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2022 Michigan Evidence

AT: INB—European Defense High

European Defense spending is high and increasing rapidly

Rolander ’22 (Niclas Rolander, Reporter, “Global Military Spending Tops $2 Trillion for First Time as Europe Boosts Defenses”, ) //sethlee

Global military expenditure has surpassed $2 trillion per year for the first time, and looks set to rise further as European countries beef up their armed forces in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

2022 Michigan Evidence

AT: Blankenship

Their “threats key” evidence is a mis-reading of Blankenship. They think the latent and implicit threat of abandonment is preferable to overt QPQs.

Blankenship – 1NC solvency advocate - 18 (Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami in Coral Gables, PhD political science at Columba, MPhil & MA political science at Columbia “Promises under Pressure: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances,” Columbia University PhD dissertation)

The credibility of a patron’s threat of abandonment is shaped by far more than just the level of reassurance it provides. As a result, the extent to which reassurance and burden-sharing are positively or negatively correlated depends in large part on whether the patron can couple its assurances with threats. When a patron’s threat to abandon allies is credible ex ante, it can afford to reassure its allies without worrying as much about free-riding. Indeed, the literature on coercion shows that reassurance is equally as important as threats in making for effective coercion, although it is much less studied (Davis, 2000; Sechser, 2007; Carnegie, 2015; Gerzhoy, 2015). The target of coercive bargaining needs to know that if it gives in, its partner will simply punish it anyway (Schelling, 1966). Thus, reassurance can actually be a positive tool that is used to increase burden-sharing, though only if it is backed up by threats. These threats do not necessarily need to be explicit, and indeed may be most effective if they are not. Allies are likely to consider how likely patron abandonment is, and thus their burden-sharing efforts will in no small part be a reaction to the patron’s latent threat of abandonment.

2022 Michigan Evidence

Deficit—AI—Say No

Despite talks and rhetoric, there’s no way that NATO cooperations on AI and Tech.

Franke ’21 (Ulrike Esther Franke, Senior policy fellow at the European council on Foreign Relations, “ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI”, ) //sethlee

Both sides of the Atlantic are already motivated to cooperate with each other on AI. But, despite these shared interests, transatlantic cooperation on AI may not be straightforward. Four trends, in particular, could pose problems: transatlantic estrangement; European digital autonomy efforts; differing views on China; and, potentially, Brexit. The transatlantic alliance has had a bad four years. The Trump administration’s criticism of the United Nations and the World Trade Organization, the president’s threats to leave NATO, and his active criticism of the EU all made Europeans wonder whether they had lost their most important partner. Moreover, in light of the conflict over 5G, in the minds of many Europeans, technology in particular has become an area that creates conflict in the transatlantic relationship rather than fostering cooperation. Although transatlantic relations are likely to improve under Biden, substantial damage has been done, and it will take some time to mend these ties. But, even if relations improve, it is becoming increasingly obvious that US has a diminishing interest in Europe as a geopolitically important part of the world. This trend was already visible under Trump’s predecessor, Barack Obama. It is, therefore, unsurprising that, on technology cooperation, both sides emphasise the importance of working with other actors as well as each other. The US National Security Commission on AI, for example, recommends that the US Departments of State and Defense “should negotiate formal AI cooperation agreements with Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam”. Its March 2020 report emphasises on several occasions the importance of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. Meanwhile, Europeans are pursuing the idea of an alliance for multilateralism. And, on technology and AI more specifically, they have also begun to reach out to other democratic allies. The most important aspect of transatlantic estrangement, however, is not the loss of trust between the US and Europe – which they will eventually reverse. Rather, during the four years of the Trump administration, and partly in response to isolationist tendencies in the US, Europeans have become much more comfortable talking about European strategic autonomy or sovereignty. Without encouraging the narrative that these efforts are directed against the US, or were primarily an answer to Trump, Europeans aim to empower Europe as an actor in its own right. In the technological realm, this led to the idea of European digital sovereignty, the aim of which is to build up European technological capabilities. Although European digital sovereignty is not specifically targeted at the US, it has led, among other things, to efforts such as the possible regulation of American technology companies and concerns over American firms acquiring European start-ups. European campaigners and some policymakers believe US tech giants such as Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon are forces to protect against. European thinking on technology partly developed in opposition to the US and US companies. Thus, European efforts to build up digital sovereignty may impede transatlantic cooperation. The EU’s effort to strengthen ethical AI, and to make ‘trustworthy AI’ a unique selling point for Europe, might also end up creating problems for transatlantic cooperation. Many EU policymakers believe that the EU’s insistence on ethical AI will eventually become a location advantage for Europe (much like data privacy): as more people become concerned about unethical AI and data security, they will prefer to use or buy AI ‘made in Europe’ rather than elsewhere. In this respect, two European aims are at odds with each other: on the one hand, Europeans want to ensure that AI is developed and used in an ethical way. Partnering with a powerful player such as the US on this matter should be an obvious way to help them achieve this goal. However, if the EU considers ethical AI not just a goal for humanity but a development that may also create commercial advantages for Europe, then transatlantic cooperation on this issue is counterproductive, as it would undermine Europe’s uniqueness. Finally, many Europeans have expressed scepticism about the extent to which Europe and the US are indeed aligned on ethical AI principles. For example, the Danish national AI strategy argues for a common ethical and human-centred basis for AI. It describes ethical AI as a particularly European approach: “Europe and Denmark should not copy the US or China. Both countries are investing heavily in artificial intelligence, but with little regard for responsibility, ethical principles and privacy.” Many Europeans feel that the US “has no idea how to regulate” cyberspace and continues to show little enthusiasm for doing so. The EU, however, likes to think of itself as a trailblazer when it comes to digital rights, such as the 2014 “right to be forgotten” or the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation.

2022 Michigan Evidence

Deficit—Conditions Fail

Conditional SC fails—it doesn’t induce behavioral change

Munson 13 (Peter J. Munson is senior vice president for preventive services and global crisis management for a private sector corporation and a retired U.S. Marine Corps officer. “THE LIMITS OF SECURITY COOPERATION” 9/10/13 )

Planners should go to great lengths to ensure that SC is seen as a tool for a specific purpose, not a reward to condition behaviors. SC-as-a-conditioning-tool becomes bribery with diminishing returns. If policymakers want a quid pro quo, they need to admit as much and use much more precisely targeted incentives: paying a fee for access or head-of-the-line transit privileges for example. This becomes a much more predictable business transaction than trying to use SC funds, winks, and nudges to get one’s way. Finally, in the land of perverse incentives, SC is often seen as a means to drive defense business to U.S. contractors. This is true. By creating arms races and supplying prestige weapons, however useless, to unstable areas of the world, they are creating U.S. jobs. But wouldn’t taxpayer money and efforts be better spent if officials more precisely targeted domestic concerns with taxpayer funds rather than hoping that efforts trickle down predictably from collaboration with corpulent and unsavory foreign generals? In the land of perverse incentives, SC funding is one of the most egregious—and in the post-9/11 era, many officials see SC as a critical tool of strategic positioning. However, the premises of SC must be reconsidered before the U.S. military squanders more resources on white elephant projects.

2022 Michigan Evidence

Deficit—Deterrence

The CP’s pressure undermines deterrence

Schnaufer 21, Tad A. Schnaufer II is a Ph.D. candidate in Security Studies at the School for Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida and is a captain in the Florida Army National Guard, “The US-NATO Relationship: The Cost of Maintaining Political Pressure on Allies,” January 15th 2021, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Conflict & Security, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/01/15/the-us-nato-relationship-the-cost-of-maintaining-political-pressure-on-allies/

These responses from European leaders show that startling allies into thinking the United States will abandon them has influenced allies to increase defense spending in line with the . However, in the long term, NATO policymaking should employ a balanced approach. If the United States brings its security guarantee of the alliance too much into question, Russia or other states may take action to test the United States’ resolve. During the Cold War, US leaders continually reaffirmed their commitment to allies, effectively deterring a Soviet invasion. Deterrence works best when allies clearly express their mutual obligations to all actors on the international stage.

2022 Michigan Evidence

Deficit—Cohesion/Relations—Trump Proves

Conditional U.S. aid undermines allied cohesion – Trump’s public views on NATO prove

Benitez 19, Jorge Benitez is a senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, specializing in NATO, transatlantic relations, European politics, and U.S. national security, “U.S. NATO Policy in the Age of Trump: Controversy and Consistency,” Winter 2019, The Fletcher forum of world affairs, vol. 43

These statements echo some of Trump’s remarks about NATO. They demonstrate that American leaders are becoming more impatient with the persistent burden-sharing imbalance with European allies, marking a frequently overlooked yet nevertheless dangerous decline in the U.S. attitude toward the behavior of its allies. They are proof that Europe has underestimated the corrosive effect of its attitude toward fulfilling the NATO defense commitment. These comments demonstrate that the problem of burden-sharing is serious and will continue to jeopardize transatlantic relations after Trump, unless significant progress is made. Trump no doubt feels validated by these criticisms from previous presidents. But Trump also feels that previous presidents were unsuccessful because they did not make sufficient effort to pressure NATO allies to fulfill their defense commitments. As a result, Trump appears willing to take greater risks than any of his predecessors. Trump summed this up after his last NATO summit in 2018: Now, what has happened is, presidents over many years, from Ronald Reagan to Barack Obama, they came in, they said, “Okay, hey, do the best you can,” and they left. Nobody did anything about it. And it got to a point where the United States was paying for 90 percent of NATO. And that’s not fair. So it’s changed.13 To properly understand this widening gap between the United States and NATO allies, it is essential to recall the timely warning from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates. In 2011, Gates spoke in very direct language to emphasize to Europe the gravity of the problem, stating, “I am the latest in a string of U.S. defense secretaries who have urged allies privately and publicly, often with exasperation, to meet agreed-upon NATO benchmarks for defense spending.”14 He then made one of the starkest warnings about the health of the Alliance, stating, “[I]f current trends in the decline of European defense capabilities are not halted and reversed, future U.S. political leaders— those for whom the Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me—may not consider the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost.”15 Gates did not advocate for such a change in U.S. NATO policy, but he feared that if allies did not make a significant change, future U.S. leaders would lose faith in the most powerful alliance in U.S. history. This warning may now seem prophetic with the rise of Trump, but even Gates must have been surprised at how quickly his warning proved true. TRUMP BREAKS FROM HISTORICAL PRESIDENTIAL SUPPORT FOR NATO As we have seen, Trump is not the first president to complain that NATO allies are not contributing their fair share of defense spending to the Alliance. But Trump has done two things his predecessors avoided. First, he has publicly questioned the value of NATO to U.S. national security. Second, Trump has publicly questioned the validity of U.S. defense commitments to NATO allies. These two deviations from decades of bipartisan presidential support for NATO have weakened the cohesion of the transatlantic alliance and caused fears in allied capitals that under the Trump administration, the U.S. may not help defend them should they face a foreign attack. Trump’s views on NATO should be understood and examined in two phases: his statements about NATO as a candidate during the 2016 presidential campaign and his statements about NATO since he became president.

2022 Michigan Evidence

Deficit—Cohesion/Relations—Abandonment Fears

CP causes allies to perceive lack of US commitment

Benitez 19, Jorge Benitez is a senior fellow in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council, specializing in NATO, transatlantic relations, European politics, and U.S. national security, “U.S. NATO Policy in the Age of Trump: Controversy and Consistency,” Winter 2019, The Fletcher forum of world affairs, vol. 43

Since its creation in response to Soviet aggression after World War II, the majority of the U.S. public has consistently held favorable views of NATO. But Trump’s repeated public criticism of NATO may be having an effect on popular support for the Alliance. Support for NATO by Republicans decreased from 52 percent in 2016 to 47 percent in 2017, during the first year of the Trump administration.81 Nevertheless, a strong majority of Americans polled have a favorable view of NATO. While Republican support for NATO may have gone down slightly, support for NATO by Democrats and Independents has increased significantly. As a result, overall public support for NATO has grown, from 53 percent in 2016 to 62 percent in 2017. 82 Still, Trump’s tough NATO policy is putting great strain on the Alliance. It will not convince the majority of U.S. allies to meet NATO’s 2-percent defense-spending pledge by 2024. Moreover, reducing U.S. commitments to NATO and cutting contributions to the Alliance will only make the problem worse and may make hostile powers more willing to test the Alliance by using force or engaging in a hybrid attack against a NATO member. Instead of focusing on threats, Trump’s NATO policy should propose feasible burden-sharing ideas that can be implemented quickly.83 But the key to a successful NATO policy from the Trump administration must be a more accurate perspective on the central role of NATO in U.S. national security. Trump needs to stop overestimating the harm from burden-sharing and underestimating the value of NATO to U.S. national interests. The security that NATO provides Europe, the North Atlantic, and the Mediterranean is worth much more to the United States than the 5 percent of the Department of Defense budget allocated to U.S. forces in Europe. It is critical that Trump appreciate the unique value that previous presidents saw in NATO. As George W. Bush described it,“These trans-Atlantic ties could not be severed by U-boats. They could not be cut by checkpoints and barbed wire. They were not ended by SS-20s and nuclear blackmail. And they certainly will not be broken by commercial quarrels and political debates.”84 NATO must not be evaluated simply as a transactional cost. It is a unique asset for the United States that protects American citizens, interests, and values. As Barack Obama explained,“Our nations are stronger and more prosperous when we stand together. In good times and in bad, our alliance has endured; in fact, it has thrived—because we share an unbreakable commitment to the freedom and security of our citizens. NATO is a force multiplier…. There is nothing else like it on Earth.”85 Notably, on July 6, 2017, Trump gave one of his most powerful foreign policy speeches in Warsaw. In the speech, he made two strong statements. “Americans know that a strong alliance of free, sovereign and independent nations is the best defense for our freedoms and for our interests. That is why my administration has demanded that all members of NATO finally meet their full and fair financial obligation,” he said.86 It is important that Trump recognize how his threats and demands are jeopardizing the significant value that NATO offers. If Trump leaves NATO or unintentionally breaks up the Alliance, the United States will not be able to replace it. Rather, the Trump administration should pursue alternative options to produce more responsible and fair behavior from NATO allies. As President, it is in Trump’s interest to strengthen NATO and find more positive and feasible policies to resolve the burden-sharing problem. NATO is the most powerful alliance in history and a key asset in U.S. national security. None of our competitors have anything like it. The loss of NATO would be a major victory for U.S. adversaries. As former Secretary of Defense Mattis has explained to the Senate Armed Services Committee, “history is clear: nations with strong allies thrive, and those without them wither.”87

2022 Michigan Evidence

Deficit—Cohesion/Relations—2AC

Threats of abandonment cause allied backlash and destroy cohesion

Blankenship 18, Brian Dylan Blankenship is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Miami and a researcher with a focus on international security and international cooperation, “Promises under Pressure: Reassurance and Burden-Sharing in Asymmetric Alliances,” 2018, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Columbia University, p. 28-29

2.5.1 The Reassurance Dilemma. One might thus conclude that reassurance is suboptimal, and that patrons are best served by casting their protection into doubt. The reality is not so simple, however. Because the patron’s side of the bargain entails providing protection to its allies, if that protection comes into doubt then allies have less reason to honor their end of the bargain: namely, to remain loyal to the patron by siding with it against its adversaries, providing basing access, and supporting its other foreign policy priorities (Morrow, 1991; Lake, 2009). The patron thus faces a dilemma. It must choose between withholding reassurance to maximize burden-sharing, on the one hand, and providing reassurance to ensure that allies have incentives to remain loyal to it, on the other. Directly studying the relationship between reassurance and burden-sharing is difficult, however. The first two problems are methodological. Any relationship that exists between patron reassurance and allied burden-sharing may be spurious. For example, U.S. troop presence is likely to be correlated with threat, which may have an independent effect on allied military spending. Second, the relationship between reassurance and burden-sharing may be endogenous; patrons may withhold reassurance from allies which are under-contributing and then reward them with assurances of protection once they have increased their efforts. The third problem is theoretical – even if troops are present, allies may fear (and, indeed, the patron may threaten) that they will be withdrawn. It is difficult to know, for example, whether a large U.S. troop presence in a country indicates that the host is highly dependent on the United States, or whether it is instead the United States that is dependent upon the host. Indeed, while Lake (2007, 2009) and Machain and Morgan (2013) find that states which host U.S. troops have lower defense contributions, Allen, VanDusky-Allen, and Flynn (2016) show that NATO allies’ defense efforts are positively related to U.S. military presence. Moreover, Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger (1994) find that states with a large U.S. military presence – which they treat as a proxy for partners’ dependence on the United States – were more likely to contribute to the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War.

2022 Michigan Evidence

Deficit—Delay

Delay and say no—adequate burden sharing takes years

Hoffman & Dinneen 18 [Frank G. Hoffman, board of advisors at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, serving the National Defense University as a Research Fellow; Molly Dinneen, Research Intern at the National Defense University, 7-6-2018, Foreign Policy Research Institute, ‘Examining NATO’s Progress: Common Goals, Shared Burdens’, /alundy]

In anticipation of the 2018 NATO Summit, analysts have commented on : command and control structure changes, new headquarters for maritime forces, and higher defense spending levels. European scholars and policy experts would like to see the Summit move past the issue of burden sharing. Certainly, there is much more than burden sharing to discuss. Yet, a lack of consensus about Russia and threats from terrorism have limited the progress the Alliance should have gained since Wales in 2014. Coercive tactics with tariffs and trade imbalances will only increase resistance and weaken consensus on a way ahead with regard to security arguments.

2022 Michigan Evidence

Deficit—Credibility

Conditional leadership in NATO can’t solve—creates a power vacuum and unconditional leadership is empirically better.

Lagon & Moreland ’19 [Mark Lagon and Will Moreland; Chief Policy Officer at Friends of the Global Fight Against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, as well as Distinguished Senior Scholar in the Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, and associate fellow with the Brookings Institution's Project on International Order and Strategy; 2-14-2019; "Burden-Sharing Doesn’t Need to Be Burdensome"; National Interest; https://nationalinterest.org/feature/burden-sharing-doesn%E2%80%99t-need-be-burdensome-44572; Accessed 7-9-2022; AW]

The president’s critique is not unfounded. American power today differs from its heights in 1945, or even 1990. The United States will need help shouldering the maintenance of a liberal international order that has increased global security, prosperity and freedom these past seven decades. Nevertheless, the manner in which an American administration approaches the burden-sharing issue matters. Trump has pointedly called for NATO allies to pay more for defense and his team at the United Nations has circulated a potential policy to make foreign aid contingent on alignment with U.S. positions, so that aid dollars “only go to America’s friends.” Though increased action among allies and partners is necessary, to simply demand greater burden-sharing is insufficient. Policymakers confront two central questions if they are to promote effective burden-sharing: first, how to ensure other stakeholders do step forward, rather than leave a vacuum around an issue; and, second, how to protect and advance U.S. interests if burden-sharing cedes the initiative to others. Demands for increased activities from partners must be coupled with coordination and a measure of U.S. leadership for an effective burden-sharing campaign. A number of cases, therefore, reveal bases for eliciting burden-sharing of the quality and variety the United States should want—as well as the risks of forcing burden-sharing via disengagement. The notion of compelling other nations into taking actions—particularly by arousing skepticism around U.S. credibility—is a recipe for shortchanging American interests. Consideration of both UN peacekeeping operations and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria illustrate how effective burden-sharing requires continued U.S. commitments in order to spur burden-sharing over inaction. Furthermore, the success of the Global Fund, the worsening of some crises in the Middle East, such as in Yemen, and the mixed record of the U.S. withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), similarly demonstrate that leadership creates the leverage necessary for Washington to advance U.S. interests when others do step up to act. Americans may legitimately want others to do more, but how that aim is pursued matters. Nowhere is this more evident than the debate over NATO. Even before the signing of the Washington Treaty, concerns around NATO burden-sharing arose. U.S. military planners worried that an American security guarantee would perpetually deter defense spending by the new European allies. This concern dogged the allies throughout the Cold War. Disagreements flared almost immediately in the Senate’s “great debate” over deploying troops to Europe without additional European support in the Korean War, a peripheral interest to many European leaders. Disagreements resurfaced in the 1960s as Western European economies recovered from their postwar devastation. The Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon administrations repeatedly sought to navigate clashes between security interests in Europe and trade or balance of payments deficits. Compounded by the strains of Vietnam, both the security and economic arrangements boiled over in the Nixon administration with the resulting shifts of the Nixon Doctrine and the shocks to the Bretton Woods system. Though the transatlantic partners were in sync on détente and then counterbalancing in face of the Soviet Union in the 1970s and early 1980s, disagreements surrounding approaches to European security, particularly around the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles, maintained a measure of tension between the Euro-Atlantic allies. The subsequent Soviet collapse transformed the global security environment; yet, it did not take long for a new generation of burden-sharing issues to emerge. The Clinton administration at first evidenced ambivalence on respective roles and responses on Balkans crises. Others, like then-French foreign minister Hubert Vedrine, derided the U.S. “hyperpower.” During this period even Paul Wolfowitz admitted a “need to believe that others are doing their share.” Frustrations persisted in the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. Under both presidents, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates forewarned of a potential “two-tiered alliance” at the 2008 Munich Security Conference and the “the growing difficulty for the United States to sustain current support for NATO if the American taxpayer continues to carry most of the burden in the Alliance” in his 2011 farewell address at NATO. Jeffrey Goldberg further captured this sentiment in President Obama’s derision of “free-riders” in his revealing 2016 article “The Obama Doctrine” in The Atlantic. Surviving these crises, NATO’s story reminds that the organization has been and remains, like many of America’s global partnerships, inherently reformable—provided the United States engages with tangible and realistic ambitions. Without initial U.S. involvement, no effective collective defense organization would have developed in Europe sufficient to manage the Soviet threat. Without continued engagement that same organization would not have changed as needed, for instance, to be a stalwart partner in Afghanistan. NATO and the broader transatlantic partnership certainly require further shifts to manage today’s era of resurgent great power competition; however, this past precedent emphasizes the need for active U.S. leadership and reasonable agenda-setting. Pragmatic engagement will yield practical results. Peacekeeping by the United Nations offers an important example of what burden-sharing means and what elicits it. During the Cold War, UN peace operations were confined to interposing a deployment between formerly warring parties. The clash of the Cold War superpowers as veto-wielding United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members meant that was all the traffic would bear. In settings like Cyprus and Lebanon, long-standing deployments kept additional military duties off the U.S. plate through decades of the Cold War. The Cold War’s end ushered in more numerous and ambitious UNSC mandates—as the United States and Russia were more often willing to align on authorizing peace operations. In the 1990s, along with a couple of dramatic failures marred by murky mandates (in Bosnia and Rwanda, where excessive impartiality left atrocities to occur on peacekeepers’ watch), an array of peace operations took hold with a variety of governance and post-conflict goals beyond the traditional interpositional model.

2022 Michigan Evidence

Deficit—Say No—vs 2% of GDP

The 2% standard is not an accurate representation of contribution--- destabilizes the alliance by calling out competent countries.

Kivimaki, 19 [Timo Kivimaki, 2-13-2019, professor of International Relations and Director of Research at University of Bath, European Security, Volume 28, ‘Power, Contribution, and Dependence in NATO Burden Sharing’, /alundy]

The national GDP share of defence spending is often used as an easy, parsimonious, quantitative measure of contribution in some of the formative studies in the field and in most studies that aim at complete mathematical models of burden sharing in military alliances (Olson and Zeckhauser , Boyer , Oneal , Sandler and Hartley ). The use of national defence spending is justified by the fact that much of NATO’s operations and activities are funded by national defence spending, while only some funding is channelled through the NATO budget. Thus, the idea of measuring contribution to NATO by considering GDP shares of national military spending makes some sense, but it is neither an accurate, nor a necessarily useful, indicator of contributions (Zyla , Techau , Kunertova ).

2022 Michigan Evidence

Deficit—Say No—AT: Pressure Solves

Say no and the cp collapses NATO

Wohlforth 16 (William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, “The Right Choice for NATO,” This chapter will appear in: Sustainable Security: Rethinking American, National Security Strategy, edited by Jeremi Suri and Benjamin Valentino, )

A further, critical implication of this assessment of the strategic environment is rarely noted: it is entirely inconsistent with shock therapy’s assumption about the lack of serious threats to European security to say that calling the United States’ Article 5 commitment into question will cause European governments step up and create more military capacity via increased spending or cooperation. On the contrary, a relatively benign security setting is arguably more conducive to allowing (p.260) narrow national perspectives to trump EU-wide initiatives and to foster the continuation of minimalist defense efforts than the status quo of US leadership. America’s NATO allies make up nearly a fifth of global military spending. Britain is the fourth biggest military spender in the world, with France close behind (after another US ally, Japan) as sixth. Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Canada all rank among the world’s fifteen biggest spenders.41 Very secure states like Norway and Canada purchase sophisticated weaponry from the US military-industrial complex and order their soldiers into battle in America’s wars in far off lands. Why? A major reason is the alliance with the United States—it is the existence of the overseas hegemon and the perceived need to retain access to it and standing with it that drive much of this behavior.42

2022 Michigan Evidence

Deficit—Say No—Nationalism

Nationalism breeds distrust—prevents support for burden sharing

Kluth 19 [Andreas Kluth is a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion, was previously editor in chief of Handelsblatt Global and a writer for the Economist, “A European Army? It’ll Never Happen,” Dec 2, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-12-02/a-european-army-will-never-happen-nato-remains-essential]

The complications that caused that stillbirth linger. The nations in what is now the European Union still care about their sovereignty, which is expressed above all in the decision to send young soldiers into harm’s way. They also have different interests. The French are busy in their former African colonies. The Poles and Balts feel most threatened by Russia. Germany, caring not a whit about all that, is merrily building itself a second gas pipeline to Russia, circumventing the eastern EU.

2022 Michigan Evidence

Deficit—Say No—Domestic Politics

Say No—Domestic politics and faith in US security guarantee

Zannella, 20 [Anthony Zannella Seton Hall University, majored in Political Science and Philosophy, 4-7-2020 "An Analysis of Burden Sharing in NATO and the Problem of Free Riding," Political Analysis: Vol. 21 , Article 5, /alundy]

The literature on burden sharing has shown great development over the years moving from a more pecuniary focus, to a focus that incorporates a variety of inconspicuous factors. From a deterrence and pure public goods standpoint, the United States is bearing an unfair share of the burden. The simple fact that it is leading the way economically (and in turn with the efficiency and effectiveness of its forces) shows that non-U.S. NATO allies are indeed benefitting unfairly from its ally’s efforts. The decline in NATO allied defense spending indicates the acceptance of relying on U.S. capabilities and letting their own forces bear less of the financial responsibility associated with collective defense. However, the simplicity of this model does not consider other factors that can be just as important to burden sharing. The joint product model would seem to take better account of factors that do not seem immediately pertinent to burden sharing but are without a doubt just as important. The dedication of alliance forces can produce strain in a political manner due to the potential loss of life and the ramifications such losses can have back home. Furthermore, the introduction of excludable goods levels the playing field in different ways. The massive output of defense provided by the U.S., incurs significant benefits that are only a positive for the U.S. alone. The expansion of the defense industry, for example, can provide jobs and further stimulate the U.S. economy; however, this is a good that other nations cannot benefit from directly. This same idea can be redirected back to non-U.S. NATO allies. Many of them intend to focus more on domestic issues at home while letting their forces weaken under the greater protection of the United States. With new threats on the rise and a turn to out-of-area operations, it becomes apparent that if the U.S. “is able to provide politically or physically sufficient levels of security for the rest of NATO’s members in response… then other members can free ride and will provide little additional assistance. Therefore, we should expect even more free riding than in the past,” (Siegel 2009).

2022 Michigan Evidence

Deficit—Say No—Cost

Say no—defense spending is too costly

Wohlforth 16 (William C. Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government in the Dartmouth College Department of Government, “The Right Choice for NATO,” This chapter will appear in: Sustainable Security: Rethinking American, National Security Strategy, edited by Jeremi Suri and Benjamin Valentino, )

A further, critical implication of this assessment of the strategic environment is rarely noted: it is entirely inconsistent with shock therapy’s assumption about the lack of serious threats to European security to say that calling the United States’ Article 5 commitment into question will cause European governments step up and create more military capacity via increased spending or cooperation. On the contrary, a relatively benign security setting is arguably more conducive to allowing (p.260) narrow national perspectives to trump EU-wide initiatives and to foster the continuation of minimalist defense efforts than the status quo of US leadership. America’s NATO allies make up nearly a fifth of global military spending. Britain is the fourth biggest military spender in the world, with France close behind (after another US ally, Japan) as sixth. Germany, Italy, Turkey, and Canada all rank among the world’s fifteen biggest spenders.41 Very secure states like Norway and Canada purchase sophisticated weaponry from the US military-industrial complex and order their soldiers into battle in America’s wars in far off lands. Why? A major reason is the alliance with the United States—it is the existence of the overseas hegemon and the perceived need to retain access to it and standing with it that drive much of this behavior.42

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › Materiality Good

Material action paves the way for a post-colonial future which breaks down the settler-native binary and gives natives autonomy in policy

Bashir and Busbridge, 18. [Bashir Bashir, Ph.D., London School of Economics and a senior lecturer in the department of sociology, political science and communication at the Open University of Israel and a research fellow at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute. Rachel Busbridge, Ph.D., and has held research positions at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, La Trobe University and Freie Universitaet Berlin as an Alexander von Humboldt Postdoctoral Research Fellow, and has taught sociology and politics at al-Quds University, al-Quds Bard College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of South Australia, Deakin University and Swinburne. 04-09-2018. “The Politics of Decolonisation and Bi-Nationalism in Israel/Palestine” (Political Studies), vol. 67, no. 2, May 2019, pp. 388–405, doi:10.1177/0032321718767029.]//Don Markos

Theorising Decolonisation For all its attached redemptive prospects and radical possibilities, it is important to emphasise that the meanings of decolonisation as both a concept and political project are not just broad, but also multifaceted and highly contested. What it means to ‘undo’ colonialism is deeply contextual (Jansen and Osterhammel, 2017). While colonialism can be defined broadly as a relationship of domination in which a people or territory is politically and economically subjugated to a foreign power, actual colonial situations vary quite widely from each other, depending on, among others, the particular political systems instituted to maintain control, types of exploitation and expropriation (resources, labour, plantations), relationship between the metropole and colony and patterns of migration they compel (slavery, settlement). Projects of decolonisation accordingly take different forms even if they are united by the common concern of ending or overturning structures of domination instituted by colonialism, which has historically taken place mostly through the withdrawal of colonial powers and achievement of independence for the colonised (Buchanan, 2010). Decolonisation speaks to the aspiration of self-rule and its concomitant critique of colonialism as the ‘systematic denial of freedom’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 6) and is therefore entangled with a variety of concerns, namely, self-determination, justice, equality, freedom and solidarity against colonialism and imperialism. As Todd Shepherd (2006: 3–4) writes, decolonisation is ‘a much wider concept than the mere “winning of Independence” or “transfer of power”… It entails the exploration of dreams, the analysis of struggles, compromises, pledges and achievements, and the rethinking of fundamentals’. Traditional literature on decolonisation approached it in terms of the historical process that began in the immediate aftermath of World War Two in which countries previously under (typically European) foreign rule transitioned to constitutional independence (Buchanan, 2010). Decolonisation was one of the most significant developments of the twentieth century, radically changing the face of the globe from one in which a small number of empires had dominion over some 80% of the earth’s surface to an international order based on the principle of self-determination and made up of ostensibly independent states (Hopkins, 2008). Scholars in this tradition have done much to illuminate the wide-reaching structural transformations that accompanied decolonisation, including the emergence of anti-colonial and national liberation struggles at the turn of the century, shifts in world economy that made the maintenance of traditional forms of Empire increasingly difficult, the development of a ‘Third World’ political project and the institutionalisation of human and civic rights principles that rendered systems based on ideas of racial and ethnic superiority less viable (Hopkins, 2008: 216). Yet, the focus on transition has been critiqued for its narrowness insofar as it seems to take for granted the meanings of self-determination and temporally restricts decolonisation to the moment of national liberation. Postcolonial scholars, among others, have been at the forefront of this charge, arguing that decolonisation did not produce a postcolonial world per se, but rather one that continues to be shaped in significant ways by the legacies of European colonialism (e.g. Spivak, 1999). As Ella Shohat (1992) has argued, there is no way of turning back from the world colonialism set in play nor did colonial modes of domination end with the formal period of decolonisation. From this broadened perspective, decolonisation is the difficult task of tracing the economic, political, social, cultural, relational and linguistic consequences of colonialism and is therefore also an ongoing imaginative project seeking ‘a new form of consciousness and way of life’ (Pieterse and Parekh, 1995: 3) beyond the coloniality of modern modes of culture, identity and knowledge more generally. While the transitional focus of conventional scholarship is quite illuminating in the contexts of Africa and Asia, for example, it furthermore excludes a great many decolonisation efforts that have taken place and continue to take place in other regions. This includes countries that remained dependent or only achieved semi-independence as dominions, decolonising projects carried out in territories never formally under colonial rule (the Iranian Revolution, for instance) and – as is particularly important to our discussion here – settler colonies that only partially decolonised, whether by way of loosening ties with the Motherland or achieving independence, but which continue to dominate substantial indigenous populations (Hopkins, 2008). There is a significant lacuna in the decolonisation literature when it comes to settler colonialism, which has increasingly been recognised as a distinct form of colonial practice – and one that is particularly resistant to decolonisation (Veracini, 2007). As the transfer of an exogenous population to a territory they intend to claim as their permanent home, settler colonialism establishes quite a different structural relationship to ‘traditional’ forms of colonialism, especially when settler colonial projects succeed in creating a state (Bateman and Pilkington, 2011). Rather than governing native peoples in order to extract resources for economic gain, settler colonisers instead aim to ‘seize their land and push them beyond an ever-expanding frontier of settlement’ (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 2). For Patrick Wolfe (2006), what distinguishes settler colonialism is thus that it is guided by a logic of elimination as opposed to a logic of exploitation, wherein the eradication of indigenous presence is essential to the success of settler colonial projects. The primacy of national liberation in the literature makes it especially difficult to imagine, let alone theorise, decolonisation in many settler colonial contexts. Whereas some settler colonial projects like Algeria and Kenya saw decolonisation by way of a mass settler exodus, paving the way for the establishment of independent states, the more successful ones established permanent settler communities (e.g. Northern Ireland) or their own states (e.g. Australia, Canada, the United States) which preclude a simple transition from foreign rule to sovereign status (Veracini, 2007). This is of course not to say that self-determination of the type aspired to by anti-colonial national movements was an easy or even necessarily achievable task. As Kohn and McBride (2011) suggest, in pursuing the dream of self-rule, anti-colonial thinkers had to reckon with the difficulties of articulating alternative political foundations that would make for a genuinely self-determining polity, an enormous task which demands decolonising of minds as much institutions and territory (see Fanon, 2001[1963]). Decolonisation must pursue a convincing ‘break’ between a colonial past and a postcolonial future ‘through decisive action in the present’; it must also ‘seek to reinterpret the past in such a way that it may help in the present and future struggle for self-rule’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 19). While these pursuits are invariably contingent, partial and commonly symbolic, national liberation struggles very often provide the fodder for a reinterpreted past that is robustly positive and the establishment of an independent state serves as that aspired for ‘break’. Settler colonial contexts, especially those where indigenous peoples live as minorities in settler states, make these types of symbolic transitions challenging, as they do the imagining of postcolonial alternatives. If the narrative structure of colonialism is circular (leave, stay, return), making that symbolic break possible, settler colonial narratives are linear insofar as the settler comes to stay and the line continues on unbroken (Veracini, 2007). As Ann Curthoys (1999: 288) writes, settler colonial spaces are simultaneously colonial and postcolonial, colonising and decolonising, which makes decolonisation temporally ambivalent at best. Lorenzo Veracini (2007) suggests that there are only two alternatives to settler evacuation for decolonising settler colonial forms and it is dubious whether one of these counts as decolonisation at all: the decolonisation of relationships through ‘the promotion of various processes of Indigenous reconciliation’ or the maintenance of the status quo ‘with the explicit rejection of the possibility of reforming the settler body politic’. Again, what the former might mean is often vague, and historically it is the decolonisation of relationships that is hardest to come by considering the psychological consequences of colonialism for coloniser and colonised alike (Memmi, 1965). Like traditional forms of colonialism, settler colonialism was legitimated by a belief in the colonised’s racial and cultural inferiority. However, the specific settler colonial pursuit of land seizure compels additional stereotypes of native peoples or unique applications of existing colonial ones, wherein their supposed inferiority makes them ill-equipped to develop that land (pre-modern, nomadic, barbaric) or, alternatively, voids any claims to ownership (terra nullius). In other words, settler colonialism is as much premised on the denial of indigenous peoples as a political constituency with rights to land as it is their purported inferiority, which is typically enshrined in their status as second-class citizens with all the economic, cultural and social disadvantage this entails (Bateman and Pilkington, 2011: 3). Given that settler societies are marked by ‘pervasive inequalities, usually codified in law, between native and settler populations’ which preserve political and economic privileges for the latter (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 4), decolonising relationships demands structural changes that often encounter significant resistance from settler constituencies. Likewise, it requires a reckoning with historical injustice – specifically violence and conflict at the colonial frontier – that is challenging for settler states and populations because it opens questions of settler identity, privileges, legitimacy and reparations and expressly seeks to scrutinise disavowed and long suppressed histories. Settler colonial decolonisation is thus complicated by a multitude of hurdles, which bring the postcolonial caution of the impossibility of a ‘break’ into stark relief. Kohn and McBride (2011) suggest that decisive action in the present is essential to decolonisation, but in settler colonial contexts this is hindered by power discrepancies between settler and native constituencies, a general lack of settler political will to enter into difficult processes of historical introspection as well as the constraining of Indigenous claims within the settler state. Indeed, even a commitment to a postcolonial polity as expressed through processes of historical reconciliation often encounters strong resistance when it comes to judicial, constitutional or legislative change genuinely decolonised relationships would demand. Nevertheless, even if it remains difficult to comprehensively imagine the decolonisation of ‘settler societies vis-à-vis Indigenous constituencies’ (Veracini, 2007), the central question must be how to construct political foundations which simultaneously acknowledge ‘the practices of racism, violence and subordination’ (Kohn and McBride, 2011: 18) that preceded them while also paving the way for a postcolonial future in which natives and settlers are equal parties and share the right to narrate the polity. Equality, freedom and justice may come from legally enshrining Indigenous rights to self-determination or, alternatively, doing away with the categories of ‘settler’ and ‘native’ altogether (Mamdani, 2001). What shape such efforts are likely to take depends, among others, on the ‘size and tenacity’ of Indigenous populations as well as the power of the settler constituency (Elkin and Pedersen, 2005: 3, 6). But we would suggest that the measure to which they may be thought of as decolonising rests on the robustness of the relationship they envision and the space they carve for equal membership in and to a postcolonial polity.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › Perm

Perm solves- only working through jurisdiction solves decolonization

Buchanan 17 (Brenton, Society and Space Organization, “Lumpy Space, Colonial Place: Jurisdiction As Infrastructure And (Post)Colonial Place Making In The Marshall Islands”, https://www.societyandspace.org/articles/lumpy-space-colonial-place-jurisdiction-as-infrastructure-and-post-colonial-place-making-in-the-marshall-islands)

In their work, both Lauren Benton and Shiri Pasternak examine the fluidity of legal relationships through conceptions of jurisdiction which overlap, entangle, and shift over time. As Pasternak explains, seeing “jurisdiction as a spatial category… [allows] for the examination of the production of colonial space through the work of jurisdiction” (emphasis mine. 2014: 147) Pasternak’s geographic lens positions law and space as political, as contested categories that come together in constituting colonial claims to authority; to colonial jurisdiction over others. As a result, layers of colonial and imperial authority “become thicker or thinner as peoples’ movements through space produce new arrangements and negotiations of power,” (Pasternak, 2014: 149) bringing with them further systems of domination. As unevenly asserted and applied across space and time, jurisdiction-as-infrastructure opens up a refutation of the completeness of the colonial project. Infrastructure, in this sense, is understood not only as a ‘structure,’ but also as ‘process’; one that works to produce other systems and relations. This perspective highlights the productive aspects of jurisdiction, rather than accepting legal authority and law as removed from the space they claim. Instead, when framed as infrastructure, jurisdiction is shown to be a process of “overlapping authority claims between Indigenous, state, regional, and private interests, and it can help parse the ways in which these jurisdictional encounters produce colonial space” (Pasternak, 2014: 146). The importance of this emphasis on process and production is that, even as laws are instituted and legal systems established, jurisdiction forms its necessary and underlying infrastructure; “the power to speak the law” (Pasternak, 2014: 148). Jurisdiction-as-infrastructure highlights this claim-making, opening up law and legal authority as a contested category. Mentioned above, this approach refuses an acceptance of “law” as a pre-spatial category, positioning instead not only the content of the law but its claim to applicability over a given space as something that must be established, and therefore maintained. As such, law is produced through claims to jurisdiction, and by situating it as such in the colonial process reveals uneven and contested geographies of power. Law, legal systems, and the authority to impose them become highly historicized objects, ones that are spatially and relationally contingent in their production, enactment, and perpetuation. Through examining jurisdiction as infrastructure then, colonial and imperial authority not only become, but already are, contested and contestable claims. By asserting that legal authority is continually produced, the voices of Indigenous claims and contestations become themselves jurisdictional “lumps that betray patterns of partial and uneven state sovereignty” (Pasternak, 2014: 148). The singular authority that colonial powers claim is instead unsettled and made to compete. This framework importantly resists the perspective of the fatal impact theory, wherein the colonial encounter produces a terminal “historical descent into a state of nothingness and hopelessness” (Smith, 1999: 88) of Indigenous cultures and peoples, as well as reduction of the colonized to “the concept of “bare lives” … [withdrawing] all form of agency from the bodies targeted by this violence” (Lambert, 2017: 13). Its spatial qualities belie the finality of colonial authority, as the emphasis on the power “to speak” the law, rather than the law itself, allows for non-colonial and non-state forms of authority to be recognized. Jurisdiction works as a process over time to establish and claim authority over space. As necessarily contingent, relational, and historical, for this short intervention an examination of the long imperial/colonial history of the Marshall Islands reveals some of the ways that jurisdiction takes on “a quality of lumpiness” (Benton, 2005: 701). At the same time the contemporary work of the Nuclear Claims Tribunal (NCT), established under the Compact of Free Association (COFA), opens up space to discuss both the possibilities of resistance through jurisdictional claims and the incompleteness of the postcolonial project. Moving from infrequent economic exchange with Spain (established through the Treaty of Tordesillas, 1594), German interests in the islands were recognized in 1885. However, their relationship with the islands was primarily established in 1878 through a treaty with one local chief, granting them exclusive use of a Jaluit Atoll harbor and trading privileges. The combination of inter-imperial and German-indigenous relations positions, even tacitly, indigenous jurisdiction over access and use of island harbors and resources on a relatively even plane with imperial claims. Yet, in 1914, when the Japanese seized the Marshall Islands from Germany during WWI, it was not a renegotiation of a treaty between the new imperial power and local chiefs, but rather seizure of one empire’s land and transference of control to another. Viewed as a German protectorate, the shifted context meant that since “a state of war existed between… nations… therefore the takings were legal” (emphasis mine. Benton, 2005: 705). As inter-imperial conflict, the transfer from German to Japanese possession overlapped with German-Indigenous treaties. As the former did not require a reconsideration of the latter, it implicitly arranges them in a hierarchical legal relationship. Centering jurisdiction as infrastructure, Japanese claims over Germany’s imperial relation to the Marshall Islands is temporarily troubled. If this “transfer” is something necessarily produced, then by what authority does Japan claim possession of the Marshall Islands, especially considering the German-Marshall relationship was negotiated directly with local Islander authority? Rather, these transfers should be seen less as a shifting of powers but a cementing of certain legal relationships that works to produce a privileging of imperial and colonial claims over those of indigenous peoples. This did not equate in a complete erasure, as much as the imperial/colonial project might desire, but rather a layering on of different dominating relations. This fungibility of (imperial) authority shifted not necessarily under the auspices of a single imperial power, but rather across powers through imperial jurisdictional understandings and transitions through conquest. In this way, “territory… was constructed not just for empire but also in empire, and at its margins” (Benton, 2005: 701). Divesting the Marshallese of authority was not a foregone conclusion, but one produced out of the very practice of empire. When the United States defeated Japan in the islands in 1944, assertion of authority over the Islands in 1945 was in this sense a claim less in relation to the Marshallese peoples, but rather against the Japanese empire. Perhaps an irony of this shifting web of jurisdiction between imperial powers is found in a statement from the UN in 1947 (itself newly established and working to assert its own claims to authority) made to declare the Marshalls a trust territory of the U.S. Not only was this the only trusteeship “designated as a “strategic” territory,” granting greater latitude over the securitization of the region, but the UN declared the responsibility of the U.S. to “protect the inhabitants… against the loss of their lands and resources” (emphasis mine. Barker, 2013: 22). This language implies a form of ownership by the Marshallese over the islands, yet positions it as a subordinate claim to the paternalistic oversight of the U.S. This reflexive maneuvering of possession and authority constitutes a “cynical grounds for recognition” that “also entrenched the subordination of Indigenous societies” (Pasternak, 2014: 159). Through representing Marshallese possession of their islands, U.S. (and UN) authority is asserted, structured, and simultaneously folds Marshallese claims under this oversight. Though a shifting terrain, this post-World War II legal relationship is predicated on preceding imperial ones, and their own claims to “speak the law” in Marshallese lands. The infrastructure of inter-imperial jurisdiction becomes productive of US claims to the islands, as seized from Imperial Japan, as well as the UN’s claim to be able to designate a certain kind of authority over them. The long historical process started with infrequent Spanish trading, when understood though conceptions of jurisdiction over the islands reveals the long production of the islands as colonial space, privileging (primarily) Western imperial authority over Indigenous claims over their land. This imperial history of the Marshalls forms the centuries long preamble and pretext that established a legal context wherein the United States could be “granted” the Islands as a strategic territory under their trusteeship; pursuing sixty-six nuclear tests between 1946-1963 and ongoing ballistic missile testing in the islands. As the Cold War continued, the Marshallese of various communities sent petitions through both US and UN channels to protest and improve their position under US “strategic” oversight. Understanding these within the productive infrastructure of jurisdiction, American legal authority and aspects of the colonial dynamic are brought into question through both an invocation of UN authority, and the very voices of the Islanders who petition, protest, and contest. Within a broader framework of Cold War decolonial movements, the basis of and imperial power to “speak the law” became increasingly troubled. In addition to gaining periodic concessions, tensions between indigenous movements and continued US investment in the Marshall Islands as a military (test) site culminated in the 1980s with negotiations for the COFA. As a victory for indigenous sovereignty this nominally recognizes Marshallese self-government even as it simultaneously perpetuates US military and colonial interests. Following jurisdiction through the COFA, the establishment of the NCT was to provide “jurisdiction to render final determination upon all claims past, present, and future” (Pevec, 2005) regarding the nuclear testing program. Given $150 million for these ends, Smith-Norris (2016: 40) notes how the “finality” of this agreement also resulted in the dismissal of all claims pending in the United States, as courts in the US were divested of jurisdictional authority over these matters. Although woefully underfunded, and the possibility of pursuing legal cases within US courts being denied, the findings of the NCT function as an avenue for pressuring the United States for further redress for the legacy of its testing program. It is noted (Smith-Norris, 2016: 41) that having awarded $341,049,311 in damages to the Enewetakese alone in 2000, the findings of the NCT are not immediately actionable (though payments are made as much as is possible). Instead, assessment of damages, processing of claims, and the power to speak the law in cases of redress for nuclear testing, contamination, and devastation has become a new lump in the US-Marshallese relationship. Though quickly running up against a limited budget, this shifting jurisdictional geography opens up a site of resistance as well as a look into the incomplete nature of decolonization. After an independent review of the NCT by former US Attorney General Richard Thornburgh in 2003 and a 2012 UN investigation into impacts of the testing program, the findings of the NCT comprise a mechanism of knowledge production about the legacies of nuclear contamination independent from US oversight. As the Marshallese continue to argue for adequate compensation through the NCT, examining jurisdiction as infrastructural process through which colonial and imperial authority can be asserted, its “return” through decolonization belies the uneven power dynamics and systems that continue to pervade colonizer/colonized relations. However, through the NCT and its claim to jurisdiction over damages due to the Marshallese people as a result of the United States’ nuclear testing and colonial domination, these contestations might be seen as more than an uneven power dynamic. These claims to authority by the NCT, and by extension the Marshallese people, are not simply petitions to US or UN law. They are themselves claims to sovereignty that are one part of a larger decolonial struggle, where the NCT’s jurisdiction produces a new vision and future for the Republic of the Marshall Islands. It seems true that the “decolonization” promised through the COFA and the establishment of the NCT is not a recognition of an originary, total jurisdiction, but a modified and contingent one that maintains other structures of domination. Just as jurisdiction opens a recognition of the process and contested nature of coloniality, as part of the postcolonial project it reveals its own incompleteness. The ability of the US to deny responsibility for the ongoing impacts of its nuclear colonialism and payment of damages concluded by the NCT makes clear that jurisdictional authority is but one of the necessary components for a true decolonization of the Marshall Islands. Yet employing it as a point of intervention can help reveal the contours of domination that make up the lumpiness of imperial and (post)colonial dynamics. For a historical approach, consideration of jurisdiction as infrastructure can help to make clear the long duration, and process, of imperial and colonial imposition and assertions of authority. Important to this is that jurisdiction as productive of the colonial context and relationship helps to set the stage for other forms and systems of power; jurisdiction does not travel alone. For the decolonizing process then, understanding it as infrastructure can reveal other forms of colonial persistence. Even as jurisdiction is “returned” or recognized in purportedly (de)colonized peoples, unequal power dynamics and neo-colonial systems persist through other forms. Being productive of colonial and imperial claims to authority, a site of contestation that “actively works to produce something” (Dorsett and McVeigh quoted in Pasternak, 2014: 151) it is also a process of multiple “things” in the making. Perhaps as an ethical statement, this framework also insists on hopeful potential and possibilities for decolonial struggles, even as it provides a valuable critical approach to understanding the complexities of colonial domination. Centering debates and claims worked out through jurisdiction can reveal both the production and persistence of colonialism, but also competing systems and visions of post- or de-colonial futures.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › State Good

The state is inevitable—engaging the state doesn’t necesarilly mean endorsing it—they devolves politics into a dogmatic void that the right will fill

Choat, 16—PhD in Political Science at Queen Mary University of London, member of the Political Studies Association, Senior Lecturer in the School of Economics, Politics, and History (Simon, “Marxism and anarchism in an age of neoliberal crisis,” )

The anarchist critique of Marxist organisational forms is unconvincing, then, because it does not acknowledge the diversity of Marxist approaches and it tends towards a theoreticism that sees a linear, causal, and continuous line from theory to practice. Nonetheless, there are significant differences of strategy between anarchism and Marxism: it is just that these are less to do with organisation as such, and are much more broadly to do with differing attitudes toward politics and the state. Although some (though by no means all) anarchists have supported formal political organisations, with rules, membership criteria, and even internal discipline (Schmidt and van der Walt 2009: 247-263), they have traditionally rejected any engagement with the state – whether it be voting, demanding legal rights or protections, forming political parties, or attempting the revolutionary seizure of government – on the basis that such engagement can only end up replicating the oppressive hierarchies that they are fighting: either it will lead to new forms of dictatorship and bureaucracy (such as developed in the Soviet Union); or it will lead to parliamentary reformism and hence merely reinforce existing structures and relations of power. If Marxists support (qualified) engagement with the state and even the formation of political parties, however, it is not because they think that centralised hierarchies are desirable or inevitable, but because they begin from a different understanding of politics. They argue that the anarchist abstention from state politics denies us the most effective means of political action: we disempower ourselves rather than the state when we refuse to engage with it. Making demands on the state does not necessarily entail an endorsement of the state, any more than the demands that are made by employees during a strike are an endorsement of the employer or of the system of wage-labour (Marx 1988). Anarchists themselves have at least implicitly recognised the efficacy of political engagement by occasionally supporting the policies of certain governments and even participating in elections (Engels 1988; Franks 2012: 216). More than this, abstention from state politics is not a genuine option: whether we like it or not, we are all already involved in state politics, because we are all always already submitted to state power, control, and oppression. Anarchists are concerned that participation in conventional politics will lead to parliamentary reformism. But this concern is itself ultimately premised on a tacit acceptance of the liberal-parliamentary understanding of politics: to claim that we can safely repudiate state politics simply by refusing ever to enter a polling booth is to assume that ‘the state’ stops at the door of Parliament. Marxists, in contrast, have argued that the state apparatus includes educational institutions, the media, churches, the family, and so on (e.g. Althusser 1971): simply in going about our daily lives we are all therefore implicated in state politics. Given our necessary involvement within politics, the question is not whether we engage with it, but how we do so; even libertarian Marxists like Holloway argue that engagement with the state is inevitable (Holloway 2005: 40). In contrast, the anarchist recommendation of disengagement from the state risks a politics of withdrawal and isolation. There are two related reasons why under our current conditions in particular the Marxist willingness to engage in state politics is preferable to an anarchist position. The first is the dominance of neoliberalism today. Given the strength of neoliberalism since the crisis that it created, there is a strong case for a certain pragmatism in our response. A danger of the prefigurative politics favoured by anarchists is that it dogmatically dictates an a priori exclusion of certain forms of political action. For Marxists, on the other hand, political strategies must be decided according to particular conditions and within a certain context. In a context in which private companies are increasingly undertaking tasks previously performed by the state, the active defence of state services and institutions can be viewed as a radical position to adopt: defending welfare provision, public pensions, universal healthcare, and free higher education should be seen not as a reformist compromise with the existing order but as safeguarding the gains of class struggle against capitalist processes of accumulation by dispossession. This leads to the second reason for doubting the refusal of state politics as a viable tactic under current conditions, which concerns the specific role of the state under neoliberalism. The anti-state politics of anarchism may have made sense during eras in which the state could plausibly be presented as the main threat to freedom and equality: during the period of nation-building and imperialistic expansion in the mid- to late-19th century, of the rise of fascism in the early-20th century, or even of the development of welfare capitalism after WWII. But it has far less purchase in an era in which neoliberalism, as both the official ideology and a form of everyday common sense, is anti-statist. Put simply, the attack on state power too easily echoes the rhetoric of neoliberalism itself (Taylor 2013: 735). When government actors themselves are explicitly endorsing the retreat of the state, then anarchist attacks on state power have limited efficacy either as a tactical call to arms or as a convincing analysis of our present conjuncture. In practice, of course, it is true that neoliberalism has not dissolved state power. But nor has the relation between state and capital remained the same under neoliberalism, such that our analyses, strategies, or rhetoric need not alter. The nature of this relationship between state and capital will be examined in the next section.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › State Good

Their understanding of the state as unified, immutable, and inevitably dangerous to Indigenous actors creates a pessimism trap that stifles Indigenous agency and activism.

Lightfoot, 20—associate professor in First Nations and Indigenous Studies and the Department of Political Science, University of British Columbia, Ojibwe (Sheryl, “The Pessimism Traps of Indigenous Resurgence,” Pessimism in International Relations, Chapter 9, pp 162-170, SpringerLink)

Pessimism Trap 2: The State is Unified, Deliberate and Unchanging in Its Desire to Dispossess Indigenous Peoples and Gain Unfettered Access to Indigenous Lands and Resources

In other words, colonialism by settler states is a constant, not a variable, in both outcome and intent. Further, the state is not only intentionally colonial, but it is also unifed in its desire to co-opt Indigenous peoples as a method and means of control.

2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › AT Thesis

Liberal democracy is self-reflexive and good

Youngs, Director-General FRIDE, ’11 [February 2011, Richard- Professor Politics University of Warwick, “Misunderstanding The Maladies Of Liberal Democracy Promotion” ] //Don Markos

Reflections on liberalism’s future Current international political trends are complex and still in flux. History shows that there are no iron laws of democratisation, and dominant political dynamics can prove strikingly changeable. The easy triumphalism of the liberal democracy agenda in the 1990s was misplaced. However, much criticism now risks over-shooting.18 The Bush administration provided an easy dog to kick. But its excessive awfulness skewered the nature of conceptual debate: critical theory has become as lacking in self-reflexivity as the ‘liberal imperialism’ it everywhere sees and excoriates. A nuanced view is warranted of the ‘democracy backlash’.19 We should be attentive to a lack of flexibility in the conceptualisation of democracy. The consideration of a variety of models is necessary and desirable. However, the evidence does not sustain the suggestion that the most serious problem with democracy promotion today is an excess of the ‘liberal’ in liberal democracy. Indeed, in many places quite the reverse is true. The most worrying problem is not practitioners’ lack of willingness to consider varieties of democratic institutions, but the lack of priority attached to advancing core liberal rights. As Western powers decline, this trend is likely to deepen in the future. Liberalism will increasingly be on the back foot. In this sense, those that assume that liberalism is dominant risk lagging behind the policy curve. Dahl’s definition of democracy may be partial and narrow, but can we really not say with confidence that it is better than the authoritarianism that the West is still propping up under the guise of respect for ‘local values’? Moreover, the ‘liberal overdose’ argument is curious to the extent that since the end of the 1990s a central thrust of debate common to development, security and governance circles has been ‘the rediscovery of the state’. The stress on core liberal political norms is today under- not over-played. It continues to be the centrally important area where local reformers look to the international community for support – most commonly, in vain. Deliberations over precise institutional configurations and second-generation reforms are of a lesser order of importance. Michael McFaul observes that some debates about the intricate sequencing of reform and different varieties of institutional pathways look incongruous, as the US can today do little to influence such details, but rather simply back core democratic values.20 Yet it still hesitates to do so, for all the standard commentary on US ‘liberal imperialism’. Liberal internationalism is still de-legitimised by the pervasive assumption that it is concerned primarily with mobilising military force in support of democratic values; it must be made clearer that military power is simply anathema to the standard day-to-day agenda of democracy support. There are different levels of critique, which risk elision. One thing is to argue that Western powers should support core liberal democratic principles, then from this base work to build into their policies a concern with social equality, participation, deliberation and religious identity. It would be entirely convincing to argue that, while democracy promoters have advanced, they could and should be doing more in this direction. But it is quite another thing to suggest that such aims should be supported against or instead of core liberal norms. In practice, what many critics appear to advocate is not a cumulative combination, but a dilution of the liberal component in favour of other forms. They betray a core inconsistency: they dislike democracy promotion for being overly intrusive, but then advocate modifications that would make it more, not less, intrusive. This is because most suggested ‘alternative forms of democracy’ breach the line between process and substantive policy outputs – they advocate particular ends, not just a type of policy-making means. The concrete examples of European policies demonstrate that it is hardly credible to ‘accuse’ Brussels of being an unthinking citadel of blinkered liberalism. Indeed, in this author’s experience, conversations with policy-makers reveal this to be akin to an almost unmentionable L-word. When so much doubt and ambivalence now suffuses democracy support strategies, it is unconvincing to admonish the latter for being uniformly, heavily prescriptive. Donors’ tendency to see democracy through the prism of their own political systems still often surfaces. But in terms of the way that the ‘democracy’ in democracy support is defined conceptually it would seem somewhat redundant now to warn donors of the dangers of heavily-prescriptive institutional templates. There is some evidence of the self-reflexive policy-learning on the part of democracy promotion practitioners that many critics assume is entirely lacking. Indeed, genuine doubt over the most suitable paths forward has reached the point where some actors’ policies are reduced to immobilism. The problem is that while policy-relevant knowledge has accumulated, it has done so in an ad hoc fashion and has not been systematised into common or comprehensive new approaches.21 The influences on democracy strategy of academic traditions are eclectic. If we were to trace the philosophical roots of European good governance and democracy support policies, it is simply not the case that Locke prevails over all else. The breadth of democracy assistance programmes goes way beyond the Schumpeterian. The stress on the role of the state and the existential identity-value of the political community found in many current policy initiatives finds resonance (if unconsciously) in thinking that historically stood as the antithesis to political liberalism. Such a line can be traced from Aristotle’s view of the political community as a biological organism; to Rousseau’s insistence that the general will embodies a mystical, spiritual collective identity of the political community above and beyond the will of the majority; through to Hegel’s system centred on the state as the organic embodiment of collective interests and identity, the ‘absolute’ within which the individual finds his very meaning. This is not to say any such strand of thinking would capture entirely the ideas that inform today’s foreign policies. However, the pertinent point is that the underpinnings of these policies can be seen in writers who were in combat with Lockean liberalism. The standard European discourse on equality being more important than formal political democracy has a direct echo in (politically) anti-liberal Rousseau. Concerns over the ‘tyranny of the majority’ that inform power-sharing strategies in post-conflict situations have a long line of antecedent philosophers who inveighed strongly against the will of the majority, from Aristotle through even to Kant (who was concerned with the republican separation of executive and legislation but certainly not with augmenting popular power against the aristocracy). Even Benthamite radical utilitarianism shines through, in its concern with a strong rule of law to restrain individual freedoms and ensure greater equality in the furtherance of collective interests. If any modern philosopher is the thinker of choice for today’s discerning Eurocrat it is Habermas, not the classic liberals. In general, deliberative democracy has been most widely advocated as a means of situating abstract cosmopolitan universalism within concrete and varied social settings.22 And all this is quite apart from the more obvious cases of cynical realpolitik that take their cue from the more violent illiberalism of Machiavelli and Hobbes.23 It is self-evident that liberal democracy now shares the conceptual field with rivals in a way that it did not in the 1990s. This may provide for vibrant debate and much-needed selfexamination. But it does not necessarily mean that alternatives have superior legitimacy. Allowing analytic space for a wider variety of forms and definitions of democracy does not mean that sovereign democracy, Islamic democracy, tribal democracy or Bolivarian democracy are necessarily superior or more in tune with local demands. With the West accused of being overly-prescriptive of a liberal form of democracy, it would be subversive of the critique to jump straight into advocating other pre-cooked forms. It should be remembered that a form such as social democracy is just as ‘Western’ in it origins as liberal democracy: there is no reason a priori to assume that it corresponds more closely to ‘local demands’ in the way that is routinely and rather uncritically suggested (however one may oneself desire socially democratic outcomes). If the ascendance of conceptual competitors can add usefully to the parameters of desirable political reform, it is not incompatible with this that they should at the same time sharpen the West’s defence of core liberalism. Critical theorists skate a thin line: they issue pleas for a rethinking of democracy, but scratch beneath the surface and what they really lionise is undemocratic state-led development; theirs is in fact not a genuine concern with reconceptualising democracy so much as a pretty wholesale questioning of the democracy agenda, dressed up in softened discourse. A central pivot of many such critiques is the criticism of liberalism’s teleological arrogance. But this centres too much on one influential book published at one rather distinctive moment in time24; liberalism more broadly and properly understood is not teleology. Moreover, many writers argue against teleology and prescription but then in the next breath confidently assert that social democracy must be a superior and more acceptable form of democracy outside the West and one which has a more sustainable long-term future. This may be the case, but they have no philosophical justification for saying so without replicating the very same methodological features they profess to dislike in ‘liberal’ tenets – and thus contradicting themselves. Clearly, more debate about different forms of political representation would be healthy. Allowing space for a plurality of routes to and types of political reform would sit well with the core spirit of democracy. However, while more flexibility and open mindedness are still required in democracy promotion, there is a risk of being unduly defensive about the virtues of liberal democracy’s core tenets. The problem in many places of the world is the absence of liberalism’s core values, not their excess. Vigilance in the need for democracy’s reconceptualisation is indeed merited. But it would be a muddled reasoning that took this to provide a case for the wholesale pull back from the (already anaemic) support for liberal democracy’s notion of fundamental political rights. We need more fully to understand local demands. But there is an automatic assumption routinely made that such demands are for more diverse, anti-liberal political forms. This may in many places be the case, but the evidence must be assembled. One cannot simply assert this as if it were axiomatic to the emerging world order; there is no reason for supposing a priori that this is a natural outcome of the rebalancing of international order. The evidence that exists points, again, to a more nuanced conclusion: a demand for the essential tenets of liberal universalism, made relevant to and expressed through the language and concepts of local cultures and histories. A growing focus within political philosophy has been on ‘capabilities’: negative liberal freedoms need to be deepened but also combined with the locally-rooted capabilities that ensure their effective realisation.25 The central thrust of Locke’s liberalism was anti-dogmatism and prudence. The irony – and, for anyone concerned over democracy’s health, the tragedy – is that international support for a supposedly liberal democratic agenda is today associated with exactly the opposite of these values. It is the non-dogmatic spirit that liberalism must work to recover: liberal democracy as a system that (simply) creates space for a variety of different local choices. Advocates and opponents of liberalism are trapped in a circular debate over this matter: while core liberal freedoms are required to make such local choices, critics insist that those very liberal rights are themselves a corruption of local autonomy. The imperative is not for liberalism to cede to other creeds, but to work towards squaring the circle that has always existed at its heart: that is, liberalism is in its very essence the rejection of utopian political design, yet, if not pursued with care, it can appear as an unbending utopia. This defines its challenge: can liberalism stand convincingly as an anti-utopian creed whose own propulsion requires courageous normative conviction? Can it strike the Rawlsian balance of deepening a plurality of values without descent into relativism?