MAM)

While most of the impacts of climate change so far have fallen within the range of what was experienced during the Holocene, the rate of change is faster than in the Holocene and we are now beginning to see climate change push beyond these boundaries. In the latest edition of the planetary boundaries’ framework, climate change is placed in the zone of increasing risk, implying that while this boundary has been breached, there remains some potential for normal functioning and recovery (Steffen et al., 2015). It thus lies between what the authors identify as the ‘safe zone’ and other ‘high risk’ transgressions, such as disruption to the biochemical flows of nitrogen and phosphorus and loss of biosphere integrity. As part of their discussion of BRIHN Baum and Handoh (2014) note that climate change is the planetary boundary for which the risk to humanity has received most meaningful consideration and they suggest that this attention is deserved. Yet little research attention has been paid to climate change’s extreme or catastrophic effects. Kareiva and Carranza (2018) argue that, despite currently falling outside of the area of high risk, climate change has the clear potential to push humanity across a threshold of irreversible loss by “changing major ocean circulation patterns, causing massive sea-level rise, and increasing the frequency and severity of extreme events… that displace people, and ruin economies.” Even if humanity was resilient to each of these individual impacts, a global catastrophe could occur if these impacts were to occur rapidly and simultaneously. One scenario that has received comparatively more attention is that of the global climate crossing a tipping point that would trigger environmental feedback loops (such as declining albedo from melting ice or the release of methane from clathrates) and cascading effects (such as shifting rainfall patterns that trigger desertification and soil erosion). After this point, anthropogenic activity may cease to be the main driver of climate change, making it accelerate and become harder to stop (King et al., 2015). Other scenarios can be discerned from the numerous historical cases in which the modest, usually regional, climatic changes experienced during the Holocene have been implicated in the collapse of previous societies, including the Anasazi, the Tiwanaku, the Akkadians, the Western Roman Empire, the lowland Maya, and dozens of others (Diamond, 2005, Fagan, 2008). These provide a precedent for how a changing climate can trigger or contribute to societal breakdown. At present, our understanding of this phenomena is limited, and the IPCC has labelled its findings as “low confidence” due to a lack of understanding of cause and effect and restrictions in historical data (Klein et al., 2014). Further study and cooperation between archaeologists, historians, climate scientists and global catastrophic risk scholars could overcome some of these limitations by identifying how the impacts of climate change translate into social transformation and collapse, and hence what the impacts of more rapid and extreme climatic changes might be. There is also the potential for larger studies into how global climate variations have coincided with collapse and violence at the regional level (Zhang, Chiyung, Chusheng, Yuanqing, & Fung, 2005; Zhang et al., 2006). However, these need to be interpreted and generalized with care given the differences between pre-industrial and modern societies. Societies also have a long history of adapting to, and recovering from, climate change induced collapses (McAnany and Yoffee, 2009). However, there are two reasons to be sceptical that such resilience can be easily extrapolated into the future. First, the relatively stable context of the Holocene, with well-functioning, resilient ecosystems, has greatly assisted recovery, while anthropogenic climate change is more rapid, pervasive, global, and severe. Large-scale states did not emerge until the onset of the Holocene (Richerson, Boyd, & Bettinger, 2001), and societies have since remained in a surprisingly narrow climatic niche of roughly 15 mean annual average temperature (Xu, Kohler, Lenton, Svenning, & Scheffer, 2020). A return to agrarian or hunter-gatherer lifestyles could thus have more devastating and long-lasting effects in a world of rapid climate change and ecological disruption (Gowdy, 2020).7 Second, modern human societies may have developed hidden fragilities that amplify the shocks posed by climate change (Mannheim 2020) and the complex, tightly-coupled and interdependent nature of our socio-economic systems makes it more likely that the failure of a few key states or industries due to climate change could cascade into a global collapse (Kemp, 2019). A third set of plausible scenarios stem from climate change’s broader environmental impacts. Apart from being a planetary boundary of its own, Steffen et al. (2015) point out that climate change is intimately connected with other planetary boundaries (see Table 1). Climate change is thus identified by the authors as one of two ‘core’ boundaries with the potential “to drive the Earth system into a new state should they be substantially and persistently transgressed.” This transformative potential was elaborated on in subsequent work exploring how the world could be pushed towards a ‘Hothouse Earth’ state, even with anthropogenic temperature rises as low as 2 ◦C (Steffen et al., 2018). The connection between climate change and biosphere integrity (the survival of complex adaptive ecosystems supporting diverse forms of life) is particularly strong. The IPCC is highly confident that climate change is adversely impacting terrestrial ecosystems, contributing to desertification and land degradation in many areas and changing the range, abundance and seasonality of many plant and animal species (Arneth et al., 2019). Similarly, the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) has reported that climate change is restricting the range of nearly half the world’s threatened mammal species and a quarter of threatened birds, with marine, coastal, and arctic ecosystems worst affected (Diaz et al., 2019). According to one estimate, climate change could cause 15–37 % of all species to become ‘committed to extinction’ by mid-century (Thomas et al., 2004). Disruption to biosphere integrity can have profound economic and social repercussions, ranging from loss of ecosystem services and natural resources to the destruction of traditional knowledge and livelihoods. For instance, desertification, which threatens a quarter of Earth’s land area and a fifth of the population, is already estimated to cost developing nations 4–8 % of their GDP (United Nations, 2011). Many other rapid regime shifts involving loss of biosphere integrity have been observed, including shifts in arid vegetation, freshwater eutrophication, and the collapse of fish populations (Amano et al. 2020). There is a theoretical possibility of still more profound regime shifts at the global level (Rocha, Peterson, Bodin, & Levin, 2018). However, the contribution of loss of biosphere integrity to GCR is yet to be assessed. Kareiva and Carranza (2018) argue that it is unlikely to threaten human civilization, due both to a lack of plausible mechanisms for this threat and the fact that “local and regional biodiversity is often staying the same because species from elsewhere replace local losses.” However, in their classification of GCRs, Avin et al. (2018) suggest the potential for ecological collapse to threaten the safety boundaries of multiple critical systems with diverse spread mechanisms at a range of scales, from the biogeochemical and anatomical to the ecological and sociotechnological. Note that both these studies were conducted for largely conceptual purposes and should not be taken as rigorous analyses of this risk, this topic warrants further investigation.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › Adv. – Green Jobs › ! – Climate Change

AND drives global conflict from resource shortages and migration waves.

Potts et al. 22

(Mary, Project Assistant in adelphi's Climate Diplomacy and Security Programme. Mary completed her undergraduate degree in Environmental Studies and Political Science at Northeastern University and is pursuing graduate studies in Environmental Planning at the Technical University of Berlin. Lukas Rüttinger is Senior Advisor at adelphi. He has worked on the security implications of climate change for the UN, the OSCE, the European Commission, the European External Action Service, the German Foreign Ministry, and the G7. Janani Vivekananda is Head of Programme Climate Diplomacy and Security at adelphi, where she specialises in climate change and peacebuilding. Janani holds master’s degrees from the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, and from the University of Oxford. "What does the IPCC report tell us about climate and conflict?", accessed 10-8-2022, https://climate-diplomacy.org/magazine/conflict/what-does-ipcc-report-tell-us-about-climate-and-conflict) jcw

The report spells out many of the specific pathways that link climate change and conflict: Food security: Climate change increases drought in many regions of the world, which can in turn reduce agricultural production and drive up food prices. According to the report, “food insecurity from food price spikes (…) can lead to both domestic and international conflict, including political instability” (IPCC 2022, 5-114). Of course, the pathway is not direct: factors like economic development and diversification, governance, state capacity, and history of conflict all interact in determining if food insecurity escalates into conflict. What is clear is that climate applies additional pressure in already fragile contexts, increasing the likelihood of conflict erupting. For example, the report confirms “there is increasing evidence linking increased temperatures and drought to conflict risk in Africa (high confidence),” particularly in populations that depend on agriculture or are politically excluded (IPCC 2022, 9-9). Water security: Climate is expected to affect water availability in a number of ways, including shifting rainfall patterns, glacial melt, and saltwater encroachment into groundwater. According to the report, “evidence suggests that changes in rainfall patterns amplify existing tensions” (IPCC 2022, 4-53), a prime example being Syria and the role a drier climate played in the country’s civil war. In water-stressed areas with existing tensions between population groups or states over a water source, “the impact of climate change on water resources might increase tensions, particularly in the absence of strong institutional capacity” (IPCC 2022, 4-86). This increased tension can bubble over into social conflicts, even protests and riots (IPCC 2022, 5-134). Migration: Climate change influences migration in several ways — extreme weather events can trigger displacement, while loss of livelihood opportunities can contribute to internal migration to cities. The report confirms with high confidence that “climate hazards are a growing driver of involuntary migration and displacement” (IPCC 2022, 7-3). While migration is an important adaptation tool and not a direct cause of conflict, rural-urban migration to informal settlements on the outskirts of cities can lead to pockets of high human vulnerability, “where the capacities of local, municipal and national governments, communities and the private sector are least able to provide infrastructures and basic services (high confidence)” (IPCC 2022, SPM-12). Additionally, “there is robust evidence and medium agreement that climate change can exacerbate existing tensions, which can in turn result in political violence and an increase in asylum-seeking” (IPCC 2022, 8-24). Beyond these individual climate security pathways, and perhaps most importantly, the report highlights how adaptation can reduce the impacts of climate change on known climate-sensitive drivers of conflict and contribute to building peace and preventing conflict. Steps to develop climate-sensitive, resilient livelihoods, improve governance, and advance women’s empowerment can serve as powerful peacebuilding tools (IPCC 2022, SMP-26). Conversely, “there is robust evidence that inequitable responses [to climate change] further exacerbate marginalisation, exclusion or disenfranchisement of some populations, which are commonly recognized drivers of violent conflict” (IPCC 2022, 8-25). Moreover, “adaptation can provide a common goal reaching across political differences and be a part of building political trust and local cooperation between alienated communities” (IPCC 2022, 6-42). Examples like EcoPeace Middle East using water as an arena for trust-building or Turkey-Armenian cooperation over the shared Arpacay River despite a closed border show us how adapting to the common threat of climate change can offer entry-points for negotiation and future collaboration in contentious areas. Similarly, our own studies indicate how the UN’s Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) could enhance resilience by putting a focus on helping communities adapt to the impacts of climate change. It is true that climate is not the main driver directly causing conflict, yet climate has undeniable economic and social impacts from food and water insecurity, loss of livelihood, to increased inequities and competition over natural resources that can act as drivers of insecurity and conflict. The additional pressures brought on by higher levels of warming will increase vulnerability and the risk of violent intrastate conflict (IPCC 2022, SPM-16), especially in those places that are characterised by a history of conflict, marginalisation and exclusion and weak governance. The IPCC report therefore underscores the need to identify synergies between conflict risk reduction and climate adaptation, and address the root causes of these problems in parallel.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › Adv. – Green Jobs › ! – Climate Change

Climate change causes rapid disease spread---extinction.

Cassata, 22

(Cathy, and Marley Hall, bachelor's degree in English from Clemson University. She also earned a graduate certificate in clinical and translational research from Clemson University, 8-19-2022, "How Climate Change Is Worsening Infectious Diseases Across the Globe", accessed 10-8-2022, https://www.health.com/news/climate-change-infectious-disease) jcw

The global COVID-19 pandemic, followed in short-order by a worldwide monkeypox outbreak, have opened the world's eyes anew to the harm infectious diseases can cause. And it seems these types of global disease-related challenges may only intensify amid climate change. A new study published by researchers at the University of Hawai'i is bringing awareness to the fact that climate change—including increasingly frequent occurrences of heat waves, droughts, and wildfires— has a major impact on infectious diseases. In particular, the study notes that 58% percent of infectious diseases confronted by humanity have at some point been aggravated by various climatic hazards. The same study revealed 1,006 unique pathways in which climatic hazards, via different transmission types, led to pathogenic diseases. These findings, according to the study authors, point to the urgent need to control greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. "Climate change is a human health issue, not just an environmental issue," Erik Franklin, associate research professor at the Hawaii Institute of Marine Biology at the University of Hawai'i at Manoa, told Health. "Based on prior research, we expected to find some relationships between climate hazards and diseases but the sheer number of pathways (over 1000) was a wake-up call that climate change will have a dramatic impact on human health," Franklin said. While the study's results focus on impacts that have already occurred and don't predict future outcomes, Franklin said the results are "sobering." Here's a closer look at the study, its findings and its ramifications. The Link Between Climate Change and Infectious Disease The University of Hawai'i study, which was published in the journal Nature Climate Change, reviewed medical literature that linked climatic hazards to specific pathogenic diseases. The review found that 218 out of the known 375 human infectious diseases appear to be made worse by one of 10 types of extreme weather connected to climate change. Some of the extreme weather types considered by study included drought, heatwaves, wildfires, flooding, sea level rise, and changes in land cover. Based on the study, researchers uncovered four basic relationships between climate and human disease: Climate hazards, such as warming, floods, and droughts, affected insects and animals carrying diseases by bringing them in closer contact with humans. Humans, in turn, reacted to climate hazards by moving closer to the sources of the diseases. Some diseases were also strengthened by climate hazards. In some cases, humans' immune systems were weakened by climate hazards, which made them more susceptible to diseases. The researchers did not limit their investigations to the microorganisms that cause infectious diseases. They expanded their scope to include all types of human illnesses, meaning the study also encompassed non-infectious sicknesses such as asthma and allergies. The goal was to determine if these health issues were also impacted by climate change. "Reducing the [study] scope to just microbes would have excluded plant and fungal allergens, which are aggravated by warming, floods and storms," said the study, noting that these things and indeed becoming a serious health problem for non-communicable outbreaks of asthma, skin, and respiratory illness. How Climate Change Exacerbates Disease To help better understand the direct connection between climate change and diseases, William Schaffner, MD, professor of preventive medicine and infectious diseases at Vanderbilt University Medical Center in Nashville, Tennessee, explained that "as temperatures rise, they can influence the range of insects, practically mosquitoes, but also ticks and other insects that can carry infectious disease." For example, the deadly disease malaria is transmitted by certain mosquitos, which typically don't survive above 5,000 feet high, so mountainous areas tend to be mosquito-free. "But with global warming their range has increased because it's a little warmer at higher altitudes than it used to be and it's been discovered that the mosquitos will follow the increasing temperature so the risk of malaria increases geographically and so new populations are involved," explained Schaffner. Similarly, ticks that transmit Lyme disease have typically thrived in the northeast and upper Midwest regions of the United States. "Yet those have been increasing and it's thought that at the very least, the warming climate has provided an opportunity for those tick populations to expand somewhat," said Schaffner. The study results show that society needs to take immediate action to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions and in turn reduce the future risk of negative human health outcomes from climate change, Franklin said. "From a health standpoint, humanity will need to adapt to a changing climate that brings a growing risk of pathogenic diseases," he said. Schaffner agreed, noting that the infectious disease community supports a range of activities that are recommended to help diminish the impact of climate change and protect human health. "This research is certainly noteworthy. It reinforces the notion that we are a very small and getting smaller global community in terms of distance because people travel so much. So, whatever is over there in other countries can soon be over here," Schaffner said. However, Schaffner also stressed that other factors not discussed in the research, such as an expanding population and more people traveling over greater distances, also contribute to the present expansion of infectious diseases. The recent COVID-19 and monkeypox outbreaks are an example of this point, said Schaffner. "Within a month of COVID having been first described in China, this virus had been detected on every continent in the world except Antarctica and that's because the COVID virus didn't move on its own. It was people; people got on airplanes," Schaffner explained. The same holds true for monkeypox, which began in west African and now is detected in Europe, Canada, and the United States. "That's not global warming but international travel," said Schaffner. Schaffner added that today people spend more time in primitive areas of the world like jungles for work and recreation, which puts them in contact with more insects and wild animals, providing even more opportunities for viruses to jump from animals to humans. Society Should Take Note—Not Panic An August report titled Climate Endgame: Exploring Catastrophic Climate Change Scenarios, published by the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), warned that society needs to seriously look at worst-case scenarios of accelerating climate change. The scientists who developed the report highlighted the importance of what they call the "four horsemen" of the climate endgame: increases in infectious diseases; risks of famine; extreme weather disasters; and conflict over resources. The point of the study is to motivate world leaders and create an understanding of the worst-case scenarios of climate change—which include the global population decreasing by 10% and even total human extinction. "Prudent risk management requires consideration of bad-to-worst-case scenarios," states the report. "Yet, for climate change, such potential futures are poorly understood. Could anthropogenic climate change result in worldwide societal collapse or even eventual human extinction? At present, this is a dangerously underexplored topic. Yet there are ample reasons to suspect that climate change could result in a global catastrophe." When it comes to the increase in infectious diseases now being highlighted by scientists, continued and diligent monitoring of such developments will be an essential task in the face of climate change.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › Adv. – Green Jobs › ! – Climate Change

Climate change causes extinction.

Sears, 21

(Nathan, PhD Candidate in Political Science at The University of Toronto, Professor of International Relations at the Universidad de Las Américas “Great Powers, Polarity, and Existential Threats to Humanity: An Analysis of the Distribution of the Forces of Total Destruction in International Security” accessed 5-18-2021, https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Nathan-Sears-2/publication/350500094_Great_Powers_Polarity_and_Existential_Threats_to_Humanity_An_Analysis_of_the_Distribution_of_the_Forces_of_Total_Destruction_in_International_Security/links/60639248a6fdccbfea1a4cc4/Great-Powers-Polarity-and-Existential-Threats-to-Humanity-An-Analysis-of-the-Distribution-of-the-Forces-of-Total-Destruction-in-International-Security.pdf) jcw

Climate Change Humanity faces existential risks from the large-scale destruction of Earth’s natural environment making the planet less hospitable for humankind (Wallace-Wells 2019). The decline of some of Earth’s natural systems may already exceed the “planetary boundaries” that represent a “safe operating space for humanity” (Rockstrom et al. 2009). Humanity has become one of the driving forces behind Earth’s climate system (Crutzen 2002). The major anthropogenic drivers of climate change are the burning of fossil fuels (e.g., coal, oil, and gas), combined with the degradation of Earth’s natural systems for absorbing carbon dioxide, such as deforestation for agriculture (e.g., livestock and monocultures) and resource extraction (e.g., mining and oil), and the warming of the oceans (Kump et al. 2003). While humanity has influenced Earth’s climate since at least the Industrial Revolution, the dramatic increase in greenhouse gas emissions since the mid-twentieth century—the “Great Acceleration” (Steffen et al. 2007; 2015; McNeill & Engelke 2016)— is responsible for contemporary climate change, which has reached approximately 1°C above preindustrial levels (IPCC 2018). Climate change could become an existential threat to humanity if the planet’s climate reaches a “Hothouse Earth” state (Ripple et al. 2020). What are the dangers? There are two mechanisms of climate change that threaten humankind. The direct threat is extreme heat. While human societies possesses some capacity for adaptation and resilience to climate change, the physiological response of humans to heat stress imposes physical limits—with a hard limit at roughly 35°C wet-bulb temperature (Sherwood et al. 2010). A rise in global average temperatures by 3–4°C would increase the risk of heat stress, while 7°C could render some regions uninhabitable, and 11–12°C would leave much of the planet too hot for human habitation (Sherwood et al. 2010). The indirect effects of climate change could include, inter alia, rising sea levels affecting coastal regions (e.g., Miami and Shanghai), or even swallowing entire countries (e.g., Bangladesh and the Maldives); extreme and unpredictable weather and natural disasters (e.g., hurricanes and forest fires); environmental pressures on water and food scarcity (e.g., droughts from less-dispersed rainfall, and lower wheat-yields at higher temperatures);the possible inception of new bacteria and viruses; and, of course, large-scale human migration (World Bank 2012; Wallace-Well 2019; Richards, Lupton & Allywood 2001). While it is difficult to determine the existential implications of extreme environmental conditions, there are historic precedents for the collapse of human societies under environmental pressures (Diamond 2005). Earth’s “big five” mass extinction events have been linked to dramatic shifts in Earth’s climate (Ward 2008; Payne & Clapham 2012; Kolbert 2014; Brannen 2017), and a Hothouse Earth climate would represent terra incognita for humanity. Thus, the assumption here is that a Hothouse Earth climate could pose an existential threat to the habitability of the planet for humanity (Steffen et al. 2018., 5). At what point could climate change cross the threshold of an existential threat to humankind? The complexity of Earth’s natural systems makes it extremely difficult to give a precise figure (Rockstrom et al. 2009; ). However, much of the concern about climate change is over the danger of crossing “tipping points,” whereby positive feedback loops in Earth’s climate system could lead to potentially irreversible and self-reinforcing “runaway” climate change. For example, the melting of Arctic “permafrost” could produce additional warming, as glacial retreat reduces the refractory effect of the ice and releases huge quantities of methane currently trapped beneath it. A recent study suggests that a “planetary threshold” could exist at global average temperature of 2°C above preindustrial levels (Steffen et al. 2018; also IPCC 2018). Therefore, the analysis here takes the 2°C rise in global average temperatures as representing the lower-boundary of an existential threat to humanity, with higher temperatures increasing the risk of runaway climate change leading to a Hothouse Earth.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › Adv. – Green Jobs › ! – Innovation

That goes nuclear.

Graham Allison 17. American political scientist and professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard. “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?” Scribe Publications Pty Limited.

Two centuries ago, Napoleon warned, "Let China sleep; when she wakes, she will shake the world." Today China has awakened, and the world is beginning to shake. Yet many Americans are still in denial about what China's transfor- mation from agrarian backwater to "the biggest player in the history of the world" means for the United States. What is this book's Big Idea? In a phrase. Thucydidess Trap; When rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, alarm bells should sound: danger ahead. China and the United States are currently on a collision course for war-unless both parties take difficult and painful actions to avert it. As a rapidly ascending China challenges America's accustomed pre- dominance, these two nations risk falling into a deadly trap first identified the 'ancient' Greek historian Thucydides. Writing about a war that devastated the two leading city-states of classical Greece two and a half. millennia ago, he explained: "It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable." That primal insight describes :1 perilous historical pattern. Reviewing the record of the past five hundred years, the Thucydides's Trap Project I direct at Harvard has found sixteen cases in which a major nation's rise has disrupted the position of a dominant state. In the most infamous example, an industrial Germany rattled Britain's established position at the top of the pecking order a century ago. The catastrophic outcome of their competition necessitated a new category of violent conflict: world war. Our research finds that twelve of these rivalries ended in war and four did not - not a comforting ratio for the twenty- first century's most important geopolitical contest. This is not a book about China. It is about the impact of a rising China on the US and the global order. For seven decades since World War II, a rules-based framework led by Washington has defined world order, producing an era without war among great powers. Most people now think of this as normal. Historians call it a rare "Long Peace." To- day, an increasingly powerful China is unraveling this order, throwing into question the peace generations have taken for granted. In 2015, the Atlantic published "The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China headed for War?" In that essay I argued that this histori- cal metaphor provides the best lens available for illuminating relations between China and the US today. Since then, the concept has ignited considerable debate. Rather than face the evidence and reflect on the uncomfortable but necessary adjustments both sides might make, pol- icy wonlts and presidents alike have constructed a straw man around Thucydides's claim about "inevitability." They have then put a torch to it -arguing that war between Washington and Beijing is not predetermined. At their 2015 summit, Presidents Barack Obama and Xijinping discussed the Trap at length. Obama emphasized that despite the structural stress created by China's rise. "the two countries are capable of managing their disagreements." At the same time, they acknowledged that. in Xi's words. "should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves." I concur: war between the US and China is not inevitable. Indeed, Thucydides would agree that neither was war between Athens and Sparta. Read in context. it is clear that he meant his claim about inevitability as hyperbole: exaggeration for the purpose of emphasis. The point of Thucydides's Trap is neither fatalism nor pessimism. Instead. it points us beyond the headlines and regime rhetoric to recognize the tectonic structural stress that Beijing and Washington must master to construct a peaceful relationship. If Hollywood were making a movie pitting China against the United States on the path to war. central casting could not find two better leading actors than Xi jinping and Donald Trump. Each personifies his country's deep aspirations of national greatness. Much as Xi's appointment as leader (if China in 2012 accentuated the role of the rising power, America': election of Donald Trump in a campaign that vilified China promises a more vigorous response from the ruling power. As personalities, Trump and Xi could not be more different. As protagonists in a struggle to be number one. however, they share por- tentous similarities. Both - Are driven by .1 common ambition: to malte their nation great again. - Identify the nation ruled by the other as the principal obstacle to their dream. - Take pride in their own unique leadership capabilities. ' See themselves playing a central role in revitalizing their nation. ° Have announced daunting domestic agendas that call for radical changes. - Have fired up populist nationalist support to "drain the swamp" of corruption at home and confront attempts by each other to thwart their nation's historic mission. Will the impending clash between these two great nations lead to war? Will Presidents Trump and Xi, or their successors. follow in the tragic footsteps of the leaders of Athens and Sparta or Britain and Ger- many? Or will they find a way to avoid war as effectively as Britain and the US did a century ago or the US and the Soviet Union did through four decades of Cold War? Obviously, no one knows. We can be cer- tain, however, that the dynamic Thucydides identified will intensify in the years ahead. Denying Thucydides’s Trap does not make it less real. Recognizing it does not mean just accepting whatever happens. We owe it to future generations to face one of history’s most brutal tendencies head on and then do everything we can to defy the odds. h, if we only knew." That was the best the Gemian chancellor could offer. Even when a colleague pressed Theobald von Beth- mann Hollweg. he could not explain how his choices. and those of other European statesmen, had led to the most devastating war the world had seen to that point. By the time the slaughter of the Great War finally ended in 1918, the key players had lost all they fought for: the Austro-Hungarian Empire dissolved. the German kaiser ousted, the Russian tsar overthrown, France bled for a generation, and England shorn of its treasure and youth. And for what? If we only knew. Bethmann Hollweg's phrase haunted the president of the United States nearly half a century later. In 1962.]ohn F. Kennedy was forty- five years old and in his second year in oflice, but still struggling to get his mind around his responsibilities commander in chief. He knew that his finger was on the button of a nuclear arsenal that could ltill hundreds of millions of human beings in a matter of minutes. But for what? A slogan at the time declared. "Better dead than red." Kennedy rejected that dichotomy as not just facile, but false. "Our goal," as he put it, had to be "not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom." The question was how he and his administration could achieve both. As he vacationecl at the family compound on Cape Cod in the sum- mer of 1902, Kennedy found himself reading The Gun: q/'August, Bar- bara Tuchman's compelling account of the outbrealt of war in 1914. Tuclnnan traced the thoughts and actions of Germany's Kaiser Wil- helm and his chancellor Bethmann Hollweg. Britain's King George and his foreign secretary Edward Grey, Tsar Nicholas, Austro-Hungarian emperor Franz Joseph. and others as they sleepwalked into the abyss. Tuchman argued that none of these men understood the danger they faced. None wanted the war they got. Given the opportunity for a do- -mwm he made. Reflecting on his own responsibilities, Kennedy pledged that if he ever found himself facing his own responsibilities, Kennedy pledged that if ever found himself facing choices that could make the difference between catastrophic war and peace, he would be able to give history a better answer than Bethmann Holloweg’s. Kennedy had no inkling of what lay ahead. In October 1962, just two months after he read Tuchman's book, he faced off against Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev in the most dangerous confrontation in hu- man history. The Cuban Missile Crisis began when the United States discovered the Soviets attempting to sneak nuclear-tipped missiles into Cuba, a mere ninety miles from Florida. The situation quickly esca- lated from diplomatic threats to an American blockade of the island, military mobilizations in both the US and USSR, and several high- stakes clashes. including the shooting down of an American U-2 spy plane over Cuba. At the height of the crisis, which lasted for a tense thirteen days. Kennedy confided to his brother Robert that he believed the chances it would end in nuclear war were "between one-in-three and even." Nothing historians have discovered since has lengthened ' those odds. Although he appreciated the dangers of his predicament. Kennedy repeatedly made choices he knew actually increased the risk of war, in- cluding nuclear war. He chose to confront Khrushchev publicly (rather than my to resolve the issue privately through diplomatic channels); to draw an unambiguous red line requiring the removal of Soviet missiles (rather than leave himself more wiggle room); to threaten air strikes to destroy the missiles (knowing this could trigger Soviet retaliation against Berlin); and finally, on the penultimate day of the crisis. to give Khrushchev a time-limited ultimatum (that. if rejected. would have re- quired the US to fire the first shot). In each of these choices, Kennedy understood that he was raising the risk that further events and choices by others beyond his control could lead to nuclear bombs destroying American cities. including Washing- ton, DC (where his family stayed throughout the ordeal). For example, when Kennedy elevated the alert level of the American nuclear arse- nal to Defcon II. he made US weapons less vulnerable to a preemptive Soviet attack but simultaneously relaxed a score of safety catches. At Defcon ll. German and Turkish pilots took their seats in NATO fighter bombers loaded with armed nuclear weapons less than two hours away from their targets in the Soviet Union. Since electronic locks on nu- clm weapons had not yet been invented, there was no physical or tech- nica barrier preventing a pilot from deciding to fly to Moscow, drop a mic ar bomb, and start World War III. ith no way to wish away these "risks of the uncontrollable," Ken- ned ' and his secretary of defense, Robert McNamara, reached deeply into organizational procedures to minimize accidents or mistakes. De- spit those efforts, historians have identified more than a dozen close calls outside Kennedy's span of control that could have sparked a war. A US ntisubmarine campaign, For example, dropped explosives around Soviet submarines to force them to surface, leading a Soviet captain to believe he was under attack and almost fire his nuclear-armed torpe- does. In another incident, the pilot of a U-2 spy craft mistakenly flew over the Soviet Union, causing Khrushchev to fear that Washington was refining coordinates for a preemptive nuclear attack. If one of these actions had sparked a nuclear World War III. could_]FK explain how his choices contributed to it? Could he give a better answer to an inquisi- tor's question than Bethmann Hollweg did? The complexity of causation in human affairs has vexed philoso- phers, jurists, and social scientists. In analyzing how wars break out, historians focus primarily on proximate or immediate causes. In the case of World War I, these include the assassination of the Hapsburg archduke Franz Ferdinand and the decision by Tsar Nicholas II to mo- bilize Russian forces against the Central Powers. If the Cuban Missile Crisis had resulted in war, the proximate causes could have been the Soviet submarine captain's decision to fire his torpedoes rather than al- low his submarine to sink, or a Turkish pilot's errant choice to fly his nuclear payload to Moscow. Proximate causes for war are undeniably important. But the founder of history believed that the most obvious causes for bloodshed mask even more significant ones. More import- ant than the sparks that lead to war, Thucydides teaches us, are the structural factors that lay its foundations: conditions in which other- wise manageable events can escalate with unforeseeable severity and produce unimaginable consequences. Tl-IUCYDIDES'S TRAP In the most frequently cited one-liner in the study of international re- lations, the ancient Greek historian Thucydides explained, "It was the rise of Athens and the fear that this instilled in Sparta that made war a} . I I .99 Tliucydides wrote about the Peloponnesian War, a conflict that en- gulfcd his homeland, the city-state of Athens, in the fifth century BCB, and which in time came to consume almost the entirety of ancient Greece. A former soldier. Thucydides watched as Athens challenged the dominant Greek power of the day, the martial city-state of Sparta. He observed the outbreak of armed hostilities between the two powers and detailed the fighting's horrific toll. He did not live to see its bitter end. when a weakened Sparta finally vanquished Athens. but it is just as well for him. While others identified an array of contributing causes of the Pelo- ponncsian War. Thucydides went to the heart of the matter. When he turned the spotlight on "the rise of Athens and the fear that this in- stilled in Sparta." he identified a primary driver at the root of some of history's most catastrophic and puzzling wars. Intentions aside, when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, the resulting structural stress makes a violent clash the rule, not the exception. It happened between Athens and Sparta in the fifth century ncia, between Germany and Britain a century ago. and almost led to war between the Soviet Union and the United States in the 1950s and 19605. Like so many others. Athens believed its advance to be benign. Over the half century that preceded the conflict, it had emerged as a steeple of civilization. Philosophy, drama. architecture, democracy. history, and naval prowess-Athens had it all. beyond anything previously -s'eel'I'Imder the sun. Its rapid development began to threaten Sparta, which had grown accustomed to its position as the dominant power on the Peloponnese. As Athenian confidence and pride grew, so too did its demands for respect and expectations that arrangements be revised to reflect new realities of power. These were, Thucydides tells us, natural reactions to its changing station. How could Athenians not believe that their interests deserved more weight? How could Athenians not expect that they should have greater influence in resolving differences? But it was also natural. Thucydides explained. that Spartans should see the Athenian claims as unreasonable, and even ungrateful. Who, Spartans rightly asked. provided the security environment that allowed Athens to flourish? As Athens swelled with a growing sense of its own importance, and felt entitled to greater say and sway, Sparta reacted with insecurity. fear. and a determination to defend the status quo. Similar dynamics can be found in a host of other settings, indeed even in families. When a young man's adolescent surge poses the prospect that he will overshadow his older sibling (or even his father), what do we expect? Should the allocation of bedrooms. or closet space, or seat- ing be adjusted to reflect relative size as well as age? In alpha-dominated species like gorillas, as a potential successor grows larger and stronger, both the pack leader and the wannabe prepare for a showdown. In businesses, when disruptive technologies allow upstart companies like Apple. Google. or Uber to break quickly into new industries. the re- sult is often a bitter competition that forces established companies like : ifliiexpvlett-Packard, Microsoft. or taxi operators to adapt their business models -or perish. Thucydides's Trap refers to the natural, inevitable discombobulation that occurs when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power. This can happen in any sphere. But its implications are most dangerous in international affairs. For just as the original instance of Thucydides's Trap resulted in a war that brought ancient Greece to its knees, this phenomenon has haunted diplomacy in the millennia since. Today it has set the world's two biggest powers on a path to a cataclysm nobody wants, bud which they may prove unable to avoid. ARE THE US AND CHINA DESTINED FOR WAR? The world has never seen anything like the rapid, tectonic shift in the global balance of power created by the rise of China. If the US were a corporation. it would have accounted for 50 percent of the global eco- nomic market in the years immediately after World War II. By 1980, that had declined to 22 percent. Three decades of double-digit Chi- nese growth has reduced that US share to 16 percent today. If current trends continue, the US share of global economic output will decline further over the next three decades to 'ust ll rcent. Over this same J P' criod, China's share of the global economy will have soared from 2 P 8 Y percent in 1980 to 18 percent in 2016, well on its way to 30 percent in 2040. China's economic development is transforming it into a formida- ble political and military competitor. During the Cold War. as the US mounted clumsy responses to Soviet provocations, a sign in the Penta- gon said: "lf we ever faced a real enemy, we would be in deep trouble." China is a serious potential enemy. The possibility that the United States and China could find them- selves at war appears as unlikely as it would be unwise. The centennials recalling World War l, however, have reminded us of man's capacity for folly. When we say that war is "inconceivable." is this a statement about what is possible in the world-or only about what our limited minds can conceive? As far ahead as the eye can see. the defining question about global order is whether China and the US can escape Thucydides's Trap. Most contests that fit this pattern have ended badly. Over the past five hun- drcd years, in sixteen cases a major rising power has threatened to dis- place a ruling power. In twelve of those, the result was war. The four cases that avoided this outcome did so only because of huge, painful adjustments in attitudes and actions on the part of challenger and chal- lenged alilte. The United States and China can likewise avoid war, but only if they can internalize two difficult truths. First. on the current trajectory. war between the US and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than currently recognized. Indeed. on the historical record. war lS IUOT? add to they h tainly major likely than not. By underestimating the danger, moreover, we the risk. If leaders in Beijing and Washington keep doing what ave done for the past decade. the US and China will almost cer- wind up at war. Second, war is not inevitable. History shows that ruling powers can manage relations with rivals. even those that threaten to overtake them, without triggering a war. The record of those successes, as well as the failures. offers many lessons for statesmen today. As George Santayana noted, only those who fail to study history are condemned to repeat it. The chapters that follow describe the origins of Thucydides's Trap, explore its dynamics. and explain its implications for the present con- test between the US and China. Part One provides a succinct summary of the rise of China. Everyone knows about China's growth but few have realized its magnitude or its consequences. To paraphrase former Czech president Vaclav Havel. it has happened so quickly that we have not yet had time to be astonished. Part Two locates recent developments in US-China relations on the broader canvas of history. This not only helps us understand current events. but also provides clues about where events are trending. Our review stretches back 2,500 years, to the time when the rapid growth of Athens shocked a dominant martial Sparta and led to the Pelopon- nesian War. Key examples from the past 500 years also provide insights into the ways in which the tension between rising and ruling powers can tilt the chessboard toward war. The closest analogue to the current standoff--Germany's challenge to Britain's ruling global empire be- fore World War I--should give us all pause. Part Three asks whether we should see current trends in America's relations with China as a gathering storm of similar proportions. Daily media reports of China's "aggressive" behavior and unwillingness to accept the "intemational rules-based order" established by the US af- -!El"W6l'l'd War I] describe incidents and accidents reminiscent of 1914. At the same time. a dose of self-awareness is due. If China were "just lilte us" when the US burst into the twentieth century brimming with confidence that the hundred years ahead would be an American era. the rivalry would be even more severe, and war even harder to avoid. If it actually followed in America's footsteps, we should expect to see Chi- nese troops enforcing Beijing's will from Mongolia to Australia, just as Theodore Roosevelt molded "our hemisphere" to his China is following a different trajectory than did the United States during its own surge to primacy. But in many aspects of China's rise, we can hear echoes. What does President Xi_|inping's China want? In one line: to make China great again. The deepest aspiration of over a billion Chinese citizens is to make their nation not only rich, but also pow- erful. Indeed, their goal is a China so rich and so powerful that other nations will have no choice but to recognize its interests and give it the respect that it deserves. The sheer scale and ambition of this "China Dream" should disabuse us of any notion that the contest between (jliina and the United States will naturally subside as China becomes a "responsible stakeholder." This is especially so given what my former colleague Sam Huntington famously called a "clash of civilizations," a historical disjunction in which fundamentally different Chinese and American values and traditions make rapprochement between the two powers even more elusive. While resolution of the present rivalry may seem difficult to foresee. actual armed conflict appears distant. But is it? In truth, the paths to war are more varied and plausible (and even mundane) than we want to believe. From current confrontations in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and cyberspace, to a trade conflict that spirals out of control, it is frighteningly easy to develop scenarios in which Ameri- can and Chinese soldiers are killing each other. Though none of these scenarios seem likely, when we recall the unintended consequences of the assassination of the Hapsburg archdulte or of l(hrushchev's nuclear adventure in Cuba, we are reminded of just how narrow the gap is be- tween "unlikely" and "impossible." Part Four explains why war is not inevitable. Most of the policy community and general public are naively complacent about the possi- bility of war. Fatalists. meanwhile, see an irresistible force rapidly ap- proaching an immovable object. Neither side has it right. If leaders in both societies will study the successes and failures of the past, they will find a rich source of clues from which to fashion a strategy that can meet each nation's essential interests without war. The return to prominence of a 5,000-year-old civilization with 1.4 billion people is not a problem to be fixed. It is a condin'on-a chronic condition that will have to be managed over a generation. Success will require not just a new slogan, more frequent presidential summits. or additional meetings of departmental working groups. Managing this relationship without war will demand sustained attention, week by Wcclc. at the highest levels in both governments. It will require a depth of mutual understanding not seen since the Henry Kissinger-Zhou En- lai conversations that reestablished US-China relations in the 19705. Most significant, it will mean more radical changes in attitudes and ac- tions by leaders and the public alilte than anyone has yet undertaken. To escape Thucydides's Trap. we must be willing to think the unthinkable -:md imagine the unimaginable. Avoiding Thucydides's Trap in this case will require nothing less than bending the arc of history.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › Adv. – Green Jobs › ! – Innovation

US-China competition isn’t defined by military strength, but relative innovation capacity. Outpacing China is the only way to prevent a war.

James Lewis 18. Senior vice president at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Technological Competition and China.” .

The United States and China are in a growing competition, perhaps verging on conflict, but it is not a nineteenth century competition between empires for control of territory and resources. Unlike great power competition in previous centuries, the focal point is not military strength or territorial expansion. This conflict is over control of the modern levers of power—global rules and institutions, standards, trade, and technology. The ability to create new technologies, particularly digital technologies (given their importance for politics, security, and economic growth) have become key factors in the U.S.-China relationship, which is marked by close commercial cooperation and deep governmental distrust. This disparity creates unavoidable tensions.

The link between technology, innovation, national security, and international power is now widely recognized. When Vladimir Putin says that the country that leads in artificial intelligence (AI) “will be the ruler of the world,” it is hyperbole, but hyperbole that confirms that political leaders recognize that the ability to innovate is a potent source of national power. In the digital age, national security and national power have different requirements shaped by technological change and cyberspace.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › Adv. – Green Jobs › I/L – Innovation

Increased competition aligns innovation with profit motive and drives technological breakthroughs in every sector of the economy.

Giulio Federico 20. Head of the Unit at the Chief Economist Team (CET) of DG Competition, European Commission, et al., 2020. “Antitrust and Innovation: Welcoming and Protecting Disruption.” https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Shapiro-Carl-Antitrust-and-Innovation-Welcoming-and-Protecting-Disruption.pdf.

The goal of antitrust policy is to protect and promote a vigorous competitive process. Effective rivalry spurs firms to introduce new and innovative products, as they seek to capture profitable sales from their competitors and to protect their existing sales from future challengers. In this fundamental way, competition promotes innovation. We apply this basic insight to the antitrust treatment of horizontal mergers and of exclusionary conduct by dominant firms. A merger between rivals internalizes business-stealing effects arising from their parallel innovation efforts and thus tends to depress innovation incentives. Merger-specific synergies, such as the internalization of involuntary spillovers or an increase in the productivity of R&D, may offset the adverse effect of a merger on innovation. We describe the possible effects of a merger on innovation by developing a taxonomy of cases, with reference to recent US and EU examples. A dominant firm may engage in exclusionary conduct to eliminate the threat from disruptive firms. This suppresses innovation by foreclosing disruptive rivals and by reducing the pressure to innovative on the incumbent. We apply this broad principle to possible exclusionary strategies by dominant firms.

I. Introduction

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AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › Adv. – Green Jobs › Internal Link – Climate

Climate and economic policy must be integrated to achieve green jobs

Tcherneva, Bard Economics Associate professor, ‘20

[Pavlina R. Tcherneva, Associate Professor, Economics, Bard College, THE CASE FOR A JOB GUARANTEE, Polity Press, Medford MA, 2020, epub]

Climate policy is social and economic policy. Every climate solution and the manner of its implementation will have deep economic, social, and political ramifications. To answer the question of how to tackle the climate threat is necessarily to answer the question of how to reorganize our social and economic life. The challenge before us is not just about switching techniques of production. If the inequities in the current system are not addressed, then by definition, a new technique of production would not ensure a sustainable and livable future. Would adequate housing be accessible to all if we weatherized our buildings? Would food deserts and food insecurity be wiped out if we moved from industrial to regenerative agriculture? Would gaps in public transportation be fixed if we electrified our transport systems? Would this new world provide economic security for all? Or would unemployment and poorly paid employment continue to be the norm and access to basic necessities (even if produced by green techniques) remain out of reach for many?

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › Adv. – Labor › ! - Democracy

Democratic collapse is existential.

Hadley ’17 [Stephen; March 21; Chair of the Board of Directors at the United States Institute of Peace, former director of the National Security Council, J.D. from Yale University; United States Institute of Peace, “America’s Role in the World,” https://www.usip.org/publications/2017/03/americas-role-world;]

Over the past seventy years, Democratic and Republican administrations alike have understood that American security and prosperity at home are linked to economic and political health abroad, and that America does better when other countries have the incentive and the capacity to work alongside us in tackling global challenges. This is why we constructed a system of international institutions and security alliances after World War II. They provided a framework for advancing economic openness and political freedom in the years that followed. The international order America built and led has not been perfect, but it has coincided with a period of security and prosperity unmatched in human history. And while many nations benefited from the investments America made in global security and prosperity, none benefited more than the United States. Yet today, the value of America’s global engagement is under question. A substantial number of Americans feel that their lives and livelihoods have been threatened rather than enhanced by it. They view international trade as having shuttered the factories at which they worked, immigrants as threatening their standard of living or safety, and globalization as undermining American culture. This popular dissatisfaction needs to be understood and acknowledged. Washington needs to ensure that the benefits of America’s international engagement are shared by all of our citizens. But we also need to be clear about the consequences of disengagement. For while it is comforting to believe that we can wall ourselves off from the ailments of the world, history teaches us that whenever problems abroad are allowed to fester and grow, sooner or later, they come home to America. Isolationism and retreat do not work; we know because we have tried them before. We also know, from recent experience, that if America recedes from the global stage, people in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East will increasingly look elsewhere for inspiration and guidance – whether to authoritarianism or extremist ideology. In our opinion, such a shift would be harmful to the interests of those populations, but it would be harmful above all to the interests of the United States, because our security and our prosperity depend on having friends abroad that share our values – including our belief in the rule of law, freedom of movement, and access to markets. Neither Russia nor China proclaim the same loyalty to those principles as we do. Were they to fill a vacuum left by the United States, it could very well mark a return to a balance of power system, where the world’s major powers competed militarily for territory and spheres of influence at great human and financial cost. This is a world to which none of us should want to return. America’s continued global leadership cannot be taken for granted, but a retreat into isolationism is not preordained. We have an opportunity – and, in our view, an obligation – to defend those aspects of the international system that work in the twenty-first century, and to adapt those that do not. In doing so, we should acknowledge that the existing order is in need of revision and refurbishment. The international system was designed for a different era, and it requires a renewal of purpose and a reform of its structures. Its mission should more clearly extend beyond preventing war in Europe to include stabilizing other strategic regions that affect our well-being. Its approach should reflect the fact that long-term stability depends on well-governed states whose leaders are seen as legitimate by their people. And its structure must be adapted to the realities of a world in which power is more diffuse, so other countries can take on a greater role commensurate with the contributions they make and the responsibilities they assume. China, Russia, and other countries should understand that there is a larger place for them at the decision-making table, provided they are constructive and respect the interests of other nations. And they need to understand that there will be costs if they do not. For this and other reasons, U.S. military power will remain vital in a renewed international order. We appreciate this committee’s efforts to ensure that our military remains the best-trained, best-equipped, and best-led force on earth. Given the variety of threats facing our country, it makes sense to continue upgrading and enhancing our country’s military capabilities and deterrent power. But we strongly believe that it would be a mistake to increase defense spending at the expense of other critical investments in national security – especially those in diplomacy, development, democracy, and peacebuilding. We know from experience that force, and the credible possibility of its use, are essential to defend our vital interests and keep America safe. But as one of us has said in the past, force alone can be a blunt instrument, and there are many problems it cannot solve. The military leaders who so frequently testify before this committee would be the first to tell you that they cannot succeed in their missions without the vital capabilities that our civilian agencies bring to the table. Gutting these capabilities will put an unacceptable burden on our men and women in uniform, and would make America less safe. We need to fund these other civilian elements of American power as robustly as we do the military element. We recognize that government can always be made more efficient and effective, but the best way to accomplish that goal is to build a budget based on a sound strategy. This administration first needs to take the time to staff the Departments and agencies, and to develop a national security strategy. As members of the legislative branch, it is your responsibility to ensure that every dollar is spent wisely, but it also your responsibility to protect our national security institutions from arbitrary and senseless cuts. The Middle East Strategy Task Force No region has seen more death and suffering or presented more challenges to the international order than the Middle East, with outcomes that have frustrated both Democratic and Republican administrations. The Middle East is likely to be an important test case in the coming years – the region in which the international order gets rejuvenated for a new era or ceases to function entirely. From 2015 to 2016, we served as Co-Chairs of the Atlantic Council’s Middle East Strategy Task Force, which sought to understand better the underlying challenges in the region and to articulate a long-term strategy for meeting them. Our goal was not to develop a new U.S. strategy, but to understand the role that the U.S. can play in supporting a larger international effort led by the region itself. One of our initial insights was that we face not just a crisis in the Middle East, but from the Middle East having global impact. The roots of this crisis lie in a long history of poor governance in many states in the region. The Arab Spring was a consequence of the dissatisfaction of increasingly connected and empowered citizens with a number of political leaders who ruled ineptly and often corruptly. Where leaders sought to quash these popular protests by force, the result in most cases was civil war. The four civil wars raging in the Middle East – in Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen – have had destabilizing consequences for the region and beyond. They have produced the ungoverned spaces and grievances that have allowed terrorist groups to direct or inspire attacks in the West. They have also created the greatest worldwide refugee crisis since the Second World War, the devastating human cost of which has been coupled with profound effects on our own domestic politics and those of Europe. The challenges we face in the Middle East bear some resemblance to those of post-war Europe. Countries torn apart by war will need to determine the new shape of their governments, and how those governments interact with their people. The entire state system will need to be shored up so that countries are less prone to subversion, supported by effective regional institutions to mediate conflicts and prevent them from spiraling into all-out war. But there are also important differences between the modern Middle East and post-war Europe. There is no magnanimous victor in the mold of the Allies, with the will and capability to reshape the region from the outside. New global and political realities mean that no Marshall Plan is in the offing for the rebuilding of the Middle East. The American people have no appetite for this, and the people of the region, too, are tired of being beholden to outside powers. The Middle East must chart its own vision for the future. There is reason for hope. The fact is that now, more than any time in the Middle East’s modern history, the region has significant capabilities and resources of its own to define and work toward this vision and secure better opportunities for its people. And more than ever, there are also indications that people and some governments in the Middle East have the will to take on the region’s hard challenges. Although not always evident at first glance, there are promising developments happening in the Middle East, even in the most unexpected places. In Saudi Arabia, female entrepreneurs are founding startup companies at a rate three times that of women in Silicon Valley, as they begin to claim their rightful place in Saudi civic life. In Egypt, the social enterprise Nafham is using technological solutions to address the problem of overcrowding in Egyptian schools. And in Jordan, Syrian refugees are using innovative 3D printing technology to help develop more affordable prosthetic limb components for friends and neighbors who bear the physical scars of Bashar Assad’s war on his own people. The region’s vast population of educated youth, commonly understood to be a liability, can in fact be a tremendous asset. Some governments are beginning to understand that their future depends on promoting these efforts and partnering with their people to build a common future. Tunisia is showing that revolution need not result in either chaos or authoritarianism, but can begin a transition to an inclusive, democratic future. The UAE has led the way for positive economic and social reforms and Saudi Arabia has now adopted its own vision for the future. Jordan is making its own efforts. These can be examples for other countries in the region. Renewed and enhanced American leadership is needed in the Middle East. But not to impose our will militarily or otherwise. Instead, America has a clear interest in supporting and accelerating the positive changes that are already happening. The goal of our strategy in the region should be to help the Middle East move from the current vicious cycle in which it finds itself to a more virtuous one -- one in which the Middle East no longer spawns violence and refugees, is not a drain on international resources, and does not through its instability and political vacuums aggravate great power competition. With this goal in mind, US foreign policy toward the Middle East should be informed by a set of guiding principles that represent the new reality of the region since 2011. First, the old order is gone and is not coming back. Stability will not be achieved until a new regional order takes shape. The region should assume the principal responsibility for defining this new order, which should offer the people of the region the prospect of a stable and prosperous future free from both terrorist violence and government oppression. Second, disengagement is not a practical solution for the West. Disengagement will only allow the region’s problems to spread and deepen unchecked, creating further threats. Instead, it is in the interest of the United States and others to help the Middle East achieve a more peaceful vision. But their role must be different from what it has been in the past. Rather than dictating from the outside how countries should behave, they should support and facilitate the positive efforts that some people and governments in the region are beginning to take.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › Adv. – Labor › ! – Inequality

Extinction – threatens the structure of society while lowering the chance for international collaboration

Schwab et. Al. 17 – Professor Klaus Schwab is Founder and Executive Chairman of the World Economic Forum, the International Organization for Public-Private Cooperation.

Klaus Schwab, 2017, “The Global Risks Report 2017," World Economic Forum, https://www3.weforum.org/docs/GRR17_Report_web.pdf

The combination of economic inequality and political polarization threatens to amplify global risks, fraying the social solidarity on which the legitimacy of our economic and political systems rests. New economic systems and policy paradigms are urgently needed to address the sources of popular disenchantment.20 These could include more effective human capital policies, to enable more people to benefit from skill-biased technological change; better public goods (whether publicly or privately provided) to address the ambitions of the growing middle class around the world; and more responsive governance systems to empower individuals at the local level without sacrificing the many benefits of globalization. Society: Rebuilding Communities Issues of identity and culture were central to the two most dramatic Western political results of 2016, in the United Kingdom and the United States. This is part of a broader trend affecting both international and domestic politics. Across the European Union, parties stressing national sovereignty and/or values have prospered,21 boosted in part by migration flows that GRPS respondents continue to point to as a major geopolitical risk. Outside the European Union, polarization in Turkey has deepened since 2010,22 while Russia has been expressing its national political identity in increasingly assertive foreign policy stances.23 Globally, politics is increasingly defined by the rise of charismatic “strongman” national politicians and emotive political debate: “post-truth” was the Oxford English Dictionary’s word of the year.24 In the latest GRPS, respondents ranked “increasing polarization” as the third most important trend for the next 10 years – it was cited by 31% of respondents, with “increasing national sentiment” cited by 14%. The survey recorded an increase in the perceived impact of “failure of national governance” but, perhaps surprisingly, “profound social instability” dropped in the rankings for both perceived likelihood and impact. One possibility is that the global decision-makers who mostly comprise the GRPS panel have not been sufficiently attuned to this risk. Another way of interpreting the GRPS, however, is to focus on the underlying trends rather than the risks. By placing both polarization and intensifying national sentiment among the top five trends (see Table 1.1), GRPS respondents have highlighted long-term patterns that, if they persist, are likely to continue to amplify a range of social and political risks. In the West, decades of rapid social and economic change have widened generation gaps in values, disrupted traditional patterns of affiliation and community, and eroded the support of mainstream political parties.25 Early analysis by political scientists Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris points to the populism behind the victories of Brexit and President-elect Trump as being driven more by demographics and cultural factors than income inequality:26 a backlash among older and less-educated voters who “feel that they are being marginalized within their own countries” by changing values in areas such as gender, sexual orientation, race, multiculturalism, environmental protection and international cooperation. Pew research found stark divisions in the self-described values of supporters of President-elect Trump and Democrat candidate Hillary Clinton: for example, 72% of President-elect Trump’s supporters described themselves as “traditional”, versus 31% of Clinton supporters; other big differences Source: OECD Economic Outlook 100 database Figure 1.2: Fiscal Balances 2009–2018 General government balance; % of GDP 2009 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 0 -2 -4 -6 -8 -10 -12 -14 United States Euro–zone 14 The Global Risks Report 2017 Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 included “honor and duty are my core values” (59% vs 35%); “typical American” (72% vs 49%), “feminist” (5% vs 38%) and “supporter of LGBT rights” (24% vs 66%).27 Many established political parties are ill-equipped to respond to voters’ placing greater emphasis on culture and values, because the parties have shifted towards the centre of the political spectrum and a managerial or technocratic style of politics.28 They have lost touch with their traditional core constituencies, particularly those with class-based roots.29 In 2013, political scientist Peter Mair wrote that political parties’ failure to engage voters meant democracy was starting to buckle as electorates “are becoming effectively non-sovereign”.30 Events last year suggest that verdict may have been premature. Both the Brexit and President-elect Trump victories featured (1) outsiders to major party politics (2) successfully engaging traditionalist voters with (3) appeals to sovereignty rooted in national identity and pride. Unusually, older voters were in the vanguard of these disruptive movements – and with populations ageing, the pendulum may not swing back towards the younger generation’s views for some time.31 Dramatic events can have complex effects on the risk landscape. They can trigger new risks or exacerbate existing ones, but they can also open the way to responses that mitigate risks. As many of the West’s democracies face up to the growing electoral influence of traditionalist political identities, there are potential gains for social solidarity and democratic legitimacy if processes of political debate and compromise re-connect with the older, less-educated and predominantly male voters who currently feel excluded. However, it will be challenging to find political narratives and policies that can repair decades-long cultural fault-lines while preserving, for example, gender and minority rights. Failure could further undermine social and cultural cohesion: Daron Acemoglu, author with James Robinson of Why Nations Fail, has cautioned that current divisions in the United States risk undermining not just the electoral process but the institutions and norms on which it is founded.32 Technology: Managing Disruption Evidence suggests that technological change provides a better explanation than globalization for the industrial decline and deteriorating labour-market prospects that have catalyzed antiestablishment voting in many of the world’s advanced economies. Today’s world is one in which production, mobility, communication, energy and other systems are changing with unprecedented speed and scope, disrupting everything from employment patterns to social relationships and geopolitical stability. Driven by the convergence between digital, biological and physical technologies, the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) is creating new global risks and exacerbating existing risks. Perhaps because of the increasing ubiquity of innovative technology, respondents to the GRPS have tended not to include technological risks among the most impactful or the most likely to occur. This can be seen in the comparatively few technological risks that appear in the evolving risk matrix (Figure 2, inner cover). There are possible signs of change, however. The year 2014 was the first in which two technological risks made it into the evolving risk matrix, and this year, although only one is included (“massive incident of data fraud/theft”), another (“large-scale cyberattacks”) came sixth in the list of risks most likely to occur in the next 10 years. According to the economists Michael Hicks and Srikant Devaraj, 86% of manufacturing job losses in the United States between 1997 and 2007 were the result of rising productivity, compared to less than 14% lost because of trade. Most assessments suggest that technology’s disruptive effect on labour markets will accelerate across non-manufacturing sectors in the years ahead, as rapid advances in robotics, sensors and machine learning enable capital to replace labour in an expanding range of service-sector job. Estimates of the number of jobs at risk to technological displacement vary: a frequently cited 2013 Oxford Martin School study has suggested that 47% of US jobs were at high risk from automation; in 2016 an OECD Source: Adapted from Inglehart and Norris (2016), drawing on Döring and Manow (2016). Parliaments and government database (ParlGov) ‘Elections’ dataset. Note: Vote shares of populist-right parties in national parliamentary and European parliamentary elections in 24 European countries. Figure 1.3: Populist Voting in Europe 1970s 2000s 5.1% 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 Mean vote share (%) 13.2% The Global Risks Report 2017 15 Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 working paper put the figure lower, at 9%.33 In 2015 a McKinsey study concluded that 45% of the activities that workers do today could already be automated if companies choose to do so.34 As discussed in Chapter 3.1, respondents to this year’s GRPS rate artificial intelligence and robotics as the emerging technology with the greatest potential for negative consequences over the coming decade. Technology has always created jobs as well as destroying them, but there is evidence that the engine of technological job creation is sputtering. The Oxford Martin School estimates that only 0.5% of today’s US workforce is employed in sectors created since 2000, compared with approximately 8% in industries created during the 1980s.35 Technological change is shifting the distribution of income from labour to capital: according to the OECD, up to 80% of the decline in labour’s share of national income between 1990 and 2007 was the result of the impact of technology.36 At a global level, however, many people are being left behind altogether: more than 4 billion people still lack access to the internet, and more than 1.2 billion people are without even electricity.37 We can shape the dynamics of the 4IR. Careful governance can guide the distribution of benefits and impact on global risks, because the evolution of new technologies will be heavily influenced by the social norms, corporate policies, industry standards and regulatory principles being debated and written today.38 Unfortunately, however, current legal, policy-making and standard-setting institutions tend to move slowly. For example, the US Federal Aviation Authority took eight months to grant Amazon an “experimental airworthiness certificate” to test a particular model of drone, by which time the model was obsolete;39 Amazon conducted its trials in Canada and the United Kingdom instead. In 2015, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved an application by AquaBounty Technologies for regulatory approval of genetically modified salmon – an application made in 1995. The salmon still cannot be sold in the United States, pending an update to labelling regulations.40 Such regulatory delays can mean social and economic benefits are missed – but when health, the environment and broader social impacts are at stake, a cautiously deliberative approach is prudent. How best to strike this balance is currently causing debate, for example, in efforts to accelerate the regulation of self-driving vehicles.41 Although populist movements have recently tapped public hostility to globalization more than to technology, there is still the risk of backlash against technological change. For example, public concerns about genetically modified foods have consistently exceeded scientific assessments of the risks associated with them, and concerns about climate change have not precluded public opposition to wind farms.42 We are in a highly disruptive phase of technological development, at a time of rising challenges to social cohesion and policy-makers’ legitimacy. Given the power of the 4IR to create and exacerbate global risks, the associated governance challenges are both huge and pressing, as further discussed in Part 3. It is critical that policy-makers and other stakeholders – across government, civil society, academia and the media – collaborate to create more agile and adaptive forms of local, national and global governance and risk management. Geopolitics: Strengthening Cooperation In a worrying sign of deteriorating commitment to global cooperation, states are stepping back from mechanisms set up to underpin international security through mutual accountability and respect for common norms. For example, 2016 saw Russia, South Africa, Burundi and Gambia withdraw from the International Criminal Court, and China reject the verdict of the international tribunal on the South China Sea. At the time of writing, the incoming US president is considering withdrawal from the recent Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran nuclear deal) and the Paris Climate Change agreement. The exit of major stakeholders from economic agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership also carries geopolitical significance. In Syria, the drawn-out nature of the war indicates how the absence of a great-power accord handicaps the United Nations, compounding the difficulties of brokering a settlement to a conflict with multiple stakeholders at global, regional and non-state levels, or even organizing a limited intervention to facilitate humanitarian relief or protect civilians. The death toll among non-combatants – including from chemical weapons – has been met with despairing rhetoric but no effective action to enforce long-standing humanitarian laws and norms. In parallel to their withdrawal of support for collective solutions, major powers now openly trade accusations of undermining international security or interfering in their domestic politics. For years President Putin has accused the United States of seeking to undermine global stability and Russian sovereignty, and in 2016 the US National Security Agency blamed Russia for interference in the presidential election. Tensions rose between the United States and China over freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and the deployment of US missile defence systems to the Republic of Korea, which led to Beijing warning the United States not to “harm China’s strategic security interests”. In response to the general loss of faith in collective security mechanisms, regional powers and smaller nations are increasingly exploring the acquisition of new conventional weapons capabilities, offensive cyber weapons and even nuclear ones. Notwithstanding the normative and practical obstacles confronting a state seeking nuclear capability, political leaders in nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states alike have increasingly made reference to the utility of nuclear weapons in the context of changing threat perceptions and wavering confidence in alliance structures. If this rhetoric turns into policy, it could entail a huge diversion of resources into a new nuclear arms race and a jump in the risk of preemptive strikes aimed at preventing an adversary gaining nuclear capability. In summary, developments in 2016 present numerous reminders that international security requires collective 16 The Global Risks Report 2017 Part 1 Part 2 Part 3 commitments and investment to define a positive vision, as well as political will to make responsible trade-offs and commit resources (Box 1.1). As technological, demographic and climate pressures intensify the danger of systems failure, competition among world powers and fragmentation of security efforts makes the international system more fragile, placing collective prosperity and survival at risk.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › Adv. – Labor › Solvency – Democratize Work

Job Guarantee democratizes the economy.

LNS ’19

[Labor Network for Sustainability, CLIMATE JOBS FOR ALL: BUILDING BLOCK FOR THE GREEN NEW DEAL, 12—18, p. 8]

4. Economic democratization

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › Adv. – Labor › Underemployment Now: Particiation Rates

Labor problems—low participation, GJ S

LNS ’19

[Labor Network for Sustainability, CLIMATE JOBS FOR ALL: BUILDING BLOCK FOR THE GREEN NEW DEAL, 12—18, p. 8-9]

People who are unemployed, underemployed, and outside the workforce, combined with low-wage workers making less than $16 per hour, add up to about half the potential working population. Putting them to work building a fossil free economy can not only combat climate change but also sharply reduce poverty and unemployment.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › Adv. – Labor › Underemployment Now: Unemployment

Unemployment metrics understate and only count recent unemployment

Wray et al., Bard College researcher, ‘18

[L.Randall Wray, Levy Economics Institute, Bard College, Flavia Dantas, SUNY-Cortland, Scott Fullwiler, UMKC, Pavlina R. Tcherneva, Levy Economics Institute, Bard College, and Stephanie A. Kelton, Stony Brook University, PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYMENT: A PATH TO FULL EMPLOYMENT, Levy Economics Institute, Bard College, 4—18, p. 9-10]

Note: PSE = Public Service Employment (form of job guarantee)

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › Adv. – Labor › Underemployment Now: General

Evidence of labor market recovery ignores disproportional wages and risk of secular stagnation

Wray et al., Bard College researcher, ‘18

[L.Randall Wray, Levy Economics Institute, Bard College, Flavia Dantas, SUNY-Cortland, Scott Fullwiler, UMKC, Pavlina R. Tcherneva, Levy Economics Institute, Bard College, and Stephanie A. Kelton, Stony Brook University, PUBLIC SERVICE EMPLOYMENT: A PATH TO FULL EMPLOYMENT, Levy Economics Institute, Bard College, 4—18, p. 8]

Note: PSE = Public Service Employment (form of job guarantee)

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › Adv. – Labor › Underemployment Now: General

Job loss and precarity is ongoing, forcing millions into working multiple low paying jobs.

Tcherneva, Bard Economics Associate professor, ‘20

[Pavlina R. Tcherneva, Associate Professor, Economics, Bard College, THE CASE FOR A JOB GUARANTEE, Polity Press, Medford MA, 2020, epub]

How many of these stories can we tell? In the US – millions; globally – hundreds of millions. The loss of one’s job and livelihood is not just a consequence of unusual circumstances or “acts of God.” It is a regular occurrence. The drumbeat of the economy, expanding in good times and shrinking in bad, along with outsourcing and technological change, creates ongoing job losses. And while new employment opportunities are also created, they are never enough for all jobseekers even at the peak of expansions. Meanwhile many workers are in unstable, poorly paid jobs. In 2018, there were 6.9 million working people earning below the official poverty level.7 For millions of Americans, one job is just not enough.

2023 GDI Affirmative
AFF – Green New Deal – Gonzaga Debate Pre-Institute 2023 › 1AC › Solvency

The Green New Deal and Job Guarantee are symbiotic – formalize the labor market through environmental transition – holds both public and private employers accountable

Noor and Tcherneva, director of Economics program at Bard, 19 (Dharna Noor, RNN reporter, interviewing Pavlina, 2-20-2019, "Why the Green New Deal Includes a Jobs Guarantee," Real News Network, , GDI-MAM)

But I think it’s useful analytically to distinguish the millions of jobs that will be created through the green investment from specifically the Job Guarantee. The Job Guarantee has a unique purpose within this program, and that is the following, that it is essentially the backstop, it is essentially the safety net. It is a program that says if you have lost your fossil fuel job, so to speak, and you have not yet been incorporated into the green sector, we will ensure that transition for you, we will provide the safety net and employment opportunities in the interim in this transition, which for some people will be disruptive, and most likely for the most vulnerable it will be disruptive.

DHARNA NOOR: And the New Deal, FDR’s New Deal of the 1930s, included protections for organizing with the National Labor Relations Act, the Wagner Act. The Green Deal resolution specifies that the jobs created under this Jobs Guarantee would be unionized. How could the policy protect workers’ right to organize?