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2022 HDC Counterplan
NEGATIVE › 1NC › DOS CP---1NC

Department of State assistance solves best

Bergmann and Schmitt 21, *senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, **senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress, )//BB

U.S. security assistance is broken and in need of an overhaul. Over the past two decades, the bureaucratic system developed to deliver billions of dollars of military aid to partner nations has evolved and expanded not by design but as the result of a series of ad hoc legislative and policy changes. Though the U.S. Department of State was initially in charge of security assistance policy and accounts, since 9/11, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has established a separate, well-funded security assistance bureaucracy at the Pentagon. This has inhibited effective congressional oversight, harmed coordination between diplomacy and defense, and contributed to the growing militarization of U.S. foreign policy. It has created a dysfunctional and bifurcated security assistance system. Under the current security assistance system, the returns on America’s security investments are limited, inconsistent, and not strategic. The consequences of today’s broken system include increased reliance on the military to solve foreign policy challenges; a perpetuated status quo whereby nondemocratic partners receive U.S. assistance and where human rights abuses are ignored; and an ineffective and unwieldy bureaucracy. This matters because the United States depends on capable allies and partners as a core component of its national security strategy, but the current system is not suited to the task. A new administration can change this by embracing wholesale reform of the security assistance system. To do so, however, a Biden-Harris administration must move quickly to work with Congress and include such reforms in any effort to rebuild and revive U.S. diplomacy. This will require talking not only about security assistance authorities, but fundamentally about money and resources as well. Any reform efforts intending to bolster the role of the State Department must start by examining how funding is oriented and balanced between the departments. This necessitates close cooperation with the Hill. There must be a dramatic realignment of U.S. security assistance. This report provides an overview and a systemic critique of the current bureaucratic structure of U.S. security assistance and outlines how transferring resources and responsibilities for security assistance back to the State Department will better advance U.S. interests and address the current geopolitical challenges America confronts. It calls for reviving the centrality of diplomacy by restoring the State Department’s role, as originally intended under U.S. law, as the overseer of all U.S. foreign assistance. It also offers recommendations for expanding and training the security assistance workforce, improving interagency coordination, elevating human rights concerns in security assistance policy, and adapting best practices from the DOD. Specifically, this report calls for transferring the following programs and funding from the DOD to the State Department: The relatively newly created Section 333 train and equip authority, which replicates the State Department’s Foreign Military Financing (FMF) authority The DOD’s security assistance authorities that focus on long-term security force reform to the State Department, including the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, the Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) Train and Equip Fund, and the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative fund This would result in a roughly $7 billion transfer, significantly augmenting the State Department’s budget and capacity to guide security assistance policy. Putting the State Department back in charge of security assistance will be a major reform and will require significant operational changes within the department, as well as a dramatic expansion of its administrative capacity. This will take time to implement and require significant reform within the agency. The DOD has done an admirable job in setting up a new institutional structure, in implementing assistance, and in coordinating with the State Department. However, officials across the U.S. foreign policy world acknowledge that the system is not working. Tommy Ross, a former DOD official in charge of overseeing the Pentagon’s security assistance, recently argued that U.S. security assistance is “not fit for purpose” and is “out of sync with U.S. priorities when it comes to where resources are needed most and the types of capabilities required by America’s allied and partners.”1 Indeed, throughout much of the last decade, it has been DOD officials who publicly argued for increased funding for the State Department.2 Ultimately, the current bifurcated security assistance system is suboptimal and results in the bureaucratic diminishment of the State Department relative to the military considerations of the DOD. Transferring resources and responsibility to the State Department would centralize responsibility for foreign aid under diplomatic control, while improving interagency cooperation, as DOD would remain the primary implementer of U.S. assistance. Some of these ideas will likely be met with innate skepticism from a generation of security professionals whose experience in Washington has been characterized by an ever-withering State Department and an ever-strengthening Pentagon. This report anticipates and rebuts likely arguments against reform, including the capacity of the State Department to take on this responsibility, the benefits of the Pentagon’s current management, or the unnecessary disruption that would result from significant bureaucratic change laid out in this proposal. Failing to reform security assistance not only leaves the United States with a wasteful and inefficient status quo, it also perpetuates the marginalization of diplomacy and locks in the military’s newly found dominance in driving U.S. foreign policy. The current security assistance system evolved to address the threats posed by the post-9/11 era and is now outdated and ill-suited for a new geopolitical environment characterized by competition. If the next administration is to revive U.S. diplomacy and rebuild the State Department, it must empower the agency to oversee and direct foreign assistance. The Biden-Harris administration should seize the opportunity to work with a new Congress to reform the system from its first days in office and restore an effective tool in the U.S. foreign policy arsenal. A new security assistance system, centralized and coordinated within the State Department, would allow the United States to wield its security assistance more effectively and responsibly in today’s competitive geopolitical environment. Arms transfers, training, and support could also better support U.S. foreign policy goals, in particular bolstering democratic partners and emerging democracies, making them stronger U.S. partners to counter threats from authoritarian actors. Empowering the State Department to oversee and manage security assistance would also ensure that aid is used to advance a values-based foreign policy that respects and supports human rights.3 It would also give U.S. diplomats greater clout and leverage and potentially create greater coherence to the provision of foreign assistance overall. The result would be to strengthen a key tool in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox and increase the clout and authority of America’s diplomats, which is badly needed in this new era of geopolitical competition.

2022 HDC Counterplan
NEGATIVE › 1NC › DOS CP---1NC

The counterplan competes. The plan’s “security cooperation” requires the Department of Defense. The counterplan’s “security assistance” is administered by the Department of State.

Kerr 18, Visiting Research Fellow at the National Defense University (NDU) in the Center for Complex Operations (Alexandra, “Defense Institution Building in the U.S. Context,” Connections, 17.3)//BB

Finally, in the U.S. government, “security cooperation” and “security assistance”—which are the chief lines of effort in the U.S. toolkit to help partners bolster their security and work with the United States to support common security objectives—are overlapping but not necessarily interchangeable. The distinction between “security cooperation” and “security assistance” activities has to do with the agency administering the program: in simplest terms, it is either an activity of the Department of Defense (security cooperation) or the Department of State (security assistance). DOD and the Department of State (DOS) have shared responsibility for engaging with foreign partner militaries since the mid-twentieth century, with the bulk of congressional security assistance funding allocated to DOS. Any security assistance administered by DOD—whether funded under Title 10 (Armed Services) or Title 22 (Foreign Affairs) of the U.S. Code—is a “security cooperation” activity.[21] After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the legal framework for the funding and administration of such activities evolved in response to emerging threats. Congress increasingly granted funding and authorities directly to DOD under Title 10 for security cooperation.[22] Therefore, while DOS security assistance programs can include DIB components, the majority of DIB-specific programming is currently funded under and implemented by the Department of Defense and is thus considered security cooperation.

2022 HDC Counterplan
AFFIRMATIVE › AFF---DOS---AFF Solvency---AT Bergmann

Even Bergmann admits structural reforms in the DoS would be necessary for solvency

1NC Bergmann and Schmitt 21, *senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, **senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)//BB

Moreover, due to personnel and resource shortages, former U.S. officials found that the State Department is “not equipped to coordinate across the increasingly complex and unwieldy” security assistance system.80 Senior policymakers, who often lack adequate staff or extensive training on security assistance, are not well equipped to effectively guide the bureaucracy on who should receive security assistance and how it fits into broader foreign policy decision-making.81 The State Department’s lack of resources also naturally hampers dual-key provisions that seek to fix coordination gaps between the State Department and the DOD. This leads to a system where security assistance policy varies country by country, depending on the personnel in place and the agency that takes charge. The added bureaucracy can make efficient, cost-conscious decisions impossible, and it opens the process up to political influence.

2022 HDC Counterplan
AFFIRMATIVE › AFF---DOS---AFF Solvency---AT Bergmann

State Department assistance fails

Sadler 21, Senior Fellow for Naval Warfare and Advanced Technology at Heritage, and Janae Diaz, Fall 2020 member of the Young Leaders Program at The Heritage Foundation (“Don’t Shift Security Cooperation to State Department,” The Heritage Foundation,

America spends billions each year on security cooperation and assistance programs, but the results do not match the investment. To help improve efficiencies, the Center for American Progress recently proposed consolidating all these programs within the State Department. That would be a big mistake, because it would minimize the Pentagon’s role in shaping and directing security assistance and, ultimately, the program’s military objectives would be subordinated to State Department interests, such as judicial reform and humanitarian programs. Those are not the values by which such security assistance programs should be solely judged. Security sector assistance programs deliver arms, military training, and other defense-related services to allies and partner nation governments via grants, loans, credit, cash sales, or leasing. By definition, these programs should prioritize national security. To this end, reforms should enhance joint State and Defense authorities so programs are evaluated in terms of America’s national strategic goals.

2022 HDC Counterplan
AFFIRMATIVE › AFF---DOS CP---No Solvency---Trust

Military diplomacy builds trust and relations

Ebitz 19, graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, and holds master’s degrees in Military Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Strategic Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps War College (Amy, “The use of military diplomacy in great power competition,” Brookings Institute, )//BB

Moreover, in places where the U.S. military has maintained a long-term presence (e.g. Japan, South Korea, Germany), we see that military interoperability enhances regions economically—directly through commercial contracting and the resulting employment, servicemember contributions through commerce, and in some cases, contributions of military gear and equipment through foreign military sales or otherwise. The resulting “military diplomacy,” also referred to as “defense diplomacy,” “soft power,” “military public diplomacy,” and “strategic communication,” allows the military to have a direct impact on foreign policy through other means. Although not diplomacy in the traditional sense of a State Department mission, military relationships between countries build a foundation on which further connections between nations are developed.

2022 HDC Counterplan
AFFIRMATIVE › AFF---DOS CP---No Solvency---Trust

The DoD is best for improving strong relationships with host countries

Karlin 22, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (Mara, “Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance,” Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)//BB

Our relationships provide us with a reservoir of strength. They allow us to operate by, with, and through our allies and partners to meet shared security challenges. The degree of partnership should not be measured by the quantity of security cooperation programs, but rather by their quality. The Department of Defense has learned from large-scale assistance programs that for lasting impact, a comprehensive engagement plan involves more than training and equipping. Importantly, we are building a culture of learning and adaptation, drawing on lessons from program successes, as well as, from programs that did not have the desired impact. We are building a learning agenda and integrating it into decision processes, and measure program impact in a way that assesses real change, rather than counting our own inputs into programs as successes in themselves. We seek to learn lessons and avoid the fallacy of sunk costs by ruthlessly prioritizing programs that are strategic, and setting appropriate expectations for programs that provide more of a tactical advantage. Through this approach, we can unlock the comparative advantages our allies and partners bring as we collectively work together to meet our shared objectives.

2022 HDC Counterplan
AFFIRMATIVE › AFF---DOS CP---No Solvency---Trust

Military-to-military contacts are necessary to build trust and avoid miscalculation

Ebitz 19, graduate of the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy, and holds master’s degrees in Military Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and Strategic Studies, from the U.S. Marine Corps War College (Amy, “The use of military diplomacy in great power competition,” Brookings Institute,

Within the main elements of national power (diplomacy, informational, military, and economic, or DIME), the military is often considered the last resort. However, the U.S. military has been a key player in, for instance, the spread of democracy, building partner countries’ strength through military-to-military relationships (including in the form of bi- and trilateral exercises to support standing Operation Plans, NATO, the United Nations, and Theater Security Cooperation), personnel exchange, and humanitarian assistance operations. Through these efforts, among others, the U.S. military helps to carry out the diplomatic mission of the United States (military diplomacy paved the way for NATO, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization, for instance). When military units participate in bilateral or multilateral exercises with other countries, for example, the purpose is several-fold: The interaction increases interoperability between the militaries, provides for cultural exchange and understanding, and offers an opportunity to expand each nation’s capabilities while exercising potential contingencies. The importance of military diplomacy in foreign engagement is to build dialogue that may facilitate further communication and, during a crisis, avoid confusion between cultures.

2022 HDC Counterplan
AFFIRMATIVE › AFF---DOS CP---No Solvency---DOD vs DOS

The military doesn’t suffer from the same resource shortages that the State Department does

Serafino 8, Coordinator and International Affairs Specialist at CRS (Nina, “The Department of Defense Role in Foreign Assistance: Background, Major Issues, and Options for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, )//BB

In addition to its regional advantage, DOD enjoys two other advantages: greater planning and execution capabilities, and substantially greater budgetary resources. DOD can muster more [hu]manpower than any other agency. While U.S. military personnel may be stretched in wartime, there still exist substantial reserves of personnel that can be tapped to plan and carry out activities. The combatant commands enjoy considerably more personnel than do individual embassies, and their personnel are oriented toward planning activities, whereas State Department personnel are oriented toward collecting information and furthering U.S. policy through diplomacy, such as person-to-person contact. Despite waging a war in Iraq, CENTCOM created a new Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa (CJT-HOA) of roughly 2,000 U.S. military personnel (the number fluctuates regularly) to plan and carry out efforts in the Horn of Africa that include much foreign assistance activity. In Iraq, DOD temporarily provided military personnel to fill about 100 State Department PRT posts, until the State Department could contract persons with the needed expertise to fill them.

2022 HDC Counterplan
AFFIRMATIVE › AFF---DOS CP---No Solvency---DOD vs DOS

The Department of State is structurally inept and incapable at effective diplomacy

Zeya and Finer 20, *American diplomat who has served as the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights in the Biden Administration since July 2021, **American journalist and diplomat who serves as Deputy National Security Advisor under National Security Advisor (Uzra and Jon, “Revitalizing the State Department and American Diplomacy,” Council Special Report No. 89)//BB

It has become an article of faith among policymakers that principled American leadership has waned but remains in demand around the world. Moreover, America’s network of international relationships is its foremost strategic asset, even as the agency charged with advancing U.S. interests through diplomacy—the Department of State (DOS)— has fallen into a deep and sustained period of crisis. However, there is a third framing assumption: that the current crisis offers an opportunity to address this predicament and revitalize American diplomacy. Despite the decades-long failure to implement essential reforms—and even in the face of sustained hostility from the current administration—diplomacy remains the best tool the United States has to advance its foreign policy interests. The role of the State Department has received heightened attention amid the onslaught it has suffered under the Donald J. Trump administration, which has treated American diplomats and diplomacy with a mix of neglect and disdain. But many of the challenges facing the DOS have existed for decades. Deficits in diversity, institutional culture, and professionalization are endemic to the State Department as an institution, and a diminished policy role for career officials persisted under previous administrations. Too often, leaders from both major parties have taken public support for U.S. leadership in the world for granted without making a strong enough case to the American public for why it is essential. Concrete steps can, and should, be taken solely through executive action in the first year of an administration committed to revitalizing American diplomacy, with thought to cementing change through legislation. The most pressing challenges facing the State Department include a twenty-first-century policy environment that has, in some priority areas, evolved beyond the core competencies of most Foreign and Civil Service officers and an institution hollowed out by three years of talent flight, mired in excessively layered structure, and resistant to reform. Perhaps most important, they include the multigenerational challenge of a diplomatic workforce that falls woefully short of reflecting the diverse country it serves, particularly at the senior-most ranks, compromising its effectiveness and fostering a homogeneous and risk-averse culture that drives out rather than cultivates fresh perspectives. The State Department today risks losing the “war for talent,” not only to the private sector but increasingly to other government agencies, due to inflexible career tracks, self-defeating hiring constraints, and a lack of commitment to training and professional development. Finally, DOS is hampered by Congress’s failure over many years to pass authorizing legislation, leading to budgetary pressures and diminishing DOS’s status in the hierarchy of national security agencies rather than reinforcing the nation’s paramount foreign policy institution.

2022 HDC Counterplan
AFFIRMATIVE › AFF---DOS CP---Perm Do CP

Substantial security cooperation is funded and controlled by State

Lieutenant Colonel Toney Filostrat and Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth A. Medina, United States Army, 12 – paper written for the Harvard Kennedy School of Government National Security Fellowship Program (“SMART TOOLS: Integrating Security Cooperation and Foreign Assistance in a Period of Constrained Resources” SC = Security Cooperation. SA = Security Assistance. FID = Foreign Internal Defense assistance

Significant portions of U.S. military security cooperation are funded as foreign assistance activities managed by the Department of State, and appropriated by Congress. With the amount of funding in the Defense appropriations bills, it’s not common knowledge that these military programs are funded under DoS budget authorities. The State Department has always taken its lead role on foreign assistance seriously, as a significant foreign policy tool. Over the past ten years, DoS focused on substantial internal reforms including foreign assistance planning and implementation. The U.S. government struggles to prepare for a future of persistent conflict and budget constraints. It is important to solidify reforms and institutionalize the integrating actions planned in the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review and the 3D Planning Framework to implement effective and efficient foreign assistance activities.

2022 HDC Counterplan
AFFIRMATIVE › AFF---DOS CP---Perm Do CP

State controls security cooperation – all DOD SC is carried out through embassies under direct supervision of State

Lieutenant Colonel Toney Filostrat and Lieutenant Colonel Elizabeth A. Medina, United States Army, 12 – paper written for the Harvard Kennedy School of Government National Security Fellowship Program (“SMART TOOLS: Integrating Security Cooperation and Foreign Assistance in a Period of Constrained Resources” SC = Security Cooperation. SA = Security Assistance. FID = Foreign Internal Defense assistance

Who Conducts Security Cooperation The following paragraphs describe the key participants and stakeholders for planning and managing SC activities at both the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Strategic / National Level The National Security Council (NSC) generally provides the initial guidance and translation of national-level decisions pertaining to FID, SA, and SC. The Department of State (DoS) is generally the lead government agency for U.S. international affairs. The Secretary of State advises the President in forming foreign policy, including the national FID effort. The DoS assists the NSC in building national FID related policies and priorities, and is the lead government agency to carry out these policies. The DoS Policy Planning Staff, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), and the new Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (CSO) are the most involved with interagency planning for FID, SA, and SC. The Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security is the principal advisor and focal point for SA matters within DoS; control and coordination of SA extends from this office to the Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs. At the national level, the PM is the principal channel of liaison between DoS and DoD. Generally, DoS directs the overall U.S. Government (USG) SA program and DoD executes via SC programs and activities.

DoD Directive 5132.03, Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation, dated October 24, 2008, establishes DoD policy and assigns responsibilities under the GEF, which provides SC guidance to the GCCs, and titles 10 and 22 of the United States Code (USC), and statutory authorities, executive orders, and policies relating to the administration of SC, including SA programs authorized by the FAA and AECA, as amended. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy USD(P) serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense on all SC matters. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Global Security Affairs) establishes SA policy and supervises SA programs through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The Secretaries of the Military Departments (MILDEPs) coordinate on SC policy guidance, campaign plans, and allocate resources to achieve SC objectives. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provides implementation guidance for U.S. military plans and programs and provides the Secretary of Defense with military advice concerning SC.15 Operational and Tactical Level The Director, DSCA, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), directs, administers, and provides DoD-wide guidance to the DoD Components and DoD representatives to U.S. missions, for the execution of DoD SC programs for which DSCA has responsibility. Other security SC programs are managed by other Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the GCCs, or MILDEPs. Specifically, GCCs develop campaign plans to conduct SC programs and activities in accordance with the GEF, and complete campaign plan and campaign support plan assessments.16

2022 HDC Counterplan
AFFIRMATIVE › AFF---DOS CP---Perm Do CP

Security cooperation includes the DOS

MAJ Nicholas R. Simontis, 13 - U.S. Army School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas “SECURITY COOPERATION: AN OLD PRACTICE FOR NEW TIMES”

How we deal with our adversaries is changing in response to these developments in the security environment. How we deal with our international allies and partners also should change. For many years, the term “security cooperation” referred to efforts by the Department of Defense (DOD) to promote U.S. security interests through the interaction with and development of friendly and allied security capabilities.2 This definition is evolving, however, as illustrated by recent strategic documents and statements by the President and Secretary of Defense.3 The term as used recently includes synchronized efforts by the whole-of-government to build the security capacity of U.S. friends and allies, including the development of economic and political capabilities. The most recent strategic guidance calls for increased emphasis on an interagency and interorganizational approach to building partner capacity and capability, focused on promoting stability and preventing conflict before it begins, all within a framework that emphasizes governance and rule of law. Put another way, recent strategic guidance advocates a whole-of-government approach as the means for translating national security objectives into the outcome of increased partner capacity. This change represents recognition that a wide variety of skill sets is necessary to address these changes in the security environment. Unfortunately, this change presents challenges for current security cooperation practices.

The current structure of security cooperation, that is, the infrastructure of government agencies that participate in security cooperation activities, does not readily support this new guidance. The current security cooperation organization originated in the aftermath of World War II, and continued to evolve through the Cold War. Although the Department of State (DOS) has responsibility for planning and executing security cooperation, the system primarily addresses the military component of security in terms of equipment and training. The DOD, under the auspices of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) executes these portions of U.S. Security cooperation endeavors, which constitute the preponderance of efforts, both in terms of labor and fund allocation. Furthermore, the DOD’s share has grown considerably in the past five years as Congress significantly increased funding authorities in order to facilitate stabilization in Iraq and Afghanistan.4 The key issue, then, is how to shift the emphasis from the Department of Defense to efforts shared among Defense, State, USAID, and other agencies as needed.

2022 HDC Counterplan
AFFIRMATIVE › AFF---DOS CP---Perm Do Both

Close collaboration is good

Karlin 22, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities (Mara, “Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance,” Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)//BB

A key aspect of the success of the security cooperation enterprise is the collaboration among and within the Department, most notably DoD’s close collaboration with the State Department ensures that programs are designed and executed with broader national security interests in mind. Internal to the Department of Defense, we recently reorganized – bringing the Defense Security Cooperation Agency under the umbrella of Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities in the Office of the Secretary of the Defense for Policy to facilitate better collaboration and coordination. Success requires teamwork, and I can assure you that our entire team is focused on embracing it.

2022 HDC Counterplan
AFFIRMATIVE › AFF---DOS CP---Perm Do Both

Military assistance does not trade off with State Department involvement

Early 11, Lt Col, USAF (Billie, “IMPLICATIONS OF THE MILITARIZATION OF US FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH SECURITY ASSISTANCE,” Air War College, )//BB

When the three indicators of militarization are applied to DOD’s security assistance efforts, results indicate that the United States relies heavily on DOD to pursue foreign policy objectives, but not at the expense of State Department responsibilities. DOD uses security cooperation to build relationships with partner nations and respond to humanitarian efforts, and uses security assistance as a flexible tool to build the capacity of foreign military forces so they can respond to threats in their regions before conditions require a greater US military response. Whenever possible, DOD proactively shapes the global security environment promoting US interests. DOD has the option to use its new Section 1206 authority to respond to urgent and emerging threats based on regional command priorities, or to influence longer-term State Department programs in support of country requirements. Also, DOD’s considerable force presence and commander influence can sway security assistance decisions favorably toward US interests. However, the State Department maintains a high degree of direct involvement and oversight in all security assistance decisions.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › Fem lens – general

States try to be the “savior” especially if they believe they are vulnerable – history proves

Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender and Global Security, pg. 87 /// MF)

On this point, Susan Faludi’s The Terror Dream (2007) continues to be quite instructive. Not only does this work document the resurgence in the US of a state security discourse proff ered across the airwaves, almost exclusively by military men (to the almost absolute exclusion of female and particularly feminist voices representing alternative views), in the fi rst few years of the post-9/11 period, but it also analyzes the resurgence of older sexist and racist mythologies from America’s past called up to cover up the chink in the sovereign man’s armor. Faludi asks us to consider the lionizing of male rescue workers at “ground zero” (and the attendant silencing of female rescue workers long discriminated against, as well as widows who questioned the US military response, because neither conformed with adulating male protection and security at any cost), the ersatz “rescue” of US soldier Jessica Lynch supposedly from rapacious Iraqi captors (who turned out to be caring medical personnel), or overblown (and in most cases untrue) claims about women opting out of the workplace to return home to raise babies and become “security moms” in support of war. She argues that these convenient “fi ctions” have roots in earlier frontier stories, captivity narratives, and Cold War hysterias. These get trotted out whenever there are fears of “masculine insuffi ciency” because hegemonic masculinity cannot countenance “vulnerability” (Faludi 2007: 280).

When we look more closely at the events behind these earlier narratives, we fi nd that white male frontiersmen (such as Daniel Boone) were, in fact, undistinguished as providers or protectors and more often relied on the provisioning and protective skills of their wives, children, and indigenous peoples to survive, and the majority of white women taken captive by indigenous peoples either preferred to stay with their newfound families into which they were adopted or won their release from their captors on their own (Faludi 2007: 212, 256–262). Nevertheless, Faludi argues, insecure times in patriarchal cultures ratchet up the need for elaborate mythologies that “measure national male strength by female peril,” requiring that “women be saved from more and more gruesome violation to prove their saviors’ valor” (2007: 262). In the US white patriarchal cultural imagination, that peril is limited to con-cerns for white women and symbolized most by racialized men, whether they be indigenous “captors” of old and newer Iraqi ones, the “yellow” and “Hun” hordes of World War II, or the “red” communist threat of the Cold War. In each case, fears of “alien” invasion required the “securing of American domesticity,” which conjured images of (white) women (re)confi ned to the home front, obsessions with “women’s sexual purity” supposedly at risk from racial-ized men, and a summoning of “John Wayne and his avenging brethren” (Faludi 2007: 282–283, 286).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › Fem lens – general

Trying to be the “savior” especially if they believe they are vulnerable – history proves and it ends up foreclosing the possibility of change within the system

Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender and Global Security, pg. 87-88 /// MF)

On this point, Susan Faludi’s The Terror Dream (2007) continues to be quite instructive. Not only does this work document the resurgence in the US of a state security discourse proff ered across the airwaves, almost exclusively by military men (to the almost absolute exclusion of female and particularly feminist voices representing alternative views), in the fi rst few years of the post-9/11 period, but it also analyzes the resurgence of older sexist and racist mythologies from America’s past called up to cover up the chink in the sovereign man’s armor. Faludi asks us to consider the lionizing of male rescue workers at “ground zero” (and the attendant silencing of female rescue workers long discriminated against, as well as widows who questioned the US military response, because neither conformed with adulating male protection and security at any cost), the ersatz “rescue” of US soldier Jessica Lynch supposedly from rapacious Iraqi captors (who turned out to be caring medical personnel), or overblown (and in most cases untrue) claims about women opting out of the workplace to return home to raise babies and become “security moms” in support of war. She argues that these convenient “fi ctions” have roots in earlier frontier stories, captivity narratives, and Cold War hysterias. These get trotted out whenever there are fears of “masculine insuffi ciency” because hegemonic masculinity cannot countenance “vulnerability” (Faludi 2007: 280).

When we look more closely at the events behind these earlier narratives, we fi nd that white male frontiersmen (such as Daniel Boone) were, in fact, undistinguished as providers or protectors and more often relied on the provisioning and protective skills of their wives, children, and indigenous peoples to survive, and the majority of white women taken captive by indigenous peoples either preferred to stay with their newfound families into which they were adopted or won their release from their captors on their own (Faludi 2007: 212, 256–262). Nevertheless, Faludi argues, insecure times in patriarchal cultures ratchet up the need for elaborate mythologies that “measure national male strength by female peril,” requiring that “women be saved from more and more gruesome violation to prove their saviors’ valor” (2007: 262). In the US white patriarchal cultural imagination, that peril is limited to con-cerns for white women and symbolized most by racialized men, whether they be indigenous “captors” of old and newer Iraqi ones, the “yellow” and “Hun” hordes of World War II, or the “red” communist threat of the Cold War. In each case, fears of “alien” invasion required the “securing of American domesticity,” which conjured images of (white) women (re)confi ned to the home front, obsessions with “women’s sexual purity” supposedly at risk from racial-ized men, and a summoning of “John Wayne and his avenging brethren” (Faludi 2007: 282–283, 286).

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › Fem lens – general

Men are not inherently prone to war – its been socially constructed

Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender and Global Security, pgs. 84-85 /// MF)

Nevertheless, still other contemporary feminists have shown, most recently quantitatively as noted in Chapters 1 and 2, that there is a powerful and direct relationship between inter-national violence and domestic violence, which gives women particular interests in resisting warfare and war preparedness because it produces men who do not visit violence only on the “enemy” but also on their own wives, partners, and children. But men, too, feminists have argued, can develop interests in resisting war because of the harm it does to their bodies and psyches, leading to the destruction of their loved ones and their own selves. What keeps more men—particularly those in subordinate military positions whose bodies are most on the line—from developing such interests is the valorization of war as the penultimate masculine activity through which men can prove they are “real men” (Whitworth 2008). As pointed out in Chapters 1 and 2 , heteronormative masculinity is an elastic construct, but it is also an extraordinarily fragile and unstable one. Men are never suffi ciently masculine simply when they have the appropriate genitalia, and establishing masculinity is never a done deal: males face relentless pressures to demonstrate they are real men by exhibiting unequivocally mas-culine qualities and distancing themselves from what is defi ned as feminine (Kimmel 2008). Thus, masculinity is an identity that leaves men having to prove repeatedly that they have “it.” They are put in constant fear and anxiety that they will be dubbed less than “real men” and, therefore, be demoted down the gender hierarchy and be subject to greater violence by other, higher men.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › Fem lens – general

Discourse analysis avoids additional stereotyping and counters exclusion in IR and the world globally

Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender(ed) Lenses on Global Politics, pg 46 /// MF)

Such practices seek to reveal the underside of global politics, simultaneously exposing the gendered dynamics that underlie and infect the thought, language, structures, and practices of it and privileging dissident and alternative voices about how it might be rethought, reartic-ulated, and rearranged. These practices also require refl exivity about the power relations between the researcher and the researched. In cases of “studying down”—such as working with non-elite actors—feminist IR scholars aim to be cognizant of their privilege and, thus, their responsibility to allow such actors to represent themselves in their own ways so as not to impose Eurocentric/Orientalist, heteronormative, gender normative, or classist interpreta-tions on the motivations, nature, and outcomes of their struggles. When “studying up”—or dealing with elite or more privileged actors—feminist IR scholars aim to be cognizant of how such actors limit access to researchers engaged in critical scholarship and mystify their power through bureaucratic language. Discourse analysis is thus especially productive when studying up because it enables reading between the lines and catching how the powerful con-sistently represent themselves and how they consistently represent “others” to justify their policies and actions. In these ways, feminist IR scholarship itself seeks to counter the crisis of representation both in the fi eld of IR, in which the study of people and especially non-elite people has historically been absent, and in global politics, which has historically operated as if people and especially non-elite people did not matter. Moreover, it has ignored how bodies, embodied experiences, and embodied thought are integral to producing and understanding global political phenomenon

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › Fem lens – general

Contemporary fem IR reveals and overcomes the mistakes – like exclusion - made by traditional IR

Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender(ed) Lenses on Global Politics, pgs 45-46/// MF)

In the contemporary period, feminist IR is characterized as consisting of two major and interactive areas of inquiry—feminist security studies (FSS) 4 and feminist international (or global) political economy (F(I or G)PE) studies. 5 FSS scholars engage with and critique conventional, state-centric understandings of war, peace, and security that remain at the center of the discipline of IR and challenge the everyday as well as international violence they leave in place. They re-theorize such concepts as states, just war, the democratic peace, and human security through a gender(ed) lens while emphasizing the role of “subjectivities,” human “agency,” and “discourses” (or narratives) as well as bodies and emotions in the production and experience of direct violence, from the intimate to the global (Hudson 2018: 129). F(I or G)PE scholars focus most on “economic insecurities” produced by neo(colonial-ism), (capitalist) economic development, and globalization and the gendered nature of these processes (Hudson 2018: 129). They apply more materialist analyses to reveal how conven-tional accounts of the global political economy and its global governance structures fail to understand how the political economy of gender—from the sex, domestic labor, and beauty trades to the reliance on women’s unpaid reproductive labor to make up for declining wages, public services, and environmental protection standards under global (and fi nancial) capitalism—underpins unjust global economic relations. As a result, they are more focused on structural violence. However, FSS and F(I or G)PE scholarship often intersect, such as in studies on the political economy of peacekeeping in rural societies that disregards women’s economic roles in the gathering of food and fuel far away from homes and refugee camps, making them most vulnerable to attacks, or in studies on the privatization of security forces, either as subcontracted or mercenary labor, which is implicated in greater direct (including sexual) violence being perpetrated on local populations (particularly women) with less accountability than state militaries (Hudson 2018: 135). Although FSS inquiry is highlighted in Chapter 4 and F(I or G)PE inquiry is highlighted in Chapter 5 of this text, as is argued throughout the book, there are strong connections made between direct and structural violence and discursive and material forms of violence in much current feminist IR scholarship. 6

As interrelated FSS and F(I or G)PE research has burgeoned, scholars working in these areas have multiplied the methodologies used in IR inquiry in order to get at the multiple ways in which global politics is gendered. In contrast to conventional positivist IR research, feminist IR scholars (and other transnational feminist scholars who engage with and contribute to feminist IR thought) have often utilized such qualitative approaches as ethnographic fi eldwork to learn about the lives of the non-elite, social action research through participant observation of social movements, and discourse analysis of classic IR texts, world leaders’ pronouncements, (inter)governmental policies and documents, NGO campaigns, and local group articulations of social problems. In doing so, they consider the role of emotion and bodily experience in the production and reproduction of global political actions and reactions. They thus participate in what is referred to as the “aff ective” turn in IR inquiry, which destabilizes rational actor claims in IR and takes seriously how global politics thought and practice are embodied phenomenon. They also plumb cultural sources, such as popular culture images on the airwaves and the Internet and even literature, art, and poetry, to fi nd expressions over time and space of resistance to global politics-as-usual in unusual places (Ackerly, Stern, and True 2006). As a result, feminist scholarship, as well as, increasingly, other critical scholarship, also engages in what has been referred to as the “visual” or “aesthetic” turn in IR inquiry, which examines such things as images, mediascapes, places, and cartographies to better understand how global politics is embedded in, shaped by, productive, and reproductive of cultural construction and processes.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Fem IR updates › Neg › Fem lens – general

Current theorizing revealed that politics are defined in gendered ways, especially in international politics

Anne Ruyan, 2018 (Ruyan, professor in the School of Public and International Affairs, faculty affiliate of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at the University of Cincinnati and has a PhD in International Relations. “Global Power Politics” Gender and Global Governance, pg 53/// MF)

This was an important insight, but it still did not yield signifi cant change in women’s representation in political offi ce or signifi cantly increase women’s access to and participation in formal politics more generally. Such a focus on “women worthies” also limited feminist interventions to getting relatively few women into relatively few positions of formal power. This led feminist political theorists to question the very defi nition of politics and the standards by which political behavior is judged. 1 That public-sphere, formal politics is only one form of politics was revealed by showing how the private sphere and everyday life are shot through with power relations and negotia-tions (“the personal is political”). This also drew attention to the ways in which women engaged in non-formal political action to turn practices assumed to be natural and unchange-able (such as rape and domestic violence) into “political” (and thus changeable) “issues.” Feminist political theorizing also revealed that formal politics was defi ned, and political behavior judged, on the basis of (hegemonic) male norms that privileged notions of politics as winner-take-all aff airs, eff ectively necessitating individualist and aggressive traits to be successful in such politics. This problem is magnifi ed in the case of international politics, which could be defi ned as hypermasculinist when compared with masculinist domestic politics. Feminists have also shown that domestic politics, as not only national but also local, household, and interpersonal politics, is not separate from international politics, arguing that “the personal is international” (Enloe 1989).