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2023 GDI Disadvantage
2NC › 2NC Link Core › Social Security

The GOP is planning to eliminate Social Security

Umpierrez 06-19-2023 (Amanda, Managing Editor of 401(k) Specialist magazine. She is a financial services reporter with over six years of experience and a passion for telling stories and reporting news., House Republicans Propose Social Security Benefit Cuts, https://401kspecialistmag.com/house-republicans-propose-social-security-benefit-cuts/)-TL

House Republicans last week proposed increasing the retirement age to collect Social Security to 69, in a controversial move that may come back to bite conservatives as Democrats look to gear up for the 2024 election. The Republican Study Committee (RSC), which includes 176 out of the 222 Republican members in the House of Representatives, making it the largest group of House conservatives, proposed the change as part of a budget package that it says would limit $16.3 trillion in spending and $5.1 trillion in taxes in the next seven years. This isn’t the first time the RSC has attempted to raise retirement ages for seniors. In 2022, the group made a proposal to raise the retirement age for Medicare from its current 65. While the proposal has since been dropped, the current blueprint includes a “premium support” plan that would support privatization of Medicare programs. While the current retirement age is 66, it gradually increases each month until it reaches age 67. The RSC proposal would include a slower change at four months a year, eventually reaching age 69 for those who turn 62 in 2033. The earliest retirement age would remain at 62 but would include the lowest benefits. The plan would continue former President Donald Trump’s tax cut plan for wealthy households and corporations, which is currently set to expire in 2027, eliminate the estate tax, and would gradually raise military from $886 billion in 2024 to $969 billion in 2023, among other proposals. In response to the budget package, lawmakers and officials have accused House Republicans of once again attempting to abolish Social Security and Medicare programs. In a statement, Senate Finance Committee Chair Ron Wyden, D-OR, said the plan is “proof that Republicans are committed as ever to cutting Medicare and Medicaid while allowing Social Security to wither.” White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre added in a statement that the proposed budget counters “…exactly what Republicans in Congress pledged not to do just months ago at the President’s State of the Union Address.” Earlier this year, President Joe Biden accused House Republicans of wanting to sunset federal programs including Medicare and Social Security during the State of the Union address, to which Republicans and Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) disagreed. After a back-and-forth between both parties, Biden eventually took the argument to mean that Republicans didn’t want to make cuts. “So folks, as we all apparently agree, Social Security and Medicare is off the books now?” That brought the audience to its feet in applause. “All right—we got unanimity,” he said. The proposed budget solidifies Social Security and Medicare as two main themes set to appear during the 2024 election cycle, one that will likely serve as fuel for Democrats—and some Republicans—to call out opponents on. Trump, who has already announced his campaign for presidency, has previously attacked competitor and Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis for his past support on a GOP budget proposal that would restructure Social Security and Medicare benefits.

2023 GDI Disadvantage
2NC › 2NC Link Core › Generic Magnifier

The Farm bill’s complexity means that the introduction of the plan removes it from the docket –empirics prove

Heitshusen 2013 (Valerie, Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process ‘The Legislative Process on the Senate Floor: An Introduction”, 3/18/13, )

The legislative process is laborious and time-consuming, and the time available for Senate floor action each year is limited. Every day devoted to one bill is a day denied for consideration of other legislation, and there are not enough days to act on all the bills that Senators and Senate committees wish to see enacted. Naturally, the time pressures become even greater with the approach of deadlines such as the date for adjournment and the end of the fiscal year. So, for all but the most important bills, even the threat of a filibuster can be a potent weapon. Before a bill reaches the floor or while it is being debated, its supporters often seek ways to accommodate the concerns of opponents, preferring an amended bill that can be passed without protracted debate to the time, effort, and risks involved in confronting a filibuster or the threat of one.

2023 GDI Disadvantage
2NC › 2NC UQ › AT: Immigration Thumper

The immigration bill is going nowhere and was dead on arrival

Prude 05-26-23 (Harvest, a reporter for The Dispatch. She previously covered politics for WORLD Magazine., Does a New Immigration Reform Bill Have a Chance?, https://thedispatch.com/article/does-a-new-immigration-reform-bill-have-a-chance/)-TL

Can the bill get the votes it needs? It will be difficult to move this legislation through the House. One option: a discharge petition. Salazar and Escobar would need to gather support from 218 members for it to pass through that process, which would circumvent the need for House Speaker Kevin McCarthy’s backing. It’s not clear the sponsors will be able to meet that threshold. Three Republicans have signed on as co-sponsors: Reps. Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon of Puerto Rico, Lori Chavez-DeRemer of Oregon, and Mike Lawler of New York. Democratic co-sponsors include Michigan Rep. Hillary Scholten and Rep. Kathy Manning of North Carolina. Salazar plans to meet soon with more hardline Republicans, including members of the House Freedom Caucus (HFC), according to the Washington Post. But she’s already facing skepticism. Rep. Byron Donalds, an HFC member, “likes Maria but doesn’t support the bill,” a staffer told The Dispatch. “He’s firmly anti-amnesty.” And Rep. Doug Lamborn of Colorado, said he “can’t really see it going very far.” Rep. Chip Roy, a Texas Republican who was key to negotiating the Secure the Border Act earlier this month, at first hesitated to weigh in until he’d had a chance to look at the bill, but acknowledged he didn’t think it would gain steam: “Right now I think we need to get the security bill done.” That legislation primarily focuses on managing the flow of migration at the U.S.-Mexico border through restarting construction on a border wall, funding surveillance and technology at ports of entry, and codifying some of former President Donald Trump’s immigration policies, as well as implementing E-Verify. But it stands no chance of passing in a Senate controlled by Democrats. When asked if he thought other Freedom Caucus members would have the same view, Roy nodded yes. They may have support from leadership: Majority Leader Steve Scalise recently said he doesn’t envision a bill dealing with broader immigration questions passing until border security is dealt with first, according to the Washington Post: “We’ve got to first start with border security,” he said. “If we get that done, then you can start talking about the interior problems that exist.” More moderate members in the GOP caucus were less negative, though many also were caught up with other priorities: “I’m still making up my mind, but there is lots of goodness in it,” said Rep. Don Bacon, a Nebraska Republican. Others who supported a previous version of the bill said they wanted to look at the updated text before signing on. Among Democrats, House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries told The Dispatch he hasn’t had a chance to look at the bill but said any fix for immigration issues should be bipartisan. Getting support in the Senate will be another hurdle to the Dignity Act becoming law: Sen. Chris Coons, a Democrat from Delaware praised the bill Tuesday in a statement and signaled plans to introduce corresponding legislation in the Senate. Sen. Kyrsten Sinema, a former Democrat turned independent, who last Congress worked on (an ultimately unsuccessful) last-minute bid to pass immigration reform, called the legislation “another opportunity to help us find lasting, non partisan solutions,” on immigration issues. Michigan Democratic Rep. Hillary Scholten, an original co-sponsor to the Dignity Act, acknowledged immigration reform has bedeviled Congress for years. “Leaving this issue unaddressed is not an option anymore,” she said. “We are reaching such a critical boiling point on immigration issues, and we’re continuing to see the national security threat, the economic emergency and the humanitarian crisis that it presents.”

2023 GDI Disadvantage
2NC › 2NC UQ › AT: NDAA Thumper

NDAA will always pass and it also does not matter if it does not pass—empirics prove

Feldscher 2021 (Jacqueline, SENIOR NATIONAL SECURITY CORRESPONDENT for Defense One, The NDAA Likely Won’t Become Law Until 2022. 11-30-21, That’s ‘Not The End of the World’, https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2021/11/ndaa-likely-wont-become-law-until-2022-s-not-end-world/187174/)-TL

It’s looking more and more likely that the annual defense policy bill will not become law in 2021. Congress frequently has an end-of-calendar-year push to pass the bill, which authorizes the Defense Department activities for the fiscal year that began in October, requests reports or briefings from the Pentagon, and sets new policy on things such as military justice reform or who should register for the draft. But experts say there’s lots of precedent for the legislation passing in the new year and few consequences to doing so. A Senate motion to end debate on the fiscal 2022 National Defense Authorization Act failed on Monday by a vote of 41-51; it needed 60 ayes to set up a vote for final passage. All Republicans who voted rejected the procedural step forward. They were joined by five liberal lawmakers: Ed Markey, D-Mass.; Jeff Merkley, D-Ore.; Bernie Sanders, I-Vt.; Elizabeth Warren, D-Mass.; and Ron Wyden, D-Ore. Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., also voted against the motion when it became clear it would fail—a procedural move that will allow him to bring it up for a vote again. Some Republicans said they were rejecting the process set by Schumer, not the bill itself, and complained that they did not have enough time to debate the bill and have an open amendment process. “We’re not delaying national security,” Sen. Jim Inhofe, R-Okla., the ranking member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said Monday night. “This is the opposite. We are demanding that we show, through open and robust debate, that our men and women in uniform are our priority.” But Schumer pushed back, saying that the process has been “fair and reasonable” and that committee leaders agreed to hold votes in the full Senate on 19 bipartisan amendments. “That’s more than the total number of amendments to the NDAA that received votes under the Republican majority and under Leader [Mitch] McConnell when we debated this bill in 2017, 2018, 2019, and 2020. Not more than each year, more than all of them put together,” Schumer said Tuesday. While analysts called the failed cloture vote “disappointing,” they are optimistic Congress will still pass a bill. Congressional staff will need to continue negotiations to agree on which and how many amendments will be considered. After that, the Senate will have to pass the bill, representatives from the House and Senate will need to reconcile the two different versions of the bill, then the final bill will need to pass each chamber again before it can become law. This long timeline makes it increasingly likely that the bill won’t become law until 2022. “The likelihood of the NDAA being pushed into January is getting higher and higher, which is not the end of the world,” said Todd Harrison, the director of defense budget analysis at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. It wouldn’t be the first time. The fiscal 2011 bill became law on January 7, 2011; the fiscal 2008 bill became law on January 28, 2008; and the fiscal 2006 bill became law on January 6, 2006. The bill for fiscal year 1996 wasn’t signed into law until February 10, 1996. Most recently, the fiscal 2021 bill became law on January 1, when Congress overrode President Donald Trump’s veto. The bill also isn’t critical to how the department functions. Other parts of the government routinely do their jobs without an authorization bill. The State Department, for example, has not had an authorization bill for nearly 20 years. “DoD can operate just fine without an authorization bill,” Harrison said. Not passing a bill, however, could undermine Congress’ oversight power, according to Bradley Bowman, a director at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. “The State Department doesn’t take questions [from lawmakers] as seriously because there’s no bill where you can impose consequences. It shifts the balance of power,” Bowman said. “It makes appropriators even more powerful.” Even though the bill is viewed as a must-pass piece of legislation that Congress has approved every year for the past six decades, there are few consequences when it is delayed until the new year. The bill authorizes Defense Department programs and gives Congress a chance to set priorities, but does not actually disburse any money. The appropriations bill is what funds the department, and blurred lines between authorization and funding bills means that appropriations legislation sometimes also order reports or set policy too. Bowman acknowledged that the appropriations bill is more important when it comes to buying equipment to prepare troops to fight. But even that is in danger, since the government is funded by a continuing resolution that will expire on Friday. “If I had to pick one right now...I’d say ‘pass a defense appropriations bill so we don’t have a long-term CR’,” he said. “That would be my first request, because when you fund a program, that’s treated with or without the NDAA as an authorization.

2023 GDI Disadvantage
2NC › 2NC UQ › 2NC UQ

The Farm Bill will pass in September as long as hard right Republicans stay disorganized

Hagstrom 06-15-2023 (Jerry, DTN's political correspondent, is a prize-winning agricultural journalist, author and commentator. He writes The Hagstrom Report, a daily service for subscribers, is a columnist for National Journal in Washington, and writes for other publications. The American Journalism Review named him one of its "unsung heroes" for his agricultural coverage., “Farm Bill Update”, https://www.dtnpf.com/agriculture/web/ag/news/article/2023/06/15/house-ag-chair-wants-house-farm-bill)-TL

WASHINGTON (DTN) -- House Agriculture Committee Chairman Glenn "GT" Thompson, R-Pa., said Wednesday he hopes the committee can vote on the farm bill when Congress returns in September after the August recess and he has more trips planned to listen to the concerns of farmers around the country. At a breakfast for reporters with House Agriculture Forestry Subcommittee Chairman Doug LaMalfa, R-Calif., Thompson said he believes the committee is "at first base on the farm bill." He said the analogy is appropriate because the congressional baseball game is tonight (Wednesday). Thompson said he has a "goal" of committee consideration of the bill shortly after the House returns from the August recess Sept. 12, and plans for floor consideration shortly thereafter. Thompson and LaMalfa held their roundtable while the House Appropriations Committee spent Wednesday in a fierce partisan debate over Republican plans to cut funding from USDA programs in the FY 2024 budget. The USDA appropriations bill proposed to cut back spending 2.1% and rescind $5.8 billion in funding for USDA from the Inflation Reduction Act. The bill also restricts the Agriculture Secretary's use of the Commodity Credit Corp. and eliminates the budget for USDA's Office of Communications. The Appropriations Committee advanced the funding bill to the full House late in the afternoon on a party-line vote. The 2018 farm bill expires Sept. 30. Thompson said he wants to pass a bicameral, bipartisan bill "on time." But he added, "The clock is ticking pretty rapidly." Thompson said he rejects a statement by Sen. Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, that a one-year extension will be needed. "I respectfully disagree," Thompson said. "We can get our job done." But he added, "We need to put fingers to keyboards." Thompson did not say when he would release a draft of the bill. Asked by a reporter for their views on "dissidents" in the ranks of the House Republicans who stopped the consideration of legislation on the House floor last week, Thompson said he likes the term "dissidents" because "conservatives" refers to a broader group of Republicans. Both Thompson and LaMalfa said they don't think the dissidents will stop the farm bill, and they praised the leadership of House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, R-Calif. Thompson also said he wants to be remembered for convincing the House speaker to attend a farm bill listening session in Tulare, Calif., and "sit quietly" for two and a half hours while listening to the farmers. Thompson said he will travel to New Mexico on Friday to meet with cattlemen and has another trip to Tennessee planned. He also said he will hold listening sessions in Connecticut with Rep. Jahana Hayes, D-Conn., and in Maine with Rep. Chellie Pingree, D-Maine. LaMalfa said he hopes to use his position as chair of the Forestry Subcommittee to achieve more effective, efficient forest management.

2023 GDI Disadvantage
2NC › 2NC UQ › 2NC UQ

The Ag committee has promised swift passage of the farm bill

Henderson 06-19-23 (O.Kay, reporting for RadioIowa, Nunn says House Ag panel has aggressive timeline for Farm Bill, https://www.radioiowa.com/2023/06/19/nunn-says-house-ag-panel-has-aggressive-timeline-for-farm-bill/)-TL

The five-year framework for federal farm and food assistance programs expires September 30, but development of the 2023 Farm Bill was delayed by this spring’s debt deal negotiations. Iowa Congressman Zach Nunn, a Republican Bondurant, is a member of the House Ag Committee. “I’ll be very clear. We have to get this done,” Nunn says. “Iowa’s got 85,000 farmers and already in the past year we’ve lost 100 family farms. Once a family farm disappears, those things don’t come back.” He says the committee has an “aggressive” timeline to advance the Farm Bill in early September, so a House vote could follow. “We’ve shown that we can take some pretty big bills and march out smartly on that,” Nunn says, “but it’s a two partner dance and we’ll see what happens in the Senate.” Five years ago, lawmakers temporarily extended programs covered in the 2018 Farm Bill for a couple of months until negotiations were completed in December. For the 2023 Farm Bill, Nunn says he’s indicated to the House Ag Committee chair that rural development, federal crop insurance and conserving natural resources are priorities for Iowans. “The actual innovation, investment that goes to farmers is actually less than 20% of the overall Farm Bill,” Nunn says, “but anybody who enjoys having food on their plate wants that for the future, then we’ve got to have the fields be successful.” Some lawmakers from both parties say they’ll press to exclude high income farming operations from federal crop insurance. And some House Republicans have indicated they’ll press for stricter work requirements for food stamps, or SNAP, than were included in the debt deal. “Progressives on the left or House Freedom on the right…I’m not up for bumper sticker policies of ‘Let’s just cut money.’ That’s not a logical way to go about balancing the budget,” Nunn says. “We can’t balance the budget on the backs of farmers and certainly on the backs of families who need SNAP. We can do these things more efficiently, but that also requires us to be pragmatic about the types of policies we’re going to undertake.” Nunn says he’s collaborating with likeminded House Republicans as well as House Democrats who represent rural districts in Illinois and North Carolina on Farm Bill priorities. Nunn represents Iowa’s third congressional district, which includes Ottumwa on the southeast corner and half of Shenandoah on the southwest, as well as Atlantic, Guthrie Center and the Des Moines metro.

2023 GDI Disadvantage
1NC › Shell

Food insecurity escalates every hotspot to go nuclear causing extinction

Castellaw 2017 (John, Lieutenant General, former President of the non-profit Crockett Policy Institute, “Opinion: Food Security Strategy Is Essential to Our National Security,” )

The United States faces many threats to our National Security. These threats include continuing wars with extremist elements such as ISIS and potential wars with rogue state North Korea or regional nuclear power Iran. The heated economic and diplomatic competition with Russia and a surging China could spiral out of control. Concurrently, we face threats to our future security posed by growing civil strife, famine, and refugee and migration challenges which create incubators for extremist and anti-American government factions. Our response cannot be one dimensional but instead must be a nuanced and comprehensive National Security Strategy combining all elements of National Power including a Food Security Strategy. An American Food Security Strategy is an imperative factor in reducing the multiple threats impacting our National wellbeing. Recent history has shown that reliable food supplies and stable prices produce more stable and secure countries. Conversely, food insecurity, particularly in poorer countries, can lead to instability, unrest, and violence. Food insecurity drives mass migration around the world from the Middle East, to Africa, to Southeast Asia, destabilizing neighboring populations, generating conflicts, and threatening our own security by disrupting our economic, military, and diplomatic relationships. Food system shocks from extreme food-price volatility can be correlated with protests and riots. Food price related protests toppled governments in Haiti and Madagascar in 2007 and 2008. In 2010 and in 2011, food prices and grievances related to food policy were one of the major drivers of the Arab Spring uprisings. Repeatedly, history has taught us that a strong agricultural sector is an unquestionable requirement for inclusive and sustainable growth, broad-based development progress, and long-term stability. The impact can be remarkable and far reaching. Rising income, in addition to reducing the opportunities for an upsurge in extremism, leads to changes in diet, producing demand for more diverse and nutritious foods provided, in many cases, from American farmers and ranchers. Emerging markets currently purchase 20 percent of U.S. agriculture exports and that figure is expected to grow as populations boom. Moving early to ensure stability in strategically significant regions requires long term planning and a disciplined, thoughtful strategy. To combat current threats and work to prevent future ones, our national leadership must employ the entire spectrum of our power including diplomatic, economic, and cultural elements. The best means to prevent future chaos and the resulting instability is positive engagement addressing the causes of instability before it occurs. This is not rocket science. We know where the instability is most likely to occur. The world population will grow by 2.5 billion people by 2050. Unfortunately, this massive population boom is projected to occur primarily in the most fragile and food insecure countries. This alarming math is not just about total numbers. Projections show that the greatest increase is in the age groups most vulnerable to extremism. There are currently 200 million people in Africa between the ages of 15 and 24, with that number expected to double in the next 30 years. Already, 60% of the unemployed in Africa are young people. Too often these situations deteriorate into shooting wars requiring the deployment of our military forces. We should be continually mindful that the price we pay for committing military forces is measured in our most precious national resource, the blood of those who serve. For those who live in rural America, this has a disproportionate impact. Fully 40% of those who serve in our military come from the farms, ranches, and non-urban communities that make up only 16% of our population. Actions taken now to increase agricultural sector jobs can provide economic opportunity and stability for those unemployed youths while helping to feed people. A recent report by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs identifies agriculture development as the core essential for providing greater food security, economic growth, and population well-being. Our active support for food security, including agriculture development, has helped stabilize key regions over the past 60 years. A robust food security strategy, as a part of our overall security strategy, can mitigate the growth of terrorism, build important relationships, and support continued American economic and agricultural prosperity while materially contributing to our Nation’s and the world’s security.

2023 GDI Disadvantage
1NC › Shell

!: Farm bills are key to US agriculture which is key to global food security—multiple warrants

Ziadeh 04-12-2023 (Amanda, reporting for FiscalNote, The 2023 Farm Bill: Impacts, What to Expect, and How to Prepare, https://fiscalnote.com/blog/2023-farm-bill)-TL

Factors Influencing the New Farm Bill 2023 The priorities mentioned above, and many of those outlined by different interest groups and stakeholders, are influenced by factors such as inflation, market changes, climate and weather concerns, pricing regulations, and more. MARKET VOLATILITY U.S. consumer prices skyrocketed 9 percent in the year ending in June 2022, marking the largest increase in 40 years. This upswing has affected everyone, particularly farm and ranch families. Reps. Thompson and Scott’s letter highlights these families “are perhaps the most critically impacted by the spike in the cost of goods, especially for the inputs necessary to operate a farm.” USDA also tracks production costs with a Prices Paid Index, which has risen 28 percent since the enactment of the 2018 Farm Bill. The farm sector equity, representing the difference between total farm sector assets and debt, is projected to reach $3.51 trillion in 2023, a 5 percent hike compared to 2022. “When adjusted for inflation, farm sector equity, assets, and debt are forecast to increase by 2.1 percent, 2.3 percent, and 3.3 percent, respectively,” USDA reported. Thompson and Scott said these are “frightening indications of an erosion of farm solvency, and this pattern bears a striking resemblance to the lead-up to the farm financial crisis of the 1980s.” Stakeholders such as AFBA, the Wheat Growers Association, and lawmakers are calling for a reference price increase for all Title I commodities in the farm bill. These prices are meant to offer a basic safety net for producers if commodity prices or farm revenue plummet. The existing policies were established in the 2014 Farm Bill using 2012 cost of production data. “Today, the combination of spiking input costs and outdated policy has rendered the commodity title ineffective,” Thompson and Scott wrote. That’s because under the existing law, to activate support, the average farm price of the four major U.S. crops — corn, soybeans, wheat, and cotton — would need to decline by roughly 23, 30, 21 and 52 percent, respectively, in 2023. This could bankrupt producers before Title I support becomes available. “We're looking at getting an increase in the reference price,” Westlin said. “We feel it's outdated. It doesn't move quickly enough to adjust for market conditions. We've seen a lot of market volatility over the last year and a half here with some of the global events.” Inflation and the current market are also factoring into the trade promotion programs in the farm bill. U.S. producers export over 20 percent of what they produce. Some commodities export over 70 percent of U.S. production. The current flagship program in the trade title is the Market Access Program (MAP), which has received $200 million in yearly funding since 2006. However, because of inflation and sequestration, this amount has been reduced to $125 million. Stakeholders such as the Wheat Growers Association and lawmakers are urging for increased MAP funding. “For U.S. producers to remain competitive in international markets in the face of high and rising foreign subsidies, tariffs, and non-tariff trade barriers of countries such as China, further investments in these [market development] programs may well be required,” Thomas and Scott wrote. About half the wheat grown in the U.S. is exported internationally, which helps develop new markets and enhance trade competitiveness globally, according to Westlin. Many stakeholders are interested in MAP funding and adjusted reference prices, and the commonality among them is promising. THE STAKEHOLDER POOL IS GROWING Smith and his colleagues at Montana State University found the majority of agricultural subsidy dollars in 2020 went to fewer than 200,000 of the largest and wealthiest farms. In fact, “60 percent of all payments go to the largest 10 percent of farms, and over 80 percent of all payments go to the largest 20 percent of farms,” Smith said. “The payments are very heavily concentrated on the largest farms because they have the largest acres.” The federal crop insurance program, for instance, works great and the coalition of bill supporters is almost always around policies that enhance farm incomes, “but those policies are also not policies designed to help very, very small farm operations or even medium-sized operations,” Smith said. This disparity between large and small farms has also led to a wider stakeholder pool. “Newer farm interest groups that serve producers of specialty and small-acre crops (for example, organic crop growers and pea and lentil producers) have also entered the national farm policy arena over the past two decades,” Smith wrote in his report. “Many of these groups were originally focused on establishing regulations that would create quality standards for their crops. Understandably, some of those groups have subsequently morphed toward seeking benefits from other programs, especially crop insurance.” Smith suggests there has been increasing support for producers of organic crops, and fruits and vegetables, whether organic or not. “It's likely that those groups will get traction, not least because the chair of the Senate Agriculture Committee Senator Stabenow has had long-standing concerns about improving farm programs for fruits and vegetables producers,” he wrote. The rise in interested parties and lack of funding or subsidiary programs for smaller farms may be given more consideration this year. Farm Bill 2023 Change and Impact The 2023 farm bill discussions have started to consider changes, investments, and programs that could affect farmers, ranchers, and their supply chains. It's still early in the process to determine the specific details, but any changes that do pass will impact retail outlets and consumers' homes. The Subcommittee on Conservation, Climate, Forestry, and Natural Resources held a farm bill hearing on March 30 to discuss supporting forests amid climate-related issues, including wildfires and post-fire recovery work. Maintaining crop insurance is crucial for providing a safety net, Westlin said. Parts of the country like Texas, Oklahoma, and Kansas currently face severe droughts, and crop insurance helps ensure revenue protection and stability in an unpredictable market. “You’ve got to plan for the worst,” he said. Plus, Westlin is confident the MAP will receive a significant funding boost. “Increasing that program is really important because it does have a significant return on investment,” he added. “Other countries have programs like this, and it's important that we continue to bring it up to speed.” Trade promotion programs have proven successful and involve other cooperators in exporting commodities or goods. “We really need to be redoubling our investments in that, to make sure that we are maintaining our competitiveness on the global stage,” Westlin said. The impact of the farm bill is expansive and critical — that’s why stakeholder input is necessary for drafting and developing the policies, regulations, and investments that meet the needs of producers (big and small), rural communities, and consumers.

2023 GDI Disadvantage
1NC › Shell

IL: Political capital will have to be expended for the Farm Bill to pass– debt ceiling deal makes it now or never for Biden and McCarthy

Brooks and Schnell 06-07-23 (EMILY BROOKS AND MYCHAEL SCHNELL writing for TheHill, Conservative rebels throw House into limbo, https://thehill.com/homenews/house/4038648-conservative-rebels-throw-house-into-limbo/)-TL

Conservatives are still incensed at the debt limit compromise deal McCarthy struck with President Biden that got more votes from Democrats than Republicans, though two-thirds of the GOP conference voted for the bill. A group of 20 “concerned” conservatives met among themselves Wednesday morning to discuss their issues with leadership, Rep. Ralph Norman (R-S.C.) told The Hill. But the major hurdle to reaching some agreement appears to be a big one: The conservatives haven’t named any demands and are still deciding what they should be. “I don’t know,” Rep. Andy Biggs (R-Ariz.) said when asked what he is looking for in order to break the impasse and move legislation on the floor again. “The Speaker formed a coalition with Democrats to get us a $4 trillion national debt. And I continued to be concerned because he hasn’t repudiated that coalition. And my guess is he’s prepared to do that again on the next three must-pass bills: Farm Bill, NDAA, and the budget.” “We’re looking for concrete things that are going to be done,” Norman said. When asked to elaborate, he responded, “well, that’s in process now.”

2023 GDI Disadvantage
1NC › Shell

L: The plan’s massive expansion of social spending via policy bundling dooms Congress to gridlock even if the farm bill is bipartisan now—empirics and quantitative data prove

Lee 2022 (Barton, Magdalen College, University of Oxford, United Kingdom, Gridlock, leverage, and policy bundling Journal of Public Economics 212 (2022) 104687, p.1-3, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272722000895#b0130)-TL

1. Introduction Congress’ inability to pass legislation is a defining characteristic of the modern era. Since the 1950s, legislative gridlock has doubled in frequency (Binder, 2014) and, in October 2013 alone, was estimated to have cost the U.S. economy $24 billion (Lowrey et al., 2013). It is not surprising that divisive policies, which benefit one party at the expense of the other, become gridlocked. However, policies that have strong bipartisan support can also fail to become law. For example, the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act creates a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants that entered the U.S. as minors. The first version of the bill was introduced in April 2001 by a Democratic Republican pair of senators and has ‘‘enjoyed bipartisan support for two decades” (Munoz, 2021).1 Yet, repeated proposals of the DREAM Act (sometimes bundled with other legislation) have continually failed to be enacted (Petts, 2021). The precise reasons for these failures are unclear and often debated. Some political commentators speculate that the proposal would pass under a conscience vote,2 suggesting that party leadership may be to blame.3 Others argue that legislators have blocked the proposal in the hope of using it to pass larger—and likely more divisive—reforms.4 Consistent with both of these views, Senate minority leader Mitch McConnell elaborated on the Republican party’s recent opposition to the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) policy, a weaker version of the DREAM Act, ‘‘everybody is sympathetic with the DACA issue [but] I can’t imagine that we would take up an immigration-related bill, no matter how worthy it might be ...without insistence on our part that we address the obvious crisis at the border” — Carney (2021). In this paper, I explore the possibility that Congress’ ability to engage in policy bundling, whereby legislators bundle diverse and (possibly) unrelated proposals into a single piece of legislation, can result in some bipartisan proposals being gridlocked.5,6 This idea runs contrary to the prevailing wisdom that policy bundling reduces gridlock by (i) facilitating compromises and (ii) allowing legislators to more fully exploit their proposal (or agenda-setting) power (see, e.g., Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Câmara and Eguia, 2017; Krutz, 2000, 2001; Sinclair, 1997). As stated by former U.S. Senator Lieberman (2020), ‘‘leadership often resorts to a tactic of passing unpopular ideas by attaching them to bills supported on both sides of the aisle.” In a dynamic environment, where alternatives to the status quo arrive over time, policy bundling also creates an incentive for parties to gridlock bipartisan alternatives. By blocking a bipartisan proposal today, a party may benefit tomorrow since they can bundle this same proposal with a divisive alternative that otherwise would not pass. In other words, the prospect of policy bundling turns bipartisan proposals into a form of ‘‘leverage” that may be better used in—or saved for—future negotiations. Per Senator Lieberman (2020), ‘‘Some of the most popular ideas are in many cases held in abeyance so that they can be used to pass legislation that most members would oppose if considered separately.” Although it is difficult to say with certainty when and why bipartisan policies fail to pass, Senator Lieberman’s quote is a striking admission that policy bundling can have such an effect. It is also notable that Lieberman does not make reference to other potential causes of gridlock that are commonly proposed in the literature. For example, references to attempts to signal information to voters (Groseclose and McCarty, 2001; Patty, 2016) or an opposition (McCarty, 1997; Abreu and Gul, 2000), time constraints enforced by the legislative calendar (Chen and Eraslan, 2017), the difficulty in finding bipartisan policies (Acharya and Ortner, 2018; Callander, 2011), and concerns about an endogenous and hard-to-repeal status quo (Austin-Smith et al., 2019; Dziuda and Loeper, 2016, 2018) are all absent in Lieberman’s depiction. Instead, his depiction captures a simple—almost mechanical— mechanism that arises from policy bundling and can lead bipartisan policies to be gridlocked. Beyond simple anecdotes, there are a number of empirical observations that suggest that policy bundling can contribute to gridlock. Firstly—and in contrast to the U.S. Congress—in almost all U.S. state legislatures the possibility to policy bundle is restricted because of the single-subject and line-item veto rules (Brown, 2012).7 Yet, even in highly-polarized states, gridlock is less frequent than in the U.S. Congress (Masket, 2019). Furthermore, state legislators often cite the single-subject rule—and its effect of limiting policy bundling—as a key factor that helps them overcome gridlock (Center for Legislative Strengthening, 2018). This directly conflicts with the prevailing wisdom that policy bundling reduces gridlock and thus far the existing literature does not provide an explanation as to why such a pattern might arise. Secondly, Hughes and Carlson (2015) observe that salient bills in Congress that are (eventually) included in a policy bundle face substantial delays compared to stand alone legislation.8 In this paper, I study a dynamic model of bargaining that formalizes Senator Lieberman’s intuition. I establish that policy bundling can generate gridlock in equilibrium and then derive conditions that cause gridlock to be more likely to occur and study the implications for voter welfare. I also explore the model’s insights for the long-running debate of whether policy bundling should be removed from Congress via constitutional reform. I conclude with a discussion of the empirical implications of the results. I develop a benchmark model with two periods, two parties, and a voter. At the start of period 1, an alternative to the status quo is realized which may or may not be available in period 2, and the proposer decides whether to propose this alternative as a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other party. At the end of period 1, the voter decides which party will be the proposer for period 2. In period 2, a new alternative to the status quo is realized, and the period-2 proposer decides whether to make a proposal. However, the set of possible proposals depends on the period-1 bargaining outcome. If the period-1 alternative passed in period 1, it will not be available as a proposal in period 2; otherwise, with some probability, it will be available as a proposal.9 In this latter case, the proposer decides whether to make a proposal and, if proposing both alternatives, decides whether to propose each alternative separately or to ‘‘bundle” the alternatives into a single proposal. By bundling the alternatives, the proposer forces the other party to either accept both alternatives or reject both. Each period’s alternative has a known voter-welfare component and an ex-ante unknown partisan component.10 The voter’s payoff is equal to the voter-welfare component, and each party’s payoff depends on both the voter-welfare and partisan components. Alternatives that have a small (respectively, large) partisan component provide both parties (resp., only one party) with a positive payoff and, hence, are said to be bipartisan (resp., divisive). In Section 7, I discuss the key assumptions of the benchmark model and explore some extensions, which are formally analyzed in the Supplementary Material. The first extension allows for an arbitrary (and stochastic) number of alternatives to arrive in each period and, in addition, allows for an arbitrary but finite time horizon. The second extension relaxes the strategic sophistication of the voter by replacing the endogenous election outcome with an exogenous transition probability. The model shows that policy bundling can increase gridlock. Policy bundling will sometimes reduce gridlock via two distinct channels. First, by facilitating compromise: parties may agree to pass a bundle of alternatives if the benefits of passing each alternative that they prefer outweigh the cost of passing alternatives that they don’t. Second, by allowing parties to more fully exploit their proposal power: a small divisive alternative that they favor can be bundled with a bipartisan alternative, which could have other wise passed on its own. This allows for more alternatives to pass to the benefit of the proposer and at the expense of the opposition. However, policy bundling also creates an incentive for parties to gridlock bipartisan alternatives. Preventing a bipartisan alternative from passing is costly in terms of delay, but it also provides benefits. By vetoing a bipartisan alternative, a party may benefit in the future since (if elected) they will be able to bundle this same alternative with future alternatives that are divisive and otherwise would not pass. That is, the vetoed alternative can be used as leverage in future negotiations. This leverage incentive exists only because of policy bundling and can induce gridlock; I call gridlock of this form leverage-based gridlock.11 Leverage-based gridlock differs from gridlock that arises when an alternative is divisive, which I call preference-based gridlock. Preference-based gridlock coincides with the notion of a ‘‘gridlock interval” (Krehbiel, 1996, 1998). Leverage-based gridlock will occur more frequently when alternatives are more partisan or unpassed alternatives are more likely to be available in the future. When a party engages in leveragebased gridlock there are two costs. First, the unpassed alternative may be unavailable in the future, in which case the party forgoes the payoff associated with the alternative and there is no leverage benefit. Second, there is a cost of delay because future payoffs are discounted. As a bipartisan alternative becomes more partisan, one party’s payoff from passing the alternative decreases and the other party’s payoff increases. This leads the party with lower (but positive) payoff to have a greater incentive to engage in leveragebased gridlock: they face a smaller cost of delay and, via the delayed alternative, will have more leverage to pass divisive alternatives in the future. Similarly, leverage-based gridlock will be more frequent when unpassed alternatives are more likely to be available in the future (e.g., during times of economic stability) because the cost of delay of reduced. Contrary to standard models of bargaining, I show that an increase in polarization can have a non-monotonic effect on the frequency of gridlock. I measure polarization by the likelihood that each period’s alternative has a large partisan component. Hence, polarization increases the likelihood that an alternative is divisive. However, in equilibrium, polarization also affects the leverage incentive of parties. When polarization is low or high, there is no leverage incentive and bipartisan alternatives are never gridlocked but, when polarization is intermediate, gridlock may reach its highest levels. Leverage-based gridlock is accentuated by the voter being forward-looking. In the model, the voter rationally elects the party that is likely to pass the most alternatives. This behavior is intuitive—voters want to elect politicians that ‘‘get stuff done” (Rivlin, 2018). However, this also implies that, conditional on an alternative failing to pass, one party will be electorally advantaged and elected with certainty. The forward-looking behavior of the voter leads this electorally-advantaged party to have a greater incentive to engage in leverage-based gridlock.12 With a weaker (or no) electoral advantage, vetoing an alternative comes with additional risk: the other party may be elected and the unpassed alternative used as leverage against the vetoing party. This reduces—but does not eliminate—the incentive for parties to engage in leveraged-based gridlock. Thus, the voter’s desire to elect a politician that will be productive in the future can, perhaps counterintuitively, encourage politicians to gridlock present-day policies. In equilibrium, gridlock occurs in excess. From the voter’s perspective, gridlock is costly but also entails benefits since, if the unpassed alternative is available, more alternatives will pass in the future. When the benefits outweigh the costs, gridlock is said to be efficient. In equilibrium, gridlock always occurs if it is efficient but may also occur when it is inefficient. This state of excess gridlock is driven by the voter’s inability to commit. With commitment power, it is optimal for the voter to follow a ‘‘blame-game” strategy, whereby they never elect a vetoing party; this strategy allows the voter to completely eradicate inefficient leverage-based gridlock. My results have a number of empirical implications. Returning to immigration reform, my results provide insights into why the DREAM Act (and DACA) may be vulnerable to gridlock. Although the policies enjoy bipartisan support, they provide much greater benefit to the Democratic party and, hence, by delaying such policies, Republicans obtain a large amount of leverage to pass divisive issues in the future. My model also suggests that this leverage based gridlock benefits the Republicans electorally since it allows them to credibly claim that, if elected, they’ll be able to pass more policies in the future compared to the Democrats. More generally, the phenomenon of leverage-based gridlock is empirically relevant because it suggests that traditional measures of ideology based on roll-call voting records (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal (1985)’s NOMINATE methods) will overstate ideological disagreement between parties. Furthermore, my model predicts that gridlock will be more frequent during periods of economic stability. These two predictions combine to provide a novel explanation for why measures of polarization have increased rapidly since the 1980s (Barber and McCarty, 2015). The 1980s marked the beginning of the Great Moderation, a period of economic stability, leading to more frequent leverage-based gridlock and, hence, overstated measures of polarization. This may also explain why within-Congress polarization compared to that within the public is more pronounced (Hetherington, 2001). Finally, my results suggest that direct measures of gridlock can also fail to capture ideological disagreement since gridlock and polarization have a non-monotonic relationship.

2023 GDI Disadvantage
1NC › Shell

UQ: The Farm Bill is barely going to pass now—the debt ceiling fight over SNAP proves that any increase in social programs will doom the Biden-McCarthy coalition

Hill 06-15-23 (Meredith, food and agriculture policy reporter for POLITICO., Far-right Republicans threaten to derail another House priority, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/06/14/mccarthy-house-gop-farm-bill-00101968)-TL

The recent far-right rebellion that brought the House floor to a halt is a bad omen for another rapidly approaching legislative fight: the 2023 farm bill. Major battle lines are forming within the House Republican caucus over the $1 trillion farm bill reauthorization expected to hit the full House this fall — just as Washington is set to descend into another all-consuming battle to fund the government. GOP hardliners are still fuming over the deal House Speaker Kevin McCarthy struck with President Joe Biden to raise the debt limit earlier this month, especially a provision that could expand the number of people on federal food aid. And they are keen to take another swing at limiting that anti-hunger program, the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, up for reauthorization in the farm bill — which promises to be politically polarizing. Republican lawmakers from agriculture-heavy districts, however, want to move as quickly as possible to pass the legislative package — which contains billions of dollars for agriculture and rural development programs their constituents rely on. And they worry their far-right colleagues will snarl up those plans, pushing farm bill passage into the new year. That’s presenting McCarthy with one of his biggest legislative tests yet: Fending off yet another revolt from the right flank of his caucus while securing the bipartisan support that will be necessary to approve the must-pass legislation. At the rate it’s going, Congress may have to resort to extending the existing farm bill authorizations as programs begin to expire this fall — a practical and political headache for the agriculture sector and ag-state Republicans as they gear up for the 2024 election. It’s not just moderate Republicans raising alarms about the potential fall-out if the GOP-led House fails to pass a farm bill this year. “I don’t have a lot of confidence of anything passing the House anymore under the current environment,” said Rep. Scott DesJarlais (R-Tenn.). DesJarlais, one of the few Republicans who is a member of both the Freedom Caucus and the Agriculture Committee, said he plans to reach out to all the fellow hard-right members he can in order to pass a farm bill with minimal delays. But he noted “there’s certain members … that I don’t think anybody can change their opinions.” The notoriously complex farm bill reauthorization process, by design, requires similar bipartisan compromises to those that enraged conservative Republicans during the debt limit negotiations. GOP aides are already assuming that a swathe of far-right Republicans will not vote for the farm bill, and they’ll need at least four to five dozen Democratic votes to pass it in the narrowly-divided House. But after taking a beating over that deal with the White House, and straining to defuse the Freedom Caucus’ rebellion on the House floor last week, McCarthy has signaled it will likely be politically necessary to offer up some concessions to the hard right in the farm bill. In addition to further cuts to SNAP, GOP hardliners are targeting some of the farm safety net programs that are a third rail for the agriculture sector. A House Republican, who spoke of the condition of anonymity to discuss internal matters, said any concessions from McCarthy to House GOP hardliners on the farm bill would be “a really dangerous pin to pull out of the grenade,” given the swift and bitter backlash it would stoke from the rest of the caucus. The farm bill came up only in passing during McCarthy’s meeting with the leaders of the so-called “five families” GOP caucus factions earlier this week, as one of the many legislative items Republicans need to get done this fall, according to two House Republicans who were granted anonymity to discuss private conversations. House Agriculture Committee staff have started compiling a 2023 draft of the farm bill as the panel races to complete a series of farm bill hearings. Negotiations on the text are expected to heat up later this month, with aides and lawmakers pushing for a committee markup by early September. The House-passed legislation will have to be reconciled with the version approved by the Senate. According to Senate Agriculture Chair and No. 3 Democrat Debbie Stabenow of Michigan, Congress is “done” discussing SNAP work requirements in the wake of the debt limit talks. Many lawmakers are beginning to worry that given the current trajectory, the reauthorization process could drag into 2024, which would put additional pressure on a U.S. agriculture sector already reeling from high inflation and, in turn, become a political headache for lawmakers in agriculture-heavy districts and states ahead of the 2024 election. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell recently took to the floor to warn that “time is running out” to pass a farm bill this year. McCarthy has experienced a similar farm bill scenario in the past. He was the No. 2 Republican in the House in 2018 when Freedom Caucus members helped to sink a partisan House GOP farm bill on the floor. It took another seven months for Congress to get the final bill to then-President Donald Trump’s desk, giving Democrats ammunition to go after rural-district Republicans in the meantime. The Republican-majority Senate eventually stripped the House GOP’s steep SNAP restrictions from the final legislation, despite months of toil by McCarthy and then-Speaker Paul Ryan. This time around, congressional leaders are facing even more of a time crunch and far-right Republicans are taking an even harder line, arguing McCarthy and fellow GOP leaders “watered down” new SNAP work requirements in their deal to raise the debt limit. Although he hails from an agriculture-heavy district in California’s Central Valley, McCarthy is still not heavily involved, personally, in the farm bill policy talks. In private, however, the speaker has told fellow Republicans that in order to appease hardliners, the party will need to at least push for stricter work requirements and other restrictions on federal food assistance for low-income Americans beyond the debt deal provisions, according to three other GOP lawmakers who were granted anonymity to discuss internal matters. “I think what the Speaker is saying is that let’s not just let that be the end of the conversation. Let’s have a good conversation, a bipartisan conversation about how we can have the most integrity and serve the most people with the dollars that we have,” said Rep. Brad Finstad (R-Minn.), chair of the House Agriculture subcommittee that oversees the country’s leading anti-hunger program. Many moderate House Republicans, however, are done having that conversation for now — especially those who delivered their party the House majority in 2020 by flipping districts Biden won over Trump. Democrats are already attacking many of those vulnerable Republicans for their support of the debt deal and the new SNAP restrictions in it.

2023 GDI Affirmative
NEG › ***OFF-case*** › EITC CP solvency

Expanded EITC creates the same effects as UBI and avoids the link to politics

Kriston Capps May 30, 2019. “Is This the Universal Basic Income That Americans Will Buy?” BLOOMBERG, accessed July 1, 2023, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-30/the-case-for-a-universal-earned-income-tax-credit

As far as most of the country is concerned, universal basic income—that’s when the government just, like, gives people money—is the stuff of NBER white papers and Star Trek economics. Beyond a handful of notable experiments, like a pilot program in Stockton, California, to give 130 random residents $500 a month for a year and a half, UBI demonstrations—in the U.S. at least—are more elusive than UFOs. That’s at least in part because the premise itself is so fundamentally antithetical to the American mythology of self-made men and women: Handouts are for places like Finland.

But with job-eating automation looming and the wealth gap growing, the essential logic behind UBI—a no-strings-attached cash transfer program that helps vulnerable low-wage households from teetering into ruinous poverty—is more relevant than ever. And we might not have to wait for a socialist revolution or an Andrew Yang presidency to see what it might look like in the United States. Leaders in the here-and-now are thinking about ways to expand a conventional tax credit to guarantee the wages of low- and middle-income working households. Changes to the tax code could help to make up the wage stagnation that has dragged the economy for more than a generation.

2023 GDI Affirmative
NEG › ***OFF-case*** › Link – Capitalism k

Cap Reification DA - UBI locks in capitalist negative consciousness which is the root cause of alienation and capitalist ontology

Harris 2023 (Neal, Department of Social Sciences, Oxford Brookes University, Critical Theory and Universal Basic Income, Critical Sociology, sagepub.com/journals-permissions DOI: 10.1177/08969205231151562 p.9-10)-TL

Reification. Adorno and Horkheimer (1997) united insights from Weber and Marx, and crucially, from Lukács, in their seminal work on reification. For Lukács (1972), reification chiefly refers to the artificial distanciation between the subject and their external world which is induced by capitalism. The capitalist subject views the world in a disengaged manner, abstracted from their surroundings, viewing others people, and their wider environment, as mere ‘things’, as ‘dead matter’ (Horkheimer, 1993: 81). For Lukács (1972), reification derives from ‘the fetish character of commodities’ and is ‘the subjective stance corresponding to it’ (p. 84). In a world which is governed by the exchange of commodities, a pathological form of consciousness comes to dominate. Reification is furthered by the market’s dependence on logics of false equivalence, what Lukács (1972) calls a ‘phantom objectivity’ (p. 6). The capitalist subject is encouraged to reduce their external world to exchangeable, purposeless matter which can be swapped for equivalent capital. The exchange value of a human liver is now commensurate with the exchange value of a certain weight of turnips, or of plutonium. The qualitative difference between the aforementioned objects is ‘written off as literature’ by the reifying logics of the market (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 7). For critical theorists, the hegemony of such reified consciousness is a crucial obstacle to progressive transformation as it prevents the development of critical reason. A fundamental concern for critical theorists, when assessing UBI, therefore, is will it help ameliorate reified consciousness? In this regard, the answer is a resounding negative. Rather than furthering a co-operative approach to all social relations, ever more domains of social life will become controlled by the market. As Van Parijs and Vanderborght (2017: 12) argue, it is ‘fundamental to the concept of a basic income . . . that it is paid in cash’. We would then see an attendant expansion of the commodity form, because we will see an attendant expansion of market actors. The capital relation will now become more, rather than less dominant, as more actors become ‘consumers’, regardless of how their capital is ‘earned’. While the ‘hidden abodes’ of capitalism (Fraser, 2014) were undeniably irrational and inequitable in past social formations, they remained substantially immune from the reifying power of the market. For example, love, esteem and respect can be earned in a manner not mediated by wage-labour (Honneth, 1995). The introduction of a UBI would see ‘recognition’ taking the universal form of capital. Recall that for Van der Veen and Van Parijs (1986) UBI could displace the socialist stage of production in the route to communism as it would enable the development of a community who are socially conditioned to more readily embrace communistic values. However, when viewed through a critical theoretical lens, UBI serves to further entrench and embed reification and false equivalence. By expanding the field of consumers, and reaffirming capital as the fundamental method of affirming social recognition, UBI serves to reinforce a reified atomistic consciousness, rather than serving to enable the transition to a more communistic form of thought and sociality. Critical theory thus offers a warning against the implementation of a UBI: by expanding the market-mediated domains of the social world, the deeply pathological reified form of consciousness associated with capitalistic societies would further proliferate, rather than recede (see Delanty, 2020). This would serve to retard prospects for qualitative socialistic transition as the reified form of thought associated with commodification and the capitalistic relation will be further enshrined, rather than challenged.

2023 GDI Affirmative
NEG › ***OFF-case*** › Link – Capitalism k

UBI doesn’t solve the root cause

Navjeet Sidhu ‘20, National Representative, Research Department, “A Universal Basic Income: Too Good to Be True?” THE UNION,

The introduction of a UBI program would do little in tackling the root causes of poverty and inequality. Our current economic system breeds inequality by funneling extreme wealth to a small group of people. A UBI not accompanied by a radical transformation of the structural economic conditions that promotes unsustainable wealth concentration simply provides people the bare minimum to survive. Even if a UBI were set at a level that was just above an agreed upon poverty line, it would not translate into making overall living conditions more affordable for working-class people. Many would continue, for instance, spending more than half of their income on housing or ever-increasing costs of child care.

2023 GDI Affirmative
NEG › ***OFF-case*** › Link – Capitalism k

UBI oversimplifies capitalist oppression – plan settles for a symbolic solution and does nothing to question or change the foundation of inequality

Simon Szreter, Professor of History and Public Policy at Cambridge University, ’22, July 11, “How Seriously Should we Take Universal Basic Income?” https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-923X.13169

There is a fundamental problem with UBI's restricted focus on a cash transfer as the solution to the plight of the planet and the plight of the poor. Samuel Moyn has been extremely critical of the consequences of human rights being reduced to a UBI-style policy of monetised ‘basic needs’.29 Liz Fouksman found from interviews with UBI recipients in an experimental policy in Namibia that they insisted they wanted jobs, not cash transfers, though they were also attracted by the notion of some kind of social dividend if represented as a right in the collective wealth of their country.30 Louise Haagh has argued persuasively that UBI has itself become something of a token-like voucher, which suits an anti-governmental free market of abstracted finance capitalism.31 A focus on providing the world's poor with mere sufficiency, if taken as a final goal of current policy, stands in the way of addressing the powerful global, corporate, legal and financial forces of inequality keeping them poor. The plundering of the planet and of the poor are intimately related issues and they both need to be addressed by a thoroughgoing focus on the problem of inequality, not just poverty. Behind that lies issues of power. The poor are not only lacking in adequate weekly cash, they are disempowered.

2023 GDI Affirmative
NEG › ***OFF-case*** › Link – Capitalism k

UBI pushes us closer to capitalism extinction – focus on poverty prevents solvency for inequality

Simon Szreter, Professor of History and Public Policy at Cambridge University, ’22, July 11, “How Seriously Should we Take Universal Basic Income?” https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-923X.13169

UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME (UBI) is the policy flavour of the month in the radical centre. There have been experimental pilots during the last decade in the USA, Europe, India and Africa. The UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, wondered aloud in his July 2020 Nelson Mandela Lecture whether the new era, post-Covid, should consider ‘the possibility of a universal basic income’. A UBI proposal was presented in the UK to the Liberal Democrats’ September 2021 conference.

What is the difference between UBI and a long history of similar-sounding policies and proposals, such as a guaranteed income, a negative income tax, basic incomes to cover basic needs, cash transfers and conditional cash transfers? Fortunately a number of scholars have this year published historically-researched accounts of UBI with which to think in a critical, informed way about this.1

2023 GDI Affirmative
NEG › ***OFF-case*** › Link – Inflation

UBI effectiveness gets nullified by resulting inflation

Alan Thomas , June 4, 2020, Berkeley: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, "Full Employment, Unconditional Basic Income and the Keynesian Critique of Rentier Capitalism,"  Pages 18-21 DOA - 6/24/23 DD

There is a specific, macro-economic concern about Van Parijs’s UBI that Minsky explicitly discusses – under his usual description of it as a “negative income tax”. His concern is that this policy is self-stultifying because of its effect on inflation: the purchasing power of the worst off is boosted, only then to be undermined. I think, in Rawlsian terms, we can describe it as one aspect of a conception of justice proving to be unstable – unable to reproduce itself over time. I have already described Minsky’s general argument that tax and transfer schemes, absent an independent commitment to full employment, are of their nature inflationary. Those who produce are taxed and that income is moved to those who do not produce goods or services for consumption. This latter group spend a higher proportion of the transferred resources than those from whom it is transferred. Minsky believed that this inherently inflationary transfer was exacerbated by a UBI via its impact on labour market participation rates. It is true that some people who are currently involuntarily unemployed would, if in receipt of an UBI, be drawn on to the labour market, namely, those currently caught up in benefits traps. But Minsky’s concern is that a significant number of those currently on the labour market will withdraw from it. As Minsky notes, many of the currently poor cannot attach much value to leisure as leisure activities are themselves costly. Not only would a person currently in poverty be even poorer if they reduced their market participation, the leisure would be inadequate compensation given their lack of resources that would allow them to enjoy it. Under a UBI, however, the incentive to introduce more leisure into the economy is accompanied with a financial incentive to make use of it. Those conditions together are likely to produce substantial exit from the labour market. It follows that, at the macro-level, one the one hand, spending power is transferred to those more likely to make use of it. This is an attractive and deliberate upshot of a UBI. However, another macro-effect will be that fewer people will participate in the labour market, so that wages will have to be increased by employers to “bid up” the value of labour. Only this increased remuneration will attract those who could otherwise live on an UBI. As a result, employers will increase wages and push that cost through to prices. Minsky argued that the resulting inflationary increase will largely cancel out the value of a UBI to the worst off, making the policy (from a Rawlsian perspective) self-stultifying. Even those drawn on to the labour market by being freed from benefits traps will see their gains eroded by price inflation. The real point of contrast is between the self-stultifying way in which an UBI leads to inflation that negates most of its good effects for the worst off, and a Rawlsian proposal widely to disperse capital, to ensure fair access to it, and to aim at reasonable equity in its distribution. You can either take SELR to be a policy contained already in this general description – if you include human capital as capital – or as complementary to it (Thomas, 2017, p. 403, fn. 41, 2020b). Rentier Capitalism 19 The final issue to be addressed is the comparative one: if this paper claims that the policy of SELR achieves our egalitarian goals in a stable why, while an UBI does not, what guarantees that the former policy is not inflationary in the same way? Minsky believes that the transition from slack to tight full employment will be inflationary for a time, but: The high wage worker and other affluent citizens have been subsidized, by way of low product prices, by the poor … tight full employment … will lead to cost-push inflation. (Minsky 2013a, p. 10).

2023 GDI Affirmative
NEG › ***OFF-case*** › Link – Inflation

UBI creates inflation – overwhelms the benefits of the plan

CFI Team 2023’

[CFI Team, Originally published 6,16,2020, Updated during 1,7,2023, Corparate Finance Institute, “Universal Basic Income (UBI),” https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/career/universal-basic-income-ubi/, 6/24, DG]

One major issue with a universal basic income, raised by those who oppose such a practice, is inflation. It’s easy to see how the institution of a UBI may fuel inflation.

2023 GDI Affirmative
NEG › ***OFF-case*** › Link – Elections

UBI is unpopular- Most prefer supported financial assistance over unconditional

Sawhill, Senior Fellow in Economic Studies, 16

(Isabel V. Sawhill, is a senior fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution, working in the Center on Children and Families and on the Future of the Middle Class Initiative, “Money for nothing: Why a universal basic income is a step too far” https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobility-memos/2016/06/15/money-for-nothing-why-a-universal-basic-income-is-a-step-too-far/)

Robert Greenstein argues, however, that a UBI would actually hurt the poor by reallocating support up the income scale. His logic is inescapable: either we have to spend additional trillions providing income grants to all Americans or we have to limit assistance to those who need it most. One option is to provide unconditional payments along the lines of a UBI, but to phase it out as income rises. Libertarians like this approach since it gets rid of bureaucracies and leaves the poor free to spend the money on whatever they choose, rather than providing specific funds for particular needs. Liberals fear that such unconditional assistance would be unpopular and would be an easy target for elimination in the face of budget pressures. Right now most of our social programs are conditional. With the exception of the aged and the disabled, assistance is tied to work or to the consumption of necessities such as food, housing, or medical care, and our two largest means-tested programs are Food Stamps and the Earned Income Tax Credit.

2023 GDI Affirmative
NEG › ***OFF-case*** › Link – Elections

Elections DA Link – UBI unpopular even among liberals

Lee, University of La Verne, Public Administration, Professor 21

[Soomi Lee, 2021, Basic Income Studies Vol.16 (2), “Politics of Universal and Unconditional Cash Transfer: Examining Attitudes Toward Universal Basic Income,” , Accessed: 06-24-23, CV]

Since universalism is a built-in feature of UBI, people who support universal social benefits are expected to be more supportive of UBI. The analysis shows the opposite. People who believe that social benefits should be provided only to the lowest income group are more likely to support UBI. The result is consistent with findings in Roosma and Van Oorschot (2019). It is puzzling why strong preferences for universalism do not increase support for UBI. There are a few potential explanations. First, “social benefits and services” in the survey questionnaire are open to interpretation. Some people may consider social benefits only as cash transfers while others as cash and in-kind benefits (e.g. universal healthcare). In other words, people might support the universal provision of public education and universal healthcare but not for cash assistance. Thus, even when people support universal in-kind transfers, they may not necessarily support a universal cash transfer program such as UBI. Second, people perceive UBI as a complementary program to current poverty alleviation programs, although researchers and policymakers consider it as a radical alternative that could transform flawed current welfare programs. Europeans may construe a UBI policy as one of the programs that they are familiar with. Roosma and Van Oorschot (2019) conjecture that “[t]hismay be related to the fact that the so-called path dependency of welfare institutions is stronger in more developed welfare states, with the result that it will be more difficult to gather support for a radical alternative such as [U]BI (p. 6).” Alternatively, it is possible that respondents do not understand Figure 1: Marginal effects of preference for universal benefits on attitudes toward redistribution and UBI. Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Politics of Universal Basic Income 201 UBI’s universalism. However, the speculations are difficult to be tested due to data limitation.