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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › PROLIFERATION › 1NC
Matthew Kroenig and Rebecca Davis Gibbons 16. Matthew Kroenig is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service and a Senior Fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. Rebecca Davis Gibbons is a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Government at Bowdoin College. “Chapter 5 The Next Nuclear War”. Should We Let the Bomb Spread http://npolicy.org/books/Should_We_Let_the_Bomb_Spread/Full_Book.pdf//SJ
Iran’s nuclear program is at least temporarily halted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action struck with the international community in 2015. But if the limits in this deal were contravened for any reason, it is possible that Iran could still join the nuclear club. If Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it is also possible that other states in the region, including Turkey, Egypt, or Saudi Arabia could attempt to acquire nuclear weapons in response.88 While fears of a rapid and complete nuclear cascade in the region are probably overblown, it is possible, if not likely, that one or two additional states would join the nuclear club within the course of several decades if Iran goes nuclear.89
The nuclear balance of power between Iran and its neighbors could be highly unstable and would likely lack many of the safeguards that existed between the superpowers during the Cold War, including: the absence of a direct line of communication between Iran and its rivals, short timelines for nuclear-armed missiles to travel between states, the lack of secure second-strike capabilities (at least initially), and, in Israel, a lack of strategic depth and a strategic culture that emphasizes preemption.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › TURKEY-GREECE › !---Turns Case
Salacanin 20 — Stasa Salacanin, Author for Inside Arabia. 10/21/2020. “NATO’s Dilemma Over Greece-Turkey Friction”, Inside Arabia, https://insidearabia.com/natos-dilemma-over-greece-turkey-friction/ WMK
Tensions between Turkey and Greece have increased after a series of disputes over the interpretation of international maritime law and territorial waters in the Eastern Mediterranean, where rich gas deposits have been found. Last month, Greek and Turkish military ships collided in contested waters near the Greek island of Kastellorizo, which lies just 2 km (1.2 miles) from the Turkish coast. Turkish military vessels guarded the country’s seismic research ship. This flexing of military muscles has raised concerns of confrontation between the two NATO members, who share a long history of disputes.
In short, while Greece has insisted that a country’s continental shelf should be measured from islands that belong to a particular state – an interpretation that has been supported by the UN Law of the Sea –Turkey builds its case by claiming that a nation’s continental shelf should be measured from its mainland coast.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › TURKEY-GREECE › !---Escalates
Stratfor 20, Shadow CIA, iykyk, “What's Driving Turkish Aggression in the Mediterranean Sea,” 9/9/20,
Turkey is putting its 50-year view on maritime rights into practice through its Blue Homeland Doctrine, growing its naval and commercial presence in Mediterranean waters that it claims are part of its exclusive economic zones (EEZs). Oil and gas exploration is becoming a crucial tool in implementing this strategy. But Ankara's attempts to claim extensive maritime resource rights risk broadening to a wider conflict with Greece and other NATO allies that would bring foreign energy projects, and potentially the United States, into the fray. Turkey's Maritime Ambitions Turkey claims that all of its neighboring waters in the Aegean, Black and Mediterranean seas deserve special treatment under international law, and that the islands in the Aegean Sea (which Greece controls the majority of) should not enjoy the same rights as large countries like Turkey with lengthy coastlines. The international community never adopted these distinctions, which is why Turkey is not a signatory to the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and prefers to resolve disputes through bilateral negotiations in lieu of not international arbitration. This has so far led to two major disputes with Greece in the Aegean and Mediterranean seas, as well as a major dispute with Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey's most important dispute is in the Aegean Sea, where thousands of Greek islands help boost Greece's maritime claims over Turkey's, and where the two countries disagree on how to even start drawing a maritime border due to the disparity in the number of islands between them. Turkey has just three islands in the Aegean Sea, while Greece claims more than 3,000. Given the higher number of Greek islands, Turkey has long maintained that any expansion of Greek maritime claims from six nautical miles (nm) to 12 nm off Greece's shores would constitute a "casus belli," or cause of war. While Greece and Turkey have nearly gone to war several times over disputes in the Aegean Sea, the two countries have so far avoided declaring full EEZs in the region, as well as claiming territorial waters beyond six nautical miles. But that doesn't mean they can't do so in the future. Ankara has argued that if both Greece and Turkey extended their claims beyond 12 nm, Turkey's percent ownership of the territory would only marginally increase, while Greece would see its territorial control reach nearly three-quarters of the entire Aegean Sea. The use of Greece's islands in the Aegean Sea to demarcate a maritime border for EEZs, which extend up to 200 nm from the coast, would also leave Turkey with virtually no rights to the natural resources and fisheries in the Aegean Sea. Turkey has argued that a more equitable way to split the sea's resources would be by ignoring the islands altogether and starting off with an equidistant line between the Greek and Turkish mainlands. Ankara Takes Action By more aggressively flexing its claims through energy exploration and naval exercises in the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey is trying to both legitimize its declared EEZ claim, as well as delegitimize any potential EEZ claims in the region that Greece has through its islands of Crete, Rhodes and Kastellorizo. Kastellorizo, in particular, has the potential to generate a significant EEZ claim for Greece that could connect to Cyprus's own claimed EEZ, thus significantly limiting Turkish claims to resources between Crete and Cyprus. Further escalation could result in Greece finally claiming its full EEZ in the eastern Mediterranean, which Athens has so far been reluctant to do for fear of spurring a wider conflict. Protected by a Turkish naval convoy, Turkey's Oruc Reis surveying vessel has been active throughout the Mediterranean Sea since the beginning of the year. Turkey's December 2019 maritime agreement with Libya's Government of National Accord aims to legitimize Turkey's claims by establishing a border between Turkish and Libyan waters that ignores Crete and Kastellorizo. On Aug. 27, the Greek parliament ratified a maritime border agreement with Egypt aimed at countering Turkey's pact with Libya by legitimizing a potential EEZ border generated via its control of Crete with Egypt. Greece's deal with Egypt is a first step in potentially declaring a full EEZ in the eastern Mediterranean, but the agreement with Egypt does not legitimize potential claims that Kastellorizo could give Greece rights to. Turkey has also been actively attempting to delegitimize Cyprus' claimed EEZ in the eastern Mediterranean by both conducting energy exploration in waters that Cyprus directly claims, as well as harassing foreign companies that are operating on behalf of the Cypriot government. Turkey has argued that Cyprus' claimed EEZ is not legal because it was not done in coordination with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which Ankara recognizes as a legitimate government for all of Cyprus. Turkey also argues that, as an island, Cyprus cannot claim a full EEZ. Turkey's Yavuz vessel is currently drilling off the coast of Western Cyprus. Turkey's Barbados vessel is also currently researching in the Northern Cyprus territorial waters that Turkey recognizes as a part of an oil exploration block held by the state-owned Turkish Petroleum Corporation. In 2018, the Turkish navy prevented the Italian oil firm Eni from drilling on its Cuttlefish prospect in an exploration block the company received from Cyprus. The Specter of War Turkey's increased provocations will continue to drive the United States and other NATO countries, including France and Greece, to boost their own naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean. Both Turkey and Greece will try to refrain from crossing red lines that could spur a larger confrontation that neither wants, but the higher presence of ships in the eastern Mediterranean will nonetheless increase the possibility of incidents, as evidenced by the Aug. 10 collision between the Greek frigate Limnos and the Turkish frigate Kemal Reis. International mediation would likely avoid further escalation to a military conflict between Greece and Turkey, but is unlikely to result in a diplomatic solution to their dispute. In the case of a wider crisis, most NATO members would view Turkey as the aggressor and would likely back Greece. This would likely reinforce Ankara's overall pursuit of its maritime strategy and intensifying national security push by offering Turkey further proof that NATO does not prioritize its national security priorities. Countries can only leave NATO on their own accord, which Turkey remains is unlikely to do. Instead, Ankara would probably continue to reduce collaboration with NATO countries. Despite Cyprus and Greece's calls for a more significant response to deter Turkey's behavior, the European Union will likely be hesitant to impose more drastic measures for fear of prompting Ankara to reduce cooperation on migration and other EU priorities. Unless Turkey starts to more directly protect its claims in the Aegean Sea, fires upon a Greek or another European vessel, or conducts drilling or exploration activities around Crete, Brussels will likely limit its sanctions pressure to companies and individuals supporting Turkish activities in the Mediterranean. Decisions on implementing EU sanctions require unanimity among the bloc's member states. And some countries, such as Germany, are more concerned about aggressive sanctions only inflaming Brussels' tensions with Turkey. If the European Union does not take significant action on Turkey, Cyprus is now threatening to veto proposed EU sanctions against Belarus amid the country's ongoing political crisis. This may result in slightly stronger EU sanctions that target more Turkish individuals and companies, but more broad-based economic sanctions against the Turkish government remain unlikely. Energy Projects in the Crossfire The United States will likely let the European Union continue to take the lead in responding to Turkey's attempts to delegitimize Greek and Cypriot maritime claims, but Chevron's recent entry into the eastern Mediterranean could eventually draw Washington more directly into the conflict. On July 20, Chevron announced an agreement to acquire the Houston-based oil and gas firm Noble Energy, which operates both the Leviathan gas field off the coast of Israel and the Aphrodite gas field off the coast of Cyprus. Ankara, however, will likely adopt a more hands-off approach to U.S. companies operating in the region, as the United States would be more willing to impose hardline sanctions in response to American firms being drawn into its maritime disputes. By continuing to increase the cost of developing resources in Cypriot waters, Turkey's ongoing harassment of foreign energy firms will drive its neighbors closer together on both maritime security and energy exploration issues. But it could also potentially halt their construction of the proposed East Med pipeline. Cyprus, Egypt, Greece and Israel created the East Mediterranean Gas Forum in 2019. The quartet has since collaborated to construct the roughly $6 billion pipeline project, which would carry natural gas from the eastern Mediterranean to Europe. Under international law, Turkey is technically required to allow other countries to build pipelines through its EEZ. But Ankara retains the power to demand that any constructors of the East Med pipeline adhere to its environmental reviews and oversight, which would be de facto recognition of Turkey's EEZ. Otherwise, Turkey could send its navy to harass or intercept vessels involved with construction as Ankara did in 2018 with a drillship planning to spud a well in Cypriot waters.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › TURKEY-GREECE › !---Escalates
Ted Galen Carpenter 20, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute. He received his Ph.D. in U.S. diplomatic history from the University of Texas, “An Old NATO Nightmare Returns: Possible War between Greece and Turkey,” 9/10/20,
U.S. and other Western leaders have long worried about what to do if an armed conflict ever erupted between two NATO members. Rapidly rising tensions between Greece and Turkey, primarily involving a maritime dispute over oil, natural gas, and other resources under the eastern Mediterranean, have brought that nightmare to the surface once again. Germany’s Foreign Minister, Heiko Maas, warned both governments in late August against further military escalation. “Fire is being played with and any small spark could lead to catastrophe,” he stressed. The heart of the North Atlantic Treaty is Article 5, which proclaims that an attack on any member of the Alliance will be considered an attack on all. The underlying assumption is that there would then be a collective response to repel and punish the aggressor. Obviously, that approach would not work if two NATO signatories went to war against each other. Even determining which country was the aggressor and which the victim could be quite challenging. Throughout NATO’s history, the greatest risk of an intra‐alliance conflict has always been one involving Greece and Turkey. Although both countries joined NATO in 1952, mutual membership in that security partnership did not erase the centuries of animosity between the two populations. Athens and Ankara have nearly come to blows on several occasions, most notably when Turkey invaded majority‐Greek Cyprus in 1974, proceeded to occupy nearly 40 percent of the island, and expelled Greek Cypriots from that territory. The occupation continues to this day. There have been several lesser, but still worrisome, incidents over the years. Among other problems, Turkish military planes continuously violate Greek airspace. Athens then sends its fighter planes up to intercept and challenge the Turkish aircraft—in some years as many as 2,000 times. Thus far, there have been no armed clashes, but as I’ve written elsewhere, similar games of aerial “chicken” involving the United States and such countries as Russia and China are extremely reckless. One such episode between U.S. and Chinese planes in 2001 resulted in a midair collision that killed the Chinese pilot and created an ugly diplomatic row between Washington and Beijing. All it would take is one miscalculation by a Greek or Turkish pilot to trigger a similar (or worse) crisis between Athens and Ankara. The Cyprus episode suggests what Washington’s reaction would be to the outbreak of a Greco‐Turkish armed conflict. Under the guidance of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, the United States pressured both countries to dampen their quarrel, and Kissinger used maximum leverage to get the other NATO members to adopt the same position. However, Kissinger’s stance was far from neutral. Even though Turkey had been the aggressor, the [US] United States soon tilted in favor of Ankara’s position. Congressional anger compelled Gerald Ford’s administration to implement sanctions against the Turkish government, but the White House moved inexorably to dilute those measures as quickly as possible. That approach continued under Jimmy Carter’s administration, and by the beginning of the 1980s, the restrictions were effectively moot. Washington’s response reflected the belief that Turkey was a much more important ally than Greece in terms of strategic considerations. There is little reason to believe that the U.S. attitude has changed. Even if a Biden administration would not share Donald Trump’s apparent admiration for Turkey’s autocratic president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, both security and economic calculations would push Washington toward that conclusion. There is one important difference, though, between the Cyprus crisis and a possible new confrontation between Athens and Ankara. Key NATO powers, most notably France and Italy, are not happy about Erdogan’s increasingly undemocratic rule and his government’s maverick, often pro‐Russian, behavior on security issues. In addition, France has openly challenged Turkey’s territorial and resource claims in the eastern Mediterranean, and in late August, French warships and planes joined a joint military exercise with Greece and Cyprus to convey a blunt message of displeasure to Ankara. Washington may find it far more difficult today to drag its NATO allies into taking a pro‐Turkish stance in case of an armed confrontation between Greece and Turkey than it did in 1974. The mere prospect of a possible Greco‐Turkish war underscores one of the major drawbacks of the United States being the leader of a nearly 30‐member military alliance. America automatically is entangled in the grievances and quarrels of every one of those members. And when two members openly hate each other, that situation can create not only a headache but an outright nightmare for the United States.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › TURKEY-GREECE › 1NC
Psaropoulos 18 (John Psaropoulos, independent journalist based in Athens, with two decades of experience covering Greece, Cyprus and southeast Europe. Freelance correspondent for Al Jazeera International, NPR, the Daily Beast and others; “Greece vs. Turkey: Are We Headed for an Intra-NATO War?”; Washington Examiner; 3/28/18; https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/greece-vs-turkey-are-we-headed-for-an-intra-nato-war kp)
The Aegean Sea between Greece and Turkey hosts one of the world’s highest concentrations of high-tech weaponry. Sixty-seven surface ships and two dozen submarines are deployed on a body of water the size of Lake Superior. The two air forces command 448 fighter jets armed with smart bombs and guided missiles. On land, 832 heavy tanks and more than 2,500 lighter artillery vehicles—as much tank firepower as in all the rest of Europe combined—could rapidly be brought to bear along a Greek-Turkish border only 105 miles long.
These arsenals, built up over decades and constantly modernized, were not merely a boon to U.S. and German defence contractors. Western policymakers wanted to believe that loyalty to NATO’s mission of containing the USSR, rather than regional rivalries, motivated this exemplary level of Greek and Turkish defense spending. After the Soviet Union collapsed, good diplomacy and Turkey’s EU aspirations made it possible, most of the time, to overlook the downsides of an arms race between uneasy neighbors. Recently, however, the Aegean has become a dangerously narrow sea.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › TURKEY-GREECE › 1NC
Gingeras 22, professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School and is an expert on Turkish, Balkan, and Middle East history (Ryan, “DOGFIGHT OVER THE AEGEAN: TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS IN LIGHT OF UKRAINE,” War on the Rocks,
Making matters worse, Turkey’s current posture toward the Aegean is not solely the product of domestic politics. In assessing the impact the war in Ukraine could have upon Turkish foreign policy, scholar Selim Koru suggested that Erdogan may sense a moment of opportunity to pursue a broad set of revisionist goals in its near abroad. Koru prophesized that, with the backing of right-wing politicians and the country’s security establishment, Ankara “could push more strongly against Greek naval boundaries, which it believes to be unfairly stacked against it.” To some extent, Turkey’s expressions of insecurity echo those of Russia’s in the lead-up to the war with Ukraine. Like the case of Turkish-Greek relations, Russia and Ukraine share a long history of antagonism and disagreement over matters of territory. Like Russian supporters of Putin’s war against Ukraine, prominent voices in Turkey similarly see the Aegean as a potential front in a proxy struggle against the United States. It may be this fear that has led Erdogan’s government to reiterate its threat to “take matters further” in challenging Greek sovereignty in the Aegean. If the current crisis in Ukraine imparts any lesson, it is that one should not underrate the risk of conflict. A war between Greece and Turkey is not only possible but perhaps, at some point, probable.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › SYRIA › ---xt: ISIS IL
Seldin 5-27-2022, VOA’s National Security Correspondent tracking developments in intelligence, counterterrorism, and cyber since March 2015, following a stint covering the Pentagon. His current focus has been on terror groups such as ISIS and al-Qaida, while also covering U.S. election security, as well as covering developments with Russia, China, North Korea and other global hotspots (Jeff, “US Allies in NE Syria Warn Against New Turkish Incursion,” VoA News, https://www.voanews.com/a/us-allies-in-ne-syria-warn-against-new-turkish-incursion-/6592567.html)//BB
U.S. allies in northeastern Syria are increasingly worried about Turkey’s pledge to launch a new round of military operations in the region, warning it could embolden and even strengthen the Islamic State terror group.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced the new round of operations earlier this week Monday, pledging to expand existing 30-kilometer-deep security zones on the Syrian side of the Turkish border.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › SYRIA › !---ISIS
Hubbard 1/31/22 [Ben Hubbard, Beirut bureau chief for the NYTimes, Asmaa al-Omar contributed reporting from Beirut, Lebanon, Eric Schmitt from Washington and Jane Arraf from Hasaka, Syria; “ISIS, Thriving in Unstable Places, Proves It’s Still a Threat”; Jan. 31, 2022; DOA: 6/25/22; ; Lowell-ES]
BEIRUT, Lebanon — One week after Islamic State fighters attacked a prison in northeastern Syria, where they have held out despite a heavy assault by a Kurdish-led militia backed by the United States, the terrorist organization published its version of what had gone down.
In its official magazine, it mocked how many times in its history its foes had declared the Islamic State to be defeated. Its surprise attack on the prison, it crowed, had made its enemies “shout in frustration: ‘They have returned again!’”
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › SYRIA › !---Escalates---ME
Jeffrey 12-13-2021, Chair of the Middle East Program at the Wilson Center. He served as a Foreign Service officer in seven U.S. administrations, most recently as Special Representative for Syria Engagement and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. (James, “A Deal Is Still Possible in Syria,” Foreign Affairs,
As U.S. President Joe Biden and his team focus on the Iran nuclear file, the war in Syria remains a festering wound at the heart of the Middle East. Although the current administration has made no dramatic departures from the approach of previous administrations, its decision to deprioritize the conflict comes at a particularly bad time. Opportunities to find a solution to the Syria crisis are now emerging—and the United States should devote the diplomatic energy necessary to seize them. The keys to success after years of failure include not just high-level engagement but a realistic assessment of what can be achieved in any deal.
The risks in keeping Syria on the back burner are significant. The conflict is already a strategic train wreck: a victory by President Bashar al-Assad’s regime would send a message to autocrats across the globe that mass murder is a viable tactic for retaining power and signal the regional ascendance of Assad’s Russian and Iranian enablers. It has also spawned geopolitical threats, from the rise of the Islamic State (also known as ISIS), to the deployment of Iranian precision missiles that target Israel, to the massive refugee flows that threaten to destabilize neighboring states and Europe. And for Syrians themselves, the decade-long civil war has resulted in horrendous casualties, displaced half the population from their homes, and left most citizens destitute. If left unaddressed, these dynamics will threaten to destabilize the Middle East for years to come.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › SYRIA › !---Brink
Cambanis 6-7-2022, senior fellow and director of the international policy program at The Century Foundation in New York. He teaches at Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs (Thanassis, “Turkey Is Playing With Fire in Syria—Again,” World Politics Review,
While the war in Syria has receded from the international spotlight, residents in the country’s northeast are bracing for a new wave of armed conflict. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has for months threatened to launch a military invasion of the region to push back Syrian Kurdish fighters and create a buffer zone in the border area between the two countries. Turkish military deployments and diplomatic outreach to Russia suggest that a decision from Ankara to launch a military operation is likely and may even possibly be imminent.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › EMBOLDENMENT › Link---AT Cooperation Turn---General
Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” Foreign Policy Analysis, No. 7)//BB
In the results from equation 1, we see that, contrary to Hypothesis 1a (Arms for Influence), but consistent with Hypothesis 3b (Reverse Leverage), there is a significant, negative correlation between levels of US military aid and recipient state cooperation. Economic aid, on the other hand, appears to have no effect on recipient state cooperation. The recipient country's GDP and S score are also not correlated with a state's behavior toward the United States. Recipient states that are democratic, and those that have US troops stationed on their soil, appear to be more cooperative with the United States, all else equal.
Table 3 presents results from using equation 1 to simulate the substantive impact of the statistically significant independent variables on recipient state cooperation. States that do not receive any US military aid display an average level of cooperation with the United States of +1.5 when all other variables are held constant at their means. The model predicts that states that obtain the average amount of US military aid ($20 million) will be less cooperative—scoring an average of −11 on the cooperation-conflict scale. An increase in US military aid to one standard deviation above the mean leads to an additional six-point reduction in the monthly cooperation score of the recipient state. In contrast, an increase in the number of US troops from its mean to one standard deviation above the mean raises recipient state cooperation almost one point. Democratic recipients are on average four points more cooperative than nondemocratic recipients.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › EMBOLDENMENT › Link---AT Cooperation Turn---General
Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” Foreign Policy Analysis, No. 7)//BB
In this paper, we attempted a systematic investigation into the relationship between US military aid and the level of foreign policy cooperation exhibited by the states that receive that aid. We aimed to improve on the existing literature by building and testing three explicit theoretical models (Arms for Influence, Lonely Superpower and Reverse Leverage), focusing on a new measure of cooperation generated from events data rather than UN voting records, and controlling for preference similarity, so that our results capture the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior independent of any dyadic predisposition toward cooperation or conflict.
We test seven hypotheses associated with three different theoretical models and find mixed results. There is little evidence in favor of the Arms for Influence model: there is an inverse relationship between absolute levels of US military aid and recipient state cooperation, and there is no relationship at all between recipient state dependence on US aid and recipient state behavior. Thus, while the Lonely Superpower hypothesis was on the right track by predicting an unorthodox relationship between aid and cooperation, it did not perform as well as some of the Reverse Leverage hypotheses when it came to explaining exactly what form such unorthodoxy would take.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › EMBOLDENMENT › Link---AT Cooperation Turn---General
Sullivan 11, Professor at UNC-Chapel Hill, with Brock Tessman, Assistant Professor at Georgia and Xiaojun Li, PhD in Political Science from Stanford (Patricia, “US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation,” Foreign Policy Analysis, No. 7)//BB
The United States spends more than eleven billion dollars per year on direct military assistance to foreign governments and substate groups (USAID 2009). The American government expresses a wide variety of goals motivating their use of military assistance as a foreign policy tool. Frequently, US administrations have explicitly linked military aid or arms transfers to a quid-pro-quo expectation of compliance from a government (Sislin 1994). More generally, military assistance is expected to augment US national security by increasing recipient state cooperation with US objectives. According to the State Department's 2007 Report to Congress: Section 1206(f) of the 2006 National Defense Authorization Act:
Security cooperation remains a critical foreign policy tool that allows the United States to advance its national security interests worldwide…. Building partner nation security capacity is one of the most important strategic requirements for the United States to promote international security, advance U.S. interests and prevail in the war against terrorism (1).
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › EMBOLDENMENT › Link---AT Cooperation Turn---Specific
BPC 16. Bipartisan Policy Center, “Beyond the Myth of Partnership: Rethinking U.S. Policy Toward Turkey”, Bipartisan Policy Center, December 2016, https://bipartisanpolicy.org/download/?file=/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/BPC-Turkey-Partnership-Myth.pdf//SJ
Myth: Erdogan is a strongman America can work with or appease.
Despite the evidence, it still might be tempting to conclude that Erdoğan could prove to be an authoritarian leader with whom Washington could have a mutually beneficial, transactional relationship—as it did with Egypt’s General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, for example, or even with the Turkish generals who came to power after the country’s 1980 coup. In this light, observers have been tempted to dismiss Erdoğan’s most provocative positions, especially in foreign policy, as rhetoric designed for domestic consumption that does not necessarily reflect Ankara’s actual interests. Yet this optimism misunderstands both the depth and sincerity of Erdoğan’s anti-Western attitudes and the extent to which his populist rhetoric comes to shape policy. This assessment also ignores the extent to which Erdoğan’s consolidation of power makes Turkish policy more erratic, more dependent on Erdoğan’s shifting personal ambitions, and, in many cases, more divorced from reality.12
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › EMBOLDENMENT › Link---AT Plan is Just Talks
Troitskiy 19 - Dean of and Associate Professor at the School of Government and International Affairs at MGIMO University in Moscow and IMARES Program Professor at European University at St. Petersburg. Recently, he co‐authored and co‐edited (with Fen Osler Hampson) Tug of War: Negotiating Security in Eurasia (McGill‐Queen's University/CIGI Press, 2017). (Mikhail, “The Emerging Great Power Politics and Regionalism: Structuring Effective Regional Conflict Management: Special Issue: New Diplomacy for New Conflicts,” Global Policy, )//BB
Another obstacle to comprehensive negotiation is that the leading global powers may consider negotiation itself to be a major concession to the aspiring challengers. Cooperative resolution of proxy conflicts was practiced by the United States and the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. However, that period was unique in that the USSR was eager to dismantle the bipolar system while experiencing serious economic overextension, so it sought to do away with the conflicts tarnishing its reputation and depleting Soviet financial resources. At the end of the 2010s, agreement to negotiate may mean unwarranted accommodation. It has been noted that the very fact of engagement in negotiation confers status on the parties that are invited to negotiate (Zartman, 2008). Conceding status may meet with the same kind of domestic impediments as attempted grand bargains discussed above.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › EMBOLDENMENT › Link---Military Improvement/Advancement
Bodette 22, Director of Research at the Kurdish Peace Institute (Meghan, “How US Security Assistance Funds Turkey’s Anti-Kurdish Aggression,” Progressive International Wire,
In the name of “fighting the PKK,” Turkey currently occupies swaths of territory in Iraq and Syria, carries out ethnic cleansing of Kurds, Yezidis, Assyrians, and other minorities, empowers jihadist militias, hinders the fight against ISIS, and jails tens of thousands of civilians on spurious “terror” charges, including democratically elected MPs and mayors from the progressive pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) and its predecessors.
U.S.-trained officials continue to lead these policies. A Department of Defense document created in or after 2018 to track IMET-trained officials who rose to positions of prominence in their home countries includes nearly 70 Turkish personnel. The first and highest-ranking Turkish official on the list is identifiable as Defense Minister Hulusi Akar, who is recorded as having trained in the United States between January and June of 1987.
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › EMBOLDENMENT › Link---HR Violations
PSD 20, Peace Science Digest (The article bolds “foreign security assistance” and and then boxes the definition of FSA. This cutting makes clear that the definition is linked to the bolded phrase, “Military Aid Worsens Human Rights Conditions in Post-Conflict Countries,” https://peacesciencedigest.org/military-aid-worsens-human-rights-conditions-in-post-conflict-countries/)
Foreign assistance to post-conflict countries is a key feature of global engagement to encourage peace in such contexts. According to recent research conducted by Patricia Sullivan, Leo Blanken, and Ian Rice, the type of aid matters. They argue that foreign security assistance [bold in original]
Begin definition
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TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › EMBOLDENMENT › Link---HR Violations
Sullivan 18, associate professor in the Department of Public Policy and the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina (Patricia, et al, “Arming the Peace: Foreign Security Assistance and Human Rights Conditions in Post-Conflict Countries,” Defence and Peace Economics, doi:10.1080/10242694.2018.1558388)//BB
The second link between security assistance and human rights violations arises out of the ability of the regime to distribute military training, weapons, equipment, and funding as private goods. In states in which civilian control of the military is not solidly institutionalized, support from the military is always essential to regime survival – and the military has incentives to resist any loss of authority or autonomy. Foreign military aid and arms transfers can be used to buy the allegiance of a military elite, ensuring their loyalty in the face of challenges from the wider citizenry (Savage and Caverley 2017, Biddle 2017, Biddle, Macdonald, and Baker 2018). This aid reinforces the privileged position of the military, empowering it relative to other state institutions and giving it an incentive to work with the ruling regime to repress liberalization efforts that are likely to redistribute power and resources away from the military (Savage 2017, Call 2002b). In many war-torn countries, the military exercises control over internal security and is responsible for significant violations of human rights. In these countries, major reforms that would improve human rights conditions after conflict termination are only possible if the military is significantly weakened and their role in internal security is curtailed and brought under civilian control (Call 2002b). But an empowered military is likely to strongly resist any additional accountability, loss of autonomy, or restriction of its internal security role. Donors, for their part, may even encourage the armed forces to retain their role in providing internal security to suppress threats to the donor’s own business or geostrategic interests (e.g. communist insurgents during the Cold War, drug traffickers or terrorist groups more recently) (McClintock 1992, Huggins 1998). As Biddle (2017) warns, security assistance provided to the armed forces in authoritarian countries can encourage transformation of the national military into an abusive praetorian guard – loyal to the regime or a particular sector of the population, rather than an apolitical defender of the state. If foreign security assistance reduces a government’s incentives for investing in public goods, lowers the marginal cost of repression, and strengthens the security sector relative to other government institutions, we should see increased violations of human rights when post-conflict countries receive military aid. The receipt of lethal aid from foreign governments is neither a necessary, nor a sufficient, mechanism for turning post-conflict countries into repressive states. However, all else being equal, the provision of lethal aid will increase the likelihood of a package of policies and choices that will result in human rights violations.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › EMBOLDENMENT › Link---HR Violations
Sullivan 18, associate professor in the Department of Public Policy and the Curriculum in Peace, War, and Defense at the University of North Carolina (Patricia, et al, “Arming the Peace: Foreign Security Assistance and Human Rights Conditions in Post-Conflict Countries,” Defence and Peace Economics, doi:10.1080/10242694.2018.1558388)//BB
Only a handful of other studies systematically investigate the impact of military aid on civilian populations outside the context of an ongoing war. This scholarship tends to focus on weapons transfers. Like much of the literature on economic aid, the bulk of the research on arms transfers concludes that major conventional weapons transfers to developing countries increase human rights abuses and impede democratization (Blanton 1999a, 1999b, de Soysa, Jackson, and Ormhaug 2010). More recently, Pamp et al. (2018) find that conventional weapons imports increase the risk of intrastate conflict onset – particularly in countries with other risk factors for political violence. This study echoes results from Craft and Smaldone (2002) who find that arms imports increase the risk of civil war in sub-Saharan Africa. In sum, extant research leans toward a pessimistic outlook on the prospects for foreign assistance to improve human security in fragile and conflict-affected countries. While there is some evidence that economic aid could increase the capacity of governments to deter violent nonstate actors and lessen armed conflict, most studies suggest economic aid, military assistance, and arms transfers all negatively impact governance and human rights conditions.
2022
Michigan
Disadvantage
TURKISH APPEASEMENT DA › EMBOLDENMENT › Link---Security Cooperation
Bushey 17, J.D., SUNY Buffalo Law School, Buffalo, New York, 2007 (Adam, “GOVERNANCE: THE MISSING INGREDIENT IN SECURITY COOPERATION,”
Well-intentioned SC/SA programming can harm partner nations in four ways. First, the U.S. could negatively affect the rights and protections of citizens within a country if there is a lack of transparency and checks and balances in the defense institutions. 160 For example, when DOD has ignored host nation corruption in the past, which has had detrimental results. As written in 2016 by Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, current U.S. National Security Advisor, “Paradoxically, avoiding state building or sidestepping the political causes of state weakness in the hope of avoiding costly or protracted commitments often increases costs and extends efforts in time.”161 In fragile states, the government often does not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Therefore, the default in fragile states is often self-protection forces and other powerbrokers providing security, distributing aid, delivering justice, and supplying jobs in lieu of government intervention. They operate along ethnic, religious, or tribal lines and are frequently under political protection. While U.S. assistance to self-protection forces may secure short-term gains, such as in Afghanistan, these forces over the long run often exploit weaknesses in the political and economic systems, and “have a tendency to evolve into predatory groups, attacking external enemies while extorting or preying upon their own community.”162 Such extortion and corruption actually reinforce ethnic, religious, and other divisions that fuel cycles of violence, thereby making peace more difficult and prolonging the need for international forces. Instead, foreign assistance should be used to support the government in displacing these groups. While this thesis does not address conflict countries, it should be noted that in 2014, DOD concluded that the United States’ initial support of warlords in Afghanistan created an environment that exacerbated criminal patronage networks and fostered corruption, which ultimately had significant unintended consequences for U.S. strategy.163 Second, harm can be done by empowering a military that already has undue influence in a country without also strengthening oversight institutions. Unmatched military assistance to an already militarized society may tip the scales of power and permit the military to act as a tool to “suppress democratic opposition or movements.”164 In fact, “a coup or attempted coup occurred once every four months in Latin America (1945-1972), once every seven months in Asia (1947-1972), [and] once every three months in the Middle East (1949-1972).”165 There have been forty-four coups in West Africa alone over the last fifty years.166 Not all of these coups were antidemocratic, not all were successful, and not all of them were even against democratically elected regimes. Nonetheless, the point remains that if SC/SA programs followed the framework of other U.S. Government foreign assistance initiatives, security sector programs would be part of a multidimensional effort, and would incorporate systematic assessments and simultaneously address weak government policies, inadequate laws, or poorly functioning legislatures to counterbalance any assistance given to a military with a misbalance of power. It is USAID’s position that when legislative committee and bill drafter capacity is increased, additional checks and balances on overly powerful executives or corrupt ministries of defense can be established as an additional oversight body to safeguard against power-grabs.167