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TURKEY PIC › SOLVENCY › AT Unanimity Key
Antoine Got 20. Fellow, Geneva Center for Security Policy. M.A., International Relations, University of Edinburgh. "Turkey’s Crisis with the West: How a New Low in Relations Risks Paralyzing NATO." War on the Rocks. 11-19-2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/11/turkeys-crisis-with-the-west-how-a-new-low-in-relations-risks-paralyzing-nato/. accessed 6-20-2022 //ART --- ability edited
As tensions grow, a key risk for NATO relates to the crisis’ potential to hamper its cohesion and ability to act decisively, as the alliance relies on the principle of consensus to successfully operate. Every major NATO decision embodies the collective will of all allies and results, therefore, from a complex but fragile process of negotiation wherein nations are invited to compromise on matters of mutual interest. The inevitable drawback to this is that every ally possesses a de facto right to veto any NATO issue if its demands are not met, which they may be incentivized to use as leverage to pursue national interests. The same can be said of the European Union, which operates on unanimity and where Cyprus recently made headlines for blocking sanctions on Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s regime, insisting on the imposition of E.U. measures on Turkey for its energy exploration in Mediterranean waters. The European Union was criticized for failing to agree on timely sanctions.
Unlike the European Union, NATO consultations are held behind closed doors, and disagreements largely avoid public scrutiny. In principle, however, any nation’s objections could stall key alliance policy or business. Last year, leaks revealed that Turkey had threatened on the eve of a NATO summit to block a key defense plan to protect the Baltic states and Poland against Russian aggression unless NATO backed its own recognition of the Kurdish People’s Protection Units militia as terrorists. Likewise, for years, Turkey had vetoed NATO cooperation with neutral Austria under its partnership program in response to Vienna’s calls for the European Union to halt membership talks with Ankara. Though in both cases deals were eventually reached to break the deadlock, and though such negotiation tactics are not uncommon, these incidents highlight a mounting climate of uncooperativeness and unwillingness to compromise between allies, making interaction increasingly difficult.
2022
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Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › SOLVENCY › S---Deterrence/Warfighting
Saidel 18, JD @ Georgetown, Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School (Nicolas, “Turkey's Eastern Pivot: A Challenge for NATO and a Threat to US National Security,” Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7539-turkey-nato-1192018)
Erdoğan’s purge gutted the Turkish military, which is a concern for NATO as Turkey has the second largest armed forces in the organization.94 Dismissing thousands of officers, pilots, and other critical and knowledgeable members of the Turkish military is a loss for NATO, especially because they are being replaced with individuals with far less experience. NATO’s top commander in Europe, Joseph Scaparrotti, underscored this point when he spoke of the Turkish military’s “degradation.”95 Scaparrotti stated: “Those are ones that have spent a career now and have a great deal of experience… I think it will take some time for them to overcome that.”96 One exiled officer echoed Scaparrotti’s sentiment when he told CNN: “To be very blunt over here, (the) Turkish military... have lost their war-fighting capability to a great extent.”97
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › SOLVENCY › S---Russian Espionage
GM 19 (Geopolitical Monitor, “Point Counterpoint: Turkey Should Be Expelled from NATO,” https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/point-counterpoint-turkey-should-be-expelled-from-nato/)//BB
Lastly, Turkey has been flirting with Russia – which remains NATO’s main security concern – to the point of buying its S-400 air-defense system. This represents a major break from the Alliance and raises a myriad of operational issues because the platform is not interoperable with Western hardware. In response, the US has expelled Turkey from the F-35 program, also due to the risk that by operating both systems, Turkey could leak important information on NATO aircraft to the Russians. It is also possible that Washington will introduce economic sanctions against Ankara under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.
2022
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Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › SOLVENCY › S---Russian Espionage
Daria Isachenko 21. Research Fellow, Otto-von-Guericke University of Magdeburg, Institute of Political Science." Turkey and Russia: the logic of conflictual cooperation." German Institute for International and Security Affairs. https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/76380/ssoar-2021-isachenko-Turkey_and_Russia_the_logic.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y&lnkname=ssoar-2021-isachenko-Turkey_and_Russia_the_logic.pdf. accessed 6-18-2022 //ART
The cooperation between the two countries appears paradoxical only if their relationship is viewed against the backdrop of their past rivalry, and trust is thought necessary to sustainable relations. Turkey and Russia’s ability to cooperate without a relationship of trust suggests that the trust factor is overestimated. According to Russian foreign policy expert Timofei Bordachev, Moscow’s military superiority enables it to regard Ankara as something like a “good enemy”. Nevertheless, both sides also have other good reasons to persist in ignoring their history of animosity.
Since relations were normalized in 2016, too much has been at stake for either side to jeopardize the cooperation. In Syria, Moscow and Ankara are dependent on each other for preserving vital interests: in Russia’s case, preventing regime change and in Turkey’s, containing the Kurdish push for autonomy. On a bilateral level their mutual dependence is maintained through strategic projects like Akkuyu, TurkStream and S-400. An important aspect of TurkishRussian relations since the 2016 normalization is thus their expansion into areas with structural components. “No longer do construction, tourism, textiles, and fruit or vegetables define Turkish-Russian economic ties,” says Galip Dalay. “Instead, cooperation has shifted to strategic industries that create long-lasting mutual dependencies”.
2022
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Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › SOLVENCY › S---Cohesion
Gannon and Kent 21, PhD in Political Science @ UC-San Diego, **PhD in Political Science @ Ohio State (“Keeping Your Friends Close, but Acquaintances Closer: Why Weakly Allied States Make Committed Coalition Partners,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 65.5)//BB
Because alliance membership is a club good, not a pure public good, worries about being excluded from the security benefits of an alliance can incentivize a state to try to shore up the alliance by sending a costly signal of their commitment to their alliance partners. “Today, we should expect the European allies to find that the best way to strengthen (or avoid weakening) their bonds with the United States is to contribute to out-of-area operations like ISAF. According to this line of reasoning, the allies who put the highest premium on NATO’s traditional products should be the ones—together with the United States—shouldering the heaviest burdens in Afghanistan” (Ringsmose 2010, 331). Yet the Afghanistan case demonstrates this is not just a story about club goods in formal alliances, but security cooperation more generally. States may use war efforts as a signal of their willingness to accept large costs in the hopes that this will improve their relationship with the coalition leader in the future. States use conflicts that are not of immediate strategic importance to— hopefully—gain the attention and respect of important international players. Closer alignments may be valued inherently, for unspecified reasons, or to help the state acquire side payments or policy concessions on unrelated issues. Henke (2019a) argues that states contribute to coalition conflicts when the “pivotal state”— what we call the coalition leader—provides side payments as incentives to contribute. This highlights our broader logic about variation in club goods and public goods in alliances and coalitions. States contribute to coalition warfare when there are benefits to contributing troops that fall outside the traditionally understood alliance mandates or security concerns. In US-led conflicts since the Korean War, Henke (2019a) find that future benefits offered by pivotal states can induce coalition participation. We extend upon this finding by arguing that states with unrealized alliance potential are most likely to be moved by that logic. Furthermore, they will go above and beyond in their coalition participation to try to secure future benefits— whether side payments or unrelated payments—that extend from a closer relationship with the coalition leader.
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Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › SOLVENCY › S---Cohesion
Carothers 21, senior vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Benjamin Press, research assistant in the Democracy, Conflict, and Governance Program (Thomas, “Navigating the Democracy-Security Dilemma in U.S. Foreign Policy: Lessons from Egypt, India, and Turkey,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, )//BB
In addition, policymakers should not limit their expectations for positive change only to potential liberalizing actions by the partner government. They should also ask whether greater attention from the United States on democracy issues helps bolster the will and steadfastness of embattled leaders in civil society or the political opposition of the country in question. A common mistake is to think of the push on democracy and rights issues with a problematic security partner only in terms of effects on the government. But other parts of the political and civic communities are highly important and reactive to external signals. However, U.S. policymakers need to be careful of crossing the line between support and perceived (or real) interference in a foreign country’s domestic politics. For example, pushing the government hard on maintaining electoral integrity may be more effective than expressing direct support for opposition forces. U.S. officials should also evaluate the regional and global signaling effects of stepping engagement up on democracy with a particular country. Speaking out on democracy challenges in India, for example, may have positive signaling effects on other countries in South Asia given India’ s heft in the region; so, too, may raising these issues with Turkey signal what is in store if other NATO allies, like Hungary and Poland, continue down the path of democratic backsliding. There are often wider benefits to engaging on democracy and human rights, so policymakers should avoid the tendency to think of responses to the democracy-security dilemma in a particular country as relating only to that country.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › SOLVENCY › S---Turkey Spoiler
Leonardo Jacopo Maria Mazzucco 22, Researcher in the Strategic Studies Department at TRENDS, Research & Advisory, MA degree in Comparative International Relations from Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, “Turkey’s delicate balancing act: Mediating between the West, Russia, and Ukraine”, Trend Research, 6-17-2022, https://trendsresearch.org/insight/turkeys-delicate-balancing-act-mediating-between-the-west-russia-and-ukraine///SJ
Spoilers Trust-deficit within the Western camp In the early stages of the Ukraine-Russia war, NATO praised Turkey’s attempts to mediate the conflict and sent messages of appreciation to President Erdoğan.[57] However, the widespread consensus supporting Ankara started to wane following Turkey’s veto of Sweden and Finland’s membership bids for NATO. After a short-lived thaw in relations, the current impasse seems to have brought the Atlantic Alliance back into the cold. The first round of bilateral meetings held in an attempt to clear the air between Turkey and the two Scandinavian countries were inconclusive.[58] Ankara’s outright hostility toward Sweden and Finland’s NATO bids rests on the two Nordic countries’ semi-overt sympathy to exiled exponents of AKP’s historical nemesis, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and the Gülen movement.[59] Although Sweden and Finland approved legislations declaring the Kurdish guerrilla group a terrorist organization, the two countries – but especially Sweden – have historically expressed interest in the Kurdish movement’s political ambitions.[60] Stockholm and Helsinki are refusing to extradite to Ankara those charged with terrorism offences or thought to be linked to Fethullah Gülen,[61] which has led to tensions soaring on minor issues. The election of a former Iranian Kurdish peshmerga, Amineh Kakabaveh, as a member of parliament in Sweden, and the media coverage of a PKK affiliate, Salih Muslim, by Swedish state television channel SVT, are but two examples.[62] Turkey has legitimate security concerns regarding the military activities linked to the PKK and considers the separatist group a primary threat to its national security.[63] In an op-ed published by The Economist, President Erdoğan maintained that Ankara is ready to enter into genuine negotiations on condition that the Nordic candidate countries are willing “to curb the activities of all terrorist organizations and extradite the members of these organizations.”[64] However, Ankara’s steadfast opposition has been met with discontent rather than solidarity from its NATO allies, who perceive Turkey’s posture as uncooperative and provocative in a moment of extreme vulnerability for the Atlantic Alliance. Should Turkey continue to veto Sweden and Finland’s bid for Nato membership, the stalemate will likely nurture frustration and fuel mistrust among other NATO members. With Ankara pulling the brakes on the recently resumed bilateral talks with Greece[65] while unveiling a new military offensive in northern Syria,[66] tensions are likely to soar again within NATO. If the above dynamics are not handled deftly, the temporary cold could drive a major wedge between Turkey and the other members of the Atlantic Alliance. Needless to say, such a fractured Western camp significantly waters down the chance of a successful Turkey-led mediation.
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Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › SOLVENCY › S---Turkey Spoiler
Steven Erlanger 20. Chief Diplomatic Correspondent at New York Times. "Turkish Aggression Is NATO’s ‘Elephant in the Room’." New York Times. 8-3-2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/03/world/europe/turkey-nato.html. accessed 6-18-2022 //ART
The warships were escorting a vessel suspected of smuggling weapons into Libya, violating a United Nations arms embargo. Challenged by a French naval frigate, the warships went to battle alert. Outnumbered and outgunned, the French frigate withdrew.
But this mid-June naval showdown in the Mediterranean was not a confrontation of enemies. The antagonists were France and Turkey, fellow members of NATO, sworn to protect one another.
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Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › SOLVENCY › S---Turkey Spoiler
Flanagan 20, PhD in IR, adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation (Stephen “Turkey’s Nationalist Course,” RAND, )
Foreign and Defense Policy: From “Zero Problems” to “Precious Loneliness”
The AKP has moved away from the strategy of its first years in power, which gave priority to European integration, good relations with the United States, and the leveraging of Turkey’s economic strength and Ottoman heritage to build good relations with all its neighbors—a policy that was dubbed “zero problems.” Erdoğan is now pursuing a realist balancing strategy in foreign affairs, seeking to leave open options that will best advance his consolidation of power and Turkish national interests. Erdoğan’s often provocative actions and rhetoric that express his disappointment with Europe, the United States, and Israel have further strained relations with these longtime allies. Erdoğan is more focused on building the country’s stature in the Islamic world and forging new ties with Russia and China. He has not given up on the West but appears to hope that he can elicit favorable policy changes from allies and partners by demonstrating that he has options. Up until U.S. President Donald Trump announced his decision to move the U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem in December 2017, Turkish officials expressed hopes that Trump would bring a fresh start in relations with Washington, and Erdoğan has been using his budding relationship with French President Emmanuel Macron to bring a reset in relations with the EU.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › SOLVENCY › S---General---Top-Shelf
Saidel 18, JD @ Georgetown, Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law at the University of Pennsylvania Law School (Nicolas, “Turkey's Eastern Pivot: A Challenge for NATO and a Threat to US National Security,” Center for Ethics and the Rule of Law,
The recent guilty plea by Former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn, and the indictment of Trump campaign officials Paul Manafort and Rick Gates, should highlight the fact that violators of the Foreign Agents Registration Act have reached the highest levels of government. 1 Flynn’s long delay in registering as a foreign agent is particularly problematic in view of his lobbying efforts on behalf of the Turkish government. 2 As detailed below, Turkey is no longer reliably aligned with US and NATO interests, despite being a military partner of the US as well as a member of NATO. Indeed, Turkey now appears to be more firmly aligned with Russia than with the US or NATO. Turkey’s penetration into our political system is therefore of significant concern from the standpoint of national security. This paper will argue that Turkey has become a threat to US and NATO security, and that this fact has not resulted in the policy shift it merits. Notably, US strategy regarding Turkey is nowhere to be found within the White House National Security Strategy document, suggesting that the current Administration is insufficiently attuned to the risks of our present alliance with Turkey. 3 This paper will propose several policy adjustments warranted by Turkey’s shifting orientation towards Russian interests. I. Introduction On December 2, 2017, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis told reporters that as the war against ISIS enters its final stages, US strategy would move towards holding territory instead of arming Syrian Kurdish fighters.4 This statement came a week after US President Donald Trump informed Turkish President Recep Erdoğan in a phone call of “pending adjustments to the military support provided to our partners on the ground in Syria,” a reference to Kurdish fighters that have been working in tandem with the US military in Syria.5 This abrupt about-face in American policy, which includes the recouping of weapons and vehicles from Kurdish militias, is an imprudent attempt at détente by the Trump administration towards the Turkish government.6 Erdoğan is a vociferous critic of American support for the Kurds in Syria. This issue, among others, has strained US-Turkish relations. For the US, the diplomatic crisis with Turkey is a matter of critical national security, given our intelligence and military collaboration with Turkish forces. In July 2017, the Turkish state-run news organization, Anadolu, revealed the location of 10 US bases and outposts in northern Syria.7 In late August 2017, US troops stationed in northern Syria came under direct fire from Turkish- backed forces.8 In December 2017, Turkey finalized the purchase of the S-400 surface-to-air missile defense system from Russia, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (hereinafter “NATO” or the “Alliance”) historical adversary.9 These are but a few recent examples of increasingly overtly hostile acts taken by Turkey against NATO and the United States, actions that suggest a growing alliance between Turkey and the Kremlin, and a lack of commitment to democratic ideals. Erdoğan once revealed his attitude towards democracy by remarking, “Democracy is like a bus, when you arrive at your destination, you step off.”10 Turkey possesses a formidable military and a robust economy. NATO’s only Muslim-majority state, Turkey serves as NATO’s bridge to the Middle East, sharing as it does a border with Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Turkey also helps to stem the tide of migration into Europe. It is in Russia’s interest to drive a wedge between NATO and Turkey, both to diminish NATO and to bring Turkey increasingly within Russia’s sphere of influence. Turkish recalcitrance towards contributing forces and capacities to NATO operations may reflect an enhanced Turkish-Russian relationship. Strengthening bilateral relationships with other NATO nations as well as pursuing a multilateral NATO approach towards Turkey, in a judicious combination of “carrots and sticks,” appears to be the optimal path moving forward for the US.
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TURKEY PIC › SOLVENCY › S---General---Top-Shelf
Ghosh 6/20 — Bobby Ghosh is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering foreign affairs. Previously, he was editor in chief at Hindustan Times, managing editor at Quartz and international editor at Time. Bobby Ghosh, " US Should Brace for More Pushback From Erdogan," Washington Post, 6-20-2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/us-should-brace-for-more-pushback-from-erdogan/2022/06/17/88e89f1e-ee03-11ec-9f90-79df1fb28296_story.html, accessed 6-25-2022, WMK
Turkey’s allies and rivals, along with Turks themselves, might want to buckle up for 12 months of turbulence. The US and Europe should brace themselves for even more mudslinging and contrariness from Erdogan at a time when they need his cooperation in containing Russian adventurism. Ornery in the best of times, Erdogan has grown even more quarrelsome with the West as he has become politically vulnerable at home. His fortunes are now at their lowest ebb since he first took the reins in Ankara in 2003. He and his party have slipped in opinion polls over the past couple of years, as Turkey’s economy has been hammered by a combination of the pandemic and the president’s economic policies. Although the lira has tanked and inflation has soared, Erdogan has stubbornly resisted calls to raise interest rates. “Turkey is again stuck in a vicious cycle. High inflation causes the lira to weaken, which results in even higher inflation” said Ziad Daoud, chief emerging markets economist at Bloomberg Economics. “Lifting interest rates would break this cycle, but that’s unlikely to happen.” With little prospect of an economic turnaround in time for the vote, the president must find other ways to make his case for re-election. All the early signs are that he will dip into the old populist’s playbook, appealing to ethno-nationalism at home and raising alarms about foreign enemies — real and imagined. Some of his favorite bogeymen are now out of bounds: Turkey’s economic troubles have forced Erdogan to make nice with the Gulf Arab states he used to pillory, to popular acclaim. He can’t very well portray the ruling families of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates as perfidious reactionaries while pleading with them for investment and trade deals. Erdogan has also softened his rhetoric against Israel, thanks in no small part to a friendship he has struck with President Isaac Herzog. This leaves him with one familiar fall guy: the West. He has already begun to ratchet up his rhetoric against the US and Europe. In a carefully choreographed meeting with young Turks last week, he denounced the West as mendacious and untrustworthy. He has lashed out at another old bugbear, demanding that Greece demilitarize islands in the Aegean Sea, adding that he was “not joking.” In the months ahead, expect Erdogan to build on the general themes of Western duplicitousness and to double down on his conspiracy theory that Turkey’s woes are the result of a deliberate campaign by “global barons of politics and money.” Turks groaning under the twin burdens of inflation and currency depreciation will be encouraged to blame the US and the Europe rather than their president. In addition to using progressively more astringent rhetoric, the president will be less cooperative in his dealings with the West. We’re already seeing this in his refusal to budge on NATO expansion: By framing his objection to Sweden and Finland as a matter of national security (he accuses them of harboring Kurdish terrorists) Erdogan is exaggerating the threat as well as portraying his recalcitrance as patriotic resistance in the face of foreign bullying. There is no point in expecting reasonableness from any politician who has their back to the wall, and certainly not from one who has decided intransigence is in his best interest. As frustrating as it will be for President Biden and European leaders, they should recognize where Erdogan is coming from, and act accordingly. Threats won’t work since they will only play into his narrative of heroic defiance. Their best bet might be to signal to him that if Turkey won’t join the consensus, they will devise workarounds. This may require the NATO powers to build a separate security architecture for Sweden and Finland outside the alliance — at least until next summer, when they will either be dealing with a new Turkish president or with a victorious Erdogan who no longer needs them as bogeymen.
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TURKEY PIC › 1NC’s › 1NC---With Kickout
Sujeet Samaddar 18. Visiting International Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs. MSc, MPhil, Defense and Strategic Studies from the University of Madras. "US Pivot to Asia: Implications for the Indo-Pacific." Routledge. https://www-taylorfrancis-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780429491665-9/us-pivot-asia-implications-indo-pacific-sujeet-samaddar. accessed 6-25-2022 //ART
In pushing the case for the US pivot to Asia, one of the underlying catalysts was the increasing relevance of Asia to America. Approximately 28 per cent of American goods and services are exported to Asia; some 32 per cent of jobs are generated through these exports and close to 40 Asian states account for 30 per cent of their exports to the US. USA remains the favored destination for Asian students and tourists who contribute about US $70 billion to the US economy annually. Strategically, Asian geopolitics is more complex than Cold War dynamics. It involves complex political and economic forums such as the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), East Asian Summit (EAS), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) on the one hand, and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) competing for favorable trade parameters on the other. Ideological positions are not as rigid as witnessed during the Cold War. Consequently, Asian geopolitics is not a zero-sum game and is dominated by economic interdependencies and trade considerations but is also glued together by a common recognition that whilst economic rivalries may exist, security threats emanating from terror and calamities require coordinated and consultative approaches for their resolution. To that end, the US had to contend with the core issue of diplomatically containing regional space, nuclear and ballistic missile programs, the absence of a NATO or Warsaw Pact arrangement in Asia and the primacy of trade and economics over security and sovereignty considerations. The peripheral but important issues of unsustainable growth of Asian economies impacting climate change, water, food, natural disasters, pandemic diseases such as the avian flu, and contesting freedom of US Pivot to Asia navigation in international waters may promote regional instability, and fierce nationalism.
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Michigan
Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › 1NC’s › 1NC---With Kickout
John R. Deni 22. Research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. "NATO Should Admit Finland and Sweden ASAP." Wall Street Journal. 5-8-2022. https://www.wsj.com/articles/nato-should-admit-finland-and-sweden-asap-ally-border-russia-ukraine-war-article-five-11652036687. accessed 6-22-2022 //ART
Membership of Finland and Sweden in NATO reinforces each of these imperatives. Both are members of America’s largest trade and investment partner, the EU. Sweden has the ninth-largest economy in the 27-member EU, Finland the 15th. Both are home to advanced manufacturing and vibrant tech startup communities
Finland and Sweden are among the world’s most robust democracies. The greatest threat to freedom in Europe today is Russia, which has invaded neighboring democracies like Ukraine and Georgia and made efforts to undermine democracy across the Continent. Given their proximity to this threat, Finland and Sweden clearly understand this.
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Michigan
Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › 1NC’s › 1NC---With Kickout
Shackleford 6-2-2022, senior fellow on U.S. foreign policy with the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. She was previously a U.S. diplomat and is author of “The Dissent Channel: American Diplomacy in a Dishonest Age.” (Elizabeth, “Elizabeth Shackelford: When it comes to Turkey, NATO needs to consider divorce,” Chicago Tribune,
Partnerships, among people and nations, have a wide range of possible meanings and scope. But alliances are formal agreements that indicate a specific kind of commitment, such as marriage. An alliance is a promise between nations to support and defend each other, in good times and bad, sickness and health, or more specifically, peace time or war.
Alliances shouldn’t be entered into casually, but they shouldn’t be unalterable either. If an alliance becomes an obstacle to a nation’s ability to secure its needs, the standards and path for getting out should be clear and reasonable. This brings me to Turkey. As any real friend to NATO would, I have to ask: is Turkey today really the Turkey you were drawn to as a partner 70 years ago? I fear you and Turkey have grown apart, most recently with its threat to block NATO membership for Sweden and Finland. I worry the growing differences are becoming irreconcilable. In the early NATO days, Turkey was sitting on the border of the Soviet Union. When stopping Soviet expansion was NATO’s primary purpose, Turkey’s geography might have been compelling enough to overcome other shortcomings. This was easy to do, too, given Turkey’s potential at the time. It seemed to be moving firmly toward a Western identity and embracing liberal, democratic values that NATO saw within itself. As often happens in relationships, that promise didn’t turn out, and Turkey saw coups and unrest in the coming decades. In 2002, the West thought this time could be different, with the democratic election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), but the commitment to democracy still wasn’t real, and Turkey took a hard turn toward illiberal, authoritarian rule. Turkey’s antidemocratic nature isn’t just a bad look for an alliance that claims to be grounded in democratic principles. It also undermines NATO’s security. Turkey wields its veto within the alliance like a cudgel, slamming its allies on unrelated issues to punish it for not validating Erdogan’s obsession with punishing the Kurds. Erdogan is in it for what Erdogan wants — and that frequently doesn’t align with the alliance’s interest and security. While they clash on several issues, Erdogan is still close to Putin, as he tries to play both sides. Turkey’s purchase of Russian missile defense systems in 2019 was a slap in NATO’s face and direct violation of U.S. sanctions. Can Turkey still be trusted with NATO’s weapons systems, or does Turkey’s snug relationship with Russia risk the compromise of classified NATO weapons system information? NATO, you can do better. Finland and Sweden are courting you, after all. Like Turkey, they have capable, professional militaries and strategic geography, but they also share your values, such as democracy and the rule of law. You’re not likely to catch Finland or Sweden imprisoning political opponents or threatening journalists. And Erdogan’s objection to the accession of Finland and Sweden raises the question of whose side Erdogan is on at all. Other NATO members have long tired of Turkey’s duplicity and games. This isn’t the first time booting Turkey out of the alliance has been a topic of debate. The possibility was raised after Erdogan’s harsh crackdown in 2016 following a failed coup attempt, as well after Turkey invaded northeastern Syria in 2019. But since NATO has no mechanism for suspending or expelling an ally, a path out isn’t clear. If the rest of the alliance finds that Turkey has consistently violated NATO principles, they can unanimously agree to withdraw Article 5 protections from Turkey, effectively suspending its participation and any assistance it receives from NATO. This is probably the closest to divorce it can get, but even this determination would require a clear-eyed assessment of the benefits Turkey brings to the table and the risks too. Perhaps Turkey would agree to a no-fault divorce — it can always choose to withdraw. If not, marriage counseling might be in order. No ally is the perfect ally, and no spouse the perfect spouse. Some manner of compromise and understanding is always necessary. It’s ultimately up to NATO to decide whether Turkey is worth the formal defense commitment, but it’s a decision they should feel empowered to make rather than accept the alliance as is. Periodically reconsidering the value and legitimacy of these commitments isn’t unreasonable. In fact, it’s one marker of a healthy relationship.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › 1NC’s › 1NC---With Kickout
Bandow 21, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Doug, “Eight reasons why the U.S. should ditch Turkey as a military partner,” Responsible Statecraft,
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has transformed his country and its relationship with America — but not for the better. President Donald Trump’s personal ties to Erdogan may have disguised the widening divergence in interests, but a chasm has now truly opened between the two governments, requiring a much tougher approach toward Ankara than in the past. The Republic of Turkey grew out of the ramshackle Ottoman Empire, which collapsed at the end of World War I. Ankara joined NATO in 1952, controlling access to the Black Sea and serving as the alliance’s southeast foundation. The Pentagon was always Ankara’s strongest booster, since Incirlik and Izmir Air Bases extended Washington’s military reach in the Middle East. Turkey also was presented as a model of Islamic democracy, despite the military’s ruthless intervention in the illiberal political system, staging soft and hard coups, and invading the Republic of Cyprus in 1974. For America, the Cold War was more important than human rights. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the 2002 election and began to transform Turkey. After a decade of modest reform and good press, Erdogan turned Turkey in an authoritarian, corrupt, and Islamist direction. Repression accelerated after a failed coup in July 2016, months before Trump was elected, provided Erdogan with a Turkish version of the Reichstag fire. Freedom House rates Turkey as not free, reporting that the government “has pursued a dramatic and wide-ranging crackdown on perceived opponents” since that attempted coup event. Based on scant evidence, Erdogan accused the Hizmet movement’s Fethullah Gulen of being behind the putsch. He has tried, but so far unsuccessfully, to have Gulen extradited from his exile in Pennsylvania. Erdogan then turned his country into a prison state. Even the slightest connection — teaching at a Hizmet school, or using a bank owned by a Hizmet member — resulted in dismissal, arrest, and/or imprisonment. Journalists and opposition politicians remain frequent targets, especially when Erdogan’s poll ratings dip. Reported Freedom House: Opposition gains and economic troubles “have given the government new incentives to suppress dissent and limit public discourse.” Moreover, Turkish foreign policy is increasingly at odds with U.S. policy. The challenge is not that Erdogan is taking independent positions, but rather is actively undermining U.S. policies. Among the problem areas: One: Treating another NATO ally, Greece, and a European Union member, Cyprus, as adversaries. Unhappy over Greece’s possession of islands near Turkey’s coast, Ankara refuses to recognize Greek airspace and territorial waters, leading to dangerous military confrontations. The Erdogan government continues to resist efforts to end the partition of Cyprus and interfere with efforts by the internationally recognized government of Cyprus to develop nearby hydrocarbons. Some observers fear a Turkish-Greco war. Two: Forging a military relationship with Russia. Ankara purchased Moscow’s S-400 air defense system, resulting in Turkey’s ouster from the F-35 program. The Erdogan government plans to buy additional S-400 missiles. Turkey also has reached accommodations with Moscow involving Syria and other regional issues, though the two governments’ alignment is not perfect. Erdogan has negatively contrasted his relationship with President Joe Biden to that with Putin. Ozgur Unluhisarcikli of the German Marshall Fund opined that Erdogan seeks “a counterbalancing alliance with Russia against the US.” If Ankara was forced to choose between NATO and Russia in a conflict, the allies could not be confident that Turkey would fulfill its alliance commitments. Three: Adopting an expansive, neo-Ottoman maritime doctrine known as Blue Homeland, which seeks to dominate the Mediterranean. Once stuck at the policymaking fringe, this strategy envisions controlling waters claimed by Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel. Clashes over contending territorial claims have increased chances of violent confrontation. Ankara’s desire to strengthen its maritime position spurred its intervention in Libya’s civil war. Four: Arming Azerbaijan and encouraging it to restart hostilities with Armenia over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The result was a bitter fight and abundant war crimes. There were unverified claims that Ankara shot down an Armenian aircraft and deployed Syrian mercenaries on Azerbaijan’s behalf. A side impact was to deepen Russia’s role. Five: Intervening in Libya’s civil war. Ankara backed the Islamist Tripoli-based Government of National Accord, violating the United Nations weapons embargo. Turkish vessels confronted French and German ships tasked with preventing arms smuggling. In return the Tripoli authorities accepted a maritime boundary agreement privileging Ankara in waters also claimed by Greece and Cyprus. Six: Treating the Islamic State and other radical groups operating in Syria as co-belligerents if not allies. Ankara brazenly facilitated ISIS border crossings and oil sales; charges of corruption tainted Erdogan’s family. Even Vice President Joe Biden inconveniently acknowledged Ankara’s role. Seven: Targeting the Kurdish-dominated People’s Defense Units, or YPG, in Syria. The Erdogan government twice invaded Syrian Kurdish territory, utilizing U.S.-supplied weapons and employing jihadist forces previously active elsewhere in Syria. Amnesty International cited “a shameful disregard for civilian life, carrying out serious violations and war crimes, including summary killings and unlawful attacks that have killed and injured civilians, during the offensive into northeast Syria.” The YPG was Washington’s main ally fighting ISIS on the ground, yet Ankara is threatening to invade again. Eight: Using Syrian fighters as mercenaries via private military companies, in particular, the SADAT International Defense Consultancy, to meddle in conflicts abroad, including Libya and the Caucasus. These forces are essentially accountable to no one. Despite this terrible record, Ankara’s ambassador to the US, Hasan Murat Mercan, recently argued that “Turkey stands as a reliable ally that can deliver at the moment of crisis — a friend in need.” However, policy differences have been exacerbated by Erdogan’s personal hostility. He recently went before the Turkish National Assembly to denounce “those who ignored our country in the region for years — and confronted us with maps and demands that would imprison us into our coasts — irst tried the language of threat and blackmail after the steps we took.” Moreover, Erdogan’s ambitions have grown increasingly radical. As he told the National Assembly: “There is no chance left for this distorted order, in which the entire globe is encumbered by a handful of greedy people, to continue to exist the way it currently does.” There was little doubt about who he meant. The greater his domestic political problems, the more aggressive his foreign policy is likely to become. Which is dangerous to the US. In 2015 the Erdogan government recklessly downed a Russian warplane that briefly entered Turkish airspace. Had Russia’s Vladimir Putin responded with force America and Europe could have ended up at war. Today Moscow’s and Ankara’s respective proxies, the Syrian government, and Idlib-area insurgents, also could spark a conflict. So could Ankara’s increasingly aggressive activities elsewhere — North Africa, Mediterranean, Mideast, and Central Asia — which often are at variance with NATO’s interest. Turkey’s band of American friends is diminishing. Some are stuck in the past, remembering the ally Ankara once was. Other analysts prefer to wait for Erdogan’s passage across the River Styx, given rumors about his health. However, in two decades he would still be younger than Joe Biden. The political waters at home have grown rougher, but so far he has surmounted every challenge with increasing force. Nor would a new president and parliamentary majority necessarily transform Ankara’s policies. Turkish public opinion is nationalistic, conspiracy-minded, and ever more hostile toward the U.S. Indeed, a recent poll found that six of ten Turks viewed America as the greatest threat to Turkey, compared to just 19 percent who fingered Russia. Today Ankara could not enter the transatlantic alliance. Washington should minimize its reliance on Turkey and the latter’s threat to U.S. interests. The U.S. should remove its nuclear weapons stored at Incirlik Air Base, and downgrade use of the facility, access to which remains under Erdogan’s erratic control. If Washington intervened in the Mideast less often, the base would matter less. In any case, there are alternatives: In response to Ankara’s policies U.S.-Greek military ties have recently expanded. The Pentagon should limit arm sales, building on the F-35 sales ban. Finally, the Biden administration should begin NATO discussions on options ranging from limiting Turkey’s role in decision-making to ousting Ankara from the transatlantic alliance. Two months ago Erdogan admitted: “I cannot say that a healthy process is running in Turkish-American ties.” Yet Washington’s policy reflects the continuing illusion that Turkey remains a loyal and reliable U.S. ally, European partner, and NATO member. None of these are true. A change in policy is long overdue.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › 1NC’s › 1NC---With Kickout
For reference, the resolution says “the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” [The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in one or more of the following areas: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity.]
Supreme Court of Kentucky 3 (“Kotila v. Commonwealth,” 2000-SC-0341-MR, Lexis)//BB
Whether a conviction under this statute requires possession of all (as opposed to any) of the chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture [**24] methamphetamine under some manufacturing process is a matter of statutory construction. First, we examine the language of the statute, itself. United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 338-39 (6th Cir. 2000) HN9 ("The starting point in a statutory interpretation case is the language of the statute itself."). Obviously, the multiple manufacturing methods and the availability of a broad range of readily available chemicals and equipment necessary for each manufacturing process militates against itemizing within the statute all of the possible chemical and equipment combinations by which methamphetamine could be manufactured. Nevertheless, KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) does not read "[p]ossesses chemicals or equipment," or "[p]ossesses some of the chemicals or equipment," or "[p]ossesses any of the chemicals or equipment." It reads "[p]ossesses the chemicals or equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine." The presence of the article "the" is significant because, grammatically speaking, possession of some but not all of the chemicals or equipment does not satisfy the statutory language.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › 1NC’s › 1NC---No Kickout + HR Cred
Burke-White 4, Lecturer in Public and International Affairs and Senior Special Assistant to the Dean at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University and Ph.D. at Cambridge (William, “Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic Correlation,” The Harvard Human Rights Journal, 17)//BB
For most of the past fifty years, U.S. foreign policymakers have largely viewed the promotion of human rights and the protection of national security as in inherent tension. Almost without exception, each administration has treated the two goals as mutually exclusive: promote human rights at the expense of national security or protect national security while overlooking international human rights. While U.S. policymakers have been motivated at times by human rights concerns, such concerns have generally been subordinate to national security. For example, President Bush’s 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy speaks of a “commitment to protecting basic human rights.” In the same document, President Bush makes it clear that “defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government.”1 This subordination of human rights to national security is both unnecessary and strategically questionable. A more effective U.S. foreign policy would view human rights and national security as correlated and complementary goals. Better protection of human rights around the world would make the United States safer and more secure. The United States needs to restructure its foreign policy accordingly. This Article presents a strategic--as opposed to ideological or normative--argument that the promotion of human rights should be given a more prominent place in U.S. foreign policy. It does so by suggesting a correlation between the domestic human rights practices of states and their propensity to engage in aggressive international conduct. Among the chief threats to U.S. national security are acts of aggression by other states. Aggressive acts of war may directly endanger the United States, as did the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor in 1941, or they may require U.S. military action overseas, as in Kuwait fifty years later. Evidence from the post-Cold War period [*250] indicates that states that systematically abuse their own citizens' human rights are also those most likely to engage in aggression. To the degree that improvements in various states' human rights records decrease the likelihood of aggressive war, a foreign policy informed by human rights can significantly enhance U.S. and global security. Since 1990, a state's domestic human rights policy appears to be a telling indicator of that state's propensity to engage in international aggression. A central element of U.S. foreign policy has long been the preservation of peace and the prevention of such acts of aggression. 2 If the correlation discussed herein is accurate, it provides U.S. policymakers with a powerful new tool to enhance national security through the promotion of human rights. A strategic linkage between national security and human rights would result in a number of important policy modifications. First, it changes the prioritization of those countries U.S. policymakers have identified as presenting the greatest concern. Second, it alters some of the policy prescriptions for such states. Third, it offers states a means of signaling benign international intent through the improvement of their domestic human rights records. Fourth, it provides a way for a current government to prevent future governments from aggressive international behavior through the institutionalization of human rights protections. Fifth, it addresses the particular threat of human rights abusing states obtaining weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Finally, it offers a mechanism for U.S.-U.N. cooperation on human rights issues.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › 1NC’s › 1NC---No Kickout + HR Cred
Rossomondo 6-10-2022, Researcher on Defense Policy and Intelligence (John, “NATO Must Confront Turkey’s Human-Rights Abuses,” Epoch Times,
“He is mainly interested in this elections in 2023, and he will not go far because of the reconciliation between him and the Turkish deep state, which resulted in rapprochement with most of the countries of the region and the West,” al-Labwani told me. NATO’s Turkey problem is one of its own creation. The alliance worried more about using Turkey as a foil against Russia, particularly following the 2014 invasion of eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea, than Turkey’s nefarious actions. It needs Turkish support to keep the strategic Bosporus strait closed under the 1936 Montreux Convention and keep the Russian Black Sea Fleet bottled up in the Black Sea. NATO looked the other way while Erdoğan purged the Turkish armed forces of pro-NATO secularist officers and replaced them with Islamist and ultra-nationalists over the past decade. Erdoğan abolished critical media just like Vladimir Putin. Our NATO ally supports the SADAT paramilitary organization that spreads jihadism across the Islamic world, not unlike Russia’s Wagner paramilitary group that acts on behalf of Putin’s interests. It militarily threatens neighboring fellow NATO member Greece and has repeatedly invaded Syria. Blinken warned Turkey against further military operations in Syria on June 1. Kurdish activists accuse Ankara of systematic ethnic cleansing. Turkish agents have abducted followers of exiled Turkish Muslim cleric Fethullah Gülen from around the world and brought them back to Turkey in the wake of the July 2016 “false-flag” coup attempt. Gülen and his followers have been strong opponents of Erdoğan’s policies. Erdoğan has played both sides of the fence with Russia for the past decade. On one side there was the Turkey that shot down a Russian jet in 2015 and sold Ukraine the Bayraktar drones manufactured by a company owned by Erdoğan’s son-in-law. On the other hand, you had the Turkey that went out of its way to annoy its NATO partners by purchasing the formidable Russian S-400 anti-aircraft missile system. The alliance helped enable the development of the current impasse by turning a blind eye to Turkey’s covert backing of ISIS and al-Qaida jihadists that necessitated the use of Kurdish fighters to push back ISIS. Turkish National Intelligence (MIT) helped tens of thousands of al-Qaida and later ISIS jihadists cross its territory to fight in Syria and also trained them. NATO also helped create the refugee flow from Syria by arming and supporting the uprising against Assad starting in 2011. NATO aircraft reportedly ferried Libyan arms to Turkey from Libya starting in late 2011 with covert support from the Obama administration. “Turkey’s antidemocratic nature isn’t just a bad look for an alliance that claims to be grounded in democratic principles. It also undermines NATO’s security. Turkey wields its veto within the alliance like a cudgel, slamming its allies on unrelated issues to punish it for not validating Erdoğan’s obsession with punishing the Kurds. Erdoğan is in it for what Erdoğan wants — and that frequently doesn’t align with the alliance’s interest and security,” former U.S. diplomat Elizabeth Shackelford wrote in the Chicago Tribune. The alliance’s charter makes it impossible for it to suspend or expel a member; consequently, Erdoğan believes he can act with impunity and hold the alliance hostage. Kurdish activist Hadi Elis accuses NATO of being anti-Kurdish. “[It] acts in accordance with Turkish policies against Iraqi and Syrian Kurds,” Elis told me. “[The] Western coalition … started putting distance between themselves and Kurds, because Turkey was using all trade and other ties to give them hard times. No one wanted to confront Turkey’s anti-Kurdish policies.” It’s time the alliance took a stand against Turkey’s bad behavior, especially now that the Turks are threatening their third invasion of Syria in eight years. The West has relied on Syria’s PKK-linked People’s Defense Units (YPG in Kurdish) to keep ISIS in check. The YPG-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) warn that ISIS is coming back in Syria, and a Turkish invasion would only destabilize and oppress the Kurds and Syriac Christians who live in the proposed buffer area along Turkey’s border with Syria. The commander of Kurdish forces said he would turn to the Assad regime should Turkey invade. “The justifications for appeasing Erdogan have never served NATO well, and made it more difficult to constrain other rogue actors and to retain credibility on human rights,” Tsukerman said.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › 1NC’s › 1NC---No Kickout + HR Cred
Bandow 21, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Doug, “Eight reasons why the U.S. should ditch Turkey as a military partner,” Responsible Statecraft,
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has transformed his country and its relationship with America — but not for the better. President Donald Trump’s personal ties to Erdogan may have disguised the widening divergence in interests, but a chasm has now truly opened between the two governments, requiring a much tougher approach toward Ankara than in the past. The Republic of Turkey grew out of the ramshackle Ottoman Empire, which collapsed at the end of World War I. Ankara joined NATO in 1952, controlling access to the Black Sea and serving as the alliance’s southeast foundation. The Pentagon was always Ankara’s strongest booster, since Incirlik and Izmir Air Bases extended Washington’s military reach in the Middle East. Turkey also was presented as a model of Islamic democracy, despite the military’s ruthless intervention in the illiberal political system, staging soft and hard coups, and invading the Republic of Cyprus in 1974. For America, the Cold War was more important than human rights. Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the 2002 election and began to transform Turkey. After a decade of modest reform and good press, Erdogan turned Turkey in an authoritarian, corrupt, and Islamist direction. Repression accelerated after a failed coup in July 2016, months before Trump was elected, provided Erdogan with a Turkish version of the Reichstag fire. Freedom House rates Turkey as not free, reporting that the government “has pursued a dramatic and wide-ranging crackdown on perceived opponents” since that attempted coup event. Based on scant evidence, Erdogan accused the Hizmet movement’s Fethullah Gulen of being behind the putsch. He has tried, but so far unsuccessfully, to have Gulen extradited from his exile in Pennsylvania. Erdogan then turned his country into a prison state. Even the slightest connection — teaching at a Hizmet school, or using a bank owned by a Hizmet member — resulted in dismissal, arrest, and/or imprisonment. Journalists and opposition politicians remain frequent targets, especially when Erdogan’s poll ratings dip. Reported Freedom House: Opposition gains and economic troubles “have given the government new incentives to suppress dissent and limit public discourse.” Moreover, Turkish foreign policy is increasingly at odds with U.S. policy. The challenge is not that Erdogan is taking independent positions, but rather is actively undermining U.S. policies. Among the problem areas: One: Treating another NATO ally, Greece, and a European Union member, Cyprus, as adversaries. Unhappy over Greece’s possession of islands near Turkey’s coast, Ankara refuses to recognize Greek airspace and territorial waters, leading to dangerous military confrontations. The Erdogan government continues to resist efforts to end the partition of Cyprus and interfere with efforts by the internationally recognized government of Cyprus to develop nearby hydrocarbons. Some observers fear a Turkish-Greco war. Two: Forging a military relationship with Russia. Ankara purchased Moscow’s S-400 air defense system, resulting in Turkey’s ouster from the F-35 program. The Erdogan government plans to buy additional S-400 missiles. Turkey also has reached accommodations with Moscow involving Syria and other regional issues, though the two governments’ alignment is not perfect. Erdogan has negatively contrasted his relationship with President Joe Biden to that with Putin. Ozgur Unluhisarcikli of the German Marshall Fund opined that Erdogan seeks “a counterbalancing alliance with Russia against the US.” If Ankara was forced to choose between NATO and Russia in a conflict, the allies could not be confident that Turkey would fulfill its alliance commitments. Three: Adopting an expansive, neo-Ottoman maritime doctrine known as Blue Homeland, which seeks to dominate the Mediterranean. Once stuck at the policymaking fringe, this strategy envisions controlling waters claimed by Greece, Cyprus, Egypt, and Israel. Clashes over contending territorial claims have increased chances of violent confrontation. Ankara’s desire to strengthen its maritime position spurred its intervention in Libya’s civil war. Four: Arming Azerbaijan and encouraging it to restart hostilities with Armenia over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The result was a bitter fight and abundant war crimes. There were unverified claims that Ankara shot down an Armenian aircraft and deployed Syrian mercenaries on Azerbaijan’s behalf. A side impact was to deepen Russia’s role. Five: Intervening in Libya’s civil war. Ankara backed the Islamist Tripoli-based Government of National Accord, violating the United Nations weapons embargo. Turkish vessels confronted French and German ships tasked with preventing arms smuggling. In return the Tripoli authorities accepted a maritime boundary agreement privileging Ankara in waters also claimed by Greece and Cyprus. Six: Treating the Islamic State and other radical groups operating in Syria as co-belligerents if not allies. Ankara brazenly facilitated ISIS border crossings and oil sales; charges of corruption tainted Erdogan’s family. Even Vice President Joe Biden inconveniently acknowledged Ankara’s role. Seven: Targeting the Kurdish-dominated People’s Defense Units, or YPG, in Syria. The Erdogan government twice invaded Syrian Kurdish territory, utilizing U.S.-supplied weapons and employing jihadist forces previously active elsewhere in Syria. Amnesty International cited “a shameful disregard for civilian life, carrying out serious violations and war crimes, including summary killings and unlawful attacks that have killed and injured civilians, during the offensive into northeast Syria.” The YPG was Washington’s main ally fighting ISIS on the ground, yet Ankara is threatening to invade again. Eight: Using Syrian fighters as mercenaries via private military companies, in particular, the SADAT International Defense Consultancy, to meddle in conflicts abroad, including Libya and the Caucasus. These forces are essentially accountable to no one. Despite this terrible record, Ankara’s ambassador to the US, Hasan Murat Mercan, recently argued that “Turkey stands as a reliable ally that can deliver at the moment of crisis — a friend in need.” However, policy differences have been exacerbated by Erdogan’s personal hostility. He recently went before the Turkish National Assembly to denounce “those who ignored our country in the region for years — and confronted us with maps and demands that would imprison us into our coasts — irst tried the language of threat and blackmail after the steps we took.” Moreover, Erdogan’s ambitions have grown increasingly radical. As he told the National Assembly: “There is no chance left for this distorted order, in which the entire globe is encumbered by a handful of greedy people, to continue to exist the way it currently does.” There was little doubt about who he meant. The greater his domestic political problems, the more aggressive his foreign policy is likely to become. Which is dangerous to the US. In 2015 the Erdogan government recklessly downed a Russian warplane that briefly entered Turkish airspace. Had Russia’s Vladimir Putin responded with force America and Europe could have ended up at war. Today Moscow’s and Ankara’s respective proxies, the Syrian government, and Idlib-area insurgents, also could spark a conflict. So could Ankara’s increasingly aggressive activities elsewhere — North Africa, Mediterranean, Mideast, and Central Asia — which often are at variance with NATO’s interest. Turkey’s band of American friends is diminishing. Some are stuck in the past, remembering the ally Ankara once was. Other analysts prefer to wait for Erdogan’s passage across the River Styx, given rumors about his health. However, in two decades he would still be younger than Joe Biden. The political waters at home have grown rougher, but so far he has surmounted every challenge with increasing force. Nor would a new president and parliamentary majority necessarily transform Ankara’s policies. Turkish public opinion is nationalistic, conspiracy-minded, and ever more hostile toward the U.S. Indeed, a recent poll found that six of ten Turks viewed America as the greatest threat to Turkey, compared to just 19 percent who fingered Russia. Today Ankara could not enter the transatlantic alliance. Washington should minimize its reliance on Turkey and the latter’s threat to U.S. interests. The U.S. should remove its nuclear weapons stored at Incirlik Air Base, and downgrade use of the facility, access to which remains under Erdogan’s erratic control. If Washington intervened in the Mideast less often, the base would matter less. In any case, there are alternatives: In response to Ankara’s policies U.S.-Greek military ties have recently expanded. The Pentagon should limit arm sales, building on the F-35 sales ban. Finally, the Biden administration should begin NATO discussions on options ranging from limiting Turkey’s role in decision-making to ousting Ankara from the transatlantic alliance. Two months ago Erdogan admitted: “I cannot say that a healthy process is running in Turkish-American ties.” Yet Washington’s policy reflects the continuing illusion that Turkey remains a loyal and reliable U.S. ally, European partner, and NATO member. None of these are true. A change in policy is long overdue.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
TURKEY PIC › 1NC’s › 1NC---No Kickout + HR Cred
For reference, the resolution says “the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” [The United States federal government should substantially increase its security cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in one or more of the following areas: artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity.]
Supreme Court of Kentucky 3 (“Kotila v. Commonwealth,” 2000-SC-0341-MR, Lexis)//BB
Whether a conviction under this statute requires possession of all (as opposed to any) of the chemicals or equipment necessary to manufacture [**24] methamphetamine under some manufacturing process is a matter of statutory construction. First, we examine the language of the statute, itself. United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 338-39 (6th Cir. 2000) HN9 ("The starting point in a statutory interpretation case is the language of the statute itself."). Obviously, the multiple manufacturing methods and the availability of a broad range of readily available chemicals and equipment necessary for each manufacturing process militates against itemizing within the statute all of the possible chemical and equipment combinations by which methamphetamine could be manufactured. Nevertheless, KRS 218A.1432(1)(b) does not read "[p]ossesses chemicals or equipment," or "[p]ossesses some of the chemicals or equipment," or "[p]ossesses any of the chemicals or equipment." It reads "[p]ossesses the chemicals or equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine." The presence of the article "the" is significant because, grammatically speaking, possession of some but not all of the chemicals or equipment does not satisfy the statutory language.