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2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › Coverage Advantage › 1AR---AT: RnD Key

Pharma RnD Fails

Donald W. Light 11, Lokey visiting professor at Stanford University and a professor of comparative health-care at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey and Rebecca Warburton, associate professor and a health economist, specializing in the costbenefit analysis of health-related public projects at School of Public Administration, University of Victoria 2011 http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCAQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.pharmamyths.net%2Ffiles%2FBiosocieties_2011_Myths_of_High_Drug_Research_Costs.pdf&ei=7o26VL7IEIaSyQSqiYLAAw&usg=AFQjCNH0EMojy1ghTCzl6bWT0bIFZqj0sg&sig2=7AmvrPw2vDbJgGLgfdQmMA&bvm=bv.83829542,d.aWw]

In the undertaking of grand challenges and the search for vaccines and other magic bullets to eradicate diseases of the poor, the very high costs of pharmaceutical research appear everywhere. When companies like GlaxoSmithKline announce they will lower prices to a fraction of what they charge in affluent countries, the initial high price is justified based on the high risks and costs of research and development (R&D). For decades, the very high costs of R&D have been the industry’s rationale for high prices in the developed world, and the basis for claims that companies cannot afford research into primarily developing-world diseases, where high prices cannot be charged. The few companies that did not abandon vaccine R&D because prices were so low ‘solved’ that problem by charging 20–40 times more than they used to, citing the high cost of R&D. When Michael Kremer’s version of an ‘advance market commitment’ (AMC) swept the policy world and was embraced by the G8 as a fiscal magic bullet that would result in new vaccines for malaria or AIDS, it was premised on meeting the allegedly high costs of R&D for multinational corporations, whose innovative researchers would find a vaccine for malaria or AIDS, where public or university researchers had failed (Kremer and Glennerster, 2004, pp. 10–11; Farlow, 2005). Industry executives, well supplied with facts and figures by the industry’s global press network, awe audiences with staggering figures for the cost of a single trial, like tribal chieftains and their scribes who recount the mythic costs of a great victory in a remote pass where no outside witnesses saw the battle. Companies tightly control access to verifiable facts about their risks and costs, allowing access only to supported economists at consulting firms and universities, who develop methods for showing how large costs and risks are; and then the public, politicians and journalists often take them at face value, accepting them as fact. The global press network never tells audiences about the detailed reconstruction of R&D costs for RotaTeq and Rotarix that found costs and risks were remarkably low up to the large final trials, and that concluded the companies recovered their investments within the first 18 months (Light et al, 2009). The companies could now sell these vaccines for rotavirus for one-tenth their Western price and still earn profits. Pharmaceutical companies have a strong vested interest in maximizing figures for R&D and supporting centres or researchers who help them do so. Since the Kefauver hearings in 1959–1962, the industry’s principal justification for its high prices on patented drugs has been the high cost of R&D, and it has sought further government protections from normal price competition. These include increasing patent terms and extending data exclusivity, without good evidence that these measures increase innovation (National Institute for Health Care Management, 2000; European Commission for Competition, 2008 (28 November); Adamini et al, 2009). Industry leaders and lobbyists routinely warn that lower prices will reduce funds for R&D and result in suffering and death that future medicines could reduce. Marcia Angell, the former editor of the New England Journal of Medicine, describes this as ‘y a kind of blackmail’ (Angell, 2004, pp. 38–39). She quotes the president of the US industry’s trade association as saying, ‘Believe me, if we impose price controls on the pharmaceutical industry, and if you reduce the R&D that this industry is able to provide, it’s going to harm my kids and it’s going to harm those millions of other Americans who have life-threatening conditions’. Merrill Goozner, former chief economic correspondent for the Chicago Tribune, points out that no other research-oriented industry makes this kind of argument (Goozner, 2004). In fact, they do the opposite: when profits decline, they redouble their research efforts to find new products that will generate more profits. Not to do so guarantees their decline. The industry’s view of European ‘price controls’ (actually, large-volume discounts) is that they do not allow recovery of huge R&D costs so that Europeans are ‘free riders’ on Americans and force US prices higher to pay for unrecovered costs the ‘free riders’ refuse to pay. This claim has been shown not to be supported by industry and government reports and to be illogical as well (Light and Lexchin, 2005). The purpose of this report is to sharpen readers’ critical skills in asking pointed questions about the seemingly insurmountable barriers of R&D, about the overpriced AMC that will result in most donations going to extra profits rather than more vaccinations (Light, 2007), and about how much global pharmaceutical companies can afford to discount (Plahte, 2005). By demythologizing in detail the most widely cited estimate of pharmaceutical R&D, the report will provide lessons in how such estimates are constructed. This exercise in critical sociology and economics builds on the substantial critiques of others (Public Citizen, 2001; Love, 2003; Angell, 2004; Goozner, 2004) but adds several new points. The report will conclude that the bigger problems lie elsewhere, with most R&D not being directed at discovering clinically superior medicines, even for affluent customers, because companies are so generously rewarded for developing hundreds of new products little better than the ones they replace. Policy needs to move away from decontextualized magic bullets and towards context-sensitive, socioeconomic programmes of health in which medicines can play a critical role.

2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › Coverage Advantage › 1AR---AT: Innovation Link

Single payer solves innovation better---cost savings and government purchasing

Jonathan Cohn 7, formerly the executive editor of The American Prospect and a senior editor at The New Republic, Cohn is now a senior national correspondent at the Huffington Post 11-12-2007 http://www.pnhp.org/news/2007/november/does_universal_healt.php

But one argument against universal health insurance isn’t so easy to dismiss: the argument about innovation and the cutting edge of medical care. It goes more or less along the lines of my conversation with Mike Kinsley: In a universal coverage system, the government would seek to limit spending by forcing down payments to doctors and pharmaceutical companies, while scrutinizing treatments for cost-effectiveness. This, in turn, would lead to both less innovation and less access to the innovation that already exists.

But it’s one thing to say that universal coverage could lead to less innovation or reduce the availability of high-tech care. It is quite another to say that it will do those things, which is the claim that opponents frequently make. That argument requires several leaps of logic, many of them highly suspect. The forces that produce innovation in medicine turn out to be a great deal more complicated than critics of universal coverage seem to grasp. Ultimately, whether innovation would continue to thrive under universal health care depends entirely on what kind of system we create and how well we run it. In fact, it’s quite possible that universal coverage could lead to better innovation.

2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › Coverage Advantage › 1AR---Innovation UQ

Numbers agree innovation is decreasing.

Pharmaceutical Technology 22, one of a network of 30+ proprietary B2B websites, with an unrivalled global audience of active decision makers, influencers, and opinion leaders across the world with a combined readership of 55 million industry professionals each year. 9-20-2022, "Healthtech innovation among pharmaceutical industry companies has dropped off in the last three months," Pharmaceutical Technology, https://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/features/healthtech-innovation-among-pharmaceutical-industry-companies-has-dropped-off-in-the-last-three-months/

Research and innovation in healthtech in the pharmaceutical sector has declined in the last year.

The most recent figures show that the number of healthtech related patent applications in the industry stood at 785 in the three months ending July – down from 1052 over the same period in 2021.

2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › Coverage Advantage › 2AC---AT: Innovation Turn

High prices are used for increasing stock value, not innovation

William Lazonick 17, Professor of Economics at the University of Massachusetts Lowell, Visiting Professor at the University of Ljubljana, Matt Hopkins, Ken Jacobson, Mustafa Erdem Sakinç Assistant Professor of Economics at University of Paris, Öner Tulum, PhD Candidate at the University of Ljubljana, 7-13-2017, “US Pharma’s Financialized Business Model” Institute for New Economic Thinking, Working Paper Number 60, https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/WP_60-Lazonick-et-al-US-Pharma-Business-Model.pdf, Date Accessed: 8-1

It is a compelling argument—until one looks at how major US pharmaceutical companies actually use the profits that high drug prices generate. In the name of “maximizing shareholder value” (MSV), pharmaceutical companies allocate profits generated by high drug prices to massive repurchases, or buybacks, of their own corporate stock for the sole purpose of giving manipulative boosts to their stock prices. Incentivizing these buybacks is stock-based compensation that rewards senior executives for increases in their companies’ stock prices (Lazonick 2014b; Lazonick 2014c; Lazonick 2015b; Hopkins and Lazonick 2016).

Like no other sector, the pharmaceutical industry puts a spotlight on how the political economy of science is a matter of life and death. In this paper, we invoke “the theory of innovative enterprise” to explain how and why high drug prices restrict access to medicines and undermine medical innovation. An innovative enterprise seeks to develop a high-quality product that it can sell to the largest possible market at the most affordable price (Lazonick 2015c). In sharp contrast, the MSV-obsessed companies that dominate the US drug industry have become monopolies that restrict output and raise price. This paper exposes the financialized business model that dominates the US pharmaceutical drug industry. From the perspective of the theory of innovative enterprise, we call for a number of policy measures to transform the industry from one that has become the source of concentrations of obscene wealth to one that can enable the world’s population to improve their health.

2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › Coverage Advantage › 2AC---AT: Innovation Turn

No Link---negotiations ensure quality innovation

Kirkwood 16 — John B. Kirkwood, Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Strategic Planning and Mission at Seattle University School of Law, and Senior Fellow at the American Antitrust Institute, Awarded the Jerry S. Cohen Award for the Best Antitrust Scholarship in 2012, J.D. from Harvard Law School, M.A. in Public Policy from Harvard, “Buyer Power And Healthcare Prices,” Washington Law Review, Volume 91, Pages 253-293, Date Accessed: 8-1

Despite this link, it does not appear that federal negotiation would have a large impact on pharmaceutical innovation. Multiple studies suggest that branded drug manufacturers have been exceptionally profitable in recent years.81 If this is correct, then even if marginal R&D projects became unprofitable, most projects would remain worthwhile. Put differently, if the industry has consistently earned high profits, despite the high failure rate of new drugs,82 then its overall, risk-adjusted return on investment has been above the competitive level. If so, the profitability of many drugs could be reduced significantly without depriving the industry of a competitive return on most R&D.

In addition, profits are unlikely to fall significantly on drugs that have no substitutes. On these drugs—the drugs that matter most to patients— the government’s leverage to obtain discounts would be severely limited. In consequence, the companies’ motivation to develop them would remain largely, if not completely, unchanged. This motivation is likely to be substantial, given the way these drugs are priced. Studies of new cancer drugs have found that drug makers base their prices not on the cost of developing them but on the price of the most similar existing treatment. Indeed, the new price is usually set above the price of the existing treatment, producing a steady escalation of new drug prices.83 Because of the companies’ pricing discretion, the incentive to generate “breakthrough” drugs would remain substantial, even if drug companies were forced to give rebates on all drugs.84 In fact, because federal negotiation would increase the relative profitability of new, unique drugs, it may actually heighten the incentive to develop them.85 Finally, the companies are aided in their search for the next breakthrough drug by the federal government’s extensive support of basic scientific research.86

2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › Coverage Advantage › 2AC---AT: Innovation Turn

Innovation is slowing due to structural factors.

Russell J. Funk et al 23, Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota. 1-4-2023, "Papers and patents are becoming less disruptive over time," Nature Vol. 613, Pp. 138–144 (2023), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-022-05543-x

In summary, we report a marked decline in disruptive science and technology over time. Our analyses show that this trend is unlikely to be driven by changes in citation practices or the quality of published work. Rather, the decline represents a substantive shift in science and technology, one that reinforces concerns about slowing innovative activity. We attribute this trend in part to scientists’ and inventors’ reliance on a narrower set of existing knowledge. Even though philosophers of science may be correct that the growth of knowledge is an endogenous process—wherein accumulated understanding promotes future discovery and invention—engagement with a broad range of extant knowledge is necessary for that process to play out, a requirement that appears more difficult with time. Relying on narrower slices of knowledge benefits individual careers53, but not scientific progress more generally.

Moreover, even though the prevalence of disruptive works has declined, we find that the sheer number has remained stable. On the one hand, this result may suggest that there is a fixed ‘carrying capacity’ for highly disruptive science and technology, in which case, policy interventions aimed at increasing such work may prove challenging. On the other hand, our observation of considerable churn in the underlying fields responsible for producing disruptive science and technology suggests the potential importance of factors such as the shifting interests of funders and scientists and the ‘ripeness’ of scientific and technological knowledge for breakthroughs, in which case the production of disruptive work may be responsive to policy levers. In either case, the stability we observe in the sheer number of disruptive papers and patents suggests that science and technology do not appear to have reached the end of the ‘endless frontier’. Room remains for the regular rerouting that disruptive works contribute to scientific and technological progress.

2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › Coverage Advantage › 2AC---XT: Access IL

Access to care acts as an active deterrent to bioterror attacks

Margaret E. Kosal 14, PhD, Georgia Institute of Technology, Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, 12/10/14, “A new role for public health in bioterrorism deterrence”,

This commentary will explore the creation of new relationships between deterrence, infectious disease, and public health to reduce the threat of biological terrorism and increase international security. Examining the global spread of re-emerging infectious disease, such as the re-emergence of polio from northern Nigeria, offers a novel case study for thinking about how to deter potential bioterrorists who seek to use infectious disease. Polio outbreaks have more directly affected the developing world compared to the US or other nations with robust public health sectors. This example suggests that a bioterrorist attack would also be more devastating for developing countries in low-resource settings compared to the western world. Credibly, communicating this may offer a new approach to deterring bioterrorism by foreign actors. Although a robust public health sector has long been noted to reduce the vulnerability to a bioterrorism attack, actively promoting the strength of US public health can also serve as a powerful deterrent in its own right. The issue of terrorist groups utilizing biological weapons against other states is a mounting concern, yet little deterrence research in the field of political science addresses methods of dealing with the threat of bioterrorism. Thus, creating new conversations among the life sciences, public health, and political science can lead to new perspectives on deterring bioterrorism. The issue of bioterrorism deterrence, if addressed, has been often added or subsumed under the auspices of deterrence strategies associated with nuclear weapons. In the second half of the twentieth century, nuclear deterrence dominated geopolitics and national security strategies. At its height, the threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD) existed in which both superpowers possessed arsenals with second-strike capabilities, i.e., the ability to respond to a first nuclear strike on land via use of nearly undetectable submarine-launched ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. These historical approaches, however, undermine and oversimplify the distinct challenges of deterring bioterrorism. One such method attempted is focusing on pathogen security, or securing and denying access to the materials necessary to develop biological weapons (i.e., deterrence by denial). Based on the nuclear non-proliferation model, pathogen security strives to control the materials, equipment, and personnel involved with production and use of biological agents. With nuclear weapons, controlling fissile materials proved successful because of key characteristics of the critical materials: fissile material is man-made and can be tracked. Those same characteristics that make nuclear weapons easier to track are those that make biological weapons material difficult to monitor. These characteristics include the presence of biological agents in nature, lower production costs, increased diversity of materials that could be used in bioweapons attacks, and multiple legitimate uses for biological materials. These differing features have not always been fully considered by policy-makers (1). Rather than focusing solely on securing biological materials and laboratories from misuse, other recommendations and strategies that the US has pursued include prevention measures such as biosurveillance, global laboratory and research cooperation, research and development of diagnostics and countermeasures,international stockpiles of effective medical countermeasures, and increased response and mitigation capabilities (2–6). These approaches aim to reduce consequences of an attack, afford earlier detection, and reduce vulnerability; they do not address the challenge of deterring use and reducing motivation directly, however. To date, discussions about public health and deterrence have focused on measures such as regular vaccinations; access to timely medical care to treat infected, isolate suspected infected, and mitigate the spread of disease; confidence in the professional nature of health providers, etc. These are largely passive, defensive deterrence measures, in that they demonstrate credible capacity by a state to respond and mitigate the consequences of an attack (post-exposure) or reduce vulnerability to an attack by making it ineffective (preexposure) (7–9). Both approaches mentioned thus far, pathogen security and a defensive approach to terrorism, which ultimately aim to decrease vulnerability by fortifying civilian populations, are examples of deterrence by denial adapted from the realm of nuclear deterrence. In contrast to these passive approaches, active deterrence strategies have not been explored. Active deterrence is actions and policies preventing a specific opponent from doing something they may wish to do. Traditionally, robust active deterrence has involved the application of expressive force to change the policy or character of the target government or group (10). Forces and policies are used to send a political message. In contrast to passive strategies, active deterrence is more dynamic and may incorporate escalating threats in response to an adversary. What this would look like at the nexus of international security and public health is largely an unexplored area of study or policy. Therefore, there are limited models for thinking about deterrence that have been developed exclusively for bioterrorism. As a consequence, the role of a robust public health system for twenty- first century active deterrence remains to be explored. There has not been a substantive consideration of robust public health system as a strategic asset in a more active deterrence role.

2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › Economy Advantage › 1AR---AT: Industry Jobs

No Jobs Link---government positions, intra-industry mobility, and retraining solves

PNHP, 16 — Physicians for a National Health Program, 2016, Accessed: 9-29-2017, “Single-Payer FAQ” Physicians for a National Health, http://www.pnhp.org/facts/single-payer-faq#insurance_companies

What will happen to all of the people who work for insurance companies?

The new system will still need some people to administer claims. Administration will shrink, however, eliminating the need for many insurance workers, as well as administrative staff in hospitals, clinics and nursing homes. More health care providers, especially in the fields of long-term care, home health care, and public health, will be needed, and many insurance clerks can be retrained to enter these fields. Many people now working in the insurance industry are, in fact, already health professionals (e.g. nurses) who will be able to find work in the health care field again. But many insurance and health administrative workers will need a job retraining and placement program. We anticipate that such a program would cost about $20 billion, a small fraction of the administrative savings from the transition to national health insurance. PNHP has worked with labor unions and others to develop plans for a jobs conversion program with would protect the incomes of displaced clerical workers until they were retrained and transitioned to other jobs.

2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › Economy Advantage › 2AC---AT: Insurance Industry

Insurance would get bought out---the government has no interest in collapsing stocks and lobbying would push this portion through

WVN 14 — West View News, Newsletter for Lower West Side of Manhattan, 03-01-2014, “Universal Healthcare: A Modest Proposal,” West View News, 

The benefits of, and need for, a universal single payer healthcare system in the United States has been discussed previously (WestView, June 2013). Yet, what isn’t clear is how this can be achieved over the objections of the health insurance industry and their political supporters. There is one possible way that the health insurance firms, which oppose a single payer or “Improved Medicare” universal system, can be converted to supporters. Bribe them. More specifically, offer to buy them out. Friendly takeovers and buyouts are common in the private sector. Corporations buyout corporations, and hospitals buyout other hospitals, along with doctors’ practices and other providers. This is not a bailout like those financial industry at the end of 2008 and beginning of 2009. Instead, firms would close upshop, turn over all their assets, including contracts, to the Federal single payer system and then go away to count their money. There is nothing radical about this proposal other then the fact that the government would be doing it instead of a private firm. The principle is well established; it’s just a matter of haggling over the price. An internet search shows that the 12 largest private insurers, as of 2009, have a total stock value, or market capitalization, ofunder $200 billion. Given the value of smaller firms and stock fluctuation, a rough estimate of this value may go as high as $300 billion today. Most corporate buyouts can range from 25% to 100% of market capitalization, depending on the strength and future prospects for the target firms. Using these, admittedly crude, estimates, an overall offer of $500 billion for the industry as a whole would result in as much as a 67% up front bonanza for the corporations being bought out. If the estimates are too high, the costs would be lower. This may appear like a great deal of money, but the cost of health care in the United States is approaching $3 trillion. A mere 5% savings in administrative costs would cover the costs of this proposal in a few years, while providing universal health insurance indefinitely, or at least until conservatives make their first attempts to re-privatize it. Furthermore, this buyout has to be extravagant since it will require the insurance companies to change their opposition to not only acquiescence, but active lobbying for a single payer system. The myriad lobbyists they have in Washington will have to do a U-turn and demand that their elected representatives, who might be interested in campaign contributions in the future, actively work to secure this financial windfall and universal health care. The fight for universal health care has been going on in the United States for generations. We have a system which is uniquely expensive, bureaucracy-ridden, low quality, and maddeningly frustrating, or lethal, for patients and families caught up in its weaknesses. Instead of attempting complicated reforms of a terrible system, this proposal would decrease or eliminate all of these problems. It would be a bargain at a cost of a half trillion dollars.

2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › Economy Advantage › 1AR---AT: Taxes Collapse

Other countries prove

Jeff Spross 17, economics and business correspondent, May 30, 2017. “The bright side of private health insurance companies.” http://theweek.com/articles/701674/bright-side-private-health-insurance-companies

A lot of liberals are eager to push a Medicare-for-all, single-payer health insurance system. to pass state-level single-payer in California, and a national bill is among congressional Democrats. The implicit argument is that single-payer is obviously better than private health insurance, so we ought to just get rid of the private marketplace altogether. But there is a case for holding onto a private market in insurance. It's just a bit more subtle — and interesting! — than most people realize. First off, let's dispense with what's not important: costs. Even if a national single-payer system would require in new spending, America wouldn't be sweating it. Indeed, that would merely bring the U.S. government as a percent of GDP into line with where other Western countries . There's those countries suffer economically from higher relative spending levels. (And it wouldn't cost $1.5 trillion anyway, because a large portion by the hundreds of billions we'd save in lower administrative and drug costs.)

2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › Economy Advantage › 1AR---AT: Taxes Collapse

Progressive income tax hikes won’t collapse the economy

Seidman 13 [Laurence Seidman Professor of Economics University of Delaware November 2013 http://lerner.udel.edu/sites/default/files/ECON/PDFs/RePEc/dlw/WorkingPapers/2014/UDWP2014-02.pdf]

Here is a rough estimate of how much the new earmarked taxes would need to be as a percent of GDP. Today U.S. medical costs are 18% of GDP while no other country exceeds 12%. Suppose Medicare for All aims to cut the huge 6 percentage point gap in half to 3%, so that U.S. medical costs are 15% of GDP. If Medicare for All succeeds in using its single-payer bargaining power (as explained below) to achieve its medical cost target of 15% of GDP, then Medicare for All taxes would need to be 15% of GDP. Government (federal and state) spending on Medicare, Medicaid, and other government health programs is currently about 7% of GDP (U.S. Congressional Budget Office 2012), so new earmarked taxes would need to be roughly 8% of GDP. To put this 8% of GDP number in perspective, in 2007 (before the Great Recession caused a plunge in tax revenue), U.S. taxes (federal, state, and local) were about 30% of GDP. Thus, taxes would rise by 8% of GDP from 30% to 38% (federal taxes would rise by 9.5% of GDP while state taxes would fall by 1.5% of GDP due to the reduction in state Medicaid expenses), which would still leave U.S. taxes as a percent of GDP slightly lower than the average of the economically advanced OECD countries (roughly 40%) and far below the Scandinavian countries (roughly 50%). At the same time, U.S. medical costs would be 3% of GDP lower every year (15% instead of 18% of GDP) so goods and services other than medical care would be 3% of GDP higher every year (85% instead of 82% of GDP). Each year Americans would enjoy 3% of GDP more goods and services other than medical care while still having the highest medical care spending in the world (15% of GDP when all other countries spend 12% of GDP or less). Medicare for All would have to bargain over prices and budget caps with medical providers in order to keep Medicare for All spending from exceeding the earmarked revenues it collects. If a gap occurs, Congress would have to bridge the gap by either raising earmarked taxes or reducing medical prices and budget caps. Once Medicare for All taxes are in place, political resistance to raising the rates of these earmarked taxes would help contain the rise in medical costs under Medicare for All. Would the efficiency cost imposed by increasing the tax burden from 30 to 38 percent of GDP be large or small? A huge literature by economists addresses this question, and I make no attempt to review that literature here. I will cite just one economist’s empirical work here that has influenced my own thinking, while acknowledging that not all economists agree with his empirical results. In his monograph on social spending and economic growth in economically advanced countries over the past three centuries, Peter Lindert (2004, p16-17) wrote: “Knowing that higher tax rates and higher subsidies to people who don’t produce could discourage productivity, many of us naturally suspect that taxes and transfers should reduce the productivity of the whole economy…Yet the history of economic growth is unkind to this natural suspicion…Nine decades of historical experience fail to show that transferring a larger share of GDP from taxpayers to transfer recipients has a negative correlation with either the level or rate of growth of GDP per person. The average correlation is essentially zero.” Lindert then gave his explanation (p31): “In general, high-budget welfare states have a more pro-growth and regressive mix of taxes…They rely more heavily on labor income taxes and flat consumption (or value-added) taxes…Granted, the rates of overall taxation are still higher in the high-budget countries, yet their attention to the side-effects on economic growth seems to have led them to choose types of taxes that minimize or eliminate any damage to growth.”

2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › Economy Advantage › 1AR---AT: Taxes Link

Wealth tax key to growth

Smith 16

(Noah, Bloomberg; 7/26/17; A Wealth Tax Looks Like It Can Make a Country Richer; https://www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/2016/07/25/a-wealth-tax-looks-like-it-can-make-a-country-richer)

(Bloomberg View) -- Standard economic theory says that taxation reduces productivity. If you tax income, you reduce the incentive to work. If you tax capital gains, you reduce the incentive to invest, and so on. When you discourage useful economic activity, the economy becomes less efficient.

2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › Economy Advantage › 1AR---AT: Taxes Link

Replacing premiums with taxes is net beneficial for economic growth and brings taxes to standard rates with the rest of the world

Seidman 15 – Laurence Seidman, Professor of Economics, University of Delaware, Ph.D. in economics, University of California, Berkeley (“The Affordable Care Act versus Medicare for All,” Journal of Health Politics, Policy & Law, Vol. 40, No. 4, August 2015, Available through Ebsco)

What is the effect of replacing premiums with taxes? Taxes vary with ability to pay, while premiums do not (Seidman 2009). It would be better for the economy and fairer to use a set of earmarked taxes that have moderate rates (Seidman 2013b). The set of taxes earmarked for Medicare for All might consist of the following: the Medicare payroll tax, a VAT, and a Medicare for All income tax surcharge on the 1040 income tax return. The Medicare payroll tax is currently 1.45 percent on the employer and 1.45 percent on the employee— a combined rate of 2.90 percent on all wage income. The VAT is used successfully by virtually every economically advanced country except the United States. Many US economists have recommended a US VAT (Seidman 2004, 2013b; Hines 2007). Several analysts have recommended that a VAT be enacted and earmarked for universal health (Morone 2002; Burman 2009). The VAT burden on low-income households would be offset by giving these households a refundable tax credit on their 1040 income tax return to compensate roughly for most of the burden they bear from the VAT (Seidman 2013b).

Today US medical costs are 18 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), while no other country exceeds 12 percent. Suppose Medicare for All aims to cut the huge 6 percentage point gap in half to 3 percent so that US medical costs are 15 percent of GDP. If Medicare for All succeeds in using its single-payer bargaining power (as explained below) to achieve its medical cost target of 15 percent of GDP, then Medicare for All taxes would need to be 15 percent of GDP. Government (federal and state) spending on Medicare, Medicaid, and other government health programs is currently about 7 percent of GDP (CBO 2012: 49, 55-57), so new earmarked taxes would need to be roughly 8 percent of GDP.

2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › Economy Advantage › 2AC---AT: Taxes

The impact of tax increases on the economy is overstated and short-lived.

Kate Davidson 17, covers the Federal Reserve and U.S. economy from the Wall Street Journal's Washington bureau, 10-1-2017, "The Link Between Economic Growth and Tax Cuts Is Tenuous ," WSJ, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-link-between-economic-growth-and-tax-cuts-is-tenuous-1506873601

The Trump administration and congressional Republicans are counting on an overhaul of the U.S. tax code to rev up the anemic U.S. economic growth rate. History suggests that isn’t a sure outcome. John F. Kennedy, a Democrat, in 1963 proposed and Lyndon Johnson, also a Democrat, in 1964 signed into a law a cut in the top tax rate from 91% to 70% and a slightly lower corporate tax rate. Economic output expanded at a swift 4.7% rate for the rest of the decade. Republican Ronald Reagan signed a tax cut into law in 1981 and later reduced the corporate tax rate, and economic output expanded at 3.8% for the rest of the decade. Those examples suggest a strong connection between tax cuts and growth. Other examples cut the other way. George H.W. Bush, a Republican, and then Bill Clinton, a Democrat, advanced increases in the top tax rate that became effective in 1991 and 1993, and U.S. output nevertheless expanded at a robust 4.1% annual rate for the rest of the 1990s. George W. Bush, a Republican, cut taxes in 2001 and 2003, and growth expanded at an anemic 1.7% rate for the rest of the decade. And back in the 1950s, when a top rate of 91% prevailed, the economy nevertheless expanded at a steaming 4.5% annual rate. Joel Slemrod, a University of Michigan economics professor and co-author of the book, “Taxing Ourselves,” a study of tax-policy changes over time, looked all the way back to the 1870s and found a tenuous connection between economic growth rates and taxes. He also found tenuous connections when comparing tax and growth between countries. For example, output per person in Sweden, a high-tax country, grew faster between 1970 and 2012 than in Switzerland, a relatively low-tax country, during the same period. Turkey, a low tax country, didn’t keep up with Luxembourg, a relatively high tax country, during the same period. “It’s really hard to just look at countries’ growth rates over time, relate that to what their tax rates and structures are, and say, ‘Ah, here’s the silver bullet,’ ” said Mr. Slemrod. One complicating factor is the interplay between taxes, interest rates and growth. The U.S. economy boomed in the 1980s in part because the Federal Reserve beat down inflation with high interest rates and then, after a deep recession, cut interest rates aggressively. In the 1990s, interest rates were held down by a worker-productivity boom that helped to keep inflation lower than the Fed expected. Tax and deficit policies can directly affect the level of interest rates and growth. In the 1990s, for example, U.S. policy makers counted on deficit cuts to keep interest rates low and spur economic growth. Some economists say big deficits, by pushing up public debt, crowd out private investment and growth. Some warn that deficit increases now could spur the Fed to raise interest rates faster than expected, potentially offsetting some of the benefits of lower tax rates. Economists generally agree tax cuts that aren’t offset by a decrease in government spending will boost the deficit. “Can tax cuts pay for themselves? The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that this is not true,” Mr. Slemrod said. “If it takes a modest deficit to get really good tax policy, I suppose that’s fine,” said Columbia Business School dean Glenn Hubbard, former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under George W. Bush. “If it were a gigantic deficit I don’t think that would be fine at all.” The Trump administration is aiming for a 3% growth rate, compared with the 1.9% rate that has prevailed since 2000. Many factors affect a nation’s economic growth rate. The productivity of the workforce—driven not just by policy change in Washington but also by innovations like the internet and the education of workers—is critical. When productivity boomed in the 1990s, it spurred growth, and when it slowed in the 2000s, it held growth back. Labor-force participation is also key. The 1970s, a decade marred by high inflation and slowing productivity, nevertheless produced a 3.4% growth rate, which was better than the 2000s, because baby boomers and women joined the workforce in droves. The key to effective tax policy is thus whether it can drive productivity and labor-force participation higher. Lower income-tax rates in theory should increase labor-market participation because it means individuals get a bigger after-tax payoff from working. That is offset to some degree because it means individuals also don’t need to work as many hours to keep their after-tax income and standard-of-living level stable. The net effect of individual-tax-rate reductions on participation seems to be modestly positive. Raj Chetty, a Stanford University professor, found that a 10% increase in after-tax wages led to a 4% increase in hours worked. Matthew Shapiro, another Michigan economics professor, said tax-policy changes can have important short-run effects on business investment as well, but the effects tended to fade over time. “Most changes are fairly temporary, and there’s a big incentive to take advantage of those temporary changes,” he said. In other words, firms might shift investment plans forward to take advantage of a temporary change. The impact of permanent changes to the tax code lasted longer but were less pronounced, Mr. Shapiro said.

2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › Economy Advantage › 2AC---Costs UQ

Even if they’re low now, crisis in two to three years.

Shubham Singhal 22, Global leader of McKinsey's social, healthcare, and public entities sectors; with Aneesh Krishna, transformation and post-acute care work for healthcare in North America and serves national and regional payers, providers, private-equity funds, and portfolio companies. 2-11-2022, "Consumer prices are rising fast, and healthcare isn’t far behind," McKinsey & Company,

Over the last 30 years, consumer prices have rarely risen faster than healthcare inflation, from doctor visits to surgeries and prescription drugs. In fact, the inverse has typically been the case, particularly during economic downturns: after the 2008 financial crisis, for example, overall inflation slowed to almost nothing while medical prices continued to grow at a 2 to 3 percent rate.1

Today, inflation in the United States has reached rates not seen in decades: from December 2020 to December 2021, the overall inflation rate (Personal Consumption Expenditure Price Index) was greater than 5.8 percent.2 In our view, it is only a matter of time before prices for healthcare catch up to this increase. Much higher prices are only being delayed by the unique features of the healthcare industry. In healthcare services, prices, reimbursement rates, labor contracts (which are typically indexed to consumer price inflation), and several other input factors are set two to three years in advance. So, while healthcare delivery systems are facing higher costs—primarily increases in areas with shortages such as nursing and supplies—in our view, there will likely be a lag before consumers experience the same pressures.

2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › Economy Advantage › 2AC---Costs UQ

Healthcare costs are a burden on families.

Alex Montero et al 22, Survey Analyst for the Public Opinion and Survey Research Program at KFF. 7-14-2022, "Americans’ Challenges with Health Care Costs," KFF,

For many years, KFF polling has found that the high cost of health care is a burden on U.S. families, and that health care costs factor into decisions about insurance coverage and care seeking. These costs also rank as a top financial worry. This data note summarizes recent KFF polling on the public’s experiences with health care costs. Main takeaways include:

About half of U.S. adults say they have difficulty affording health care costs. About four in ten U.S. adults say they have delayed or gone without medical care in the last year due to cost, with dental services being the most common type of care adults report putting off due to cost.

2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › Economy Advantage › 2AC---Costs UQ

Costs are high and growing.

Atul Grover et al 22, Executive Director, AAMC Research and Action Institute. 8-17-2022, "Health Care Costs: What’s the Problem?," AAMC, https://www.aamc.org/advocacy-policy/aamc-research-and-action-institute/health-care-costs

The cost of health care in the United States far exceeds that in other wealthy nations across the globe. In 2020, U.S. health care costs grew 9.7%, to $4.1 trillion, reaching about $12,530 per person.1 At the same time, the United States lags far behind other high-income countries when it comes to both access to care and some health care outcomes.2 As a result, policymakers and health care systems are facing increasing demands for more care at lower costs for more people. And, of course, everyone wants to know why their health care costs are so high.

The answer depends, in part, on who’s asking this question: Why does U.S. health care cost so much? Public policy often highlights and targets the total cost of the health care system or spending as a percentage of the gross domestic product (GDP), while most patients (the public) are more concerned with their own out-of-pocket costs and whether they have access to affordable, meaningful insurance. Providers feel public pressure to contain costs while trying to provide the highest-quality care to patients.

2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › 1AC › Econ Advantage

The federal government is key to every internal link---Sub-federal systems fail

Benjamin Studebaker 17, PhD in Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge, 6-2-2017, "Why Single Payer Works Better at the National Level than the State Level," https://benjaminstudebaker.com/2017/06/02/why-single-payer-works-better-at-the-national-level-than-the-state-level/

There’s a single payer plan advancing in the state of California, and many people are excited about it. And for good reason–a single payer system can potentially extend coverage while cutting costs. I’ve written about the virtues of single payer many times before, but there is a political danger in attempting to do single payer at the state level. Ironically and tragically, the very economic forces which make single payer such a good federal policy create powerful dangers for state systems. The private system in the United States wastes huge amounts of money. To show just how bad it is, I like to use a figure I call the “healthcare efficiency rating” or “HER” for short. It’s relatively simple–we just divide a country’s life expectancy by its total healthcare spending as a percent of GDP. Among rich countries, the United States ranks dead last in HER, and it’s not close: America is in red. The green countries use single-payer, and the blue countries use hybrid systems which contain large public components. Overall, the single payer systems are the most efficient: Because the American healthcare system is so inefficient, we spend a much larger percentage of our GDP on healthcare than countries with single payer do. Healthcare spending in the US is about 17% of GDP. In Britain it’s 9%. Yet in the United States, average life expectancy is 79.3 while in the UK it’s 81.2. The Brits aren’t just getting more lifespan for their money–they’re getting more lifespan, full stop. Single payer cuts costs by giving the government a monopoly on demand. Because the state negotiates on behalf of all patients, it can more or less dictate prices to doctors, hospitals, and drug companies. Usually countries with single payer manage their costs by listening to patients–if patients feel that the quality of the service is poor, they can vote in parties that pledge to increase funding. If patients feel that the service is costing taxpayers too much money, they can vote in parties that pledge to force costs down. The left and the right in European countries often act as a yin-yang on healthcare–the left stops the right from destroying the service and the right stops the left from allowing the service to grow fat and inefficient. Single payer is so inexpensive because when the government decides to reduce the cost of the service, it changes compensation for everyone in the healthcare sector and leaves them with no where to go. The American healthcare system is very fat and inefficient and there is much room for cost-cutting. For instance, because American drug companies receive entirely too much money, they have lots of extra cash to waste on advertising–far more than what they spend on medical research: In theory, if the United States were to create a federal single payer system like Britain’s and cut healthcare spending to 9% of GDP, it could save $1.4 trillion every year. That’s more than $14 trillion in the first decade, without including inflation or economic growth, both of which would raise that figure. The thing is, these cost savings are so immense that if we did this all at once we’d create tremendous disruption in the healthcare sector. In addition to wiping out the $800 billion health insurance industry and its 450,000+ jobs, we’d also cut some of the 12.4 million healthcare jobs and reduce compensation for the rest. So in practice, a federal system might instead reduce healthcare costs gradually. Instead of forcing compensation down to European levels immediately, we might hold down the rate at which healthcare costs grow below the rates of growth and inflation until at some point, some years down the line, we’d achieve a competitive spending percentage and HER. This means that a federal single payer system might initially cost a trillion dollars more than is really necessary, as we slowly transition the healthcare system to a lower compensation, higher efficiency model. Fortunately, the federal government doesn’t need to collect all that tax money. Because of its tremendous ability to borrow large sums of money, the feds can cover some of it with borrowing. The IMF calculates that the United States can safely borrow an additional 165% of GDP before it runs out of “fiscal space”. That’s about $30 trillion dollars. If we aimed to reduce healthcare spending to 12% of GDP in the long-term, we could raise that 12% ($2.1 trillion) in taxes while covering the remaining 5% ($890 billion) with borrowing in the first year. Some of the taxes we’d need are already on the books–the government already raises revenue to fund spending equivalent to 8.3% of GDP, which goes mostly to Medicaid and Medicare. So with a 12% target, new taxes might only amount to about 3.7% of GDP, or $660 billion. Each year, we could trim the fat a bit, gradually decreasing the sum we borrow until it reaches zero. We’d come nowhere close to reaching our fiscal limit. Along the way, American families and businesses would feel significant economic relief–most people’s tax burdens would be significantly smaller than their current premiums. They’d have more to spend on other things, and other sectors of the economy would grow, generating new jobs. It’s a major undertaking, but it can work for two key reasons: The federal government has the spending capacity to cover some of the cost with borrowing while we transition to a more efficient system, enabling American families and businesses to immediately get significant relief even while we help people in the healthcare and insurance sectors find new jobs or adjust to more reasonable compensation packages. A federal single payer program covers the entire healthcare sector, so [and] it’s a true monopoly. What goes wrong when a single state tries to do single payer? Well, a single US state has problems in both these areas. Many individual US states have balanced budget amendments, preventing them from borrowing large amounts of money to facilitate a gradual transition. Even the ones that don’t have balanced budget amendments would struggle to get access to the kind of credit available to the federal government. And crucially, individual US states cannot exercise a true monopoly on demand. If one state tries to slash healthcare spending significantly, its best doctors can simply run to neighboring states, producing doctor shortages and reducing quality of care. This makes individual states afraid to use the cost-cutting leverage which single payer gives them. If they don’t use the cost-cutting leverage and don’t borrow money, they have to raise taxes high enough to cover healthcare spending which will support a national spending figure of 17% of GDP. This means that they end up raising much more tax revenue than the Europeans do to continue propping up a healthcare sector which is too big to fail. This prevents citizens from getting the healthcare relief we promise them–their premiums disappear, but their taxes rise too much for them to get the full benefits of single payer. In the long-run, people are unlikely to continue to support that kind of system, and when they give up on it the right will attempt to use the failure as evidence in national debates about single payer, even though the policy is much more workable at the federal level. There is no other rich democracy American doctors can emigrate to which will pay them the extraordinarily bloated wages they receive in the United States. For the feds, it’s simply a question of whether they prefer to borrow a lot of money facilitating a gradual transition or to profoundly disrupt the healthcare sector to save Americans huge amounts of money very quickly. In sum, the hardest thing about single payer is the fact that it’s replacing a system that has accustomed millions of people who work in the healthcare sector to unrealistic and unsustainable levels of compensation. If we cut their pay to reduce costs and give them somewhere to run, they’ll run. If we cut their pay very quickly, we’ll produce a significant increase in unemployment and disrupt many people’s lives. If we cut their pay gradually, we need to be able to borrow money in the short-term to avoid raising taxes too much. The federal government has the resources and the potential market power to get these things done. The states don’t. It’s hard to wrap our heads around just how wasteful our healthcare system is. It’s a problem that is far too big for any one state to handle. We need the feds–without them, we risk handing the right undeserved propaganda coups, enabling the private system to go on flushing our hard earned money down the drain.

2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › 1AC › Econ Advantage

Innovation solves extinction

Dylan Matthews 18, co-Founder of Vox, citing Nick Beckstead, Ph.D. in Philosophy from Rutgers University, 10/26/18, “How To Help People Millions Of Years From Now,”

If you care about improving human lives, you should overwhelmingly care about those quadrillions of lives rather than the comparatively small number of people alive today. The 7.6 billion people now living, after all, amount to less than 0.003 percent of the population that will live in the future. It’s reasonable to suggest that those quadrillions of future people have, accordingly, hundreds of thousands of times more moral weight than those of us living here today do.

That’s the basic argument behind Nick Beckstead’s 2013 Rutgers philosophy dissertation, “On the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future.” It’s a glorious mindfuck of a thesis, not least because Beckstead shows very convincingly that this is a conclusion any plausible moral view would reach. It’s not just something that weird utilitarians have to deal with.

2023 Northwestern Affirmative
Case › 1AC › Econ Advantage

And, Single Payer is key to innovation. Reducing household and employer healthcare costs boosts productivity and job creation---outweighs taxes

Elizabeth Jacobs 16, Senior Director for Policy and Academic Programs at the Washington Center for Equitable Growth, Ph.D. and an A.M. from Harvard University, former Fellow in the Multidisciplinary Program in Inequality and Social Policy at the Kennedy School of Government, formerly a Fellow in Governance Studies at the Brookings Institution, a co-founder of Brookings’ popular Social Mobility Memos blog, and a frequent public commentator on inequality, mobility, and the implications of the Great Recession for American families, “What Do Trends In Economic Inequality Imply For Innovation And Entrepreneurship?” Washington Center for Equitable Growth, February 16th, http://equitablegrowth.org/report/trends-economic-inequality-imply-innovation-entrepreneurship/

Innovation is a critical engine driving economic growth. As Council of Economic Advisers Chairman Jason Furman recently remarked, for an advanced economy such as the United States, “catching up to the productivity frontier is not possible when you are already there.”9 Borrowing from Simon Kuznets (via fellow Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow), the concept of innovation is best understood broadly, as “a new combination of existing knowledge to create something useful (in some sense).”10 A long history of economics research puts innovation at the center of most growth models, with more recent work focusing on small, young firms—startups—as the locus of a disproportionately large share of innovation.11 Startups’ unique role in fostering innovation stems from their ability to generate market turbulence, competition, and industry renewal. Indeed, they serve as particularly effective competitors in arenas that require flexibility and the ability to efficiently respond to niche markets.12 And startups generally require an individual actor, the business founder/owner—in other words, the entrepreneur. Why are startups and their entrepreneurial founders so important for generating innovation, and in turn economic growth? The research points to two main channels: job creation and productivity. The contemporary evidence is less clear on productivity (more on that in a moment) but is more persuasive on job creation.13 Startups account for 20 percent of gross job creation in the United States, but high-growth firms (which are disproportionately successful startups) account for almost 50 percent of gross job creation. Taken together, new businesses and high-growth firms account for a whopping 70 percent of gross firm-level job creation annually. The high-tech sector plays a particularly important role in job creation. High-tech firms, defined as the group of industries with disproportionately high shares of employees in the STEM fields of science, technology, engineering, and math, were 23 percent more likely than the private sector as a whole to witness a new business formation over the past three decades. While high-tech business formation was once consolidated to the Route 128 corridor and Silicon Valley, these startups are increasingly geographically dispersed.14 As Federal Reserve Board economist Ryan Decker and his colleagues summarize, “startups and young businesses are small, the underlying reason why many commenters describe small businesses as the engine of job growth.”15 It is worth noting that firm age is more important than firm size because once researchers control for firm age, a business’s size has no relationship to its growth trajectory.16 Also worth noting is this: Most startups fail, and the majority that last create only a handful of jobs. Massachusetts Institute of Technology economist Antoinette Schoar calls young businesses with low rates of job creation “subsistence” entrepreneurship, which she contrasts with “transformational” entrepreneurship that creates jobs at a rapid pace.17 These “transformational” startups are the engine of American job growth. Entrepreneurship, then, is a high-risk, high-reward enterprise on multiple levels. On a micro level, the prospect of business failure for a given individual entrepreneur is high, and comes with substantial costs. On a macro level, an economy based on the dynamism inherent in the creation of new businesses in general and in high-tech startups in particular requires substantial tolerance for failure and volatility. The second key role for startups in generating economic growth is their role in boosting productivity. While startups’ disproportionate role in job creation is well documented, their contribution to overall productivity is less clear. Productivity is central to any growth model—it’s a key source of long-run economic growth and gains for workers. Total factor productivity (sometimes called the Solow residual—after Nobel Laureate Robert Solow—or simply “technology”) captures how well a given economic unit combines capital and labor to produce output. A sizable body of research posits that startup firms are an important source of productivity growth, because of their unique ability to successfully combine capital and labor to produce high levels of innovative output. For instance, New York University economist William Baumol posits a “David and Goliath” partnership between small startup businesses and large corporations, whereby the small startups excel at generating radical innovations and the larger established corporations then improve upon them by adding capacity, usability, and marketability.18 The symbiotic relationship between the two types of firms in turn generates the products that have revolutionized our lives and grown the economy over time. From a theoretical perspective, this is why startups may play a key role in the productivity growth rate. Research from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development shows that firms across its 34 member nations exhibit high levels of total factor productivity. Yet productivity growth since 2003 has slowed considerably from its pace in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and remains well below the rate of growth seen in earlier post-World War II periods.19 (See Figure 3.) The “diffusion mechanism” that translates productivity growth in vanguard firms to productivity growth on behalf of the macro economy as a whole appears to be broken, or at least not functioning as it once did. As a result, the role of startup businesses in spurring economic growth is less clear than it once was. A recent paper from Federal Reserve Board economist Ryan Decker and colleagues suggests that the declining rate of business dynamism may be explained by a decreased response to productivity shocks.20 In other words, when a firm experiences an innovation that makes workers more productive, they are less responsive to those shocks today than they were before 2000. As a result, the relationship between innovation, productivity, and job creation looks weaker now than previously. Decker and his colleagues restrict their study to firms in the high-tech manufacturing space, but it provides clues as to what might be driving forces in other industries as well. Innovation, entrepreneurship, and economic growth across the U.S. wealth and income spectrum Given the importance of young firms for innovation, it is worth pausing here to review the contemporary empirical state of affairs for these firms in the United States. Recent evidence suggests that many U.S. entrepreneurs do not have aspirations to create high-growth or innovative firms but rather started their businesses for non-pecuniary reasons such as flexibility in work hours.21 These less-than-multimillionaire aspirations are consistent with the industry characteristics of most small businesses, which are concentrated among skilled craftsmen, lawyers, real estate agents, doctors, small shopkeepers, and restaurateurs.22 So it is perhaps unsurprising that the majority of startups exhibit low net rates of job creation. Multiple studies note a marked decline in the rate of new business creation over the past four decades, from 12 percent in the 1980s to an average of 10.6 percent just before the Great Recession of 2007-2009, during which it plunged to less than 8 percent. The rate of this decline has varied across business sectors, but applies broadly across the economy.23 The slowing average rate of new business creation has not been counterbalanced by an increase in the size of the average new business. Depending on the data used, the average size of these new firms has either decreased or remained stable since the 1980s.24 The combined result of these two trends is that newly created businesses play a smaller role in the U.S. economy today than they did in the past. Firms five years old or younger comprised 47 percent of all firms in the late 1980s, but declined to 39 percent prior to the Great Recession.25 Concurrently, recent empirical work shows that the slowdown in new business formation accounts for 32 percent of the observed decline in net job creation since the 1980s. Similarly, this slowdown contributed to a 20 percent decline in job destruction over the same period.26 And finally, the falling rate of new business formation also led to a 26 percent decline in job reallocations between the 1980s and 2000s, meaning that fewer workers switched jobs over this period.27 Lower rates of job switching may have contributed to stagnant wages for workers, as a substantial body of research suggests that job-to-job mobility is key for boosting a worker’s paycheck over time.28 Given their role in fostering innovation and driving job creation, the startup slowdown has obvious implications for economic dynamism and growth. An open question, and the focus of the remainder of this report, is how economic inequality might be playing a role in the startup slowdown as well as on other indicators of economic dynamism, especially innovation and entrepreneurialism in general. For the sake of introducing some analytic clarity, I approach inequality slice by slice, suggesting ways that inequality’s impacts may flow through the economic realities for the bottom, middle, and top of the income distribution. Doing so necessarily requires a focus not just on firms but also on individuals—a departure from much of the research on growth, dynamism, and entrepreneurship, but a critical one. The bottom-middle-top framework below provides an analytic lens for structuring a research agenda with many critical yet unanswered questions. Inequality and innovation at the bottom: Wasted potential? Entrepreneurship is at the heart of the rags-to-riches mythology, the lifeblood of the American Dream. The idea that poor kids with gumption and a great idea can rise out of poverty and lift themselves and their families into the vaunted top echelons of society has been echoed time and time again, from literary figures such as Horatio Alger to Jay Gatsby to scrappy business go-getters from Andrew Carnegie to Mark Cuban. A wealth of new empirical work, however, suggests that the intergenerational mobility embodied by the American Dream has been largely overstated.29 What remains an open question is whether the broken promise of the American Dream is linked to trends in entrepreneurship and innovation. Are low-income individuals more or less likely to succeed in entrepreneurship compared to their wealthier counterparts, all things being equal? How has increasing economic inequality in recent decades affected the likelihood of entrepreneurial success among the poor? New research from a team of economists from Harvard University, the U.S. Treasury Department, and the London School of Economics quantifies just how far out of reach entrepreneurial success is for the vast majority of children born into low-income families in the United States.30 The team matches up data on patents in the United States with tax returns of the people receiving the patents, and the tax returns of those patent recipients’ parents. This multigenerational match allows them to see not only how much these inventors earn as adults, but also their families’ economic resources during the inventor’s childhood.31 As a result, for the first time ever, we have the beginnings of a picture of the lifecycle of an inventor. Unsurprisingly, children born to wealthy parents are far more likely than poor children to obtain a patent later in life. More surprising is the sheer magnitude of that patent gap. Early research findings suggest that for every 10,000 children born to families in the top 1 percent, 22.5 will receive a patent in adulthood. In contrast, just 2.2 of every 10,000 children born to families with incomes below the U.S. median income will receive a patent in adulthood. Worth noting: Just as income inequality is characterized by runaway rates at the very top of the income distribution, so too are patent rates. Children born into families in the top 1 percent are twice as likely to obtain a patent in adulthood compared to children born into the top 10 percent.32 Importantly, the data indicate that the vast majority of the patent gap is not explained by inherent skills differences between low- and high-income children. The researchers merge test score data for third-graders in their study and find that patent rates in adulthood are roughly equal for low- and high-income kids with similar test scores—except for the high performers. Among high-performing children, those born into high-income families are about four times as likely to obtain patents than their peers born into low-income families. What explains the patent gap, then? The lion’s share of the gap is explained by the cumulative consequences of educational disadvantage. The share of the patent gap explained by test scores grows by nearly 5 percent per grade from the third-grade baseline through eighth grade, the last year for which the researchers have testing data available. And when the researchers look at the role of college quality in determining who files successfully for a patent, the importance of this human capital channel of education grows even starker: 90 percent of the income-innovation relationship is explained by whether or not an individual attended a high-quality college.33 In sum, the empirical evidence suggests that low-income children face major barriers to successful entrepreneurship, even when they show significant promise. Despite early measured ability, poor children are significantly less likely to file successfully for a patent than their wealthy peers. Subsequent schooling essentially accounts for this difference, which suggests that human capital policy is hugely important for fostering innovation across the income spectrum. Research from Stanford University economist Caroline Hoxby and Harvard University economist Chris Avery tells us that even the highest-achieving low-income students are not attending the most selective colleges.34 In general, we need far more research quantifying the lifecycle of inventors, and entrepreneurs more generally. The Harvard team’s cutting-edge creation of a dataset with multigenerational layers of administrative data represents the frontier for research that will allow us to better understand the implications of inequality for entrepreneurship at the bottom of the income ladder. Better understanding macro-level phenomena requires the application of novel, large-scale micro-level data to answer key questions—an exciting, promising endeavor that remains in its early days. Inequality and innovation in the middle: Risk aversion? For millions of middle-class Americans, the idea of “striking it rich” these days is sadly far from their imaginations. Middle-class incomes have stagnated, with only the rise of women in the labor force keeping the vast majority of middle-class families afloat over the past half-century.35 (See Figure 4.) This wage-constrained, dual-income working experience of the typical American family may well blunt entrepreneurship for multiple reasons. First, the time crunch faced by millions of American families may crowd out the potential for the development of successful business plans. Second, the increase in both perceived and real economic insecurity may mean the middle class is substantially more risk averse than in the past. Third, the middle class may face serious capital constraints in the face of low and eroding wealth, with implications for the rate of new business formation and especially the time and thinking and money needed to launch a high-tech startup. Working middle-class families face a serious time crunch. Delayed marriage and child-bearing, more births outside of marriage, the increase in women’s labor force participation, and the aging of the U.S. population have altered family life and created new challenges for those with caregiving demands.36 Mothers in the United States have decreased the time they spend on housework as their time in the labor market has gone up, but they also have increased the time spent on child care. Fathers have increased the time spent on child care as well. Intensive child-rearing practices are more common, perhaps in response to the rat race that comes along with rising inequality and higher perceived costs of failure.37 Workers increasingly must contend with non-standard work schedules, with the resulting high levels of unpredictability adding additional stress for families balancing care responsibilities.38 Whether dual-earner families or single parents, these factors all translate into unprecedented levels of time pressure for many working American families. How is this multilayered time crunch affecting the entrepreneurial success rate of the American middle class? If potential entrepreneurs are collapsing at the end of a busy day, exhausted after a long day of work and “second-shift” responsibilities caring for children (and, increasingly, aging parents), what’s the likelihood that they have the energy to push their nascent big idea—be it a new restaurant or the latest idea for a new app for a mobile phone—into a transformational new venture? As noted earlier, entrepreneurship inherently involves risk. The vast majority of new businesses fail. Recent empirical work raises serious questions about whether the middle class may have grown more risk averse, even among those whose lives are currently financially stable enough to serve as fertile ground for potential entrepreneurship. Even prior to the Great Recession, public opinion polls suggested high levels of economic anxiety among Americans. A 2007 poll revealed that more than half of all Americans felt they had not moved forward, while nearly a third said they had fallen back.39 Only 41 percent said they were better off than they were five years ago, the lowest level in nearly 50 years. Meanwhile, the share saying they were worse off than they were five years ago rose to 31 percent, the highest level in almost half a century. These perceptions picked up by pollsters match the reality of the American experience fairly closely. Income growth among lower- and middle-income families has been very slow over recent decades, and has declined somewhat over recent years. In contrast, among higher-income households, income growth has been strong—much stronger than growth for everyone else over the past four decades. So it is easy to see why many middle-class Americans feel they are falling further and further behind. Survey data provide ample evidence of the precarious economic experiences of most Americans. For instance, the 2009 TNS Economic Crisis survey asked households about their capacity to come up with $2,000 in 30 days. About one-quarter of Americans reported that they would certainly not be able to come up with such funds, and an additional 19 percent reported they would do so by pawning or selling possessions, or taking payday loans. Based on this finding, Dartmouth University economist Annamaria Lusardi and her colleagues determined that nearly half of Americans are financially fragile, including a sizable fraction of seemingly “middle-class” Americans.40 Families simply don’t cope with risk using “precautionary savings,” either. While savings come first in the “pecking order” of coping methods, the typical household relies heavily on family and friends, formal and alternative credit, increased work hours, and selling items. Empirical studies of short-term income volatility—for instance, the likelihood of experiencing a large monthly or annual drop in income—suggest a rising risk of economic insecurity. More than one in seven families experienced a drop of income of at least 50 percent in a given four-month period, on average between 1996 and 2004. The probability of not fully recovering from a substantial drop in income within a year rose sharply between 1996 and 2004, with 81.9 percent failing to recover in 1996 versus 92.4 percent in 2004.41 Stagnant incomes, financial fragility, and a relatively high probability of experiencing a substantial and irredeemable drop in income in the short term all combine to provide good reason to wonder whether risk tolerance among America’s middle class has indeed shifted. In the face of such economic insecurity, what happens to the probability of entrepreneurial success? How, if at all, does the half-century-long shift toward higher individual and family economic risk impact the entrepreneurial spirit?42 Finally, consider the effects of the erosion of middle-class wealth on the probability of entrepreneurial success. There are plenty of good reasons to imagine that liquidity constraints impact an individual’s likelihood of starting a business. Simply put, starting a business costs money. Personal wealth can be seed capital or loan collateral. One way of quantifying liquidity constraints is through individual or household wealth. Early seminal work from Global Economics Group economist David Evans and his colleagues established a positive relationship between wealth and the probability of becoming an entrepreneur.43 More recent work from World Bank economist Camilo Mondragón-Vélez expands on this analysis to show that most potential entrepreneurs in the economy—especially those below the top of the wealth distribution—face capital constraints when making the decision to start a business.44 Moreover, given the role of liquidity constraints, differential access to financial markets can help determine who becomes a successful entrepreneur. Increased financing costs and limited access to borrowing for low- and middle-income individuals can hamper entrepreneurship. The empirical trends in middle-class families’ asset portfolios provide reason to ask whether liquidity constraints are hampering successful entrepreneurship. Median wealth in America in 2013 was at its lowest rate since the early 1980s.45 The average family’s net worth plummeted between 2007 and 2010, mainly due to the high debt leverage of the average U.S. household prior to the recession, and the prominence of housing in the average asset portfolio of most middle-class families.46 What’s more, the racial and ethnic wealth gap, largely stable from 1983 to 2007, widened dramatically over the course of the Great Recession. And the wealth of households under the age of 45 has taken an especially hard hit in recent years.47 Taken together, these three basic sets of trends have potentially important implications for successful entrepreneurship. Middle-class families face serious time pressures, which may be constraining their ability to do the work necessary to move from the daydreaming stage to the reality of starting their own business. Economic precariousness may be holding back potentially transformative ideas from taking flight as Americans become more risk averse in the face of rising downside risk. And liquidity constraints stemming from eroding wealth and limited access to borrowing for credit-constrained individuals may be an additional roadblock. All three of these pathways are key channels through which the effects of inequality on the middle class may be holding back innovation, and in term hampering broader economic growth and dynamism. Inequality and innovation at the top: Perverse incentives? Top-end income and wealth have skyrocketed over the past half-century. Twenty percent of pre-tax income in the United States now goes to the top 1 percent of U.S. taxpayers.48 The wealthiest 0.1 percent of taxpayers held 22 percent of the nation’s assets in 2012.49 How does the pulling away of those individuals and families at the top of the economic ladder affect trends in innovation and entrepreneurship? Below, I work through two potential mechanisms worthy of further exploration. First, an increasing fraction of top-end income earners in the United States are employed in the financial sector. Think investment bankers and highly paid money managers, and private equity and hedge fund investors.50 How has financialization possibly harmed innovation and entrepreneurship? The transition of the U.S. economy over the past three decades from manufacturing-dominated to finance-driven is well established.51 Corporate governance is increasingly more responsive to financial markets than to product markets.52 Financialization has reshaped managerial priorities away from battling for ever-growing market share and toward short-term profits, which has implications for investments in research and development. This dynamic, in turn, has potential consequences for innovation as firms are more inclined to take a short-term approach to business rather than a long-term approach.53 The research and development funding necessary for breakthrough innovations, for example, may have long-term payoffs but yields limited short-term results, and thus takes a backseat in an economy characterized by high levels of financialization. Relatedly, investing in workers’ skills and talents may also be disincentivized in a world where short-term shareholder value trumps a longer-term vision. Underinvesting in workers may have hidden negative spillover effects for innovation and entrepreneurship. Today’s large firms are the incubators of tomorrow’s high-growth startups, places where employees see market opportunities that their employers are either uninterested in or too big to care about.54 If financialization means a shift in focus from long-term goals to short-term goals, the role of the firm as a locus for human capital development may have shifted in fundamental ways. And, for reasons noted below, the public sector has not accordingly responded to the erosion of a key private-sector capacity. Second, consider the potential political dynamics at play. The outsized influence of money in the political process means that a well-organized conservative movement deeply committed to reducing the size and scope of government plays a powerful role in shaping political debates and outcomes.55 Continued cuts in public investment in research and development, including cuts to the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and elsewhere, are arguably a consequence of organized economic elites determined to rein in the role of government. Starving the country of investments in critical research and development that could spur important innovations is potentially a serious consequence of rising economic inequality. Likewise, the anemia of the social insurance system that protects against some of the risks faced by middle- and lower-class households can also plausibly be traced down the same path. Consider the organized fight against the Affordable Care Act. A growing body of empirical work shows that access to affordable, universal health insurance can play a critical role in stimulating entrepreneurship, by untethering workers’ health care needs from an employer.56 Yet the push by a small but highly organized, well-resourced economic elite jeopardizes a key element of social insurance policy with the potential to jumpstart entrepreneurial activity.