2023
Northwestern
Evidence
Dedev › Impact › AT: Econ---Ext
Rosella Cappella Zielinski et al. 17 Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania; B.A., University of Southern California, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Boston University specializing in the study of political economy of security “What goes up, must come down? The asymmetric effects of economic growth andinternational threat on military spending” 2017, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0022343317715301
We examine two factors widely held to influence military spending: economic growth and international threats. We argue that the mechanisms linking these variables to military spending imply asymmetric effects. National decisionmakers and domestic institutions face different pressures when deciding how to respond to increases and decreases in these conditions..We propose that economic decline should have a greater effect on the budget than will economic growth. Low or negative economic growth will reduce government revenue and put downward pressure on the budget.3 Economic contraction results in decreased state revenue as declining incomes lead to lower corporate, income, and value-added tax payments (Swank & Steinmo, 2002; Morrissey et al., 2016).4 Revenue may be further reduced as states implement counter-cyclical tax cuts in order to stimulate the economy (Romer & Romer, 2010). While economic contraction puts downward pressure on the entire budget due to decreased revenue, we expect military budgets to be more vulnerable to discretionary pressures. There are systematic trade-offs against defense when budgets decline, specifically in favor of civilian spending (Mok & Duval, 1992), particularly when spending is curtailed for deficit management (Ward & Mahajan, 1984). In addition to deficit management and tax cuts, civilian spending rises via automatic fiscal stabilizers (Auerbach & Feenberg, 2000) and other welfare transfer payments such as unemployment compensation, social retirement benefits, and health care (Pierson, 2001; for developing countries and taxfinanced transfers see Barrientos, 2012, 2013; Barrientos, Nino-Zarazua & Maitrot, 2010).
2023
Northwestern
Evidence
Dedev › Impact › AT: Econ---2NC
Jay ‘20 [Paul Jay, founder of The Real News Network, “Risking the Apocalypse for Dollars,” July 3, 2020, https://theanalysis.news/risking-the-apocalypse-for-dollars-paul-jay/]
The people I have interviewed, from Daniel Ellsberg to Larry Wilkerson, who used to be Colin Powell’s chief of staff; I’ve seen interviews with the former diplomats, military people. They all think that nuclear war is not likely. They think it is assured. It’s not that there’s a chance, they think, of nuclear war. They think there is 100 % certainty that if things continue as they are at some point sooner, it could be today or tomorrow or later, it could be some years from now, there will be, at the very least, accidental nuclear war. The safeguards simply aren’t safe enough, and that this new investment, the new nuclear arms race that has started under Obama, but it’s also happening under Putin, driven by the military-industrial complexes of Russia and the United States, although the Americans are certainly more the instigators. But these whole new whack of nuclear weapons are coming online and the old ones that still exist and in deteriorating situations that are not safe, the possibility of accidental nuclear war is not possible, it is certain. They think the possibility of some kind of terrorist attack using dirty bombs could be mistaken for an attack by a major power. And if the dirty bomb went off in New York, as someone would have put a small nuclear bomb in a container ship and it blows up in New York Harbor, there’s only a 10 second window. We’re still on a hair-trigger alert between Russia and the United States. 10 seconds for the militaries of both countries to decide, if what just happened was an attack or terrorist attack, an accident, ten seconds.
Michael
2023
Northwestern
Evidence
Dedev › Impact › AT: Econ---2NC
Walt ’20 [Stephen; 5/13/20; Professor of International Relations at Harvard University; " Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?" https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/]
On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”
Second, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself.
2023
Northwestern
Evidence
Dedev › Impact › Impact---Environment---2NC
Hong‑Hu Meng et al. 19 Meng is a part of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Phylogenetics and Conservation Group, Center for Integrative Conservation, and Xishuangbanna Tropical Botanical Garden, “Confict between biodiversity conservation and economic growth: insight into rare plants in tropical China” Biodiversity and Conservation, 2019 28:523–537. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs10531-018-1661-4.pdf
Globally, economic growth using natural resources can alleviate poverty in under-developed regions and countries with rich biodiversity. Thus, excessive economic growth will inevitably have negative repercussions for biodiversity. However, rare plants with few individuals or restricted distributions are at risk under the pressures of economic growth and neglect of biodiversity conservation. In some case, the rare plants, such as T. verticillata, are disappearing and becoming extinct as they are discovered. Actually, there are some rare plants are facing the same fate and disappearing before they have been described or named. Reconcilable or not, the basic confict between biodiversity conservation and economic growth is not well understood in broader society, and therefore is seldom incorporated into public policy, particularly with regards to the macroeconomic policies that infuence rates of economic growth (Czech 2008). Thus, given the current acceleration of China’s economic growth, understanding the confict is not only necessary and urgent, but is also essential for efective conservation planning, as it is based on the current situation and the infuences of environmental changes.
2023
Northwestern
Evidence
Dedev › Impact › Impact---Climate---2NC
Holthaus 18 [Eric Holthaus is a meteorologist and columnist for Grist, covering climate science, policy, and solutions. He has previously written for the Wall Street Journal, Slate, and a variety of other publications. What the stock market crash means for the climate. December 27, 2018. https://grist.org/article/what-the-stock-market-crash-means-for-the-climate/]
Politicians have long presented the economy and the environment as competing issues. And on the surface, the vast majority of people in the world don’t care about the stock market. Nearly half the people in the world live on less than $5.50 per day, and it’s them who’ll bear the brunt of climate change. When asked, they care much more about climate change than the economy.
There’s evidence that an economic downturn could be good for the planet. The rare times the world has successfully temporarily stabilized or decreased annual emissions were during economic recessions like 1990-93 and 2008-09.
2023
Northwestern
Evidence
Dedev › Impact › Impact---Climate---2NC
Roberts 18 (David Roberts, climate expert and energy politics reporter for Vox “What genuine, no-bullshit ambition on climate change would look like.” Published: October 8, 2018 DOA:7-27-20 https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/5/7/17306008/climate-change-global-warming-scenarios-ambition]
In the end, perhaps the most important conclusion in the Nature Climate Change paper is the simplest and the one that we already knew: “a rapid transformation in energy consumption and land use is needed in all scenarios.” At this point, whether it’s possible to hit various targets is almost beside the point. All the science and modeling are saying the same thing, which is that humanity faces serious danger and needs to reduce carbon emissions to zero as quickly as possible. The chances of us getting our collective shit together and accomplishing what these scenarios describe are ... slim. There are so many vested interests and so much public aversion to rapid change, so many governments to be coordinated, so many economic and technology trends that must fall just the right way. It’s daunting. Conversely, the chances of us overdoing it — trying too hard, spending too much money, reducing emissions too much or too fast — are effectively nil. So the only rule of climate policy that really matters is: go as hard and fast as possible, forever and ever, amen.
2023
Northwestern
Evidence
Dedev › Impact › Impact---Climate---2NC
Dunlop 17 [Ian Dunlop chaired the Australian Coal Association in 1987-88, chaired the Australian Greenhouse Office Experts Group on Emissions Trading from 1998-2000 and was CEO of the Australian Institute of Company Directors from 1997-2001. 7-26-2017, “A Failure of Imagination on Climate Risks,” www.resilience.org/stories/2017-07-26/a-failure-of-imagination-on-climate-risks/]
Climate change is an existential risk that could abruptly end human civilisation because of a catastrophic “failure of imagination” by global leaders to understand and act on the science and evidence before them. At the London School of Economics in 2008, Queen Elizabeth questioned: “Why did no one foresee the timing, extent and severity of the Global Financial Crisis?” The British Academy answered a year later: “A psychology of denial gripped the financial and corporate world… [it was] the failure of the collective imagination of many bright people… to understand the risks to the system as a whole”. A “failure of imagination” has also been identified as one of the reasons for the breakdown in US intelligence around the 9/11 attacks in 2001. A similar failure is occurring with climate change today. The problem is widespread at the senior levels of government and global corporations. A 2016 report, Thinking the unthinkable, based on interviews with top leaders around the world, found that: “A proliferation of ‘unthinkable’ events… has revealed a new fragility at the highest levels of corporate and public service leaderships. Their ability to spot, identify and handle unexpected, non-normative events is… perilously inadequate at critical moments… Remarkably, there remains a deep reluctance, or what might be called ‘executive myopia’, to see and contemplate even the possibility that ‘unthinkables’ might happen, let alone how to handle them. Such failures are manifested in two ways in climate policy. At the political, bureaucratic and business level in underplaying the high-end risks and in failing to recognise that the existential risk of climate change is totally different from other risk categories. And at the research level in underestimating the rate of climate change impact and costs, along with an under-emphasis on, and poor communication of, those high-end risks. An existential risk is an adverse outcome that would either annihilate intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtail its potential. For example, a big meteor impact, large-scale nuclear war, or sea levels 70 metres higher than today. Existential risks are not amenable to the reactive (learn from failure) approach of conventional risk management, and we cannot necessarily rely on the institutions, moral norms, or social attitudes developed from our experience with managing other sorts of risks. Because the consequences are so severe — perhaps the end of human global civilisation as we know it — researchers say that “even for an honest, truth-seeking, and well-intentioned investigator it is difficult to think and act rationally in regard to… existential risks”. Yet the evidence is clear that climate change already poses an existential risk to global economic and societal stability and to human civilisation that requires an emergency response. Temperature rises that are now in prospect could reduce the global human population by 80% or 90%. But this conversation is taboo, and the few who speak out are admonished as being overly alarmist. Prof. Kevin Anderson considers that “a 4°C future [relative to pre-industrial levels] is incompatible with an organized global community, is likely to be beyond ‘adaptation’, is devastating to the majority of ecosystems, and has a high probability of not being stable”. He says: “If you have got a population of nine billion by 2050 and you hit 4°C, 5°C or 6°C, you might have half a billion people surviving”. Asked at a 2011 conference in Melbourne about the difference between a 2°C world and a 4°C world, Prof. Hans Joachim Schellnhuber replied in two words: “Human civilisation”. The World Bank reports: “There is no certainty that adaptation to a 4°C world is possible”. Amongst other impacts, a 4°C warming would trigger the loss of both polar ice caps, eventually resulting, at equilibrium, in a 70-metre rise in sea level.
2023
Northwestern
Evidence
Dedev › Impact › Impact---2NC
Beckstead ’15 [Nick; September 2015; Program Officer for the Open Philanthropy Project, Ph.D. in Philosophy from Rutgers University; "How much could refuges help us recover from a global catastrophe?" Futures, Vol. 71, p. 36-44]
A first issue is that a global food crisis would not necessarily result in extinction. Extinction may even be extremely unlikely in such cases. The closest historical precedent to these crises was the supervolcanic Toba eruption that took places about 74,000 years ago. Many eruptions of this kind have taken place in the last tens of millions of years, but they did not extinguish our pre-human ancestors (Shulman, 2012a). Humans may now be in many ways worse prepared for such a crisis, with a much larger percentage of the population without hunting and agricultural skills, but we have many advantages in terms of technology and coordination. The 100+ isolated peoples would be relatively similar to pre-human ancestors who survived supervolcanic eruptions in the past, though—as noted above—they may have a notable disadvantage in re-establishing an advanced industrial civilization.
Second, in any of the global food crisis scenarios noted above, there would be a substantial amount of remaining food reserves in the form of grain stockpiles, livestock, fisheries, foods stored at retailers and private homes, and wild land animals that could be hunted (Shulman, 2012b). Therefore, if a refuge helps humanity survive a global food crisis, the mechanism could not be conceived of as “adding enough to the global food stock to help with survival.” More plausibly, there could be a scenario where there is not enough food for everyone to survive the global food crisis, but there would be enough food for some people to survive if they got a disproportionate share of the food. However, conflict (e.g., as in McCarthy's post-apocalyptic novel The Road) and/or egalitarian pressures could prevent a distribution that would allow at least some of the population to survive the crisis. Conceivably, if the refuge were sufficiently secret, isolated, and well-stocked, it might be the only place where these pressures could be abated, making the people in refuges the sole survivors of the global food crisis. While conceivable and perhaps plausible, refuges’ unique success in this kind of case is not automatic and perhaps unlikely. If some small, well-armed group seizes some grain elevators, refuses to share their bounty, and successfully defends what they have claimed, they could also survive the global food crisis. Alternatively, a single survivalist community might be isolated and well-defended enough to achieve the same purpose. This potential use case may deserve more detailed analysis.
2023
Northwestern
Evidence
Dedev › 1NC › Impact---Inequality---1NC
Trainer et al. ’20 [Ted, Samuel Alexander, and Jonathan Rutherford; May 2020; Honorary Adjunct Associate Professor at the University of New South Wales, Ph.D. from the University of Sydney; Co-Director of the Simplicity Institute and lecturer at the Office for Environmental Programs at the University of Melbourne, Ph.D. from Melbourne Law School; former Professor of Cultural Studies at the University of Middlesex; The Simpler Way, “Part One: Overview,” Ch. 1]
We cannot solve the alarming global problems confronting humanity if we continue to be committed to affluent, consumer lifestyles or to economies driven by market forces and economic growth. The case for this conclusion has been overwhelmingly convincing for many decades, but it has been almost impossible to get people or governments to attend to it.
There is a workable and attractive alternative society, the Simpler Way, but it requires a huge and radical shift from consumer society. There are two major faults built into the foundations of our existing civilisation. The first concerns unsustainability; the second concerns injustice. This opening essay provides a short overview of these two concerns, raising issues that will be developed throughout the book.
2023
Northwestern
Evidence
Dedev › 1NC › Impact---Environment---1NC
Jones ’21 [Aled; 7/21/21; Director of the Global Sustainability Institute at Anglia Ruskin University, Ph.D. in Cosmology from the University of Cambridge, M.A. in Natural Science, Theoretical Physics from the University of Cambridge, Nick King; Visiting Researcher at Anglia Ruskin University, M.Sc. in Environmental Engineering, Technology, and Environmental Technology from the Imperial College London; "An Analysis of the Potential for the Formation of ‘Nodes of Persisting Complexity’," Sustainability, Volume 13, 8161, p. 1-32]
Note: ‘<’ expanded as ‘less than’ in brackets for readability.
1.2.5. Societal Collapse
2023
Northwestern
Evidence
Dedev › 1NC › Impact---Climate---1NC
Melton 19 [Michelle Melton is a 3L at Harvard Law School. Before law school, she was an associate fellow in the Energy and National Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where she focused on climate policy. Climate Change and National Security, Published: 1-7-20 DOA:7-27-20 “Part II: How Big a Threat is the Climate?” https://www.lawfareblog.com/climate-change-and-national-security-part-ii-how-big-threat-climate]
At least until 2050, and possibly for decades after, climate change will remain a creeping threat that will exacerbate and amplify existing, structural global inequalities. While the developed world will be negatively affected by climate change through 2050, the consequences of climate change will be felt most acutely in the developing world. The national security threats posed by climate change to 2050 are likely to differ in degree, not kind, from the kinds of threats already posed by climate change. For the next few decades, climate change will exacerbate humanitarian crises—some of which will result in the deployment of military personnel, as well as material and financial assistance. It will also aggravate natural resource constraints, potentially contributing to political and economic conflict over water, food and energy. The question for the next 30 years is not “can humanity survive as a species with 1.5°C or 2°C of warming,” but, “how much will the existing disparities between the developed and developing world widen, and how long (and how successfully) can these widening political/economic disparities be sustained?” The urgency of the climate threat in the next few decades will depend, to a large degree, on whether and how much the U.S. government perceives a widening of these global inequities as a threat to U.S. national security. By contrast, if emissions continue to creep upward (or if they do not decline rapidly), by 2100 climate-related national security threats could be existential. The question for the next hundred years is not, “are disparities politically and economically manageable?” but, “can the global order, premised on the nation-state system, itself based on territorial sovereignty, survive in a world in which substantial swathes of territory are potentially uninhabitable?” National Security Consequences of Climate Change to 2050 Scientists can predict the consequences of climate change to 2050 with some measure of certainty. (Beyond that date, the pace and magnitude of climate change—and therefore, the national security threat posed by it—depend heavily on the level of emissions in the coming years, as I have explained.) There is relative agreement across modeled climate scenarios that the world will likely warm, on average, at least 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels by about 2050—but perhaps as soon as 2030. This level of warming is likely to occur even if the world succeeds in dramatically reducing greenhouse gas emissions, as even the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report implicitly admits. In other words, a certain amount of additional warming—at least 1.5°C, and probably more than that—is presumptively unavoidable. Looking ahead to 2050, it can be said with relative confidence that the national security consequences of climate change will vary in degree, not in kind, from the national security threats already facing the United States. This is hardly good news. Even small differences in global average temperatures result in significant environmental changes, with attendant social, economic and political consequences. By 2050, climate change will wreak increasing havoc on human and natural systems—predominantly, but not exclusively, in the developing world—with attenuated but profound consequences for national security. In particular, changes in temperature, the hydrological cycle and the ranges of insects will impact food availability and food access in much of the world, increasing food insecurity. Storms, flooding, changes in ocean pH and other climate-linked changes will damage infrastructure and negatively impact labor productivity and economic growth in much of the world. Vector-borne diseases will also become more prevalent, as climate change will expand the geographic range and intensity of transmission of diseases like malaria, West Nile, Zika and dengue fever, and cholera. Rising public health challenges, economic devastation and food insecurity will translate into an increased demand for humanitarian assistance provided by the military, increased migration—especially from tropical and subtropical regions—and geopolitical conflict. Long-term trends such as declining food security, coupled with short-term events like hurricanes, could sustain unprecedented levels of migration. The 2015 refugee crisis in Europe portends the kinds of population movements that will only accelerate in the coming decades: people from Africa, Southwest and South Asia and elsewhere crossing land and water to reach Europe. For the United States, this likely means greater numbers of people seeking entry from both Central America and the Caribbean. Such influxes are not unprecedented, but they are unlikely to abate and could increase in volume over the next few decades, driven in part by climate change-related food insecurity, climate change-related storms and also by economic and political instability. Food insecurity, economic losses and loss of human life are also likely to exacerbate existing political tensions in the developing world, especially in regions with poor governance and/or where the climate is particularly vulnerable to warming (e.g., the Mediterranean basin). While the Arab Spring had many underlying causes, it also coincided with a period of high food prices, which arguably contributed to the protests. In some situations, food insecurity, economic losses and public health crises, combined with weak and ineffectual governance, could precipitate future conflicts of this kind—although it will be difficult to know where and when without more precise local studies of both underlying political dynamics and the regionally-specific impacts of climate change. While the national security impacts of climate change to 2050 are likely to be costly and disruptive for the U.S. military—and devastating for many people around the world—at some point after 2050, if warming continues at its current pace, changes to the climate could fundamentally reshape geopolitics and possibly even the current nation-state basis of the current global order. To be clear, both the ultimate level of warming and its attendant political consequences is highly speculative, for the reasons I explained in my last post. Nonetheless, we do know that the planet is currently on track for at least 3-4°C of warming by 2100. The “known knowns” of higher levels of warming—say, 3°C—are frightening. At that 3°C of warming, for example, scientists project that there will be a nearly 70 percent decline in wheat production in Central America and the Caribbean, 75 percent of the land area in the Middle East and more than 50 percent in South Asia will be affected by highly unusual heat, and sea level rise could displace and imperil the lives hundreds of millions of people, among other consequences. But even higher levels of warming are physically possible within this century. At these levels of warming, some regions of the world would be literally uninhabitable, likely resulting in the depopulation of the tropics, to say nothing of the consequences of sea-level rise for economically important cities such as Amsterdam and New York. Even if newly warmed regions of the far north could theoretically accommodate the resulting migrants, this presumes that the political response to this unprecedented global displacement would be orderly and conflict-free borders on fantasy. The geopolitical consequences of significant levels of warming are severe, but if these changes occur in a linear way, at least there will be time for human systems to adjust. Perhaps more challenging for national security is the possibility that the until-now linear changes give way to abrupt and irreversible ones. Scientists forecast that, at higher levels of warming—precisely what level is speculative—humanity could trigger catastrophic, abrupt and unavoidable consequences to the ecosystem. The IPCC has considered nine such abrupt changes; one example is the potential shutting down of the Indian summer monsoon. Over a billion people are dependent upon the Indian monsoon, which provides parts of South Asia with about 80 percent of its annual rainfall; relatively minor changes in the monsoon in either direction can cause disasters. In 2010, a wetter monsoon led to the catastrophic flooding in Pakistan, which directly affected 20 million people; a drier monsoon in 2002 led to devastating drought. Studies suggest that the Indian summer monsoon has two stable states: wet (i.e., the current state) and dry (characterized by low precipitation over the subcontinent). At some point, if warming continues, the monsoon could abruptly shift into the second, “dry” state, with catastrophic consequences for over a billion people dependent on monsoon-fed agriculture. The IPCC suggests that such a state-shift is “unlikely”—that is, there is a 10 to 33 percent chance that a state-shift will happen in the 21st century—but scientists also have relatively low confidence in their understanding of the underlying mechanisms in this and other large-scale natural systems. The consequences of abrupt, severe warming for national security are obvious in general, if unclear in the specifics. In 2003, the Defense Department asked a contractor to explore such a scenario. The resulting report outlined the offensive and defensive national security strategies countries may adopt if faced with abrupt climate change, and highlighted the increased risk of inter- and intra-state conflict over natural resources and immigration. Although the report may be off in its imagined timeframe (positing abrupt climate change by 2020), the world it conjures is improbable but not outlandish. If the Indian monsoon were to switch to dry state, and a billion people were suddenly without reliable food sources, for example, it is not clear how the Indian government would react, assuming it would survive in its current form. Major wars or low-intensity proxy conflicts seem likely, if not inevitable, in such a scenario. This is not to say that a parade of climate horribles is certain—or even likely—to come to pass. Scientific understanding of the sensitivities in the climate system are far from perfect. It is also possible that emissions will decline more rapidly than anticipated, averting the worst consequences of climate change. But this outcome is far from guaranteed. And even if global emissions decline precipitously, humanity cannot be sure when or whether the planet has crossed a climate tipping point beyond which the incremental nature of the current changes shifts from the current linear, gradual progression to a non-linear and abrupt process. Within the next few decades, the most likely scenario involves manageable, but costly, consequences on infrastructure, food security and natural disasters, which will be borne primarily by the world’s most impoverished citizens and the members of the military who provide them with humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. But while the head-turning national security impacts of climate change are probably several decades away, the nature of the threat is such that waiting until these changes manifest is not a viable option. By the time the climate consequences are severe enough to compel action, there is likely to be little that can be done on human timescales to undo the changes to environmental systems and the human societies dependent upon them.
2023
Northwestern
Evidence
Dedev › 1NC › Impact---Climate---1NC
Mastini ’18 [Riccardo; 6/1/18; Ph.D. student in ecological economics and political ecology in the Institute of Environmental Science and Technology at the Autonomous University of Barcelona; "Work in a World Without Growth," https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/work-in-a-world-without-growth/]
A fixation with growth in economics has seen GDP increase in proportion to environmental damage. As planetary limits draw ever closer and are even being surpassed, such a model cannot be sustained. Riccardo Mastini explains how a job guarantee could open up the way to a sustainable economic model.
Since the dawn of capitalism, market economies have placed a high emphasis on labour productivity. Continuous improvements in technology geared towards productivity increases lead to more output being produced for a given amount of labour. But crucially these advances also mean that fewer people are needed to produce the same amount of goods and services each year. As long as the economy expands fast enough to offset increases in labour productivity there is no problem. But if the economy does not grow, people lose their jobs.
2023
Northwestern
Evidence
Dedev › 1NC › Growth Bad---1NC
Liao ’19 [Jianan; 2019; Shenzhen Nanshan Foreign Language School; International Symposium on Social Science and Management Innovation, “Business Cycle and War: A Literature Review and Evaluation,” vol. 68]
Through the comparison of the two views, it can be found that both sides are too vague in the description of the concept of business cycle. According to economists such as Joseph Schumpeter, the business cycle is divided into four phases: expansion, crisis, recession, recovery. [12] Although there are discords in the division and naming of business cycle, it is certain that they are not simply divided into two stages of rise and recession. However, as mentioned above, scholars who discussed the relationship between business cycle and war often failed to divide the business cycle into four stages in detail to analyze the relationship.
First, war can occur at any stage of expansion, crisis, recession, recovery, so it is unrealistic to assume that wars occur at any particular stage of the business cycle. On the one hand, although the domestic economic problems in the crisis/recession/depression period break out and become prominent in a short time, in fact, such challenge exists at all stages of the business cycle. When countries cannot manage to solve these problems through conventional approaches, including fiscal and monetary policies, they may resort to military expansion to achieve their goals, a theory known as Lateral Pressure. [13] Under such circumstances, even countries in the period of economic expansion are facing downward pressure on the economy and may try to solve the problem through expansion. On the other hand, although the resources required for foreign wars are huge for countries in economic depression, the decision to wage wars depends largely on the consideration of the gain and loss of wars. Even during depression, governments can raise funding for war by issuing bonds. Argentina, for example, was mired in economic stagflation before the war on the Malvinas islands (also known as the Falkland islands in the UK). In fact, many governments would dramatically increase their expenditure to stimulate the economy during the recession, and economically war is the same as these policies, so the claim that a depressed economy cannot support a war is unfounded. In addition, during the crisis period of the business cycle, which is the early stage of the economic downturn, despite the economic crisis and potential depression, the country still retains the ability to start wars based on its economic and military power. Based on the above understanding, war has the conditions and reasons for its outbreak in all stages of the business cycle.
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Case › Economy Advantage---Defense › 2NC---AT: Econ Decline
Stephen M. Walt 20, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, 5/13/20, “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?,”
If one takes a longer-term perspective, however, a sustained economic depression could make war more likely by strengthening fascist or xenophobic political movements, fueling protectionism and hypernationalism, and making it more difficult for countries to reach mutually acceptable bargains with each other. The history of the 1930s shows where such trends can lead, although the economic effects of the Depression are hardly the only reason world politics took such a deadly turn in the 1930s. Nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarian rule were making a comeback well before COVID-19 struck, but the economic misery now occurring in every corner of the world could intensify these trends and leave us in a more war-prone condition when fear of the virus has diminished.
On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, there would be a lot more of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).”
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Case › Economy Advantage---Defense › 2NC---AT: Econ Decline
Diversionary and ‘military Keynesianism’ theories are both wrong---no country in the world today would act on either
Stephen M. Walt 20, the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University, 5/13/20, “Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?,”
For these reasons, the pandemic itself may be conducive to peace. But what about the relationship between broader economic conditions and the likelihood of war? Might a few leaders still convince themselves that provoking a crisis and going to war could still advance either long-term national interests or their own political fortunes? Are the other paths by which a deep and sustained economic downturn might make serious global conflict more likely?
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Case › Economy Advantage---Defense › 1NC---AT: Econ Decline
Jianan Liao 19, Shenzhen Nanshan Foreign Language School, February 2019, “Business Cycle and War: A Literature and Evaluation,” https://dx.doi.org/10.2991/ssmi-18.2019.37
Through the comparison of the two views, it can be found that both sides are too vague in the description of the concept of business cycle. According to economists such as Joseph Schumpeter, the business cycle is divided into four phases: expansion, crisis, recession, recovery. [12] Although there are discords in the division and naming of business cycle, it is certain that they are not simply divided into two stages of rise and recession. However, as mentioned above, scholars who discussed the relationship between business cycle and war often failed to divide the business cycle into four stages in detail to analyze the relationship.
First, war can occur at any stage of expansion, crisis, recession, recovery, so it is unrealistic to assume that wars occur at any particular stage of the business cycle. On the one hand, although the domestic economic problems in the crisis/recession/depression period break out and become prominent in a short time, in fact, such challenge exists at all stages of the business cycle. When countries cannot manage to solve these problems through conventional approaches, including fiscal and monetary policies, they may resort to military expansion to achieve their goals, a theory known as Lateral Pressure. [13] Under such circumstances, even countries in the period of economic expansion are facing downward pressure on the economy and may try to solve the problem through expansion. On the other hand, although the resources required for foreign wars are huge for countries in economic depression, the decision to wage wars depends largely on the consideration of the gain and loss of wars. Even during depression, governments can raise funding for war by issuing bonds. Argentina, for example, was mired in economic stagflation before the war on the Malvinas islands (also known as the Falkland islands in the UK). In fact, many governments would dramatically increase their expenditure to stimulate the economy during the recession, and economically war is the same as these policies, so the claim that a depressed economy cannot support a war is unfounded. In addition, during the crisis period of the business cycle, which is the early stage of the economic downturn, despite the economic crisis and potential depression, the country still retains the ability to start wars based on its economic and military power. Based on the above understanding, war has the conditions and reasons for its outbreak in all stages of the business cycle.
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Case › Economy Advantage---Defense › 2NC---AT: Innovation
Megan Mcardle 10, columnist at Bloomberg View and a former senior editor at The Atlantic. 3/23/10, “Will Health Insurance Reform Spur Entrepreneurship?” https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/03/will-health-insurance-reform-spur-entrepreneurship/37888/
I've heard a lot of arguments that health care reform will increase the rate of entrepreneurship. Most of them go along the lines of this piece from Jonathan Gruber: lack of an alternative source of health insurance creates "job lock", where employees are afraid to switch jobs. The better your recourse to alternate insurance, the more likely you are to be self-employed.
It's certainly a plausible story. And certainly, the number of people who wish to start businesses, but are held back by the health insurance problem, cannot be zero. The question is, is that number actually large? The age group that worries most about health insurance is also the age group that has other commitments, like mortgages. How many people are financially stable enough to strike out on their own, but have no recourse to COBRA, and cannot afford to buy private insurance?
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Case › Economy Advantage---Defense › 1NC---AT: Innovation
Megan Mcardle 10, columnist at Bloomberg View and a former senior editor at The Atlantic. 12/16/10, “Will National Health Care Improve Our Economic Health?” https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2010/12/will-national-health-care-improve-our-economic-health/68165/
During the latter half of the debate over the health care bill, you started to hear an intriguing argument about the effects of the bill. Where conservatives claimed that it would stifle the economy, liberals countered that in fact, it would unleash the entrepreneurial power of people "locked into" their jobs by fear of losing their health coverage. David Leonhardt rehearses this argument in his most recent column:
It's easy to look at the current debate and see an unavoidable trade-off between this country's two economic traditions -- risk-taking and security. But I don't think that's quite right. I think it is ultimately as misplaced as those worries about Social Security and Medicare equaling Bolshevism.
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Case › Economy Advantage---Defense › 2NC---Costs Not K2 Econ
Toni Johnson 12, CFR analyst. 3/26/12, “Healthcare Costs and U.S. Competitiveness” https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/healthcare-costs-and-us-competitiveness
Still, other experts debate the degree to which health care affects U.S. industries. "Health benefits are largely substitutes for other forms of labor compensation," says American Enterprise Institute Fellow Thomas Miller in a CFR.org roundup. "Hence U.S. firms have performed well [in the past], despite rising levels of healthcare costs, because high levels of productivity and a favorable investment climate were (and remain) much more important factors in determining competitiveness."
Health care is one of several factors--entrenched union contracts are another--that make doing business in the United States expensive, and it’s difficult to parse the effects of each factor. Moreover, economists disagree on the number of U.S. jobs that have been lost to offshoring--the transfer of business operations across national boundaries to friendlier operating environments. A RAND June 2009 study published in the Health Services Research Journal found that industries with the highest level of employer-sponsored health care (such as manufacturing, telecommunications, education, and finance) showed the slowest amounts of growth between 1987 and 2005 compared to industries with the smallest level of employer-provided insurance in the United States and compared to their industry competitors in Canada, where insurance is provided by the state. U.S. News and World Report Money blogger Rick Newman uses some of the RAND data to project the decrease in industry growth and potential job losses for fifteen sectors should healthcare costs rise to 20 percent of U.S. GDP.
2023
Northwestern
Affirmative
Case › Economy Advantage---Defense › 1NC---Costs Not K2 Econ
John R. Graham 16, a public-policy analyst, is Director of the Health Technology Forum: DC; and a Senior Fellow at the National Center for Policy Analysis. 4/20/16, “The U.S. Health System Is Not An Economic Burden” https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2016/04/20/the-u-s-health-system-is-not-an-economic-burden/#10720a622832
Health spending consumes a higher share of output in the United States than in other countries. In 2013, it accounted for 17% of Gross Domestic Product. The next highest country was France, where health spending accounted for 12% of GDP. Critics of U.S. healthcare claim this shows the system is too expensive and a burden on our economy, demanding even more government intervention. This conclusion is misleading and leads to poor policy recommendations, according to new research published by the National Center for Policy Analysis (U.S. Health Spending is Not A Burden on the Economy, NCPA Policy Report No. 383, April 2016).
Discussing health spending in dollars, rather than proportion of GDP, the report notes Americans spent $9,086 per capita on healthcare in 2013, versus only $6,325 in Switzerland, the runner-up. (These dollar figures are adjusted for purchasing power parity, which adjusts the exchange rates of currencies for differences in cost of living). This big difference certainly invites us to question whether we are getting our money’s worth. However, it is not clear that this spending is a burden on Americans, given our very high national income.