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2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Counterplans** › **2AC – AT: TB2 PIC** › Won’t win the war

Tanks are more important than the TB2.

Kallberg, 22 [Jan Kallberg is a Non-resident Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). He is a former Research Scientist with the Cyber Operations Research Element (CORE) with the Army Cyber Institute at West Point., 6-24-2022, accessed on 6-28-2022, CEPA, "Drones Will not Liberate Ukraine – but Tanks Will | CEPA", https://cepa.org/drones-will-not-liberate-ukraine-but-tanks-will/]/ISEE

Drones have changed the battlefield, providing additional situation awareness and the ability to strike targets, but their high success rates in the Ukraine war is a result of unique conditions unlikely to be replicated elsewhere. Unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) such as the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 have been successful in the Russian-Ukrainian war and helped prevent the Ukrainian defenses from crumbling under the initial Russian onslaught. The absence of short-range air defenses (SHORAD) in the initial months of the war gave drones free range. But four months later, man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) like the US-manufactured Stinger, its Russian counterpart the SA-25, and other air defense systems, are bringing down drones. Air defenses can as easily target larger, slow-moving drones such as TB2 Bayraktar just like other slow moving aerial targets such as helicopters and transport aircraft. Drones have additional points of vulnerability. They require frequent radio contact with their operator, and most need close-to-constant communication. These comms channels were largely undisturbed in the early stages of the war, but that has not lasted — both sides are increasingly capable of executing electronic warfare attacks to degrade or deny the drone operators’ radio links. The connection between operator and drone is a single point of failure, which, if attacked with electronic warfare, can render the drones useless on the battlefield. The Russians are trying to imitate the Ukrainian drone success, but they too face the same issue since the Ukrainians are becoming more capable of electronic warfare. Naturally, there will be large patches of the battlefield where electronic warfare is absent (as with this filmed Ukrainian attack on a Russian oil refinery), but this will change over time and as the fight develops. The next step will be to locate the electronic warfare units, seeking their spectrum and electronic signatures, so that they can be located and struck. This ability to hit electronic warfare units is an additional argument for supplying Ukraine with advanced long-range rocket artillery, which can be used for this purpose. While there has perhaps been too much enthusiasm for the drone, there have been too many obituaries written for the tank. The success of drone warfare, starting with the war in Nagorno-Karabach in 2020 to today’s war in Ukraine may give the appearance that the military environment has radically changed and that armored vehicles are as much used as armored cavalry It is true that the Ukraine war has seen enormous losses of Russian tanks (almost 800 confirmed, plus the loss of another 3,500 armored vehicles, though the real number is believed to be far higher) against lighter Ukrainian forces using modern antitank missiles spying out the battlefield with small, cheap commercial drones. Ukrainian forces have used Javelin and the Next generation Light Anti-tank Weapon (NLAW) to destroy hundreds of tanks – most of these crews never had the chance even to react to what eventually killed them. Such destruction has triggered questions about the relevance of tanks on the modern battlefield. This is not new. Earlier challenges to tanks led to adaptation. The first time the tank was widely considered obsolete was the Yom-Kippur War of 1973, where Israeli tanks suffered heavily in the initial phases of the war. Israeli counterattacks after the Egyptians crossed into the Sinai peninsula were costly. The Soviets had provided the Egyptians with wire-guided AT-3 Sagger antitank missiles that could strike an armored target up to 3km (2 miles.) The AT-3 missile itself was no surprise for Israel or NATO. Designed and in Soviet service since the early 1960s, it was well-known to foreign observers, but it wasn’t until 1973 that it was employed at large scale in wartime. Armies adapted with increased integration between artillery, infantry, and armor. The second challenge to the tank’s relevance came in the late-1970s and early 1980s when NATO needed a response to the huge tank armies of the Warsaw Pact armies. The answer was the tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) antitank missile, which was considered the ultimate tank killer and was widely distributed among NATO forces and on different platforms. Attack helicopters and the Fairchild Republic A-10 Warthog airplane were designed to strike Soviet armored echelons from above. Finally, in operation Desert Storm in 1991, the coalition to liberate Kuwait tested these antitank concepts’ lethality by unleashing them on Saddam Hussein’s forces. The Iraqis lost more than 3,000 tanks and 2,500 armored vehicles in a limited number of days. The absolute annihilation of the retreating Iraqi armored forces along Highway 80 is a grim reminder of the destructive consequences. In an effort to offset these threats, tanks were equipped with “active armor,” comprising plates of explosive material that degrade the impact from the kinetic impact of a shape charge explosive warhead. Many forces also introduced short-range air defense units to be integrated with their armored units to defend against ground attack aircraft and helicopters. The high losses of Russian tanks in Ukraine are partly related to the flawed design of the Soviet T-72 design where the crew sits surrounded by 22 rounds of ammunition to feed its automatic loader. The T-72 was designed for another battlefield; during the Cold War, it was intended to charge westward towards the Rhine and maximize forward firepower with little concern for crew survivability or protection from being hit from the side. Russian tactics have also been very strange. Deprived of covering infantry or access to artillery support, unsupported tanks became almost an invitation for Ukrainian troops to inflict maximum damage in the early stages of the war. The Russians have now adjusted their tactics. Ukrainians of course will face a similar problem in using the same flawed tank design, since it too has T-72s and other Russian models. Yet this actually presents the West with a major opportunity to change the picture on the battlefield. By supplying modern Western tanks offering much higher survivability for the crew and the tank against artillery, and enemy antitank weapons, it could supply Ukraine with the firepower needed to launch a counteroffensive. Russia is now deploying 50-year-old tanks into the fight from long-term storage, vehicles that only have combat value if used against unsupported infantry. It hopes to use these obsolete tanks to shore up its defensive positions around Kharkiv and Kherson against a Ukrainian counteroffensive. Any mothballed NATO tank from the 1990s or early 2000s will outperform this Russian armor, and would be devastating against it. Germany’s blocking of Spain’s desire to provide Leopard 2s is, therefore, a direct threat to the war’s pro-democratic strategic outcome. A counteroffensive needs protected firepower that can follow the maneuvering units. Tanks fill that role to support mechanized and light infantry in their forward movement. Post-1990, modern Western tanks have improved sensors and targeting systems, the later versions with laser range finders and thermal imaging. Electronic warfare cannot intercept a tank round; once it is on its way, the round will continue until it hits (anti-projectile systems, like Israel’s Trophy, are now appearing but remain rare.) Properly used, tanks remain a key system on the frontlines. Advanced armored vehicles (many of which now sit in Western storage facilities) have the power to turn the military tide. The pretense by democratic countries that supplying tanks to Ukraine is escalation, is simply fatuous. It is time to dust them down and send them eastwards.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Counterplans** › **2AC – AT: TB2 PIC** › Whole World Deficit

TB2 won’t be sold to just Ukraine but the entire world. Even if the instance of Ukraine is good, the proliferation to Russia, the US, etc. links to all our offense.

Bagirova, 22 [Nailia Bagirova graduated from Azjarbajžan Tibb Universiteti, May 30, 2022, accessed on 6-28-2022, Reuters, "After Ukraine, 'whole world' is a customer for Turkish drone, maker says,” https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/exclusive-after-ukraine-whole-world-is-customer-turkish-drone-maker-says-2022-05-30/]/ISEE

Ukraine's destruction of Russian artillery systems and armoured vehicles with Turkish Bayraktar TB2 aerial drones has made "the whole world" a customer, according to its designer. Selcuk Bayraktar, who runs the Istanbul firm Baykar with his brother Haluk, said the drones had shown how technology was revolutionising modern warfare. "Bayraktar TB2 is doing what it was supposed to do – taking out some of the most advanced anti-aircraft systems and advanced artillery systems and armoured vehicles," he told Reuters in English beside the new Akinci drone at an exhibition in Baku. "The whole world is a customer." Advertisement · Scroll to continue At least for a time, the TB2, which has a 12-metre wingspan and can soar to 25,000 feet before swooping to destroy tanks and artillery with laser-guided armour-piercing bombs, helped undermine Russia's overwhelming military superiority. Such is the drone's renown that it became the subject of a patriotic expletive-strewn hit song in Ukraine that mocked Russian troops, with the chorus "Bayraktar, Bayraktar". Advertisement · Scroll to continue Beyond satire, the Bayraktar drone has received attention from Russian President Vladimir Putin, and the defence ministry has mentioned it at least 45 times in public since the war began on Feb. 24. Baykar, founded in the 1980s by Bayraktar's father, Ozdemir Bayraktar, began to focus on unmanned aircraft in 2005 as Turkey sought to strengthen its local defence industry. The TB2 has been such a factor in the conflicts in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Nagorno-Karabakh as well as Ukraine that it now spearheads Turkey's global defence export push. Advertisement · Scroll to continue President Tayyip Erdogan says international demand is huge for the TB2 and the newer Akinci. Bayraktar, who is married to Erdogan's daughter, said Baykar can produce 200 TB2 drones a year. COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND TAXIS He said he was proud that the drones had been used in Nagorno-Karabakh, an ethnic Armenian enclave of Turkey's ally Azerbaijan where Baku's forces recaptured swathes of territory in 2020, and in Ukraine. "It is an illegal invasion so TB2 is helping the honourable people of Ukraine defend their country," he said. "The illegal occupation of Karabakh was like a heart wound since our youth. And as engineers developing the technology, it is an honour to have helped our brothers and sisters here to regain their land." Russia two weeks ago touted a new generation of laser weapons including a mobile system that Moscow said could blind orbiting satellites and destroy drones. read more But Bayraktar, who was born in Istanbul and studied at the University of Pennsylvania and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, said such weapons were ineffective against the TB2. "Their ranges are limited so if your sensory and munition range is longer, they are not going to be effective," he said. Baykar is working on a TB3, which has foldable wings and can take off or land on short-runway aircraft carriers, and an unmanned combat aircraft called MUIS or Kizilelma. "Inshallah, the first flight of Kizilelma will be next year, and TB3 either by the end of this year or the beginning of next year," Bayraktar said. "If you look at the longer time horizon, we are working on taxi drones – for that we need to develop more higher-level autonomy technology – which is AI basically – but it will revolutionise how people will be transported in cities." Russia's invasion has killed thousands of people, displaced millions, and raised fears of a direct confrontation between Russia and the United States. Putin says Washington was using Ukraine to threaten Russia through NATO enlargement, and that Moscow had to defend Russian-speakers from persecution. Ukraine and its Western allies reject these as baseless pretexts to invade a sovereign country.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Counterplans** › **2AC – AT: TB2 PIC** › Competition

TB2 is not a LAW.

Pike, 19 [John Pike one of the world's leading experts on defense, space and intelligence policy, worked for the Federation of American Scientists, where he directed the Space Policy, Cyberstrategy, Military Analysis, Nuclear Resource and Intelligence Resource projects., 12-16-2019, accessed on 6-28-2022, Globalsecurity, "Bayraktar TB Tactical Armed UAV", https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/bayraktar-tb.htm]/ISEE

The Bayraktar Tactical Block 2 (TB2) is a Tactical Armed / UAV System, developed and manufactured by Baykar. Bayraktar TB2, which can carry 4 MAM-L and MAM-C missiles produced by Roketsan on its wings, has the ability to perform precise targeting with its built-in laser target marker. While the Turkish Armed Forces describes Bayraktar as "Tactical UAV Class" to prevent it from being a competitor to the TAI Anka UAV, international standards would classify it as a medium-altitude long-endurance UAV. With its 650 kg MTOW and 12 meters wingspan platform powered by an internal combustion engine, Bayraktar is capable of flying at 22,500 feet and loitering for more than 24 hours. A highly sophisticated design that provides all solutions that operator may need in one integrated system. The system consists of Bayraktar TB2 Armed / UAV Platform, Ground Control Station, Ground Data Terminal, Remote Display Terminal, Advanced Base with Generator and Trailer modules. Thanks to Baykar's technological accumulation and capabilities, the entire system is produced indigenously.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Counterplans** › **2AC – AT: Patriot PIC** › Patriot Bad

The patriot system is faulty---Iraq proves.

Atherton, 22 [Kelsey Atherton is a military technology journalist based in Albuquerque, New Mexico. His reporting has appeared in Popular Science, Breaking Defense, and The New York Times, 5-6-2022, accessed on 6-28-2022, Brookings, "Understanding the errors introduced by military AI applications", https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/understanding-the-errors-introduced-by-military-ai-applications/]/ISEE

On March 22, 2003, two days into the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, American troops fired a Patriot interceptor missile at what they assumed was an Iraqi anti-radiation missile designed to destroy air-defense systems. Acting on the recommendation of their computer-powered weapon, the Americans fired in self-defense, thinking they were shooting down a missile coming to destroy their outpost. What the Patriot missile system had identified as an incoming missile, was in fact a UK Tornado fighter jet, and when the Patriot struck the aircraft, it killed two crew on board instantly. The deaths were the first losses suffered by the Royal Air Force in the war and the tragic result of friendly fire. A subsequent RAF Board of Inquiry investigation concluded that the shoot-down was the result of a combination of factors: how the Patriot missile classified targets, rules for firing the missiles, autonomous operation of Patriot missile batteries, and several other technical and procedural factors, like the Tornado not broadcasting its “friend or foe” identifier at the time of the friendly fire. The destruction of Tornado ZG710, the report concluded, represented a tragic error enabled by the missile’s computer routines. The shoot-down of the Tornado happened nearly 20 years ago, but it offers an insight into how AI-enabled systems or automated tools on the battlefield will affect the kinds of errors that happen in war. Today, human decisionmaking is shifting toward machines. With this shift comes the potential to reduce human error, but also to introduce new and novel types of mistakes. Where humans might have once misidentified a civilian as a combatant, computers are expected to step in and provide more accurate judgment. Across a range of military functions, from the movement of autonomous planes and cars to identifying tanks on a battlefield, computers are expected to provide quick, accurate decisions. But the embrace of AI in military applications also comes with immense risk. New systems introduce the possibility of new types of error, and understanding how autonomous machines will fail is important when crafting policy for buying and overseeing this new generation of autonomous weapons. What went wrong in 2003 The Patriot missile began development in the 1960s, when the U.S. Army sought a means to reliably shoot down enemy airplanes. Later, the missile would gain the ability to also intercept other missiles, and as the roles assigned to the missile expanded, its autonomous capabilities increased. Patriot missile batteries use a phased array radar to detect and identify targets. This information is then fed into a computer control station to manage how the missiles are launched in response. Once fired, the missiles fly toward an identified intercept point calculated before firing, directions that can be altered by sending updated sensor readings over radio signal to the fired missile. As it approaches for impact, the missile’s own radar tracks the target. Raytheon, which manufactures the Patriot, has described the system as having “automated operations” with “man-in-the-loop (human) override” capabilities—technology that allows the weapon to quickly engage targets with the necessary speed to carry out its missile defense mission. Automation is a compelling feature for an anti-air and, especially, for an anti-missile system. The calculations involved in shooting down aircraft and missiles are hard and require immediate translation of sensor information. Both interceptors and targets are traveling exceptionally fast. It’s the kind of task in which the involvement of a human introduces lag, slows down the process, and makes it less likely a missile is going to successfully shoot down an incoming projectile or aircraft. But human operators also serve an essential role: preventing accidental, incorrect shootdowns. And this requires a balance between human and machine decisionmaking that is difficult to achieve. When the Pentagon investigated the causes of the Tornado shootdown, as well as two other incidents of friendly fire involving Patriot systems, the missile system’s automated functions were identified as contributing factors in misidentifying friend as foe. U.S. Patriot batteries deployed to Iraq under the assumption that they would face heavy missile attacks, which would require the batteries to operate with a relative degree of autonomy in order to respond with sufficient speed. As a 2005 report by the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Patriot system’s performance observed, operating autonomously required U.S. forces to trust that the automated features of the system were functioning properly. So when the assumptions underlying the decision to allow the Patriot system to autonomously identify and sometimes fire on targets no longer applied, the soldiers operating the system were not in a position to question what the weapon’s sensors were telling them. Had U.S. and coalition forces faced heavy missile attacks in the war, automating such defenses would have made more sense. Instead, U.S. and allied forces quickly established air superiority, enough to drastically shift the balance of what was in the sky. Instead of facing large amounts of incoming missiles, Patriot batteries were observing large numbers of allied planes operating in the sky above them and sometimes struggling to identify friend from foe. According to the Defense Science Board’s task force, the first 30 days of combat in Iraq saw nine ballistic missile attacks that Patriot batteries might have been expected to counter, compared to 41,000 aircraft sorties, amounting to a “4,000-to-1 friendly-to-enemy ratio.” Picking out the correct targets against the background of a large number of potential false positives proved highly challenging.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Counterplans** › **2AC – AT: Patriot PIC** › Competition

No competition---Patriot has humans in the loop.

Atherton, 22 [Kelsey Atherton is a military technology journalist based in Albuquerque, New Mexico. His reporting has appeared in Popular Science, Breaking Defense, and The New York Times, 5-6-2022, accessed on 6-28-2022, Brookings, "Understanding the errors introduced by military AI applications", https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/understanding-the-errors-introduced-by-military-ai-applications/]/ISEE

The Patriot missile began development in the 1960s, when the U.S. Army sought a means to reliably shoot down enemy airplanes. Later, the missile would gain the ability to also intercept other missiles, and as the roles assigned to the missile expanded, its autonomous capabilities increased. Patriot missile batteries use a phased array radar to detect and identify targets. This information is then fed into a computer control station to manage how the missiles are launched in response. Once fired, the missiles fly toward an identified intercept point calculated before firing, directions that can be altered by sending updated sensor readings over radio signal to the fired missile. As it approaches for impact, the missile’s own radar tracks the target. Raytheon, which manufactures the Patriot, has described the system as having “automated operations” with “man-in-the-loop (human) override” capabilities—technology that allows the weapon to quickly engage targets with the necessary speed to carry out its missile defense mission.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Counterplans** › **2AC – Top Level** › 2AC – AT: Weapons PICs

Hegemonic masculinity informs the use of weapon systems. The aff’s analysis of gender is key to break down those norms.

Myrttinen 03

(Henri, researcher with the Institute for Social Transformation in Yogyakarta, Indonesia. He is also currently a post-graduate student at the University of Natal in Durban, South Africa, researching masculinities in violent nation-building processes. “Disarming masculinities” Women, Men Peace and security from Disarmament forum)

Conventional wisdom has it that men enjoy a ‘special relationship’ with weapons, a view which seems to be corroborated by empirical evidence. The relationship between ‘masculine’ men and weapons is such a prevailing cliché that one finds it everywhere, from advertising to left-wing revolutionary posters, fascist imagery to the novels of Hemingway, war memorials to homoerotic art, from the porn industry to feminist critiques of male militarism. Weapons systems are designed mostly by men, marketed mostly for men and used mostly by men—and in many parts of the world, they are the primary source of death for men. Boys are given guns and swords to play with or they make them for themselves. Adolescent male warriors and middle-aged male hunters pose for cameras brandishing their weapons. Michael Ignatieff describes entering ‘zones of toxic testosterone’ in the Bosnian war.1 War memorials depict muscular men clutching their guns or hurling grenades with flexed, oversized pectoral muscles bulging out of the opened shirts of their uniforms. If one considers gender, in this case masculinity, to be socially constructed, and one additionally wants to further the cause of disarmament, it becomes evident that this bond between men and weapons and how this is linked with violent notions of masculinity need to be investigated and analysed further in order to be able to develop sustainable disarmament policies. The importance of analysing violent masculinity gains even more significance if one accepts the notion of conflicts increasingly being ones of ‘identity’, in which the gendered ethnic identities that are constructed and mobilized tend to be highly militarized.2 In this article, I will analyse some of the ways in which enactments of masculinities and the wielding of weapons go together, the sexualized imagery used in conjunction with weapons, and the models of masculinity that lie behind these concepts. I will argue that the public display, the threat of or actual use of weapons is an intrinsic part of violent, militarized models of masculinityThe specific ‘message’ conveyed by the display and use of weapons is dependent on the social and cultural environment. I will argue that weapons are part of one notion of masculinity, a militarized view that equates ‘manliness’ with the ‘sanctioned use of aggression, force and violence’.3 Weapons are used as status symbols but also as tools to achieve economic and social gains, wielding power over unarmed males and females. This can often be linked to a crisis of masculinity, when there is a ‘fear of loss of male power and privilege’4 through social transformations, leading to a backlash in which ‘traditional’ gender roles are reinforced. The construct of the male warrior/protector relies on the suppression of others— including competing concepts of masculinity. Weapons and their public display seek to underline the ‘manly’ prowess of the bearer, but tragically often also undermine it—men are not only disproportionately the perpetrators of violence, but also often its victims. This contribution is intended to open up discussion. As I consider gender roles to be highly dependent on the cultural and social environment in which men and women act, I will start by delineating which socio-cultural environment I shall examine. Unfortunately, by necessity rather than by choice, the limited scope of this study will lead me to concentrate heavily on ‘western’ (i.e. North American, European and Australian) perceptions of masculinity, though I will endeavour, where possible, to broaden this scope.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**AT: Counterplans** › **2AC – Top Level** › 2AC AT: PICs Generics

PICs create loopholes that are impossible to close---the judge should throw out util calculus in the context of exceptions to the AFF plan.

Wallach, 17 [Wendell Wallach a bioethicist and author focused on the ethics and governance of emerging technologies, in particular artificial intelligence and neuroscience, May 2017, accessed on 6-30-2022, Cacm.acm, "Toward a Ban on Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Surmounting the Obstacles", https://cacm.acm.org/magazines/2017/5/216318-toward-a-ban-on-lethal-autonomous-weapons/fulltext]/ISEE

From April 1115, 2016, at the United Nations Office at Geneva, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) conducted a third year of informal meetings to hear expert testimony regarding a preemptive ban on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). A total of 94 states attended the meeting, and at the end of the week they agreed by consensus to recommend the formation of an open-ended Group of Government Experts (GGE). A GGE is the next step in forging a concrete proposal upon which the member states could vote. By the end of 2016 a preemptive ban has been called for by 19 states. Furthermore, meaningful human control, a phrase first proposed by advocates for a ban, has been adopted by nearly all the states, although the phrase's meaning is contested. Thus a ban on LAWS would appear to have gained momentum. Even the large military powers, notably the U.S., have publicly stated that they will support a ban if that is the will of the member states. Behind the scenes, however, the principal powers express their serious disinclination to embrace a ban. Many of the smaller states will follow their lead. The hurdles in the way of a successful campaign to ban LAWS remain daunting, but are not insurmountable. The debate to date has been characterized by a succession of arguments and counterarguments by proponents and opponents of a ban. This back and forth should not be interpreted as either a stalemate or a simple calculation as to whether the harms of LAWS can be offset by their benefits. For all states that are signatories to the laws of armed conflict,a any violation of the principles of international humanitarian law (IHL)b must trump utilitarian calculations. Therefore, those who believe the benefits of LAWS justify their use and therefore oppose a ban, are intent that LAWS do not become a special case within IHL. Demonstrating that LAWS pose unique challenges for IHL has been a core strategy for supporters of a ban. Those among the more than 3,100 AI/Robotics researchers who signed the Autonomous Weapons: An Open Letter From AI & Robotics Researchersc are reflective of a broad consensus among citizens and even active military personnel who favor a preemptive ban.4 This consensus is partially attributable to speculative, futuristic, and fictional scenarios. But perhaps even science fiction represents a deep intuition that unleashing LAWS is not a road humanity should tread. Some nations will be emboldened to start wars if they believe they can achieve political objectives without the loss of their troops. Researchers who have waded into the debate over banning LAWS have come to appreciate the manner in which geopolitics, security concerns, the arcana of arms control, and linguistic obfuscations can turn a relatively straightforward proposal into an extremely complicated proposition. A ban on LAWS does not fit easily, or perhaps at all, into traditional models for arms control.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **2AC AT: Case** › 2AC - AT: NATO Bad 4 Women

NATO will do the plan – they’ve already signaled a commitment to feminism

Doyle et al 21 [Gabriela R. A. Doyle (Assistant director for the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative within the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security), Leah Sheunemann (The deputy director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. In her role, she oversees the Initiative’s programming and research covering US transatlantic policy, NATO defense policy, and European security), and Christopher Skaluba (Expert lecturer and writer on international relations, national security, and defense policy), 3-9-2021, "Why NATO should adopt a feminist foreign policy," Atlantic Council, ] // st

As values-based democracies, NATO allies and partners have been at the forefront of the global women’s rights movement. And as an alliance, NATO plays an important role in advancing equity within foreign policy. When NATO foreign ministers meet later in March, they should take the natural next steps toward adopting a feminist foreign policy (FFP). FFP is a multifaceted framework that offers an additive lens to more traditional approaches to foreign policy. It aims to amplify the experiences and perspectives of women and marginalized people to dismantle existing systems of patriarchy, colonization, and racism in a way that builds peace, attains gender equality, and protects human rights. FFP’s goals, which are oriented toward changing global systems of power, include eliminating the gender gap, supporting equal representation, and funding diversity initiatives. They also encompass achieving inclusivity for LGBTQ individuals and institutionalizing gender equality and female empowerment. FFP proponents imagine a world where women and minorities are central to decision-making and accounted for in every aspect of policy, rather than an afterthought. In pursuit of this objective, the framework prioritizes expanding opportunities for women and minorities within national governments, among other policy recommendations. In 2014, Sweden became the first country to officially adopt a feminist foreign policy. Since then, a handful of other countries have begun applying FFP as well. So far, all but one of the six countries that have committed to adopting or officially adopted a feminist foreign policy are affiliated with NATO. Canada, France, Luxembourg, and Spain are treaty allies. Sweden is a close official partner. And while Mexico has no formal ties to the Alliance, there is a good case that it should. The Alliance has already incorporated gender perspectives into its policy-planning processes, training, and operations; adopted a zero-tolerance approach to sexual exploitation and abuse; and increased the participation of women across the organization. But NATO should formally adopt a feminist foreign policy for two reasons: because morally it is the right thing to do and because FFP will strengthen the Alliance.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **2AC AT: Case** › 2AC - NATO Key

NATO is key – the EU is inefficient, and NATO is the only organization capable of setting an ethical precedent on AI

HeikkilÄ 22 Melissa HeikkilÄ, 6-22-2022, "NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.," POLITICO,

NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics. Big differences over how to treat autonomous weapons could undermine NATO’s drive. On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way. The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use. “We need each other more than ever. No country alone or no continent alone can compete in this era of great power competition,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană, the alliance’s second in command, said in an interview with POLITICO. The standard-setting effort comes as China is pressing ahead with AI applications in the military largely free of democratic oversight. David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said Beijing's lack of concern with the tech's ethical implications has sped along the integration of AI into the military apparatus. "I'm ... not sure that they're having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they're definitely not applying our democratic values to these technologies,” he said. Meanwhile, the EU — which has pledged to roll out the world's first binding rules on AI in coming weeks — is seeking closer collaboration with Washington to oversee emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. But those efforts have been slow in getting off the ground. For Geoană, that collaboration will happen at NATO, which is working closely with the European Union as it prepares AI regulation focusing on “high risk” applications. The pitch NATO does not regulate, but “once NATO sets a standard, it becomes in terms of defensive security the gold standard in that respective field,” Geoană said. The alliance's own AI strategy, to be released before the summer, will identify ways to operate AI systems responsibly, identify military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it's up to NATO standards,” van Weel said. The strategy will also set ethical guidelines around how to govern AI systems, for example by ensuring systems can be shut down by a human at all times, and to maintain accountability by ensuring a human is responsible for the actions of AI systems. “If an adversary would use autonomous AI powered systems in a way that is not compatible with our values and morals, it would still have defense implications because we would need to defend and deter against those systems,” van Weel said. “We need to be aware of that and we need to flag legislators when we feel that our restrictions are coming into the realm of [being detrimental to] our defense and deterrence,” he continued. Mission impossible? The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context. The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies. “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said: That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly. The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently. There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control. Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious concerns about the technology. These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban. Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.” Staying relevant These issues threaten to hamper NATO's standard-setting drive. "I think there’s a certain danger that if NATO doesn’t take this on as a real challenge, that it may be marginalized by other such efforts,” Franke said. She pointed to the U.S.-led AI Partnership for Defense, which consists of 13 countries from Europe and Asia to collaborate on AI use in the military context — a forum which could supplant NATO as the standard-setting body. That could have consequences for human rights, too. “NATO… is a great place to responsibly think about how to harness the good parts of this technology and how to prohibit the parts that would be catastrophic for humanitarian law and human rights law, and people at the end of the day,” said Verity Coyle, a senior adviser at Amnesty International, which is part of the Stop Killer Robots campaign. “Without oversight mechanisms to ensure ethical standards and measures, which would guarantee that this technology will operate under meaningful human control” NATO’s strategy could head into an “ethical vacuum,” Coyle said. Franke said it's better for the alliance to focus on the basics, like increased data sharing to develop and train military AI and cooperating on using artificial intelligence in logistics. “If NATO countries were to cooperate on that, that could create good procedures and set precedents. And I think we should then move on to the more controversial things such as autonomous weapons systems,” she said.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **2AC AT: Case** › 2AC - NATO Key

LAWS are inevitable absent a unified pushback from NATO – NATO policies are specifically designed with ethics in mind

Michelson 21 Brian Michelson, 2-23-2021, "Why NATO Needs Lethal Autonomous Weapon Standards," CEPA, https://cepa.org/why-nato-needs-lethal-autonomous-weapon-standards//mb24

Lethal autonomous weapon systems will come to dominate warfare in the coming years. NATO needs to harmonize its approach to their development and use, or risk being left behind. The rapid weaponization of artificial intelligence, “big data,” social media, robotics, and a host of other technologies presents a clear competitive challenge to NATO, an alliance with members that exist on a wide spectrum of military-technological capabilities. The future effectiveness of NATO will be driven in large part by how it handles these challenges from hobbling its ability both to act in unison and to prevail in a contest of wills. While there are numerous potential technology gaps, one that will likely only increase is partner nations’ ability and willingness to employ lethal autonomous weapon systems. These systems will inevitably grow more capable, and more necessary, in the coming decade. Technological gaps are inevitable considering the disparities in GDP and military budgets. The United States accounts for over 70 percent of NATO’s overall military spending, while the next three largest contributors (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) provide approximately half of the remaining 30 percent. And with most NATO nations continuing to fund their militaries at under the 2 percent GDP goal, technological gaps will continue to grow. For perspective, the 2021 United States Department of Defense research and development budget is approximately equal to the entire defense outlay of France and Germany combined. With such a large differential, what can be done to help enable effective investments in autonomous weapons by smaller nations? Even more specifically, how can smaller nations provide capabilities that can integrate into, and contribute to the alliance? To better invest limited funds, now is the time to look at a NATO standard for lethal autonomous weapons and their ethical use. While there is no agreed-upon international definition of lethal autonomous weapons systems, the U.S. Department of Defense defines them as “weapon system[s] that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator.“ While these are not Schwarzenegger-style Terminators and still have a degree of human control over them, the technology enabling these systems is maturing rapidly, and military necessity will increasingly demand that these systems gain broader parameters of autonomous action. Yet despite the complexity of these systems and the inevitability of their proliferation, NATO does not currently have a common standard for their use or development. In fact, some NATO countries even have opposing views of how to handle them. NATO standards are designed to ensure compatibility among weapon systems, communication architecture, and a host of other warfighting systems. The 7.62mm small arms round is a good example of this. But what is the 7.62mm equivalent standard for the development and employment of autonomous weapon systems? This opens a host of related questions regarding the employment of these systems: What Identification – Friend – Foe (IFF) capability should ground and air units require to prevent fratricide? What degree of certainty does a lethal autonomous weapon system require before final engagement? What level of collateral damage is acceptable? What degree of compatibility between systems is required? Should all these parameters (and others) be adjustable, and if so, at what command level? The attendant ethics also need to be addressed. NATO’s experience in Afghanistan was a case study in the challenges of coalition warfare. Differing risk tolerances, legal requirements, ethical views, domestic political concerns, and at times simply combat capability, all combined into to complex policy cocktail that impeded the effectiveness of combat operations. While modern militaries have accountability, legal, and ethical systems incorporated into their command structures, they are not uniform and leaders in differing militaries have varying degrees of authority. The key questions hinge on two issues: Who gets to decide to employ an autonomous weapon, and who is responsible should things go wrong? The Kunduz hospital strike in October of 2015 was driven primarily by human error. Responsibility was fixed on the chain of command and 16 leaders were disciplined. Who will be responsible if a member nation conducts a NATO-authorized strike and it goes terribly wrong? If this framework is not thoroughly established ahead of time, not only is it likely that commanders may hesitate to use this capability, the risk-aversion inherent in bureaucracies may limit the development of autonomous weapons that will be needed in future conflicts. In the emerging field of lethal autonomous weapons, establishing a common NATO standard for the development and use of autonomous weapons will help address the gap in capabilities among NATO member nations. By establishing these standards, nations can ensure that their defense expenditures on autonomous weapons will create systems that are interoperable, able to contribute to NATO’s capability, and can be employed within defensible ethical guidelines.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **2AC AT: Case** › 2AC - NATO Say Yes

U.S. is the global leader on AI, other countries will follow on.

Insinna, 22 [Valerie Insinna is a point person for major Pentagon policy and strategy developments, 5-26-2022, accessed on 6-24-2022, Breaking Defense, "Updated autonomous weapons rules coming for the Pentagon: Exclusive details - Breaking Defense", https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/updated-autonomous-weapons-rules-coming-for-the-pentagon-exclusive-details/]/ISEE

WASHINGTON: The Defense Department is updating its guidance on autonomous weapons to consider advances in artificial intelligence, with a revised directive slated for release later this year, the head of the Pentagon’s emerging capabilities policy office told Breaking Defense in an exclusive interview. DoD directive 3000.09 [PDF], signed by then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Ash Carter on Nov. 21, 2012, established policy, responsibilities and review processes for the “design, development, acquisition, testing, fielding, and employment of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, including guided munitions that can independently select and discriminate targets.” But in the decade since its release, artificial intelligence and machine learning technologies have made a massive leap forward, and it’s “entirely plausible” there may need to be revisions that reflect the Pentagon’s “responsible AI” initiative and other ethical principles adopted by the department, said Michael Horowitz, DoD director of emerging capabilities policy. “Autonomy and AI are not the exact same thing,” Horowitz told Breaking Defense on May 24. “But given the growing importance that AI plays, and thinking about the future of war and the way the department has been thinking about AI, I think ensuring that’s reflected in the directive seems to make sense.” It’s important to note that, based on the definition inscribed in DoD directive 3000.09, the military currently does not operate any weapon systems that qualify as an autonomous weapon — and at least publicly is not currently developing such a weapon. The department characterizes an “autonomous weapon” as an autonomous or semi-autonomous system that can choose its own targets and apply lethal or nonlethal force without a human in the loop. The directive does not apply to unarmed drones or armed drones like the MQ-9 Reaper, whose flight path and weapons release is controlled by a human pilot sitting at a remote location. It also doesn’t apply to systems like the Switchblade loitering munitions the US has provided to Ukraine, which are programmed by a human operator to hit specific targets and can be called off when needed. “It was the first national policy published on autonomous weapons systems, and actually remains one of the only publicly available national policies,” Horowitz said. “It set the standard essentially for the global dialogue that followed and demonstrated America’s responsible approach to the potential incorporation of autonomy into weapon systems.” In a 2012 interview with Defense News, David Ochmanek, then the deputy assistant secretary for policy force development, described the doctrine as “flexible” and stressed the imposition of a “rigorous review process” that would now be in place before any future autonomous weapon could be approved. But that promise has done little to assuage opponents, who raise comparisons to Terminators and have organized into efforts, such as the eponymous Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, to preemptively ban the technology. Horowitz — a longtime drone expert who once authored a paper titled “The Ethics & Morality of Robotic Warfare: Assessing the Debate over Autonomous Weapons” — is well aware of the debate around such systems, and while avoiding commenting on those concerns directly, he noted that the department’s increased focus on autonomy and AI in recent years has always been with the idea of a human being involved in the process. “I would say the one of the things about the approach of the United States to the role of AI and autonomous systems has been imagining these systems as a way to enhance the warfighter,” he said. “It’s why, dating back a couple of administrations, the United States has talked about things like human-machine teaming, because it tends to think about AI and autonomous systems as things that work synergistically with the best trained military in the world to improve its capacity.” Modernized AI The update is occurring not because a major technological breakthrough is on the horizon, but because of a department standard that requires directives be updated every 10 years. Right now, it’s unclear exactly how much of the original directive will need to be revised, but Horowitz seemed to downplay massive rewrites. “Our instinct entering this process is that the fundamental approach in the directive remains sound, that the directive laid out a very responsible approach to the incorporation of autonomy and weapons systems,” Horowitz said. “But we want to make sure, of course, that the directive still reflects the views of the department and the way the department should be thinking about [autonomous] weapon systems,” he continued. “You know, it has been a decade. And it’s entirely plausible that there are some updates and clarifications that would be helpful.” Horowitz declined to go into details about where he thinks changes may be needed, but did highlight that the document reflects the Pentagon of 2012, which has morphed over the course of the Obama, Trump and Biden administrations. For instance, the review process laid out in the original directive references the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics — a position that no longer exists, whose responsibilities are now split between the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment and the Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. He also underlined that this directive would be focused on the specific subject of autonomous weapons, and not the broader AI efforts that exist throughout the department. “When this directive was published in 2012, the notion of the way that algorithms, how algorithms might impact the military seemed pretty futuristic, or seemed further away. And autonomous weapon systems were a specific thing that the department chose to write a directive about,” he continued. “I think it’s important that the department consider the way that should then also influence this directive … given the intersection between AI and autonomous systems, and I say autonomous systems as opposed to autonomous weapon systems deliberately. “There’s so many AI applications that can or are already influencing the American military and will influence the American military that, you know, that have nothing to do with this.” While Horowitz’s office — only recently established — will seek out input from the relatively new defense organizations that have been stood up in the past decade, such as the office of the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer (CDAO), other organizations that may be relative to the revamp of DoD Directive 3000.09—the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, Defense Digital Service and Office of Advancing Analytics—are slated to become part of the CDAO office on June 1, Breaking Defense reported earlier this week. He also expects to get inputs from the services, Joint Staff and other stakeholders — of which, he noted, there are significantly more now than a decade ago.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **2AC AT: Case** › 2AC - NATO Say Yes

NATO says yes-- all NATO allies have met to discuss LAWs and agree major regulation is needed

Christie, 22 [Edward Hunter Christie is a Researcher, consultant, economist, EU affairs professional, former NATO official, public policy expert, November 24, 2020, accessed on 6-21-2022, NATO Review. “Artificial Intelligence at NATO: dynamic adoption, responsible use,” https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2020/11/24/artificial-intelligence-at-nato-dynamic-adoption-responsible-use/index.html]/ISEE

The Alliance’s success with AI will also depend on new and well-designed principles and practices relating to good governance and responsible use. Certain Allied governments have already made certain public commitments in the area of responsible use, addressing concepts such as lawfulness, responsibility, reliability, and governability, among others. In parallel, Allies have taken part in the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems under the auspices of the United Nations, leading to the formulation of 11 guiding principles. Importantly, there is a good case for viewing work on adopting AI and work on principles of responsible use as complementary and synergistic. In effect, there are certain essential principles or goals that will underpin and facilitate both engineering good practice, as well as responsible state behaviour. Certain national principles imply a need for specific design requirements. For example, a principle of governability may be linked to technical abilities to detect and avoid unintended consequences, and to disengage or deactivate in case of unintended behaviour.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **2AC AT: Case** › 2AC - NATO Say Yes

NATO wants to set AI standards---US is the last holdout.

Heikkilä, 21 [Melissa Heikkilä, 3-29-2021, accessed on 6-24-2022, POLITICO, "NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.",

On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way. The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use. “We need each other more than ever. No country alone or no continent alone can compete in this era of great power competition,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană, the alliance’s second in command, said in an interview with POLITICO. The standard-setting effort comes as China is pressing ahead with AI applications in the military largely free of democratic oversight. David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said Beijing's lack of concern with the tech's ethical implications has sped along the integration of AI into the military apparatus. "I'm ... not sure that they're having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they're definitely not applying our democratic values to these technologies,” he said. Meanwhile, the EU — which has pledged to roll out the world's first binding rules on AI in coming weeks — is seeking closer collaboration with Washington to oversee emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. But those efforts have been slow in getting off the ground. For Geoană, that collaboration will happen at NATO, which is working closely with the European Union as it prepares AI regulation focusing on “high risk” applications. The pitch NATO does not regulate, but “once NATO sets a standard, it becomes in terms of defensive security the gold standard in that respective field,” Geoană said. The alliance's own AI strategy, to be released before the summer, will identify ways to operate AI systems responsibly, identify military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it's up to NATO standards,” van Weel said. The strategy will also set ethical guidelines around how to govern AI systems, for example by ensuring systems can be shut down by a human at all times, and to maintain accountability by ensuring a human is responsible for the actions of AI systems. “If an adversary would use autonomous AI powered systems in a way that is not compatible with our values and morals, it would still have defense implications because we would need to defend and deter against those systems,” van Weel said. “We need to be aware of that and we need to flag legislators when we feel that our restrictions are coming into the realm of [being detrimental to] our defense and deterrence,” he continued. Mission impossible? The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context. The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies. “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said: That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly. The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently. There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control. Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious concerns about the technology. These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban. Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.” Staying relevant These issues threaten to hamper NATO's standard-setting drive. "I think there’s a certain danger that if NATO doesn’t take this on as a real challenge, that it may be marginalized by other such efforts,” Franke said. She pointed to the U.S.-led AI Partnership for Defense, which consists of 13 countries from Europe and Asia to collaborate on AI use in the military context — a forum which could supplant NATO as the standard-setting body. That could have consequences for human rights, too. “NATO… is a great place to responsibly think about how to harness the good parts of this technology and how to prohibit the parts that would be catastrophic for humanitarian law and human rights law, and people at the end of the day,” said Verity Coyle, a senior adviser at Amnesty International, which is part of the Stop Killer Robots campaign. “Without oversight mechanisms to ensure ethical standards and measures, which would guarantee that this technology will operate under meaningful human control” NATO’s strategy could head into an “ethical vacuum,” Coyle said. Franke said it's better for the alliance to focus on the basics, like increased data sharing to develop and train military AI and cooperating on using artificial intelligence in logistics. “If NATO countries were to cooperate on that, that could create good procedures and set precedents. And I think we should then move on to the more controversial things such as autonomous weapons systems,” she said.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **2AC AT: Case** › 2AC - AT: ILAW Bad

International law needs to be engaged with any other method cedes ILAW.

Sen, 22 [Rohini Sen is an Assistant Professor at the Jindal Global Law School, 10-3-2022, accessed on 6-24-2022, Voelkerrechtsblog, "We Must All Engage with Feminist Approaches to International Law", https://voelkerrechtsblog.org/we-must-all-engage-with-feminist-approaches-to-international-law/]/ISEE

In course of the last few weeks, my Twitter feed displayed three different trending news with varying degrees of urgency: Ukrainian responses to the Russian armed attack, a record complaint of rape and sexual assault in the United Kingdom and Wales, and growing tensions between state and private interest in tribal lands of central India. Any contemporary account of international law is likely to read these as three separate and recurrent patterns of how international law ‘happens’. The first is a pattern of state-centric territorial dispute with emphasis on securitization-based responses. The second is a data driven account of legal subject making – vulnerable objects of violence with a focus on sexual violence. And the third, nestled under transnational corporate legality, is the story of regulating land ownership in the language of private capital. Each of these, despite their seemingly separate spheres of operation in international law, are deeply entangled in fundamental ways. The relationships between legal subjects and institutions of international law have been subjected to critique and analysis through various discourses of power before. However, Feminist Approaches to International Law (FtAIL), oscillating between the prescriptive and the analytic, enables a very different, enmeshed mode of relational engagement with these institutions and subjects. One that is rooted in discomfort, self-awareness and affect. In the following sections I discuss two significant turns in FtAIL; the ways in which these turns have engendered the production of particular feminist pedagogical approaches, and some ways of ‘doing’ of them. What are Feminist Approaches to International Law? Old Question, New Answers Revisiting this old question is necessary not to attempt to provide a definition, but to indicate shifts in FtAIL’s perception in the mainstream writings. Some of these approaches include conversations on feminist pedagogy and the visibility of scholars such as myself who espouse a distinct ambivalence towards international law’s masculine format of academe and ‘expertise’. Earlier iterations of FtAIL, through Chinkin, Charlesworth and Wright’s now classic intervention have been around international law’s treatment of the ‘woman question’. From liberal feminisms essentializing to radical feminism’s restructuring, the questions asked were centered around the absence of women in international law and how to best intercept this figure as an essentialized legal subject. This narrative took a turn for a certain form of contingency with transnational and post-colonial feminism calling attention to extremely differential conditions and forms of alliances for women of the Global South. Their interactions led to two things. The first was the formation of an ensemble feminism that seems to espouse some characteristics of post-colonial criticality while reposing faith in liberal feminism and mainstream international law in a particular way. Pedagogically, I call this the turn of didactic discomfort. The second has been a contemporary and assertive call to center feminisms that emerged parallelly, marginally and somewhat apposite to the mainstream narrative of feminism and previous feminist positions in international law. In this account, if ‘woman’ was a multifaceted, socially produced category, then FtAIL became a structural (and structured) critique of international law’s institutions and practices with special focus on questions of labour, land ownership, and legal subjecthood as sites of analytical and prescriptive enquiries. This approach uses female subjecthood and subjection to analyse the ways in which international law produces and sustains structural inequalities and ways to subvert them. In moving away from the gender question to the colonial gendering question FtAIL became a heuristic that implicates and benefits everything and everyone rather than the previously presumed“women speaking about women”paradigm. This, I note as the pedagogical turn to entanglements. While the turn to didactic discomfort has led to academic deconstructions of the category of women and an effort to provincialize dominant feminist approaches, the turn to entanglements have led to epistemological questions around structures and praxis of international law and its knowledge systems. Both of these can be presented through ideas of relationship politics and relationship making where we give form to discomforts and epistemic alterities by examining relationships between institutions, others and selves. In the following section, I employ these two pedagogical approaches to think about international law differently, as an idea of relational politics through a) its teaching and b) knowledge production and sites of knowledge. Some ways of doing FtAIL: Relational Politics and Relationship Making in International law There are many ways to do feminisms and FtAIL and none of them are/should be prescriptive in an inflexible way. The ones I discuss below centre academia and teaching as sites of dialogic praxis. Using the two pedagogical turns stated above, I offer certain feminist interventions that ask us to turn the gaze on ourselves as agents of international law and then, to contemplate it as a project, where we co-constitute its elements and (are compelled to) move as an interconnected unit rather than disparate features and systems. A unit, where excesses are coded into structures that sustain inequalities and imbalances. FtAIL as a relational project in teaching Through this approach, teaching is foregrounded as a social process with social actors, where the teaching and teachers of international law embody differential politics as well. The core requirement is twofold – first, to turn the gaze on ourselves as knowledge interlocutors occupying striated positions, so that we can recognize where we are placed in relation to institutional knowledge making. Accordingly, we locate ourselves as social actors in the process of teaching international law where we may or may not find ourselves reflected in the discipline. And second, we subject the teaching itself to uncover similar relational arrangements. Moving away from the mainstream international law’s traditional depiction of itself as ‘regulations that govern states’, this feminist approach is grounded in identifying and teaching the various relationships that under-gird the international legal project. In contradistinction to the theories of statehood and sources of law, the basis of this approach is drawing out and examining the different forms of relationships in international law. For instance, is there a relationship of continuity between Eurocentric sovereignty and post-colonial sovereignty? What is the arrangement of power between the sovereign states and its various subjects? What are the linkages between human rights and the neoliberal market? Are sources of international law distinct from the states that make them? Let us unpack two such arrangements transversally and conceptually. Transversal, in this instance, is apprehending existing ideas of international law with critique but not disregarding them. Teaching a feminist account of sovereignty could entail a relational study of how the European sovereign state (and its post-colonial successor) securitize law to set normative notions of heterosexual relationships and family. For instance, the Women Peace and Security Resolution 1325 can be taught through exploring the forms and roles of womanhood it assumes in relation to the roles played by women in public and private places. Its emphasis on sexual vulnerability can also be contemplated in relation to other forms of gendered structural vulnerabilities such as labour, land ownership, recognition that do not feature in the ‘woman question’. The relationship between securitization and other forms of non-state interventions to address crisis can also be examined in relation to this paradigm. Similarly, the teaching of sources of international law could be approached by analyzing how the colonial distinction is written into formal and informal sources of customary international law. Once the coding is made visible, we are also able to notice how the binaries of formal and informal sources are identical to feminist analysis of international law’s false binary of public and private distinctions; a relationship between who is erasing and what is erased.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **2AC AT: Case** › 2AC - AT: No Clear Definition of LAWs

Yes definition---LAW’s are weapons systems that select and fire upon targets without human intervention

Conway, 20 [Marissa Conway is a CFFP Writer, August 2020, accessed on 6-21-2022, Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy, “Smashing the Patriarchy: The Feminist Case Against Killer Robots” https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57cd7cd9d482e9784e4ccc34/t/5f356f1e5eb59d07e78fb329/1597337376556/Smashing+the+Patriarchy_+The+Feminist+Case+Against+Killer+Robots.pdf]/ISEE

Lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs), also known as killer robots, are weapons systems that select and fire upon targets without any human intervention. In order to do this, they use Artificial Intelligence (AI) programmed with algorithms and data analysis capabilities. Such weapons are worrying to actors across the policy, technology, and activist sectors for a multitude of reasons. This report will explore these concerns from a feminist perspective, with particular focus on how a Feminist Foreign Policy (FFP) would respond to such weapons.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **2AC AT: Case** › 2AC - AT: Circumvention

Memoriam on deployment of LAW’s solves.

Russell et al. 21 [Stuart Russell is a professor of computer science at the University of California, Berkeley, Anthony Aguirre is a professor of physics at the University of California, Santa Cruz, Max Tegmark is a professor of physics, June 2021, Accessed 6/22/22, “Lethal Autonomous Weapons Exist; They Must Be Banned It may not be too late to put the evil "Slaughterbots" genie back in the bottle, if the world acts now,” https://spectrum.ieee.org/lethal-autonomous-weapons-exist-they-must-be-banned]/ISEE

A chilling future that some had said might not arrive for many years to come is, in fact, already here. According to a recent UN report, a drone airstrike in Libya from the spring of 2020—made against Libyan National Army forces by Turkish-made STM Kargu-2 drones on behalf of Libya's Government of National Accord—was conducted by weapons systems with no known humans “in the loop." In so many words, the red line of autonomous targeting of humans has now been crossed. To the best of our knowledge, this official United Nations reporting marks the first documented use case of a lethal autonomous weapon system akin to what has elsewhere been called a “Slaughterbot." We believe this is a landmark moment. Civil society organizations, such as ours, have previously advocated for a preemptive treaty prohibiting the development and use of lethal autonomous weapons, much as blinding weapons were preemptively banned in 1998. The window for preemption has now passed, but the need for a treaty is more urgent than ever. The STM Kargu-2 is a flying quadcopter that weighs a mere 7 kg, is being mass-produced, is capable of fully autonomous targeting, can form swarms, remains fully operational when GPS and radio links are jammed, and is equipped with facial recognition software to target humans. In other words, it's a Slaughterbot. The UN report notes: “Logistics convoys and retreating [Haftar Affiliated Forces] were subsequently hunted down and remotely engaged by the unmanned combat aerial vehicles or the lethal autonomous weapons systems such as the STM Kargu-2 (see Annex 30) and other loitering munitions. The lethal autonomous weapons systems were programmed to attack targets without requiring data connectivity between the operator and the munition." Annex 30 of the report depicts photographic evidence of the downed STM Kargu-2 system. In a previous effort to identify consensus areas for prohibition, we brought together experts with a range of views on lethal autonomous weapons to brainstorm a way forward. We published the agreed findings in “A Path Towards Reasonable Autonomous Weapons Regulation," which suggested a “time-limited moratorium on the development, deployment, transfer, and use of anti-personnel lethal autonomous weapon systems" as a first, and absolute minimum, step for regulation. A recent position statement from the International Committee of the Red Cross on autonomous weapons systems concurs. It states that “use of autonomous weapon systems to target human beings should be ruled out. This would best be achieved through a prohibition on autonomous weapon systems that are designed or used to apply force against persons." This sentiment is shared by many civil society organizations, such as the UK-based advocacy organization Article 36, which recommends that “An effective structure for international legal regulation would prohibit certain configurations—such as systems that target people." The “Slaughterbots" Question In 2017, the Future of Life Institute, which we represent, released a nearly eight-minute-long video titled “Slaughterbots"—which was viewed by an estimated 75 million people online—dramatizing the dangers of lethal autonomous weapons. At the time of release, the video received both praise and criticism. Paul Scharre's Dec. 2017 IEEE Spectrum article “Why You Shouldn't Fear Slaughterbots" argued that “Slaughterbots" was “very much science fiction" and a “piece of propaganda." At a Nov. 2017 meeting about lethal autonomous weapons in Geneva, Switzerland, the Russian ambassador to the UN also reportedly dismissed it, saying that such concerns were 25 or 30 years in the future. We addressed these critiques in our piece—also for Spectrum— titled “Why You Should Fear Slaughterbots–A Response." Now, less than four years later, reality has made the case for us: The age of Slaughterbots appears to have begun. The first step must be an immediate moratorium on the development, deployment, and use of lethal autonomous weapons that target persons, combined with a commitment to negotiate a permanent treaty. We produced “Slaughterbots" to educate the public and policymakers alike about the potential imminent dangers of small, cheap, and ubiquitous lethal autonomous weapons systems. Beyond the moral issue of handing over decisions over life and death to algorithms, the video pointed out that autonomous weapons will, inevitably, turn into weapons of mass destruction, precisely because they require no human supervision and can therefore be deployed in vast numbers. (A related point, concerning the tactical agility of such weapons platforms, was made in Spectrum last month in an article by Natasha Bajema.) Furthermore, like small arms, autonomous weaponized drones will proliferate easily on the international arms market. As the “Slaughterbots" video's epilogue explained, all the component technologies were already available, and we expected militaries to start deploying such weapons very soon. That prediction was essentially correct.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **2AC AT: Case** › 2AC - AT: LAWS More Ethical

LAW’s cause a restructuring of values codifying the worst values of humanity.

Roff, 16 [Heather M. Roff works for the global security imitative at Arizona State University, 1-11-2016, accessed on 6-21-2022, Taylor & Francis, "Gendering a Warbot", https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14616742.2015.1094246]/ISEE

This article is a first step in understanding the future of robotic warfare. The US military’s push for autonomous weapons systems, in conjunction with DARPA’s move to create humanoid robots, is something that should not be ignored. Scholars have only looked to the arguments about whether autonomous weapons will be capable of upholding the principles of proportionality and distinction. Yet even these arguments are dependent on an antecedent question: how a machine might be programmed to do so. As I have argued elsewhere (Roff 2014b), the level of programming necessary for a warbot requires an autonomous learning AI. This conclusion, however, is not a sufficient answer. AI is not a monolithic and neutral entity. It is dependent on what gets included in the software, which concepts and ideas and “facts” are data. AIs are biased as much as, or perhaps more than, their creators. This conclusion, presses us to question not merely the purposes of these machines, but the very values we hold. It requires us to examine the values, practices and ideals we assume and publicly espouse. The gendered humanoid warbot might distill the very worst of humanity, rather than its best, as it will not only be capable of killing efficiently, but will potentially dominate all those in its path.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **2AC AT: Case** › 2AC - AT: LAWS More Ethical

LAWs lacking emotion is an aff argument – that makes them unethical because they lack the empathy to decide whether or not they should kill.

Kenneth Anderson (Contact Author), 2-28-2017, "Debating Autonomous Weapon Systems, Their Ethics, and Their Regulation Under International Law," No Publication, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2978359

In the foreseeable future, we will be turning over more and more functions with life or death implications to machines—such as driverless cars or automated robot surgery technologies—not simply because they are more convenient but because they prove to be safer—and our basic notions about machine and human decisionmaking will evolve. Aworld that comes, if it does, to accept self-driving autonomous cars may also be one in which people expect those technologies to be applied to weapons and the battlefeld as a matter of course, precisely because it regards them as better (and indeed might fnd the failure to use them morally objectionable). Te second argument is that AWS should be banned because machine learning and AI will never reach the point of being capable of satisfying the requirements of LOAC, law, and ethics. Te underlying premise here is that machines will not be capable, now or in the future, of the requisite intuition, cognition, and judgment to comply with legal and ethical requirements—especially amid the fog of war. Tis is a core conviction held by many who favour a complete ban on autonomous lethal weapons. They generally deny that, even over time and, indeed, no matter how much time or technological progress takes place, machine systems will ever manage to reach the point of satisfying legal and ethical codes and principles applicable in war. Tat is because, they believe, no machine system will ever be able to make appropriate judgments in the infnitely complex situations of warfare, or because no machine will ever have the capability, through its programming, to exhibit key elements of human emotion and affect that make human beings irreplaceable in making lethal decisions on the battlefeld—compassion, empathy, and sympathy for other human beings (Losing Humanity 2012: 4). Tese assessments are mostly empirical. Although many who embrace them might also fnally rest upon moral premises denying in principle that a machine has the moral agency or moral psychology to make lethal decisions, they are framed here as distinct factual claims about the future evolution of technology. Te argument rests on assumptions about how machine technology will actually evolve over decades or longer or, more frankly, how it will not evolve, as well as beliefs about the special nature of human beings and their emotional and afective abilities on the battlefeld that no machine could ever exhibit, even over the course of technological evolution. It is as if to say that no autonomous lethal weapon system could ever pass an ‘ethical Turing Test’ under which, hypothetically, were a human and a machine hidden behind a veil, an objective observer could not tell which was which on the basis of their behaviours. It is of course quite possible that fully autonomous weapons will never achieve the ability to meet the required standards, even far into the future. Yet, the radical scepticism that underlies the argument that they never will is unjustifed. Research into the possibilities of autonomous machine decision-making, not just in weapons but across many human activities, is only a couple of decades old. No solid basis exists for such sweeping conclusions about the future of technology.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **2AC AT: Case** › 2AC - AT: “Robots Don’t Rape”

Lethal autonomous weapons will be used to carry out structural sexual violence against civilians.

Sanvik and Lohne, 15 [Kristin B. Sandvik is Research Professor in Humanitarian, Kjersti Lohne is a Postdoctoral Reseracher,University of Oslo, August 13, 2015, accessed on 6-21-2022, “Lethal Autonomous Weapons: Killing the ‘Robots-don’t-Rape’ Argument”]/ISEE

Thus, in thinking critically about the nature of the progress narrative of which the ‘Robots don’t rape’ argument is part, we make three observations: First, the politics of rape denunciation are now also becoming the politics of lobbyists, vendors and military manufacturers seeking access to new customers and markets. The recognition of wartime rape as a fundamental violation of international law has been a hard fought victory. Moving rape from the realm of silence, shame and mutedness and into the public domain has taken enormous effort. The denunciation of sexual violence as one of the worst features of armed conflict is thus welcome. However, this should not blur our view from recognizing how the struggle against rape has attained moral currency, a moral currency that may be useful when someone is trying to legitimate a particular set of past actions or political choices, or when someone is trying to prepare the ground for a future project. Second, this instrumentalization of the ‘Very Worst Sex Crimes’ is nothing new: the scourge of online child pornography has for a long time been used to legitimate widespread government censorship and surveillance in cyberspace. What Paul Amar (2013) calls ‘gendered cultural rescue‘ is by now an established form of securitization of gender and sexuality, legitimating intervention for the ‘protection’ of (female) civilians. It should therefore be noted that there is not only commercial interest; there is government interest too. Third, this type of argument belongs to a broader category of technological utopianism, signifying the belief that emergent military technologies create better wars not only because they are pre-programmed and remotely controlled, but because the technology in question is assumed to always function as intended: The surgical precision argument in drone warfare and its attendant claims for ‘humane warfare’ because drones (allegedly) limit collateral damage, should be familiar by now. Similarly, commentators argue that Cyberwarfare is preferable to conventional war because it is presumed to make war less bloody. Following the same type of transformative logic, autonomous robots are portrayed as the vehicles for perfect legality and perfect soldiering, which in combination will produce ‘perfect combat’. This third argument brings the normative crowd of law and ethics professors into the project. In sum, the deployment of the robots-don’t-rape argument can be understood as an attempt to build a moral economy; an environment in which social expectations, cultural transactions, and emotional investments collectively create a shared understanding between the participants in an economic exchange. Leveraging the argument that robots don’t rape—and doing so through market-based, governance and ethical discourses—can therefore be interpreted as an attempt to create this type of moral economy out of which robot soldiers are supposed to emerge. If this is the case, and the progress narrative is indeed one of strategy as indicated here, how may we respond? In an excellent posting at Duck of Minerva last year, Charlie Carpenter lamented the fact that a recurrent argument at the first Convention of Conventional Weapons (CCW) experts meeting in Geneva in May 2014 was the idea that, unlike human soldiers, autonomous weapons would never commit rape. She noted that this argument was a subset of the more general argument that killer robots would be good for human security, since they are assumed better at keeping to the norms of the laws of war (as argued by Ronald Arkin and others). Carpenter also observed that the 1998 definition of rape in international law, as codified in the Rome Statute for the International Criminal court is a broad one, according to which rape is not reducible to forcible penetration of women committed by men. Rather, rape occurs when the perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body. Carpenter suggests that this conceptualization of rape is accompanied by an implicit understanding of motivation and rationale: that rapes in war are spontaneous and unplanned and thus a breach of discipline. Contrary to widespread assumptions, sexual violence is not the male soldier’s appropriation of his ‘war dividend’; rather, as the research on sexual violence as a weapon of war has showed us, sexual violence is often strategically used against civilians. If LAWS are programmed to kill, they may also be programmed to do other forms of violence, including rape. Carpenter’s eloquent rejection of the rape argument on account of factual inaccuracy (wrong definition of rape; killer robots could technically be programmed to carry out rape) along with misleading assumptions about the uses of rape in conflict is one that we should prepare ourselves to repeat. As often as necessary. Not least as the cost of accepting the ‘Robots don’t rape’ argument risk undermining hard-fought gender battles, reducing wartime rape to an issue of uncontrolled/uncontrollable male sexuality and penis penetration of predominantly female victims instead of recognizing it primarily as an act of violence, and one which may or may not be deliberate, intentional, and programmed.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
**Aff – Gendered LAWS- FMPS** › **2AC AT: Case** › 2AC - LAWS -> War

LAWS increase the risk of war and encourages militaries to kill civilians

Payne 16

(This CRS report was written by Thomas B. Payne, U.S. Air Force Fellow. 4-14-2016, Congressional Research Service, "Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems: Issues for Congress," https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44466.html#_Toc448405890//mb24)

Likelihood of War/Jus Ad Bellum A common concern regarding the development of LAWS is that it will encourage inappropriate aggression.86 The justification for initiating armed conflict is generally described by the concept of jus ad bellum, or Just War theory.87 However, although sometimes couched as such, the concern that LAWS will lead to more warfare is not actually a legal one, since use of LAWS does not affect the legal evaluation of the propriety of war initiation.88 Rather, the argument is that LAWS would create a moral hazard for national leadership. This presupposes that current or future leaders are willing and desire to engage in unlawful war-making but are inhibited by the likelihood that it will result in military casualties, either for moral reasons or because of spin-off effects of those casualties.89 If these suppositions are accurate, then LAWS would appear to increase the likelihood that leaders would engage in unlawful aggression since it would minimize these casualties. Some argue, however, that this objection seems excessively generic.90 They contend that any weapon system that minimizes casualties, or gives a substantial advantage to one side in armed conflict, would trigger this same moral hazard.91 Uncontrolled Arms Race Another potential risk to the development of LAWS that has been noted is that it will trigger wider arms races.92 This argument takes two forms. First, that because of the tremendous tactical advantage associated with the development of LAWS, peer and near-peer competitors will be forced to develop autonomous capabilities for their own weapon systems.93 Second, asymmetric competitors, such as international terrorist organizations, would have access to the technology once it becomes widely used in warfare.94 For both of these versions of an "arms race," one harm contemplated, in addition to the inherent instability associated with arms race dynamics95, is that competitors will have either less incentive or less capacity to control the behavior of LAWS, resulting in development or fielding of LAWS that fail to comply with the laws of war (generally, this is conceived as competitors developing indiscriminate LAWS, since automation is far easier to accomplish than discrimination or ethical decision-making).96 A number of counterpoints have been presented to this risk. First, many contend that an arms race is already in progress, with peer and near-peer competitors currently developing autonomous weapon systems—regardless of U.S. development of these systems.97 It is argued these nations would refuse to adopt, or successfully evade enforcement of, any potential multilateral ban.98 Second, it is argued that asymmetric competitors may be capable of taking advantage of technological development, particularly civilian sector advancements, even if not actively developed for military purposes by nation-states.99 Under this argument, once the basics of autonomy in machines are developed for civilian purposes, weaponization of these autonomous systems is relatively trivial.100 Asymmetric Warfare Another risk associated by some with the development of LAWS is an increased likelihood of attacks on civilian targets, particularly in the United States itself.101 The argument is that the development of LAWS will result in the absence of U.S. soldiers from the war zone. Enemies of the United States, it is argued, will see no political/strategic benefit in attempting to fight, or carry out attacks on autonomous weapon systems if the United States is not suffering human casualties. The opponent, under this argument, is therefore incentivized to carry out attacks on civilian rather than military targets.102 Counter-arguments presented by others include at least one made against the discussion in the "Likelihood of War/Jus Ad Bellum" section above, in that any generic technological advantage that makes U.S. service-members less susceptible to enemy attack appears to create the same risk.103 In the same vein, a DOD analyst has noted that this argument essentially "blames the victim," by discouraging protection of soldiers because of the enemy's presumed willingness to violate the laws of war by assaulting civilians.104 Finally, it has been pointed out, considering the history of nuclear strategy as well as terrorist targeting, that both peers and asymmetric opponents are not generally reluctant to place civilians in jeopardy if it serves strategic ends, and therefore the presence or absence of U.S. casualties away from the battlefield is irrelevant.105