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2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Solvency

NATO is key to ethical principles for AI weapons due to its democratic principles and its existing agencies with experience in AI

Stanley-Lockman, 2021 - Center for Security and Emerging Technology [Zoe CSET Issue Brief August “Responsible and Ethical Military AI Allies and Allied Perspectives” https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/responsible-and-ethical-military-ai/ Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

Multilateral Institutions Focusing on Ethical and Responsible AI in Defense Understanding ethics and legality as part of the adoption of emerging technologies is not only a priority for democratic countries, but also a topic of interest for multilateral institutions that are part of the security and defense architecture. Autonomy in weapons has been on the agenda at the UN level for longer than the countries highlighted here have spent time bridging technical and policy approaches to responsible AI in defense. Select multilateral institutions are also critical for consultations and alignment about these issues. Beyond those mentioned here, several smaller allies may be waiting for multilateral views to then drive their own approaches to RAI, rather than dedicating resources to first issuing national views that will later have to align with broader multilateral structures. NATO is an obvious player in this domain, for reasons that are described below. The emerging PfD is important as an AI-specific multilateral format for like-minded countries—including non-treaty partners—to coalesce on this policy area. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) NATO is an important actor because it can help coordinate and facilitate consultations between allies to come to agreement on how ethical and responsible AI developments impact interoperability, cohesion, and operations. Further, the NATO Defence Planning Process is the primary defense planning tool for many Allies.142 The focus on principles for “responsible use” is consistent with NATO’s added value without dwelling too much on development—which happens primarily at the national (or bi- /multilateral levels outside of NATO).143 Here, responsibility refers both to best practices in engineering (e.g., ethical design) and responsible state behavior.144 The North Atlantic Council and Military Committee—the senior civilian and military decisionmaking bodies in NATO—began contending with EDTs, including AI, in 2018.145 This high-level interest built on several years of military and scientific experience at the working levels, as well as the introduction of conceptual and operational considerations in the workstream of Allied Command Transformation and the NATO Science & Technology Organization in the 2010s. When presenting on EDTs to the senior civilian and military leadership at NATO in 2018, then-Supreme Allied Commander Transformation General Denis Mercier stressed that legal, ethical, and political differences between Allies could “endanger our capacity to operate together.”146 He also focused on considerations around the “level of confidence in new technologies” as an adoption factor that is not purely technical.147 This set the tone for political alignment on ethical concerns across the Alliance—already building on the foundations of the shared value embodied in the North Atlantic Charter and legal framework in which NATO operates. Subsequently, in October 2019, the Allies agreed to an EDT Roadmap that cited “legal and ethical norms” and “arms control aspects” as key technology areas among Alliance priorities to consider.148 The political will to cooperate on technologies was solidified in February 2021, when NATO Defence Ministers endorsed an EDT Strategy.149

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Solvency

Contention Two – Solvency - The US is key to promote AI principles in NATO because of its scientific and military leadership and its ability to coordinate nations.

Kahn and Horowitz, 2021 – Research and Senior Fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations [Lauren and Michael, The Washington Quarterly 44:4 “Leading in Artificial Intelligence through Confidence Building Measures” TA]

Leveraging US Leadership Advances in artificial intelligence, driven by machine learning methods and related approaches, are already reshaping international politics. Economics, societies, and now militaries are adapting, with various degrees of speed. As it is early in the age of AI, there is still significant uncertainty about the specific ways that AI and machine learning will impact military behavior and the future of war. One significant concern involves the potential for AI-enabled military applications to increase the risk of accidents, unintentional conflict, and inadvertent escalation. Poorly programmed, trained, or deployed algorithms could be subject to accidents and their uses could be misinterpreted by adversaries. Even if algorithms work as intended and give militaries an advantage, the increase in the speed of warfare from their use could create pressure for escalation in a crisis or early in a conflict. In the midst of competition with China and Russia, the United States can simultaneously benefit and be at risk from military applications of AI. Given its economic, military, and scientific leadership, the United States has a unique opportunity to shape the global AI landscape through the promotion of norms and CBMs that could decrease the risk of unintentional conflict and escalation. Only the United States has the convening power to bring allies and adversaries to the table, whether bilaterally or multilaterally, for dialogue around areas of shared interests—the areas most likely to be building blocks for cooperation. Key areas for potential cooperation include AI safety standards, dialogue on AI and strategic stability, commitments to keep humans in the loop for the use of nuclear weapons, and an Autonomous Incidents Agreement. All require further conversation. Through proposals that involve shared commitments to standards and policies that the United States would be willing to pursue unilaterally, the United States can increase global AI safety without revealing information that would compromise US capabilities or undermine US military adoption of AI. The United States can therefore leverage AI to ensure future military superiority and simultaneously decrease the risk that military uses of AI will have disastrous unintended consequences.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage - Human Dignity

Human dignity demands that humans remain in the loop for artificial intelligence weapon systems.

International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 2021 [(iPRAW) coordinated by: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July “Building Blocks for a Regulation on LAWS and Human Control Updated Recommendations to the GGE on LAWS” https://www.readkong.com/page/building-blocks-for-a-regulation-on-laws-and-human-control-8617434 Acc 2/27/22 TA]

The precautionary principle: The obligation to take precautions is not limited to attacks but the principle applies – at least to a certain extent – to military operations in general. The notion of “military operations” has a broader meaning encompassing “any movements, maneuvers and other activities whatsoever carried out by the armed forces with a view to combat.” Parties to a conflict have to take all feasible measures to verify the target and to avoid excessive damage to civilians. Weapon systems based on computational methods could be a helpful instrument to support humans in their decision-making processes, especially with regard to target verification. However, in case LAWS are deployed, it would be questionable whether such weapon systems are able to obtain reliable information to distinguish adequately between legitimate and illegitimate targets. As adumbrated above, the distinction between combatants and civilians and between military and civilian objects respectively is challenging, often requiring the cognitive capacity to detect slight nuances in human behavior and changes of circumstances. Furthermore, the principle of precautions in attack requires parties to a conflict to take feasible measures to avoid excessive harm to civilians. This entails the obligation to deploy weapons with predictable effects which, in turn, necessitates an adequate understanding of the weapon system and its operating principles by the human operators and the military commanders. Furthermore, the use of weapon systems based on computational methods may oblige parties to a conflict to apply even higher standards of precaution. It is also important to bear in mind that the principle of precautions requires parties to a conflict to abort a mission in case the military objective turns out to be civilian. A LAWS would have to be able to autonomously abort a mission in case of doubt regarding the respective target. One way to address the risk of legal violations posed by the employment of LAWS is to regulate how these systems are used, i.e. with human control, rather than to regulate the systems, that is, their numbers or capabilities, themselves. Human Control as a Consequence of IHL? The obligation to maintain human control arguably derives from IHL, at least by implication. However, IHL does not indicate how human control should be operationalized. It is arguable that the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precautions in attack imply a requirement for the user to have sufficient situational understanding but also options for intervention. Accordingly, the operator/commander must be able to review legal assessments and translate human decision-making into the system’s action during attack prior to the actual engagement. One option to exert control is to impose operational constraints on LAWS, for example, by not using them in anti-personnel mode or against military objects by use. Even if some of those legal issues were be solved by technological achievements in the future, certain ethical challenges would still call for human control in the use of force, especially if used against human targets. Therefore, iPRAW’s ethical considerations focus on the concept of human dignity. Based on the work of Peter Asaro and Christof Heyns, we defined a set of three minimum requirements for human dignity in the use of force as the ability to: Recognize a human being as a human, not just distinguish it from other types of objects and things but as a being with rights that deserve respect; Understand the value of life and the significance of its loss; and Reflect upon the reasons for taking life and reach a rational conclusion that killing is justified in a particular situation. Depending on the moral position, one would assume or deny that autonomous functions in weapon systems break the link to moral agency. In the first case, it would be necessary to safeguard moral agency through human control, in the latter case one would want to safeguard the ability to use a weapon system lawfully at the current state of technology. In consequence, both positions would require human control in both the design of the system and in its use. Inherent in both views is an acknowledgment – tacit or explicit – of the principle of human control.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage - Human Dignity

The Process of taking a human life matters as much as the consequence – if the process denies humanity, it undermines dignity. Autonomous AI denies dignity because machines cannot understand the value of human dignity, so the decision cannot take into account the unique individual to be killed.

Docherty, 2018 - senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch [Bonnie August 21, “Heed the Call A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots” Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Respect for Human Life and Dignity Definition A second principle of humanity requires actors to respect both human life and human dignity. Christof Heyns, former special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, highlighted these related but distinct concepts when he posed two questions regarding fully autonomous weapons: “[C]an [they] do or enable proper targeting?” and “Even if they can do proper targeting, should machines hold the power of life and death over humans?”[68] The first considers whether a weapon can comply with international law’s rules on protecting life. The second addresses the “manner of targeting” and whether it respects human dignity.[69] In order to respect human life, actors must take steps to minimize killing.[70] The right to life states that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”[71] It limits the use of lethal force to circumstances in which it is absolutely necessary to protect human life, constitutes a last resort, and is applied in a manner proportionate to the threat.[72] Codified in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the right to life has been recognized as the “supreme right” of international human rights law, which applies under all circumstances. During times of armed conflict, international humanitarian law determines what constitutes arbitrary or unjustified deprivation of life. It requires that actors comply with the rules of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity in situations of armed conflict.[73] Judgment and emotion promote respect for life because they can serve as checks on killing. The ability to make legal and ethical judgments can help an actor determine which course of action will best protect human life in the infinite number of potential unforeseen scenarios. An instinctive resistance to killing provides a psychological motivation to comply with, and sometimes go beyond, the rules of international law in order to minimize casualties. Under the principles of humanity, actors must also respect the dignity of all human beings. This obligation is premised on the recognition that every human being has inherent worth that is both universal and inviolable.[74] Numerous international instruments—including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action adopted at the 1993 World Human Rights Conference, and regional treaties—enshrine the importance of dignity as a foundational principle of human rights law.[75] The Africa Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights explicitly states that individuals have “the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being.”[76] While respect for human life involves minimizing the number of deaths and avoiding arbitrary or unjustified ones, respect for human dignity requires an appreciation of the gravity of a decision to kill.[77] The ICRC explained that it matters “not just if a person is killed or injured but how they are killed or injured, including the process by which these decisions are made.”[78] Before taking a life, an actor must truly understand the value of a human life and the significance of its loss. Humans should be recognized as unique individuals and not reduced to objects with merely instrumental or no value.[79] If an actor kills without taking into account the worth of the individual victim, the killing undermines the fundamental notion of human dignity and violates this principle of humanity. Application to Fully Autonomous Weapons It is highly unlikely that fully autonomous weapons would be able to respect human life and dignity. Their lack of legal and ethical judgment would interfere with their capacity to respect human life. For example, international humanitarian law’s proportionality test requires commanders to determine whether anticipated military advantage outweighs expected civilian harm on a case-by-case basis. Given the infinite number of contingencies that may arise on the battlefield, fully autonomous weapons could not be preprogrammed to make such determinations. The generally accepted standard for assessing proportionality is whether a “reasonable military commander” would have launched a particular attack,[80] and reasonableness requires making decisions based on ethical as well as legal considerations.[81] Unable to apply this standard to the proportionality balancing test, fully autonomous weapons would likely endanger civilians and potentially violate international humanitarian law.[82] Fully autonomous weapons would also lack the instinctual human resistance to killing that can protect human life beyond the minimum requirements of the law.[83] An inclination to avoid killing comes naturally to most people because they have an innate appreciation for the inherent value of human life. Empirical research demonstrates the reluctance of human beings to take the lives of other humans. For example, a retired US Army Ranger who conducted extensive research on killing during armed conflict found that “there is within man an intense resistance to killing their fellow man. A resistance so strong that, in many circumstances, soldiers on the battlefield will die before they can overcome it.”[84] As inanimate objects, fully autonomous weapons could not lose their own life or understand the emotions associated with the loss of the life of a loved one. It is doubtful that a programmer could replicate in a robot a human’s natural inclination to avoid killing and to protect life with the complexity and nuance that would mirror human decision making. Fully autonomous weapons could not respect human dignity, which relates to the process behind, rather the consequences of, the use of force.[85] As machines, they could truly comprehend neither the value of individual life nor the significance of its loss. They would base decisions to kill on algorithms without considering the humanity of a specific victim.[86] Moreover, these weapons would be programmed in advance of a scenario and could not account for the necessity of lethal force in a specific situation. In a CCW presentation as special rapporteur, Christof Heyns explained that: to allow machines to determine when and where to use force against humans is to reduce those humans to objects; they are treated as mere targets. They become zeros and ones in the digital scopes of weapons which are programmed in advance to release force without the ability to consider whether there is no other way out, without a sufficient level of deliberate human choice about the matter.[87] Mines Action Canada similarly concluded that “[d]eploying [fully autonomous weapons] in combat displays the belief that any human targeted in this way does not warrant the consideration of a live operator, thereby robbing that human life of its right to dignity.”[88] Allowing a robot to take a life when it cannot understand the inherent worth of that life or the necessity of taking it disrespects and demeans the person whose life is taken. It is thus irreconcilable with the principles of humanity enshrined in the Martens Clause.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage - Human Dignity

Human Dignity requires that the decision to take human life be made by a human. Even if war is inevitable, inhumanity is not.

Rosert, 2019 - Professor for International Relations at Universität Hamburg [Elvira, with Frank Sauer Researcher at Bundeswehr, Global Policy, July 5 “Prohibiting Autonomous Weapons: Put Human Dignity First” https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12691 Acc 12/27/20 TA]

In addition to its successful mobilization in stigmatization and norm‐setting processes on anti‐personnel landmines and cluster munitions, the principle of distinction as enshrined in International Humanitarian Law also figures prominently in the debate on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). Proponents of a ban on LAWS frame these as indiscriminate, that is, unable to distinguish between civilians and combatants, and thus as inherently unlawful. The flip side of this particular legal argument is, however, that LAWS become acceptable when considered capable of distinguishing between combatants and civilians. We thus argue, first, that this particular legal basis for the call for a ban on LAWS might be rendered obsolete by technological progress increasing discriminatory weapon capabilities. Second, we argue that the argument is normatively troubling as it suggests that, as long as civilians remain unharmed, attacking combatants with LAWS is acceptable. Consequently, we find that the legal principle of distinction is not the overall strongest argument to mobilize when trying to stigmatize and ban LAWS. A more fundamental, ethical argument within the debate about LAWS – and one less susceptible to ‘technological fixes’ – should be emphasized instead, namely that life and death decisions on the battlefield should always and in principle be made by humans only. Lethal autonomous weapons systems: a threat to human dignity Numerous arguments motivate the current call for an international, legally binding ban on so‐called lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS).1 Strategic concerns include proliferation, arms races and escalation risks (Altmann and Sauer, 2017; Rickli, 2018). Military concerns include the incompatibility of LAWS with a traditional chain of command or the potential for operational failures cascading at machine speed (Bode and Huelss, 2018; Scharre, 2016). Ethical concerns include the fear that LAWS might further increase the dehumanization and abstractness of war (and thus its propensity), as well as its cruelty if warfare is delegated to machines incapable of empathy or of navigating in dilemmatic situations (Krishnan, 2009; Sauer and Schörnig, 2012; Sparrow, 2015; Sparrow et al., 2019; Wagner, 2014). Legal concerns include difficulties of attribution, accountability gaps, and limits to the fulfillment of obligatory precautionary measures (Brehm, 2017; Chengeta, 2017; Docherty, 2015). But the most prominent concern, focalizing some elements of the concerns just mentioned, is the danger these weapons pose to civilians. This argument's legal underpinning is the principle of distinction – undoubtedly one of the central principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL), if not the central principle (Dill, 2015). As multifaceted and complex as the debate on military applications of autonomy is now, what has been articulated at its very beginning (Altmann and Gubrud, 2004; Sharkey, 2007) and consistently since then is that LAWS would violate IHL due to their inability to distinguish between combatants and civilians. This image of LAWS as a threat to civilians is echoed routinely and placed first by all major ban supporters (we substantiate this claim in the following section). That LAWS would be incapable of making this crucial distinction – and thus have to be considered indiscriminate – is assumed because ‘civilian‐ness’ is an under‐defined, complex and heavily context‐dependent concept that is not translatable into software (regardless of whether the software is based on rules or on machine learning). Recognizing and applying this concept on the battlefield not only requires value‐based judgments but also a degree of situational awareness as well as an understanding of social context that current and foreseeable computing technology does not possess. We unequivocally share this view as well as these concerns. And yet, in this article, we propose to de‐emphasize the indiscriminateness frame in favor of a deeper ethical assertion, namely that the use of LAWS would infringe on human dignity. The minimum requirement for upholding human dignity, even in conflicts, is that life and death decisions on the battlefield should always and in principle be made by humans (Asaro, 2012; Gubrud, 2012). Not the risk of (potential) civilian harm, but rather retaining meaningful human control to preserve human dignity should be at the core of the message against LAWS.2

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage - Human Dignity

Autonomous artificial intelligence does not respect human dignity – it lacks empathy and judgement. Death by algorithm reduces human targets to data points, not people.

Docherty, 2018 - senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch [Bonnie August 21, “Heed the Call A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots” Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Due to their lack of emotion and legal and ethical judgment, fully autonomous weapons would face significant obstacles in complying with the principles of humanity. Those principles require the humane treatment of others and respect for human life and human dignity. Humans are motivated to treat each other humanely because they feel compassion and empathy for their fellow humans. Legal and ethical judgment gives people the means to minimize harm; it enables them to make considered decisions based on an understanding of a particular context. As machines, fully autonomous weapons would not be sentient beings capable of feeling compassion. Rather than exercising judgment, such weapons systems would base their actions on pre-programmed algorithms, which do not work well in complex and unpredictable situations. Showing respect for human life entails minimizing killing. Legal and ethical judgment helps humans weigh different factors to prevent arbitrary and unjustified loss of life in armed conflict and beyond. It would be difficult to recreate such judgment, developed over both human history and an individual life, in fully autonomous weapons, and they could not be pre-programmed to deal with every possible scenario in accordance with accepted legal and ethical norms. Furthermore, most humans possess an innate resistance to killing that is based on their understanding of the impact of loss of life, which fully autonomous weapons, as inanimate machines, could not share. Even if fully autonomous weapons could adequately protect human life, they would be incapable of respecting human dignity. Unlike humans, these robots would be unable to appreciate fully the value of a human life and the significance of its loss. They would make life-and-death decisions based on algorithms, reducing their human targets to objects. Fully autonomous weapons would thus violate the principles of humanity on all fronts.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage - Human Dignity

Even if AI saves lives, it destroys the Dignity that gives value to lives.

Docherty, 2018 - senior researcher in the Arms Division of Human Rights Watch [Bonnie August 21, “Heed the Call A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots” Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Showing respect for human life entails minimizing killing. Legal and ethical judgment helps humans weigh different factors to prevent arbitrary and unjustified loss of life in armed conflict and beyond. It would be difficult to recreate such judgment, developed over both human history and an individual life, in fully autonomous weapons, and they could not be pre-programmed to deal with every possible scenario in accordance with accepted legal and ethical norms. Furthermore, most humans possess an innate resistance to killing that is based on their understanding of the impact of loss of life, which fully autonomous weapons, as inanimate machines, could not share. Even if fully autonomous weapons could adequately protect human life, they would be incapable of respecting human dignity. Unlike humans, these robots would be unable to appreciate fully the value of a human life and the significance of its loss. They would make life-and-death decisions based on algorithms, reducing their human targets to objects. Fully autonomous weapons would thus violate the principles of humanity on all fronts.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage - Human Dignity

Only respecting human dignity prevents treating humans as a means to an end. Utilitarianism is an instrumental rationality, which denies human dignity.

Heyns, 2016 - Professor of Human Rights Law, University of Pretoria [Christof, Human Rights Quarterly 38 (2016) 350–378 “ Human Rights and the use of Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) During Domestic Law Enforcement” Acc 12/27/20 TA]

There are different conceptions of dignity. For example, it has a religious connotation for some and is tied up with the belief that humans are created in the image of God (imago Dei);87 others rely on the Kantian notion that each person should be treated as an end and not as a means.88 Dignity can also be seen as related to the capacity of someone to be a moral person and as moral responsibility.89 Violations of dignity often take the form of physical infringements of the person, but it is not confined to that—not being able to act out one’s moral choices could be another form of indignity. Underlying the concept of dignity is a strong emphasis on the idea of the infinite or incommensurable value of each person.90 The Kantian concept of dignity assigns this value to each person as a separate and unique, or irreplaceable, individual. Acts of indignity involve an unwarranted reduction of this worth. Each person has an inner core that may not be infringed upon, even if such infringement would be beneficial to the common good because that would mean they are used as a tool. Individual dignity cannot be accounted for properly within schemes of instrumental rationality, where competing claims are measured against each other based on their assigned weights, because each human being is considered to be of infinite value.91 Exactly whose dignity is potentially at stake? In the first place, I would submit, the concern should be about the dignity of those at the receiving end of the force used: those targeted as well as those caught in the crossfire.92 Secondly, the dignity of those in whose name force is used may also be at stake. The effect of AWS on the dignity of these two different categories will now be considered in turn. How does the use of AWS impact the dignity of those subjected to the use of force? It has been argued that to have the decision whether one lives or dies being made by machines is the ultimate indignity and similar arguments can be made about other forms of force, especially if they are potentially lethal or can seriously maim. 93 A machine, bloodless and without morality or mortality, cannot fathom the significance of using force against a human being and cannot do justice to the gravity of the decision.94 Each instance where force is used against a human being requires that another human being should decide afresh whether to cross that threshold. The heuristic argumentation used by computers fails to capture and do justice the complexity and fullness of human life and decisions about life. Robots cannot be preprogrammed to respond in an appropriate way to the infinite number of scenarios that real life—and real people—offer.95 Death by algorithm means that people are treated simply as targets and not as complete and unique human beings, who may, by virtue of that status, meet a different fate. They are placed in a position where an appeal to the humanity of the person on the other side is not possible. Some have argued that people in such situations are treated like pests or objects, as a nuisance that must be gotten rid of, rather than as someone with inherent dignity.96 When someone comes into the sights of a computer, that person is literally reduced to numbers: the zeros and the ones of bits.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage - Human Dignity

Every person has inherent worth – if we value ourselves, then we Must respect the value of others to be consistent. Sacrificing the dignity of some to protect others denies equal dignity and is morally unacceptable. Every person must be treated as an end in and of themselves.

Applbaum, 1998 - Professor of Ethics and Public Policy at the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy [Arthur "Are Violations of Rights Ever Right?*." Ethics 108.2 (1998): 340-366 Acc 12/27/20 TA]

Since we think of ourselves as beings that matter, consistency demands that we extend that status to others. Says Nagel, ‘‘I believe, as did Kant, that what drives us in the direction of universal- izability is the difficulty each person has in regarding himself as having value only for himself, but not in himself. If people are not ends in themselves—i.e. impersonally valuable—then they have a much lower order of worth.’’ If one wishes to view and value oneself as a being that is an end in itself, and not as a means to be used for the ends of others, then the status of an end must be extended to others. The violation of other persons—using them as means—therefore is an impersonal bad, something we all have reason to avoid and prevent. But if such violation is bad, why should we not seek to minimize violations, even if that sometimes requires a lesser violation? Because a violation-minimizing violation uses one as a means for the ends of others and so fails to treat persons as ends in themselves. If persons are to matter in the highest possible way, then morality must value not only the absence of violations of persons, but the treatment of persons as beings who have the status of being inviolable—whose violation is not permissible. ‘‘What actually happens to us is not the only thing we care about: What may be done to us is also important, quite apart from whether or not it is done to us—and the same is true of what we may do as opposed to what we actually do.’’ Since having the status of inviolability is of great value, if morality permits violations so as to maximize the good of not being violated, all persons cease to have a high degree of inviolability, which is a great bad. We all may be better off in a world in which morality always treated us as ends, and so where it is always morally impermissible to violate us, even though we are thereby more likely to suffer violation at the hands of immoral actors

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage - Crisis Instability

Human control solves crisis management and prevents accidental nuclear escalation.

Sauer, 2021 - Senior Research Fellow at Bundeswehr University [Frank serves on the International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons IRRC No. 913 March “Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible” https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/stepping-back-from-brink-regulation-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-913 Acc 4/5/22 TA]

Humans are more resistant to mass error than machines. Also, humans, despite being slower and sometimes making mistakes, are better managers than machines. They have the capacity to grasp an unusual situation and understand its context as well as to reflect on a decision, its genesis, its implications and the weight of the responsibility that accompanies it. In terms of crisis management, all this makes humans superior to machines, which so far are only capable of recognizing patterns and executing predefined actions, and which reach superhuman performance only in those narrowly defined scenarios for which they were specifically trained. By removing human control, the distinct role of humans as a versatile fail-safe mechanism is lost. The prominent case of Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov renders this evident. The 1983 NATO exercise Able Archer was misunderstood by the Soviets as a cover for an attack with tactical nuclear forces. During this time, a Soviet early-warning satellite registered first one, then a couple more US nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile launches. Petrov, the watch officer in charge at the time, decided (correctly) that this had to be a false alarm and gave the all-clear up the chain of command, thus preventing further, potentially nuclear escalation in this tense situation. Petrov's decision could not have been made by a completely automated system. He later testified that he had arrived at his decision by following a gut feeling, by wondering about the nature of the supposed strike, and by drawing on his past experiences with the early-warning system that he deemed not fully trustworthy.71 If the human on the destroyer in the next-to-fully automated kill chain presented by General Goldfein were ever to be removed, fully actualizing the key advantage of weapon autonomy that is fighting at machine speed, the “Petrov effect” would be lost. While, in that conventional scenario, this would not mean the inadvertent use of nuclear weapons, strategic stability is nevertheless already being affected by the effort to increase autonomy in military systems.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage - Crisis Instability

Ethical principles and Responsible AI use prevents miscalculation and escalation

International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons, 2021 [(iPRAW) coordinated by: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, July “Building Blocks for a Regulation on LAWS and Human Control Updated Recommendations to the GGE on LAWS” https://www.readkong.com/page/building-blocks-for-a-regulation-on-laws-and-human-control-8617434 Acc 2/27/22 TA]

Albeit not being at the center of the CCW debate on LAWS, military AI and machine autonomy could also have manifold implications for international security and strategic stability. A major benefit of applying autonomous functions for military purposes is the possibility of accelerating information processing, decision-making, and command and control cycles. A faster tempo of warfare however also runs risk of overwhelming human operators and undermining human judgment, especially in crisis situations. This could be aggravated by the fact that AI-enabled systems are often not entirely comprehensible for humans, especially those relying on machine or deep learning. Automation bias, meaning human overreliance and over- trust in the effectiveness of machine autonomy, has already caused various accidents in the civilian domain and could be particularly acute if human operators were not aware of the limits of AI and autonomy. Therefore, technical errors, coupled with unpredictable, opaque systems and automation bias could lead to a situation where humans might lose the ability to control escalation and manage war termination. Furthermore, already existing threat perceptions and an increasing speed of warfare could spur arms competition towards greater levels of autonomy that again increases the speed of conflicts, leading to a vicious circle. Similarly, while sophisticated AI- enabled systems might not be easily built or acquired, rather "crude" LAWS and their components could diffuse rather rapidly, potentially falling into the hands of illegitimate or irresponsible actors. Export controls might be able to mitigate this issue to a certain extent. Whether AI-enabled systems and machine autonomy will strengthen or undermine strategic stability will to a large extent depend on their application and the human role. In many cases, AI technologies could aid human operators and strengthen strategic stability. For example, by enabling the integration of heterogeneous data and rapid information processing, AI methods could improve situational awareness of human operators and commanders. This however presupposes that technical risks and limitations as well as risks in relation to human-machine interaction are taken into account and that safety measures and adequate training of human operators ensure reliable systems and their responsible use. Ultimately, the focus should be on aiding rather than replacing the unique judgment of humans.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage - Crisis Instability

A lack of human control increases crisis instability and escalation risks – recent wargaming simulations prove that the threat is already here.

Sauer, 2021 - Senior Research Fellow at Bundeswehr University [Frank serves on the International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons IRRC No. 913 March “Stepping back from the brink: Why multilateral regulation of autonomy in weapons systems is difficult, yet imperative and feasible” https://international-review.icrc.org/articles/stepping-back-from-brink-regulation-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-913 Acc 4/5/22 TA]

Escalation risks and crisis instability Weapons systems operating without human control generate not only new vulnerabilities but also unpredictability due to unforeseeable interactions with their environment, in turn creating new risks of unintended, unwanted escalation.66 In that regard, the interaction between two or more autonomous systems is to be considered in particular. High-frequency trading67 provides a useful analogue, because unforeseen and unwanted interaction processes between two or more autonomously operating trading algorithms occur on a regular basis, sometimes causing so-called “flash crashes” and resulting in financial losses. This can be remedied with regulation of the financial market to an extent, but without internationally binding regulation of autonomy on the battlefield, unforeseeable interactions of LAWS might end in unintended use of force at machine speed, even accidental war before humans can intervene.68 This risk is not in some distant future. At the Dubai Airshow in 2019, the chief of staff of the US Air Force, General David Goldfein, presented the simulated engagement of an enemy navy vessel with a next-to-fully automated kill chain. The vessel was first picked up by a satellite, then target data was relayed to airborne surveillance as well as command and control assets. A US Navy destroyer was then tasked with firing a missile, the only remaining point at which this targeting cycle involved a human decision, with the rest of the “kill chain … completed machine to machine, at the speed of light”.69 Any machine error in such a system would, if left uncorrected by a human due to automation bias, propagate quickly. It stands to reason that the error would propagate “at the speed of light” as well, were the human to be removed. A recent wargaming exercise conducted by the RAND Corporation underlines the risks of crisis instability and unintended escalation; in this exercise, simulated forces were set “on ‘full auto’ to signal resolve …[,] in one case lead[ing] to inadvertent escalation. Systems set to autonomous mode reacted with force to an unanticipated situation in which the humans did not intend to use force.”70

A lack of human control threatens to escalate crises into wars due to the speed of conflicts, the gap between human and AI solutions, and the pressure for pre-delegation

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Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage - Crisis Instability

Europe faces a future of crises that require NATO to adapt. Disruptive technologies will exacerbate these crises.

de Maizière and Mitchell, 2020 - Former German Defense Minister and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State [Thomas and Wess, November 25, “NATO 2030: United for a New Era Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General” https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf Acc. 4/12/22 TA]

2 Introduction and Main Findings “NATO stands as history’s most successful alliance.” NATO enters the eighth decade of its existence with both a longer record of success and a wider assortment of looming challenges than its founders could have foreseen when they signed the Washington Treaty in April 1949. In the thirty years since the collapse of the Soviet threat that called NATO into existence, the Western Alliance has defied innumerable predictions of its imminent demise. It ended two wars and ethnic cleansing in the Western Balkans, extended the hand of partnership to Russia and other former adversaries, stepped up to the threat of terrorism directed against NATO territory, engaged abroad including in Afghanistan, and responded with clarity, unity, and resolve to the threat posed by Russian aggression in the Euro-Atlantic region. Today, NATO stands as history’s most successful alliance, encompassing nearly a billion people and half of global GDP across a space that stretches from the Pacific coast of North America to the Black Sea. Yet, future uncertainties demand that NATO continues to adapt. The world of the next ten years will be very different than the world that the Alliance inhabited either during the Cold War or the decades that immediately followed. It will be a world of competing great powers, in which assertive authoritarian states with revisionist foreign policy agendas seek to expand their power and influence, and in which NATO Allies will once again face a systemic challenge cutting across the domains of security and economics. Well-known threats like terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations will persist, even as new risks loom from pandemics and climate change, and as emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) present both dangers and opportunities for the Alliance. Against this changing backdrop, NATO has experienced internal strains. Recent years have seen Allies engaged in disputes that partly reflect anxieties about their long-term strategic futures. Some Europeans worry that the United States is turning inward—or that its commitment to their continent will diminish as it increases focus on the Indo-Pacific. Some Americans worry that Europeans will shirk their responsibilities for the common defence – or even pursue a path of autonomy in a way that splinters the Alliance. Inside NATO, societal divisions have arisen and representative democracy is being challenged. In many ways, the Alliance could be said to be formidable in military strength; but it is far from invulnerable to such political turbulence. In spite of these challenges, NATO remains indispensable. In fact, the fundamental purpose of NATO is more demonstrably clear today than it has been for decades. NATO has weathered stormy times before, surviving the Soviet threat, the Suez Crisis, divisions among Allies over the Vietnam war, dictatorships in its own ranks, the Euromissile debates, disagreements over enlargement, and the Iraq War—just to name a few. Now, as then, Allies have remained bound together by a combination of shared principles, democratic institutions, and the benefit that all Allies derive from collective security. Looking out to 2030, the need for a collective defence Alliance to protect Europe and North America against threats to their physical security and democratic way of life is as strong as ever. A Strategic Anchor in Uncertain Times “The fundamental purpose of NATO is more demonstrably clear today than it has been for decades.” 6 Yet NATO will have to continue to adapt. In a world of systemic challengers and proliferating threats, the Alliance, in complementarity with the comprehensive military adaptation it has undergone, must cement its ability to act as the principal political forum for the strategic and geopolitical challenges facing the transatlantic community. Fulfilling this role will require even greater cohesion than NATO has possessed in recent years. As it has since NATO’s founding, cohesion resides in the ability and will to act collectively against shared threats. This is the lifeblood that ensures the vitality, credibility, and durability of the Alliance; it becomes all the more important in a sharpened competitive environment that requires collaboration and effective networks to deal with growing threats. In recent years, Allies have strengthened the military component of NATO and should continue to do so. But in parallel, they must move decisively to bolster the political dimension of NATO, including its foundations of shared democratic principles, mechanisms of consultation, processes of decision-making, and political tools for responding to current and emerging threats. If they do so, NATO will be in a strong position to protect the freedom and security of its members and act as an essential pillar of an open and stable international order.

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Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage – Cohesion

Public Support is crucial for cohesion and interoperability – it builds solutions to burden sharing problems and attracts a tech workforce.

Lin-Greenberg, 2020 - member of the MIT Security Studies Program [Erik Vol 3, Iss 2 Spring, Texas National Security Review “Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making” http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/8866 Acc 4/22/22 TA]

Even if a state has the resources to develop AI capabilities, limited public support for AI-enabled military systems can hamper such efforts. Opposition can stem from the uncertainty surrounding AI’s functionality, or from moral and ethical objections to delegating decisions on the use of force to computers. One recent cross-national survey, for instance, finds significant public disapproval of the use of lethal autonomous weapons among key U.S. allies. To be sure, autonomous weapons and AI are distinct, but AI is incorporated into the software architecture of most autonomous systems, and pundits and the public often conflate the two.57 In South Korea and Germany, 74 and 72 percent of the local populations, respectively, oppose their use (compared to 52 percent opposition among the U.S. public).58 These two countries are close U.S. allies that host dozens of U.S. military installations and over 60,000 American troops.59 Tepid public support at home and abroad can stymie alliance military operations in two ways. First, public opposition to the use of AI among allied populations may lead policymakers to restrict the use of AI-enabled technologies for military operations. In the event of future hostilities, for example, the South Korean or German governments might oppose an ally’s use of AI-enabled lethal weapon systems on their territory.60 Indeed, advocacy from the public and activist groups has led a growing number of states — including U.S. allies like Pakistan and Jordan — to call for bans on the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems.61 Second, civilian engineers and researchers that develop AI technology may refuse to work on military AI contracts. Disruptions to AI development can hinder the fielding of new capabilities and generate mistrust between the government and civilian firms. Google employees, for instance, protested their involvement in Project Maven, a Defense Department program that uses AI to analyze video collected by military drones.62 In a letter to their CEO, the employees argued that “Google should not be in the business of war,” explaining that the company should not “outsource the moral responsibility of [its] technologies to third parties,” and that work on Defense Department-backed AI would “irreparably damage Google’s brand.”63 The resistance ultimately led Google to terminate its involvement in the contract and generated public criticism of the Defense Department’s AI efforts.64

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Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage – Cohesion

Ethical principles for AI increase political support for NATO by calming public fears.

Valášek, 2017 - director of Carnegie Europe [Tomáš August 31, “How Artificial Intelligence Could Disrupt Alliances” https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/72966 Acc 4/22/22 TA]

This dilemma is not new. Even today, capitals delegate certain decisions to commanders and assume the political risk if an operation goes badly. But in such cases, responsibility can be drawn after the fact and the guilty can be punished—there is no such recourse with AI. Also, while publics understand and make allowances for human fallibility, they feel uncomfortable about machine-made mistakes. This puts democracies at a distinct disadvantage. Undemocratic governments that are unconcerned about public reaction will have fewer qualms about removing humans from the loop. This strengthens the case for a broad international agreement on offensive military uses of AI, to reassure potentially anxious publics and, ideally, prevent the most egregious applications of artificial intelligence in warfare. In short, it is time to put AI more prominently on NATO’s and the EU’s agenda.

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Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage – Cohesion

Ethical principles for AI improve NATO interoperability – cooperation is essential because it builds on ethical bonds.

Gilli, 2020 - Senior Researcher at the NATO Defense College [Andrea, NDC Research Paper No.15 – December ““NATO-Mation”: Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence” https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1514 Acc 4/21/22 TA]

Artificial Intelligence, machine learning and big data represent some, but not the only, instances of technological progress. In contrast to other realms of technology, however, artificial intelligence bodes far-reaching ramifications across all areas of society, the economy, and the military, on account of its ubiquitous nature that enables pervasive diffusion. When major technological changes occur, governments usually step in to update regulations or introduce ethical rules to help align incentives among different actors. Some measures include providing key complementary goods and services, which the market may otherwise undersupply. Governments also draw strategic directions. The Atlantic Alliance is encountering a major challenge; but is also standing before a potent opportunity to shape the future security environment, thereby preserving the freedom and well-being of its Allies’ citizens, and maintaining its technological leadership. One possible way forward consists of pursuing the NATO-mation agenda described in this report: a set of individual and collective initiatives, joint solutions and coordinated actions spanning across several fields and domains and at different levels. This Research Paper has highlighted 11 different areas where action is possible and desirable. Challenges, dynamics, actors and constraints differ in each area, but NATO can play a significant role as both as initiator and as coordinator. In the ethics domain, NATO has an interest in upholding its founding values. Innovation-wise, there is a strong rationale for the Alliance to identify or even create an internal actor to champion AI as well as to help Allies generate an innovative workforce and pioneer more modern work environments. Change, however, is difficult. Innovation, if history has any lesson to spare, is even more difficult. Launching pilot projects can help subdue scepticism and temper the understandably reluctant attitude of some, all the while fostering greater familiarity with new technologies. While the transformation we are observing is technology-driven, its main repercussions will be on human beings, their ideas, their norms and their organizations. In addition to ushering in an innovative workplace and an innovative workforce, experimentation will be necessary to accept, understand and improve novel technologies, as well as to steer their evolution to fulfil ethical considerations, alongside tactical, operational and strategic necessities. Traditionally, NATO has played a significant part in this respect and, if anything, should continue and probably expand this role further. NATO Allies have, however, a broader opportunity to shape the evolution of AI-related technologies both through increasing R&D spending and through targeted investments. The bulk of AI research is driven by the private sector. Most observers worry that this has deprived military establishments of the control over new technologies. Private-sector driven research, at least in the realm of AI, has several drawbacks, including a short-term and narrow focus, and a reliance on economically, technologically and environmentally unsustainable solutions. There is a role for NATO-wide coordinated public action and investments, and eventual concertation with the European Union, in tackling these issues. Similarly, Allies will soon have to contemplate and prepare for the infrastructures on which AI systems will run: quantum and cloud computing as well as 5G networks warrant closer scrutiny. Whether NATO should provide cloud computing the way it does through AWACS aircraft, airspace management, is however, another issue. Historically, NATO has delivered collective defence with a strong attention to arms control. Whilst not an easy endeavour with immediate payoffs, the Alliance can contribute to ongoing debates on how to reach the goal of preserving international stability. NATO armed forces, combined, are more than the sum of the single parts: this is attributable to interoperability. In the NATO context, standardization plays a critical role: coordination among Allies is important, both within the Alliance and without, such as in Standards Development Organizations (SDOs). The Atlantic Alliance won the Cold War and overcame the challenges it faced in the ensuing decades because of the bonds among the Allies. Such bonds are not primarily political, military or diplomatic: they are cultural, ideological and ethical, and are based on the founding principles on which the Alliance was built. Democracy, rule of law, human rights, and free markets have guaranteed the longevity of transatlantic relations. AI technologies, through deep-fakes, may undermine those values. This is an insidious challenge which, however, may also one day prove existential. This is why NATO must be poised to play a key role in this technological realm.

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Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage – Cohesion

The Ukraine conflict could escalate to a global great power war. A cohesive and unified NATO is essential to contain the conflict – disunity will be seen as weakness by Moscow.

Graham, 2022 – Fellow at the Center for Preventive Action and Europe Program at the Council on Foreign Relations [Thomas, March 8 Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 38 “Preventing a Wider European Conflict” TA]

The large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine now underway could quite plausibly precipitate a wider conflict in Europe. The United States is focused primarily on raising the costs to Russia with punishing sanctions and reassuring North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies neighboring Russia of its commitment to collective defense. Less attention has been given to containing the war to Ukraine and preventing its escalation into a broader European conflict. The stakes are enormous. The ripple effects of a wider conflict in Europe would spread across the globe, stressing the geopolitical, economic, and institutional foundations of the international order the United States has fashioned and underwritten since the end of the Second World War. It would test the resilience of the U.S. global system of alliances, the international financial system, global energy markets, arms control regimes, and global institutions in the face of ever more violent great power competition. No region of the world would be spared, although developments on the Eurasian supercontinent, the other locus of world power and economic might outside North America, would bear the gravest consequences for U.S. interests. NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) The Russian military intervention in Ukraine could easily escalate into a larger conflict stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea and further west into Europe. Although Russia, wielding massive military superiority, might overrun Ukrainian forces in a matter of weeks, stabilizing and pacifying the country will likely prove to be a grueling and costly affair. A significant Ukrainian resistance movement is almost certain to emerge. With sustained Western support, it could prolong the warfare for months, if not years. The first wave of sanctions that Washington has levied on Moscow could be followed by others in a continuing effort to raise the cost to Moscow and force it to yield. A negotiated end to the conflict will not come easily, since Washington has framed it in Manichean terms as a world historical struggle between the democratic West and the aggressive, malevolent, and autocratic Russia. Anything short of “victory” will be decried as surrender or appeasement in the West, while Russia will not capitulate on a matter it considers vital to its security and prosperity. The stage is thus set for an escalating cycle of violence, with Moscow seeking to stamp out a Ukrainian insurgency and retaliate against Western efforts to stop Russia’s advance. If the conflict wears on, Moscow could be increasingly tempted to expand its military operations further into Europe to achieve its goals. As a first option, Russia could intensify pressure on states neighboring Ukraine (e.g., Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) that could provide safe havens for insurgents or the inevitable government-in-exile. It will doubtless reinforce its military presence in Kaliningrad and elsewhere in the Baltics and patrol the Baltic Sea more aggressively. It could deploy hybrid-war tactics—cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and economic sabotage—to destabilize countries providing safe havens. If those actions did not sufficiently degrade the resistance, Moscow could even launch direct attacks on insurgents and their supporters outside Ukraine, as well as attempt to assassinate leading figures in the government-in-exile, akin to the attacks it has made on Chechen rebels and Federal Security Service (FSB) defectors in Europe in recent years. Such steps could, at a minimum, draw frontline NATO states directly into the military conflict with Russia, obligating the United States and other allies to come to their defense. To build up further pressure, Moscow could also “weaponize” the inevitable refugee flows into neighboring states. Refugees, who would likely number in the millions, would move first into unoccupied Ukrainian territory but eventually into adjacent European states, which have shown little tolerance for outsiders. Moscow could use harsh military and police tactics that would increase the number of refugees and seek to guide them into countries where they would create the greatest socioeconomic stress, such as Moldova. In addition, Moscow could increase the tension by pushing Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko to again seek to push thousands of Middle Eastern migrants across the borders into Poland and Lithuania. That could lead to border clashes, as it almost did on occasion last fall, with Russia supporting its ally, Belarus, and NATO states coming to the defense of allies under attack. A second option Moscow could pursue is opening up a second front in the Balkans. In recent years, Russia has taken a number of destabilizing actions in the region, seeking to weaken Montenegro after its accession to NATO, exacerbate tensions between Serbs and Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and undermine relations between Serbia and Kosovo. As it fought in Ukraine, Russia could encourage Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik to press for separation from Bosnia, threatening to reignite the bitter wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia. A Balkans war would complicate the security calculus of all countries in the region, as well as that of Germany and France, which have significant interests there. To quell the fighting, NATO countries could decide to use military force against Bosnian Serb forces enjoying Russian support. If the conflict wears on, Moscow could be increasingly tempted to expand its military operations further into Europe to achieve its goals. A third, riskier, option would be to directly attack the United States, the country that Moscow believes is orchestrating a larger anti-Russia campaign. In response to Western sanctions designed to crater Russia’s financial system and undermine critical industries, Moscow could launch major cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. If a cyberattack were to take down a major financial institution or corrupt its records, the ensuing havoc in U.S. markets could prompt overwhelming public and congressional pressure for a forceful response. The U.S. and NATO response to Russian actions will impact Moscow’s decisions on the conduct of the conflict. Both a weak response and an excessively harsh one could lead to escalation. In the first case, Moscow could be tempted to press militarily even further into Europe to enlarge its sphere of influence. Vladimir Putin has demanded that NATO withdraw its forces back to the lines they held in 1997, when the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed and the first wave of post−Cold War expansion remained in the future. His remarks announcing the start of hostilities against Ukraine hinted at a broader effort to restore Russia’s control over all of the former Soviet Union. That could include military action against the Baltic states, especially Lithuania, through which Moscow could try to carve out a land corridor to Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea. NATO would have little choice but to provide military aid to those states if it did not want to forfeit its role as the central pillar of European security. Crippling sanctions, meanwhile, could provoke Putin to lash out with greater violence. If Putin felt cornered, he could escalate the conflict either horizontally to other countries or vertically to the nuclear level in a desperate effort to save himself, his regime, and, in his mind, Russia itself. And he could find considerable public support for such a reaction. Already, some Russians believe that U.S. and EU sanctions are aimed not simply at the leaders behind the war but, by cratering the economy, at all Russians. Warning Indicators As is the case with the current crisis in Ukraine, Moscow’s intentions will remain ambiguous. The indicators of an approaching escalation in the conflict beyond Ukraine are likely to fall into three categories. The first indicators that political and military conditions are increasing the risk of broader conflict include a breakdown in channels of communication with Moscow. The absence of active diplomatic ties would preclude a negotiated resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. An end to U.S.-Russian military-to-military channels would undermine any effort to avoid direct military conflict between the two countries. Another indicator would be major insurgent successes that dramatically increase Russian casualties. Moscow would be tempted to move more aggressively against insurgent safe havens rather than capitulate on what it considers to be its vital interest in Ukraine. A wider European conflict would pose the stiffest challenge to the global standing of the United States since the end of the Cold War and to the international system it has built and underwritten for decades longer. Second are the indicators that Moscow is preparing for a broader conflict, which it would undoubtedly argue had been forced by Western actions. Such signs include Kremlin efforts to prepare the Russian public for a wider conflict, which could entail official statements, greater media focus on escalating Western “aggression,” an increased pace of civil defense drills, and mobilization of reserves. Another indicator includes the massing of Russian forces in the Baltic region. It could include such moves as aggressive hybrid actions to destabilize Poland and the Baltic states, coupled with efforts to rally indigenous ethnic Russian communities against their governments. Third are the indicators that Moscow is intentionally seeking to widen the conflict. This could include greater support for Bosnian Serb leader Dodik, such as diplomatic and financial backing, and provision of weapons. They could also encourage Serb leaders to more assertively pursue their grievances against Kosovo. Implications for the United States A wider European conflict would pose the stiffest challenge to the global standing of the United States since the end of the Cold War and to the international system it has built and underwritten for decades longer. It would test the durability of its global system of alliances and the efficacy of international regimes and institutions that have guarded world peace, security, and prosperity. The challenge would come at a time when the United States itself is in immense disarray, as a deeply polarized polity confronts massive domestic problems—the pandemic, inflation, racial justice, and cultural wars—that leave less time and fewer resources for foreign matters. The United States will be tested to see whether it can muster the will, energy, and creativity to execute an effective policy toward the unfolding crisis in Europe. At home, public attention has been focused on developments in and around Ukraine, but the Joe Biden administration cannot ignore the home front. In response to U.S.-levied sanctions, Russia can be expected to step up its cyber operations against the United States. It will more actively sow disinformation, seek to exacerbate domestic tensions, and paralyze critical infrastructure. The severity of the attacks will likely rise in proportion to the harshness of the sanctions Washington levies on Moscow. Abroad, the fate of the transatlantic community, a central pillar of U.S. security and prosperity, would be a stake. One of the Biden administration’s priorities, as laid out in the Interim National Security Strategy Guidance released in March 2021, is repairing U.S. alliances—especially with Europe—after four disruptive years under President Donald Trump. Although relations are more cordial, significant substantive differences remain and the willingness of allies to align behind a common purpose for the long haul remains questionable. The United States’ allies have rallied behind a harsh set of sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but preserving unity as the conflict drags on remains a challenge, especially if sacrifice is spread unevenly across NATO, as will most likely be the case. Putin will seek to exploit divisions through differentiated levels of pressure on NATO members, targeted energy cutoffs, offers of negotiation, and the like to advance two long-standing Russian goals: the end of NATO as a collective defense organization and the erosion of the foundations of the EU. Should he succeed, the new order that would emerge in Europe is far from certain. But Russia would undoubtedly play a central role in its formulation, and almost any conceivable new order would diminish the power and role of the United States on the continent. A similar situation obtains in the Indo-Pacific region. The Biden administration spent 2021 bolstering relations with its allies and partners—energizing the Quad (the United States, Australia, India, and Japan), and cutting a submarine deal with the United Kingdom and Australia—to meet the growing strategic challenge posed by China. A major, prolonged European distraction could undo further efforts to pivot to Asia, raise doubts among allies and partners about the credibility of the U.S. commitment, and free China to pursue its objectives with greater vigor. The United States could avoid this outcome by pursuing lesser goals in Europe—leading to the quicker development of a new order less favorable to American interests—or by a massive buildup of its military capabilities that would enable it to play a major, perhaps decisive, role in both regions. The latter would have to come at the cost of the Biden administration’s domestic priorities. Whether the Biden administration could muster sufficient domestic political support, if it decided to move in this direction, is far from certain. The United States’ allies have rallied behind a harsh set of sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but preserving unity as the conflict drags on remains a challenge, especially if sacrifice is spread unevenly across NATO. In addition to regional challenges, a major European conflict would also stress critical international regimes and institutions. One of the first victims would likely be the arms control regime that has served as the foundation of strategic nuclear stability for the past fifty-plus years. The United States withdrew from some central elements—including the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties—but two critical elements have remained in place: the New START treaty and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). A wider conflict in Europe would all but guarantee that the United States and Russia could not agree to a follow-on treaty to the New START treaty before it expires in 2026, and the NPT review conference tentatively scheduled for August 2022 would fall by the wayside. As a consequence, the incipient arms race now underway, fueled by new technologies—hypersonics, cyber tools, and artificial intelligence—would accelerate. A new wave of nuclear proliferation could ensue, especially if U.S. allies and partners lose faith in America’s commitment to extended deterrence. Mutually assured destruction, which for better or worse has anchored strategic stability since the early 1970s, would be severely stressed in a multipolar nuclear landscape with Russia and the United States fighting at least a proxy war. Likewise, a broader conflict in Europe would stress, perhaps to the breaking point, the United Nations and many of its auxiliary organizations. Already stymied by a growing rift between the Western permanent members and Russia and China, the Security Council would have failed in its primary reason for being—to prevent the outbreak of a major conflict in Europe. It could continue to exist as a forum for the airing of grievances and acrimonious debate, but it would serve little purpose as a platform for addressing major global issues. Finally, the humanitarian costs of a wider conflict in Europe would be staggering, particularly given the destructiveness of modern weapons. Beyond the physical destruction and loss of life, untold numbers of refugees would flow across borders not only into Central East Europe but perhaps further West depending on the scale of the fighting. The strain on the socioeconomic systems—coming on top of the stress of the two-year-old pandemic, economic dislocation, and mounting inflation—could bring some close to collapse. Preventive Options U.S. policy toward Russia has traditionally been a combination of deterrence and diplomacy. The Biden administration deployed both as it tried to dissuade Russia from invading Ukraine. Both have a role to play in reducing the risk of a wider European conflict, now that Russia has invaded. Many of the steps that the Biden administration is now taking to counter Russia could be accelerated and expanded to deter it from expanding its military operations beyond that country. They would likely prove more effective due to NATO’s Article 5 collective defense guarantee, which does not apply to Ukraine. The Biden administration could: With its NATO allies, accelerate and expand its current augmentation of forces in vulnerable allies along the frontier with Russia to reassure them—and convince Moscow—of the alliance’s commitment to collective defense. Step up its already intensive schedule of consultations with allies to maintain alliance unity in the face of a burgeoning Russian threat. Develop a long-term plan to reduce Europe’s dependence on imported Russian gas, building on the stopgap measures it is already putting in place to deal with a near-term decision by Moscow to stop flows of gas westward. Consider cutting off energy imports from Russia, and asking the Europeans to do the same, but only after it has prepared the American public for the economic hardship (rising energy costs, inflation) such a step would entail. Accelerate efforts to harden American and allied critical infrastructure against cyber intrusions. The Biden administration could also resume its diplomatic efforts to find a negotiated solution. To that end, it could: Resist the temptation to cut off channels of communication, as past administrations have done in reaction to Russian aggression. White House−to-Kremlin and military-to-military channels will be critical to reducing misunderstandings that could lead to direct military confrontation between the two countries. In addition, a White House−to-Kremlin link could provide a platform for negotiating an end to the conflict before it spreads beyond Ukraine. Carefully recalibrate its rhetoric to ensure that the confrontation does not turn into an existential one, where victory, whatever that might mean, is the only acceptable outcome. Such a posture would ignore the reality that Russia is unlikely to capitulate in a matter of vital interest—and would escalate rather than surrender. Talk of regime change and possible war crimes charges would probably prove counterproductive and fuel public support for escalation, especially at a moment when polls suggest the war effort enjoys the backing of the vast majority of the Russian population. Avoid appearances that the United States and NATO are waging a conflict against the Russian people. Releasing constructive proposals for resolving the conflict (including provisions for the lifting of sanctions), and urging the Ukrainians to publish reasonable negotiating terms, would be more likely than bellicose warnings to turn the Russian elites and public against the war. Russians need to be persuaded that the United States and Europe are not seeking a punitive peace but are open to a renewal of relations should their country act to end the conflict. Accelerate efforts to get information to the Russian people that would give them a more accurate portrayal of the brutal, unnecessary conflict their leaders are waging allegedly on their behalf. Students and young professionals would be particularly receptive to such information and inclined to protest. The mitigating options identified below, with the exception of invoking Article 5, could also be taken now to induce Russia to de-escalate and withdraw from Ukraine and to prevent it from expanding its military operations beyond Ukraine. Mitigating Options Should the conflict spread beyond Ukraine despite U.S. efforts, the task will be to bring it to an end on terms favorable to the United States as quickly as possible. Washington could consider diplomatic initiatives, defensive steps, and sanctions. Diplomatically, Washington could invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty to make clear NATO’s determination to come to the aid of members under Russian attack. It could call for an urgent session of the UN Security Council to focus on the threat posed by Russia to international peace and security. The debate would doubtlessly be acrimonious, but the United States needs to make a concerted effort to shape public opinion and isolate Russia as the aggressor. Washington could also propose a P5 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: the United States, China, France, Russia, and the United Kingdom) meeting to discuss steps to reduce the risk of nuclear war. To avoid turning this into a two-bloc standoff between Russia and China and the Western powers, India could be added to the discussion. But New Delhi could resist being drawn into an East-West conflict, as it has in the past. The Biden administration should take care not to provoke severe Russian retaliation or produce spillover effects that cause undue harm to its or its allies’ interests. With regard to defensive measures, Washington could enlarge NATO de facto to coordinate strategy and tactics with Sweden and Finland, with an eye to their de jure membership in the near future. It could also send a small NATO contingent to the Balkans (Albania, Croatia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia) to warn Serbia and Republika Srpska against aggressive actions against Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Concerning sanctions, Washington could build on the sanctions it had already levied to raise the costs further. However, the Biden administration should take care not to provoke severe Russian retaliation or produce spillover effects that cause undue harm to its or its allies’ interests. Recommendations The Biden administration is already taking steps to prevent the spread of conflict in Europe and harden the resilience of allies and partners in the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: further augmentation of NATO forces, including a greater presence of American troops and equipment, along the entire Russia/NATO frontier stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea; frequent consultations with allies and partners; steps to handle the large-scale exodus of refugees from Ukraine; organization of fuel shipments to Europe from various sources to cover gaps in the event of a Russian cutoff of gas exports; measures to harden U.S. and allied computer networks against attacks. The task is to turn those expedient measures into strategies to fortify the transatlantic community against a prolonged threat from the East, which Russia will continue to pose even if the current crisis is somehow defused in the near future. In particular, the United States needs to work with its European allies to drastically reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. The goal should be to cut that dependence in half by the end of the decade by fully using the regasification facilities in place, building more, and accelerating work on renewables. In addition, even as the United States and European Union are dealing with the war in Ukraine, they need to recommit themselves to sorting out the continuing problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina and between Serbia and Kosovo to reduce the opportunities for destabilizing Russian interference in the Balkans. Finally, to ease the burden on states bordering Ukraine, the United States should be working with the UNHCR and its allies to develop plans for the long-term resettlement of Ukrainian refugees throughout Europe in case of a long period of instability in Ukraine. The United States should confront the urgent crisis in Europe without unduly sacrificing focus on the strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific. All these steps, however, do not go far enough to deal with the enduring Russia challenge. The Biden administration needs to do more, ideally as part of a larger effort to reposition the United States strategically on the global stage. Critically, the United States should confront the urgent crisis in Europe without unduly sacrificing focus on the strategic challenge in the Indo-Pacific, and to prepare for a major change in the geopolitics of the Eurasian supercontinent. A tall order but not an impossible task. There are three core elements to this task: rethinking NATO, enhancing the U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific, and creating a security forum to enhance allies’ support for U.S. policy across Eurasia. Rethinking NATO. The strategic goal should be the achievement of a near perfect overlap in NATO and EU membership among European states. That would provide the foundation for the development of a united European pillar inside NATO, in a sense resolving the tension between NATO and the EU (if not necessarily between the United States and Europe). The European pillar would assume ever greater responsibility for the defense of the continent, backed up by the American strategic deterrent, thus freeing up American forces to deal with the growing challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. The alliance’s new strategic concept, to be adopted at the Madrid Summit this coming June, provides an opportunity to articulate this goal, as well as to lay out the full breadth and enduring nature of the Russia challenge. The United States should consider pressing for the following steps: Fortify NATO’s eastern border. The alliance should abandon the pledge of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act not to deploy permanent substantial combat forces to new members. It should augment its forces in vulnerable member states, as long as there is no agreement between NATO and Russia to mutually restrict force levels in border zones. Prepare for the eventual membership of Finland and Sweden to reinforce the northern flank. In the face of Russian conduct, the populations of these two countries are reconsidering their long-standing traditions of neutrality. While staying out of the domestic debate, the United States and other allies should indicate that they would welcome the two countries into the alliance and articulate clearly the changing nature of the security environment in the Baltic region brought on by a more aggressive Russia. Repair relations with Turkey. This is a matter primarily for the United States, which has levied sanctions on its ally for its purchase of S-400s, an advanced Russian air defense system. The United States could take a first step by approving the sale to Turkey of the F-16s it has requested. Washington should also look for an opportunity amidst deteriorating relations with Moscow to persuade Ankara to reconsider its purchase of S-400s. Forego expansion into the former Soviet space for an extended period. No one believes that any former Soviet state will be ready for membership for years to come. Without necessarily abandoning the Open Door policy, the alliance should make clear that it will not expand eastward while it focuses on its own consolidation.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage – Cohesion

An effective NATO is essential to the long term peace of Europe

de Maizière and Mitchell, 2020 - Former German Defense Minister and former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State [Thomas and Wess, November 25, “NATO 2030: United for a New Era Analysis and Recommendations of the Reflection Group Appointed by the NATO Secretary General” https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf Acc. 4/12/22 TA]

Conclusion: The Reflection Process concludes at an important inflection point in world affairs and Euro-Atlantic relations, in which the future role of NATO is of growing importance to a stable and open international order. The effects of Covid-19 will echo through the decade ahead, exacerbating existing trends, potentially heightening international competition, and causing long-term scarring to the global economy. While the historical record suggests room for optimism about NATO’s long-term future, it also cautions against complacency and self-congratulation. Political adaption is in the lifeblood of NATO but it is also a baseline requirement of its survival. In 1949, twelve countries established the Alliance: binding post-War Europe to a Western trajectory and cementing the transatlantic bond. Seventy-one years on, twelve have become thirty, standing together to defend the security and prosperity of a billion people. Throughout this time, NATO has been through phases of renewal and reorientation, while always delivering its central mission and never deviating from its founding principles. Throughout, the Alliance has remained strong and resolute at each turn, always challenging itself to be the best it can be. This ability to respond, adapt, and renew its internal bonds has been NATO’s hallmark over the last seven decades. Throughout our consultations, there was a unanimous view that another such moment is upon the Alliance today. Since 2014, supported by the outstanding work of the Secretary General who was appointed that year, NATO has implemented the biggest reinforcement of collective defence in a generation. The Alliance now needs a process of political adaptation to match the progress made in the military sphere. The urgency of this effort is driven by an evolving security environment which has become more challenging and complex in recent years. Alongside the potent threat from Russia, China requires particular attention as its influence and presence grows. Terrorism in all its forms and manifestations remains an immediate threat. More space is being contested physically, as the line between peace and war continues to blur, with disinformation and subversion posing serious challenges to our democracies. Hybrid attacks need new thinking about deterrence and defence, driven in part by new and emerging technologies. Agreeing a shared response to these challenges has at times tested NATO unity, with Allies taking positions that reflect anxieties about their long-term strategic futures. No single Ally can address these challenges alone. So it is essential that all Allies recommit to the spirit as well as the letter of the Washington Treaty, reaffirm their political commitment to one another, sustain their commitment to democratic values, and glean the benefits that come from the projection of collective strength. As our report describes, NATO needs to enhance its ability to respond to both existing and new threats, from both state and non-state actors, increase its range of political tools to deter adversaries and defend the Alliance in the modern threat environment. The Alliance will maintain the capacity for continual adaptation to reflect changing strategic circumstances. 5 Conclusion In our recommendations, we have set out ways in which NATO could respond to emerging technology and hybrid attacks, including by working more effectively with partners. A balance also needs to be found between the vital contribution North America continues to make to the security of Europe, and the increasing share of the burden which European Allies themselves will be taking in the years ahead. This should come together under a new Strategic Concept, which recognises the progress made and the new challenges since 2010; and equips the Alliance to deal with those to come. In the face of attempts to divide, competing priorities, criticism and intense scrutiny, Allies need to retain their confidence in the durability and vitality of the Alliance, manage differences, rise above disagreements and close their ranks against threats affecting them, as they have for more than seventy years. The peace that most of Europe has enjoyed for the last seven decades is a historical exception, not the rule. NATO remains the guardian of that precious asset. As we submit our recommendations, we have every confidence that NATO will move from reflection to further action, so that it can continue to be the cornerstone of Allies’ collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security for decades to come.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage – Cohesion

Cohesion is essential for an effective alliance – AI poses the greatest threat to NATO interoperability and cohesion

Dufour 2018 - Colonel in the Canadian Army, currently working with NATO [Martin, NDC Policy Brief No. 6 December “Will artificial intelligence challenge NATO interoperability?” https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1239 Acc. 4/21/22 TA]

NATO has arguably been the most successful alliance of its kind, and much of this success can be attributed to its cohesion in the face of various threats. At the heart of this cohesion lie two important notions: burden sharing between members; and interoperability. The Alliance’s cohesion however has increasingly come under pressure over the last two decades, and there are growing challenges with the level of interoperability between member countries. While numerous technical and political factors influence interoperability, the emergence of disruptive technologies such as genetic engineering, nanotechnology, additive manufacturing and robotics, are likely to make this challenge more acute in the next two decades. Of the many technologies rapidly emerging, none is likely to have as significant an impact as that of artificial intelligence, which combines with other technologies and multiply their effect by allowing the development of advanced autonomous systems. And while the latter holds the promise of developing new classes of weapons with great military potential, its asymmetrical adoption among the various NATO allies could also lead to significant interoperability problems.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
Aff – AI Ethics Aff – UM22 Starter Packet › 1AC › 1AC - Advantage – Cohesion

The ethical use of AI is essential for political cohesion of the alliance because it is necessary to the Legitimacy of its military operations.

Trabucco and Stanley-Lockman, 2022 – prof of Political Science, University of Copenhagen and prof of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University [Lena and Zoe, The Oxford Handbook of AI Governance, March, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs” https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69 Acc 4/16/22 TA]

The political dimension of the Alliance rests on the bedrock of a shared commitment to the “principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law,” as enshrined in the foundational North Atlantic Treaty of 1949.60 Shared values are important for NATO operations because they help constitute their legitimacy. In addition to the North Atlantic Council exerting civilian oversight over NATO operations, legitimacy also includes respect for international legal principles including the core principles of international humanitarian law, or the laws of armed conflict, distinction, proportionality, and necessity. Without political oversight and legitimacy, NATO’s military power would be less effective at shaping norms and promoting stability in the international system. The introduction of AI means that NATO has the moral and strategic imperative to adopt technologies that confer legitimacy and responsible innovation.61 Acting on a shared commitment to democratic values is vital to the political cohesion of the NATO Alliance, just as much as it is a determinant of military effectiveness in a predictable security environment. Put simply, shared values are important to both political and operational coherence between Allies. In its 2018 Framework for Future Alliance Operations, the strategic command Allied Command Transformation urged discussion of the legal and ethical dimensions of technological advancement to both know how it would impact NATO decision-making and how the Alliance would be prepared to address adversaries who do not share in that vision.62 As such, NATO is contending with the ways that ethical AI impacts its own cohesion internally and how differences between allies may project outward in the face of competitors whose ethical frameworks and commitment to the rule of law differ. Internally, there is a strong national government commitment to responsible AI. Recently, transatlantic cooperation has initiated partnerships of largely NATO states committed to advancing responsible AI with goals towards data sharing and future interoperability.63 AI defense partnerships are not restricted to military innovation but rather aim to facilitate civilian innovation cooperation for defense purposes.