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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Cease CP › 1NC – ! – France

Democracy solves extinction

Carla Zoe Cremer & Luke Kemp 21, The Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford. Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, Cambridge. "Democratising Risk: In Search of a Methodology to Study Existential Risk" //pipk

There is an intimate and neglected relationship between existential risk and democracy. Democracy must be central to efforts to prevent and mitigate catastrophic risks. It is also an antidote to many of the problems manifest in the TUA. Do those who study the future of humanity have good grounds to ignore the visions, desires, and values of the very people whose future they are trying to protect? Choosing which risks to take must be a democratic endeavour.

We understand democracy here in accordance with Landemore as the rule of the cognitively diverse many who are entitled to equal decision-making power and partake in a democratic procedure that includes both a deliberative element and one of preference aggregation (such as majority voting)45,115. Decision-making procedures are not either democratic or non- democratic, but instead lie on a spectrum. They can be more or less democratic, inclusive, and diverse.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Cease CP › 1NC – ! – France

US withdrawal from NATO incentivizes European defense spending and military developments – otherwise continued freeriding which undermines democracy

Eland, 19 (Ivan Eland, 1-18-19, “NATO May Help Putin, but It Will Help Americans More,” Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute and Director of the Independent Institute's , //mahimahi)

Even if this were true—as it may be—the time has come to reassess whether the U.S. needs to stay in an outdated alliance that was designed to deter the Soviet Union from an attack on Western Europe during the Cold War, which ended more than a quarter century ago. In fact, once the Soviet Union fell in 1991, the United States should have turned NATO over to the by-then rich Europeans to deter a much-diminished Russia. It was no longer 1949, when the Soviets still had a massive tank army in central Europe, and most of Western Europe was in rubble from World War II.

Despite today’s hype of a resurgent Russian threat, Russia still has a GDP roughly equivalent to Spain. In contrast, the Europeans combined have a GDP greater than the United States. However, Trump is correct that the wealthy Europeans are free riders on massive and excessive U.S. defense spending. For example, the mighty German economy only spends one percent of GDP on defense. And despite establishment analysts perennially noting that the only time NATO’s Article V mutual defense clause has been invoked was after the Cold War ended in response to the 9/11 attacks against the United States, European efforts in Afghanistan have been mostly window dressing, and in any major war, the United States would be defending Europe and not vice versa.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Cease CP › 1NC – ! – France

France wants autonomy in NATO now

Pannier, 2-4 (Alice Pannier, 2-4-22, assistant professor of European studies and international relations at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies,

Secondly, the quality of French-US relations (and thus French-NATO relations) depends on the Biden Administration’s attitude towards European defence efforts. President Emmanuel Macron’s view of the articulation between NATO and European defence is –in line with previous French Presidents– as follows: “our security also inevitably requires that Europeans have a greater capacity for autonomous action. […] Europeans must now take greater responsibility for this European defence, this European pillar within NATO. […]. NATO and European Defence are two pillars of European collective security” (Macron, 2020). Macron managed to get out of the AUKUS crisis in September 2021 with a recognition, from his counterpart ‘’. While seemingly symbolic, such declarations could mark a shift after 30 years of US Administrations that warned against ‘duplication’ rather than welcoming European initiatives to develop defence capabilities. Seen from Paris, further US insistence will be needed to convince Europe to fully invest in its capabilities and in the tools developed by the EU and thus to strengthen NATO’s European pillar.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Cease CP › 1NC – ! – Enlargement Bad

NATO enlargement has opened the door to military risks – US engagement is counterproductive because they will either overestimate or understimate risks.

Kuhn, 18 (Ulrich Kuh, 3-28-18, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, “Preventing Escalation in the Baltics,” //mahimahi)

For the past twenty years, as NATO has mostly pursued an open door policy toward Central and Eastern Europe, the alliance has grown by integrating former members of the Warsaw Pact, nonmembers who were previously friendly with the Soviet Union, and three former Soviet republics (the three Baltic states). The principles underlying enlargement are that new member states must choose freely to join NATO, that they fulfill a number of political and military criteria (such as having settled any ethnic or external territorial disputes, as well as being able to contribute militarily and financially to collective defense), and that their accession strengthens the alliance.1 In addition, NATO has fostered close cooperative ties with all other former Soviet republics and continues to champion their political independence. At the same time, NATO has engaged Russia to try to alleviate Moscow’s concerns about NATO enlargement and to pursue cooperation in areas of common security interest, such as mutual military risk reduction and counterterrorism. NATO insists that it does not seek conflict with Russia.2

NATO members have sometimes disagreed about which elements of this approach to prioritize; at times, fractures between different national positions have become very visible. For example, at NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Summit, the United States and some other allies pushed for Georgia and Ukraine to become members, directly challenging a core Russian interest. But France and Germany blocked this proposed accession, partly because they were concerned about Russia’s likely negative reaction and partly because they questioned the fitness of these states to join NATO and their potential to strengthen the alliance.3

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Cease CP › 2NC – ! – Baltics

NATO military engagement escalates tensions with Russia and the Baltics—the US is not willing or capable to provide necessary forces.

Kuhn, 18 (Ulrich Kuh, 3-28-18, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg, “Preventing Escalation in the Baltics,” //mahimahi)

If NATO wants to deny Russia the ability to successfully attack one or more Baltic states, it has little choice but to deploy forces on a much larger scale than it currently does.

While such measures might mitigate the short-term risk of deliberate Russian escalation, they would create a number of severe political trade-offs. First, a deterrence-by-denial approach would risk overstretching the delicate political consensus among NATO members about conventional deterrence and assurance. A number of member states, perhaps led by Germany and France, would not support such a policy and would seek to block it. Even more importantly, perhaps, not even the Baltic states are supportive of such a maximalist approach. While many Baltic officials and experts would like to see greater U.S. military engagement in the region, some of them are highly skeptical of the assumptions underlying the RAND war games and think that they are too pessimistic about Baltic defenses. While they would like to see a strong, unified allied response to the growing threat from Russia, they also recognize the need to avoid unnecessarily escalating general tensions with Russia.2 Also, against the background of often contentious debates within NATO about financial and military burden sharing, it would not be clear at all who would provide the necessary funds and forces for such a large military footprint. Neither the United States nor most other allies currently seem to be both willing and capable.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Cease CP › 2NC – ! – Baltics

The Baltic states cannot provide the US a beneficial geopolitical relationship—the security commitments of NATO have grown to an extent where withdrawal for the US is the most strategically valuable

Matthew Mai, 21; 07/19/2021, B.S. in Public Policy from Rutgers University, Marcellus Policy Fellow at the John Quincy Adams Society, and Associate Editor at the Nation Interest; “The Baltic States: Assets or Liabilities?” https://realistreview.org/2021/07/19/the-baltic-states-assets-or-liabilities//ekc

President Biden has pledged to put America “back at the head of the table” by restoring confidence in the NATO alliance. Yet, regardless of the current attitude in the White House, the United States’ defense commitments to countries on the European periphery need a serious re-examination.

Specifically, what does the United States gain by pledging to defend the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania?

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Cease CP › 1NC – ! – Baltics

Even with US military personnel, deterring regional insecurity in the Baltics isn’t possible.

Lucas, 2-2 (Edward Lucas, 2-2-22, on resident fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “NATO Is Dangerously Exposed in the Baltic,” mahimahi)

Nowhere is the credibility of the United States and its allies at greater risk than in the Baltic Sea region. NATO’s  pledges the alliance to defend its members. Doing that for the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—three thinly populated states squeezed between Russia, Belarus, and the Baltic Sea—is hard. Years of cost-cutting, timidity, and wishful thinking by NATO governments make it harder.

As the Russian military buildup around Ukraine raises fears of a broader East-West security crisis, NATO allies are hastening to bolster the Baltic states’ defenses while non-NATO members  are tightening their ties with the alliance. In late January, U.S. Air Force F-15 fighters  in Estonia as part of a wide-ranging reassurance effort. At bases elsewhere in Europe and the United States, 8,500 U.S. military personnel are on heightened alert, ready to deploy to the region as part of NATO’s 40,000-strong Response Force.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Cease CP › 1NC – ! – Baltics

NATO flirts with danger in the Baltics—the region lacks strategic assets and risks escalation with Russia

Ted Galen Carpenter, 22; Senior fellow for defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute, Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history from the University of Texas, contributing editor to the National Interest, the American Conservative, and 19FortyFive, and a weekly columnist at Antiwar.com. Editorial board officer of the Journal of Strategic Studies and the author of more than 950 articles and policy studies, author of NATO: The Dangerous Dinosaur (2019), Gullible Superpower: U.S. Support for Bogus Foreign Democratic Movements (2019), The Ties That Blind: How the U.S.-Saudi Alliance Damages Liberty and Security (2018), Perilous Partners: The Benefits and Pitfalls of America’s Alliances with Authoritarian Regimes (2015), and many more. “NATO Security Dependents Are Not Useful Allies” 01/08/2022 https://www.cato.org/commentary/nato-security-dependents-are-not-useful-allies//ekc

Since the end of World War II, U.S. officials have had an unduly expansive concept of what constitutes worthwhile strategic allies for the United States. In too many cases, the “allies” that Washington touts are small, weak, often militarily useless dependents. Worse, some of them are on bad terms with more powerful neighboring states. Under those circumstances, the so‐​called allies are major liabilities rather than assets to the United States. Indeed, they are potential snares, ones that can entangle America in unnecessary military confrontations.

Washington would do well to become far more selective about which nations it includes in its roster of allies, and U.S. leaders should stop elevating security dependents to the status of allies. When U.S. officials described the regimes that Washington installed through military force in Afghanistan and Iraq as allies, it became clear that they had lost even minimal understanding of the concept. That point became abundantly evident when their Afghan client collapsed almost overnight in the face of the Taliban military offensive. It’s time for U.S. policymakers to do better.

2022 Michigan Topicality
AT: Reasonability

Their model of reasonability is untenable—it amounts to “our interps are reasonable if we say so,” which makes the topic an unlimited free-for-all and solves neither side’s offense. Competing interpretations is the best guide to making a fair decision with incomplete information.

Hansen, 18—Senior Associate Professor, Danish School of Media and Journalism (Ejvind, “Aporias of courage and the freedom of expression,” Philosophy & Social Criticism, Vol 44, Issue 1, 2018, dml) [language modifications denoted by brackets]

In order for a practice to be courageous there needs to be some kind of goal, and, furthermore, some kind of connection between the goal and the practice. This is admittedly still pretty vague. Insofar as we define courage as a challenging practice in which we risk our lives in order to reasonably further some kind of goal, we have reached a definition with elements (‘risk’, ‘lives’, ‘reasonably’ ‘further’, ‘some kind of goal’) that are very open to differing views.

On the one hand, this is certainly as it has to be. If we are to articulate a positive supplement to the negative definitions of the freedom of expression, it must be very open, because it should be open to the improvisational and disruptive impulses of courage. As soon as we start to define the goals and the ways of reaching them too strictly, these very definitions might themselves become objects of challenge through the aporias of courage.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › ---AUKUS key to Innovation---2NC

AUKUS key to emerging tech innovation

Jennifer D.P. Moroney and Alan Tidwell 22, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation and manages many of RAND's security cooperation–related projects for Department of Defense clients. Professor of the Practice and Director of the Center for Australian, New Zealand and Pacific Studies (CANZPS) at the Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service. "Making AUKUS Work" March 22. //pipk

Russia's war in Ukraine brings into stark relief the true meaning of revisionist power. It could serve as a catalyst to urgent action in countering both Russian and Chinese revisionism. On September 15, 2021 President Biden announced the creation of AUKUS, a trilateral, experimental arrangement among the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom focused on defense technology that would deliver nuclear powered submarines to Australia by 2039. The President also made clear that AUKUS would extend beyond cooperation on submarines, and these sentiments have been echoed in Canberra and London.

Even with the ongoing war in Ukraine, Australian Secretary of Defence, Greg Moriarty, is in Washington to discuss ways to get AUKUS moving. AUKUS could open new avenues for cooperative development (co-designing) and production (co-building) of armaments (the P-8, Triton, and Jammer are examples to follow). Given the lag time to 2039, it would likely be important to demonstrate the utility of AUKUS in facilitating a broader defense relationship by laying out a realistic, clear-eyed vision for the trilateral relationship, establishing a framework and plan to manage the work, identify and then address the existing barriers, and ensure that metrics are in place to measure progress. Taking all these steps may help get AUKUS off the ground, which could bring major benefits to the allies.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › ---Delays I/L---2NC

Delays encourage allies to shift to China and Russia

E. John Teichert 22, Brigadier General, assistant deputy undersecretary of the Air Force for international affairs. "The Power of Proper Security Cooperation" March 15. //pipk

The United States aims to be the security cooperation partner of choice, but competitors get a vote. Chinese and Russian security cooperation activities span the globe, looking to gain access and influence, and often to supplant America’s positions. These competitors are active suitors with a broad portfolio of offerings to potential partners, and America’s missteps cede ground to Beijing and Moscow. As a result, key elements of American security cooperation ought to take this competitive environment into account to seize strengths and opportunities while stiff-arming weaknesses and constraints. With eyes around the world fixed on Eastern Europe, one oft-discussed topic is America’s record of security cooperation with Ukraine since 2014. But some of the most important lessons about U.S. security cooperation might come from another country: Iraq. My experience leading security cooperation efforts in Iraq offers a useful case study from which policymakers and practitioners can draw lessons for U.S. efforts elsewhere in the world.

When allies and partners consider America as a security cooperation partner, their leaders take a variety of factors into account, but foremost among these are quality, cost, and schedule. In general, American security cooperation activities provide quality weapons systems at a reasonable cost, but delivery schedules tend to lag, frustrating partners and empowering competitors. In order to meet American needs, security cooperation ought to be more timely, sustainable, consistent, and holistic.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › Democracy Module---2NC

Democracy solves multiple extinction risks

Carla Zoe Cremer & Luke Kemp 21, The Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford. Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, Cambridge. "Democratising Risk: In Search of a Methodology to Study Existential Risk" //pipk

There is an intimate and neglected relationship between existential risk and democracy. Democracy must be central to efforts to prevent and mitigate catastrophic risks. It is also an antidote to many of the problems manifest in the TUA. Do those who study the future of humanity have good grounds to ignore the visions, desires, and values of the very people whose future they are trying to protect? Choosing which risks to take must be a democratic endeavour.

We understand democracy here in accordance with Landemore as the rule of the cognitively diverse many who are entitled to equal decision-making power and partake in a democratic procedure that includes both a deliberative element and one of preference aggregation (such as majority voting)45,115. Decision-making procedures are not either democratic or non- democratic, but instead lie on a spectrum. They can be more or less democratic, inclusive, and diverse.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › Democracy Module---2NC

Stream-lined security cooperation is key to security relationships that solve innovation and deterrence necessary to defend democracy

R. Clarke Cooper 21, nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, former assistant secretary at the US Department of State, a former senior intelligence officer for the US Joint Special Operations Command. December 23. "A multipolar world requires more adaptive US security thinking" //pipk

While the scale and volume of military interventions by China, Russia, and Iran are reportedly lower now than at the height of Cold War, the increasing risks of disruptive actions by these state actors and their proxies in a multipolar world require deterrence featuring robust technological solutions, which can only emerge from smart, adaptive policy.

The United States and its security partners are awaiting the Biden administration’s Global Posture Review, along with the potential expansion of security cooperation procedures, expanded congressional reviews, and a revision of the Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) Policy—which would further protract an already lengthy arms-sale process. Meanwhile, dictatorial adversaries of democracy and freedom in Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran are aggressively seeking opportunities for disruption wherever Washington might expand or reduce security cooperation, or simply withdraw its presence. Ready access to low-cost, but effective, commercial technologies render that threat even more potent.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › Taiwan I/L---2NC

DSCA key to Taiwan arms sales

Seth Robson 22, Starts and Stripes, April 8. "US approves air-defense upgrade for Taiwan as COVID-19 nixes reported visit by Pelosi" Nexis //pipk

”The United States has approved a $95 million military sale to boost Taiwan's air defenses, as China sends increasing numbers of warplanes near the island democracy.

Details of a contract to support "training, planning, fielding, deployment, operation, maintenance, and sustainment of the Patriot Air Defense System" on Taiwan were released by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency on Tuesday.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › Turns Russia---2NC

EDI is key to deterring Russia---allies are expanding their efforts but US support is critical

*note---ERI and EDI are the same thing

Andrew S. Bowne 18, Major, Judge Advocate, USAF. Presently assigned as a Contract and Fiscal Law Professor, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army. 1. ARTICLE: DEFENDING THE NEW FULDA GAP: DETERRING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE BALTIC STATES THROUGH FISCAL LEGISLATION, 226 Mil. L. Rev. 147. Nexis //pipk

Founded on 4 April 1949, NATO is an alliance to safeguard freedom and promote stability in the North Atlantic area through collective defense. 23 Originally twelve members, NATO expanded to twenty-eight, with most of the expansion occurring after the fall of the Soviet Union. 24 Despite numerous geopolitical shifts since its [*153] inception, NATO is still the "cornerstone of transatlantic security cooperation and the guarantor of peace and stability in Europe." 25 Under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO members are committed to collective self-defense. 26 Thus, an attack against any NATO member is considered an attack on all NATO members, whereby, in the exercise of the right to individual or collective defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, each member will assist the member attacked, including the use of armed force, to "restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." 27

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › Turns Russia---2NC

Increases in security cooperation forces EDI trade-offs. That undermines deterrence

Andrew S. Bowne 18, Major, Judge Advocate, USAF. Presently assigned as a Contract and Fiscal Law Professor, The Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army. 1. ARTICLE: DEFENDING THE NEW FULDA GAP: DETERRING RUSSIAN AGGRESSION AGAINST THE BALTIC STATES THROUGH FISCAL LEGISLATION, 226 Mil. L. Rev. 147. Nexis //pipk

C. Provide Specific Lines of Funding for EDI Activities As previously discussed, one of the problems with EDI as a means to achieving the United States' strategic goals in the Baltic States is the lack of clarity in funding activities. This hampers efforts to plan, program, budget, and execute activities that could provide meaningful support to the deterrence effort. 198 Although the DoD submits a line item budget for EDI funding requests, 199 the FY17 NDAA did not provide funding authorizations for ERI activities in distinct line items in the funding tables. 200

Congress should address this omission to ensure the greatest use of EDI funds possible. Unlike EDI, other operations funded by OCO funds, such as the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) and Counter-ISIL Fund, provide specific line item funding authorizations in the Funding [*188] Tables of the FY17 NDAA. 201 These authorizations provide the commander with clear limits and sources of funding. The ASFF provides a single appropriation with a two-year period of availability to various types of authorized assistance. 202 Accordingly, it is easier to align the authority with the source of funding available for each security cooperation activity.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › Turns Russia---2NC

European security cooperation is set at a fix amount but has shifted to the EDI to deter Russia

Michael J. Mazarr et al 22, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. "Security Cooperation in a Strategic Competition" Research Report. //pipk

Security Cooperation Efforts in Europe Emphasize Reassuring U.S. Allies European partners have consistently received approximately 26 percent of all U.S. security aid, but there has been a shift since 2014 in the type of aid these partners have received. Specifically, more attention has been devoted to developing conventional capabilities to deter Russian aggression. Eastern European states that border Russia, particularly Ukraine, received $1.1 billion from 2014 to 2019.18 Georgia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia also received some funding through the European Deterrence Initiative. However, of the billions of dollars designated for the initiative, only a small portion supports building partner capacity. The initiative was designed primarily to support U.S. force presence, infrastructure, and exercises; as a result, DoD does not formally categorize European Deterrence Initiative funding as security aid.19

Over our period of study, U.S. military sales have increased for both highly capable allies and newer North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners in Europe. Among the top weapon purchasers, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany are purchasing advanced aircraft, unmanned aerial systems, and missiles through the FMS and DCS programs. Poland and Romania are acquiring Patriot air-defense systems, and Slovakia is purchasing F-16 aircraft through FMS.20

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › Yes DSCA---2NC

Yes, all security cooperation involves some coordination through the DSCA

Colonel Luisa Santiago et al 19, Captain Harry Parent, Captain Reed Lorch, Major Deidre Baker, Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Litka, Colonel Luisa Santiago, U.S. Army Reserve Command staff judge advocate; Colonel Anthony Adolph, General Counsel (Staff Judge Advocate) - United States Forces Korea; and Colonel William Smoot, Chief, Criminal Law Division, U.S. Army OTJAG. FEATURE: No. 3 Fostering Enduring Partnerships: An Overview of Security Cooperation Offices Through the Lens of Iraq, 2019 Army Law. 49, Nexis //pipk

The Director of the DSCA, in coordination with the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has approval authority for establishing SCOs and for making staffing changes. 24 Security Cooperation Offices operate in foreign countries under the authority of the Chief of Mission (CoM). 25 The CoM, under the direction of the President, has full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. Government executive branch employees in that country; shall ensure all such employees comply fully with all applicable directives of the CoM; and shall keep fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the U.S. Government within that country.

Any executive branch agency with employees in the country has a reciprocal duty to keep the CoM informed. 26 An exception is employees under the command of a U.S. area military commander. 27 However, as discussed below, CoMs exercise considerable authority over SCO personnel, to include Title 10 DoD employees. Chiefs of Mission also have, as a principal duty, the promotion of U.S. goods and services for export to such country. 28 Given this statutory framework, the Title 10 DoD security cooperation and Title 22 DoS security assistance missions are clearly linked, and a key role of DSCA, through SCOs, is to help ensure a synchronicity of effort between DoS and DoD on security assistance and cooperation efforts.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › Yes DSCA---2NC

The plan is carried out by Security Cooperation Organization’s under the Chief of Mission and overseen by the DSCA

Matthew E Dunham 15, Major, USAF. He holds a Bachelors of Arts degree in Political Science from Messiah College; a Juris Doctor from The Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law; and an Masters of Law in International and Operational Law from The Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School. Worked for the Office of Military Cooperation in Kuwait. 1. ARTICLE: A MOST "IRREGULAR" ASSIGNMENT: A VIEW INTO THE INNER WORKINGS OF A SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION, 42 The Reporter 34 NEXIS //pipk

"Office of Military Cooperation" is only one term for a Security Cooperation Organization (SCO). A SCO is a DoD organization permanently located in a foreign country with responsibilities for carrying out all security cooperation management functions with the host nation. 1 Depending on political sensitivities within a host nation, a SCO may be known by any number of names, including Office of Defense Cooperation or Military Liaison Office. [*35] Security cooperation encompasses all DoD interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation." 2 Put another way, "[security cooperation] is the means by which DoD encourages and enables countries and organizations to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives." 3

A significant portion of a SCO's responsibilities include managing and executing security assistance programs under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. While the Department of State (DoS) has primary responsibility for implementing security assistance, many programs are executed by the DoD, including Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Financing and International Military Education and Training.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
DA---Defense Security Cooperation Agency Tradeoff---FMPS › Disad › Non-DSCA Link---2NC

Doing the plan outside the DSCA magnifies the link, creates confusion over authority and conflicts with host countries---independently collapses relationships

Matthew E Dunham 15, Major, USAF. He holds a Bachelors of Arts degree in Political Science from Messiah College; a Juris Doctor from The Pennsylvania State University, Dickinson School of Law; and an Masters of Law in International and Operational Law from The Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School. Worked for the Office of Military Cooperation in Kuwait. 1. ARTICLE: A MOST "IRREGULAR" ASSIGNMENT: A VIEW INTO THE INNER WORKINGS OF A SECURITY COOPERATION ORGANIZATION, 42 The Reporter 34 NEXIS //pipk

It is up to the SCO to understand the DoD components' positions and true needs, comprehend the host nation position, communicate with all parties involved and facilitate resolution. To do this, it is essential for the SCO to have a full sight picture of all DoD happenings in the host nation. Only then can the SCO effectively liaise with the host nation and advise the Ambassador and GCC. A solution to complex multi-component challenges is usually workable as long as the parties have a strong working relationship and communication is open, regular and honest.

This is important not only for solving immediate issues, but for preserving host nation good will for long term strategic interests. Consider, for example, how the above scenario could degenerate into crisis if the Army, Air Force and Navy were independently engaging the host nation (i.e., not coordinating with the SCO), and at one of those engagements, a host nation official was seriously offended. Not only would the SCO lack situational awareness, so would the Ambassador and the GCC, and depending on the gravity of the situation and host nation's reaction, such an instance could seriously jeopardize greater U.S. strategy.