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2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › Extend – Harms - Human Dignity

2. Hope – Autonomous AI weapons deny dignity because algorithmic decisions deny Hope, which is essential to dignity.

Heyns, 2016 - Professor of Human Rights Law, University of Pretoria [Christof, Human Rights Quarterly 38 (2016) 350–378 “ Human Rights and the use of Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) During Domestic Law Enforcement” Acc 12/27/20 TA]

The interrelated considerations of time and hope play a role in this context. One of the problems presented by computer algorithms that determine when AWS will be allowed to release force is that they do so in advance, on the basis of hypotheticals, while there is no true and pressing emergency rendering such a far-reaching decision unavoidable. Even if it may be permissible in a real emergency to take far-reaching measures, it does not follow that such decisions can be taken in the abstract. Decisionmaking by politicians and scientists about the life and limb of people based on theoretical possibilities contemplated in the halls of the legislature or laboratories risks trivializing the issues at stake. Hypotheticals such as the ticking-bomb scenario present the same kind of problem. It makes crossing the threshold of using force against another human being too easy. The statute authorizing the shooting down of the plane, struck down in the German Air Security case cited above, had a similar quality—it authorized in advance, in the abstract, the ending of the lives of imaginary passengers. This seems to fly in the face of the requirement that the use of force against a human being should be a measure of last resort.97 Hope, often against the odds, is an important part of our psychological makeup and dealing with the harshness of reality.98 A sentence of life without parole, for example, like the death penalty, can be seen as a violation of dignity because it means “writing off” the person, not leaving open the possibility of hope. The possibility of a deliberative process somewhere down the line, where a change of mind and fate is possible, is ruled out in advance by the introduction of AWS if human control is sacrificed in the process A world in which death comes with the certainty of science, with no prospect, however farfetched, of a last minute change of plan, or the possibly of human compassion—what may be called humanitarian override—offers little room for hope. Hope in this sense—and thus dignity—may be one of the casualties of AWS.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › Extend – Harms - Human Dignity

1. Inhumanity – AI cannot respect human dignity because it cannot know the value of life because it is not alive.

Docherty, 2014 - senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch [Bonnie “Shaking the Foundations The Human Rights Implications of Killer Robots” Human Rights Watch http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ arms0514_ForUpload_0.pdf Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Fully autonomous weapons would possess the power to kill people yet be unable to respect their dignity. As inanimate machines, they could truly comprehend neither the value of individual life nor the significance of its loss. Allowing them to make determinations to take life away would thus conflict with the principle of dignity.82 Critics of fully autonomous weapons have expressed serious moral concerns related to these shortcomings. In his 2013 report to the Human Rights Council, Christof Heyns, the special rapporteur on extrajudicial killing, wrote, [A] human being somewhere has to take the decision to initiate lethal force and as a result internalize (or assume responsibility for) the cost of each life lost in hostilities, as part of a deliberative process of human interaction…. Delegating this process dehumanizes armed conflict even further and precludes a moment of deliberation in those cases where it may be feasible. Machines lack morality and mortality, and should as a result not have life and death powers over humans.83 Heyns described this issue as an “overriding consideration” and declared that if fully autonomous weapons are found morally unacceptable, “no other consideration can justify the deployment of [fully autonomous weapons], no matter the level of technical competence at which they operate.”84

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › Harms – Crisis Instability

A lack of human control undermines accountability, which entangles NATO in conflicts initiated by AI.

Hill and Marsan, 2018 - Director and Senior Assistant, NATO Office of Legal Affairs [Steven and Nadia, 7-18-18 “Artificial Intelligence and Accountability: A Multinational Legal Perspective” https://www.sto.nato.int/publications/STO%20Meeting%20Proceedings/STO-MP-IST-160/MP-IST-160-PP-4.pdf Acc 4/21/22 TA]

4.0 ACCOUNTABILITY OF AI-ENABLED TECHNOLOGY International and domestic law offers some tools to cope with the effects of AI-enabled weapons from a multinational collective defense perspective. New technology does not necessarily require new laws and it is not the aim of this paper to propose the creation of new legal frameworks. The applicable legal framework will depend on the technology used and on the actual and potential effects caused by that technology and can include various national laws, human rights law, the law of state responsibility, international humanitarian law and the law of armed conflict. With machines taking on the qualities of human intelligence, including perception, cognition and action, the issue of accountability for illegal acts performed by autonomous systems has dominated the debate. The issue is not so much what legal framework applies, but who is legally responsible for the effects of AI-enabled weapons. Accountability and Responsibility AI-enabled action that constitutes an “armed attack” within the sense of Article 51 of the UN Charter, could potentially set off the invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. Setting aside the issue of the threshold to be applied to determine whether an AI-enabled attack would constitute an “armed attack”, the preliminary question that would arise is that of attribution. After all, assigning responsibility for an armed attack is a necessary precondition to the use of self-defence measures. AI-enabled weapons challenge our traditional notions of responsibility: who can be held accountable for the effects of this technology, especially when fully autonomous? Can we even talk of a “legal personality” of AI-enabled systems? In this area, States have been rather clear in expressing the need for responsibility to be attributed to human beings.18 The international debates and discussions on the legal approach to take with respect to lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) provides a useful reference on the concept of “human control” where the substance of the debate has been how to regulate human-machine interaction, often referred to as “human-machine teaming”. The human role in independent machine decision-making can vary, as exemplified through the OODA loop of decision-making (Observe, Orient, Decide and Act).19 An “in the loop” system requires human intervention for its operation, an “on the loop” system provides for human intervention if needed, and an “out of the loop” system does not require human intervention at all, a prospect that is criticized by observers who have supported the concept of “minimum human control.” Privileging human judgment and accountability above mechanical efficiency, the United States, for example, has taken a clear stance towards asserting that a human being should always be kept in the decision-making loop for the use of LAWS, as the ultimate decider on the use of lethal force in the battlefield.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › Harms - Interoperability

Rapid US adoption of AI widens the NATO interoperability gap

Dufour 2018 - Colonel in the Canadian Army, currently working with NATO [Martin, NDC Policy Brief No. 6 December “Will artificial intelligence challenge NATO interoperability?” https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1239 Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

The true power of artificial intelligence however emerges when it is combined with other technologies to enable fully autonomous operations. Definitions of autonomous systems are varied, but all revolve around the concept of systems able to make autonomous decisions, independent of human operators, based on a self-constructed understanding of a situation, and with the ability to adapt to the changing environment at a speed unmatched by humans. This ability to learn and adapt without human input is the key distinction between today’s task-specific automated systems and fully autonomous systems. Once coupled to weapons systems such as uninhabited vehicles, or command and control apparatus, such autonomous systems could then herald a new era of warfare where the time required to collect and analyze large amounts of data, and make quick decisions in the face of rapidly evolving situations is greatly reduced, thereby providing a significant competitive advantage. This new era was called “hyper war” or “war at the speed of light” in a 2017 report on NATO Adaptation. 6 This report reveals that the United States, witnessing its technological advantages rapidly eroding, has embarked on a Third Offset Strategy, which heavily relies on the adoption of emerging disruptive technologies, and is already well on its way to adopting a range of capabilities including “robotics, system autonomy, miniaturization, scaling big data, artificial intelligence and deep learning”.7 The rapid development and adoption of such technologies has the potential to further widen the interoperability gap between NATO members.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › Harms - Interoperability

Asymmetric AI development undermines NATO interoperability

Dufour 2018 - Colonel in the Canadian Army, currently working with NATO [Martin, NDC Policy Brief No. 6 December “Will artificial intelligence challenge NATO interoperability?” https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1239 Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

Overcoming the interoperability gap It is evident that of the emerging disruptive technologies, none is likely to have as significant an impact on warfare as that of artificial intelligence. The effect of artificial intelligence is already being felt in numerous fields, and its further development and combination with other technologies will compound this, allowing the development of advanced autonomous systems. While the latter holds the promise of creating new classes of weapons with great military potential, disproportional growth among the various NATO allies could lead to complex interoperability problems, further widening the existing interoperability gap between member nations. Over the next two decades Alliance members will be increasingly challenged by the rapid evolution of artificial intelligence and risk becoming unable to operate together should the asymmetric adoption of emerging technologies not be carefully managed. It is therefore paramount that countries begin preparing for the future impact of artificial intelligence in the military realm, and start adopting the technology in niche areas to ensure they do not fall too far behind.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › Harms - Interoperability

Without coordination, adoption of AI by NATO will undermine interoperability as it becomes a zero sum competition between allies

Gilli, 2020 - Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College [Andrea, NDC Research Paper No.15 – December ““NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence” https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1514 Acc 4/21/22 TA]

What types of problem could emerge? Technology-generated efficiency gains in production lead to lower prices. However, lower prices lead to increases in demand – because the relative price of substitute goods (rivals) increases.76 Over the past decade, AI – and, in particular, ML – has made a particular activity, prediction, cheaper: it is reasonable to forecast that this trend will continue in the future.77 As AI becomes cheaper, however, the demand for AI-related services will increase, thus leading to more demand for related necessities like AI specialists, AI infrastructure (and 5G networks) and AI components (processors). This in turn might well lead to scarcity and higher prices, thus pitching actors against one another – not unlike the early stages of the COVID-19 crisis, when individual self-interested actions led to collectively bad outcomes.78 In the context of a military alliance, the problem goes much deeper, as it can generate a beggar-thy-neighbour effect with allies competing for the same scarce resources.79 Moreover, without consultation and cooperation, Allies could end up developing different technological solutions, with the risk of undermining compatibility and interoperability. Similarly, they could end up prioritizing some problems over others, with the risk of developing multiple, different and redundant solutions while neglecting other points in need of attention.80 However, through intra-alliance coordination and cooperation, as well as dialogue and consultation, secondary market mechanisms and other approaches, NATO could provide an important contribution to identify and address this type of problems.81

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › Harms - Interoperability

Uncoordinated adoption of AI systems undermines NATO interoperability, making miscalculation and accidents more likely.

Trabucco and Stanley-Lockman, 2022 – prof of Political Science, University of Copenhagen and prof of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University [Lena and Zoe, The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, March, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs” https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69 Acc 4/16/22 TA]

Even without being attacked, governability of AI in a NATO context also means understanding how AI-enabled and autonomous systems developed by the 30 Allies—and other partners—will interact with one another. NATO has expressed interest in governability as a principle of AI “to disengage or deactivate in case of unintended behavior,”85 which echoes the U.S. Department of Defense definition of governable AI.86 Disengaging adversaries is important to maintain de-escalation measures in conflict. For NATO, interoperability between systems also relates to governable AI because allies must also consider how the interactions between the 30 Allies’ own AI-enabled and autonomous systems may result in unintended or emergent behavior.87 This means that NATO has a responsibility to coordinate activities—be they technical exchanges, standardization efforts, or training and exercises—to build confidence that the systems perform as humans intend.88 Without this coordination, the lack of interoperability of allied systems could lead to accidents, and separately, the potential loss of operational effectiveness also presents vulnerabilities for adversaries to exploit. In addition to governability, NATO and its Allies are assessing the risks that bias, attacks, and lack of interpretability can introduce in relation to the anticipated uses of a given AI system.89 In security and defense, new and heightened risks include poisoning of the information environment, deception systems and techniques, uncertainty about the performance of systems in new and unknown environments, and the possibility that tensions or accidents escalate at a faster tempo than humans and institutions can process, among others. These risks can manifest either in motivated attacks or unintentional failure modes.90 In both cases, assuring and certifying that military assets are safe and secure is important given the inherently high risk in operational environments. These operational environments include the presumption that an adversary is disrupting one’s own systems, be it by directly attacking the AI systems themselves, or disrupting the broader command, control, and communications systems under which the AI systems are operating.91 Mitigating these types of risks is typically done in testing, evaluation, validation and verification (TEVV) and in experimentation activities.92 Yet AI cannot be validated and verified the way traditional software systems are because there is no guarantee that an AI system will perform in the real world as it does in a testing environment, and because lifelong-learning systems will perform differently over their lifecycle. Having robust assurance and TEVV processes in place are also important for operators to build trust in the systems they are meant to use, as well as for citizenries and coalition partners at large to see that accountability procedures still apply. As such, building institutional procedures to govern AI safety and security is necessary to build trust in the use of the technology—as well as to develop countermeasures and defensive systems that protect against adversarial threats. NATO thus has an institutional responsibility to prevent and mitigate these intentional and unintentional failures if using AI in operations and mission support.93 As Table 69.1 shows, the Alliance also has a range of relevant entities to coordinate national approaches to AI safety and security, as well as facilitate safety measures as part of responsible use in the Alliance-wide ecosystem.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › Harms – Cohesion

AI swarms will undermine human control, which destroys allied support for military operations.

Valášek, 2017 - director of Carnegie Europe [Tomáš August 31, “How Artificial Intelligence Could Disrupt Alliances” https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/72966 Acc 4/22/22 TA]

But the deployment of AI by allies carries its own political risk. While its use to defend networks or information integrity is widely accepted, AI’s military applications will introduce new tensions to alliances. The sense of equality and codecision among members could be at risk because of worries about accountability. When countries fight as a group they want to have a say in how that alliance prosecutes the war. But that becomes impossible if the fighting in the future is done by machines. While for now the United States has a policy of keeping a human “in the loop” on decisions to use lethal force, military tactics and technology keep evolving. As artificial intelligence becomes capable of tackling more complex tasks, the killing in the future may not be done by a single missile-armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) but, in the medium term, by swarms of UAVs that use AI to constantly adopt tactics and targeting in real time, leaving little time and space for human interference. This development might make allies more reluctant to join the fight in the first place. They would worry that if AI-directed weapons kill innocent civilians by mistake or inflict disproportional carnage, governments will be blamed despite having no control over the action itself.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › Harms – Cohesion

Interoperability is key to cohesion – it enables communication, intelligence and planning.

Dufour 2018 - Colonel in the Canadian Army, currently working with NATO [Martin, NDC Policy Brief No. 6 December “Will artificial intelligence challenge NATO interoperability?” https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1239 Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

What interoperability means Cohesion, often mentioned as the Alliance’s center of gravity, lies at the heart of NATO’s success. Underwriting this cohesion is the ability of member states to share the burden of producing military capabilities to service the whole, and the burden of conducting operational missions. To do this successfully, members have to be able to undertake military actions in concert with each other in a fully coordinated, and as much as possible integrated manner. This is referred to as interoperability, defined as “the ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to, and accept services from other systems, units or forces and to the use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together”.1 This definition implies that there are several layers to interoperability which need to be addressed to ensure forces are able to operate together effectively in a military context. These include technical features permitting systems to physically connect to one another and exchange information; and the alignment of procedures and processes to allow military personnel to function within the same space and achieve common goals without fratricide. It also implies that this takes place at various levels of operation, from tactical to strategic. A high level of interoperability allows allies to effectively exchange intelligence and information, cooperatively plan complex military operations, and conduct integrated missions with fully exchangeable force packages.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › Harms – Cohesion

AI challenges alliance cohesion because uncoordinated capabilities destroy interoperability.

Lin-Greenberg, 2020 - member of the MIT Security Studies Program [Erik Vol 3, Iss 2 Spring, Texas National Security Review “Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making” http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/8866 Acc 4/22/22 TA]

Artificial intelligence (AI) promises to increase military efficiency, but also poses unique challenges to multinational military operations and decision-making that scholars and policymakers have yet to explore. The data- and resource-intensive nature of AI development creates barriers to burden-sharing and interoperability that can hamper multinational operations. By accelerating the speed of combat and providing adversaries with a tool to heighten mistrust between allies, AI can also strain the complex processes that allies and security partners use to make decisions. To overcome these challenges and prepare for AI-enabled warfare, policymakers need to develop institutional, procedural, and technical solutions that streamline decision-making and enhance interoperability. In June 2019, the United States announced a new artificial intelligence (AI) partnership with Singapore that calls for collaboration on the development and use of AI technologies in the national security domain.1 Is this type of cooperation a harbinger of things to come? The burgeoning military use of AI — technology that carries out tasks that normally require human intelligence — has the potential to alter how states carry out military operations. AI-enabled technologies — like autonomous drone swarms and algorithms that quickly sift through massive amounts of information — can increase the speed and efficiency of warfare, but they may also exacerbate the coordination and decision-making challenges frequently associated with multinational military operations carried out by allies and security partners. Policymakers and experts in the United States and other countries have urged international cooperation on the development and use of AI, but this guidance overlooks important questions about the challenges of AI collaboration in the security domain. President Donald Trump’s executive order on AI directs “enhance[ed] international and industry collaboration with foreign partners and allies” to maintain “American leadership in AI.”2 Similarly, the congressionally chartered National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence warns, “If the United States and its allies do not coordinate early and often on AI-enabled capabilities, the effectiveness of our military coalitions will suffer.”3 Several of Washington’s allies have echoed these calls for collaboration. Germany’s 2019 National AI Strategy advocates for “work[ing] with the nations leading in this field … to conduct joint bilateral and/or multilateral R&D activities on the development and use of AI.”4 While cooperation is important, what challenges might allies and partners encounter as they work together to develop and deploy AI in the military domain? And what steps might states take to overcome these obstacles?

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › Harms – Cohesion

Different ethical perspectives can undermine political cohesion – different ethical perspectives can increase burden sharing tensions

Stanley-Lockman, 2021 - Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Zoe CSET Issue Brief August “Responsible and Ethical Military AI Allies and Allied Perspectives” https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/ Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

This philosophical debate is implicit in the Defence Ethics Committee’s opinions, and is relevant to adjacent questions about AI for two practical reasons. First is that French military officers see the need for guiding principles for technology that increases operational distance or can be applied to grey-zone activity. They note that ethics and law are well structured in rules of engagement, commander’s intent, and compliance with legal frameworks for conflict. But because these often only apply above a certain threshold of hostility, guidance that allows the armed forces to maintain “ethics and moral strength” for other types of military activity is lacking.69 This includes governance for technology that increases the distance between operators and operations, including in the information domain. As technology broadens and accelerates changes to the operating environment, taking these ethical and moral considerations into account could necessitate new “deontological principles” on duty and obligation for the French Armed Forces.70 The concept of distance from operations enters into advisory opinions, both in relation to automation bias and psychological effects. But even with the advisory opinions of the ministerial committee, such a framework is still missing.71 Second is that different allied perspectives on distance from operations could affect coalition operations if political differences widen. If guiding principles on distance from operations enter into rules of engagement or prompt questions about commanders’ intent and responsibility, then different ethical bases for the use of new technologies in warfare could create political tensions. More specifically, if the more technologically advanced allies send more AI-enabled support and fewer troops as their contributions to coalition operations, some allies may perceive that others are not willing to equally share the burden of risks to life.72 If not managed, sensitive issues that stem from different ethical risk calculations could decrease political cohesion.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › Inherency - Cooperation

US NATO AI coordination is insufficient now – adversarial AI proves we are vulnerable

Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

After being told in the wake of 9/11 that European and NATO allies pledged to fight Al Qaida alongside American troops, the then United States National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice said “it was good to have friends in the world at a time like this.”1 Nicholas Burns, the then US Ambassador to NATO, has since reflected on the importance of the transatlantic alliance. Losing the relationship with NATO and members of the European Union, he believes, would lead the US to “lose our strongest anchor in a dangerous and complex world.”2 The world has changed a lot since September 2001, however these relationships are no less important. Global terrorism is still a threat, but the rise of China and technological advancements have converged to create both new opportunities and new challenges. Artificial intelligence (AI) promises to help the world find a vaccine for Covid-19, add up to $15.7 trillion to the global economy, and improve militaries’ ability to detect, defend, and deter against cyberattacks.3 However, AI technologies could also provide adversaries and authoritarian governments with tools to increase censorship, automate disinformation. and engage in constant cyber or kinetic conflict.4 Despite all of these changes, the importance of a strong relationship between the United States and the European Union has been a constant. The transatlantic disagreements that have characterized the past few years—and have hampered a united front on emerging technologies like 5G and AI5—are not the first time US-EU relations have suffered, but they should not further divide allies that share common values.6 Deepened US-EU cooperation across the entire AI ecosystem7 is necessary to advance a more secure, safe, and prosperous world, but to do this the current level of AI-related coordination and partnership needs to be increased. This report’s purpose is twofold: first, to inform policymakers and researchers about the current state of transatlantic AI efforts; and second, to recommend specific areas where transatlantic AI collaboration should be strengthened. Based on a comprehensive study of over 260 documents and reports covering the period from December 1997 to June 2020, we proposes more than 16 recommendations to increase US-EU AI collaboration across the entire AI ecosystem, as well as 9 recommendations for AI cooperation in the healthcare, environmental sciences, and defense sectors. Greater transatlantic efforts are needed to prevent the advancement of an AI vision that is adversarial and harmful to the wellbeing of the United States, the European Union, and allies.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › Inherency - Cooperation

NATO cooperation on AI is fragmented and underfunded now.

Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

Transatlantic collaboration for AI-related research is taking place at varying levels although these projects are relatively ad hoc and materialize within existing scientific and technological research agreements and roadmaps. For instance, the current Roadmap for US-EU Science & Technology prioritizes four areas for transatlantic cooperation, most of which leverage AI (e.g., health, transportation, bioeconomy, marine and arctic research) or promote institutions that do (e.g., European Organization for Nuclear Research or CERN).35, 36 These collaborative links are supported and promoted through a variety of arrangements and initiatives, such as BILAT 4.0, EURAXES37 or the European Network of Research and Innovation Centers and Hubs (ENRICH). In general, and despite challenges to systematically integrating US entities into European research programs, the US remains the leading non-EU (“third country”) participant in Horizon 2020,38 with over 60 participations and 1,200 partnerships.39 US funding contributions to Horizon 2020 and participation in AI-related projects, however, is meager than its broader research involvement in Horizon 2020. For instance, US collaborative links with Horizon 2020 projects can only be found in 2% of AI-related projects, 12% of deep learning projects, and 4% of machine learning-related projects.40 Accordingly, there is still plenty of room for improvement.41

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › Inherency – No Human Control

The US minimizes regulations on military AI

Lawrence and Cordey, 2020 – researchers for The Cyber Project at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs [Christie and Sean, August, The Cyber Project Paper “The Case for Increased Transatlantic Cooperation on Artificial Intelligence Edited by Lauren Zabierek and Julia Voo https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/2020-08/TransatlanticAI.pdf Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

AI Regulation and Principles Although the US has made significant progress in detailing its research priorities and developing interagency groups responsible for coordinating research efforts, the US federal government still lacks a mature, overarching regulatory framework or governance structure to guide AI innovation and deployment. The US government’s approach, spearheaded by the Trump administration, has been to provide the minimal level of regulation necessary to appease industry’s desire for guidance while avoiding burdensome regulation that the Administration and industry fears would limit innovation. In line with the American AI Initiative, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) published its January 2020 draft memo with guidance intended to aid Federal agencies as they develop regulatory and non-regulatory oversight approaches to non-government applications of “weak”140 AI.141 The memo highlighted the need “to avoid regulatory and non-regulatory actions that needlessly hamper AI innovation and growth.”142 It detailed ten principles to guide oversight (see Table 2 below). The memo urges departments and agencies to consider non-regulatory approaches to address risks posed by AI applications, including providing exemptions from regulations, pursuing safe harbor pilot programs, increasing public access to government data, and developing voluntary consensus standards. Furthermore, Agencies should engage in international dialogues to promote consistent regulation while protecting American AI interests and democratic values.144 Despite this progress, it is not clear how this policy will be executed as none of the guidance has become law.145

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › Inherency – No Human Control

UN principles did not encourage Human Control.

Bolton, 2021 - professor of political science at Pace University [Matthew with Matilda Byrne, Ryan Gariepy, Emilia Javorsky, Volker Lehmann, and Laura Nolan, January “Addressing The Threat Of Autonomous Weapons Maintaining Meaningful Human Control” http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/17215.pdf Acc 5/27/22 TA]

MEANINGFUL POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS Many States have coalesced around the concept of meaningful human control as the basis for new international law on LAWS. However, meaningful human control is not explicitly referenced in the 11 Guiding Principles. States opted for less clear terminology like »human responsibility« and »human-machine interaction« in paragraphs b) and c). There is concern that such language, without elaboration and clarification, would add little meaningful constraint on State behavior. To be meaningful, certain operational and technical requirements for human control need to be met. It must be active and involved (so-called »in-the-loop«) not passive (»on-theloop « or »out-of-the-loop«). Human control needs to be maintained from the activation of a weapon until an attack is completed, aborted or terminated. This requires real-time human supervision at the level of the attack, including full knowledge of the weapon system’s actions and a reliable communications link between the weapon and its operator. It also requires allowing sufficient time in decision-making for a human operator to make meaningful decisions about targeting and a capacity to intervene and deactivate the system. A positive obligation to maintain a ratio of human operators/weapon systems greater than or equal to 1:1 may help in this regard.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › Inherency – No Human Control

DOD policies do not require human control for AI due to unclear definitions

Freedberg, 2019 – deputy editor for Breaking Defense [Sydney J “The frontline of a new age in defense Artificial Intelligence” https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/2097098/MCM120_BreakingDefense_AI_ebookR1%20(1).pdf Acc 5/25/22 TA]

• DoD 3000.09, Section 4.c(2), covers “human- supervised autonomous weapons systems” — since a human overseer can turn it off at any time , like Aegis– and specifically limits them to defensive purposes, explicitly banning the “selecting of humans as targets.” • Section 4.c(3) allows computer-controlled non- lethal systems, such as radar jammers. (Automated cybersecurity software is permitted elsewhere). • Section 4.c(1) allows the use of lethal force by “semi- autonomous weapons systems” (emphasis added), which aren’t fully computer-controlled. But even those must “not autonomously select and engage individual targets or specific target groups that have not been previously selected by an authorized human operator.” Such strictly regulated systems are a far cry from the Terminator, or even Stuart Russell’s more realistic nightmare scenario of swarming mini-drones. But while Section 4.c is the heart of the Pentagon policy on autonomous weapons, it’s immediately followed by a loophole: • Section 4.d states that “Autonomous or semi- autonomous weapon systems intended to be used in a manner that falls outside the policies in subparagraphs 4.c.(1) through 4.c.(3) must be approved” before development can proceed. Who approves? Two deputy secretaries of defense (policy and technology) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. Getting three such high-level officials to sign on is a daunting challenge for any bureaucrat, but it’s hardly impossible. • Even after the three officials approve an exception, the system must follow a long list of safety and testing guidelines and ensure “commanders and operators [can] exercise appropriate levels of human judgment in the use of force.” But “appropriate” is left undefined. What’s more, if all three officials agree, they can ask the Deputy Secretary of Defense to waive all of those restrictions, “with the exception of the requirement for a legal review, in cases of urgent military operational need” — again, left undefined. Nowhere in this document, incidentally, will you find the comforting but imprecise phrase “human in the loop.” In fact, when I used it in a query to the Pentagon, I got gentle chiding from DoD spokesperson Elissa Smith: “The Directive does not use the phrase ‘human in the loop,’ so we recommend not indicating that DoD has established requirements using that term.”

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › Case Extensions › Inherency – No Human Control

The US military does not require human control for AI, despite common misperceptions

Freedberg, 2019 – deputy editor for Breaking Defense [Sydney J “The frontline of a new age in defense Artificial Intelligence” https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/2097098/MCM120_BreakingDefense_AI_ebookR1%20(1).pdf Acc 5/25/22 TA]

The April 2018 Army released its ATLAS artificial intelligence targeting program solicitation, inspiring runaway headlines about “AI-powered killing machines.” Why did this happen? The answer lies in a strange mix of misperceptions and some very real loopholes in the Pentagon’s policy on lethal AI. “The US Defense Department policy on autonomy in weapons doesn’t say that the DoD has to keep the human in the loop,” Army Ranger turned technologist Paul Scharre said. “It doesn’t say that. That’s a common misconception.” Buzzwords & Firestorms ATLAS came to public attention in about the worst way possible: an unheralded announcement on a federal contracting website (fbo.gov) on February 19th 2019, an indigestible bolus of buzzwords that meant one thing to insiders but something very different to everyone else — not just the general public but even civilian experts in AI. The name itself is ominous: ATLAS stands for Advanced Targeting and Lethality Automated System. The wording on the website made it worse, soliciting white papers on “autonomous target acquisition technology, that will be integrated with fire control technology, aimed at providing ground combat vehicles with the capability to acquire, identify, and engage targets at least 3X faster than the current manual process.” “The LA in ATLAS stands for Lethality Automated,” pointed out an appalled Stuart Russell, an AI scientist at Berkeley who’s campaigned for a global ban on lethal autonomous weapons. “‘Acquire, identify, and engage targets’ is essentially the UN definition of lethal autonomy.” But it’s not the military definition, which is where the problem starts. The military has long applied the loaded word “lethality” to anything that could make weapons more effective, not just the weapons themselves. Adding new infrared targeting sensors to tanks, for example, is officially a “lethality” upgrade. Networking Navy ships so they can share targeting data is called “distributed lethality.” Then came Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, a retired Marine Corps four- star who liked the word “lethal” so much that underlings plastered it on everything they were trying to sell him on, from high-tech weapons to new training techniques. What about “engagement”? In plain English, a “military engagement” means people are trying to kill each other (lethally).” But in the military, “engagement” can mean anything from “destroy” to “consider” to “talk to.” A Key Leader Engagement (KLE) in Iraq meant soldiers talking with a tribal elder, sheikh, or other influential person over tea. So in military language — at once abstrusely technical and sloppy — an artificial intelligence can increase “lethality” and “engage” a potential target by helping a human soldier spot it and aim at it, without the AI having any control over the trigger.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Solvency

Even if dialogue does not produce a viable plan, the process of discussion promotes cohesion through shared values.

Hill and Marsan, 2018 - Director and Senior Assistant, NATO Office of Legal Affairs [Steven and Nadia, 7-18-18 “Artificial Intelligence and Accountability: A Multinational Legal Perspective” https://www.sto.nato.int/publications/STO%20Meeting%20Proceedings/STO-MP-IST-160/MP-IST-160-PP-4.pdf Acc 4/21/22 TA]

In the 2016 Warsaw Summit Communiqué, NATO Heads of State and Government recognized that “the changed and evolving security environment demands the ability to meet challenges and threats of any kind and from any direction”.2 As an Alliance of 29 Nations focused on collective defense as one of its core tasks, NATO must be prepared to address emerging threats and security challenges arising from the development of new technologies. Among these, the development and use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) presents both opportunities and challenges to the North Atlantic security landscape. On 22 March 2018, Allied Command Transformation, NATO’s adaptation hub located in Norfolk, Virginia in the United States of America, organized an informal workshop with NATO Ambassadors and Military Representatives to discuss the impact of the development of disruptive technologies on the Alliance. One question raised concerned the interoperability challenges NATO could face as Allies develop disruptive technology with differing capabilities. A take-away from the discussion is that Nations may wish to discuss some of the legal implications of this emerging technology in a multilaterally forum such as NATO. We have already witnessed the effect that the development and use of AI is having on Allied security: the recent revelations regarding the use of Facebook data by a consulting firm for political leverage show that automated data processes providing sophisticated profiling of individuals can be used to manipulate the fundamental elements of democracy, with potentially profound effects on security. How Allies respond to this changed security environment, both individually and collectively, raises a number of legal questions. The cross-cutting nature and widespread impact of AI-enabled technologies necessitates multinational discussion and debate. For now, these debates are fueled by the absence of State practice and jurisprudence on the development and use of AI-enabled technology. Multinational organizations such as NATO can provide a venue for discussion amongst Allies, providing a forum where States can express their views on these issues from a military and security perspective. As of yet, there are no NATO policies providing guidance on how to address the development and use of AI technology. Consequently, this paper provides some preliminary observations from the personal perspective of NATO legal advisers who have begun to encounter these issues rather than on the basis of agreed NATO positions or doctrine. It is therefore intended to introduce rather than resolve some of the key legal issues that are likely to arise in future AI-related discussions within NATO. This paper begins by presenting the concept of “legal interoperability,” one of the tools that legal advisers working in NATO seek to promote. It then introduces some of the current legal issues and debates surrounding the development and use of AI, including the difficulty in defining key concepts arising out of the increased use of AI such as “autonomy,” and questions pertaining to accountability.3 Finally, this paper examines how further dialogue among Allies and with NATO partners can contribute to the development of a reliable approach on accountability issues related to AI-enabled technology. The paper argues that given the rapidly evolving technology and the asymmetric approach and capabilities of nations on the matter, efforts within the Alliance should focus on ensuring NATO’s “legal preparedness” so that collective action is not thwarted by legal hurdles and mismatched legal approaches.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Solvency

A statement of ethical principles is a Confidence Building Measure, which helps reduce the risk of AI instability

Horowitz and Scharre, 2021 - Senior Fellows at the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security [Michael and Paul, Jan 12, “AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures” TA]

CBMs may be a useful tool for managing risks relating to military AI applications. There are a number of possible CBMs that states could adopt that may help mitigate the various AI-related risks previously outlined. These include broad CBMs applicable to AI as a category, CBMs designed to address some of the limitations of AI, and CBMs focused on specific missions for which militaries might use AI.49 Broad CBMs These CBMs focus broadly on mechanisms for dialogue and agreement surrounding military uses of AI, rather than the specific content of agreements. Given that a key goal of CBMs is to enhance trust, mechanisms that serve as a building block for more substantive dialogue and agreement can, in some cases, be an end in themselves and not just a means to an end.50 These could include promoting international norms for how nations develop and use military AI systems, Track II academic-to-academic exchanges, direct military-to-military dialogues, and agreements between states regarding military AI, such as a code of conduct or mutual statement of principles. Promoting Norms In 2019, the U.S. Defense Innovation Board proposed a set of AI principles for the U.S. Defense Department, which DoD subsequently adopted in early 2020. While these principles no doubt have domestic audiences in the U.S. defense community and tech sector, they also serve as an early example of a state promulgating norms about appropriate use of AI in military applications. The DoD AI principles included a requirement that DoD AI systems be responsible, equitable, traceable, reliable, and governable.51 (The full set of DoD AI principles is included in the Appendix). Similarly, the DoD’s unclassified summary of its AI strategy, released in 2019, called for building AI systems that were “resilient, robust, reliable, and secure.”52 A focus of the strategy was “leading in military ethics and AI safety.”53 There is value in states promoting norms for responsible use of AI, including adopting and employing technology in a way that reflects an understanding of the technical risks associated with AI systems. While stating such principles is not the same as putting in place effective bureaucratic processes to ensure their compliance, there is nevertheless value in states publicly signaling to others (and to their own bureaucracies) the importance of using AI responsibly in military applications. While these norms are at a high level, they nevertheless signal some degree of attention by senior military and civilian defense officials to some of the risks of AI systems, including issues surrounding safety, security, responsibility, and controllability. These signals may aid internal bureaucratic efforts to mitigate various AI-related risks, as bureaucratic actors can point to these official documents for support. Additionally, to the extent that other nations find these statements credible, they may help signal to other nations at least some degree of awareness and attention to these risks, helping to incentivize others to do the same.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Solvency

NATO serves as The global model for ethical AI – acting now can incentivize other nations to follow along.

Stanley-Lockman and Trabucco, 2022 – prof of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University and prof of Political Science, University of Copenhagen [Zoe and Lena, The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, March, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs” https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69 Acc 4/16/22 TA]

Ethics and values One of the vital aspects of AI which has garnered significant global attention is the ethical implications of artificial intelligence as a military technology—an issue that has divided much of the global community, including NATO member states. As a starting point, researchers and analysts have considered the implications of emerging military technology in terms of ethical responsibility and regulation, especially as states and organizations continue to release AI ethical principles, guidelines, and standards.55 We explore how NATO can operationalize the debate around ethics and values of military AI to garner coordination and continue progress of EDT harmonization among partners. Building on the theoretical discussion from STS and military innovation literature above, the adoption of technologies that reinforce values serves the strategic interest of NATO to shape technological innovation against current waves of illiberalism. Additionally, infusing AI development with certain ethical principles and values can have operational advantages and benefits, and NATO can, in particular, promote the ethical principles as operational standards for the Allies. A common critique within the ethics debate is that approaching new technology with an ethical or democratic values-driven perspective translates into comparative military disadvantage. Essentially, if your adversary develops technology without the constraints of ethical principles then there will be diminished effectiveness on the battlefield.56 We find this critique unfounded because it assumes there is a false trade-off between ethics and effectiveness; instead, we argue ethical foundations are built into the architecture of modern warfare.57 As such, ethics is a background condition for battlefield effectiveness, which is already infused in military decision-making and helping to guide the boundaries of international humanitarian law. As such, ethical guidelines do not have to detract from a military’s capacity or competency to devise means and methods of warfare that will serve their national or coalition interest.58 If anything, a first-mover advantage can incentivize an ethical and values-driven AI to establish the threshold of technological standards globally.59