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Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---CYBER › Solvency---Cyber---I-Law
Goldman 20, cyber strategist and cyber persistence subject-matter expert at U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. From 2018 to 2019, she was cyber adviser to the director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State (Emily, “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” Texas National Security Review, 3.4)//BB
The United Kingdom and the Netherlands have officially declared their respective positions and they have polar opposite views on this core question. Moreover, Estonia, Australia, and the United States have officially articulated their positions on the applicability of international law to cyber operations yet have not weighed in on this particular issue. Gary Corn considers this range of positions “prima facie evidence of the unsettled nature of the question.”85 The United States needs to seize the diplomatic initiative and publicly articulate its stance on this issue to help influence the court of world opinion. The most explicit official U.S. statement comes from the Department of Defense general counsel: For cyber operations that would not constitute a prohibited intervention or use-of-force, the Department believes there is not sufficiently widespread and consistent State practice resulting from a sense of legal obligation to conclude that customary international law generally prohibits such non-consensual cyber operations in another State’s territory. This proposition is recognized in the Department’s adoption of the “defend forward” strategy: “We will defend forward to disrupt or halt malicious cyber activity at its source, including activity that falls below the level of armed conflict.” The Department’s commitment to defend forward including to counter foreign cyber activity targeting the United States — comports with our obligations under international law and our commitment to the rules-based international order.86 This is an area where the State Department should be leading internationally if the United States hopes to persuade others to adopt its preferred norms, particularly as allies wrestle with legal ambiguities surrounding cyber operations.87
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---CYBER › Solvency---Cyber---Norms
Schaffer 4-4-2022 (Aaron, “It’s a big day at the State Department for U.S. cyberdiplomacy,” Washington Post, )//BB
“Now more than ever, I think we need to have State Department leadership in dealing with all of the many different issues and threats we’re facing in cyberspace; particularly, what we’re seeing with ransomware, but also what we’ve seen with Ukraine, or the potential of what might happen with Ukraine,” Chris Painter, the Obama administration’s top cyber diplomat, told me. Painter added that the new structure, resources and prioritization for the cyber bureau “sends a strong message to both our friends and even our adversaries that this is something we care about deeply.” (The Biden administration has requested $37 million for the bureau.) Lawmakers also want Congress to pass legislation called the Cyber Diplomacy Act. The bill, which passed the House last year, would put similar changes into law. The Cyberspace Solarium Commission also recommended a similar bureau be created. Cyber workforce The new bureau also means that the list of federal cyber officials is getting longer. Jennifer Bachus, a career diplomat who was most recently a top official at the U.S. Embassy in the Czech Republic, will lead the bureau until the Senate confirms an ambassador at large. Looking ahead The bureau will have to hit the ground running. It’ll play a key role in testy international talks about rules in cyberspace, diplomacy about 5G telecommunications equipment made by Chinese tech giant Huawei, talks about the spread of ransomware and Internet governance issues. It also comes as the U.S. government jockeys for an American candidate, Doreen Bogdan-Martin, to lead the U.N. telecommunications agency. It’s “the most important agency you’ve never heard of, setting rules for global tech like 5G,” U.S. Agency for International Development Administrator Samantha Power wrote last year. The bureau has support among lawmakers and experts. Advertisement “The State Department has taken a huge step toward making cybersecurity a core priority of U.S. foreign policy,” said Rep. Jim Langevin (D-R.I.), the co-chair of the Congressional Cybersecurity Caucus. “As the threat of cyber incidents escalates in severity and frequency, we need a strong diplomatic presence on the world stage to develop and implement norms of responsible state behavior in cyberspace.”
2022
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Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---CYBER › Solvency---Cyber---Ambiguity
Goldman 20, cyber strategist and cyber persistence subject-matter expert at U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. From 2018 to 2019, she was cyber adviser to the director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State (Emily, “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” Texas National Security Review, 3.4)//BB
The U.S. government needs to reach an interagency consensus on the preferred boundaries of acceptable behavior outside of armed conflict and promote them in international fora. The State Department is the natural leader for these efforts. Interagency discussions should proceed in tandem with consultations with the private sector. Currently, discussions with private sector entities all too often are isolated within individual agencies, with little coordination between agencies — even between the State Department and USAID. Agreed-upon conventions can then be reinforced by the actions of all departments and agencies. Working bilaterally, multilaterally, and through international institutions, the United States — led by the State Department — can influence and message what behaviors it views as unacceptable. This can help reduce the ambiguity that adversaries exploit, enhance the ability to build coalitions to support the U.S. view, and enable the United States to more effectively secure commitments from like-minded countries to impose consequences on those whose actions are counter to the principles.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---CYBER › Solvency---Cyber---Allied Consensus
Goldman 20, cyber strategist and cyber persistence subject-matter expert at U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. From 2018 to 2019, she was cyber adviser to the director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State (Emily, “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” Texas National Security Review, 3.4)//BB
The State Department’s foreign service officers forward-deployed as “cyber diplomats” can strengthen consensus among allies and partners on the nature of the cyber security problem and on the need for action to address it. To do so, they should be conversant with the U.S. government’s efforts to address cyber competition and armed with information to speak authoritatively about them. The State Department has long promoted a framework for responsible state behavior in cyberspace. The key elements of that framework include: (1) affirmation that established principles of international law apply to state behavior in cyberspace;62 (2) adherence to certain non-binding norms of state behavior in cyberspace during peacetime; and (3) consideration, development, and implementation of practical confidence-building measures to reduce the risk of conflict in cyberspace. Since not all states share American views on responsible behavior in cyberspace, the United States is working with partners and allies on collective attribution and imposition of consequences. These initiatives are now being complemented by the Department of Defense’s strategy of defend forward and U.S. Cyber Command’s operational approach of persistent engagement. The State Department and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) officers in missions around the world need to be well-versed in these other efforts and prepared to explain them to foreign partners on a routine basis. America’s partners want to understand U.S. government strategy and policies.63 It is U.S. policy that cross-domain responses to cyber aggression should be complemented with steady and sustained activities to make networks more resilient, to defend them as far forward as practicable, and to contest the most dangerous adversaries.64 Every diplomatic engagement that includes cyber issues would be an opportunity to build support for these mutually reinforcing approaches.
2022
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Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---CYBER › Solvency---Cyber
Goldman 20, cyber strategist and cyber persistence subject-matter expert at U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. From 2018 to 2019, she was cyber adviser to the director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State (Emily, “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” Texas National Security Review, 3.4)//BB
The U.S. government needs to reach an interagency consensus on the preferred boundaries of acceptable behavior outside of armed conflict and promote them in international fora. The State Department is the natural leader for these efforts. Interagency discussions should proceed in tandem with consultations with the private sector. Currently, discussions with private sector entities all too often are isolated within individual agencies, with little coordination between agencies — even between the State Department and USAID. Agreed-upon conventions can then be reinforced by the actions of all departments and agencies. Working bilaterally, multilaterally, and through international institutions, the United States — led by the State Department — can influence and message what behaviors it views as unacceptable. This can help reduce the ambiguity that adversaries exploit, enhance the ability to build coalitions to support the U.S. view, and enable the United States to more effectively secure commitments from like-minded countries to impose consequences on those whose actions are counter to the principles.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---CYBER › Solvency---Cyber
Williams 21, PhD, postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (BK, et al, “US and Allied Cyber Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, )//BB
Cooperation improves when threat perceptions converge and when the United States exercises thoughtful leadership. It erodes when efforts to promote convergence lapse, when tactical responses take precedence over strategic trust building, and when the United States sets aside the effort to promote cooperation. U.S. leadership is essential, as every U.S. ally faces real restraints and limits in improving cyber security on its own. The United States has an abundance of bureaucratic resources compared to its allies, but it still lacks a clear vision on how to build a collective and collaborative capacity in a domain centered on secrecy and rapid response. Leadership must be built on meaningful engagement and consultation on all these matters and an appropriate modesty about our collective capacity to meet the challenges ahead. Looking to the future of cybersecurity cooperation among the United States and its Indo- Pacific allies, it is easy to identify numerous challenges, usually arising from frictions over threat assessments, desired end-states, doctrine, language, and the different public-private sector relationships in each country. But these challenges also represent opportunities, places where concrete progress can be made and where frictions lend themselves to concerted action. Progress in working one will reinforce progress in working the others. Unity of command may be a bridge too far, near-unity of action is attainable. An achievable goal is to a place where the US and its allies can convey to an adversary that "to beat any one of us, you to have to beat all of us." China's strategy is comprehensive in nature, designed to contest what it perceives a capable, sophisticated, and belligerent cyber adversary in the United States. It begins with defining a central place for cyber in China's development process and military modernization. In the military domain, China pursues improved defenses and the opportunistic pursuit of information dominance. In the economic domain, it prioritizes reduced reliance on externally-sourced technologies and components alongside incentivizing developing countries to purchase Chinese companies' affordable cyber and surveillance products. In the political domain, domestically it pursues deep social control, while internationally it conducts political campaigns to stake its claim to the moral high ground of global governance. The further development of strategic thought about the ends and means of conflict in cyber space and with cyber tools is hostage to the vocabulary and concepts imported from other domains and not yet well tailored for the realities of cyber competition and conflict. This is 2 most evident in the use of the vocabulary and concepts of nuclear deterrence to try to elaborate a strategy to compete effectively in cyber space and reduce or otherwise manage cyber risks. In a strategy of persistent engagement below the lethal threshold, deterrence concepts have little value and the failure to prevent or adequately respond to events only erodes the perception that deterrence or compellence is possible in this arena. We've learned enough to try to set aside misleading concepts but not enough to have consensus around more useful ones. In the long-term, diplomacy is as important for cyber security as deterrence and defense. Diplomacy determines the realm of the possible for political cooperation and the realm of the necessary for global governance and a global ecosystem supporting U.S. and allied values. It is the means by which best practices are shared, norms constructed, and oversteps identified and acted upon. But the United States must refresh and renew its approaches. In doing so, it should be guided by the ambition for a much more competitive cyber diplomacy.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---CYBER › Solvency---Cyber
Fisher 21, serves as a Portfolio Manager in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of Global Programs and Initiatives at the U.S. Department of State (Benjamin, “U.S. Diplomats Build Cyber Defense and Cybersecurity Partnerships Worldwide,” Department of State,
The Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM) works in partnership with the U.S. Department of Defense to strengthen U.S. allies and partners worldwide through training, equipment, and capacity building projects that allow us to work together more effectively to meet shared security challenges. With the growth of malicious cyber activities worldwide, including intrusions and ransomware attacks targeting critical infrastructure, U.S. diplomats have recognized the importance of helping partners enhance the governance of security institutions, and strengthening their capacity to detect, deter, and rapidly mitigate, and respond to international cyber threats and incidents. Cyber Advisors of the Global Defense Reform Program Strong and effective security sector institutions are key to strong security partnerships. The Global Defense Reform Program (GDRP), managed by the PM Bureau’s Office of Global Programs and Initiatives (GPI) works with partners to develop and implement organizational reforms to modernize their security institutions, enhance effectiveness and accountability, and better align the security sector to the needs and challenges of the partner nation and its citizens, in places like Albania, Palau, and Kosovo. GDRP advisors assigned to Ecuador, Argentina, Bulgaria, and North Macedonia work side-by-side with counterparts in partner governments’ ministries of defense (MOD) to address cyber defense and cybersecurity challenges. Together, they are working to draft national-level strategies, policies, and procedures; streamlining coordination among agencies in their respective governments involved in cyber issues; establishing effective “command and control”; and recruiting, training, sustaining, and retaining a skilled cyber workforce. Beyond the knowledge these subject matter experts bring to strategic-level cyber planning, these engagements bolster U.S. foreign policy objectives related to cyber defense and cybersecurity. Ecuador Following a series of incidents, including threats to election platforms, data breaches, and coordinated malicious cyber activity against Ecuador’s government agencies, U.S. Embassy Quito seized the opportunity to partner with the Government of Ecuador and its defense ministry to address cyber defense issues in support of the country’s whole-of-government cyber strategy. In January 2021, the GDRP cyber advisor, Gustavo Santiago, arrived in Ecuador and has played a vital role in advising on national-level cyber policy, including by facilitating inter-ministerial agreements on the roles and responsibilities for cyber defense and for protecting Ecuador’s critical infrastructure, which are currently under review for approval. A retired U.S. Army colonel, Gustavo has worked alongside his Ecuadorian counterparts to establish a 10-year plan to build the Ministry of Defense’s cyber capacity – an initiative that garnered the support of Ecuador’s previous and current government. Since his arrival, Gustavo has shared his expertise with the Ecuadorian defense ministry to help draft foundational documents to plan the development of its cyber capabilities. This is broken out into four areas: (1) prepare the Ecuadorian defense ministry for its assigned role under the National Cybersecurity Policy—including to protect national digital critical infrastructure; (2) increase the Ecuadorian defense ministry’s coordination with Computer Security Incident Response Teams to respond to cyber incidents and mitigate the risk of future threats; (3) enhance the Cyber Defense Command’s cyber defense capabilities; and (4) implement a cyber defense program for the Ministry of Defense in line with the national cyber posture. This partnership between the United States and Ecuador came at a critical moment when strategic competitors were seeking to exert influence in the cyber domain. Gustavo continues working to build connections and new relationships between the Government of Ecuador and other U.S. government experts that work in the cybersecurity arena. Argentina In the next few weeks, a Global Defense Reform Program cyber advisor will arrive in Buenos Aires to join the Ministry of Defense and assist the Joint Staff’s Cyber Command (Comando Conjunto de Ciberdefensa or CCCD) with identifying and addressing cyber vulnerabilities and solutions. Argentina has had a robust national cyber policy for several years, but its governmental agencies and military services have observed how cyber security and policy issues can remain within organizational silos. Like in the case of GDRP Ecuador, the GDRP Argentina cyber advisor will focus on helping the Ministry of Defense coordinate across organizational lines and ensure that the ministerial-level cyber policies and strategies of the CCCD effectively support the National Cybersecurity Strategy. The placement of the cyber advisor within the Ministry of Defense is a notable development in the U.S.-Argentina relationship, which will foster trust between the United States and Argentina and reinforce the importance of partnerships and cyber cooperation in our hemisphere. Bulgaria In Europe, the Global Defense Reform Program is augmenting support to Central and Eastern European countries seeking to defend against Russian influence and malicious cyber activity. In early September, then-GDRP advisor to Bulgaria, Rich Graham, accompanied Brigadier General Vasil Sabinski, Commander of Communication Information Systems Cybersecurity Defense Command, as an official delegate to the 140th anniversary ceremony to commemorate the creation of the Bulgarian Naval Academy. To tackle cybersecurity challenges, the military has launched a new cyber program of instruction to prepare its next generation of cyber leaders. This program will equip students with the practical and technical knowledge needed to lead an effective cybersecurity operations center, modeled to blend with the practices of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense’s Cyber Defense Center. A key component of the GDRP advisor’s work is to assist with the transformation of this Center to deliver state-of-the-art cyber support and help prepare and train the government’s workforce for future cyber challenges. Although still in the early stages, the GDRP advisor has made progress in building relationships to set the conditions for the success of the cyber partnership with Bulgaria. Former Bulgarian cyber advisor with Bulgarian Navy ensign and cybersecurity Masters student Former GDRP Bulgaria cyber advisor Rich Graham (right) attends a ceremony at the Bulgarian Naval Academy for the 140th anniversary of its founding. Graham is pictured with a Bulgarian Navy ensign who is completing her Masters in Cybersecurity at the Bulgarian Naval Academy and is a 2019 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. (Photo: Ministry of Defence of North Macedonia) North Macedonia Since becoming the 30th member of NATO in March 2020, North Macedonia is focused on developing the cyber policies, infrastructure, and capabilities necessary to be an active and ready member of the alliance. This engagement will assist North Macedonia’s defense ministry to transform cyber defense planning, develop and implement a comprehensive cyber strategy to define the roles and responsibilities of different agencies that play a role in national-level cyber efforts. North Macedonian Defense Minister signs a document “We take cybersecurity very seriously.” -North Macedonian Defense Minister Radmila Shekerinska. (Photo: NATO News) Finally, this GDRP project will focus on building North Macedonia’s expertise and capacity in the cyber domain; promote good governance; increase transparency, stability, and efficiency in cyber defense planning and coordination; and enable the North Macedonia government to operate and respond more responsibly and effectively to cyber requirements. By elevating the importance of cybersecurity at the strategic level, the United States is helping countries deter, defend against, and respond to malicious cyber activity and, ultimately, protect critical infrastructure – including election systems — for societies around the world. PM Bureau’s [Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs] cyber portfolio has grown rapidly in recent years to address this demand for strategic-level planning, policy, and cybersecurity assistance with defense partners.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---CYBER › Solvency---Cyber
Goldman 20, cyber strategist and cyber persistence subject-matter expert at U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency. From 2018 to 2019, she was cyber adviser to the director of policy planning at the U.S. Department of State (Emily, “From Reaction to Action: Adopting a Competitive Posture in Cyber Diplomacy,” Texas National Security Review, 3.4)//BB
The Department of State should contribute more directly to efforts to disrupt, degrade, and contest malicious cyberspace behavior. It can do so by leveraging diplomatic channels to increase routine and agile collaboration with partners and allies for continuous pressure against adversary campaigns below the level of armed conflict. The goal would be to frustrate and thwart cyberspace aggression before it harms the United States and its allies. This approach would allow the United States to be more responsive to great-power competition, enable and sustain similar efforts by the Department of Defense, and complement the cyber deterrence initiative. Closer synergy between promoting norms of responsible state behavior in international venues and conducting persistent cyberspace operations that expose and contest behavior inconsistent with such norms has the best chance of producing a convergence of expectations (i.e., norms) on acceptable behavior. Mutually reinforcing efforts across the U.S. government to deter, disrupt, expose, and contest malicious cyberspace behavior can produce the synergy between defense and foreign policy needed for great-power competition. This, however, requires a reevaluation of cyber diplomacy priorities, activities, lines of effort, and mindset.59 Cyber Diplomacy for Great-Power Competition: Seizing and Sustaining Initiative Political conditions today favor an energetic U.S. diplomatic campaign. Russia and China’s aggressive information, political, and economic warfare campaigns have highlighted the risks to U.S. partners and allies.60 Those allies are eager to improve their cyberspace security and to work cooperatively with the United States. The U.S. government can capitalize on this favorable environment by forging agreements with foreign partners that encourage a deeper level of interaction. The United States can build coalitions for continuous pressure against adversary cyberspace campaigns outside of armed conflict.61 Such agreements and the joint efforts that follow will normalize collaborative cyberspace operations for mutual defense. Essentially, the State Department needs to operationalize the core objective of cyber persistence: seizing and sustaining initiative. The State Department is uniquely positioned to convene interagency discussions on defining boundaries of acceptable behavior below the level of armed conflict, to forge consensus with allies and partners on boundaries of acceptable competition, and to mobilize international coalitions to enforce those boundaries. It can better enable the Department of Defense to persistently engage and defend forward in cyberspace below the level of armed conflict — a necessary ingredient for constructing norms through interaction. Diplomats should be well-versed in the full range of U.S. cyber activities and explain them to U.S. partners in order to set the international conditions for the United States to compete in a globally interconnected domain. With these goals in mind, the following recommendations are offered as a roadmap for improving U.S. cyber diplomacy.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---CYBER › Solvency---Cyber
Williams 21, PhD, postdoctoral research fellow at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (BK, et al, “US and Allied Cyber Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific,” Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, )//BB
The workshop's penultimate panel stressed a renewal of innovation in diplomatic practice. An active cyber diplomacy holds the promise of restoring stability to cyberspace, and, for the United States, advocating for a free, interoperable, and secure internet globally. State Department retains the bureaucratic competencies and personnel to enact forward-looking cyber diplomacy, but they have much ground to cover on norm construction, capacity building, and affirming that states follow international law in cyberspace. Diplomacy's most substantial roles are protecting an on-line ecosystem where human rights are respected, restoring stability by reducing incentives for states to act maliciously, and demonstrating U.S. leadership in digital rights and emerging technology. Cyber diplomats at the State Department and DHS cooperate with allies on publicly attributing blame for aggressive cyber acts to state-sponsored APTs. State Department is active in the UN's Group of Governmental Experts and Open-Ended Working Group, lobbying for an internet of information freedom rather than information control by states. Thus far, as one panelist emphasized, the State Department has not yet framed its cyber diplomacy efforts in the realities of the cyber strategic environment. The State Department can make strides in supporting Persistent Engagement by socializing foreign service officers and diplomats, who are the face of diplomacy, to the domain's competitive nature. Shaping international discourse on cybersecurity norms, responsible state behavior, and governance can be best attained by a corps of diplomats who are unified with the United States' cyber doctrine. Norm construction from the bottom up presents the best route to shape global norms. Leveraging agile coalitions of allies to build norms represents a workable solution to adversary intransigence at the UN. Values, by themselves, do not have the power to influence norms against concerted state pressures to assert authoritarian control over the internet. Competitive allied cyber diplomacy can shape the standards and norms that determine the future of the internet. A competitive cyber diplomacy relies on the State Department's core competency in creating bilateral and multilateral agreements for capacity building, threat intelligence sharing, resilience measures, and to promote best practices in a competitive cyber ecosystem. Diplomats understand countries' strategic and political environments, and the State Department has the capacity to scale Hunt Forward operations. USCC [US Cyber Command] encounters limits in growing Hunt Forward. Collaboration between the State Department and USCC may present the best avenue to consensually operate in other countries' networks to observe malicious actors. The State Department will guide the United States' cyber diplomacy, not USCC [US Cyber Command], and integrating cyber authorities will create synergies for how the United States can restore stability in cyberspace and safeguard the United States' cybersecurity.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---TOP-SHELF › Solvency---AT DoS Atrophy
Roberts 17, Former Research Fellow For Economic Freedom and Growth at Heritage (James, “America Needs a Stronger State Department, Not an ‘Independent’ Foreign Aid Agency,” Heritage,
Just as is the case overseas, where the U.S. ambassador is the senior-most official in an American embassy, in Washington the secretary of state should have undisputed authority over decisions about allocating U.S. foreign assistance. The State Department—highly competent, well-equipped, appropriately staffed and resourced—should include a foreign assistance component. That is what countries such as Canada, Denmark, and Sweden already have done.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---TOP-SHELF › Solvency---AT DoS Atrophy
Zeya and Finer 20, *American diplomat who has served as the Under Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights in the Biden Administration since July 2021, **American journalist and diplomat who serves as Deputy National Security Advisor under National Security Advisor (Uzra and Jon, Revitalizing the State Department and American Diplomacy,” Council Special Report No. 89)//BB
But this situation can be reversed. The State Department’s ranks are still among the most talented professional public servants anywhere in the government. When properly empowered and entrusted with significant responsibilities, American diplomats play essential roles in consequential outcomes for the country—from the Iran nuclear deal and Paris climate accord in the Barack Obama administration to the Afghanistan peace process and the release of American prisoners from various countries under President Trump. And its current predicament could make the State Department itself, which has long resisted fundamental reform, more open to badly needed changes. This report does not speak to every challenge the State Department faces but rather highlights the reform areas that we identified as reflecting greatest need based on discussions with veteran diplomats and other experts.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---TOP-SHELF › Solvency---AT Military Articles
McLaren 14, US Air Force Captain (McKay, “Enhancing the Assessment of the Costs and Benefits of International Pilot Training (IPT) Within the U.S. Air Force: Is It Worth It?,” RAND Dissertations)
U.S. Code Title 22 provides congressional authority to conduct DoS Security Assistance programs. The programs are carried out through two basic laws, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA) and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (AECA).24 AECA enacted congressional legislative controls over export of defense articles and services. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee are responsible for foreign assistance and Security Assistance program authorization legislation. The Senate and House Armed Services Committees are responsible for defense programs authorization legislation. The term security cooperation is used within DoD, whereas the term security assistance is used within the DoS. It is important to note that these congressional committees play a role only in FMS authorization. Although Congress maintains legislative control over exports, FMS is a nonappropriated program, external to the U.S. budget, and the president is charged with signing off on spending for the program. Through Executive Order 11958, as amended, the President delegates selected functions in the AECA to the secretaries of State and Defense. They are required to provide reports to Congress and obtain specific congressional approval on certain exports or transfers. The DoS has responsibilities relating to security assistance, which include managing the export of defense articles, services, training, and military technology.25 DoD has responsibilities relating to security cooperation, which include activities to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives.26 The military departments and other DoD agencies involved in managing FMS programs are collectively called implementing agencies (IAs). The Army, Navy, and Air Force usually have the responsibility of being the IA in the process of FMS.27 The Air Force agency for all security cooperation programs is the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA). The Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition has oversight in the execution by virtue of having responsibility for Air Force acquisition. SAF/IA is supported by the Air Force Security Assistance Center at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, for most FMS and other logistics functions. The Air Force Security Assistance Training (AFSAT) squadron at Randolph Air Force Base (AFB), Texas, is in charge of planning and, with AETC, managing the Air Force international military training. It is organized under the authority of AETC.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---TOP-SHELF › Solvency---AT Military Articles
Tankel 20, Stephen Tankel, associate professor at American University, and an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and Tommy Ross, non-resident senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020 (Stephen, “RETOOLING U.S. SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE,” War on the Rocks,
The United States provides security sector assistance to foreign civilian and military forces, agencies, and institutions ranging from local law enforcement and judicial systems to standing militaries. This assistance is intended to strengthen U.S. access to key territories and facilities, shape partners’ national security decision-making and governance, and build their capacity and capabilities for use against shared threats and adversaries. It also promotes the U.S. defense industry via arms transfers, supports the infrastructure and operations of multilateral organizations such as NATO, and increases military interoperability. The State Department implements assistance across the entire security sector, including organizations responsible for defense, law enforcement, and security of key assets like ports and borders. The Department of Defense has a narrower mandate, and provides assistance to partner militaries under the umbrella of security cooperation. The Pentagon also engages in a range of other activities — combined exercises, staff talks, port visits, and officer exchanges — that fall under security cooperation as well. We use the term security sector assistance for simplicity, and distinguish where these additional security cooperation activities are relevant. The U.S. government does not typically define Foreign Military Sales as assistance, but we believe it should, and that it ought to factor Direct Commercial Sales into its assistance planning as well. Both types of sales can lead to sustained U.S. engagement with a partner in the form of training, maintenance, and sustainment for the purchased items.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---TOP-SHELF › Solvency---AT DoD Key
Bergmann and Schmitt 21, *senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College, **senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School (Max and Alexandra, “A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance,” Center for American Progress, https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/)
While there are times when it is appropriate for the DOD to have the authority to directly provide assistance to a partner, these programs should be exclusive to when the United States is at war and fighting side by side with allied or partner forces. In these cases, such as in active combat in Iraq or Afghanistan, it may make sense for the Pentagon to have its own authorities to assist foreign partners. But outside these wartime situations, and especially in light of today’s efforts to end the forever wars, the State Department is fully able to oversee and manage the bulk of U.S. security assistance programs.
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---TOP-SHELF › Solvency---AT Leverage/Cooperation
Sullivan 11, et al, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill (Patricia L. Sullivan, Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Number 7)//BB
Despite its limitations, our study offers a novel approach to the foreign aid and influence puzzle. And our results uncover interesting relationships that deserve greater theoretical and empirical attention in future research. Clearly, the relationship between US military aid and recipient state cooperation is far from straightforward. The bulk of our evidence pens a cautionary tale for policymakers; although military assistance may achieve the specific goals for which it was allocated, it appears to generate less cooperative behavior from recipient states overall. US military aid levels may be more indicative of American dependence on recipient states than of US influence over client states. Contrary to the vast majority of the existing literature on foreign aid, our results suggest military aid is neither a carrot nor a stick; US assistance is given to countries that the United States depends on for some foreign policy ‘‘good’’ and the United States will continue to provide such aid as long as that ‘‘good’’ is valued in Washington. With this knowledge, recipient state behavior is actually likely to be increasingly uncooperative as levels of American dependency (and subsequent aid packages) increase.
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Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---TOP-SHELF › Solvency---AT Leverage/Cooperation
Sullivan 11, et al, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill (Patricia L. Sullivan, Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Number 7)//BB
In several ways, the Reverse Leverage model was quite accurate: (i) states receiving military aid from the United States exhibit lower levels of cooperation than states that do not receive military aid, (ii) in the population of all states, higher levels of military aid appear to produce more defiant behavior, and (iii) the United States does not punish defiance with reductions in aid or reward greater cooperation with increases in military aid. Together, these results suggest that US military assistance is allocated for reasons that are largely independent of overall recipient state behavior toward the United States. The Reverse Leverage model contends that military aid is delivered to states that the United States depends on for security reasons. Realizing their leverage over Washington, states that receive high amounts of aid are actually more able to engage in uncooperative behavior than are states that the United States does not depend so heavily upon. We attempted to test for the effects of an aid recipient’s ‘‘security value’’ directly by comparing US allies to nonallies. Consistent with the Reverse Leverage model, we find that states with a defensive alliance with the United States are more likely to receive US military aid but less likely to respond to aid by increasing their cooperation with American preferences.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---TOP-SHELF › Solvency---AT Leverage/Cooperation
Sullivan 11, et al, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill (Patricia L. Sullivan, Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Number 7)//BB
Our research is relevant to larger academic debates about the utility and limitations of foreign aid as a policy instrument. We attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of foreign aid, and security assistance more specifically, in terms of its ability to move recipients toward more cooperative foreign policies. We test the conventional ‘‘arms for influence’’ explanation of military aid but find that the relationship between US assistance and recipient state behavior is considerably more complicated. In general, we find that military aid does not lead to more cooperative behavior on the part of recipient states. With limited exceptions, increasing levels of US aid are linked to a significant reduction in cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States. US reaction to recipient state behavior is also somewhat counterintuitive; instead of using a carrot-and-stick approach to military aid allocations, our results show that increased recipient state cooperation is likely to lead to subsequent reductions in US military assistance.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---TOP-SHELF › Solvency---AT Leverage/Cooperation
Sullivan 11, et al, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill (Patricia L. Sullivan, Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” Foreign Policy Analysis, Number 7)//BB
In this model, we anticipate a paradoxical effect of military aid in which powerful donor states become dependent on the recipients of their military aid (Mott 2002). The United States gives military aid to gain leverage and influence. But it is in a competitive market for leverage through aid; it must compete with other states to keep its influence over client states. At the same time, we can assume that the United States chooses to invest heavily in training and equipping the military forces of other countries, with all the attendant risks this entails, because it needs something from these states. Materially weak states can exploit the fact that a much stronger donor relies on them to provide some vital good—and the threat of defection to an alternative supplier—to exert influence over the donor. According to Mott (2002), during the Cold War, US security assistance recipients learned to manipulate the United States ‘‘by putting Moscow and Washington into an aid competition, by diversifying across suppliers, and converting the expected recipient dependence into a perverse sort of supplier dependence’’ (8). Although the Cold War competition with Moscow is no longer central to US foreign policy, other states and even nonstate actors have stepped in to replace the Soviet Union as alternative arms suppliers. Stokke (1995) observes that strong states have typically used foreign aid ‘‘as a lever to promote objectives set by the donor, which the recipient government would not have otherwise agreed to’’ (12). But Singer (2003) argues that the increasingly privatized military market ‘‘fundamentally alters this patron-client relationship’’ (211). Since weaker states can now purchase weapons on the open market, the patron’s ability to influence client behavior is greatly diminished. Generous US military funding runs the risk of creating militarily strong, assertive clients that become more willing to ignore US interests (Mott 2002). Recipient states should be more likely to defy the United States if they believe that the United States will be unable or unwilling to punish them for defection (Walt 2005). US dependence on recipient states for oil, troop basing, over-flight permission, counternarcotic and counterterrorism operations, etc… makes withdrawing aid potentially more costly for the United States than for the aid recipients. It may be easier for aid recipients to find alternative suppliers than it would be for the United States to find an equally valuable place to base its troops.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---TOP-SHELF › Solvency---Evolution
Toft 18, Professor of International Politics and Director of the Center for Strategic Studies at The Fletcher School (Monica, “THE DANGEROUS RISE OF KINETIC DIPLOMACY,” War on the Rocks, )//BB
But the difficulty is that the U.S. public, along with most of its representatives in Congress, have no way of knowing whether these deployments — though no doubt ideal as compared to the alternative of major conventional wars — are having a positive net effect. In order to know that we would need a fully functioning Department of State whose diplomats on the ground could help guide and inform ongoing and future special operations force deployments. The Trump administration’s hollowing out of the State Department — which is historically unprecedented — makes it progressively difficult to deal with the underlying causes of the violent extremist organization threat, and to know whether kinetic diplomacy is helping or hurting U.S. and allied interests.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
DEPARTMENT OF STATE CP › SOLVENCY---TOP-SHELF › Solvency---Trust
Casler 21, Ph.D. Candidate, Political Science Department, Columbia University (Don, “Credible To Whom? The Organizational Politics of Credibility in International Relations,” Mershon Center Working Papers, )//BB
Diplomats’ conception of credibility derives from their wide range of duties: translating between the home government and the world; providing early warning of troubles and opportunities; building and fixing relationships; and integrating the military, economic, and intelligence tools of statecraft.53 Diplomats are socialized to be experts in communication, relationship management, and negotiation — whether because they are career civil servants steeped in the art of diplomacy or because they enter government from business or law, where such skills also receive special emphasis. As a result, their self-image is as the first line of defense against international strife,54 or the process-oriented analyst and reporter who keeps the home government informed, represents its interests, and cajoles others into doing what the home government wants. Securing others’ trust is essential for each of these objectives, making diplomats highly focused on the personal and behavioral dimensions of cultivating relationships.55 This means that diplomats constantly and keenly observe how the home government is perceived across a broad range of issues, events, and commitments, which they see as tightly interconnected. The wide scope of diplomats’ core mission inculcates a broad definition of national interests and a capacious understanding of what the home government’s actions can indicate to international audiences.56 Since their chief objective is to cultivate strong, durable impressions and relationships that will persist over anticipated future interactions, I argue that diplomats conceive of credibility primarily in terms of national interests and signaling reputation — in other words, as the willingness to keep commitments and bear costs. Military officers’ conception of credibility stems from their military education, which limits the proper role of military force in foreign policy to traditional security goals such as protecting territory, geostrategic positions, and allies.57 This experience socializes military officials to be experts in managing violence through specialized training in military operations, tactics, and logistics.58 As a result, their self-image is as the goal-oriented technician, taking sober stock of a given task’s hard capability requirements.59 Because they are attentive to the nuts and bolts of military interventions as well as all that can go wrong in war, military officials hold a pessimistic professional viewpoint that typically demands maximum capabilities to address any contingency.60 This manifests in the military ethic of “conservative realism,” stressing the possession of ready forces to meet potential challenges and opposing the extension of commitments or issuance of threats unless the capacity to follow through exists.61