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2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Environmental Justice CP › 1NC --- Solvency

Understandings ableism in environmental justice is a precursor to policy action

Jampel, 18 (Catherine Jampel), “Intersections of disability justice, racial justice and environmental justice.” Environmental Sociology. . Accessed 7-22-2021. ALS

Analytical strategy for explanation: deepening understanding of EJ issues by critically attending to disability Attention to multiple systems of oppression and axes of social difference also enhances the capacity for explaining a phenomenon, in this case environmental injustice. Here, I turn to three ways in which thinking about ableism and disablement can enrich explanations of environmental injustice. Differential exposure and vulnerability – the traffic crash Exposure. People with disabilities are specifically exposed to and vulnerable to environmental injustice as a result of ableism. Just as people occupying marginalized race and class positions are geographically segregated, so are people with disabilities more likely than those without to be geographically segregated, unemployed or underemployed, and poor (Russell 1998; Hemingway and Priestley 2006). This makes people with disabilities more likely to live in areas with disproportionate burden of environmental bads, such as near current or legacy factory sites. Moreover, those most likely to be subject to and bear the greatest burdens of environmental injustice often occupy multiple marginalized social locations. Scholars have demonstrated this with respect to disability, gender and race in the case of Hurricane Katrina. Hurricane Katrina, established in the academic literature as an issue of EJ (Sze 2006), climate justice (Schlosberg and Collins 2014) and racial justice (Elliott and Pais 2006), illustrates how disability status contributed to the lived experiences of people in New Orleans, and why Hurricane Katrina also presented issues of disability justice (Finger 2005; NCD 2005). Public health researchers found that those, who did not evacuate ‘lacked public transportation, misjudged the storm, were limited by their own or a family member’s physical disability, and were more likely to be lifetime New Orleans residents’ (Brodie et al. 2006, 1407). Among those who were evacuated, 27,000 people moved from the Superdome in New Orleans to the Astrodome in Houston, Texas. Some of the arrivals had lost their mobility devices and, until donated wheelchairs arrived, had difficultly accessing the restrooms in the large arena, while other arrivals who see and hear with different strategies than typically seeing and hearing people had to adapt to the new environment until accessibility was addressed after several days (Bloodworth et al. 2007). Lack of access to disability-aware spaces and underestimation of disability-specific supplies meant that evacuees were further harmed even after leaving the hurricane area. Evacuation exacerbated previous chronic health conditions as well given the extent to which lowincome people relied on public hospitals decimated by the storm (Brodie et al. 2006). A disability justice framework understands that it is not people with disabilities who are ‘unprepared’ but rather ableism that has contributed to a larger system that has failed them and their families (Fenney Salkeld 2016; Kim 2016, 198–212). Likewise, Hurricane Katrina created conditions for further disablement. For example, demographer Narayan Sastry and economist Jesse Gregory (2013) explicitly focus on disability as an ‘effect’ of Hurricane Katrina – making disability the dependent variable and accounting for age, race and sex as independent variables. Their analysis of data from the American Community Survey revealed that the increase in disability in New Orleans was disproportionately concentrated among young and middle-aged Black women, with the young faring the worst. Sastry and Gregory draw on the extant literature to review the potential factors contributing to multiple marginalization – young black women were caught at the intersection of race, gender and age in such a way that adverse outcomes compounded. As Black people, they were more likely to live in dwellings and communities that suffered the most damage, leading to loss of property and neighborhood ties. As women, they were more likely to be left with children after households broke up, and the difficulties children in their care faced post-hurricane may have been sources of stress and consequent mental health effects. As young people, new mental and physical impairments were more 6 C. JAMPEL Downloaded by [66.189.72.133] at 06:07 11 January 2018 disabling, the researchers speculated, because of their effects on ability to work, having younger children not as easily able to help with daily tasks such as shopping, and more limited access to financial resources. In their explanation, the researchers imply a contextual model of disablement as a result of historical processes.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Environmental Justice CP › 1NC --- Solvency

Creating intersectional movements and policy is the only way to address ableist and discriminatory policy

Jampel, 18 (Catherine Jampel), “Intersections of disability justice, racial justice and environmental justice.” Environmental Sociology. . Accessed 7-22-2021. ALS

Philosopher Anna Carastathis (2013) recuperates one of Crenshaw’s early metaphors in order to illustrate this point. Crenshaw’s (1989) metaphor of a basement with a trap door illustrates how single-axis or limited-axis movements may fail people facing multiple systems of oppression. By system of oppression, I mean historical and institutionalized patterns that disadvantage a particular group of people based on their social identity. Systems of oppression include racism, sexism, heterosexism, ableism and so forth. In the ‘basement’ metaphor, ‘all people who are disadvantaged on the basis of race, sex, class, sexual preference, age, and/or physical ability’ occupy a basement with ‘those on the bottom being disadvantaged by the full array of factors, up to the very top, where the heads of those disadvantaged by a singular factor brush up against the ceiling’ (Crenshaw 1989, 151). In Crenshaw’s initial work on intersectionality, which examined why Black women facing discrimination did not have legal recourse, White women and Black men could say they would be out of the basement ‘but for’ the ceiling. However, Black women faced two ‘but fors’ – racism and sexism – and became legally invisible. Truly intersectional work aims to address all of the systems of oppression that might leave someone in the metaphorical basement. The ‘Applications: bringing intersectionality and disability justice to EJ work’ section of this paper will include examples of how EJ work can avoid perpetuating ableism, the system that oppresses people with nonnormative bodies and minds.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Ballot K › 2NC---Care Turn

C---The radical care ethic of the 1ac gets weaponized against black and brown folks—history is on our side—prefer methods which break down structural inequality

Hobart & Kneese, 20

Hi‘ilei Julia Kawehipuaakahaopulani Hobart and Tamara Kneese, Radical Care Survival Strategies for Uncertain Times, Social Text 142 • Vol. 38, No. 1 • March 2020

Finally, because care can be mobilized as a way to privilege some groups at the expense of others, the “radical” aspect of care can bleed into right-wing and white supremacist politics as much as it upholds leftist utopian visions. In describing her current book project on machine learning and segregation, Discriminating Data: Neighborhoods, Individuals, Proxies, media theorist Wendy Hui Kyong Chun argues that social networking platforms rely on a logic of homophily: birds of a feather flock together, so you will want to date, love, and be neighborly with those who are just like you, who share your fundamental values and interests.33 The problem with care attached to fellow feeling or sympathy is that all too often it means that care is reserved for those deemed worthy. As Cotten Seiler’s article in this issue underscores, radical care is also potentially dangerous: affective feelings of compassion and empathy toward poor whites during the Great Depression, for instance, could be used as justification for caring for fellow whites over others, despite the state-backed care offered by the New Deal. What happens when images of suffering or violence fail to inspire warm feelings and subsequent charitable action? Care is unevenly distributed and cannot be disentangled from structural racism and inequality. In addition to the kind of commercialized co-optation of neoliberal self-care we describe above, political leaders also take advantage of stereotypes about caregiving to extract unpaid labor from citizens. Care is a collective capacity to build an alternative to colonialism and capitalism, but those in power can also instrumentalize empathy and care to their own ends. For example, Andrea Muehlebach has shown how the post-Fordist Italian state valorizes and manipulates compassion in order to absolve itself of responsibility to its most marginalized citizens.34 In the context of the United States, the American health care and childcare systems are kept afloat by a vast corpus of unpaid or devalued domestic work performed by poor immigrant women and kin members.35 Domestic workers are some of the most exploited workers, not just in the United States but globally; in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Bangladesh they are often poor migrant women and are without labor unions or other protections, often subjected to sexual assault and other forms of violence.36 To be clear, the problems that radical care seeks to remedy are not just a product of neoliberal policy or the election of Donald Trump and other authoritarian leaders. Older histories of settler colonialism and centuries of exploitation inform the inequalities entangled with care today. As Leanne Betasamosake Simpson and Dionne Brand put it, “The monster has arrived, and the monster was always here.”3

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Ballot K › 1NC---Ballot K

The 1AC’s value stands on its own---responding to it with judgement and the ballot is a hollow validation that draws them into the oppressive gaze of the academy---vote Negative to decline affirmation.

Dr. Kendall R. Phillips 99, Professor of Communication at Central Missouri State University, PhD in Speech Communication from Pennsylvania State University, MA in Speech Communication from Central Missouri State University, BS in Psychology and Sociology from Southwest Baptist University, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 32, Number 1, p. 96-101

My concern with this movement centers around an issue that Sloop and Ono seem to take as a given, namely, the role of the critic. On one hand, calling for the systematic investigation of existing marginalized discourses is a natural extension both of critical rhetoric (see McKerrow 1989, 1991) and of the general ideological turn in criticism (see Wander 1983). On the other hand, the ease of transition from criticism in the service of resistance to criticism of resistance may obscure the need to address some fundamental issues regarding the general function of rhetorical criticism in an uncertain and contentious world. Beyond licensing the critic to engage in political struggle, Sloop and Ono advocate the pursuit of covert resistant discourses.

Such a move not only stretches our understanding of rhetoric and criticism, but also alters significantly the relationship between critic and out- law. Critical interrogation of dominant discursive practices in the service of political/cultural reform is supplanted in favor of positioning covert out- law communities as objects of investigation. Invited to seek out subversive discourses, the critic is positioned as the active agent of change and the out-law discourse becomes merely instrumental. Rather than academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criticism.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Ballot K › 1NC---Ballot K

Radical care work is impossible within the paradigm of competition. Their call for the ballot individualizes and neoliberalizes care relationships, turning the case.

Laurence Simard-Gagnon 16, Department of Geography, Queen’s University, “Everyone is fed, bathed, asleep, and I have made it through another day: Problematizing accommodation, resilience, and care in the neoliberal academy,” April 2016, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cag.12274

Following the principle of competition, if some are to succeed it is necessary that some fail. Neoliberalism entails letting die, smothering even, the casualties of marketization. It entails individualization of life circumstances, including needs and, importantly, struggles and failures that occur when needs come in the way of an individual’s capacity to compete. Neoliberalism entails exhaustion.

As I am making the final revisions on this paper, I have been experiencing partial deafness for over a year, related to an untreated inner ear infection which will now result in permanent hearing loss. I did not attend to it sooner—it was not urgent, and time and energy are so scarce. They have been made even more so this year as my son has not been attending school full-time: some weeks he won’t go for more than two or three half days. The recent neoliberal cuts to public services in the province of Québec—where I reside—have translated into losses here and there, from removal of school transportation services to cuts in hours of specialized education, effectively reducing the amount of time an autistic child can spend at school. It is now late at night, and I write these lines on an old and very slow netbook as my computer broke down: when I bought it I had very limited financial resources, so I got a cheap model with no guarantee. I could have had it fixed sooner, instead I was striving to pass my PhD comprehensive examination these last months. There is nothing extraordinary in these circumstances, no one trait that could be neatly identified and removed, no one issue that could be adjusted or fixed, so that I could at last perform as a competitive and unencumbered individual.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Capitalism › 2NC --- Alt solves

Crip theorizations are currently organized around material change to cut back against capitalism.

Hamraie and Fritsch 19 – Aimi Hamraie (they/them) is Associate Professor of Medicine, Health, & Society and American Studies at Vanderbilt University, and director of the . Trained as a feminist scholar, Hamraie’s interdisciplinary research spans critical disability studies, science and technology studies, critical design and urbanism, critical race theory, and the environmental humanities. They are author of  (University of Minnesota Press, 2017) and host of the on disability and design. With Kelly Fritsch, Mara Mills, and David Serlin, Hamraie co-edited a special issue of Catalyst: feminism theory technoscience on “” Hamraie’s research is funded by the Social Science Research Council, the Smithsonian Institution, the Mellon Foundation, the Graham Foundation for Advanced Studies in the Arts, and the National Humanities Alliance; Prior to joining the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Kelly Fritsch earned her Ph.D. in Social and Political Thought at York University (2015) and was a Banting Postdoctoral Fellow at the Women & Gender Studies Institute and Technoscience Research Unit, University of Toronto (2015-2018). Her research broadly mobilizes crip, queer, and feminist theory to engage disability, health, technology, risk, accessibility, and social justice. Fritsch is also cross-appointed to the Pauline Jewett Institute of Women’s and Gender Studies and the Institute of Political Economy.  , [“Catalyst: Feminism, Theory, Technoscience”, Crip Technoscience Manifesto, Volume 5 Section 1, 7-8, SGH]

Crip technoscience centers the work of disabled people as knowers and makers. Crip technoscience privileges disabled people as designers and world-builders, as knowing what will work best and developing the skills, capacities, and relationships to make something from our knowledge. Unlike typical approaches to disability that objectify disabled people and situate expertise in medical professionals and non-disabled designers or engineers, crip technoscience posits that disabled people are active participants in the design of everyday life. Not only do disabled people make access in our everyday lives in ways that do not get recognized as design, but the lived experience of disability, and the shared experience of disability community creates specific expertise and knowledge that informs technoscientific practices.

We call for greater acknowledgement of the lived experiences and material design practices of disabled people in the work of technoscientific intervention. There is a widespread perception that access technologies are made for us by non-disabled experts, but there is little recognition of our own practices of remaking the material world. Yet the field of disability scholarship grew out of activism against rehabilitative models of medical expertise and intervention (UPIAS, 1976), crafting a materialist politics with anti-capitalism at its center (Oliver, 1990; Russell, 1998), and continues to struggle against “compulsory ablebodiedness” (McRuer, 2006). Crip knowing-making forms the basis of political slogans such as Nothing About Us Without Us (Charlton, 2000), framing disabled people not just as design experts but also as epistemic activists whose politicized ways of knowing the material world also situate us to produce the material conditions that allow disability to thrive, in addition to remaking how disability is known and experienced. Without glorifying do-it-yourself design practices, crip technoscience recognizes that disabled peoples’ world-dismantling and world-building labors stem from situated experiences of “misfitting” in the world (Garland-Thomson, 2011). Crips are not merely formed or acted on by the world—we are engaged agents of remaking.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Capitalism › 2NC --- Root Cause

Capitalism’s drive for productivity forms the basis for Modern ableism by bracketing out those deemed as “un-productive”. Only resolving capitalism makes it possible to fracture and resolve existing ableist structures.

Shi 20- ( Abbigale ; Abbigale Shi is an author for The Daily free press and has written multiple articles on bioethics and sociological relations; "Mind Your Business: Ableism Is Rooted In Capitalism – The Daily Free Press". Dailyfreepress.Com, 2020, https://dailyfreepress.com/2020/11/19/mind-your-business-ableism-is-rooted-in-capitalism/. Accessed 5 Dec 2021.) SV

Capitalism prioritizes productivity: your value and worth lie in how much you can produce for profit. The idea of constantly striving toward production is interwoven at the individual level, as evidenced by the urge to ask kids what job they want when they grow up — as if we dream about labor — and at the societal level, where a price tag is put on everything we do. This productivity-driven mindset permeates everything in a capitalist society. I grew up idolizing certain jobs: doctors, lawyers and scientists. But, my admiration wasn’t based on how these professions helped people. It was mostly because I was taught to prioritize their salary, recognition and prestige. In turn, people who didn’t choose a traditional corporate job were knocked to the bottom and unfairly branded as lazy, useless and undeserving of respect. I’m still working to dismantle this mindset that has become ingrained in me, but I’ve realized it’s even more important to do so when capitalism is integral to modern day ableism. So, what does capitalism have to do with ableism? Ableism is a product of capitalism. Simply put, the system isn’t made for people who are different. This includes people who have different ambitions, prioritize happiness or family over work, or have a different scope of ability. The ableist-capitalist relationship means that even if not explicitly, society makes it unnecessarily difficult for disabled people to find work. Non-manual labor jobs often tack on extraneous physical requirements that are inherently discriminatory, despite claiming to hire regardless of disability. Especially in academia, when jobs listings require “walking, talking and hearing,” for example, it sends a very clear message. When a disabled person secures a job, the employer might have to shift the functions of their role, or spend small sums of money to comply with requirements set by the Americans with Disabilities Act. So, the net profit exploited from a disabled worker may be less than that from an able-bodied worker. To compensate, many businesses use a loophole in the Fair Labor Standards Act to justify paying disabled workers subminimum wage. It’s worse than it sounds — disabled workers often earn pennies, or even gift cards, and are labeled as “substandard” because their disability can affect productivity. Before 2014, disabled people who received benefits such as Medicaid payments or Social Security Disability Insurance were disqualified if they had assets totaling more than $2,000 or if their monthly earnings exceeded $700. The job hunt is very discouraging when you know you’re going to face these obstacles and could eventually be forced to forfeit your benefits. If you were to lose your job, you would have to reapply for these programs, which often have waitlists a mile long. The Achieving a Better Life Experience Act was passed in December of 2014, allowing disabled individuals to open savings accounts for certain disability costs such as education, housing, transportation, health and basic living expenses. But the limitations of the ABLE Act still put disabled people at a disadvantage — the annual gift tax exclusion, which was $15,000 in 2020, is the limit for account contributions, and individuals must be diagnosed with a disability before turning 26 to be eligible. As if that’s not enough, the ableist-capitalist treatment extends beyond the workplace into daily life. Social Security rules create penalties for disabled people who want to get married. Sure, they’re legally allowed to marry. But if they do so, they’re faced with the possibility of losing their health insurance, earning a lower monthly income or losing their benefits altogether. Why do people have to choose between basic necessities and love? Able-bodied, heterosexual people can joke about getting married for the “tax benefits” while disabled people are forced to forfeit their right to marry so they can survive. By only rewarding those who are able-bodied, capitalism feeds into ableism. It produces and then exacerbates inequalities between the “normal bodies” and those who are disabled. It seems obvious a system that relies on the exploitation of individuals would in turn enable the devaluing of disabled people because they may require more accommodations and aren’t as easily exploited. During the pandemic, it’s also become obvious that accessibility is possible. Remote work is possible. But until a global pandemic struck, our capitalist society has not considered it a possibility — even for disabled people who could greatly benefit from these accommodations. It certainly makes one thing very clear: capitalism deems disabled people unworthy of the time and effort it takes to dismantle the barriers it is responsible for. If we able-bodied people want to be allies for those who are disabled, we need to take on an anti-capitalistic lens. You can’t separate the two. If you want to fight ableism, you must be able to recognize that it is, and has been for a long time, rooted in capitalism.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Capitalism › 2NC --- Root Cause

The political economy is the best analytic to explain forms of ableist violence that lead to material impacts that disabled populations must face. Only understanding “competence” as indebted to the structures of productivity and labor relations can reshape WHAT society values.

De Cabral 22 – Vinicius Neves de Cabral holds a PhD in Education from the State University of Londrina (UEL) and currently works as a lecturer in the Department of Pedagogy at the State University of Parana (UNESPAR) in Brazil. He is a researcher associated with the Centre for Critical Studies and Research in Education and Social Inequality (UEL), and member of the Editorial Board of the The Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies (JCEPS) and of the Journal of Class and Culture. His main research interests lie in the fields of education, culture, literature, and film, drawing on Marxist methodologies. Recently published articles: (1) The Portrait of Exclusion in Brazilian Universities: the limits of inclusion, (2) Roma: images of dictatorial regimes and Human Rights abuse in Latin America, and (3) Capitalism, Class and Meritocracy: A Cross-National Study Between the UK and Brazil. (Vinícius Neves de Cabral, “A Marxist Approach to Disability: Notes on Marx’s Relative Surplus Population”, State University of Paraná (UNESPAR), Brazil and State University of Londrina, pgs. 51-65, June 2022, ) || PZ

Disability and the Ideology of Competence As stated, I am not going to analyse the disabling phenomena beyond the sphere of capitalism, but rather to understand them as part of the complex system of ontological maintenance of the capital (Mészáros 2011). One way (not the only way) to do that is to approach, from a materialist perspective, the ideological discourse of competence. It unveils not only what is expected from the working class but also what is to be discarded. Competence is a concept that is in dialectical relation with the concepts of class, exploitation, and individual. Social class, one’s position in the economic and political structure of capitalism, will have a direct impact on the limits imposed on and possibilities opened up to individuals. That is, humans make their history, but they are determined by sociohistorical forces beyond their control (Marx & Engels 1968). Therefore, a materialist reading of disability may largely contribute to deepen and expand the scientific knowledge around the disabling phenomena. Social class, albeit a commonly forgotten category in the analyses of disability, is an essential aspect of it. There are complex divergencies between facing an impairment in the higher classes, in the middle-classes, or in the lower-classes7 (See Erevelles 2011; Cabral 2021; Russel 2019; Santos 2020). Wright (1998) argues that exploitation is a grounding concept when it comes to class analysis because it creates a fissure between the higher classes (the owners of the capital, land, and means of production), who exploit, and the rest who are exploited. The development of capitalist relations, however, engendered new classes, a class that originates from the social and technical divisions of labour (Wayne 2020; Wright 1998). The middle-classes are constituted by those in the working class who perform jobs that require more complex skills in contrast to those who are working in manual jobs - and thus tendentiously share contrasting interests with them. These are also called in sociological works primary and secondary sector jobs, which respectively represent “those with high wages, high skill levels, good working conditions, job security, and ample opportunities for promotion” in contrast to “low wages, low skill levels, poor working conditions, little job security, and few if any possibilities for advancement.” (Barnes 1992b, p. 57). Wayne (2020, p. 5) keenly highlights that The social division of labour is linked to class formation because across the various branches of productive activity designed to meet variable social needs, the same social types in control of those branches have more in common with each other than they do with their immediate workers, who have the least control, least power and lowest remuneration in the production process. The maintenance of class structure and the inducement of competition and individualism in the working-classes is a fundamental trait to the ontological continuation of capitalism. The social division of labour focuses on the formation of an un-critical, individualist, and indebted working-middle class with no sense of unity or class consciousness (Marx & Engels 2008; Mészáros 2008; 2011). The spread of meritocratic values amongst the professional and managerial strata of the working-class gives them a glamorous look and the false impression that they are closer to the top than to the bottom, that they share more with those in power than with those in classes below them (Wayne & Cabral 2021). The relevance of the discussion of class lies in the fact that when we talk about inclusion without questioning capitalism, we are usually referring to the right to enter the labour force and be exploited. Disability in the working-class demands the absence of one of the non-disabled members of the family from the labour market to provide care for the disabled member. This care may also be relegated to a philanthropic special institution - in the latter, allowing all working members of the families to be absorbed by the capital (Russel 2019). It may be argued, however, that the concepts and definitions of what it means “to be able to work” are variable (Stone 1984). Indeed they are, but those are regulated by the State and by the capitalists themselves, and they vary not only influenced directly by pressures of society, but by the demands of the capital (Russel 2019). In other words, it means to say that their jobs and the place they occupy are both part of a regulatory system of the capital, as Russel (2019) argues, and a special kind of charity - in either case their workforce is easily disposable. If we consider here Robert Young’s (2009) analyses of Marx’s concept of use of value, we may indicate that: in the Capital’s commodity structure when those deemed disabled are exchanged, they are exchanged for less. Erevelles (2011, p. 252) argues that “[…] “becoming disabled is also a historical event where disability also has a use value that is deployed simultaneously with race to justify the creation of the enslaved un-gendered body. ” and that the “[…] actual act of impairment that is used both to create and at the same time to justify this construction.” Proof of that have also been the recent changes in the Brazilian legislation regarding the regulations for the mandatory employment of disabled people. Advancements in laws and legal regulations are indeed an important part of the struggles of the working class, but they “are ‘solutions’ which promote conflict between groups of disadvantaged workers, rather than making it a right of every citizen to have a living-wage job and health care” (Russel 2019, p. 77). They are part of what Mészáros (2008; 2011) regards as corrections in the structure of the capital. They play a fundamental role in the ontological conservation of capital when softening the tensions between the owners of the capital and the working class. Barnes (1992) advocated in favour of anti-discrimination legislation as a solution to improve the participation of disabled workers in the labour market, as we all should. No one would deny that even within the limits of the capital one should always fight against discrimination, prejudice, and deprivation of access to better living conditions. Notwithstanding, the market finds its ways to ‘dodge’ the legislation. When it comes to disabled workers that usually happens through what Samuels (2014) calls biocertification. Biocertification is the process companies and industries use to certify that a new employee will follow their not-so-secret internal rules, using medical reports, exams, and tests. By means of biocertification processes individuals are reduced to their biological characteristics and are erased as social subjects, “[b]iocertification materializes the modern belief that only science can reliably determine the truths of identity and generally claims to offer a simple, verifiable, and concrete solution to questions of identity” (Samuels 2014, p. 122). The structure of capital and its relations of material and cultural production, distribution, and exchange convey ideological models of individuals, social relations, and patterns of social behaviour that must be assimilated to guarantee the right to actively participate in everyday life, from the most trivial activities to the most complex forms of social participation. These representations will revolve around the notions of gender, race, age, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and, in the case of the working classes, labour skills. They carry labels of non-deviant and deviant. The archetype of an ideal individual is linked to the project of society: Hence, the oppression that disabled people face is rooted in the economic and social structures of capitalism. And this oppression is structured by racism, sexism, homophobia, ageism, and disablism, which is endemic to all capitalist societies and cannot be explained away as a universal cognitive process. (Oliver 1990, p. 165). Oliver is arguing that the foundations of prejudice are in fact part of the ideological structure of capitalism. It a structure founded on an ideological and hegemonic set of “ideas, values, belief systems, habits and practices that defend and legitimise the interests of groups at the expense of other groups in relationships of inequality” (Wayne 2020, p. 136, author’s highlights). Hence, it is important here to clarify my understanding of five concepts that are usually present in discussions of inequality, prejudice, and disability: oppression, segregation, exploitation, and inclusion/exclusion. It is my understanding that, from a materialist perspective, they are all class-related issues. Oppression derives from the idea that due to one or more deviant characteristics one is deprived from access to some or all material, cultural, and social conditions that would allow them to carry on a fulfilling life or, as Wright (2019) calls it, a flourishing life. Oppression represents an image of someone being crushed, smashed, held (socially) against their own will and despite their own efforts to change. Oppression is a product of ideologies embedded in the social structure of capitalism and it is related to inequality. Segregation revolves around marginalisation. The social process in which those who are unable to follow one or more social expectations are centrifuged, sent to the borders of society. They are not welcomed to participate in everyday life. Segregation comes as an alternative to the idea of social exclusion, as we shall see below. Exploitation, in turn, is the essential concept that sustains capital every day. The act of extracting surplus value out of those who own nothing else but their labour power (Marx 2012). Stripped of all properties and material conditions, workers have no way to sustain life other than by selling their labour power to those who own those material conditions. Modern capitalism, however, has become even more complex than it used to be when Marx’s wrote Das Kapital (Wright 2019). In order to guarantee its own survival, the structure of class conditions was reshaped based on the social and technical divisions of labour. Different class interests will clash between those who own the capital, those in positions that require higher qualification and more sophisticated skills (the modern middle-classes), and the ones performing jobs that are socially characterised as lower jobs (Wayne 2020). A material approach to these concepts understands that the condition of class will determine - imposing starting points, limits, and ends, as Williams (1988) and Wright (2019) define it - their extensions and impacts on an individual’s life. It means to say that one may be segregated but not so much oppressed. So, the extent of the processes of oppression, segregation, and exploitation is class-determined. Going back to Wayne’s definition of ideology, he understands that: there is capitalism itself which has a built-in cultural tendency to decontextualise social phenomena, individualise social phenomena and de-historicise social phenomena. We may also add that capitalism prematurely or falsely universalises capitalist culture and value systems (e.g., the only way to live) (Wayne 2020, p. 137). Therefore, there is a paramount comprehension of capitalist practices when it comes to the analysis of the disabling phenomena. When we look at Marx’s exposition of the sphere of pauperism, we were in fact targeting how this process of decontextualisation, individualisation, and de-historicisation affect those who are considered unable to adapt. Historically and traditionally, capitalist ideologies have treated disability as a personal, individual tragedy, which is brought out of context and history, in an attempt to exempt society from any obligations it might have. Against this, Russel (2019, p. 51) argues that: Our institutions (particularly medical and social welfare institutions) have historically held disablement to be an individual problem, not the result of economic or social forces. They have equated disability with physiological, anatomical, or mental “defects” and hegemonically held these conditions responsible for the disabled person’s lack of full participation in the economic life of our society. This approach presumed a biological inferiority of disabled persons. Their deviation from social models of adaptation to everyday life and productivity in the cycle of the capital, established by social standards of normality, promotes processes of social marginalisation, from institutionalising policies of discrimination to deprivation of social participation (Barnes 2012; Bueno 2001; Ferreira 1994; Vygotski 2004). It is in and from everyday life that the concepts, values, and norms that represent, regulate and organise a concrete social formation are executed (Heller 2016). Daily life is the expression of the real life of the subjects that are part of it, it is the immediate unity of action and thought and expression of concepts, values and norms formed from the hegemonic ideology conveyed and foisted upon individuals (Chauí 2016; Heller 2016). Everyday life is ordinary thinking, common sense, and the expression of uncritical thinking. It is the embodiment of men's life, and it is from it that they express their truth, build their beliefs, and guide their lives (Heller 2016). Everyday thought, the common sense, is based on experience in the complex ideological network that maintains the socio-metabolic functioning of capital and aims at the “orientation towards stability and relatively quiet social reproduction” (Mészáros 2004, p. 486- 487). The process of stigmatisation in the case of disabled people permeates the complex social construction of everyday life. The distancing of adaptation to the patterns of normality established in everyday life crystallises the stigma and removes from the person with an impairment the condition of ‘human’ and projects it socially as the ‘non-human’ – as Marx’s pointed out a spectre to political economy. The representation of the stigma occurs by a reduction of the subject to only one of its characteristics - usually that which is downgraded or socially overvalued (Goffman 1963). The possible overcoming of these conditions, or even the performance of more basic daily actions, can raise the stigmatised subject to the condition of superhuman, keeping them still in a non-human status. A stigmatised person may, however, reformulate the rules when they reach a position a social prestige. They are taken to the level of representation of their group and will be considered the example of self-determination, meritocracy, and success (Goffman 1963; McNamee & Miller 2009; Wayne & Cabral 2021). Leonard Kriegel (1987) scrutinised the images of representation of disabled characters reproduced in literature and narrowed them down to four categories, namely: Demonic cripple, Charity cripple, Realistic cripple, and Survivor Cripple. I will not discuss all of these categories, but the last one may be useful here to illustrate my previous arguments. The Survivor Cripple “[…] is the man who endures and, in his endurance, discovers survival as a cause in itself […]. His endurance is attractive, both to himself and to the audience, for it is constructed around his understanding of the limitations it has imposed on him.” (KRIEGEL, 1987, p. 38). The survivor cripple is the counterpart of the disabled person as pitiable and pathetic, as an object of pity, it is the representation of meritocratic values - the one who fights against all odds and thrives. The bridge between class conditions and the idea of a (disabled) survivor relies on capitalist meritocracy that seems to be reproduced in the image of the survivor, both in the lower and in the middle classes. The image of the disabled person has been used as a motivational strategy, to trigger feelings of determination, and has been associated with struggle and the power to overcome difficulties, usually followed by the question “What is your excuse?”. This may be perceived in the real-life based cinematic representations of disability, as they may imprint more credibility and cause a greater effect on the audiences. The Survivor Cripple makes the impairment a tragedy and overcoming it the objective or the solution to the problem. The use of disability in motivational campaigns and films projects the disabled person as an object of ridicule and as their own worst and only enemy – “if they wanted, they could.” – and cement meritocratic values – “if they did, what’s your excuse?”. As examples, I could mention the biographical films based on the lives of Christy Brown (Sheridan 2008), Gabriela Brimmer (Mandoki 1987), and Stephen Hawking (Marsh 2014). The decades after 1990 have been marked by various events and political and social reviews on the role and place of disabled people in society (Jannuzzi 2004). However, the system of justification and ideological reproduction of stereotypes in the categorisation of the socially conceived human body, the labour body and mind, as perfect permeates concrete social relationships in everyday life and triggers processes of stigmatisation of the deviants (Samuels 2014; Stone 1984). Stigma is thus very much in constant relation with the ideologies that are working through culture – as I have demonstrated with some examples in the previous paragraph. Competence, structured by bourgeois ideological pillars, conveyed by the media, and absorbed by the cultural industry, sells signs and images of youth, health and happiness (Chauí 2016). It is a powerful method of manipulation that “inoculate[s] individuals with the bourgeois appetite for personal success” (Freire 1970, p. 147). The social process of constructing the discourse of the competent produces its dialectical counterpart, the incompetent. The social and ideological role of the competent, valued by the social power of science, as an unquestionable source of knowledge, underlies and justifies the domination and economic exploitation of one class, considered superior in material and cultural capital, over the other, expropriated from the whole (Chauí 2016; Samuels 2014). The analysis of perfection, based on a neoliberal ideology, established mainly after the 1980s (Harvey 2011), subjugates disability in the working class mainly to spaces of pauperism, marginalisation and segregation and is marked by the sociopolitical order and the power of science. The ideological projection of the perfection of productivity, sociability, independence, meritocracy characterises in the opposite pole the lack and the insufficiency, emphasising the defect and erasing individuals beyond their disability and making the construction of their social relations unfeasible (Barnes 2012; Heller 2016; Soldatic & Meekosha 2012a; 2012b; Vygotski 1993). The naturalising element of capital is propagated and foisted upon individuals that reproduce the social structure through complex ideological systems of conservation, keeping individuals locked in the relationships of everyday life. Everyday life is, therefore, the life of every social subject, without being able to be totally out of it or completely trapped by it. It is in everyday life that the dominant metabolic ideological processes are emptied and reified as absolute and natural truths (Heller 2016; Mészáros 2004; 2016). Mészáros (2005, p. 401) argues that the dominant ideology of capitalism is “[…] sustained by the practical evidence of the established material structures within which people have to reproduce the material and cultural conditions of their existence and ‘feel at home as a fish in water’”. Most of the population is conditioned by the ideological standards set by the ruling class. Its ideological structure is: a logical, systematic, and coherent set of representations (ideas and values) and norms or rules (of conduct) that indicate and prescribe to the members of a society what they should think and how they should think about it, what they should value and how they should value it, what they should feel and how they should feel it, what they should do and how they should do it. (Chauí 2016, p. 53). The dominating force of ideology lies in pacification, naturalisation of the hegemonic social organisation and unity of interests, although they are conflicting (Mészáros 2008; Wayne 2020; Zizek 2012). Ideology, in its hegemonic sense, structures life lived and represents “a sense of reality for most people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is very difficult for most members of the society to move, in most areas of their lives” (Williams 1980, p. 38). It is in the everyday life that the ideological patterns of normality are executed. Heller (2016, p. 37) indicates that [t]he maturation of man means, in any society, that the individual acquires all the essential skills for the daily life of the society (social layer) in question. It is an adult who is able to live his daily life for himself. Ideological patterns of normality are socially and historically established attributes and characteristics that are reproduced as natural and ordinary and that categorise subjects as normal and abnormal deviant. They establish the norms that define what it means to be a socially desired human (Amaral 1995; Everlles 2011; Heller 2011). Stigma disqualifies the individual due to a singular characteristic that deviates from the ideological norms and standards imposed and determines the limits of their social participation. Lastly, I would like to go back to inclusion. Inclusion is part of the ideological process of self-correctness and self-preservation of the bourgeois society. It is an attempt to lessen the weight of structural injustices, inequalities, segregations/exclusions that are part of the ontological foundations of the capital. Marx’s thought elucidates how contradictory the concept is: when analysing the production of relative surplus-value, that within the capitalist system all methods for raising the social productivity of labour are put into effect at the cost of the individual worker; that all means for the development of production undergo a dialectical inversion so that they become means of domination and exploitation of the producers. (Marx 1990, p. 799). Some lines below, he famously concludes that: Accumulation of wealth at one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, the torment of labour, slavery, ignorance, brutalization and moral degradation at the opposite pole, i.e., on the side of the class that produces its own product as capital. (Marx 1990, p. 799). Inclusion, therefore, is the movement of opening opportunities to share material and cultural capital with (some of) those who were deprived from access to them. It does so without questioning or challenging the very essence of the society that created deprivation in the first place. Inclusion and exclusion are part of the same dialects. One is the dialectical inversion of the other. The need to include only exists because of a society that engenders exclusion. Thus, as I suggested, exclusion might not be a real thing, in immediate cultural and material access perhaps it does, but not as part of the structure of the system itself, i.e., the individual is not excluded from the system, they are a product of it. Inclusion and exclusion were uncritically adopted by all postmodern studies of identity, and inclusion became a motto to be fought for - as Wayne suggested (2020, p. 39), “change without real change”. In other words, these changes are constrained within the limits of capitalism and do not represent a threat to the structure of the system. Notwithstanding its core contradictions, it is something we shall all fight for. If within the limits and contradictions of the capital this is the only possibility - or the closest possibility - some individuals will have to access a flourishing life - meaning access to education, health, cultural expressions, housing, food - then until the whole system changes, perhaps it is what one should fight for. In the case of disabled people, it applies even to the access or opportunity of access to be exploited – as cruel as this may sound; that is what the “inclusion for disabled people” is in fact fighting for. In that sense, “[b]asic changes must be made in the economic, social, and political structure in order to advance economic solutions that reach beyond capitalism’s instability. The reserve army, itself, must be made a disposable concept” (Russel 2019, p. 77). Despite the limitations of what Wayne calls (following Gramsci) passive revolution – “the paradox of massive change within the social relations of capitalism: change without real change” (Wayne 2020 p. 39, author's highlights) -, these seem to represent a possibility to improve the lives of those who are now in need, not only focusing on disabled people, but also on other forms of discrimination as well. My favourite and paramount argument in that regard is that Every reasonable and reasoned action proposed in an attempt to accelerate the social and political inclusion of the poor in the process of economic development in order to bring equality to social development is historically welcomed. As much within the scope of the State and its public policies as within civil society. It would be equally wicked to deny the diversity of the aspirations and intervention actions in the problematic reality. (Martins 2012, p. 1). Nonetheless, we should not be satisfied with them, for they do not interrupt the flow and the logics of the capital.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Capitalism › 2NC --- Cap Links

Only our critical analysis of capital at the level of labor functions can explain lived, material realities of disabled bodies as the surplus population.

De Cabral 22 – Vinicius Neves de Cabral holds a PhD in Education from the State University of Londrina and currently works as a lecturer in the Department of Pedagogy at the State University of Parana in Brazil. He is a researcher associated with the Centre for Critical Studies and Research in Education and Social Inequality, and member of the Editorial Board of the The Journal for Critical Education Policy Studies and of the Journal of Class and Culture. His main research interests lie in the fields of education, culture, literature, and film, drawing on Marxist methodologies. Recently published articles: (1) The Portrait of Exclusion in Brazilian Universities: the limits of inclusion, (2) Roma: images of dictatorial regimes and Human Rights abuse in Latin America, and (3) Capitalism, Class and Meritocracy: A Cross-National Study Between the UK and Brazil. (Vinícius Neves de Cabral, “A Marxist Approach to Disability: Notes on Marx’s Relative Surplus Population”, State University of Paraná (UNESPAR), Brazil and State University of Londrina, pgs. 41-51, June 2022, ) || PZ

Capitalism, Disability, and the relative surplus population I would like to start by establishing the grounds on which I shall build my reflections. My first and final argument is that disability in capitalism is a social product of the contradictions produced by the clash between forces of exploitation and forces of labour. It is rather important to clarify, perhaps to the despair of postmodern perspectives (Eagleton 1998; 2016; Harvey 1990), that I shall focus my considerations on what we could call a materialist universalising view of the body and the mind, a body and mind that are expected by capitalism, the labour body/mind. The body/mind that is able to work and to sell its labour force in the market, so that it may extract surplus value from this abled-to-work body/mind. The contrast of the abled labour body/mind is the disabled body/mind, which is a term “used to classify persons deemed less exploitable or not exploitable by the owning class who control the means of production in a capitalist economy” (Russel 2019, p. 42). Those “deemed less exploitable or not exploitable”, deviant from the ideal labour body/mind, may be considered part of what Karl Marx calls a Stagnant Surplus Population (Figure 1), or the third category of the Relative Surplus Population (floating, latent, and stagnant) or Industrial Reserve Army (Marx 1990) – discussed in chapter 25 “The General Law of Capitalist Accumulation” of the first volume of the Capital. Although a famous quotation amongst Marxists is commonly used to summarise the author’s arguments3 , I would like to linger a little longer on his discussion of the Relative Surplus Population in order to establish a theoretical connection between a stagnant surplus population and the materiality of the lives of people labelled disabled in the capitalist society of the 21st century. Marx (1990, p. 794) argues that The relative surplus population exists in all kinds of forms. Every worker belongs to it during the time when he is only partially employed or wholly employed. Leaving aside the large-scale and periodically recovering forms that the changing phases of the industrial cycle impress on it, so that it sometimes appears acute, in times of crisis, and sometimes chronic, in times when business is slack, we can identify three forms which it always possesses: the floating, the latent, and the stagnant. David Harvey (2010, p. 145) clarifies that the surplus population is what “permits capitalists to super-exploit their workers without regard for their health or wellbeing”. Marx understands that there is a relation between the growth and accumulation of capital and the demand for a labour force, as capital expands so does the need for more workers - “[a]ccumulation of capital is therefore multiplication of the proletariat” (Marx 1990, p. 764). However, if the number of workers employed increases, so does the price of labour - an increase on wages - which means “a reduction in the unpaid labour the worker has to supply” (Marx 1990, p. 770). Despite its apparent simplicity, this movement is nevertheless more complex than it appears to be4 , but it can be summarised as follows: it is capitalistic accumulation itself that constantly produces, and produces in the direct ratio of its own energy and extent, a relativity redundant population of labourers, i.e., a population of greater extent than suffices for the average needs of the self-expansion of capital, and therefore a surplus-population. (Marx 1990, p. 782, my highlights). For starters, we should not forget that the sole aim of the capitalist is to produce profit5 . Capitalists are ruled by what Harvey calls “the coercive laws of competition” (2010, p. 146), in Marx’s words: “a coercive force external to him” (1990, p. 381). When wages rise, they become an obstacle between capitalists and the maximum amount of profit that can be extracted. More elements will then come into place, among others, the intensification of the exploitation of the work force and the use of technology to increase productivity and profitability (Harvey 2010; 2011; Marx 1990). One example that may be useful to illustrate such an abstract relation is that of bank workers in Brazil in the last 30 years. In the 1990s, bank employees in Brazil created influential labour unions to exert pressure on banks, therefore demanding higher quality jobs - higher salaries, less working hours, more job places, amongst others. When going on strikes, until the early 2000s, those unions would still have some influence in the decision-making process in the organisation of banks. In 2020, the widespread use of the new technology, which allows users to solve most of their needs using their smartphones, has caused demands for higher productivity, wage drops, more working hours, and an increase in unemployment in the sector - industrial reserve army. While strikes of the sector in the 1990s were catastrophic (crowds of employees on the streets, freezing of banks, very little or no money available, the support of the population), a strike in 2020 gathers a few dozen with signs in the streets that are usually ignored by most passerby, looking down at their smartphones. Leading us then to an important hallmark of capitalist labour exploitation practices: The Industrial Reserve Army as a regulator of the tensions between the exploiters and the exploited. As capital multiplies and grows, it also tends to follow two internal movements, namely concentration and centralisation. Respectively, the augmentation of capital and control of this capital in the hands of fewer people. At the other pole, it also produces what Marx called in the previous quote “a relatively redundant working population”, that is, the surplus population (Marx 1990, p. 782). This surplus population forms an army of workers who may at times be absorbed or rejected by the capital, according to the capital’s own needs (variation in the number of workers in a certain area), requirements (level of education, expertise, and/or experience), rules (wages/salaries, working hours, holidays, health insurance). In other words, “the working population therefore produces both the accumulation of capital and the means by which it is itself made relatively superfluous; and it does this to an extent to which is always increasing” (Marx 1990, p. 783). In the case of Brazilian bank clerks, the introduction of new technological machinery, as Marx calls it, allowed banks to dispose of thousands of employees and change the rules of the game, it developed new needs and new requirements. The first category of the relative surplus population characterises workers that are “sometimes repelled, sometimes attracted again in greater masses” by the job markets (Marx 1990, p. 794). A modern example may be the situation of engineering workers in Brazil - when the economy is growing, they are the first ones to be absorbed and to get higher salaries and better conditions of work. However, as the economy slows, they are repelled by the companies, made redundant, and will be unemployed again. The latent category represents those with potential to be part of the capitalist labour force but are in agricultural areas still struggling to survive with their own practices against massive capitalist companies; it is the representation of the death of a rural lifestyle. As cities and companies grow, they swallow small family farms and ranches, leaving those families with no other option but to sell their properties to the big companies, move to the cities, and sell their labour force. It is a situation portrayed in literature by Theodore Dreiser in The Lost Phoebe (1918) and by Graciliano Ramos in Vidas Secas (1938), and more recently in the American sitcom The Ranch (2016-2020), and vastly discussed in the works of Raymond Williams. The last category, the stagnant, is formed by those who must subject themselves to the lowest conditions of work, to the most irregular forms of employment, and to “a maximum of working time and a minimum of wages” (Marx 1990, p. 796) - a sediment of the working class that lives in the poorest conditions of life. Now that we have reached the stagnant category, we should remember that when Marx is discussing the three forms of relative surplus population, he is categorising workers, in other words, those who are forced to sell their workforce because they do not own any means of production – der Arbeitsmensch. They are those who are able to sell their workforce; those who are at their full capacity in body and mind to create surplus value at the lowest cost, with the lowest adaptation possible, as it is remarked by Marx (1990) and by Engels (1987). In contrast, when dealing with disability, we are considering those who have been labelled by capitalist practices, symbols, and meanings as disabled, unproductive, and as a burden to the rest of the working class. A burden to the rest of the working class because “what becomes of the operative…, in case he cannot work, is no concern of the employer” (Engels 1987, p. 543). Engels here sheds light on an important element of our discussion: the class condition is a fundamental aspect of analysis when we are discussing disability. Marx (1990, p.797, my highlights) enumerates three categories of those who dwell in pauperism – the lowest sediment of the relative surplus population’, (1) those who are able to work but who are not working; (2) orphans and pauper children; and, finally, (3) ‘the demoralized (sic), the ragged, and those unable to work, chiefly people who succumb to their incapacity for adaptation, an incapacity which results from the division of labour… Note that here he is dealing with the incapacity of adaptation. And he goes on to identify these workers as those “who have lived beyond the worker’s average lifespan; and the victims of industry… the mutilated, the sick…” (1990, p. 797, my highlights). Marx approaches both the issues of ageism and ableism in the same category to indicate that those who are deemed useless by capitalist practices and excluded from the labour market will dwell in pauperism. To clarify, pauperism is The hospital of the active labour-army and the dead weight of the industrial reserve army. Its production is included in that of the relative surplus population, its necessity is implied by their necessity; along with the surplus population, pauperism forms a condition of capitalist production, and of the capitalist development of wealth. It forms part of the faux frais of capitalist production: but capital usually knows how to transfer these from its own shoulders to those of the working-class and the petty bourgeoisie. (Marx 1990, p. 797). It seems to be implied that he differentiates the surplus population and pauperism. They are both conditioned to the ontological structure of the capitalist system and its ongoing wealth-making process. When Marx brings them together, he binds them, stating that one will be responsible for the other (the dead weight of the industrial reserve army), he is providing arguments against the traditional categorisation of disability as a personal and individual problem. Once again, disability is approached as a social, cultural, historical, and class-related issue. In a recent study, Santos (2020) scrutinised data on the living conditions of the Brazilian population comparing and contrasting the categories of race, gender, and disability with class condition. The author identifies how these elements come together to derail people’s access to a flourishing life in a racist, sexist/ patriarchal ableism, neoliberal Brazilian society. According to her, 30,06% of the population with a disability live with within the range of 0-1 minimum wage (R$ 1,100 reais) – in Brazil this means deprivation from a wide variety of essential goods and services, i.e., living in pauperism or close to pauperism. From another geographical perspective, in the United States, according to Erevelles (2011, p. 56), “[…] “one out of every four disabled people lives below the poverty line, and more than 75 percent have an individual income of less than $20,000.” In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx discusses the existence (Dasein) of the Arbeitsmensch in the labour-capital relationship. He points out that “[p]olitical economy… does not recognise the unoccupied worker, den Arbeitsmenschen, in so far as he happens to be outside [the] labourrelationship” (1988, p. 86), that is, it does not recognise their Dasein, their existence. According to Marx, “they are figures (Gestalten)…, specters(sic) (Gespenster) outside the domain of political economy” (1988, p. 86). Those deemed less exploitable or not exploitable are ghosts to a system that values profit over anything else. As I pointed out, when we consider the “class-disability” relationship in the working class, we are dealing with the sphere of pauperism – those on the lowest, poorest, most degrading conditions of life. These are either those who refuse to follow the system of discipline imposed by the capital or those who deviate from the ideal labour body/mind. Harvey (2010, p.149) points out that: there is the problem of what to do with people who don't conform and are therefore dubbed odd or even deviant. And this is Foucault's as well as Marx's point: they are called mad or antisocial and incarcerated in insane asylums or prisons; or as Marx notes, they get put in the stocks, mocked and punished. To be a "normal" person, therefore, is to accept a certain kind of spatiotemporal discipline convenient to a capitalist mode of production. What Marx demonstrates is that this isn't normal at all - it's a social construct that arose during this historical period in this particular way and for these particular reasons. According to Harvey, to be normal is to conform. Those who deviate will be labelled as abnormal, irrelevant, will be deemed useless, and set aside. So, normality does exist for capitalism – and it is very specific. On the one hand, it does not mean that we should simply accept it as a universal truth. On the other hand, we should not deny normality either but address it and question it. Theoretical and methodological perspectives that aim to refuse the existence of these antagonistic forces – normality and abnormality – in capitalist practices, symbols, and meanings, in an attempt to promote equality and the so-called inclusion, contribute to the ontological reproduction of the system that created the antagonism in the first place. Labelled as irrelevant and disposable to the political and economic structure, disabled people may be allocated in the Stagnant category of the Relative Surplus Population. In fact, even when they are absorbed by the system in times of need or when the system is forced to absorb them by affirmative action policies, those in the stagnant category “can be rendered superfluous at the slightest downturn of the business cycle” (Russel 2019, p. 76). Barnes (1992, p. 55) defines disability as “a diverse system of social constraints imposed on people with impairments by a highly discriminatory society — to be a disabled person means to be discriminated against”. A social approach to disability, therefore, does not deny the impairment, but understands that there is a socio-historical difference between impairment, disability, and disabled: the impairment is biological, the disability is social, and disabled is the end result of disabling a person with an impairment6 . Vygotsky (1993, p. 36) argues that “[i]n the final analysis, what decides the fate of a personality is not the defect [impairment in today’s terminology] itself, but its social consequences”. And it is this socio-psychological realisation that may or may not be a disabling one. In their development, disabled children will only require processes that will stimulate them in other ways rather than those traditionally applied at home, school, and any other social situation. As deviants of the patterns of normality, however, disabled people are many times completely or partially deprived of social participation. Deviant bodies and minds are expected to either follow the stabilised rules of society or not be part of it at all. Let us take a scene in Jack Nicholson’s One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest as an example. His character, Randle P. McMurphy, is in the swimming pool of a total institution for those considered mentally ill and/or intellectually disabled and tells one of guards that within six days he is going to leave the institution. To his surprise, according to the guard, he will only leave the institution when allowed to, when the doctors and nurses consider that he is able to adjust to social order. Randle is only pretending to have a disability to dodge prison, but to many of his companions it means never leaving the institution, because according to the rules, requirements, and needs of the capital they have already been deemed deviant and disposable or, as Harvey put it, they are “incarcerated in insane asylums or prisons […] they get put in the stocks, mocked and punished” (2010, p. 149).

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Afropess › 2NC --- Root Cause

The white body becomes the center of disability, creating a savage degeneracy at the heart of disabled blackness

Tommy Curry 17 [JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 48 No. 3, Fall 2017, 321–343., “This Nigger’s Broken: Hyper-Masculinity, the Buck, and the Role of Physical Disability in White Anxiety Toward the Black Male Body,” African American scholar, author and professor of philosophy. As of 2019, he holds a Personal Chair in Africana philosophy and Black male studies at the University of Edinburgh. In 2018, he won an American Book Award for The Man-Not: Race, Class, Genre, and the Dilemmas of Black Manhood, -ekh-]

On September 23, 2015, Mr. Jeremy McDole was executed by Wilmington, Delaware police officers. Mr. McDole was allegedly a threat to himself and suicidal. The police were responding to a “911 call reporting that [Mr. McDole] had shot himself.”1 The 911 caller can be heard yelling: “A man just shot himself in the AutoZone parking lot ... he’s fallen out of a wheelchair.”2 Mr. McDole was reported to the police as a victim, not a criminal. He was described as a disabled man with injury. A man who was suicidal; in need of help. His need, his victimhood, was not seen. He was not recognized by the police as a vulnerable person. He was seen as a Black man; a threat—a body marked for death by the danger he posed to others. This stereotype applied to his body, despite him being confined to a wheelchair. Like the deaths of hundreds of other Black males in America, his execution was recorded and subsequently released to the American public for summary judgment—just or unjust killing of a Black man. Unlike the hundreds of Black men killed every year in America, however, Mr. McDole was paralyzed from the waist down from an injury he sustained after being shot at the age of 18. What threat did this disabled Black man pose to anyone? Was he armed? Did he have a gun? These are the questions that define Black male death in this country, and despite Mr. McDole’s disability, they now define him. Why is it so easy to frame the lives of Black men and boys by one act, that same moment all the public sees where it is almost willed in unison that these Black males are in fact yearning for death? What was it about him being Black-male-disabled that resists consideration—did not diffuse the presumed danger—and convey that he was not a threat?

Like many academic fields, disability studies has been confronted with its raced, classed, and gendered assumptions about the body which lies at the center of conceptualizations of disability. Over a decade ago, Phil Smith argued in “Whiteness, Normal Theory, and Disability Studies,” that “whiteness is a normative, dominating, unexamined power that underlies the rationality of Eurocentric culture and thought. It serves to push to the margins not only those defined as not-white, but also those defined as not-Able.”3 Similarly, Chris Bell’s “Introducing White Disability Studies: A Modest Proposal,” argues that disability studies functions to commodify Blackness as synonymous with disability. Reflecting on the Queer disability conference held in 2002, he writes many disabled non-whites “could not understand the overarching mentality of many of the attendees, perhaps best expressed by a remark made in a breakout session: ‘Being disabled is just like being black, so society should stop hating us and give us our rights.’ ”4 Bell clarifies in a footnote that disability studies normalizes disability such that the white disabled body is the conceptual/anthropological origin of disabledness. Far from excluding people of color, “White Disability Studies treats people of color as if they were white people; as if there are no critical exigencies involved in being people of color that might necessitate these individuals understanding and negotiating disability in a different way from their white counterparts.”5

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Afropess › 1NC --- Link

Their attempt to refuse ableism within the structures of civil society is only the upending of a conflict that mystifies the fundamental antagonism that structures civil society and the world writ large: The non-being of blackness – Anti-blackness provides coherence to the “human” subject.

Kim 13,[ Hyo K. Kim, an assistant professor of English at Medgar Evers College, City University of New York, where he teaches Asian American literature and literary theory. He is currently involved in two research projects; one editing a collection of critical essays on Theresa Cha’s Dictee; another is a book-length study exploring the connections between minor affects and the aesthetics of minority literatures in the United States, Published in Penumbra: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Critical and Creative Inquiry, , JMH]

For instance, what at first glance seems merely naïve―that is the observation that in the U.S. “[b]eing disabled is just like being black”―actually does index how disability cannot be synonymous with Whiteness. For what is suggested through the forced parity between the construction of blackness and disability is that the disabled body or mind cannot properly embody Whiteness in toto. And that is what Anna Stubblefield demonstrates in “‘Beyond the Pale’: Tainted Whiteness, Cognitive Disability and Eugenic Sterilization,” which iterates how disabled white persons have historically been categorized as embodying a tainted form of whiteness. She convincingly argues that beginning from the 1800s in the U.S. those who were considered feebleminded, a form of cognitive disability, lost the full privileges attendant with white citizenship. As she writes, “… to grasp feeblemindedness fully as a signifier of tainted whiteness, it is important to understand that the state-sponsored, involuntary sterilization of tainted whites meant that they had, in effect, lost the full protection that whiteness conferred in a white supremacist society” (178; emphasis added). Not only did the so-called feebleminded whites come to embody a compromised form of whiteness but also the “ … white men [and women] labeled as criminal, sexually deviate, homosexual, … or insane … ” (Stubblefield 178). What Stubblefield emphasizes is that disability as a social construct cannot easily be detached from its imbricated positioning within a network of material forces that include not only race but sexuality, class, and gender. Her study foregrounds the need for Disability studies to attend to racialization as not a tangential focus but central to its overall theoretical and political project. Interestingly Stubblefield’s study of how disability can dispossess whites of their “full personhood” under U.S. law seemingly lends support to what “Dismodernism” authorizes, which is the idea that the suffering of blacks can be made equivalent to not only what disabled whites come to embody but also to all those other Others represented under the category of “people of color.” In short, disability has the potential to democratize civil society by recalling how all citizens are common in their humanity―that is, equally exposed to disability. Yet, if we read between the lines of Stubblefield’s summary of how “feebleminded whites” can become “tainted,” the singularity of “blackness’s grammar of suffering” emerges. For what distinguishes “blackness grammar of suffering” is how it does not operate according to the assumptive logic of capability. In other words, to approach “blackness’s grammar of suffering,” Wilderson insists that one must be able to imagine “an ethicality … so terrifying that, as a space to be inhabited and terror to be embraced” (41), it resists language. It is a “grammar of suffering” based not upon the logic of a “lost” capacity but that of a deontologized property, the Slave that is not “exploited and alienated” but rather “accumulated and fungible.” The effect of this singular grammar on Asian American and Disability studies is significant, but the impact of Wilderson’s critique on the “scholarly and aesthetic production” of the “Black theorist” is radical by comparison. As he writes: This [“blackness’s grammar suffering”] makes the labor of disavowal in Black scholarly and aesthetic production doubly burdensome, for it is triggered by a dread of both being ‘discovered,’ and of discovering oneself, as ontological incapacity. Thus, through borrowed institutionality―the feigned capacity to be essentially exploited and alienated (rather than accumulated and fungible) in the first ontological instance (in other words, a fantasy to be just like everyone else, which is a fantasy to be)―the work of Black film theory [and by extension Black studies] operates through a myriad of compensatory gestures in which the Black theorists assumes subjective capacity to be universal and thus ‘finds’ it everywhere. (42) Placed within the frame of “blackness’s grammar of suffering,” I want to examine the consequences of Davis’s attempt to render disability cosmopolitan. While the move has the virtual effect of equalizing all bodies around human capacity to suffer―such an ethical cum political strategy requires the disavowal of how concepts such as “human” and “civil society” in the U.S. have structurally depended on the production of social death, i.e. the Black (and the Red). As it should be obvious by now, what is therefore unthinkable in Davis’s attempt to make civil society cohere around the universality of human suffering is the contingent nature of the term human itself. This in fact is what Bells intuits but cannot name in his influential essay entitled “Introducing White Disability Studies: A Modest Proposal.” Bell’s hesitation is partly attributable to how pain or suffering is both social (that is communicable, sharable by all humans in equal measure) and incommunicable within Disability studies. That is, Disability studies’ uneven attention to the incommunicability of suffering is seemingly capable of accommodating the unrepresentability that is constituent of “blackness’s grammar of suffering.” As Siebers insists, “[i]ndividuality derived from the incommunicability of pain easily enforces a myth of hyperindividuality, a sense that each individual is locked in solitary confinement where suffering is the only object of contemplation. People with disabilities are already too politically isolated for this myth to be attractive” (176). Yet in an attempt to intervene in the poststructuralist tendency to idealize “physical pain” as site of either transcendent power or pleasure, Siebers also adds, “… [p]hysical pain is [at once] highly individualistic, unpredictable, and raw as reality. Pain is not a resource of political change. It is not a well of delight for the individual” (178). What is directly pertinent to the present essay is how the universal figure of the “individual”- human marks the critical horizon of Disability theory. Or, to put a finer point to it via Widerson’s reading of Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Mask, “… the Negro … ‘is comparison,’ nothing more and certainly nothing less, for what is less than comparison? … [And as such] ‘No one knows yet who [the Negro] is, but he knows that fear will fill the world when the world finds out’” (42). We find in the most sophisticated Asian Americanist deployment of poststructuralist strategies of reading―such as the one advanced in the influential work by Kandice Chuh―a similar call to abandon politics based on social identity.6 While I am in agreement with both Davis’s and Chuh’s overarching critique of uniform identity, I find troubling their wholesale critique of all identity formation as a priori essentialist. For such framing of social identity as necessarily restrictive can only lead to the return of the repressed in our present era of colorblindness―the ideal of abstract citizenship. As she writes: “‘Asian American’ … connotes the violence, exclusion, dislocation, and disenfranchisement that has attended the codification of certain bodies as variously, Oriental, yellow, sometimes brown, inscrutable, devious, always alien. It speaks to the active denial of personhood to the individuals inhabiting those bodies” (Chuh 27). In this, Chuh―along with Davis and Siebers―unwittingly announces the displacement and the erasure of “blackness’s grammar of suffering,” as their strategies of reading the presence or absence of justice within U.S. civil society is predicated upon exploitation and alienation of the a priori human subject. Nevertheless, by embodying the self―Disability studies helps to shift (though only slightly) critical theory toward an alternative ethicality that does not programmatically endorse the idea and ideals of abstract citizenship. For contrary to the liberal model of the political subject that achieves “hyperindividuality” through social and material detachment, the alternative model of subjectivity that is afforded through the disabled body is a self that is always already in the process of negotiating complex relations to the materiality of the social. Thus, the embodied model of subjectivity helps to re-imagine “personhood” as relation itself, leading not to the reification or essentialization of self, this relational model of subjectivity demands that any identity whatsoever be thought not as autonomous substance but rather as a site, comprising of unfinished, mobile, heterogeneously constituted relations across an embodied hermeneutic horizon. It bears mentioning here that it is this interconnected and radically open vision of “personhood” as relation that is foreclosed in the liberal model of abstract citizenship. For in the liberal model of the self, the ideal is to attain singular indeterminacy through the negation of such social relations, without which no self can hope to attain intelligibility. As Alcoff’s important work suggests: Social identities … are more properly understood as sites from which we perceive, act, and engage with others. These sites are not simply locations or positions, but also hermeneutic horizons comprised of experiences, basic beliefs, and communal values […] . We are not boxed in by them, constrained, restricted, or held captive―unless … it makes sense to say that we are boxed in by the fact that we have bodies . … (287) Interestingly it is by attending to how the self is embodied and embedded in social reality that clarifies the radical singularity of the Black’s structural non-relationality, which in turn helps to bring into focus not only what Wilderson calls the “structural antagonisms” that contour U.S. civil society but also unexplored ethico-political limits and possibilities of sub-fields such as Disability and Asian American studies. For according to Wilderson’s Red, White & Black what gives internal coherence to such terms as “human” and “civil society” in the U.S. is the disavowal of the structural (historical) relation blacks have with what is essentially non-human, a form of social death known as slavery. As he summarizes: During the emergence of new ontological relations in the modern world, from the late Middle Ages through the 1500s, many different kinds of people experienced slavery. … But African, or more precisely Blackness, refers to an individual who is by definition always already void of relationality. Thus modernity marks the emergence of a new ontology because it is an era in which an entire race appears, people who, a priori, that is prior to the contingency of the ‘transgressive act’ (such as losing a war or being convicted of a crime), stand as socially dead in relation to the rest of the world. (17-8) Wilderson’s intervention therefore hinges on isolating and exposing this dual operation by which civil society makes sense of itself to itself―the simultaneous disavowal of and parasitic dependency on the Black. In other words, the desire to make blackness an analogue of disability amounts to denying the structural relevancy of slavery to the formation of U.S. civil society. Wilderson’s reading of Fanon helps to articulate the radical singularity of “blackness’s grammar of suffering,” as it emphasizes how “… the gratuitous violence of the Black’s first ontological instance, the Middle Passage, ‘wiped out [his or her] metaphysics … his [or her] customs and sources on which they are based.’ Jews went into Auschwitz and came out as Jews. Africans went into the ships and came out as Blacks” (38). What Wilderson calls the “blackness’s grammar of suffering,” consequently, has no analogue in either the assumptive figure of the “individual” that subtends Disability studies and those other Others within U.S. civil society that have become included within the frame known as “people of color.” In this, “blackness’s grammar of suffering” gestures toward what is unnamable, a form of suffering that is in excess of any ethical language which is based upon the universal figure of the human. This is how Wilderson radically undermines the desire to transpose “blackness’s grammar of suffering” into the ethico-political language upon which civil society’s depends to make suffering (physical, psychic or otherwise) intelligible. As he writes: The ruse of analogy erroneously locates Blacks in the world―a place where they have not been since the dawn of Blackness. This attempt to position the Black in the world by way of analogy is not only a mystification, and often erasure, of Blackness’s grammar of suffering (accumulation and fungibility or the status of being non-Human) but simultaneously also a provision for civil society, promising an enabling modality for Human ethical dilemmas. It is a mystification and an erasure because … their grammars of suffering are irreconcilable. (37) Such is the logic that animates Bell’s critique of Disability studies but it does not, cannot obtain the force of Wilderson’s intervention because Bell cannot or dare not disarticulate the Black from the world. Nevertheless both Wilderson and Bell help foreground the important fact that even suffering obtains a “grammar,” that is, has a way of indexing―whether positively in the form of identification or negatively through dis- or even through non-identification, the presence or absence of a world. What Bell’s and especially Wilderson’s critique bring into sharp relief is that anti-blackness is part and parcel of the episteme that gives internal coherence to U.S. civil society. To approach “blackness’s grammar suffering” is therefore to contemplate, albeit always indirectly, not the paradigm of disability which is always already predicated on agency but a radical non-capacity. Wilderson’s illumination of how the “antagonism” that obtains around blackness is structural to the formation of U.S. civil society has the effect of clarifying the positioning of sub-fields such as Disability and Asian American studies, especially when their protocols aim toward establishing some form of political justice based upon “exploitation and alienation,” which is at odds with “blackness’s grammar of suffering.” As previously mentioned, Wilderson draws a sharp distinction between “conflict” and “antagonism.” And this is key, as it is only when anti-blackness is positioned as an “antagonism” that the residual and structural effects of the Slave (the non-human) can be allowed to erupt into the living present of U.S. civil society. As such, though by comparison far more optimistic than Wilderson’s study, Alexander’s The New Jim Crow (2010) gives powerful evidence to Wilderson’s theory of the “structural antagonisms” that contour U.S. civil society. This is how a critical theory based upon advancing a colorblind world or an ethicality based upon the universal human effectively silences the suffering of the Black. As Alexander argues: Far from being a worthy goal … colorblindness has proved catastrophic for African Americans. It is not an overstatement to say that the systematic mass incarceration of people of color in the United States would not have been possible in the post-civil rights era if the nation had not fallen under the spell of a callous colorblindness. … Saying that one does not care about race is offered as an exculpatory virtue, when in fact it can be a form of cruelty. … Our blindness also prevents us from seeing the racial and structural divisions that persist in society: the segregated, unequal schools, the segregated, jobless ghettos, and the segregated public discourse―a public conversation that excludes the current pariah of caste [the incarcerated black males in U.S. civil society]. (228) In this, Wilderson’s Red, White, & Black and Alexander’s The New Jim Crow bring into sharp focus why the framing of blackness within U.S. civil society cannot do without the ruse of analogy which effectively puts under erasure a “… violence which turns a body into flesh, ripped apart literally and imaginatively, destroy[ing] the possibility of ontology because it positions the Black in an infinite and indeterminately horrifying and open vulnerability, an object made available (which is to say fungible) for any subject” (Wilderson, 38). Put otherwise, this “violence” which is in excess of that ideologically saturated term called Humanity demands the infinitely difficult yet necessary encountering with what gives U.S. civil society the simulacrum of ethical and political decency.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Case › 2NC --- Reform

Disability must be politicized---this is the only way to secure collective rights---the retreat from politics reifies ableist tropes of charity politics and naively tries to wish problems away

Ruckelshaus 17, (Jay Ruckelshaus is a Rhodes Scholar and graduate student in political theory at the University of Oxford, and the founder and president of Ramp Less Traveled, a nonprofit organization that helps students with spinal cord injuries pursue higher education, The Non-Politics of Disability, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/opinion/denouncing-trump-wont-help-disability-rights.html)

Disability rights enjoy a seemingly ironclad moral consensus, an ostensible unanimity that is striking given America’s entrenched polarization and the antagonism surrounding other identity movements. Many are wary of L.G.B.T. rights or the Black Lives Matter movement, but it seems beyond the pale — almost cruel — to oppose disability rights. Nobody wants to be anti-disability. Initially, this harmony would seem helpful. Free from partisan discord, advancements for the approximately 57 million Americans with disabilities should be easier to achieve, borne aloft by the wings of certain progress. Why, then, do rampant unemployment and educational disparities endure, and why does success remain the exception? I think part of the reason is the insulation of our pro-disabled political consensus. Its logic is rooted not in any deep belief in the equal worth of citizens with disabilities, but rather in a general aversion to disability. This is related to the charity impulse that has always surrounded disability — and has constrained liberation efforts by assuming that inequities are unfortunate but natural realities to be mitigated through compassion, rather than politically structured injustices. There is also a profound lack of disabled people in the public sphere, meaning any substantive discussion that does occur is extremely rare. I suspect many people I talk to about disability maintain an implicit hope that, if they nod as vigorously as possible, the issue will simply go away. In this way, support for disability rights is similar to the act of expressing perfunctory thanks to military veterans. It temporarily absolves us of the responsibility to address the heart of the matter. Moreover, the apparent moral consensus may be mostly superficial. In trying to enact accessibility, disability advocates encounter increasing resistance as the effort and costs involved in proposals come closer to being realized. (Consider the neighborhood store that decides it’s just too costly to install a ramp, or the community lecture that excludes deaf attendees by refusing to hire a sign-language interpreter.) Instead of facilitating change, false unity actually restrains change. It stifles the more substantive conversations true progress requires. And our inability to speak honestly — and contentiously — about disability shows how the politics of disability is in this sense non-political. We are the worse for it. In addition to greater participation in the public sphere, true progress for citizens with disabilities will require a willingness to confront the issues head-on, even when — especially when — citizens disagree on competing solutions. We must politicize disability — not in the cable-news, grandstanding kind of way, but in the term’s more formal sense. The work of the Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe can help illuminate what’s at stake. Mouffe begins with the premise that human relations are inherently antagonistic: Political change always requires controversial transfers in power or prestige, and it is an illusion to imagine politics without confrontation. Per this “agonistic” conception of democracy, a healthy political order is one that prefers vigorous, good-faith argumentation to complacent consensus. Until we publicly recognize real disagreements surrounding disability and accessibility, Mouffe would insist, we are doomed to a vacuous, empty debate that is neither political nor productive. Recall the Kovaleski incident. I’m not suggesting that the abhorrence of Mr. Trump’s actions is open to legitimate questioning. But in their forcefully reassuring comments and messages, my friends prevented any serious discussion of disability at the level where reasonable disagreement does exist. Where will the money come from to fund disability employment schemes? How do we even define “disability”? Despite — and, I would argue, partly because of — the broad condemnation of Mr. Trump for his insensitivity, there was no substantive public discussion of such issues. You may be thinking, haven’t we had enough politics lately? Maybe it’s a blessing that disability isn’t as political as it might be; it avoids the drama and messiness that now seem to define our common life. Avoiding politics might be possible if disability were an exclusively private affair. But it is fundamentally a public concern, affecting everyone directly or indirectly and revealing our obligations to one another as members of a democratic society. Issues of accessibility can be fully addressed only through public institutions and collective effort. For the disability community, there is no answer but politics.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Case › 1NC --- Reform

Abstract critique keeps us from forefronting political reform

Ruckelshaus 17 (Jay, Rhodes Scholar and graduate student in political theory at the University of Oxford, and the founder and president of Ramp Less Traveled, a nonprofit organization that helps students with spinal cord injuries pursue higher education, "The Non-Politics of Disability”, 1/18/17, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/opinion/denouncing-trump-wont-help-disability-rights.html)

Disability rights enjoy a seemingly ironclad moral consensus, an ostensible unanimity that is striking given America’s entrenched polarization and the antagonism surrounding other identity movements. Many are wary of L.G.B.T. rights or the Black Lives Matter movement, but it seems beyond the pale — almost cruel — to oppose disability rights. Nobody wants to be anti-disability. Initially, this harmony would seem helpful. Free from partisan discord, advancements for the approximately 57 million Americans with disabilities should be easier to achieve, borne aloft by the wings of certain progress. Why, then, do rampant unemployment and educational disparities endure, and why does success remain the exception? I think part of the reason is the insulation of our pro-disabled political consensus. Its logic is rooted not in any deep belief in the equal worth of citizens with disabilities, but rather in a general aversion to disability. This is related to the charity impulse that has always surrounded disability — and has constrained liberation efforts by assuming that inequities are unfortunate but natural realities to be mitigated through compassion, rather than politically structured injustices. There is also a profound lack of disabled people in the public sphere, meaning any substantive discussion that does occur is extremely rare. I suspect many people I talk to about disability maintain an implicit hope that, if they nod as vigorously as possible, the issue will simply go away. In this way, support for disability rights is similar to the act of expressing perfunctory thanks to military veterans. It temporarily absolves us of the responsibility to address the heart of the matter. Moreover, the apparent moral consensus may be mostly superficial. In trying to enact accessibility, disability advocates encounter increasing resistance as the effort and costs involved in proposals come closer to being realized. (Consider the neighborhood store that decides it’s just too costly to install a ramp, or the community lecture that excludes deaf attendees by refusing to hire a sign-language interpreter.) Instead of facilitating change, false unity actually restrains change. It stifles the more substantive conversations true progress requires. And our inability to speak honestly — and contentiously — about disability shows how the politics of disability is in this sense non-political. We are the worse for it. In addition to greater participation in the public sphere, true progress for citizens with disabilities will require a willingness to confront the issues head-on, even when — especially when — citizens disagree on competing solutions. We must politicize disability — not in the cable-news, grandstanding kind of way, but in the term’s more formal sense. The work of the Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe can help illuminate what’s at stake. Mouffe begins with the premise that human relations are inherently antagonistic: Political change always requires controversial transfers in power or prestige, and it is an illusion to imagine politics without confrontation. Per this “agonistic” conception of democracy, a healthy political order is one that prefers vigorous, good-faith argumentation to complacent consensus. Until we publicly recognize real disagreements surrounding disability and accessibility, Mouffe would insist, we are doomed to a vacuous, empty debate that is neither political nor productive. Recall the Kovaleski incident. I’m not suggesting that the abhorrence of Mr. Trump’s actions is open to legitimate questioning. But in their forcefully reassuring comments and messages, my friends prevented any serious discussion of disability at the level where reasonable disagreement does exist. Where will the money come from to fund disability employment schemes? How do we even define “disability”? Despite — and, I would argue, partly because of — the broad condemnation of Mr. Trump for his insensitivity, there was no substantive public discussion of such issues. You may be thinking, haven’t we had enough politics lately? Maybe it’s a blessing that disability isn’t as political as it might be; it avoids the drama and messiness that now seem to define our common life. Avoiding politics might be possible if disability were an exclusively private affair. But it is fundamentally a public concern, affecting everyone directly or indirectly and revealing our obligations to one another as members of a democratic society. Issues of accessibility can be fully addressed only through public institutions and collective effort. For the disability community, there is no answer but politics. But politics need not be repulsive. That’s the beauty of Mouffe’s agonism: By legitimating clashing arguments and welcoming them into the political fold, unproductive antagonism becomes constructive, and compromises emerge.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Case › 2NC --- State Good

State action can be good for people with disabilities – ADA proves

Mckeever 20 (Amy Mckeever, JULY 30, 2020, "How the Americans with Disabilities Act transformed a country," History, ) //RB

More than 2,000 disability rights advocates gathered on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, D.C., on a hot summer day. It was July 26, 1990, and they’d come together to witness one of the most momentous civil rights victories in decades: President George H.W. Bush signing the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) into law.

During the signing ceremony—days after the Fourth of July—Bush admitted that the United States hadn’t always lived up to its founding principles of freedom and equality. “[T]ragically, for too many Americans, the blessings of liberty have been limited or even denied,” he said. “Today’s legislation brings us closer to that day when no Americans will ever again be deprived of their basic guarantee of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Case › 1NC --- State Good

The bidirectionality of this topic allows for state action for info sharing which resolves the securitization of collective trauma that caused the War on drugs, terror, and poverty

Jonathon P. Whooley 21 [San Francisco State University, International Relations, Ontological (In)visibility and Cyber Conflict: The Problem of Sight and Vision in Establishing Threat, Global, Local, Political 2021, Vol. 46(2) 47–51, , -ekh-]

International Relations (IR) is a field of vision. Elements traditional to IR like nuclear deterrence, armed conflict, terrorism, or great power balancing, all require states to interpret the behavior and posture of other actors to define the menu of options that are available to them. Ontological security theorists in general agree with this position, arguing that feelings and interpretations of their security are required for states to understand their position in relation to others in the international system. Thus, a state’s identity is defined as much by its relationship and feeling of threat toward and among other states. But what happens if the linchpin of defining a state’s security is covert, what if the mechanisms by which a state understands its security standing is accomplished not in the light, but rather in the shadows, around computer networks, non-state actors, disinformation campaigns, hacking, and at least for democratic states like the US through electoral manipulation?

At a recent conference panel with intelligent scholars of various stripe I was asked ‘when was the last cyber attack?’ They noted the presence of Stuxnet (a US-Israeli produced computer virus targeting the Iranian nuclear refining infrastructure at the Natanz plant) but hinted in confusion that there had not been much since. And my colleague was not alone, polling on the threat of cyber-attack routinely finds that these actions among the lowest of concerns for most Americans,1 The problem inherent in the disconnect between the assumptions of my informed colleagues and the reality of the cyber landscape is vision and sight. Cyberthreats often fall in between and within the context of our blindspots, hackers and non-state actors use the fact that much of what they do, be it malware or ransomware toward a hospital, misinformation or disinformation online, or direct attacks on networks or individuals, all too often are relegated to page A7 instead of the front page and largely away from public vision. However, if say, a series of bombs were exploded paralyzing the financial sector of a major American city the focus would immediately be apprehended and the eyeballs of many Americans would be glued to said attack.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Case › 1NC --- Liberalism

Even if political liberalism currently excludes the disabled, discussing questions of implementation can revise it

Badano 13 (Gabriele – PhD candidate at the Centre for Philosophy, Justice and Health at University College London – “Political liberalism and the justice claims of the disabled: a reconciliation,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, April 2013, http://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/tHKkbrxhGYIWAxTcJrAW/full#.UxyV-PldX-4)

I argue that any proposal abandoning the language of political justice would not seem to do enough for those individuals with disabilities who fall outside the basic idea of persons as depicted by Rawls. In fact, the intuitions supporting the idea that concepts like rights and opportunities are indispensable are very strong.11 Let us go back to the examples of individuals falling outside Rawls’s idea of persons because their disabilities prevent them from being a net benefit to social cooperation. They are individuals who need multiple carers to work, or whose disabilities prevent them from providing a benefit to social cooperation that is large enough. To put the point more sharply, it is worth noticing that the disabilities in question are compatible with being in full possession of one’s logical and moral powers. Now, should we accept that those individuals ought to be given no rights or opportunities? An affirmative answer would strike us as implausible, and for a good reason. In a liberal society, having one’s rights, opportunities and basic distributive entitlements acknowledged is one and the same as being recognized as an equal. And what is missing from Rawls’s political liberalism is precisely the idea that falling below a threshold of full cooperation should not be enough to prevent the disabled from being regarded as persons on an equal footing with anyone else. In sum, Rawls’s political liberalism is not amenable to any extension that, keeping the basic ideas of society and persons intact, is able to include a concern with the status of individuals with disabilities. In addition, the proposal that the interests of the disabled are not for public reason to protect is not satisfactory. Consequently, a substantial revision is the only way to reconcile political liberalism with our intuitions concerning what is due to the disabled. 5. Revising political liberalism I: beyond Hartley’s contractualism The aim of this section and the next is to propose a substantial revision of Rawls’s theory that accommodates the justice claims of the disabled while upholding the project of political liberalism. A question that needs to be answered at this point is: why should we uphold the project of political liberalism, rather than endorsing a different model that more neatly fits with our intuitions concerning what is due to the disabled? First, the general project of political liberalism is compelling. Rawls’s political liberalism aims to identify a common ground of political ideas that can work as the basis on which the most important political decisions should be made. This project is of the greatest importance because, if successful, it creates legitimacy by building institutions on the basis of concepts that are acceptable to each reasonable individual. Moreover, it promotes stability in societies that are characterized by deep pluralism. Second, despite Rawls’s failure to take the interests of the disabled into consideration, political liberalism is well suited to support the justice claims of individuals with disabilities. This is because the idea that the disabled are citizens who deserve our respect is part of the common culture of our societies. In other words, there is an overlapping consensus on the idea that rights, opportunities and distributive shares must be granted to individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society, including those who fall below full moral powers. It is widely believed that those with physical disabilities should have the same rights as their fellow citizens, live in a social environment that does not excessively limit their opportunities and receive benefits that help meet their special needs. Besides, although the state or third parties are given exceptional rights to interfere with the autonomy of individuals with severe cognitive disabilities, it is widely recognized that the mentally disabled are citizens whose basic interests must be protected by the law.12 In the public space, any proposal that individuals who are not fully cooperating members of society should have their basic interests neglected would be widely received with outrage. Such proposal would be said to fit a fascist society, not a decent one. Among other legal documents, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (UN General Assembly, A/61/611) can be taken as the epitome of this widespread attitude. Adopted in 2006, the Convention requires that all individuals with disabilities should share in the enjoyment of equal fundamental rights.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Case › 1NC --- Cyborg Bad

The Aff is an ableist cyborg hoax

Ellcessor 16 (Elizabeth Ellcessor is an associate professor of media studies at the University of Virginia, “Cyborg hoaxes: Disability, deception, and critical studies of digital media”, , 4/19/16, Buck)

Cyborg hoaxes, deceptive forms of identity presentation that articulate gender, disability, and technology, have been persistent but unremarked upon elements of online culture. By identifying, contextualizing, and deconstructing them, this article has highlighted the persistence of an ideology of ability in online culture and in cyberculture and Internet studies. An ideology of ability is at work in the pitiable presentation of a digital sweet innocent and in the excuses offered by cancer. Identifying these themes reveals that online cultures remain closely connected to larger ideologies and norms. Far from offering a “liberation technology” (Coombs, 1991), online spaces may reproduce and amplify the prejudices and normative assumptions of a broader cultural context. These deceptive assemblages deploy disability strategically for an able-bodied audience, taking advantage of existing hierarchies. Yet, they may also challenge the very ideologies upon which they depend. For instance, the prominence of romance and sexuality in these hoaxes counters very real tendencies to desexualize people with disabilities. Such contradictions, and the blurring of identity and technology, are indicative of the “cyborg” component of these hoaxes. While I retained this language in order to highlight the possibility of such provocations, it is in the experiences of people with disabilities using online media that a richer form of cyborg can be found. These experiences reflect a variety of possible linkages of gender and sexuality, disability, and technology. In these formations, people with disabilities can be understood “as cyborgs not because of [their] bodies (e.g. our use of prosthetics, ventilators, or attendants), but because of [their] political practices” (Kafer, 2013: 120). In claiming disability identity and engaging in community formation, by reconfiguring default settings of computer hardware and software, and by speaking back to dominant narratives of disability and gender, these individuals and communities are producing disability technocultures that are seditious and, too often, invisible. Disability is a necessary and theoretically rich addition to the forms of identity, community, and material technology that have dominated critical and cultural studies of digital media. Present since the earliest cyberculture work, but rendered invisible or metaphorical, disability offers important critical resources for the nuanced and complex study of the digital networked media that increasingly permeate daily life. Not a metaphor, and not invisible, but ever-present and meaningful, disability offers a lens through which to examine theoretical assumptions and exclusions and with which to critically interrogate normative forms of digital media and the ideological structures that maintain and challenge them.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Case › 1NC --- Cyborg Bad

Cyborg theorizing is rooted in ableist and Anti-Black logics that ensure it’s failure.

Knadler 19 - ( Stephen Knadler; Stephen Knadler is an associate professor of English at Spelman College, where he teaches US literature and cultural studies. He has been published in American Literature, American Literary History, American Quarterly, Minnesota Review, and Modern Fiction Studies.; Originally published: August 6, 2019; “Vitality politics : health, debility, and the limits of black emancipation”; http://link.umsl.edu/portal/Vitality-politics--health-debility-and-the/n6SXiAQq3ac) Dōgen

What I am also unwilling to take with the theory of assemblage is the freighted territory of the cyborg: the feminist materialist theory of becoming developed by Donna Haraway that combines human, animal, and machine as a radical political enterprise that ushers in the future both theoretically and practically. I have found it useful as a thought exercise that complicates the relationship of the body to itself and to others and deals with our very real reliance on machines and kinship with animals. Since the cyborg opens up the conversation about futurity—which usually elides madness and Blackness—it also becomes a useful space to consider who we are becoming.60 Certainly, to think through our kinship with machines is apropos for discussions of disability given the medicalization of certain bodies, and remains so given my emphasis on speculative fiction. But the cyborg is an incomplete, politically fraught, and ethically suspicious answer to a series of questions about raced and disabled futurity. Material reality must reckon with what others have pointed out are the lived experiences of the Black and disabled body, what amount to (in this project, at least) the gaps and folds within Black speculative fiction. Read in alignment with Tobin Siebers’s theory of complex embodiment and Alison Kafer’s questioning of spatial, cultural, and temporal logics, the emphasis on the cyborg and the desire to supersede the body has an antagonistic relationship with concerns at the heart of disability studies: pain, fiscal access, and the validity of embodied experience, to name a few.61 What happens when one does not desire cyborgian intervention as cure? What of those for whom material cyborgian realities are more painful than useful or pleasurable? As much as cyborgian futures promise a radical set of possibilities for considering disability, we ought to be wary of them because they are also reliant on a set of middleclass (or rich) realities. I have elsewhere pointed out the way the cyborg’s promise of radical potential hinges on an original white Western subject.62 Leaning on Donna Haraway’s original definition, João Costa Vargas and Joy A. James understand the Black cyborg as a postbellum construction that requires Black degradation: “A Black cyborg: a modified, improved human whose increased ethical, spiritual, and physical capabilities generate unusual strength, omniscience, and boundless love.”63 They invoke Haraway’s understanding of the cyborg as both real and fictive to pinpoint how the Black cyborg relies on a set of interracial dynamics that extend from a history steeped in anti-Blackness. The Black cyborg is required to participate in its own self abnegation since it is built on top of the foundations of American democratic and imperial projects reliant on phobic understandings of Blackness. The Black cyborg, then, in Vargas and James’s formulation, echoes that of the disabled cyborg: neither can escape the desire for normalcy that erases Blackness and madness both. Alison Kafer reads in the gaps of Haraway’s work and its intellectual genealogy to reinsert the oft-overlooked contributions of women of color—among them Octavia E. Butler and Chela Sandoval—to the definition of the cyborg. She pinpoints that the cyborg as transgressive figure has limited potential precisely because of how it has been developed and mobilized in ways that erase women of color and reify the virgule between disabled and able-bodied. Though the cyborg asks for blasphemous interpretation—a promise and proposition Kafer, Vargas, and James readily champion—as part of its political transgression, I question how much the cyborg can map a future of any kind when it relies on a past and path of erasure. What the cyborg ushers in—that I’d prefer to leave aside for this discussion—is an assemblage yoked to anti-Blackness and ableism, a method of becoming that requires theoretical overcoming since the theories rely on but refuse disabled and Black embodiment.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Neg › Case › 1NC --- Presumption

Alt can’t change society’s worldview and only marginalizes material experiences

Vehmas & Watson 13 (Simo Vehmas & Nick Watson, “Moral wrongs, disadvantages, and disability: a critique of critical disability studies”, p. 648-649)

Further, deconstructing differences will not in and of itself produce respect and equality between all people with various characteristics. Neither will it result in a social order free from a sense of difference. It is simply unrealistic to assume that a society could exist were people would not see some other people as different, and their lives or characteristics as representing a deviation from some norm considered important regarding good human life. This is because some of the individual characteristics that define disabled people are, sometimes with good reason, undesirable, even in a utopia where all differences would have been queered. Disability is not the same as many other group identities and we need to explore both morally and socially disability and difference rather than simply use difference as a concept through which to critique the disability identity. There are no rational reasons to consider homosexuality or gender undesirable characteristics whatever the social context, but there are many impairments that can reasonably be seen as undesirable (Shakespeare 2006). Motor neuron disease, depression or spinal cord injury are the kinds of conditions that we would prefer not to have, and this is not merely because of the cultural representations attached to them but because these conditions are the kinds of predicaments that cause suffering irrespective of one’s cultural environment. In acknowledging that impairments can include an undesirable dimension does not imply devaluing people with impairments nor their positive group identity (Shakespeare and Watson 2010). As long as people are genuinely free to decide for themselves and feel about themselves however they wish to feel, we are pretty close to relational justice, free from hierarchical evils. Imposing on people ableist or disablist assumptions is certainly wrong, but so would be the denial of the personal experiences of fearing the loss of one’s physical and mental capacities, or the fear of dying (Carel 2008). To explain the psychological anguish related to conditions such as motor neurone disease or depression merely in terms of internalized oppression and ableism would be insensitive, disrespectful and simply nonsensical.

2022 Michigan Kritik
Aff --- Disability --- K lab › DA › 2AC --- Tech Good

Modern technology is unpredictable; we cannot rely on it to “solve” disability

Schalk 18 (Sami Schalk, Associate Professor in the Department of Gender & Women's Studies at the University of Wisconsin – Madison, (2018) Bodyminds Reimagined: (Dis)ability, Race, and Gender in Black Women's Speculative Fiction 105-108 http://library.lol/main/2C8F7A1D8C5F5DC42089719EDD904C24)

Through the origins of hyperempathy, Butler demonstrates how modern technology can have unpredictable effects, particularly technologies applied to human bodyminds. Such a speculative fictional representation is not far from impossible given the incredible rate of prescription drug consumption in contemporary American culture and our increasing interest in genetic testing, selection, and manipulation of embryos. The representation of hyperempathy suggests, in its critical dystopian form, that we cannot know in advance what our widespread cultural use of pharmaceutical treatments, genetic alterations, and other disability-preventing/curing technologies might have on our bodyminds in the long run, let alone on the bodyminds of future generations. Butler’s papers reveal that she planned to extend this theme in the unfinished third book in the series, often referred to as Parable of the Trickster. Drafts, notes, and outlines for this text show Butler was exploring the idea of having an Earthseed community travel to start a new colony on a planet in another solar system. When the community members arrive, people begin to experience different forms of disablement, which vary from draft to draft, including blindness, epilepsy, paralysis, and hallucinations. The idea that she continued to experiment with, based on these 106 Chapter Three drafts, outlines, and notes, was that either the technology used to keep the Earthseed community members alive on the trip, or the toxins in the air of the new habitable planet, caused these changes, and the community must learn to live with their altered bodyminds.12 Butler’s engagement with the effects of technology in the future is not simply limited to (dis)ability, but also has important material intersections with issues of race, gender, and class. When imagining a disability-free future perpetuated by technological advances that will supposedly prevent congenital disability and “fix” or “cure” all acquired disabilities, it is important to ask, who will have access to these advanced medical technologies and who will not? On whose bodyminds will new and experimental drugs and devices be tested? Who will perform the labor to extract raw materials for and construct these new technologies? Who will benefit the most and who will be barred from participation? If the history of medical experimentation such as the Tuskegee experiments or the work of Dr. Marion Sims tells us anything, people of color, women, working-class people, and people in poverty will benefit the least from technological advances and will be most at risk for harm in the development, production, and consumption of new technologies.13 In the Parable series, Butler emphasizes that technology is neither inherently liberatory nor destructive. In a journal entry dated April 23, 1999, Butler writes about this directly, stating, “Technology isn’t good or bad. It’s part of who we are, part of what we do. It’s how we us[e] it is [w]hat matters, of course” (Octavia E. Butler Papers, “oeb 1069”). Technology does not have inherent value; rather, it is how we as a culture use, misuse, and make available technologies that produces technological enhancements and/or harm. Further, the line between enhancement and harm is not always clear—nor are the two mutually exclusive. Enhancement for whom and harm to whom? What kind of enhancement and how much? What kind of harm and how much? As Butler writes, “Consequences may be beneficial or harmful. They may be too slight to matter or they may be worth the risk because the potential benefits are great, but the consequences are always there” (“A Few Rules for Predicting the Future” 166). Technology, the Parable series asserts in the face of the ideal of a technologically created, disability-free future, is an ambivalent cultural tool which is subject to both use and abuse, availability and unavailability, and a variety of unintended consequences. Hyperempathy is used as a primary example of this position on technology. As a result, Butler encourages readers to un- Bodyminds of the Future 107 derstand that one’s critical position in relation to technology need not be either purely celebratory or, in Melzer’s words, “paranoid rejection” (“And How Many Souls Do You Have?’” 177). Instead, we can evaluate particular technologies within specific contexts of creation and use. We can do so in solidarity with people with disabilities, people of color, the working class, the poor, and others who are more likely to participate in the creation and testing of such technologies while being less likely to be the beneficiaries of the results of such developments. Butler’s published and unpublished writings argue that technology guarantees neither a disability-free future nor any other supposedly desired outcome since we cannot predict its longterm effects, especially when it comes to biomedical technology. In particular, the Parable series demonstrates how marginalized groups, especially people of color and the poor, are less likely to have access to healing/curing technologies and are much more likely to be the targets of destructive technologies of violence and war. The suggestion that we cannot know in advance what our impulse toward a technologically created, disability-free future might lead to may seem problematically foreboding because it potentially suggests that the problem of disability-prevention technologies is that they might simply create more disability. However, the second way that the representation of hyperempathy resists our cultural idealization of a technologically created, disabilityfree future is through the representation of disability-related pleasure. Butler’s creation of hyperempathy insists on pleasure as an inherent aspect of the experience of this disability, a type of pleasure that nonsharers can never experience. For example, Lauren states that when having sex, “I get the guy’s good feeling and my own” (Parable of the Sower 12). During her early travels with her friends Harry and Zahra, Lauren also shares their pleasure when they have sex near her during their watch, writing, “I got caught up in their lovemaking. I couldn’t escape their sensation” (200). Later, when she meets Bankole, Lauren again discusses sharing pleasure in sex, explaining, “Best of all, he took a lot of uncomplicated pleasure in my body, and I got to share it with him. It isn’t often that I can enjoy the good side of my hyperempathy. I let the sensation take over, intense and wild” (266). While these moments of Lauren’s shared pleasure are few in comparison to the many representations of shared pain, they are incredibly important to Butler’s representation of disability in the future. The representation of disability-related pleasure in the Parable series shifts the ableist ways in which our culture typically understands disabled bodyminds as both nonsexual and as always more difficult and limiting than nondisabled bodyminds. Importantly, Butler does this without making Lauren come across as magical or as the perpetually overcoming, superpowered supercrip.14