2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › No Impact › 2AC – AI
Cooper and Kompella, 22 (James Cooper and Kashyap Kompella, 2-3-22, opinion contributors for the Hill, “No, China is not winning the AI race” //mahimahi)
In this light, as a horizontal technology that can be applied across all sectors, artificial intelligence (AI) has become a strategic priority and the on superiority in this field is touted as something about which the U.S. should be concerned. Some have gone so far as to conclude that .
Don’t believe the hype. To be sure, the availability of large amounts of data is at the heart of AI success. It is tempting to think that less-democratic regimes that amass huge amounts of data about their citizens and have scant regard for privacy can develop better AI systems using that data. However, all other things being equal, better and higher quality AI systems emerge from countries with strong data privacy and data protection regulations because AI systems must undergo greater scrutiny during their development and deployment. of this can be seen in the United States regarding fair lending practices and consumer protection from credit bureaus. Further, the market for AI is global, and such high-quality AI systems find buyers in other countries as well.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › No Impact › 2AC – AI
Franz-Stefan Gady 18, Research Fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) focused on future conflict and the future of war, 11/7/2018, "Lora Saalman on How Artificial Intelligence Will Impact China’s Nuclear Strategy," , sg
Chinese research indicates that its pursuit of artificial intelligence (AI) crosses a broad spectrum of both civilian and military arenas. Currently, the indication is that the vast majority of Chinese investment of labor and cost is being trained on unmanned systems and surveillance capabilities that aid in policing and counterterrorism activities. When it comes to its nuclear arsenal, much like the majority of other countries with nuclear weapons, there are no indications at this time that AI would be directly integrated into a nuclear platform.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Immoral › 2AC – Yes Deaths
ICRC, 18 (ICRC, 9-7-18, “Nuclear weapons- an intolerable threat to humanity,” https://www.icrc.org/en/nuclear-weapons-a-threat-to-humanity)
Nuclear weapons are the most terrifying weapon ever invented: no weapon is more destructive; no weapon causes such unspeakable human suffering; and there is no way to control how far the radioactive fallout will spread or how long the effects will last.
A nuclear bomb detonated in a city would immediately kill tens of thousands of people, and tens of thousands more would suffer horrific injuries and later die from radiation exposure.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Immoral › 2AC – Nuclear Fallout
Wolfson and Veress, 20 (Richard Wolfson and Ferenc Dalnoki-Veress, 2020, Professor of Physics at Middlebury College and scientist-in-residence and adjunct professor, “The Devastating Effects of Nuclear Weapons, /mahimahi)
The most immediate effect of a nuclear explosion is an intense burst of nuclear radiation, primarily gamma rays and neutrons. This direct radiation is produced in the weapon’s nuclear reactions themselves, and lasts well under a second. Lethal direct radiation extends nearly a mile from a 10-kiloton explosion. With most weapons, though, direct radiation is of little significance because other lethal effects generally encompass greater distances. An important exception is the enhanced-radiation weapon, or neutron bomb, which maximizes direct radiation and minimizes other destructive effects.
An exploding nuclear weapon instantly vaporizes itself. What was cold, solid material microseconds earlier becomes a gas hotter than the Sun’s 15-million-degree core. This hot gas radiates its energy in the form of X-rays, which heat the surrounding air. A fireball of superheated air forms and grows rapidly; 10 seconds after a 1-megaton explosion, the fireball is a mile in diameter. The fireball glows visibly from its own heat — so visibly that the early stages of a 1-megaton fireball are many times brighter than the Sun even at a distance of 50 miles. Besides light, the glowing fireball radiates heat.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Immoral › 2AC – Preemption Bad
Freeman, 14 (Brenden Brower-Freeman, 2014, writer for JCCC Honors journal, “The Ethics of Preemptive Warfare,” //mahimahi)
With issues such as the Syrian Civil War taking a central role in current political discussion, it is important to understand fully what is occurring in the conversations surrounding them. As some people call for an attack on Syria to prevent the use of weapons of mass destruction or the nation being used as an Al Qaeda base to attack the United States, others call for an overthrow of the current regime because its actions to date have been unethical. What exactly does this mean? When analyzing warfare, how can one frame ethics in such a way as to capture the nuance that goes into warfare? This becomes even more relevant when assessing the potential threats posed by North Korea and Iran. Whether it is regarding the use of a computer virus to attack an Iranian nuclear centrifuge or a missile to level a regime facility in Syria, the issue at hand remains the same; whether preemptive warfare is ever ethically justifiable. Nations like Iran, Syria and North Korea could all pose very real and imminent threats, and it is important to understand the proper way to approach that problem, just like any other. Should there be room in ethics for the preemptive strike? The answer is no. There are three philosophies that represent the ethics of war. These schools are Realism, Pacifism and Just War Theory. There could be other names for methods of approaching and viewing war and peace, but they will always fall into one of the three previously mentioned traditional philosophies based on the ethical criteria and principles of each. These approaches are evidently dominant in this regard. First, it is important to understand what makes each idea distinct and different from the other. Pacifism1 is unique in positing that no use of force is ever ethically justified. In Pacifism, the thoughts and notions of what is or is not ethical is applied broadly to relationships between nation-states. In this school of thought, it would not make sense to try to determine whether a war is just. This is because the result of every attempt to make a determination would yield the same result; that war is not just and therefore not ever ethically justifiable. By contrast, Just War Theory2 is on occasion favorable toward war and conflict. For Pacifism, war is always and continually wrong. War can never be a solution and there is always a better way to resolve the problem that is generating the conflict rather than fighting.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Immoral › 2AC – Unethical
Giampaolo, 16 (Kayla, Giampaolo, 2-4-16, “Deterrence of Disarmament?: The Ethics of Nuclear Warfare,” from Fordham University, )
Most research across disciplines unanimously agrees that it is immoral to detonate an atomic weapon due to both short and long-term catastrophic effects. Therefore, this piece shall not focus on the actual use of nuclear weapons, but instead analyze the latter question. Using various philosophical concepts, it will explore the fundamental question as to whether any implementation of nuclear deterrence that involves a risk to civilians is morally acceptable. The models, though differing in origin and rationale, provide a unique lens from which to view this ethical dilemma.
Before analyzing various frameworks, it is first important to understand the concept of nuclear deterrence and why it is a pressing ethical issue. Deterrence is a psychological phenomenon. It involves convincing an aggressor not to attack by threatening it with harmful retaliation. A psychological dimension is involved because the success of deterrence is not due solely to the retaliators capability, but to how persuasive the message of the threat is. In other words, in order for deterrence to work, the opponent must perceive the retaliatory threat as legitimate and serious (Morgan, 1985, p. 125).
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 1AR – Subs – AT: Physics
Katarzyna Kubiak 20, a Senior Policy Fellow on nuclear and arms control policy. Previously, she was a Transatlantic Post-Doc Fellow for International Relations and Security at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), an associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), a research assistant at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH), a field researcher for the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) and a fellow in the German Bundestag. December 2020, “Quantum Technology and Submarine Near-Invulnerability,” European Leadership Network.
Quantum gravity gradiometers will be very sensitive. That creates two problems. First, although putting them in space would solve the issue of their subsequent sensitivity to ground noise, space-based quantum gravity sensing or mapping is unlikely to detect submarines. Due to a combination of instrument sensitivity and satellite altitude, satellite gravity sensing will have a limited spatial resolution on the ground. Even if the currently estimated achievable resolution of around 100 km could be reduced up to 10 km, it would still be a few orders of magnitude the size of a submarine.46 Whether further improvements will be possible remains to be seen after the first quantum gravity gradiometers are put into space. Second, even if the spatial resolution would improve, gravity gradiometers would see a lot from space as a lot is happening in and above waters – think, for instance, of commercial underwater infrastructure, surface ships, planes etc. Even if a gravity gradiometer would be able to detect and distinguish a submarine, further intelligence will need to determine whose and what type of submarine it sees. Yet classification is tough. Like with birdwatching, one needs to know very well what to look for. Next to SSBNs waters are crowded with commercial, research and conventional military submarines. In 2019, militaries of 40 states operated 491 conventional and nuclear subs.47 That number excludes those owned privately or by research institutions. Distinguishing a strategic nuclear submarine would thus most likely make only sense through continuous tracking, so tracing nuclear submarines down from their known ports/bastions. While submarines can shield themselves from magnetic or acoustic detection, there are no methods to shield from gravity gradiometers. Simply because such methods have not been necessary so far. Should this change, however, in the first instance decision-makers will likely do all possible to hide their submarines better. One could design ways to decrease the detectable gravity signature by improving mass distribution on a submarines’ hull. That would need to happen at the already overly complex design stage of a submarine. Correcting mass distribution in hindsight could turn out very tricky. Moving masses in a significant way on a vessel is not easy in itself and might upset other optimisation efforts. States building new SSBNs today would need to consider this in advance.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 1AR – Subs – AT: Physics
Katarzyna Kubiak 20, a Senior Policy Fellow on nuclear and arms control policy. Previously, she was a Transatlantic Post-Doc Fellow for International Relations and Security at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies (IFS), an associate at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), a research assistant at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH), a field researcher for the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) and a fellow in the German Bundestag. December 2020, “Quantum Technology and Submarine Near-Invulnerability,” European Leadership Network.
SQUID-based magnetometers still suffer from major disadvantages: they require extreme cooling and can be challenging to set up.40 Together with their detection range, this currently makes it unlikely that SQUIDs will be put on satellites anytime soon. While cryogenic cooling is already used in space for astronomy missions, it remains overly expensive. Moreover, space radiation seriously affects superconductive technology generated signals.41 Another problem is the lack of market proof processing solutions to image and identify findings. Furthermore, submarines can apply magnetic shielding. Similarly to preventing acoustic detection, stealth technology can minimise their magnetic signature. Deploying magnetometers on planes, ships or unmanned aerial, surface or underwater vehicles (UAV, UUS, UUV, respectively) could provide more of a step-development in anti-submarine warfare. But these platforms also pose some constraints. UAVs require lightweight, small volume and very low power consumption devices.42 UUVs’ limiting factor is its battery life, determined by the power demands of the propulsion and onboard systems.43 As one sensor produces too much noise, it requires spatial correlation of a signal from more detectors. An array of detectors is necessary. Yet networked UAVs or UUV’s covering a specific area to find a submarine could prove too costly, especially if they turn easy to defeat. As such, quantum magnetometers will unlikely be a game-changer for now. Even if they improve the location range to, say, 100 kilometres, this remains a location which requires prior knowledge of the submarine’s rough position
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 2AC – Subs
Kyle Mizokami 22; writes on defense and security issues in Asia, particularly Japan; founder and editor for the blogs Japan Security Watch, Asia Security Watch and War Is Boring. “Satellite Catches Likely New Chinese Missile Submarine,” Popular Mechanics, MAY 17, 2022 https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-ships/a40011949/satellite-spots-new-chinese-missile-submarine/
A commercial satellite has taken pictures of what is probably a new Chinese missile submarine.
The submarine, photographed in drydock, is likely nuclear powered and built to launch cruise missiles.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 2AC – Subs
Jennings 21 — (Ralph, [Ralph Jennings has covered news in China, Taiwan and Southeast Asia for the past 14 years. The native of Portland, Ore. found his interest in journalism overseas while earning a University of California-Berkeley mass communication degree that drew heavily on anthropology courses. He was a natural in gathering news from under-covered communities while working at newspapers for seven years in California.Based in Beijing from 1999, Ralph would talk to people ranging from those living in frozen brick homes short of coal to the Communist officials who set policy for them. He moved to Taipei in 2006. There he has worked further on his anthro-journalism by learning the language of high-tech pros and the culture of investment bankers. Taipei serves also as Ralph's launch pad into Southeast Asia for news, or in one case to write the 2012 Insight Guide to the Philippines. He’s going now for a master’s in mass communication from Taiwan’s No. 2 university.], “Nuclear Sub Mystery Highlights Risk of China-US Miscalculation “, VOA, 10-13-2021, Available Online at https://www.voanews.com/a/nuclear-sub-mystery-highlights-risk-of-china-us-miscalculation/6269388.html, mysoor)
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA — A mysterious incident involving an American nuclear submarine in the South China Sea has analysts weighing the risk that a similar mishap — perhaps involving a U.S. treaty partner — could spark an unwanted conflagration between the United States and China. Experts say the danger is growing as Beijing aggressively advances its territorial claims in the South and East China seas while Western nations counter with a growing number of naval passages designed to support freedom of navigation through the contested waters. The stakes were further raised last month with the announcement of the new AUKUS alliance among the United States, Britain and Australia, which will provide Australia with 10 new nuclear-powered submarines. In the latest incident, a U.S. nuclear-powered submarine hit an unknown underwater object on October 2, the U.S. Navy's Pacific Fleet said in a news release. The Navy said crewmembers aboard its Seawolf-class submarine USS Connecticut were hurt, though no one's life was threatened, and that it is investigating what happened. But an analysis published on the Chinese state-controlled CGTN news website said last week that the U.S. use of nuclear submarines to "secretly infringe on China's maritime territory in the South China Sea runs the risk of triggering a war between these two major powers by miscalculation." The CGTN analyst is not the only one who is worried. Other experts tell VOA they fear that a more serious incident between China and a U.S. treaty ally such as Japan or the Philippines could, under certain circumstances, trigger a severe response from Washington. The exact U.S. recourse would depend on the details of the actual incident, said Scott Harold, Washington-based senior political scientist with the Rand Corporation research organization. "Is a bump an attack or does it have to result in an injury or an actual death or a sinking?" Harold asked. "I think those would be areas where U.S. policymakers and in particular U.S. defense officials and military officers would be very quickly trying to assess what is the intention, what is the threshold, is the host nation — meaning the third-party Japan or the Philippines — is it able to respond without the United States?" The U.S. Indo Pacific Command in Hawaii did not answer requests for comment on the risk of accidents near China. China's neighbors, US alliances China calls about 90% of the South China Sea its own despite competing claims from the Philippines and three other Southeast Asian countries that are sympathetic to the West. Beijing claims all of Taiwan, a self-ruled island that's supported by Washington, and vies with Japan for control over parts of the East China Sea. Successive U.S. presidents have seen their Asian allies as buffers against China in any showdown between superpowers. Treaties obligate Washington to consider helping its allies in military crises. Increasing numbers of Chinese military flights near Taiwan, where the island's air force sometimes chases the planes away, is raising the specter of a mishap now, analysts believe. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act gives Washington the option of intervening on Taipei's behalf. "How long do you keep poking your fist in Taiwan's face before you miscalculate at one point?" asked Carl Thayer, emeritus professor of politics at the University of New South Wales in Australia. "The aircraft could cross a line, or Taiwan's air defenses, which have been turned on and locked onto some of these flights as a warning, could lead to firing missiles." News reports this month saying the United States has stationed troops in Taiwan for at least a year could prompt an angry China to send more planes toward the island, said Oh Ei Sun, senior fellow at the Singapore Institute of International Affairs. The Philippines, for its part, might risk an accident with Chinese vessels even if warned against it by the United States, Oh said. The 2022 Philippine presidential race could be a trigger point, he added, if Sino-Philippine relations become a campaign issue. Vessels from China and the Philippines got into a protracted standoff in 2012 over Scarborough Shoal, a fisheries-rich feature that each side claims as its own. "I think the Filipinos, they are very independent minded, and when something happened, the U.S. may be obligated by treaty obligation to come to their rescue," Oh said. A miscalculation involving China and Japan would probably prompt the United States to examine "gray zone contingencies" before responding, Harold said. Those would mean learning, for example, whether the mishap involved Chinese naval boats or fishing boats, Harold said. U.S. officials would explore further whether Japan needed U.S. help or could follow up on its own, he said. Allies, including the United States, U.K. and Australia, are making ever clearer to China that they would "react in a contingency," Harold said. Informal Sino-foreign channels to bury accidents China and the United States have their own informal resolution channel for collisions and accidental misfires, lowering the risk of conflict, analysts believe. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command holds regular maritime consultations with the PLA to boost sea and air safety while reviewing any incidents, a command spokesperson said. “U.S. Indo-Pacific Command vessels and aircraft comply with international laws and norms that guide safe and professional operations in international waters and airspace and we rely on other nations operating in the Indo-Pacific to do the same,” the spokesperson said. Beijing hopes to avoid war but will fume and blame the United States over any accidents, they say. China did both after the deadly U.S. bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999 during a war over Kosovo — Washington called the strike accidental — and after the 2001 emergency landing of a U.S. reconnaissance plane that two Chinese fighter jets had chased near China's south coast. "The situation has become a chicken game basically, and countries are just shadowing each other," said Eduardo Araral, associate professor at the National University of Singapore's public policy school. "There's no intention to harm each other probably, but accidents can and do happen."
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 2AC – Subs
Jamali and O'Connor 21 — (Naveed and Tom, [Naveed Jamali is a Newsweek editor at large; former FBI double agent and the author of "How to Catch a Russian Spy", Tom O'Connor is an award-winning senior writer of foreign policy at Newsweek, where he specializes in the Middle East, North Korea and other areas of international affairs and conflict. He has previously written for International Business Times, the New York Post, the Daily Star (Lebanon) and Staten Island Advance.], “China's submarine fleet is catching up to the U.S., causing partners to panic“, Newsweek, 10-29-2021, Available Online at , mysoor)
China's push for mass military modernization includes new, more advanced submarines to add to the world's largest navy, causing U.S. partners in the region to scramble to acquire new capabilities of their own. Their answer to the rising underwater threat is a passenger plane-sized submarine killer called the P-8 Poseidon, and orders for the aircraft are pouring in from countries like Australia and India. Both are members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which also includes the U.S. and Japan as part of a quasi-alliance that seeks to enforce a "free and open Indo-Pacific." And countries as far away as Germany, Norway and the United Kingdom have also purchased the aircraft. One senior Pentagon intelligence official said it's no coincidence that countries were buying up the anti-submarine warfare platform. "China is expanding their undersea warfare capability to extend beyond the South China Sea, which presents a strategic threat to not only nations with territorial disputes, but throughout the entire Pacific area," the official told Newsweek. "It is essential for the national security of partner nations to have the ability to detect and monitor Chinese submarines. The P-8 Poseidon is the best capability to perform that task." "With an advanced anti-submarine warfare suite," the official added, "the P-8 is the best answer to countering Chinese submarines." A spokesperson for Boeing, the U.S. aerospace company that produces the P-8 and its submarine-fighting P-8A variant, said the aircraft was "deployed around the world, with more than 135 aircraft in service, and over 400,000 collective mishap-free flight hours." But even with these new capabilities in stock, China's prowess continues to multiply, presenting a formidable competitor as tensions simmer across the seas of Asia. The U.S. military's latest assessment of Chinese military power, published in September 2020, estimated that China had 50 diesel-powered attack submarines, six nuclear-powered attack submarines and four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. The U.S. is estimated to possess roughly 68 submarines, all nuclear-powered, but China's fleet is expanding rapidly. The report described submarine development as a "high priority" for the People's Liberation Army Navy, and estimated that the force "will likely maintain between 65 and 70 submarines through the 2020s, replacing older units with more capable units on a near one-to-one basis." China has set out to update two key submarine models, the Xia-class Type 092 and the Jin-class Type 094, according to a report published last month by French submarine expert Eric Genevelle and retired U.S. Navy submarine sonar technician Richard W. Stirn. This campaign includes vessels equipped with nuclear-capable submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), as well as an array of other weapons such as anti-ship missiles and torpedos. The latest Chinese SLBM, known as JL-2A, has a range of nearly 8,600 kilometers, more than 5,340 miles, putting potential targets as far as the U.S. mainland within range, as estimated in Genevelle and Stirn's paper. China's submarine fleet serves another important strategic function. These quiet undersea craft traverse the depths largely undetected, making them ideal for gathering intelligence as they conduct missions as far out as the Indian Ocean. They also can serve to fortify Beijing's broad territorial claims across geopolitically sensitive spots in the South China Sea and East China Sea, where Japan last month sent both warplanes and warships in response to a suspected Chinese submarine spotted too close for Tokyo's comfort to islands claimed by both countries. With the U.S. and partnered nations seeking to challenge China's version of the world map, the People's Republic views submarines as a key asset. Using advanced monitoring equipment, China seeks to establish what it refers to as a "Great Underwater Wall" to keep tabs on some of the world's busiest waterways in the South China Sea.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 2AC – Subs
Holmes 21 — (James, [James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and author of “Visualize Chinese Sea Power,” in the current issue of the Naval Institute Proceedings. The views voiced here are his alone.], “Deathly Quiet: The Navy Can’t Kill China’s Submarines If It Cant Find Them“, National Interest, 8-17-2021, Available Online at https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/deathly-quiet-navy-can%E2%80%99t-kill-china%E2%80%99s-submarines-if-it-cant-find-them-191921, mysoor)
Word has it that China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) has staged a breakthrough in submarine propulsion. Here's What You Need To Remember: The PLA Navy may be poised to overcome a technological and tactical defect that has plagued it since its founding. Word has it that China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) has staged a breakthrough in submarine propulsion. At any rate, that’s the word from marine engineer Rear Admiral Ma Weiming, a specialist in electromagnetic systems. Admiral Ma recently reported on state-run CCTV that shipwrights are installing shaftless rim-driven pumpjets in China’s “next-generation nuclear submarines,” meaning attack or ballistic-missile boats. (Click here for a layman’s description of pumpjet technology.) Ma crowed that Chinese engineers are “now way ahead of the United States, which has also been developing similar technology.” If Admiral Ma is playing it straight—rather than hyping promising but yet-to-be-proven gadgetry—then the PLA Navy is poised to overcome a technological and tactical defect that has plagued it since its founding. American submariners long lampooned Soviet and Chinese nuclear boats for being noisy and easy to detect. PLA Navy boats remained backward long after the Cold War. Ultraquiet propulsion, though, would put an end to unquestioned U.S. acoustic supremacy, opening up new operational and strategic vistas before the PLA Navy while ushering in a deadlier phase of U.S.-China strategic competition. The rim-driven pumpjet is an electrically driven “propulsor” that simplifies and thus quiets an engineering plant. Older technology typically uses gears to connect the elements of a drive train. Steam spins the innards of high-speed turbines. Turbines spin far too fast for any main propulsion shaft or propeller, however, so ships outfitted with traditional engineering plants have “main reduction gears” that step down the speed of rotation drastically, to speeds useful for the shaft that turns the screw and impels the hull through the water. Gears are noisemakers. Pumpjet technology dispenses with them, simplifying and silencing plant operations. The design also reduces cavitation—bubbles churned up when a propeller turns rapidly underwater, leaving low-pressure zones behind the blades where water can boil. Cavitation emits noise that enemy sonar operators may hear. Thus it can alert hostile anti-submarine-warfare (ASW) forces, helping them find, track and target the emitter. Hence the allure of novel technology that suppresses cavitation. Now, there are ample grounds for skepticism toward Admiral Ma’s claims. New technology remains a hypothesis until tested out in real-world operations. But at the same time it’s doubtful Ma was simply showboating for Chinese TV viewers. Rising competitors have caught up with established navies before, or even leapfrogged them in certain areas. The Imperial Japanese Navy defied expectations, devising the Long Lance torpedo that it deployed to devastating effect at Pearl Harbor. The Soviet Navy concocted antiship missiles and torpedoes that give the U.S. Navy fits to this day. Thus it behooves us to ask what if: what if China pulls off a technological leap of similar magnitude? Set aside the question of whose submarines are quieter than whose. Boastfulness—the urge to be the biggest, best and most of everything, and to have others acknowledge it—forms a strand in China’s cultural DNA. Ma is indulging in it. But no one is going to hold a contest to measure noise given off by U.S. Navy and PLA Navy boats, and award victory to the quietest fleet. Combat is the true arbiter of military effectiveness—and undersea combat hinges on whether “hiders” or “finders” prevail. It pits a sub’s capacity for silent running against the acuity of ASW sensors and operators trying to ferret it out. In other words, if American hiders remain quiet enough to evade Chinese finders, they hold the advantage of stealth. If acoustics has befriended the PLA Navy, then American finders have a problem. And if both submarine services can elude ASW hunters, then both they and surface fleets are in dire peril. “Peer” submarines could engage one another at close proximity in the deep, or strike against surface vessels without warning. Indeed, the surface of embattled oceans could verge on no-go territory. That prospect makes this thought experiment about the future of subsurface warfare worthwhile. Suppose rim-driven pumpjet propulsors do pan out for China’s navy. How might commanders use newly elusive boats? First of all, they might afford nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs, known to U.S. submariners as “boomers”) precedence when installing newfangled propulsion hardware. The PLA Navy already operates a sizable fleet of diesel-electric attack subs that satisfices for antiaccess/area-denial purposes. They can make shift until silent-running nuclear-powered attack subs (SSNs) join the fleet. SSNs can wait. By contrast, the navy stands at the brink of fielding its first effective SSBNs. Fabricating a new capability would seem to take precedence over improving an old but adequate one—especially if the nation’s nuclear deterrent depends on the new capability. If this logic prevails, how will the PLA Navy employ working boomers? To all appearances, it envisions employing the South China Sea as an offshore “bastion” for SSBNs, much as the Soviet Navy of yesteryear made semienclosed waters into protected bastions for its missile boats. Undersea deterrence, then, probably numbers among the motives impelling the PLA to transform rocks and atolls into fortified outposts, acquaint itself with underwater hydrography, and so forth. China’s Type 094 SSBNs or their pumpjet-equipped descendants could slip out of the sub base on Hainan Island, descend into South China Sea waters, lose themselves in the depths and dare rival navies to come into China’s “near seas”—expanses that fall under the shadow of land-based PLA missiles and aircraft—to hunt them. Or if Chinese Communist Party leaders feel comfortable granting SSBN skippers the liberty to venture outside the near seas (though that’s a lot of atomic firepower to entrust to a naval officer whose loyalties might prove suspect), the Luzon Strait affords a convenient entryway to the western Pacific. Within the strait lies the Bashi Channel, a deep underwater thoroughfare into the Pacific. The weather between Luzon and the southern tip of Taiwan often works against airborne ASW; subs transiting the channel can conceal their whereabouts by diving beneath thermal layers that play tricks with sound. An ultraquiet SSBN, in short, could thrive in South China Sea patrol grounds—and beyond. Second, PLA Navy commanders doubtless salivate at the prospect of ultraquiet attack boats. They could merge new SSNs—presumably the Type 095s under development—into their antiaccess defenses against the U.S. Pacific Fleet. They could package new with old units inventively. For example, they could station a picket line of diesel boats and older Type 093 SSNs along likely axes of approach from Hawaii or U.S. West Coast seaports. Speedy but quiet Type 095s could act as “skirmishers,” operating forward of the pickets. SSNs could snipe at the Pacific Fleet’s flanks during its westward voyage while scouting for the rest of the fleet, and for shore-based PLA defenders. They could mount piecemeal attacks against the American fleet, or even try to herd it toward the picket line for additional punishment. PLA commanders thus could use ultramodern platforms to wring new value out of legacy platforms. Such an approach would harness the latest technology while staying true to China’s Maoist tradition of “active defense.” Active defense—which, as Chinese military folk remind us, remains the “essence” of Chinese military strategy decades after Mao Zedong’s demise—envisions luring foes deep into Chinese-held territory. PLA defenders stage tactical actions to weary enemies as they come. They fall on isolated units and try to smash them. Successive small-scale attacks enfeeble enemy forces, setting the stage for decisive battle on Chinese ground. Think about the options that may become available to Chinese skippers as propulsor technology matures. Diesel boats could act as western Pacific pickets, or congregate in wolfpacks to concentrate firepower from multiple axes. Relatively noisy Type 093s could act as decoys, distracting American ASW hunters while Type 095s spring ambushes at opportune moments. And on and on. Commanders could combine and recombine forces in limitless ways—in keeping with China’s way of war. Call it undersea active defense. Third, the advent of quiet-running SSNs would let the PLA Navy play submarine-on-submarine games reminiscent of those once played by U.S. and Soviet boats. To date, lacking a peer to U.S. Navy Los Angeles– or Virginia-class SSNs, the PLA Navy has employed its submarine fleet mainly as an antisurface force. It waits offshore for hostile forces to approach, then does its best to pummel them with missiles or torpedoes. American submariners, by contrast, will tell you the best ASW weapon is another submarine. They view hunting subs as their chief contribution to high-seas warfare. Chinese submariners might follow suit if their boats ran quiet enough, and boasted sensors sensitive enough, to make sub-on-sub ASW an option. Or they might incorporate ASW into their operational portfolio while retaining the emphasis on antiship missions. Either way, PLA submarine operations would take on an intensely offensive hue. No longer would the sub force be a mostly static force lofting antiship missiles toward adversary surface task forces. It would seek out adversary subs as well—and, if successful, project China’s antiaccess defenses into the depths in a serious way for the first time. No longer could the United States’ silent service prowl Asian waters with impunity. Indeed, if both fleets were comparable in stealth, cat-and-mouse games might predominate. This would be a dangerous business. Reaction times would be minimal if boats could only detect and track one another at intimate range. Proximity would magnify the prospect of collisions, accidents of other types, or even inadvertent exchanges of fire. Both navies and their political masters must think ahead about how to manage close-quarters encounters in the deep. And fourth, the debut of pumpjet-equipped SSNs would empower Beijing to mount a standing presence in faraway recesses of the South China Sea and Indian Ocean for the first time. Diesel boats have ventured into the “far seas” in recent years, but they must put into port at regular intervals to refuel. This exposes them to detection. SSNs can remain at sea, and undersea, as long as their food and stores hold out. The crew—not the engineering plant—thus constitutes the limiting factor on a nuclear-powered boat’s at-sea endurance. The Indian Navy has taken notice of PLA Navy forays into India’s home region, and grasps the implications of high-tech Chinese SSNs cruising the Indian Ocean. Indeed, some Indian mariners deem such a presence a red line for competition between the two navies. It can be no accident, then, that there’s an antisubmarine flair to this summer’s Malabar exercises among the Indian Navy, U.S. Navy and Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force. All three navies dispatched aircraft carriers for maneuvers for the first time. The Japanese flattop JS Izumo is a euphemistically dubbed “helicopter destroyer” optimized for hunting submarines. What hostile subs may lurk in the Bay of Bengal, where the exercises are underway, apart from China’s? Hider-finder competition, it seems, has come to the Indian Ocean. Does new engineering technology herald an age of Chinese maritime supremacy? Of course not. Carl von Clausewitz portrays martial strife as constant struggle between “wrestlers” striving to “throw” each other for strategic gain. That goes for acoustic one-upmanship as well. One contender innovates; the other resolves to outdo it. It appears, consequently, that more equal undersea competition lies in store. To prepare for it, U.S. Navy submariners must learn to think of PLA Navy subs not as prey to be devoured by American predators but as worthy foes, capable of some sub hunting of their own. The silent service must adjust to the new, old reality of peer competition beneath the waves. The game’s afoot.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 2AC – Subs
Osborn 21 — (Kris, [Kris Osborn serves as Defense Editor for the National Interest. He previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army - Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also been an anchor and on-air military analyst for national TV networks.], “Why China's Nuclear Armed Submarines Make U.S. General Sweat“, National Interest, 11-10-2021, Available Online at , mysoor)
The People’s Republic of China is fielding newer submarine-launched ballistic missiles that can fly farther distances. China is developing submarines with the ability to put the United States at risk of catastrophic nuclear attack from submarines, according to a Pentagon report. China already operates six Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines armed with JL-2 intercontinental-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Now, the People’s Liberation Army is preparing to produce a far more lethal, longer-range JL-3 nuclear-armed ballistic missile variant. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is fielding newer SLBMs that can fly farther distances, such as the JL-3, China “will gain the ability to target the continental United States from littoral waters, and thus may consider bastion operations to enhance the survivability of its sea-based deterrent,” according to the Defense Department’s 2021 report on Military and Security Developments involving the People’s Republic of China. Unlike the JL-2, which fires at more limited ranges, the JL-3 will reportedly operate with an ability to travel as far as fifty-six hundred miles. That means Jin-class submarines will not need to operate close to the shore in order to pose a threat to the United States. “The current range limitations of the JL-2 will require the JIN to operate in areas north and east of Hawaii if the PRC seeks to target the east coast of the United States,” according to the report. The JL-3 substantially changes this calculus. The PRC currently operates six Jin-class SSBNs equipped to carry up to twelve JL-2 missiles. The range of these weapons restricts the geographical flexibility of Chinese commanders, which would have a higher chance of being detected. This range extension of the JL-3 is significant because it enables the newer Chinese submarine-launched nuclear missiles to outrange the U.S. Navy’s Trident II D5 missiles, which reportedly operate at ranges up to four thousand miles. Inland portions of mainland China are roughly ten thousand kilometers or so from the California coast. The math shows the JL-3 missiles will likely allow China’s nuclear-armed submarines to attack California or other parts of the United States from almost anywhere in the Pacific Ocean.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 2AC – Silos
Cabot 21 — (Adam Cabot, [Adam Cabot has a Master’s in international relations and is currently researching nuclear strategy.], “What Threat Do China’s New Missile Silos Pose to the US?“, The Diplomat, 07-16-2021, Available Online at https://thediplomat.com/2021/07/what-threat-do-chinas-new-missile-silos-pose-to-the-us/, mysoor)
The silos will significantly complicate counterforce options. What can Washington do? The Washington Post recently reported that over 100 missile silos have been discovered being built in a desert near the city of Yumen in China. Chinese media have since claimed that the structures are actually part of a wind farm, but the experts behind the Post piece stand by their analysis. Analysts indicate that these silos will probably house the newest intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in the Chinese strategic nuclear arsenal, the DF-41. This ICBM can reach the continental United States, is solid-fueled, and is believed to eventually be a replacement for the liquid-fueled, silo-based DF-5 ICBM. Estimates vary, but the DF-41 is rumored to be able to carry anywhere from three to 10 nuclear warheads. This is a formidable strategic weapon seemingly designed to be utilized as a component of a launch-on-warning policy while deployed in hardened silos. What threat do these ICBM silos pose for the United States and what should the U.S. do to counter the threat? Let’s start by putting ourselves in China’s position. There could be two primary reasons why President Xi Jinping has decided to build over 100 new ICBM silos. These reasons are not mutually exclusive. The first reason could simply be to adopt a launch-on-warning policy. This would mean most if not all the silos will probably be filled with the DF-41 and China will utilize an early warning system to detect an enemy attack and respond by launching its ICBMs before they can be destroyed in the silos. Adding strength to this theory are reports that Russia has been assisting China to build a ballistic missile early warning system. The adoption of a launch-on-warning policy would increase the survivability of China’s strategic nuclear weapons and bring them closer to the standard of the United States and Russia. The second reason could be to complicate U.S. counterforce targeting, meaning the targeting of the enemy’s military infrastructure. Under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the United States and Russia are each allowed to have 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads. The introduction of over 100 ICBM silos significantly adds to potential targets that the U.S. must consider in planning for a nuclear attack. In the event of a strategic nuclear conflict, it is expected that at least two warheads would be utilized for hardened counterforce targets, reducing the U.S. arsenal by over 200 weapons. A recent statement by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stressed the growth and advancement of the Russia-China comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination. While this is not technically an alliance at this stage, it is highly plausible that the cooperation between the two countries could include deliberately complicating U.S. targeting plans and degrading the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal. In this scenario, the Chinese silos could collectively contain just a handful of ICBMs. The United States would still be required to target each silo, as there would be no certainty regarding which of the over 100 silos contained missiles. With the element of having to allocate at least two warheads to ensure the destruction of hardened targets, it’s evident that the U.S. arsenal will be stretched thin as it still needs to maintain a credible deterrent against Russia. It will be further stretched if China decides to continue building ICBM silos. One can see how this is an effective strategy designed to complicate a U.S. strategic response. So, what can the United States do about it? It’s critical that the U.S. builds and maintains a robust nuclear warfighting capability. With an effective triad of air, sea, and land based strategic nuclear weapons, the United States is illustrating that it has options available for different contingencies. Added to this capability are tactical nuclear weapons based in Europe and the introduction of the low-yield submarine-launched ballistic missile deployed on the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines. As diverse as this force is, it still does not adequately deal with the addition of Chinese silos due to New START limitations. A possible option is the introduction and deployment of land based nuclear medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles within range of Chinese strategic weapons. These could be positioned in countries willing to accept them and due to the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, the quantity deployed would not be subject to restrictions. The deployment of INF range nuclear weapons would resolve the issue of stretching the U.S. strategic arsenal thin. A step forward for the Biden administration would be to publicly commence negotiations with countries willing to house these weapons while keeping the door open to China for a diplomatic solution. The potential threat of being surrounded by U.S.-controlled INF range weapons could result in China re-thinking its opposition to entering into New START negotiations with the United States and Russia. If nothing is done to counter China’s rapid nuclear weapons increase, we could see hundreds more ICBM silos being built, rendering the U.S. strategic arsenal inadequate to deal with multiple threats in addition to fulfilling its extended deterrence role to allies including South Korea, Japan, and Australia. China and Russia have demonstrated that they are united in reducing the influence and power of the United States in order to achieve their own strategic goals. A future strategic nuclear alliance between China and Russia is not a fantasy. China has the technological and economic capability to continue modernizing and increasing the size of its nuclear forces exponentially. While it is seemingly lagging behind in an effective ballistic missile early warning system and ballistic missile submarines, it already possesses a robust nuclear force including INF range weapons and mobile ICBM launchers. It will not take China long to bridge the gap and the United States may find itself dangerously outnumbered against two major nuclear powers. The Biden administration needs to proactively deal with this now because China is steamrolling ahead to catch up.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 2AC – Remote Sensing Fails
Thomas D. MacDonald 21, a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has an interdisciplinary scientific background which he applies to interesting technical problems which are interwoven with political concerns. June 2021, “Hide and Seek: Remote Sensing and Strategic Stability,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, accessed online via UMich libraries
6.1.3 Sight-Blocking Structures The hider can build sight-blocking structures alongside roads if they want to decrease the probability of detection of satellites which are at large incidence angles. Sight-blocking structures, as discussed in Chapter 4, can impinge on lines-of-sight to a road segment as a function of their height and lateral displacement from the road. The maximum incidence angle (𝜃max) at which a TEL on a road segment is visible is 𝜃max(𝛼) = 𝜋 2 − tan−1 [︂ 𝑠𝑏 − 𝑚 𝑑𝑟(𝛼) ]︂ , (6.5) where 𝑠𝑏 is the height of the sight blocking structure, 𝑚 is the highest point on the TEL which the seeker needs line-of-sight to, and 𝑑𝑟(𝛼) is the distance to the sight blocking object from the center point of the TEL as a function of the azimuthal angle from the heading of the TEL 𝛼. Sight-blocking structures are most effective when they are tall, close to the road, or both.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 2AC – Remote Sensing Fails
Thomas D. MacDonald 21, a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has an interdisciplinary scientific background which he applies to interesting technical problems which are interwoven with political concerns. June 2021, “Hide and Seek: Remote Sensing and Strategic Stability,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, accessed online via UMich libraries
Radar-Absorbing Material There are two primary approaches for modulation of the surface reflection characteristics, radar-absorbing materials (RAM) and surface-shape modulation. TELs are primarily made from metal, which is a near-perfect reflector of radio waves. Metal can be coated with RAM which absorbs a portion of the incident field, decreasing the magnitude of the reflected electric field. RAM operate by diminishing the magnitude of radar reflections by coupling the incident field into a partially conductive, lossy medium [116]. At a boundary between two media (such as air and a TEL), some fraction of the incident energy will reflect off of the boundary and some will transmit into the second medium. Figure 6-5 shows a schematic of a wave approaching a boundary. At normal incidence, for a wave traveling from medium 1 to medium 2, 𝑅 = 𝜂2 − 𝜂1 𝜂2 + 𝜂1 , 𝑇 = 2𝜂2 𝜂2 + 𝜂1 , (6.6) where 𝑅 is the reflection coefficient, 𝜂𝑖 is the wave impedance of the 𝑖 th medium.10 The reflectivity (𝑟) and transmissivity 𝑡 of the boundary are 𝑟 = |𝑅| 2 , 𝑡 = |𝑇| 2 . (6.7)
[figure 5 omitted]
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 2AC – Remote Sensing Fails
Thomas D. MacDonald 21, a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has an interdisciplinary scientific background which he applies to interesting technical problems which are interwoven with political concerns. June 2021, “Hide and Seek: Remote Sensing and Strategic Stability,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, accessed online via UMich libraries
Covered Roads The hider can also create road segments that permanently cannot be observed with radar systems by creating covered roads. This effectively reduces the inter-shelter spacing to zero. If a TEL enters a covered road section, after a time 𝐶/𝑣TEL where 𝐶 is the length of the sheltered road segment, the seeker’s uncertainty will span the covered segment. The hider can deter an attack from an attacker with a risk tolerance of 𝑃𝑘 and 𝑛𝑤 available by building a covered roads totaling at most ∑︁ 𝑖 𝐶𝑖 ≤ 𝑃𝑘𝑛𝑤2𝑟𝑤 , (6.4) of length, where 𝐶𝑖 is the length of the 𝑖the covered segment and 𝑟𝑤 is the weapon effect radius. The equivalence holds if all 𝑛TEL are deployed within the covered segments, and the covered segments are built in multiples of 𝑟𝑤. I will take this as the upper bound. In practice the hider could keep TELs deployed outside of the covered roads in addition to the covered segments, and force the seeker to allocate inefficient numbers of warheads by building covered segments of non-integer multiple lengths of 𝑟𝑤. Covered roads could also be utilized as tunnels to connect naturally well-sight-blocked areas in order facilitate spread of uncertainty.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 2AC – Remote Sensing Fails
Thomas D. MacDonald 21, a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has an interdisciplinary scientific background which he applies to interesting technical problems which are interwoven with political concerns. June 2021, “Hide and Seek: Remote Sensing and Strategic Stability,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, accessed online via UMich libraries
TEL-Shaped Decoy An average RCS decoy is capable of deceiving SMTI, which only measures the RCS distribution. SAR and ISAR instead measure the spatial distribution of the scattering centers of the target, which can be used to form an image. An average RCS decoy can be constructed from a small number of corner reflectors while a TEL-shaped decoy mimics not just the sizes of the scattering centers, but also their spatial distribution. One of the challenges of creating a TEL-shaped decoy is that TELs are large objects. Decoys are ideally easily and cheaply built, so that many can be used in conjunction (discussed in detail below). A shape decoy must be able to approximate the physical size of a real TEL, meaning that it will be on the order of tens of meters in length. The challenges of creating a TEL-shaped decoy mirror those of shaping an actual TEL for RCSR. The same set of radar reflective materials, metal sheets or mesh can be used to control the RCS of a decoy. In the case of TEL RCSR, the TEL itself is large and can serve as a skeleton on which the outer radar reflective skin can be mounted. One possible decoy design would be to utilize an interior scaffolding made of inexpensive and lightweight material such as PVC tubing or aluminum struts to form the scaffold over which a wire mesh could be stretched. Integrating the mesh with a fabric or plastic liner, the same color as a TEL would make the decoy difficult to identify with optical modalities, in the case it was moved during the day.16 In order to make such a simple decoy indistinguishable from an actual TEL, the same procedure could be used on actual TELs, i.e. decoys are made more convincing when used in conjunction with RCSR shaping. Making the TEL decoy mobile would allow the hider additional modes for deceiving the seeker. Two simple methods for making a shape decoy mobile are mounting it on a smaller vehicle or on a trailer. In both cases, the decoy needs to be made lightweight enough that it can be carried by a vehicle such as one of the TEL convoy support vehicles. A TEL sized decoy could be skinned with 60–180 kg of material.17 If scaffolding were constructed from aluminum tubing, it could weigh on the order of a few hundred kilograms.18 Collectively, the decoy material would weight half a ton, approximately the payload weight capacity of a half-ton pickup truck. Such a decoy could be fabricated for roughly the cost of the pickup truck itself, on the order of tens of thousands of dollars. A less expensive option would be to mount the decoy on a trailer that could be towed by a security vehicle. This would have the advantage of being able to be disconnected and left in a shelter indefinitely.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 2AC – Remote Sensing Fails
Thomas D. MacDonald 21, a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has an interdisciplinary scientific background which he applies to interesting technical problems which are interwoven with political concerns. June 2021, “Hide and Seek: Remote Sensing and Strategic Stability,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, accessed online via UMich libraries
6.1.2 Shelter Spacing Shelters are an integral part of the hider’s ability to keep TELs undetected for an extended period of time. As noted in Chapter 4, shelters are any location in which a TEL cannot be detected by remote-sensing systems. This could be a natural area, or a permanent or temporary structure.9 It is under the hider’s control how many, and how closely spaced these shelters are. Fixed Shelters Fixed shelters are permanent or semi-permanent locations for TELs to hide. Electromagnetic radiation, such as micro- and radio-waves are reflected by conductive surfaces, as discussed in Chapter 2. Dielectric substances, such as wood can also reflect or absorb radio waves in sufficient thickness. The hider could use a number of materials to build shelters. A simple material for reflecting radiowaves is a conductive metal mesh. The size of holes in a mesh determines if it is radar-reflective. Radio waves are reflected by the metal of the mesh, but the holes in the mesh act as waveguides which can allow radiation to pass through if it has a high enough frequency. The cutoff frequency of a rectangular waveguide, the lowest frequency that can travel through the waveguide, is 𝜔𝑐 = 𝑐 √︂(︁𝑛𝜋 𝑎 )︁2 + (︁𝑚𝜋 𝑏 )︁2 , (6.2) where 𝑐 is the speed of light, 𝑛 and 𝑚 are mode numbers associated with the waveguide dimensions 𝑎 and 𝑏, respectively, where 𝑎 ≥ 𝑏 The lowest frequency mode that is allowed is the TE10 mode where 𝑛 = 1 and 𝑚 = 0. The cutoff frequency of a waveguide is therefore
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AFF › Counterforce Fails › 2AC – Remote Sensing Fails
Thomas D. MacDonald 21, a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He has an interdisciplinary scientific background which he applies to interesting technical problems which are interwoven with political concerns. June 2021, “Hide and Seek: Remote Sensing and Strategic Stability,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology, accessed online via UMich libraries
Mobile Jammers The other method for employing jammers to shield the movement of TELs is utilizing mobile jammers. Mobile jammers are already part of the electronic-warfare arsenal of Russia, includes the Krashuka-4 mobile jammer system. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has assessed that Russian mobile jammers have the capability to deny SAR observations as well interfere with satellite communications [121]. While mobile jammers could be utilized to transiently set up a jammer array in an area, this would be inefficient compared to a static jammer array (though more flexible). For example, to create an area of uncertainty 10 shelters in extent would require 10–61 mobile jammers for a linear or gridded road system, respectively. A more efficient method for utilizing jammers would be in exploiting their mobility. A mobile jammer creates a moving blind spot for the seeker. By moving a TEL alongside the jammer, the hider can mask TEL movements. To cover a shelter-to-shelter movement, the jammer would need to approach the shelter containing a TEL, and move with it to another shelter where the TEL could encamp. The hider would be unable to determine if a TEL was present, or moved at all. So, if a mobile jammer passed through any TEL’s area of uncertainty while operating its jammer, that TEL’s possible positions would be spread over every shelter the jammer subsequently passed