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2022 Michigan Counterplan
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP › NET-BENEFITS › 2NC---NB---Shields Russia Backlash

The counterplan solves without initiating foreign blowback

Bradley Bowman & Thomas Pledger, 20 (Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Maj. Thomas G. Pledger is a visiting military analyst at Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 8-10-2020, accessed on 6-30-2022, Breaking Defense, “Modernize The National Guard’s State Partnership Program”, , HBisevac)

Why does SPP matter? With threats growing and budgets under pressure from COVID-19, the Pentagon needs a cost-efficient way to build stronger relationships and military capacity with partner nations in each combatant command. Ideally, this approach would not place additional burdens on the active duty U.S. military and would operate largely below the radar of America’s adversaries and competitors. That is where the SPP excels. But the program is overdue for a strategic assessment to ensure it is appropriately resourced and properly focused on the objectives of the National Defense Strategy, which refocuses the US military from counterinsurgency to strategic competition against Russia and China.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP › NET-BENEFITS › 2NC---NB---Shields Russia Backlash

Counterplan avoids Russian blowback

Ahlness 14, Associate of Arts degree from Century College, Ahlness plans to continue her work as a graduate student in Political science upon graduation from MSU-Mankato. After earning her doctoral degree, she anticipates participating in an international volunteer organization, followed by teaching either International Relations or Scandinavian studies at the university level. (THE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: STATES AS GLOBAL ACTORS THE IMPLICATIONS OF NONAGGRESSIVE NATIONAL FORCES, Journal of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato, 14.1)

This paper identifies the dependent and independent variables before moving into a brief history of the State Partnership Program and its precursor, the Norwegian Reciprocal Exchange Program. The focus will then be on the implications of using reserve forces in military exchange programs, looking specifically at Norway and Poland as examples of countries involved in partnership programs. The dependent variable of this case study is the level of perceived aggression the United States displays through involvement in military exchange programs. This variable can be measured in relative terms by examining the actions taken by opposing states to try and restore the balance of power, and thus their own security. The U.S.’s State Partnership Program, created during the time of the Soviet Union collapse, reached out to former Soviet countries as well as other countries that had been independent, yet still under the Russian sphere of influence. Several independent variables play into the level of perceived aggression. First is the geographical location of the state with whom the U.S. partnered. Soviet Russia would be less 4 concerned by a military partnership with Norway, which is further away from Russia and is more economically and culturally tied to Western Europe, than it would be with a partnership with Poland, which is adjacent to the Soviet Union and is of ideological importance to the union. Additionally, the kind of military force that is used in a military exchange can affect the perceived level of aggression. For example, active duty forces or Special Forces would be seen as extremely threatening by Russia, especially in the wake of the Cold War. Conversely, the use of National Guard or Reserve forces would be less threatening, since these are part-time military members.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP › NET-BENEFITS › 2NC---NB---Shields Russia Backlash

Security cooperation causes Russian miscalc

Bergmann and Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College; Alexandra Schmitt, a senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School; "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance"; Center for American Progress; Published: 4-22-2015; Accessed: 6-20-2022; https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/; KL]

Security assistance in a tense era of great power competition is extremely sensitive and can increase tension and lead to miscalculation. The risk in today’s geopolitical environment is that providing sensitive and potentially provocative assistance will not receive the same scrutiny from policymakers and will become the norm for the administering agency, the DOD. In the last era of great power competition, the Cold War, security assistance often stoked tension between the United States and the Soviet Union and led to spiraling commitments. For instance, Soviet provision of nuclear missiles to Cuba led to a nuclear standoff, while U.S. military support for Vietnam led to deepening U.S. engagement.

As competition with China and Russia increases, security assistance could once again prove a major source of tension and cause miscalculation. Providing aid in this environment is not a mere technical military matter, but ultimately a political and diplomatic concern that is highly sensitive. Yet today, it is the DOD that is driving assistance to countries such as Ukraine and regions such as Southeast Asia.13 When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2014, the National Security Council became significantly involved in policymaking and limited types of assistance that could be provided, including lethal aid.14 Such unique scrutiny was warranted because there was a crisis involving a U.S. partner and a nuclear-armed state. But the nature of White House intervention was necessary in large part because the security assistance process—for both decision-making and for providing assistance—was broken.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP › NET-BENEFITS › 2NC---NB---PTX

States avoid partisan fights---lower visibility flies under the radar

Monica Prasad 12 (Monica Prasad is a professor of sociology at Northwestern, June 2012, accessed 8/3/21, “State-level renewable electricity policies and reductions in carbon emissions”, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0301421512001413)AGabay

These state policies are surprising in many ways. For example, they are often driven by bipartisan coalitions, and, perhaps because of their lower visibility, they seem to have escaped the partisan wrangling that has limited national-level policy. Both George W. Bush and Christine Todd Whitman were pioneers of alternative energy policy at the state level, as governors of Texas and New Jersey respectively, before they went on to obstruct environmental policy at the federal level as president and head of the EPA (Rabe, 2004). Texas, a state that produces reliably conservative and anti-environmental contingents at the national level, is a leader in wind energy.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP › NET-BENEFITS › 2NC---NB---PTX

The process makes it appealing.

James N. Williams, 12 (Lieutenant Colonel James N. Williams, Army National Guard, March 2012, accessed on 6-30-2022, United States Army War Project Strategy Research Project, “The National Guard State Partnership Program: Element of Smart Power”, , HBisevac)

Any new directives, regulations or statutory authorities would be most effective with a “bottom-up” approach, using input from the National Guard to the greatest extent possible. Given the vastness and diversity of the programs requirements, the coordinators at the National Guard Bureau level should be the “trusted advisors” to ensure that language incorporated into evolving guidance ensure the flexibility required to administer the program effectively “where the rubber meets the road.”

The Bureau can most effectively synthesize the discrete nuances across the program into a cohesive representation for the further development of directives and authorities. Without initial input from the program level, any top-driven attempts to develop guidance will ultimately fail to achieve the balance and flexibility required to effectively administer the program. The National Guard Bureau has had over twenty years experience with this program and is the only single agency that truly has the “big picture.” The Bureau is more than capable of fairly and honestly representing the needs of the partner nations consistent with the requirements of the Department of State, the Geographic Combatant Commanders and the American taxpayers.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP › NET-BENEFITS › 2NC---NB---PTX

Even if the FG is tangentially involved, the SPP completely avoids politics

Hightower 17, PhD in Public Policy and Management (Rudolph, “National Security Policy Complexity: An Analysis of U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Program Effects on Political Terror,” Proquest Dissertations)

Currently, the senior-most foreign military and civilian decision makers who have previously and are currently participating in the program view the State Partnership Program in glowing terms. The following illustrates the level of endorsement of the security cooperation program: "…Multiply that by 22 all around Europe and you can see the bang for the buck here is really quite significant.[SPP] is a very powerful tool. It is unmatched. They are, bang for the buck, one of the best things going. Anything that enhances state partnership is money in the bank for the regional combatant commanders.” - Admiral James Stavridis, Former USEUCOM Commander Retired US Navy Admiral Stavridis’ glowing praise of SPP is not unique. There is evidence of a significant quantitative knowledge gap between security cooperation stakeholders and government policy evaluators. National Guard leadership and foreign partners continually state these qualitative outcomes of SPP. Conversely, the Government Accounting Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS) have concluded that SPP needs far more quantitative data collection and analysis to properly assess program efficiency and effectiveness. The measurable outcomes, not merely public budgeting line item outputs, on democratic consolidation principles such as reducing political terror in partner nations, are needed to assess SPP program effectiveness. Though the program is wildly popular, there remains a disconnection between leadership’s pronouncements and a testable, measurable program evaluation. Until most recently, SPP effectiveness as has been qualitatively evaluated and the results consistently associated with the value of trust-building and strengthening relationships with foreign partners (NGAUS, 2016). Evaluation metrics included outputs related to the number of foreign engagement missions, the numbers of individual troops participating in SPP events, and the dollars spent in implementing the SPP annually. The evaluation of program effectiveness has not broached the broader concept of the whether the program affects long-term outcomes on democratic consolidation and political terror. Countering the possibly biased qualitative assessment of stakeholders, the official US Government’s assessments of security cooperation programs in general, and of SPP, in particular, offer much more tempered endorsements of such programs: According to the private National Guard of the United States Association (NGUSA): The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) is one of the most innovative low-cost security cooperation tools available to the United States…In addition to military-to-military engagements; SPP leverages the whole-of-society relations and capabilities to facilitate broader interagency and whole-of-government engagements. Though policymaker support for DSC programs is strong and pronouncements of great success are common, there is a counter-argument to its success. There are obvious real-world events that challenge the efficaciousness of DSC programs in building stabilization and/or stemming the use of state security forces to violently suppress political dissent or for soldiers to attack the government. These counter arguments are usually in real world news headlines from around the world. 31

2022 Michigan Counterplan
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP › NET-BENEFITS › 2NC---NB---PTX

The counterplan is just the states. It has to follow DoS and DoD directives, but requires no federal action.

CALL 18 (The Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Security Cooperation and the State Partnership Program,” https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/publications/19-01%20State%20Partnership%20Program%20%28Lo%20Res%29.pdf)//BB

The SPP is administered by the National Guard Bureau (NGB) in accordance with Department of Defense (DOD) regulations and directives, guided by Department of State foreign policy goals, implemented by the geographic combatant commands (GCCs), and sourced by National Guard forces. The National Guard executes SPP activities to maintain enduring partnerships that ensure access and influence; enhance the capabilities of both the State; National Guard and the partner country’s defense and security forces build partner nation’s military capacity; increase interoperability; and to promote National Guard core competencies of civil support, humanitarian assistance/disaster assistance and joint force headquarters’ (JFHQ) institutional functions. Activities are identified, approved, and coordinated through the GCCs, U.S. Embassy country teams, and other agencies as required to ensure that SPP activities are tailored to meet U.S. and partner country objectives.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP › NET-BENEFITS › 2NC---NB---DoD---AT FG Involved

If there is FG involvement, it’s The State Department rubber-stamping the initiative, but the states are the implementing agency

Ahlness 14, Associate of Arts degree from Century College, Ahlness plans to continue her work as a graduate student in Political science upon graduation from MSU-Mankato. After earning her doctoral degree, she anticipates participating in an international volunteer organization, followed by teaching either International Relations or Scandinavian studies at the university level. (THE STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM: STATES AS GLOBAL ACTORS THE IMPLICATIONS OF NONAGGRESSIVE NATIONAL FORCES, Journal of Undergraduate Research at Minnesota State University, Mankato, 14.1)

The State Partnership Program links state National Guard units to the military reserve components of other countries through U.S. military engagement programs. This typically involves going through the U.S. Department of State, implying that at the national level diplomats have control over the program. Even though the yearly exchanges require federal ‘goaheads,’ the state-level National Guard has become, and remains, the primary agency for implementing U.S. military engagement programs within the reserve forces. From an institutional perspective, it is clear that the State Partnership Program provides states an increasingly growing role in shaping U.S. foreign policy. Looking at the ‘second level’ of international politics, as discussed by Waltz, neither foreign policy nor federalism is able to address the growth of state policies because of the divided nature of the programs used. That is, implemented on a national level, while carried out on a provincial level.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP › NET-BENEFITS › 2NC---NB---DoD---Troops

The counterplan requires zero active-duty troops

Hightower 17, PhD in Public Policy and Management (Rudolph, “National Security Policy Complexity: An Analysis of U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Program Effects on Political Terror,” Proquest Dissertations)

Escalating political violence that does not result in a failed or collapse state can still lead to tragic consequences that are less than civil war. This quasi-conflict condition of becoming a continuing simmering state with the potentially violent state action referred to as a “Frozen Conflict”. Examples of potential for unchecked political terror are the Frozen Conflicts in Moldova, Armenia, and NagornoKarabakh. In these nations, there are no massively scaled, centrally coordinated military operations ongoing, but nonetheless, repressive actions of government forces continue against an indigenous separatist population seeking autonomy. In addition, while there is no US commitment of active duty, military combat troop to any of these three nations, the US consistently shows its commitment to improving partner nation security and preventing political terror by running State Partnership Program engagement activities for two of these countries via the North Carolina and Kansas National Guards, respectively16.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP › NET-BENEFITS › 2NC---NB---DoD

It saves resources.

Tracey Poirier, 17 (Lieutenant Colonel Tracey Poirier, Vermont Army National Guard, 1-4-2017, accessed on 7-1-2022, United States Army War College Strategy Research Project, “Increasing Interoperability and Preparedness through the State Partnership Program”, , HBisevac)

The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) has continually received rave reviews from Combatant Commanders. Major General Frederick S. Rudesheim, US Army South Commander, called the program “almost incalculable.”3 Admiral James Winnefeld, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called it “one of the best foreign policy bargains our nation has.”4 Perhaps the most ringing endorsement comes from Admiral James Stavridis, Former US European Command Commander, when he stated the SPP is, “a very powerful tool. It is unmatched. They are, bang for the buck, one of the best things going. Anything that enhances state partnership is money in the bank for the regional combatant commanders.” 5 In fact, it is difficult to find a criticism of the program from anyone who has experienced it on the ground. Given such reviews, why would the US government not expand its model to include more interactions that would improve interoperability with partner nations?

2022 Michigan Counterplan
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP › NET-BENEFITS › 2NC---NB---DoD

It's cheap!

Samir Battiss, 13 (Samir Battiss, Lecturer at the University of Quebec in Montreal, May 2013, accessed on 6-30-2022, NORDIKA Programme, NATO Military Partnerships: The US National Guard State Partnership as the driving force for pre-accession and long-term cooperation,” , HBisevac)

Because the United States and their Allies share common security interests and common values and face common challenges (threats, risks), they rely on other partnering nations. All major NATO nations’ strategies recognize and emphasize the importance of multinational operations; each country reaffirms its will to act with others when it can, giving priority to “regional” or “ideological” allies and friends. Multinational operations are often analyzed as a compromise between military capability and political constraints, usually include a wide spectrum of missions; the intensity ranges from war to long-term tasks with a civilian nature in which the military apparatus plays a minor but necessary role. Multilateral actions of war are the extreme circumstance for conducting operations whose goal is to quickly achieve the multinational collective objectives with as little cost as possible. Peacetime engagement activities involving the military help to shape the security strategic environment by sharing experience in early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation, promotion of human rights, and strengthening democratic reforms. Although they are theoretically based on individual State requests and needs, bilateral military relations with “neutral” States and the State Partnership Program / PfP seek means to achieve rationalization, standardization, and interoperability that will significantly enhance the probability of operational success in multinational missions. For commanders as for political actors, the key is to build relationships, trust, cooperation, and cohesion at all military levels, while overcoming language and cultural barriers and relevantly applying common procedures or norms.

These accomplishments display U.S. commitment in relevant security areas, and are designed to lend credibility to its alliances by enhancing regional stability and providing a crisis response capability while promoting U.S. influence and access. Four significant paths have been followed by the SPP/PfP since the beginning of the 21st century. Several countries from Central and Eastern Europe have become members of NATO, correlatively the number of SPP/ PfP participating countries. NATO has also multiplied several instruments (Individual Partnership Program; Planning and Review Process; Operational Capabilities Concept) which deepen this program by allowing partners to adapt their participation through additional opportunities based upon their national objectives and capacities and perspective (Individual Partnership Action Plan ; Annual National Program; Membership Action Plan). A third dimension of NATO partnership is directly linked to the allied military presence in Afghanistan. At tactical and operational levels, the SPP innovative activities combined with PfP low-tech and low-cost solutions appears to be a way for the United States to avoid technological shortfalls and to bypass incapability to integrate their cutting edge technologies with most of NATO and non- NATO partners. The second aspect here is the growing strategic importance of the Caucasus and Central Asia that come out as the existence of PfP countries/SPP participants in the region and the perspective of the future Afghan participation in NATO partnership initiatives. Finally, the PfP is increasingly used to build cooperative relationships with countries in the region by regionalizing the treatment of security and stabilization missions.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP › NET-BENEFITS › 2NC---NB---DoD

It’s comparatively cheaper than the AFF.

Bradley Bowman & Thomas Pledger, 20 (Bradley Bowman is senior director of the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Maj. Thomas G. Pledger is a visiting military analyst at Foundation for Defense of Democracies, 8-10-2020, accessed on 6-30-2022, Breaking Defense, “Modernize The National Guard’s State Partnership Program”, , HBisevac)

The United States has a low-key, low-cost tool to build relationships with friendly militaries around the world. But after 27 years of success, the State Partnership Program – originally created for post-Cold War Europe – needs a review to ensure it is optimized for Washington’s current national security needs. Why does SPP matter? With threats growing and budgets under pressure from COVID-19, the Pentagon needs a cost-efficient way to build stronger relationships and military capacity with partner nations in each combatant command. Ideally, this approach would not place additional burdens on the active duty U.S. military and would operate largely below the radar of America’s adversaries and competitors. That is where the SPP excels. But the program is overdue for a strategic assessment to ensure it is appropriately resourced and properly focused on the objectives of the National Defense Strategy, which refocuses the US military from counterinsurgency to strategic competition against Russia and China.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP › NET-BENEFITS › 2NC---INB---Soft Power

Otherwise, Extinction

Brooks, 14 [Rosa, 11/13, Prof of Law @ Georgetown & Schwartz Sr. Fellow at the New America Foundation http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/11/13/a_strategyless_nation_america_democrats_grand_strategy_foreign_policy]

I've written about these issues before (here and here), and at risk of being both a narcissist and a broken record, I'll quote myself: The world has grown more complex. Believe it. The world now contains more people living in more states than ever before, and we're all more interconnected. A hundred years ago, the world population was about 1.8 billion, there were roughly 60 sovereign states in the world, the automobile was still a rarity, and there were no commercial passenger flights and no transcontinental telephone service. Fifty years ago, global population had climbed to more than 3 billion and there were 115 U.N. member states, but air travel was still for the wealthy and the personal computer still lay two decades in the future. Today? We've got 7 billion people living in 192 U.N. member states and a handful of other territories. These 7 billion people take 93,000 commercial flights a day from 9,000 airports, drive 1 billion cars, and carry 7 billion mobile phones around with them. In numerous ways, life has gotten substantially better in this more crowded and interconnected era. Seventy years ago, global war killed scores of millions, but interstate conflict has declined sharply since the end of World War II, and the creation of the United Nations ushered in a far more egalitarian and democratic form of international governance than existed in any previous era. Today, militarily powerful states are far less free than in the pre-U.N. era to use overt force to accomplish their aims, and the world now has numerous transnational courts and dispute-resolution bodies that collectively offer states a viable alternative to the use of force. The modern international order is no global utopia, but it sure beats colonial domination and world wars. In the 50 years that followed World War II, medical and agricultural advances brought unprecedented health and prosperity to most parts of the globe. More recently, the communications revolution has enabled exciting new forms of nongovernmental cross-border alliances to emerge, empowering, for instance, global human rights and environmental movements. In just the last two decades, the near-universal penetration of mobile phones has had a powerful leveling effect: All over the globe, people at every age and income level can use these tiny but powerful computers to learn foreign languages, solve complex mathematical problems, create and share videos, watch the news, move money around, or communicate with far-flung friends. All this has had a dark side, of course. As access to knowledge has been democratized, so too has access to the tools of violence and destruction, and greater global interconnectedness enables disease, pollution, and conflict to spread quickly and easily beyond borders. A hundred years ago, no single individual or nonstate actor could do more than cause localized mayhem; today, we have to worry about massive bioengineered threats created by tiny terrorist cells and globally devastating cyberattacks devised by malevolent teen hackers. Even as many forms of power have grown more democratized and diffuse, other forms of power have grown more concentrated. A very small number of states control and consume a disproportionate share of the world's resources, and a very small number of individuals control most of the world's wealth. (According to a 2014 Oxfam report, the 85 richest individuals on Earth are worth more than the globe's 3.5 billion poorest people). Indeed, from a species-survival perspective, the world has grown vastly more dangerous over the last century. Individual humans live longer than ever before, but a small number of states now possess the unprecedented ability to destroy large chunks of the human race and possibly the Earth itself -- all in a matter of days or even hours. What's more, though the near-term threat of interstate nuclear conflict has greatly diminished since the end of the Cold War, nuclear material and know-how are now both less controlled and less controllable. Amid all these changes, our world has also grown far more uncertain. We possess more information than ever before and vastly greater processing power, but the accelerating pace of global change has far exceeded our collective ability to understand it, much less manage it. This makes it increasingly difficult to make predictions or calculate risks. As I've written previously: We literally have no points of comparison for understanding the scale and scope of the risks faced by humanity today. Compared to the long, slow sweep of human history, the events of the last century have taken place in the blink of an eye. This should ... give us pause when we're tempted to conclude that today's trends are likely to continue. Rising life expectancy? That's great, but if climate change has consequences as nasty as some predict, a century of rising life expectancy could turn out to be a mere blip on the charts. A steep decline in interstate conflicts? Fantastic, but less than 70 years of human history isn't much to go on.... That's why one can't dismiss the risk of catastrophic events [such as disastrous climate change or nuclear conflict] as "high consequence, low probability." How do we compute the probability of catastrophic events of a type that has never happened? Does 70 years without nuclear annihilation tell us that there's a low probability of nuclear catastrophe -- or just tell us that we haven't had a nuclear catastrophe yet?... Lack of catastrophic change might signify a system in stable equilibrium, but sometimes -- as with earthquakes -- pressure may be building up over time, undetected.... Most analysts assumed the Soviet Union was stable -- until it collapsed. Analysts predicted that Egypt's Hosni Mubarak would retain his firm grip on power -- until he was ousted. How much of what we currently file under "Stable" should be recategorized under "Hasn't Collapsed Yet"? This, then, is the character of world messiness in this first quarter of the 21st century. So on to the next question: Where, in all this messiness, does the United States find itself?

2022 Michigan Counterplan
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP › NET-BENEFITS › 2NC---INB---Soft Power

Multilateralism is an impact filter – great power sharing checks escalation of conflict

Pouliot, 11

Professor of Political Science at McGill University (Vincent, “Multilateralism as an End in Itself”, International Studies Perspectives (2011) 12, 18–26)

Because it rests on open, nondiscriminatory debate, and the routine exchange of viewpoints, the multilateral procedure introduces three key advantages that are gained, regardless of the specific policies adopted, and tend to diffuse across all participants. Contrary to the standard viewpoint, according to which a rational preference or functional imperative lead to multilateral cooperation, here it is the systematic practice of multilateralism that creates the drive to cooperate. At the theoretical level, the premise is that it is not only what people think that explains what they do, but also what they do that determines what they think (Pouliot 2010). Everyday multilateralism is a self-fulfilling practice for at least three reasons. First, the joint practice of multilateralism creates mutually recognizable [and] patterns of action among global actors. This process owes to the fact that practices structure social interaction (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming).2 Because they are meaningful, organized, and repeated, practices generally convey a degree of mutual intelligibility that allows people to develop social relations over time. In the field of international security, for example, the practice of deterrence is premised on a limited number of gestures, signals, and linguistic devices that are meant, as Schelling (1966:113) put it, to ‘‘getting the right signal across.’’ The same goes with the practice of multilateralism, which rests on a set of political and social patterns that establish the boundaries of action in a mutually intelligible fashion. These structuring effects, in turn, allow for the development of common frameworks for appraising global events. Multilateral dialog serves not only to find joint solutions; it also makes it possible for various actors to zoom in on the definition of the issue at hand—a particularly important step on the global stage. The point is certainly not that the multilateral procedure leads everybody to agree on everything—that would be as impossible as counterproductive. Theoretically speaking, there is room for skepticism that multilateralism may ever allow communicative rationality at the global level (see Risse 2000; Diez and Steans 2005). With such a diverse and uneven playing field, one can doubt that discursive engagement, in and of itself, can lead to common lifeworlds. Instead, what the practice of multilateralism fosters is the emergence of a shared framework of interaction—for example, a common linguistic repertoire—that allows global actors to make sense of world politics in mutually recognizable ways. Of course, they may not agree on the specific actions to be taken, but at least they can build on an established pattern of political interaction to deal with the problem at hand—sometimes even before it emerges in acute form. In today’s pluralistic world, that would already be a considerable achievement. In that sense, multilateralism may well be a constitutive practice of what Lu (2009) calls ‘‘political friendship among peoples.’’ The axiomatic practice of principled and inclusive dialog is quite apparent in the way she describes this social structure: ‘‘While conflicts, especially over the distribution of goods and burdens, will inevitably arise, under conditions of political friendship among peoples, they will be negotiated within a global background context of norms and institutions based on mutual recognition, equity in the distribution of burdens and benefits of global cooperation, and power-sharing in the institutions of global governance rather than domination by any group’’ (2009:54–55). In a world where multilateralism becomes an end in itself, this ideal pattern emerges out of the structuring effects of axiomatic practice: take the case of NATO, for instance, which has recently had to manage, through the multilateral practice, fairly strong internal dissent (Pouliot 2006). While clashing views and interests will never go away in our particularly diverse world, as pessimists are quick to emphasize (for example, Dahl 1999), the management of discord is certainly made easier by shared patterns of dialog based on mutually recognizable frameworks. Second, the multilateral procedure typically ensures a remarkable level of moderation in the global policies adopted. In fact, a quick historical tour d’horizon suggests that actors engaged in multilateralism tend to avoid radical solutions in their joint decision making. Of course, the very process of uniting disparate voices helps explain why multilateralism tends to produce median consensus. This is not to say that the multilateral practice inevitably leads to lowest common denominators. To repeat, because it entails complex and often painstaking debate before any actions are taken, the multilateral procedure forces involved actors to devise and potentially share similar analytical lenses that, in hindsight, make the policies adopted seem inherently, and seemingly ‘‘naturally,’’ moderate. This is because the debate about what a given policy means takes place before its implementation, which makes for a much smoother ride when decisions hit the ground. This joint interpretive work, which constitutes a crucial aspect of multilateralism, creates outcomes that are generally perceived as inherently reasonable. Participation brings inherent benefits to politics, as Bachrach (1975) argued in the context of democratic theory. Going after the conventional liberal view according to which actors enter politics with an already fixed set of preferences, Bachrach observes that most of the time people define their interests in the very process of participation. The argument is not that interests formed in the course of social interaction are in any sense more altruistic. It rather is that the nature and process of political practices, in this case multilateralism, matter a great deal in shaping participants’ preferences (Wendt 1999). In this sense, not only does the multilateral practice have structuring effects on global governance, but it is also constitutive of what actors say, want, and do (Adler and Pouliot forthcoming). Third and related, multilateralism lends legitimacy to the policies that it generates by virtue of the debate that the process necessarily entails. There is no need here to explain at length how deliberative processes that are inclusive of all stakeholders tend to produce outcomes that are generally considered more socially and politically acceptable. In the long run, the large ownership also leads to more efficient implementation, because actors feel invested in the enactment of solutions on the ground. Even episodes of political failure, such as the lack of UN reaction to the Rwandan genocide, can generate useful lessons when re-appropriated multilaterally—think of the Responsibility to Protect, for instance.3 From this outlook, there is no contradiction between efficiency and the axiomatic practice of multilateralism, quite the contrary. The more multilateralism becomes the normal or self-evident practice of global governance, the more benefits it yields for the many stakeholders of global governance. In fact, multilateralism as an end in and of itself could generate even more diffuse reciprocity than Ruggie had originally envisioned. Not only do its distributional consequences tend to even out, multilateralism as a global governance routine also creates self-reinforcing dynamics and new focal points for strategic interaction. The axiomatic practice of multilateralism helps define problems in commensurable ways and craft moderate solutions with wide-ranging ownership—three processual benefits that further strengthen the impetus for multilateral dialog. Pg. 21-23

2022 Michigan Counterplan
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP › NET-BENEFITS › 2NC---INB---FAF

Independently, CO2 causes ocean acidification---extinction

Brian Merchant 15, Senior Editor at Motherboard at VICE Media, Inc., Appeared on CNN, MSNBC, BBC World News, and NPR, Vice, 4/9/2015, http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-last-time-our-oceans-got-this-acidic-it-drove-earths-greatest-extinction

The biggest extinction event in planetary history was driven by the rapid acidification of our oceans, a new study concludes. So much carbon was released into the atmosphere, and the oceans absorbed so much of it so quickly, that marine life simply died off, from the bottom of the food chain up. That doesn’t bode well for the present, given the disturbingly similar rate that our seas are acidifying right now. Parts of the Pacific, for instance, are already so acidic that sea snails’ shells begin dissolving as soon as they’re born. The biggest die-off in history, the Permian Extinction event, aka the Great Dying, extinguished over 90 percent of the planet's species—and 96 percent of marine species. A lot of theories have been put forward about why and how, exactly, the vast majority of Earth life went belly up 252 million years ago, but the new study, published in Science, offers some compelling evidence acidification was a key driver. A team led by University of Edinburgh researchers collected rocks in the United Arab Emirates that were on the seafloor hundreds of millions of years ago, and used the boron isotopes found within to model the changing levels of acidification in our prehistoric oceans. Through this “combined geochemical, geological, and modeling approach,” the scientists say, they were able to accurately model the series of “perturbations” that unfolded in the era. They now believe that a series of gigantic volcanic eruptions in the Siberian Trap spewed a great fountain of carbon into the atmosphere over a period of tens of thousands of years. This was the first phase of the extinction event, in which terrestrial life began to die out. The study explains that the second phase of the event happened much more quickly. “During the second extinction pulse, however, a rapid and large injection of carbon caused an abrupt acidification event that drove the preferential loss of heavily calcified marine biota," the authors write. So does this study mean we should be especially worried about the phenomenon taking hold today? "Yes," said Dr. Rachel Wood, a professor of carbonate geoscience at the University of Edinburgh and one of the paper's authors. "We are concerned about modern ocean acidification," she told me in an email. "Although the amount of carbon added to the atmosphere that triggered the mass extinction was probably greater than today's fossil fuel reserves, the rate at which the carbon was released was at a rate similar to modern emissions." In other words, the Siberian Traps probably spewed out more carbon in total, but we're spewing out just as fast. And that's overwhelming the planetary equilibrium. "This fast rate of release was a critical factor driving ocean acidification," Wood said. Why? "The rate of release is critical because the oceans absorb a lot of the carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere, around 30 percent of the carbon dioxide released by humans," Wood said. "To achieve chemical equilibrium, some of this CO2 reacts with the water to form carbonic acid. Some of these molecules react with a water molecule to give a bicarbonate ion and a hydronium ion, thus increasing ocean 'acidity' (H+ ion concentration)." Marine animals whose skeletons are comprised of calcium carbonate—and that’s a lot of them (think snails, coral), which form a crucial part of the food chain—dissolved or couldn’t form in the first place. And that is what’s happening today. "Between 1751 and 1994, surface ocean pH is estimated to have decreased from approximately 8.25 to 8.14, representing an increase of almost 30 percent in H+ ion concentration in the world's oceans," Wood said. That's a major uptick in ocean acidity in a relatively short amount of time, and it's happening because humans have burned fossil fuels like coal, oil, and gas with reckless abandon since the Industrial Revolution. That's fueling climate change, of course, as well as its less-discussed, but potentially equally cataclysmic sibling, ocean acidification. "Scientists have long suspected that an ocean acidification event occurred during the greatest mass extinction of all time, but direct evidence has been lacking until now,” study coordinator Dr. Matthew Clarkson said in a statement. “This is a worrying finding, considering that we can already see an increase in ocean acidity today that is the result of human carbon emissions." Much of marine life is already in grave danger from acidification. It's contributing to the bleaching of coral reefs around the world, and, as mentioned before, it's killing sea snails in the Pacific. If it worsens, acidification could threaten the whole of the marine biosphere, and, obviously, the land-dwelling creatures that depend on it too. In 2013, marine scientists released a "State of the Oceans" report that found that the rate of current acidification was “unprecedented.” They noted that the seas were acidifying faster than any point in the last 300 million years. That study didn’t take into account the new data, of course, but that’s the timeline we’re dealing with: The last time the oceans were so acidic was in the midst of the greatest extinction in the history of the world.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP › 1NC › 1NC---INB---Soft Power

That averts a laundry list of existential impacts.

Margaret Seymour, 21 (Margaret Seymour, 2020 Lt. Gen. Bernard E. Trainor USMC Veterans Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, is Currently a Graduate Student at the University of Missouri Studying Journalism and Strategic Communications, 3-19-2021, accessed on 7-4-2022, Foreign Policy Research Institute, “Building Soft Power Back Better?”, , HBisevac)

The Biden administration has multiple competing priorities: COVID-19 and its economic impacts, long-ignored racial fissures, and a growing tenuous relationship with truth, reality, and trust among the populace, just to name a few. President Joseph Biden also has the challenge of representing the United States on the foreign stage. In that capacity, he is charged with crafting a new foreign policy—one that champions a balance of hard and soft power, tailored for the most efficient use of resources and the most effective results.

He is off to a good start; in his interim national security guidance released in early March, President Biden acknowledges the role of soft power resources in building and maintaining U.S. strength, even if he doesn’t call the concept out by name. He posits,

2022 Michigan Counterplan
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP › 1NC › 1NC---INB---Soft Power

SPP expansion hedges losses in U.S soft power.

Matthew Hughes, 20 (Matthew Hughes, MD, MPH, Occupational and Environmental Health Specialist, 2-14-2020, accessed on 7-2-2022, Small Wars Journal, “Projecting Soft Power Through the State Partnership Program”, , HBisevac) **edited for gendered language**

Power is a relative term, especially when referring to the amount of control and influence a nation wields in the global community. In analyzing nations’ sources of power, American political scientist Joseph Nye popularized the concepts of hard power, or “the ability to use carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will,” and soft power, an influence which “co-opts [nations] rather than coerces them.”[1] Whereas nations mainly derive hard power from military forces, Nye asserts a nation’s soft power stems from “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when others see them as legitimate and having moral authority).”[2] Soft power grows through cultural diffusion, which often occurs more rapidly thanks to globalization, but there are also institutions which directly contribute to soft power projection. The United States Department of State (DoS) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) are chief among these institutions cultivating American soft power through initiatives and foreign presence.

Investment into these soft power tools has been under tight scrutiny as U.S. policy shifts toward hard power. A common theme in executive budget proposals between 2017 and 2019 involved funding cuts between 23 and 32 percent for diplomacy and international aid.[3] Although Congress countered these proposals, albeit narrowly by one vote in the Senate in 2018, these proposals mark a clear shift in power priorities rendering the budget for soft power tools volatile and unpredictable.[4] As policymakers consider significant budget cuts in traditional soft power tools, however, other countries are investing resources toward soft power projection. China’s national strategy, for instance, now includes the political jargon wenhua ruan shili (cultural soft power) and plans for cultural influence to permeate.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP › 1NC › 1NC---INB---FAF

The counterplan linearly increases state involvement in foreign affairs.

Peter Howard, 4 (Peter Howard is the economics director at Policy Integrity, and a former economic fellow, May 2004, accessed on 7-2-2022, International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 2, “The Growing Role of States in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Case of the State Partnership Program”, , HBisevac)

As the preceding case illustrates, states can play a significant role in implementing U.S. foreign policy. The National Guard’s State Partnership Program has given states a critical role in U.S. engagement programs. The networks of opportunity created by the number of SPP funding sources and potential programs have allowed entrepreneurial state actors to shape a unique course for each partnership. Some innovative state coordinators have, on their own initiative, tapped other funds, such as cooperative threat reduction programs or environmental programs to further the reach of their state partnership. The participating state National Guards are uniquely positioned in this respect—they are connected to both the state and federal governments through their dual mission and contain vast experience including military duties, support to civilians, and regular civilian jobs. This gives an enterprising state a chance to make a significant impact in the content of U.S. foreign policy. The meaning attached to that policy is created, in part, by the actions undertaken in the name of that policy. Through their implementation of the SPP, states have shaped the meaning of U.S. foreign policy of engaging the former communist states of Eastern Europe and NATO enlargement. This is not to say that all National Guards and Partnerships are equally forward-leaning, but some can be, and in a way not directed or anticipated by the federal government.

Early criticisms that military engagement programs lacked direction (Ulrich, 1999) have receded as programs such as the SPP evolve into more sophisticated enterprise. Recent analyses of the SPP have revealed that all of the program’s “stakeholders,” including the governors, the National Guard, the U.S. Defense Department, and the partner countries, are enamored with the program’s success.”° With ten years of experience, the National Guard has developed a “life cycle” approach to each state partnership. Early in the life of the partnership, mil-mil exchanges dominate. After a certain point, however, the marginal utility of additional military familiarization exchanges declines, and mil-civ and civ—civ exchanges rise to take their place. As the partnerships mature and are dominated by the civilian exchanges, state governments take an even greater role in initiating and implementing international relationships.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
STATE PARTNERSHIP PROGRAM CP › 1NC › 1NC---Shell

SPP initiatives over emerging tech with NATO solves---ensures U.S influence AND bolsters alliances.

Samir Battiss, 13 (Samir Battiss, Lecturer at the University of Quebec in Montreal, May 2013, accessed on 6-30-2022, NORDIKA Programme, NATO Military Partnerships: The US National Guard State Partnership as the driving force for pre-accession and long-term cooperation,” , HBisevac)

The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) involves establishing a partnership between a State National Guard and other national armed forces of a sovereign country. Initially conceived as military-to-military engagement activities, several of these relationships have developed further and, nowadays include civilian-to-civilian initiatives. As a security assistance provider, it conducts activities and in so doing influences the perceptions and behavior of regional security actors. Due to the specific nature of the U.S. National Guard, the SPP initiatives have been used as dual assets – national and NATO6. In addition to laying the foundation of goodwill, trust, access and influence, they pave the way for allied/allied – allied/partners interactions that go beyond a simple relationship to help increase a partner’s ability to accomplish a particular task or mission7.

Basic to the issue are the answers to the question “when”, and “how” military assistance is to be made available; especially since the number of recipients has steadily increased over the last 20 years, and this trend is likely to continue, in view of the number of States scheduled to be involved in the growing concept of “Air/Sea Battle in Asia -Pacific”, and of the future challenges in Africa and in Central Asia. This unceasing expansion of potential recipients has introduced dynamism into the framework upon which military assistance rests, making it most difficult to establish any set formula, even in general principles.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
Oversight DA › Asats---Link

Satellites specifically cause overstretch due to infighting

Best 02 (Richard A. Best, Jr Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division. “CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Order Code RL31369 Imagery Intelligence: Issues for Congress”, https://irp.fas.org/crs/RL31369.pdf)LR

Intelligence derived from satellites has become an essential element of military operations and foreign policymaking. In particular, precise imagery from space-based collection systems makes possible the effective use of precision-guided munitions that is becoming the basis of U.S. defense planning. Imagery intelligence also provides the factual bases for addressing many foreign policy issues. Imagery is collected by satellites acquired and operated by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), an organization with a record of enormous technological achievements since its creation in 1961. Imagery collected by the NRO is processed, analyzed, exploited, and disseminated by another organization, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). NIMA was established in 1996, incorporating the Defense Mapping Agency and various intelligence offices. Congress has been concerned with satellite imagery because of its critical importance and its high costs. Independent commissions established by Congress to assess the state of the imagery intelligence effort have concluded that significant changes need to be made in the way the Nation’s imagery effort is conducted. There is a consensus that greater emphasis should be placed on better collection targeting and improving processing, exploitation, and dissemination (the processes collectively termed TPED); that greater attention should be given to acquiring commercial imagery; and that the management of the imagery effort may need to be changed. Even before the events of September 11, 2001, there appeared to be a fairly widespread view within congressional committees that at least some additional funding should be directed towards imagery collection and TPED. Subsequent military campaigns have underscored the use of imagery in military operations and other counterterrorist efforts. NIMA may not be ready to accept such a broad role within the Intelligence Community. According to a media account, Robert Zitz, a senior NIMA official, has stated that for the present integrating imagery and geospatial data and imagery remains the agency’s primary focus; “right now,” according to Zitz, “we don’t feel that we are ready to take on the challenge of doing imagery and signals intelligence both in one architecture.”23 NIMA officials undoubtedly recognize that such fusion would not only be technically challenging but it could involve conflicts with other, older, and larger agencies that could complicate NIMA’s overall missions. Peter Marino, the chairman of the NIMA Commission, inApril 3, 2001 testimony, indicated continuing concern that NIMA lacks adequate resources for such a task: and I think what you’re creating is a recipe for disaster for the day when [FIA] starts dropping down volumes of data that is considerably greater than the volumes of data that we’re seeing today and expects an organization like NIMA to start processing and exploiting that data. That doesn’t close at all right now with the budget that NIMA has to do TPED.24 Beyond questions of resources, some observers express concern that the heavy responsibility of managing a multi-int geospatial grid would be assigned to a relatively new organization that is a DOD combat support agency. According to this view, developing and acquiring the necessary systemsthat manage the flow of imagery will be a daunting task that NIMA will probably be able to accomplish only with additional funding and by drawing upon outside assistance. They suggest that establishment of collection requirements–determining which targets should get the highest priorities–more appropriately should become the responsibility of the DCI who has, in any event, been assigned the responsibility by statute.25 Nor do they believe would NIMA be a logical candidate to address the tasking of the sigint collection efforts of the National Security Agency (NSA) for which longstanding interagency procedures exist. Organizing a process by which analysts in various agencies can annotate data on an imagery base would be a logical NIMA responsibility, but attempting to become a “final authority” for validating such annotation would, at least in some cases, appear to be an overstretch that could cause prolonged interagency disagreements.