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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Orientalism supplements › Ballot key/ballot good

Challenging the state is key

Lisa Yoneyama 16, 9-8-2016, "Cold War Ruins: Transpacific Critique of American Justice and Japanese War Crimes," Duke University Press, , kav

Importantly, the redress activism reinvigorated in the United States since the turn of the new century has enlisted Asian/Americans as new subjects of historical justice.2 Underpinning reemerging memories of Japanese imperial violence and the impetus to seek redress in the U.S. judicial system is the heightened presence of Asian immigrant-citizen-subjects and their growing importance in American representative politics. The demographic shift in the U.S. body politic is one crucial factor in the belated but increasing Asian/American presence in redress activism. The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act abolished ethnonational and racial quotas, leading to a dramatic increase in immigration from Asia. Many new immigrants carried with them traumatic memories of suffering and loss wrought by Japanese colonialism as well as Japanese military invasions before and during the Asia-Pacific War. Much of the institutional drive for redress therefore comes from California and other North American locations where new and old Asian populations now pose a significant representational force. The Alliance for Preserving the Truth of Sino-Japanese War, the Global Alliance for Preserving the History of wwII in Asia (ga), and the Association for Learning and Preserving the History of wwII in Asia (alpha)—three overlapping North American network organizations demanding redress and apologies from the Japanese government and corporations not exclusively but largely for Chinese victims of Japan’s aggressive war—are particularly noteworthy. Prompted by the publication of Iris Chang’s Rape of Nanking: Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (1997), these organizations have also successfully mobilized the nineties discourse of international criminal justice and human rights to target Japanese war crimes.3 With regard to “comfort women” redress, Korean/American and Asian/American transnational feminists have deployed American juridical venues, legislatures, communities, social media, and spaces of cultural production to disseminate memories of the Japanese military’s sex trafficking and forced prostitution throughout the empire. In ways that were not possible in the immediate aftermath of the war, Asian/Americans have emerged as new subjects of justice in the U.S. polity. The increasing visibility of Asian/Americans in U.S. redress culture at the same time reminds us of the ways in which the constitution of U.S. public institutions and discourses has been a racialized process. 4 More urgently, attention to the racial differences among subjects who pursue redress calls into question the history of the uneven distribution of power within America’s nationalized liberal public sphere, forcing us to understand that reparation issues concern more than interstate normalization and reconciliation. Transborder redress culture affects colonial diasporic peoples as well as refugees and migrants who were violently uprooted by colonialism and war, and who became further displaced in many cases as a result of the political and economic disfranchisement they experienced in the process of decolonization. In analyzing the Americanization of Japanese war crimes, the redress practices of colonial diasporic and migrant peoples emerge as critical terrains of possibility and scrutiny for transnational practices seeking historical justice. Americanization’s new phase, at least in the above sense, thus registers the nationalization of Asian transnational migrants. Through subjectification to U.S. judicial, legislative, and other state apparatuses of knowledge, Asian immigrant-citizens are not only beckoned to speak as owners of and witnesses to memories of Japanese imperial violence in Asia. They also become speaking subjects by subjecting themselves to the institutional arrangements that enable their speech and visibility, but only to the extent to which they are recognized by the given parameters of historical knowledge and the idea of justice. The exploration of Japan’s historical revisionists in the previous chapter demonstrated that National History performs a vital function as a normative epistemic apparatus that disciplines and interpellates nationalized citizen-subjects through mobilizing them toward the proper recitation of the nation’s honorable and supposedly uniformly shared past. The normative remembering of the nation’s past is intimately linked to the management of knowledge and subjectivities. Given such inseparable relationships among nationalism, normativity of citizenship, history, power, and knowledge, what are the ramifications of memories of Japanese imperial violence that travel from Asia and then become integrated with hegemonic American war memories and the persistent American discourse on historical justice? What type of political subject might we anticipate this process interpellates? The special issue of the Journal of Asian American Studies, published in 2003, on “Korean Comfort Women” addressed precisely this question by focusing on the Asian American investment in Japan’s wartime military “comfort women” issue. Guest-edited by the American literary critic Kandice Chuh, the special issue was based on an Association for American Studies (asa) session, titled “Siting/Citing ‘Comfort Women’ Critically: Transnational Memories in Korea-Japan-U.S. Liaisons.”5 In her essay theorizing the Asian American investment in Japan’s wartime military “comfort women” issue, Chuh raised a fundamental question regarding Asian Americanists’ objectification of “comfort women.”6 Chuh examined the literary representation of comfort women by the works of two Korean American authors, Comfort Woman (1998), by Nora Okja Keller, and A Gesture Life (2000), by ChangRae Lee, calling into question the “highly troubling ideological and political ends” the Asian American knowledge of “comfort women” might accommodate (8). Laura H. Y. Kang’s essay in the special issue likewise problematized the Americanization of Korean “comfort women” and its effect on knowledge and power.7 Asking “who are and should be the ‘we’ who must remember and represent this subject,” Kang argued for the urgent need to attend to the “multiple mediations and disciplinizations” (28) that are integral to the economy of Americanized “comfort women” knowledge, or the process she saw as “the various conjurings of ‘comfort women’” (46). As an alternative to such an Americanization of “comfort women” discourse, Kang calls our attention to the issue of class, suggesting the need to consider “what U.S. citizenship might mean not only for differently racialized and gendered but also differently capitalized subjects” (47). The investigations into the new phase of the Americanization of memories of Japanese imperial violence and the historical justice they call for can most productively yield critical politico-intellectual outcomes when situated in the perspectives put forward by the above Asian/American interventions. In keeping with Chuh’s and Kang’s theorizations, in what follows I explore the not-so-uniform effects of Asian/American mobilization into redress efforts within the U.S. public sphere. I will focus on juridicohistorical discourse—a nexus of power and historical knowledge produced by juridical practices—and intend to closely examine the ways in which Asian/Americans are erected as the law’s agent-subject who enunciates, enacts, or at other times defers, not a single but multiple ideas of historical justice. American discourse on Japanese war crimes is profoundly shaped by U.S. nationalism and assumptions about modernity, liberalism, colonialism, and postcoloniality that are embedded in Cold War epistemologies. Asian/America, as a discursively constituted terrain, is deeply implicated in this knowledge production.8 And yet Asian/Americans as new subjects of justice animated by the power invested in them as American citizen-subjects also necessarily illuminate contradictions of transnationality within the American civic sphere in such a way that they hold out the possibility of a radical politicization of justice and a critique of Americanization.9 Asian/American involvement in redress unveils, often inadvertently, the long history of entanglements and the complicity of imperial violence, as well as the amnesia about these matters between Japan and the United States. In this process, juridico-historical discourse may produce new subjects and publicity that transnationally rally around antiracist, decolonial notions of history and justice. At the same time, however, this process is not automatic or easily decipherable. Asian/Americans, as the agent-subjects of U.S. state apparatuses, tend to secure their nationalized status by underwriting America’s Cold War myth of liberation and rehabilitation vis-à-vis Asia. The North American liberal, multicultural nationalism, moreover, has effectively mobilized Asian ethnonationalisms as an enabling constituent element. Continuing the work of the previous chapters, in the following I seek out an analytic with which we might discern the risks, the possibilities, and the multiple and contested implications of this seemingly new phase in the Americanization of justice.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Orientalism supplements › Ballot key/ballot good

Accumulating ballots is good and key because it forces engagement with our method – simply modelling USFG policy replicates the racist tendencies of the state and forcing us to engage with it is equally harmful

Reid Brinkey 8(THE HARSH REALITIES OF “ACTING BLACK”: HOW AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLICY DEBATERS NEGOTIATE REPRESENTATION THROUGH RACIAL PERFORMANCE AND STYLE, Shanara Rose Reid Brinkley, 2008, Page 114-115)//BRownRice

Signifyin’ on institutional symbols of American democracy, Jones’ draws attention to the parallels in power structures between the federal government and the decision-making arms of the debate community. The “halls of Congress” represent the halls of debate tournaments. “Capitol Hill” where the laws of this country are enacted is a metaphor for debate tournament tabrooms where wins and losses are catalogued. Tournament ballots metaphorically represent the signing of the judges ballot at the conclusion of debates. In facts, debaters often argue that the “impacts” they identify or the solvency for their plan happens “once the judge signs the ballot,” as if assigning a winner or loser actually results in the passage of a policy. Jones argues that it is the ballot that is the most significant tool in influencing the practices and procedures of the community. In other words, the competitive nature of debate guarantees that teams and coaches remain responsive to trends amongst the judging pool. Ultimately, debate competition is a run to capture or win the judges ballot. That the ballot “enacts” the “policies” of the debate “community,” makes the space of competition a critical arena from which to attempt community change. Up until this point, the policy debate community had dealt with issues of diversity and inclusion outside of tournament competition. Directors, coaches, assistants, and debaters may have engaged in outreach and recruitment practices designed to diversify the debate community, but discussions and support for such actions were not generated from debate tournament competition. Those discussions occurred in collaborative versus competitive settings where stakeholders were encouraged to dialogue without concern for winners or losers. For example, OSI (the original non-profit arm of the UDL) sponsored Ideafests to bring stakeholders in the debate community together to discuss the national expansion of the UDL. Thus, Green’s following argument during tournament competition directly violates the traditional practice of discussing issues of diversity and inclusion in the community, outside of competitive debate rounds: Racism is one of the leading exports of the United States Federal Government and it exploits it on to other countries. It doesn’t acknowledge its problems at home and the debate community replicates those values by playing in this fantasy world that we cannot change. By sitting silent, by not acknowledging, or addressing the problems within this community. It is easy for us to say that there are problems racism and sexism but the problem comes when we recognize those systemic issues and do nothing to change our methods of how we challenge those problems.109 Green is holding the debate community accountable for its failure in significantly increasing diversity and inclusion. They hold teams accountable for their methodological choices in debate participation forcing other teams and judges to consider whether or not the traditional or normative ways of engaging in competition result in an activity and environment hostile to those debate bodies marked by difference. Let me remind you of the use of the term “export” in the previous quotation. Green argues that the US federal government “exports” American racism to other nations. Significantly, they argue that the debate community does the same. The Louisville debaters make a very controversial argument, one that if true, deeply wounds the debate community. They argue that the racism in the debate community, just like U.S. institutional racism, is exported to the UDL. Note this excerpt from Jones: And, I gave an example of the Urban Debate Leagues, how people don’t recognize how they export these type of oppressions onto Urban Debate Leagues, when they assume that they are ignorant and have nothing to contribute to this activity. So they teach them how to debate, never realize that they know how to debate in the first place. This is the example, these is the ways in which we have to change the social structures and the power relations that affect our world.”110 As I stated earlier in this chapter, it is largely the development of the UDL and its representations within the debate community that led to the creation of the Louisville Project. Remember that the UDL is often held as the communal exemplar that demonstrates the policy debate community’s commitment to diversity and inclusion. Thus, to argue that the debate community perpetuates institutional racism even while acting against it is a confrontational stance for the Project members.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Orientalism supplements › Russia threat is real

Russia threat real

Mcinnis and Fata 5/20 (Kathleen J. Mcinnis, Daniel Fata, 5-20-2022, "Russia Is a Real Threat to NATO," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/20/russia-threat-nato-madrid-summit/)//BRownRice

Recent events in Ukraine have once again proved that reports of NATO’s death are an exaggeration. Many leaders across the alliance have been quick to respond to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with aid to Kyiv, increases in their own country’s defense budgets, or both. But as the war grinds on and the geopolitical reality of an adversarial relationship with Russia sets in, NATO must once again take the longer view on what all this means for trans-Atlantic and global security. Conveniently, in less than two months, NATO leaders will meet in Madrid to endorse the alliance’s new strategy. The key question, therefore, is whether member states will use the moment to reforge NATO’s raison d’être to meet current and future challenges—in particular, by naming Russia as a threat to the alliance itself. Given the implications of Ukraine for European and global order, the stakes could hardly be higher. Some take the view that Madrid should mark a reprioritization of U.S. efforts away from Europe and back toward Asia. Their logic goes that not only is European defense spending increasing, but Russia has also demonstrated ineptitude in the prosecution of its war in Ukraine. That means the longer-term need for significant U.S. forces in Europe has also therefore declined. And, after all, China is the pacing threat for Department of Defense planning. In fact, the opposite is true. For starters, Russian President Vladimir Putin has made it abundantly clear that he views NATO as a strategic threat. Recent events suggest we should take these statements at face value. In the runup to the current war, some analysts developed elaborate rationales for why the buildup of Russian forces on the Ukrainian border didn’t mean an invasion was coming, such as a strengthened negotiating position vis-à-vis Ukraine’s future political directions. Another Russian invasion of Ukraine was so obviously strategically counterproductive that there must have been another reason for the buildup. In the event, there wasn’t. Expand your perspective with unlimited access to FP. SUBSCRIBE NOW And while Russian military incompetence has been startling, planners shouldn’t leap to conclusions. Russian forces were not able to capture Kyiv, but they have been able to seize tens of thousands of square miles of territory along Ukraine’s eastern border—at least for now. Estonia, a Baltic NATO member that borders Russia, is less than 20,000 square miles in size. Militaries can also reform, especially after disaster, as Ukraine’s own army did after its failures in 2014. The United States has good reasons to want to keep NATO vibrant: The strategic benefits of U.S. leadership are manifold. Not only does American leadership in NATO provide pathways for organizing military coalitions, but it also affords the United States privileged status on trade partnerships and access to bases. If Putin achieves his aim of discrediting NATO, this could lead to trans-Atlantic strategic insolvency: a situation whereby allies, including the United States, are unable to meet their security obligations and, relatedly, maintain favorable standards of living for their populations. Which brings us back to Madrid. The last time that NATO agreed on a strategic concept was in 2010. It is a document that specified that, among other things, defense of allied territory remains a critical mission for the alliance, but it is silent on naming nation-state threats to NATO. For a variety of domestic and international political reasons, building formal consensus on threats among 30 allied states is extremely challenging. Indeed, in the 2010 document Russia is viewed as an aspirational partner for NATO when it comes to European security—despite the warning sign of Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia. In the intervening years, Russia has conducted destabilizing disinformation campaigns in NATO states and has attacked Ukraine twice. And while NATO leaders have condemned Russian aggression, the rhetoric falls short of formally declaring Russia as a long-term strategic threat to the alliance. Durable consensus requires clarity. To prepare NATO to contend with this threat over the long term requires a frank admission of the strategic realities that Russia poses in the alliance’s new strategic concept, to be adopted in Madrid. As a practical matter, this will commit NATO members to take budgeting, force planning, acquisition, and possible troop repositioning seriously—and put teeth into the declaration. This is needed for NATO planners to determine, for example, whether spending 2 percent of GDP on defense is sufficient to meet the challenges to the alliance. But the real value of the document is what the collective members reaffirm as to what NATO continues to stand for, what it calls out as the threats to the member territory, and what it intends to do to address, deter, and, if necessary, defend against these threats. By stating up front that Russia is a formal threat, member states—and the alliance as a whole—will find it harder to backslide from their current cohesion. It is difficult to overstate how important it is for NATO to ensure its consensus is durable; as the war grinds on and publics begin feeling the economic effects of the conflict and sanctions on Russia, the temptation to dilute support to Ukraine will undoubtedly mount. Not to mention, calling it like it is will send an important message to Putin: NATO will not be deterred. Words matter. It is time for NATO leaders to formally accept reality: Putin is a threat to the alliance and its members, and, therefore, they should declare so in the news strategic concept. Indeed, not declaring Russia a formal threat to NATO territory would compromise NATO’s credibility and would give Putin a pass for the atrocities and violations he has committed in Ukraine. Neither NATO nor the United States can afford to allow that to happen.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Orientalism supplements › Russia threat is real

The Russian cyber threat is very real

Kakaes 3/22(Konstantin Kakaes, 3-22-2022, "How real is Russia’s cyber threat?," POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/politico-nightly/2022/03/22/how-real-is-russias-cyber-threat-00019386)//BRownRice

WEB OF UNCERTAINTY — “As the world’s most technically advanced nation, the United States is also potentially the most vulnerable to foreign cyberthreats,” John Markoff warned in The New York Times more than two decades ago, in October 1999. Like the nuclear threat of the Cold War, which loomed over daily life for nearly half a century, the possibility of “simultaneous computer network attacks against banking, transportation, commerce and utility targets — as well as against the military,” as the Times put it long before the internet was a central to society as it is today, has become part of the backdrop of modern life. Those fears became more vivid — more real — than ever before on Monday evening, when President Joe Biden, addressing business leaders, said “the magnitude of Russia’s cyber capacity is fairly consequential and it’s coming.” Trillions of dollars have been spent on cybersecurity this century. Despite that, as a society, we are less resilient to cyberattacks today than we were in 1999. Ridesharing services that rely on networked communications and positioning systems have largely replaced taxis that relied on drivers who knew their way around; smartphones have become essential to the conduct of business; even grocery stores are growing dependent on sophisticated computational surveillance systems. Even so, it is hard to know what to make of Biden’s warning. On the one hand, he is privy to secret intelligence, and that intelligence was right about Vladimir Putin’s willingness to invade Ukraine with an army of tanks and airplanes. On the other, cyber pundits have so far been mistaken about the cyberwar that was supposed to accompany Putin’s Ukraine invasion. “They will do things that will ruin people and cause great harm. This is a serious thing. It’s not just about making the lights go on and off,” Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, the former commanding general of the U.S. Army Europe, told POLITICO’s Maggie Miller in January. And Jonathan Reiber, the former chief strategy officer for cyber policy in Obama’s Pentagon said in January, “This may end up being the first declared hostility where cyberspace operations are a part of an integrated offensive military invasion.” That hasn’t happened. Even as Ukraine has been pummeled by bombs and artillery strikes, cyberattacks have been — so far — muted in Ukraine, and there haven’t yet been any notable attacks on the U.S. In an article coming Wednesday morning in POLITICO that examines why Russia hasn’t launched major cyberattacks in Ukraine (and is available to POLITICO Pro subscribers right now), Hodges acknowledges that the “cyber juggernaut” he expected never materialized. It’s unclear whether this is because Russia didn’t want to, or because it couldn’t. Russia’s brutal invasion has lacked strategic coherence, in the cyber realm as in others. Had cyberattacks made it harder for Ukrainians to communicate, it seems inevitable that Volodymyr Zelenskyy would have been less effective at drumming up international support for Ukraine. The exact extent of Russia’s cyber capabilities remains opaque. If Russia is capable of a serious cyberattack against the U.S., then now, after Russia has been frustrated in its attempt to swiftly conquer Ukraine, could be the moment when it comes. Because cyberattacks are generally difficult to definitively attribute, they could provide a way for Putin to bring the war to Americans while making it difficult for U.S. policymakers to retaliate in kind. Plus, as Biden said Monday, in the U.S. it’s the private sector, not the government, that largely decides “the protections we will or will not take” against cyberattacks that might disrupt our electricity or our water supplies. He called on business leaders to do their part to “secure every American’s privacy.” So far, since Markoff’s essay in 1999, the possibility of what was then called an electronic Pearl Harbor, and more recently a cyber Pearl Harbor, has remained just that: a possibility. The cyberattacks that have taken place, like the Colonial Pipeline ransomware incident, have been headaches for their targets but not world-historical catastrophes. If a momentous, long-feared attack from Russia does come, that could change. The world could be reshaped in unpredictable ways, as it was after Sept. 11, 2001, and as it was after the onset of the pandemic. Cyberattacks can have temporary effects, or they can have more lasting ones. A blackout that lasted months would transform life, as food spoiled and hospital generators ran out of gas, and might be treated as an act of war. To be clear, these are purely speculative threats. They don’t seem realistic, nor worth worrying about. Planning for very low probability but very high impact events — a cyber black swan — is nearly impossible. It feels a little irresponsible even to speculate about them. But then, the idea that the world would endure nearly two years of lockdowns as businesses shut globally once seemed far-fet ched too.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Tech Impact Turns › 2AC – AT: Conventional Substitution Turn

They’re complementary – Ukraine proves.

DSU 22 – Microsoft’s Digital Security Unit, 4/27/2022, "Special Report: Ukraine," https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/api/am/binary/RE4Vwwd, RMax

Throughout this conflict, we have observed Russian nation state cyber actors conducting intrusions in concert with kinetic military action.

At least six Russian Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) actors and other unattributed threats, have conducted destructive attacks, espionage operations, or both, while Russian military forces attack the country by land, air, and sea. It is unclear whether computer network operators and physical forces are just independently pursuing a common set of priorities or actively coordinating. However, collectively, the cyber and kinetic actions work to disrupt or degrade Ukrainian government and military functions and undermine the public’s trust in those same institutions.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Tech Impact Turns › 2AC – AT: China Espionage Good – Biotech Scenario

China’s biotech industry fails BUT isn’t driven by espionage.

Chris Liu 21, Senior Portfolio Manager at Invesco, 6/22/2021, "China, Explained series: What’s driving growth in China’s biotech industry?" , RMax

The biotech industry in China is relatively nascent. Even though the country’s healthcare market is the second largest globally, biotech-driven treatments account for only 12% of the China’s total drug market. Companies in this space are also far behind their global counterparts both in terms of revenue and R&D investments. In 2019 for example, sales of the top ten biotech drugs (biologics) globally were in the range of USD 6 to 20 billion while Chinese biologic sales were in the range of RMB 3 to 5 billion (see Chart 1 and 2).  

Source: Frost & Sullivan, Morgan Stanley Research

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
*Disad Updates** › BBB 1NC – UQ

Build Back Better will pass with razor-thin margins next week

UBS 7-22 – global wealth management service (UBS Editorial, 7-22-2022, "Washington: Tech push, climate change, and Build Back Better," global, https://www.ubs.com/global/en/wealth-management/our-approach/marketnews/article.1570692.html)//KH

Build Back Better Revival. Senate Democrats behind the scenes continue to work on navigating their slimmed-down Build Back Better (BBB) legislation through the complicated rules of budget reconciliation, which will allow them to pass the bill with just 50 votes (instead of the de facto 60 vote threshold that applies to most legislation in the Senate). We expect the final BBB bill to be considered by the Senate beginning the week of August 1. It will take that entire week (and possibly the next) to reach a conclusion. The smaller BBB most notably would include prescription drug pricing reforms that will allow Medicare to achieve cost savings for the government. Those savings will be applied to an extension of federal subsidies under Obamacare. There may be a few other provisions that are not controversial, but importantly, we do not expect any tax increases on wealthier individuals or businesses to be included in this bill (unlike earlier versions). While the smaller bill is no doubt a disappointment to many Democrats who still favor the $1.75 trillion bill passed by the House last fall, it still will be a major accomplishment for Democrats to tout to voters this year if it can pass in the Senate, which we believe is likely.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
*Disad Updates** › BBB 2AC – UQ

BBB is dead until midterms at leads – Manchin funding opposition

Budryk 7-14 – reporter at the Hill (Zack, 7-14-2022, "Manchin will not support climate spending in reconciliation package," Hill, https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/3560404-manchin-will-not-support-climate-spending-in-reconciliation-package-reports/)//KH

Sen. Joe Manchin (D-W.Va.) will not support climate spending as part of a reconciliation package, likely dooming any major climate legislation before the 2022 midterms, a Democrat briefed on the conversation confirmed to The Hill Thursday night.

The West Virginia Democrat told Democratic leaders on Thursday that he was unwilling to support a spending package with either climate provisions or new tax increases on corporations or wealthy individuals.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
*Disad Updates** › DSCA 2AC – AT: Link

O&M and different implementing agencies mean no link to the DA

McInnis and Lucas 15 (Kathleen McInnis is an analyst in international security, Nathan Lucas is a section research manager, “What Is ‘Building Partner Capacity?’ Issues for Congress”, Congressional Research Service, 12-18-15, Accessed on 7-22-19, , DP)

Security assistance, by contrast, is defined as a group of programs authorized by Title 22 of the U.S. Code, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, cash sales, or lease, in furtherance of national policies and objectives.17

Security assistance is a subset of security cooperation, 18 and BPC, in its current formulation, appears to be associated with those security cooperation and assistance activities designed to enable weakened or fragile states to manage their own security challenges. Although all DOD aspects of security assistance programs are administered by DSCA, the agency is not responsible for the department’s broader strategy and non-programmatic elements of security cooperation or building partner capacity.19

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
*Disad Updates** › DSCA 2AC – AT: Link

Plan not DSCA

DSCA ND "Chapter 1," No Publication, https://samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-1

The Secretary of Defense establishes military requirements and implements programs to transfer defense articles and services to eligible foreign countries and international organizations. Within DoD, the principal responsible agencies for Security Cooperation (SC) are the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the Combatant Commands (CCMDs), the Joint Staff, the Security Cooperation Organizations (SCOs), and the Military Departments (MILDEPs).

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
*Disad Updates** › DSCA 2AC – Thumpers Galore

UAE sales thump

Naomi Cooper 22, 7-22-2022, "State Department OKs $206M Oceanographic Observation Equipment FMS to UAE," ExecutiveBiz, https://blog.executivebiz.com/2022/07/state-department-oks-206m-oceanographic-observation-equipment-sale-to-uae/

The State Department has granted the UAE government approval to buy oceanographic observation equipment and associated system under a potential $206 million foreign military sale contract. Lockheed Martin’s rotary and mission system division has been named the principal for the proposed deal, which includes fiber optic communications suites, remote data collection facilities, multi-site sensors, data analysis workstations and power supplies, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency said Thursday. The UAE also requested technical and logistics support and other related services under the FMS deal, which will provide the country with access to real-time oceanographic data to protect natural resources, maritime boundaries and ports. The potential contract calls for the deployment of two contractor representatives to the UAE for a period of two and a half years. DSCA does not expect the sale to alter the basic military balance in the region.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
*Disad Updates** › DSCA 2AC – Thumpers Galore

Idk but 127 million to belgium seems like more than the plan

Costas Pitas 22, 7-19-2022, "U.S. approves sales of $127 million of F-16 equipment to Belgium," https://www.reuters.com/world/us-approves-sales-127-million-f-16-equipment-belgium-2022-07-19/

The U.S. State Department has green-lighted the potential sale of F-16 sustainment and related equipment worth $127 million to Belgium, the Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation Agency said on Tuesday. "This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a NATO ally which is an important force for political stability and economic progress in Europe," it said in a statement.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
*Disad Updates** › DSCA 2AC – Thumpers Galore

DSCA action in Europe turns the DA—signals global strength

Reuters 22, 7-22-2022, "U.S. State Dept. approves $2 billion in arms sales to four countries," No Publication, https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/us-state-dept-approves-2-billion-in-arms-sales-to-four-countries/article65668262.ece

The sale comes as governments around the world are watching Russia's invasion of Ukraine and grow more willing to invest in weapons systems The U.S. State Department has approved the potential sale of more than $2 billion worth of arms and equipment, including Patriot missiles for the Netherlands, cruise missiles for Australia, and oceanographic observation equipment for the United Arab Emirates, the Pentagon said on Thursday. The sale comes as governments around the world are watching Russia's invasion of Ukraine and grow more willing to invest in weapons systems. The package for the Netherlands would include 96 Patriot ballistic missiles and related equipment, the Pentagon said. If finalized, Raytheon Technologies would be the prime contractor for the deal, which could be worth as much as $1.2 billion. Australia was approved to buy 80 Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles, or extended-range cruise missiles. Made by Lockheed Martin Corp, the missiles can be launched from F/A-18 Super Hornets and F-35s. That deal could be worth as much as $235 million. The United Arab Emirates was approved to buy an oceanographic observation equipment system which includes multisite sensors and remote data collection facilities for a total cost of $206 million. Lockheed Martin is the prime contractor for that system. The State Department also authorized the sale of as much as $397 million worth of various Raytheon- and Lockheed-made munitions to Kuwait. The weapons include air-to-air missiles, bombs, and kits that make bombs more precise and lethal. The Pentagon's Defense Security Cooperation Agency notified Congress of the possible sale on Thursday.Despite approval by the State Department, the notification does not indicate that a contract has been signed or that negotiations have concluded.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
*Disad Updates** › DSCA 2AC – Turn

Democracy solves a laundry list of impacts---economic growth, public goods, alliances, and war---the US is key.

Lee ’18 (Carrie; is an assistant professor at the U.S. Air War College and a Security Fellow with Truman National Security Project. Any views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, Air University, or Truman National Security Project; The Truman Project; September 10th; “Why Democracy Promotion is in the Strategic Interest of the United States”; ; accessed 7/9/19; MSCOTT)

However, reducing the United States’ emphasis on a values-driven foreign policy is wrong, and contrary to the strategic interests of the United States. Democracy promotion in particular serves a key role in safeguarding U.S. interests and promoting global, long-term growth in ways fundamentally compatible with U.S. strategic interests. After all, democracies protect private property in important ways, invest in public goods, are more politically stable, make for more dependable allies, and empirically do not go to war with one another. Ultimately, a world full of democratic governments is safer, more prosperous, and more stable — all states of being that the United States has an interest in promoting.

Democracy guarantees that the public has a stake in its own institutions and government, which leads to investor confidence and growth. Since elected politicians are accountable to property owners and are held in check by an independent judiciary, democracies tend to have better mechanisms for protecting private property than their autocratic counterparts. This makes democracies a particularly attractive type of country for investors — both public and private — because checks and balances make it difficult for the state to nationalize industries. Further, private property rights protected by the legal system encourage entrepreneurship and small business development, both of which are key to a growing and modernizing economy. As a result, democracies tend to be wealthier and more economically stable than their autocratic counterparts. This is fundamentally in the interest of the United States in that both private and public investors have an interest in seeing returns on their investments, thereby potentially making countries less willing to go to war if that would require severing economic ties. Democratic institutions ensure that citizens with both economic and political power are heard.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
*Disad Updates** › DSCA 2AC – Turn

DSCA increasing security cooperation weakens already fragile states and causes democratic backsliding

Barbara Salera 22, 7-18-2022, "The Case Against Security Cooperation in Fragile States," War on the Rocks, https://warontherocks.com/2022/07/the-case-against-security-cooperation-in-fragile-states/

A dark cloud hangs over the Department of Defense. After the “strategic failure” that was Afghanistan, the department is struggling to figure out how not to repeat it. In particular, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the lead agency for advising, training, and equipping foreign governments, has taken a number of key steps to prevent this from reoccurring. My fellow colleagues in the agency, whose key mission is to build the military capacity of foreign partners, took the collapse in Afghanistan particularly hard. After the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act the agency established certification programs for its workforce and introduced new concepts such as “building capacity” and “full-spectrum capability.” This is in addition to various other initiatives, such as changing security cooperation planning methods and requiring the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of outcomes. Though these initiatives predate the recent events in Afghanistan, they symbolize a widespread recognition of a problem with how the United States conducts military assistance, a recognition grimly underscored by the collapse of the Afghan security forces in August 2021 and the failures of Iraqi reconstruction. BECOME A MEMBER For years, the United States has struggled with how best to build foreign militaries, with minor successes here and there but nothing substantial over the long term. These noted difficulties have led to what Jahara Matisek has called the “Faberge Egg army problem, an expensively built military … easily broken by insurgents.” Some have argued that to address these poor outcomes the United States should consolidate and simplify the complicated domestic processes used to execute security cooperation, in addition to augmenting programs by building the capacity of formal defense institutions. However, military assistance outcomes will not improve simply by making the foreign military sales process faster or by improving a country’s defense institutions, as argued by Jeremy Gwinn. Many past articles on security cooperation focused on the minutiae of how to improve the process as opposed to asking whether security cooperation is the best means by which to accomplish national security objectives. Security cooperation analyses have a tendency to focus on the “tactical” level of security cooperation and concentrate on how to get the equipment to countries faster, or what other augmentations or incentives the United States should add to make it work. My argument focuses on the strategic use of security cooperation to accomplish wider American interests in fragile states. By fragile states, I specifically reference those countries that are dealing with “extensive corruption and criminal behavior, inability to collect taxes or otherwise draw on citizen support, large-scale involuntary dislocation of the population, sharp economic decline, group-based inequality, institutionalized persecution or discrimination, severe demographic pressures, brain drain, and environmental decay.” Rather than being a key foreign policy tool, the United States should carefully consider the ramifications of increasing security cooperation in fragile states. For one, the partner nation will likely be unable to sustain this newfound military capacity. Second, miliary assistance is likely to lead to an increase in political instability, corruption, human-rights abuses, and incidences of political oppression. This is because, at its core, the U.S. approach to security cooperation is contradictory and anachronistic. It is based on faulty assumptions about conditions in partner nations, often designed to defeat an enemy the partner nation does not have, and rooted in American models of defense institutions that do not exist. Even during the era of great-power competition, it is not clear that U.S. interests are best served by sending millions of dollars in defense articles and training to fragile states under the guise of “regional stability,” with the primary purpose of keeping Russia and China out. Inherent in the definition of security cooperation are explicit goals to “build capacity,” which often translate to ensuring that foreign countries can use, maintain, and sustain the equipment that the United States has transferred to them, either through grant assistance or by foreign military sales. Given the internal instability of fragile states, most military capabilities that the United States is seeking to foster are for the purposes of internal defense, counter-insurgency, or counter-terrorism. The suite of programs used to transfer training and equipment are referred to as “building partner capacity” or “train and equip programs.” Often recipients of these programs are states that cannot or will not provide basic services for their population or control their own territory, because the government lacks either the resources, the authority, or the trust of many of its citizens. While the state exists de jure, there is no state de facto. The idea of transferring millions of dollars of state-of-the-art American equipment to a country that cannot provide the most basic services to its population seems counter-intuitive. How is the recipient country expected to maintain it? While the issue of sustainment is important, let’s sidestep it and focus on what happens after the equipment is delivered and the training has been completed. There may be anecdotal evidence of how security cooperation programs have been “successful” in building military capacity, but numerous commentaries and studies argue that the outcomes of this newfound capacity have been less than ideal. According to these studies, an increase in security cooperation and security assistance correlated with an increased incidence of military coups, political oppression, human-rights violations, and other forms of political instability. For example, a 2020 study conducted by Patricia Sullivan, Leo Blanken, and Ian Rice analyzing post-conflict countries between 1956 and 2012 found a statistically significant increase in incidences of torture, extra-judicial killings, disappearances, political imprisonment and executions, and incidents of genocide among recipients of military assistance. A second study, analyzing U.S. security assistance to 150 countries, found a similar result: An increase in military assistance (security cooperation) correlated with worse performance on human rights. Both of these studies include years in which United States security cooperation programs were tied to Leahy Amendment conditions concerning human rights that barred sending material to units on a human-rights watch list and having every recipient of training vetted. Regardless, the results of these studies should not be surprising. Fragile states in which leaders lack resources to provide basic services for their population often turn to well-resourced (thanks to military assistance) militaries to repress restless populations and target political opponents. Political leaders in fragile states often use newfound military capacity to shore up power. Moreover, if political leaders can depend on an outside donor, like the United States, to resource their military, as opposed to taxes or some other internal resources, it further severs the tie between the government and its citizens. Regardless of these outcomes, the primary purpose of security cooperation is “to build partner nation capacity consistent with [American] defense objectives.” While the National Defense Strategy outlines numerous defense objectives, in regions with fragile states these objectives often include promoting regional stability, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, and even policing (countering human trafficking and drug trafficking). Therefore, the purpose of building military capacity in weak and failed states is mostly to ensure the internal security of that state. However, the American military, by law and tradition, is not designed to play an internal security role. When the United States has engaged in building foreign militaries, it has tended to reflect the American way of war centered around playing its economic strength and technological advantage into a tactical advantage on the battlefield. From doctrine to defense institutions and logistics systems, the entire Department of Defense is built around this American way of war. In fact, for U.S. forces counter-insurgency was a subset of total war until the late 2000s. Through building partner capacity programs, especially those under Department of Defense authorities, the approach to security cooperation has been to mirror American ways of war, doctrine, logistics systems, and training by asking American military members and institutions to help to build the capacity of defense institutions. In Afghanistan in particular, the Department of Defense sought to build a military “that was modeled on the centralized command structures and complex bureaucracy of the Defense Department” rather than build a military to defeat the specific threat(s) that Afghanistan faces rooted in defense institutions that Afghanistan could support. The U.S. implementers drew on what they knew, which resulted in Afghan forces not being able to function without American support operationally and logistically. Ultimately, once the United States withdrew, the Afghan forces fell quickly. U.S. security practitioners specializing in institutional capacity-building point to Afghanistan as an example of not taking institutional capacity-building seriously, therefore dooming the rebuilding of the Afghan military, and not necessarily of broader security cooperation failure. Congress listened, and required frequently used security cooperation programs to address institutional capacity-building, which advocates argue can even help to prevent human rights abuses, mostly through education or some sort of subject-matter expert or military advisor exchanges. However, institutional capacity-building is not the panacea to the security cooperation dilemma that many within the Department of Defense think it is. Institutional capacity-building programs still focus on the technical aspects of institutions, or give cursory education on issues such as the law of armed conflict. But these programs fail to consider the politics of how authority within states emerges, develops, or changes in order to institutionalize these newly introduced practices. To be clear, I am not arguing that security cooperation planners do not consider politics at all. In fact, U.S. law requires the Department of Defense to “jointly consider political, social, economic, diplomatic, and historical factors, if any, of the foreign country that may impact the effectiveness of the program.” However, assessments of these factors are often shallow and concentrate on the politics of formal institutions, overlooking the importance of informal institutions and how power and authority is actually wielded in fragile states. In order to understand the deep politics of fragile states, it is crucial to have an understanding of what a state is. The noted sociologist Max Weber defined the state as a “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” The key for the Weberian conception of the state is the term legitimate use of force. Weber argued that even states that appear to be authoritarian will seek to root their claim of legitimacy in one of three “pure” types of authority: legal, traditional, or charismatic. Authority in the American state most closely aligns itself with legal legitimation, meaning that U.S. citizens see the American state and government as legitimate because a leader’s power is derived from written laws, procedures, and regulations. Leaders in fragile states often try to legitimize their rule not through legal means, but in a sub-categorization of traditional authority: the neo-patrimonial system. Leaders in neo-patrimonial states, while having a veneer of bureaucracy, also seek to remain in power through clientelism, or the exchange of goods and services for political support. Neo-patrimonial governments also prefer to keep state institutions weak by stacking bureaucracies, like defense institutions, with supporters and encouraging competition amongst individuals to keep them divided and therefore not a threat to their rule. This allows key military leaders to be dependent on the ruler for their wealth while also keeping “national armies divided and faction-ridden.” U.S. military assistance is especially prone to contribute to corruption as often this assistance accounts for a large portion of defense budgets. “Ghost soldiers” (nonexistent military personnel manufactured by corrupt officials to pocket their salary) in Iraq and Uganda are two well-known examples of how easy it can be for military institutions to engage in corruption. Clientelism is not considered corruption, but just the way governance is done in states in which the central government competes with local actors for legitimacy. The Taliban understood this and struck deals “with low-level representatives of the standing Afghan government through bribes or safety guarantees” in order to quickly seize control of various regions. With this understanding of the state, a deeper look into the approach to institutional capacity-building still shows the failures of security cooperation. According to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, institutional capacity-building initiatives are to be “driven by U.S. interests and values” but at the same time avoid “the projection or imposition of United States’ models, which may not fit an ally or partner’s specific context.” How can institutional capacity-building be driven by U.S. values while also not be driven by U.S. models? Often Americans sent to help build institutions are subject-matter experts in developing and running logistics systems, human resource institutions, and other formal defense institutions in the United States, not state-building or political development scholars with a deep understanding of the informal politics of the state. These gaps in knowledge are then filled in by their experience in running institutions in the United States, resulting in foreign defense institutions modeled on the complex American bureaucratic system, a system rooted in rational legitimacy. Additionally, institutional capacity programs are often aimed at improving the skills of functionaries and/or rewriting laws, processes, or regulations that improve the veneer of the neo-patrimonial system without necessarily shifting governance style further down the legal continuum. This veneer serves to further enhance a leader’s international legitimacy while doing nothing to improve their domestic legitimacy, to say nothing of the standard of living of the country’s citizens. Security cooperation observers may point to Ukraine as an example of successful security cooperation, with the United States providing military assistance to deny Russia an easy win, and so far it seems to be working. Observers did not expect Ukraine to do so well against Russia. However, this is the exception that proves the rule. Ukraine by most measures is not a deeply fragile state. In fact, according to the fragile state index, where a lower number indicates less fragility, it has ranked anywhere from 86 to as low as 117 out of 179 countries. Currently, about 88 out of 179 countries are deemed more fragile than Ukraine. Compared to countries like the Philippines, Nigeria, Egypt, Afghanistan, Iraq, and many African countries, it was relatively more stable. Second, American defense articles and services are being used to fight off an external threat. Third, government legitimacy is not in question. The reason that security cooperation is “working” is that Ukrainian citizens see the government as trying to provide them with protection against the Russian invasion: They see an arrangement in which they (the Ukrainians) are giving their blood, with much of the treasure being provided by the United States. After the war, Ukraine may come out with a stronger nation-state identity and perhaps a less corrupt government. In addition, following the path identified by Charles Tilly, becoming efficient and effective at war contributes to moving states further down the legal legitimacy continuum. The issue with many fragile states, especially in African countries, is that their citizens see a variety of actors as legitimate governors, not the central government. In turn, often, governments of fragile states see their own citizens and groups as potential political rivals, not communities to be served. Some fragile states are only states because international society says so, not because their citizens believe them to be, unlike in Ukraine. Engaging in security cooperation in fragile countries is a wicked problem, in that any approach the United States takes will invariably not be good enough to achieve the lofty goals outlined in the National Security Strategy. When the United States helps to build foreign militaries it cannot help but use an American model, one that also assumes an objective control of civil-military relations, which neo-patrimonial regimes do not follow. Political leaders in fragile states will gladly take whatever military training and equipment that the United States is willing to give while also ensuring they can still hold on to power, through various forms of patronage and/or coup-proofing. In addition, Chinese and Russian military and economic assistance is waiting in the wings to supplement or even supplant American assistance. Suggestions to tie continued U.S. security cooperation to improvement in domestic conditions may not work, as fragile states often use the threat of going to Russia or China to gain concessions. U.S. policymakers need to rethink their approach to security cooperation by first deciding whether keeping Russia and China out is enough of a national interest to justify providing support to specific fragile states. Despite great-power competition, U.S. interests may be best served by abandoning security-cooperation efforts in fragile states. Arguments to improve the foreign military sales process or incentivize a country’s behavior are largely irrelevant and will not lead to better security cooperation outcomes, at least not within the timelines imposed by U.S. government programs. It is very difficult to build a sustainable military capacity in fragile countries whose governments lack resources, both monetary and human, and to do so against the desires of political leaders who may see keeping institutions weak as a way to stay in power. The United States should only choose to conduct security cooperation, especially if paid for by taxpayer dollars — because not all programs are, and some are funded by the foreign governments themselves — in very specific cases that truly serve national interests. U.S. policymakers should also be prepared for the fallout that comes with increasing military capacity in states that cannot provide basic needs for their own population or have governments that lack legitimacy, namely human-rights abuses, corruption, and general regional instability. When the United States does choose to pour millions of taxpayer dollars into the security sector of a fragile state, it should be ready to make a long-term commitment and embed any approach in both the formal and informal political structures of the state.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
*Disad Updates** › DSCA 2NC – K2 Win Ukraine

DSCA key to victory in Ukraine

Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army General Mark A. Milley 22 (U.S. Department of Defense, “Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army General Mark A. Milley Hold a Press Conference”, 7- 20-2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3100301/secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-and-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-of-sta/)

As you heard me say, we're also committed to providing two NASAMS air defense systems to help Ukraine protect its troops and its civilians from Russian missile attacks. And we're committed to sending more HIMARS munitions and precision-guided artillery ammunition and other vital support. The United States will continue to push and to lead. You see that yet again in our next new presidential drawdown of weapons and equipment to help Ukraine defend itself, which we'll announce later this week. It will be our sixteenth drawdown of equipment from DOD inventory since August 2021. It will include four more HIMARS advanced rocket systems for a total of 16. The Ukrainians have made excellent use of HIMARS and you can see the impact on the battlefield. And the new package will also include additional GMLRS, and that's -- those are the rockets that -- that are used on a HIMARS. And we'll also provide more rounds of artillery ammunition. Now we're not working just to provide security assistance in the short term. One key theme of today's discussion was ensuring that Ukraine can sustain the fight to defend itself and its citizens. So we're even more focused on Ukraine's near-term needs -- as we're even more focused on Ukraine's near-term needs, we're also looking ahead to provide Ukraine with the capabilities that it will need for deterrence and self-defense over the longer term.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
*Disad Updates** › DSCA AT: Ukraine Impact

More aid to Ukraine coming now

Merchant 22 (Nomaan Merchant, reporter for PBS, PBS News Hours, “U.S. sends an additional $270 million in military aid to Ukraine”, 7-22-2022, https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/u-s-sends-an-additional-270-million-in-military-aid-to-ukraine)

WASHINGTON (AP) — The White House announced Friday that the U.S. is sending an additional $270 million in security assistance to Ukraine, a package that will include additional medium range rocket systems and tactical drones. The latest tranche brings the total U.S. security assistance committed to Ukraine by the Biden administration to $8.2 billion, and is being paid for through $40 billion in economic and security aid for Ukraine approved by Congress in May. The new package includes four High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, or HIMARS and will allow Kyiv to acquire up to 580 Phoenix Ghost drones, both crucial weapon systems that have allowed the Ukrainians to stay in the fight despite Russian artillery supremacy, according to John Kirby, the White House National Security Council’s coordinator for strategic communications. The latest assistance also includes some 36,000 rounds of artillery ammunition and additional ammunition for the HIMARS. “The president has been clear that we’re going to continue to support the government of Ukraine and its people for as long as it takes,” Kirby said. Ukrainian forces have used U.S.-made rocket launchers and tactical drones to destroy dozens of Russian targets and hold at bay Russia’s larger and more heavily equipped forces.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
*Disad Updates** › DSCA Impact- Russia victory

Fix and Kimmage 22 (Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage, Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, Professor of History at the Catholic University of America, 2-18-2022, Foreign Affairs, “What if Russia Wins”,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-18/what-if-russia-wins?check_logged_in=1&utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20220722)

In the event of a Russian victory in Ukraine, Germany‘s position in Europe will be severely challenged. Germany is a marginal military power that has based its postwar political identity on the rejection of war. The ring of friends it has surrounded itself with, especially in the east with Poland and the Baltic states, risks being destabilized by Russia. France and the United Kingdom will assume leading roles in European affairs by virtue of their comparatively strong militaries and long tradition of military interventions. The key factor in Europe, however, will remain the United States. NATO will depend on U.S. support as will the anxious and imperiled countries of Europe’s east, the frontline nations arrayed along a now very large, expanded, and uncertain line of contact with Russia, including Belarus and the Russian-controlled parts of Ukraine.

Eastern member states, including Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Romania, will likely have substantial numbers of NATO troops permanently stationed on their soil. A request from Finland and Sweden to gain an Article 5 commitment and to join NATO would be impossible to reject. In Ukraine, EU and NATO countries will never recognize a new Russian-backed regime created by Moscow. But they will face the same challenge they do with Belarus: wielding sanctions without punishing the population and supporting those in need without having access to them. Some NATO members will bolster a Ukrainian insurgency, to which Russia will respond by threatening NATO members.

Ukraine’s predicament will be very great. Refugees will flee in multiple directions, quite possibly in the millions. And those parts of the Ukrainian military that are not directly defeated will continue fighting, echoing the partisan warfare that tore apart this whole region of Europe during and after World War II.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
*Disad Updates** › DSCA Impact- Russia victory

Fix and Kimmage 22(Liana Fix and Michael Kimmage, Resident Fellow at the German Marshall Fund, Professor of History at the Catholic University of America, 2-18-2022, Foreign Affairs, “What if Russia Wins”,https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-02-18/what-if-russia-wins?check_logged_in=1&utm_medium=promo_email&utm_source=lo_flows&utm_campaign=registered_user_welcome&utm_term=email_1&utm_content=20220722)

If Russia gains control of Ukraine or manages to destabilize it on a major scale, a new era for the United States and for Europe will begin. U.S. and European leaders would face the dual challenge of rethinking European security and of not being drawn into a larger war with Russia. All sides would have to consider the potential of nuclear-armed adversaries in direct confrontation. These two responsibilities—robustly defending European peace and prudently avoiding military escalation with Russia—will not necessarily be compatible. The United States and its allies could find themselves deeply unprepared for the task of having to create a new European security order as a result of Russia’s military actions in Ukraine.

For Russia, victory in Ukraine could take various forms. As in Syria, victory does not have to result in a sustainable settlement. It could involve the installation of a compliant government in Kyiv or the partition of the country. Alternatively, the defeat of the Ukrainian military and the negotiation of a Ukrainian surrender could effectively transform Ukraine into a failed state. Russia could also employ devastating cyberattacks and disinformation tools, backed by the threat of force, to cripple[weaken] the country and induce regime change. With any of these outcomes, Ukraine will have been effectively detached from the West.

If Russia achieves its political aims in Ukraine by military means, Europe will not be what it was before the war. Not only will U.S. primacy in Europe have been qualified; any sense that the European Union or NATO can ensure peace on the continent will be the artifact of a lost age. Instead, security in Europe will have to be reduced to defending the core members of the EU and NATO. Everyone outside the clubs will stand alone, with the exception of Finland and Sweden. This may not necessarily be a conscious decision to end enlargement or association policies; but it will be de facto policy. Under a perceived siege by Russia, the EU and NATO will no longer have the capacity for ambitious policies beyond their own borders.

2022 Michigan Disadvantage
*Disad Updates** › DSCA 1NC Link —Piolet Projects

Piolet programs cost DSCA’s time and money

Idrees Ali 16, 8-11-2016, "U.S. approves sale of bombs to NATO under pilot project," No Publication, https://sports.yahoo.com/news/u-approves-sale-bombs-nato-182401360.html?guccounter=1

WASHINGTON, Aug 11 (Reuters) - The U.S. State Department has approved the potential sale of precision guided munitions and equipment worth $231 million to NATO's support and procurement agency, under a pilot program where the organization acts as a lead buyer for member countries, the Pentagon said on Thursday.

The U.S. government last year announced a two-year project aimed at making it easier for NATO and member countries to share costs and buy weapons as a group as they struggle to stretch scarce defense budgets.