2022
Michigan
Counterplan
AT: Advantage CPs › AT: Net Assessment Office
Senator Chuck Grassley, 2-7-2022, "Grassley: The Office of Net Assessment is a Failure," GH-PJ
Accordingly, it appears that the Office of Net Assessment gets to keep operating like a Pentagon slush fund for irrelevant and political research projects. On , the Director of the Office of Net Assessment told me, “We review all deliverables to ensure they’re consistent with the statement of work. We evaluate each deliverable to assess whether we should seek additional information or require a resubmission of commissioned work.” I’ll return to that statement in a bit. In , I asked the inspector general to take a deeper dive into the Office of Net Assessment’s contracting practices. That means connecting all the dots in the contract transactions to ensure everything matches up. The inspector general reviewed 20 contracts. On , the inspector general issued its results and found, in part: · Office of Net Assessment acquisition personnel inappropriately performed Contracting Officer Representative duties for 20 contracts. · ONA acquisition personnel and an office providing contract support didn’t maintain complete contract files, including pre-award and contract administration documentation. That also included the failure to maintain signed contracts and modifications. Since 2019, I’ve repeatedly asked for a full accounting of Stefan Halper’s contracts. Either they never had one or they’ve decided to obstruct Congress. · ONA acquisition personnel and an office providing contract support inappropriately approved invoices for payments totaling 9.8 million dollars due to a lack of oversight. And that’s just for the 20 contracts the Inspector General sampled. Without required supporting documentation for payment, the door is wide open to fraud, theft and improper payments. · Without established and documented surveillance measures for ONA service contracts, the Office of Net Assessment may not have received all services outlined in contractor statements of work. · At this point, the next finding is no surprise: the ONA didn’t administer contracts in accordance with federal, Defense Department and Washington Headquarters Services internal regulations and policies. Further, the audit states, “Office of Net Assessment Acquisition personnel can’t verify whether they received services, valued at 4.1 million dollars, in accordance with the statement of work.” Now, let’s return to that quote from the Director of the ONA, “We review all deliverables to ensure they’re consistent with the statement of work. We evaluate each deliverable to assess whether we should seek additional information or require a resubmission of commissioned work.” Based on the available evidence, his statement is false. Here’s the bottom line: the ONA has no clue what they’re paying for and whether they’ve even received complete work product. And whatever they’re actually doing, it’s not in compliance with federal regulations, policy and law. This is a complete embarrassment and a slap in the face to the American taxpayer. While the ONA wasted millions of dollars in taxpayer money every year, the communist Chinese government developed hypersonic missiles that can travel the globe. If this unit isn’t doing the job they’re supposed to do, why are we still funding it? It’d be better to take their 20 million dollar budget and give it our service members. At least we know they’ve earned it. A government slush fund will always be a government slush fund unless the Congress steps up and fixes the problem.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADR CP vs Space Assets Aff
Shaub 19 – (Professor in Aerospace engineering at UC Boulder. “Active Debris Dynamics and Removal” )
The low Earth orbit debris environment continues to be a concern for the space community. While debris mitigation is an important component of reducing on-orbit clutter, active debris removal methods are likely to be necessary in the future. The AVS Lab is studying a debris removal concept which aims to deorbit existing defunct large rocket bodies by considering small modifications to existing launch vehicles. The following concept is being proposed by Dr. V. Trushlyakov of Omsk State Technical University. Post-mission fuel reserves from the second stage of a heavy launch vehicle are used to rendezvous with an existing rocket body debris object. Upon tethering to this debris, a Delta-v maneuver is performed with the remaining fuel reserves to lower both objects' periapses. Specifically, in current study, a Soyuz-like rocket-body is considered the thrusting tug craft, while a Cosmos-3M rocket-body is considered the debris object. To deorbit a Cosmos-3M in 25 years from an 800 km orbit only requires a combined Delta-v of 120 m/s. This is within the fuel reserve budget of the Soyuz upper stage, illustrating the feasibility of this approach. In to avoid collision between the two craft, deep-space dynamics reveal that the thrust can be throttled in synchronization with the relative motion so that, at the end of a burn, zero relative velocity between the two craft is achieved. The on-orbit dynamics reveal that the orbital motion helps keep both craft separated. Our research is collaborating with Omsk State University by investigating the complex relative dynamics once the two large, rigid bodies are tethered to each other, and the deorbiting burns are engaged. Studying the dynamics, and the thruster control solutions, methods are being investigated to ensure the robustness of this ADR system.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADR CP vs Space Assets Aff
Megan Ansdell 10, graduate student in the Master in International Science and Technology Policy program at the George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, where she focuses on space policy, "Active Space Debris Removal: Needs, Implications, and Recommendations for Today's Geopolitical Environment", Journal of Public & International Affairs, Volume 21, Spring 2010, https://jpia.princeton.edu/sites/jpia/files/space-debris-removal.pdf
International cooperation in space has rarely resulted in cost-effective or expedient solutions, especially in politically-charged areas of uncertain technological feasibility. The International Space Station, because of both political and technical setbacks, has taken over two decades to deploy and cost many billions of dollars—far more time and money than was originally intended. Space debris mitigation has also encountered aversion in international forums. The topic was brought up in COPUOS as early as 1980, yet a policy failed to develop despite a steady flow of documents on the increasing danger of space debris (Perek 1991). In fact, COPUOS did not adopt debris mitigation guidelines until 2007 and, even then, they were legally non-binding.
Space debris removal systems could take decades to develop and deploy through international partnerships due to the many interdisciplinary challenges they face. Given the need to start actively removing space debris sooner rather than later to ensure the continued benefits of satellite services, international cooperation may not be the most appropriate mechanism for instigating the first space debris removal system. Instead, one country should take a leadership role by establishing a national space debris removal program. This would accelerate technology development and demonstration, which would, in turn, build-up trust and hasten international participation in space debris removal.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Enforcement › 2ac AT Reforms Fail
Could also be a no link against PTX
Croshier 20 (Maj Rose Croshier is an active duty Air Force Foreign Area Officer and Intelligence Officer. She has served with various organizations in Africa, to include the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), the UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO), and the Office of Security Cooperation for Ghana, Togo and Benin. Currently, Maj Croshier is the Regional Director for the Lake Chad Region, Gulf of Guinea and Central Africa, Intelligence Security Cooperation and Engagements Branch, USAFRICOM. “IMPLEMENTING SECURITY COOPERATION REFORMS: CHALLENGES AND PRACTICAL APPROACHES FOR USAFRICOM”, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/implementing-security-cooperation-reforms-challenges-and-practical-approaches-usafricom)LR
As Robert Gates observed in 2010, “the US military was designed to defeat other armies, navies, and air forces, not to advise, train and equip them.”[1] Although meaning to achieve major operational effects using a complex whole-of-government process, Component Commands are operating with a generally undertrained and inexperienced security cooperation workforce and an ever-evolving national decision process. These issues complicate U.S. cooperation with even the most capable and willing state partners. Since the Foreign Assistance Act passed in 1961, the US Department of State has traditionally led US security assistance to train, equip, and assist foreign partners, in cooperation with agencies, to include the Department of Defense (DoD). In practice, however, the US military is the largest implementer of international security assistance and cooperation, usually charged with improving Partner Nation capability in the security sector so as to “create space” for diplomacy and development efforts. Echoing the sentiments of Mr. Gates, the DoD was not designed to collaborate easily with US development and diplomacy efforts in countries facing complex security environments. Historically, military leadership has been hesitant to draw focus away from traditional military operations to invest in advancing its foreign capacity-building expertise and processes. This hesitancy has resulted in a disproportionally large pool of well-meaning, forward-leaning novices bent on doing, compared to few experienced security cooperation professionals guiding the process. The imbalance between military generalists and security cooperation specialists means that foreign area officers, as the usual DoD representatives working with foreign nations, often encounter a familiar pattern. A common example, particularly for smaller coastal states, is the US donation of a small boat for maritime and littoral patrols, a critical tool used for border security and counter-illicit trafficking operations. Because the capability is usually requested by a partner nation, US military planners often assume the partner already possesses the “relatively basic” infrastructure, funding, and personnel to receive and operate said boat. The reality, however, is more nuanced. US program implementers typically (re)discover some combination of the following issues: there are no easily transferred processes, no training facility for maintenance personnel, no regular or predictable budgets, no routine way to acquire parts, and no human resources apparatus to attract, train, and retain top talent. US military planners typically assume the partner nation has these capacities, or can quickly generate them. Lauren Witlin, author of “Mirror-Imaging and Its Dangers,” would assert this tendency of reverting to US norms is due to a lack of data and training, making planners “look within his or her own experiences to fill in any information gaps.”[2] The gulf between the world’s largest military and a typical partner state’s more modest security sector makes US planners especially susceptible to proscribing untenable capability building programs. The assumption that other nations can easily adapt a “US-lite” model stands in stark contrast to the actual difficulty the US has in building a capability that is also sustainable by a said nation. Mirror Imaging Bias, limited training and lack of experienced security cooperation professionals have taxed decades of military cooperation provided to partners, resulting in, at best, a mixed record of lasting success.[3],[4] These issues have been recognized by Congress and reforms mobilized. In 2016, the Congressional Research Service issued a report detailing US Security Cooperation challenges, one of many such papers from various think tanks and journals lamenting poor results from the security cooperation enterprise.[5] In response, Congress launched significant, but slow-moving reforms codified in the 2017 and 2018 National Defense Authorization Acts. [6] In 2016, Congress mandated the DoD to “develop and issue… a strategic framework… to guide prioritization of resources and activities.” In 2017, Congress reduced multiple authorities into a streamlined band of activities described in Chapter 16 of the U.S. Code.[7] It established new requirements for human rights vetting, institutional capacity building, and assessment, monitoring and evaluation (AM&E). DoD consolidated several security cooperation related agencies and organizations into the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).[8] In 2019, the Defense Security Cooperation University (DSCU) opened, establishing a certification and career development path for security cooperation professionals. In 2020, Congress funded small DSCA teams to conduct Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation (AM&E), both at the Pentagon and at the Combatant Commands.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Enforcement › 2ac AT Reforms Fail
Vergun 21 (David, Associate Editor and Writer, Department of Defense and Contributor. “Acquisition Reform Is Making Rapid Progress, Defense Official Says”, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2607639/acquisition-reform-is-making-rapid-progress-defense-official-says/)LR
From the start of a program to initial operating capability, where systems were tested, took nearly eight years, she noted. As a result, the department looked to transform the acquisition process and a lot was accomplished in the last year. "Our goal was to deliver a defense acquisition system that is flexible, that allows for tailoring, and empowers critical thinking and common sense decision making, with the outcome being an acceleration of delivery and timelines," she said. During 2020, a record 13 acquisition policies were published, she said. "This has been, at least in my experience, among the most transformational changes to acquisition policy in years, and we really anticipate this change in policy having really sustaining, enduring and positive effects to the department for years to come." Cummings said the redesign in policy can be broken down into six discrete pathways that are meant to be used individually or together, specifically tailored to the capabilities that the program team has been asked to deliver to the warfighter. They are: Urgent capability acquisition The middle tier of acquisition Major capability acquisition, which is the traditional milestone-based approach Software acquisition Defense business systems Acquisition of services. Cummings said she didn't want this to be a series of policy documents that people would pick up and read from cover to cover. "What I was really looking for is that it would be interactive, and you would use the policy to help inform decision making exactly when you need it." Rapid delivery of software upgrades used for weapons and communications systems and making them cyber secure is another priority of the department, she said. Cummings also touched on the need to address any future shortages of medical supplies, microelectronics and critical minerals, by working closely with interagency partners like the Department of Commerce, the Department of Treasury and the Department of Health and Human Services. In the future, DOD will be using artificial intelligence and machine learning to better manage its sprawling supply chain and reduce vulnerabilities, she added.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Enforcement › 2ac AT Individual Interests Outweigh
Kuo, 21 (Raymond C. Kuo, Ph.D. from Princeton University, M.Sc. from the London School of Economics, B.A. from Wesleyan University, Political Scientist with the RAND Corporation., 8-3-2021, accessed on 6-20-2022, Google Books, "Following the Leader", , LASA-CSK)
Nations have powerful reasons to get their military alliances right. When security pacts go well, they underpin regional and global order; when they fail, they spread wars across continents as states are dragged into conflict. We would, therefore, expect states to carefully tailor their military partnerships to specific conditions. This expectation, Raymond C. Kuo argues, is wrong. Following the Leader argues that most countries ignore their individual security interests in military pacts, instead converging on a single, dominant alliance strategy. The book introduces a new social theory of strategic diffusion and emulation, using case studies and advanced statistical analysis of alliances from 1815 to 2003. In the wake of each major war that shatters the international system, a new hegemon creates a core military partnership to target its greatest enemy. Secondary and peripheral countries rush to emulate this alliance, illustrating their credibility and prestige by mimicking the dominant form. Be it the NATO model that seems so commonsense today, or the realpolitik that reigned in Europe of the late nineteenth century, a lone alliance strategy has defined broad swaths of diplomatic history. It is not states' own security interests driving this phenomenon, Kuo shows, but their jockeying for status in a world periodically remade by great powers.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Enforcement › 2ac AT China
Mahbubani, 1/1 (Kishore Mahbubani, Former President of the United Nations Security Council, Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore, 1/1/2022, accessed on 6-20-2022, Springer, "What China Threat? How the United States and China Can Avoid War", , LASA-CSK)
If America finally changes its strategic thinking about China, it will also discover that it is possible to develop a strategy that will both constrain China and advance US interests. Bill Clinton provided the wisdom for this strategy in a speech at Yale University in 2003, when he said, in short, that the only way to manage the next superpower is to create multilateral rules and partnerships that would tie it down. For example, though China lays claim to reefs and shoals in the South China Sea, the UN Law of the Sea Convention has prevented it from declaring the entire South China Sea an internal Chinese lake. China has also been obliged to implement WTO judgments that have gone against it. International rules do have a bite. Fortunately, under Xi Jinping, China is still in favor of strengthening the global multilateral architecture the United States created, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations, and the WTO. China has contributed more UN peacekeepers than the four other Permanent Members of the UN Security Council combined. Hence, there is a window of opportunity for cooperation between America and China in multilateral forums. To seize the opportunity, American policymakers have to accept the undeniable reality that the return of China (and India) is unstoppable. Why not? From the year 1 to 1820, China and India had the world’s two largest economies. The past two hundred years of Western domination of global commerce have been an aberration. As PricewaterhouseCoopers has predicted, China and India will resume their number one and two positions by 2050 or earlier. The leaders of both China and India understand that we now live in a small, interdependent global village, threatened by many new challenges, including global warming. Both China and India could have walked away from the Paris Agreement after Trump did so. Both chose not to. Despite their very different political systems, both have decided that they can be responsible global citizens. Perhaps this may be the best route to find out if China will emerge as a threat to the United States and the world. If it agrees to be constrained by multiple global rules and partnerships, China could very well remain a different polity—that is, not a liberal democracy—and still not be a threatening one. This is the alternative scenario that the “China threat” industry in the United States should consider and work toward.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging tech › Cyber › 2ac AT NATO fails – Cyber – Deterrence
Anderson, 17 (Troy Anderson, 2017, " Fitting a Virtual Peg into a Round Hole: Why Existing International Law Fails to Govern Cyber Reprisals," University of Arizona, http://hdl.handle.net/10150/658820, LASA-CSK)
The existing laws that govern legal retaliations and deterrence come from an era of entirely different warfare. A century ago, state borders were physical, state interests were tangible, and state-on-state attacks involved formal militaries—or, at a minimum, physical weapons. Today, states exist with one foot in the physical world and one in the virtual. This is a trend that is likely to continue. Because of the volatile nature of cyber warfare, and because the existing body of law is woefully inadequate in governing these issues, it will be necessary for these nations to take steps to modernize the doctrine of reprisals in order to reflect the new technological challenges facing the world today. Individual states may have substantial reservations about limiting their options by agreeing to the creation of a new international cyber warfare regime. The clarity that would come with a new, binding, international convention, however, would bolster states’ cyber defenses by enabling the deterrence of cyber-attacks. As such, updating international law is critical to maintaining stability in the virtual world—and peace in the real world.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging tech › Cyber › 2ac AT Coop Fails – Cyber - Data
Annegret Bendiek 14 - Deputy Head of EU/Europe Research Division at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. (“Tests of Partnership Transatlantic Cooperation in Cyber Security, Internet Governance, and Data Protection,” German Institute for International and Security Affairs, March 2014, ) PJW
Edward Snowden’s revelations of the scope of surveillance conducted by U.S. intelligence agencies have been the subject of much debate in Europe, especially in Germany. It came as a surprise to many that Europe’s closest political ally has been intercepting private communications on a large scale, even going so far as to wiretap high-ranking officials of the European Union and its member states. Moreover, the U.S. government has been and continues to use the most important Internet platforms in daily use by Europeans — Google, Yahoo, Amazon, and others —to acquire information about European citizens, through methods that are fundamentally opposed to European legal sensibilities and to the fundamental right of informational self-determination. These practices have damaged the transatlantic partnership between Europe and the United States and may well have resulted in a breach of trust that will prove irreparable. Some observers argue that the two partners’ differences over the right balance between cyber security and data protection are ultimately irreconcilable because they are the product of differing geostrategic positions. Because U.S. engagement is more global in scope, the threats to U.S. security are thought to be more serious than those faced by Europe. For this reason, “Venus Europe” and “Mars America” are unlikely to find common ground on cyber security policy and data protection in the near future. Indeed, the kinds of cooperation in global multistakeholder Internet governance that have been taken for granted in the past may well become increasingly controversial in the future. Although relations are currently being tested, the transatlantic cyber partnership continues to stand on a solid normative and institutional foundation. Both sides agree on the fundamentals of Internet regulation. Both are of the conviction that universal accessibility to the Internet is extraordinarily useful not only for democratic decision-making and free markets but also for the future of the liberal democratic order. And both sides are united also in the search for effective means to limit malicious software, to fight crime, and to secure critical infrastructure. The controversy surrounding the NSA’s espionage activities exposed differences in what the United States and EU member countries consider to be the legitimate means and methods of reaching their common goals. It also revealed that they have different approaches to handling normative dissonance. Nevertheless, it certainly should not be misunderstood as an existential threat to the transatlantic partnership. Instead, transatlantic differences can and should be speedily resolved through political dialogue. Three major problem areas must be dealt with in this process. Global: The present mode of Internet regulation lopsidedly favors the United States and does not sufficiently integrate the emerging powers of Brazil, India, South Africa, China, and Russia. The concept of “multistakeholder governance” may rhetorically evoke egalitarian fairness, but in practice camouflages the fact that U.S. interests and U.S. corporations are de facto the most important agenda setters in Internet governance. Financially weaker actors wield precious little influence in central institutions such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) or the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). The United States and Europe have defended in unison the existing governance model for a long time. The recent disclosures about U.S. surveillance practices, however, are causing more Europeans to question the status quo, and a realignment with states like Brazil is taking place. Transatlantic: The EU and the United States diverge sharply in their views on the most important goals for transatlantic cooperation between national governments in the field of cyber security policy, especially regarding the appropriate balance of security and freedom. U.S. cyberspace policy is driven increasingly by the military logic of deterrence, which entails maintaining and strengthening an offensive capacity. Europeans, however, treat the security aspects of cyberspace policy as a police matter, and their main goal is strengthening systemic resilience and resistance to attack and fraud. Accordingly, U.S. and European intelligence agencies differ in their areas of responsibility and authority, and they have acquired quite different attitudes regarding informational selfdetermination and other civil liberties. To prevent these differences from degenerating into massive conflict, both sides must engage each other more openly. Success depends on the United States and Europe recognizing that on both sides, domestic politics limit the range of feasible compromise. As long as the United States seeks to maintain its position as a dominant global power, U.S. cyberspace policy will continue to be driven by national security issues and thus also by the military logic of deterrence. For the EU, however, questions of data protection will continue to be of central significance as long as its approach to cyberspace is police-driven and focused on improving its defensive capacities. Only if these limits are respected will mutual cooperation in cyber security policy and Internet governance find some middle ground that pays off for both sides. Transnational: The transatlantic cyber partnership is being challenged by a number of transnational conflicts involving different perceptions of the proper state-citizen relationship. Unfortunately, these require urgent attention at a time when mutual trust between states and citizens has been eroded. Disclosures have sensitized citizens to the dangers inherent in the digital revolution. It is possible that public trust in the safety of Internet communications has been deeply shaken and that some groups will begin to demand the renationalization of information and communication technology infrastructure. In the run-up to negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), for example, demands for the creation of supranational legal instruments and independent mediating bodies are already being voiced. In the coming years, both the EU and the United States will have to get used to emerging countries like Brazil, India, South Africa, and Indonesia demanding the more frequent use of multilateral agreements in Internet governance within the multistakeholder process.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging tech › Biotech › 2ac AT Squo Solves Biotech Regs
Langer and Sharma, 20 (Ronit Langer, Shruti Sharma, 11-20-2020, "The Blessing and Curse of Biotechnology: A Primer on Biosafety and Biosecurity," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, , LASA-CSK)
There are numerous international treaties and regimes in place to help mitigate the risks at play with biotechnology. Three of the most significant ones are the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and the Australian Group. Each of these agreements or regimes tackles a different aspect of the risk profile—biosafety, bioweapons, and banned substances—but each of them comes with limitations, such as limited scope, sparse funding, and inadequate verification and monitoring mechanisms. None of the agreements create a binding framework to holistically address biosafety and biosecurity risks, making for an overall lack of accountability and rendering the development of international standards piecemeal and incomplete. In this regulatory environment, it is difficult to keep up with rapidly emerging advances in biotechnology or address pressing issues such as releasing biotechnology products, like gene drives, into nature.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging tech › Biotech › 2ac AT NATO Fails – Biotech
Carlson et al., 21 (Rob Carlson Chad Sbragia, and Kate Sixt, 9-14-2021, "Beyond Biological Defense: Maintaining the U.S. Biotechnology Advantage," War on the Rocks, , LASA-CSK)
The Pentagon needs to expand its approach to biotechnology beyond biodefense. If China maintains biological warfare aspirations, by all means address those. But defense planners should also address China’s broader approach to biotechnology and its integrated approach to civil-military fusion.
Securing biotechnology secures the nation. Maintaining the U.S. lead in biotechnology is critical to the nation’s economic and military resilience in war, peace, and the gray zone short of conflict. This requires better biotechnology collaboration — within the U.S. government, with allies and partners, and even, where possible, with competitors.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging tech › Biotech › 2ac AT France Says No
Schofield 6-1 (Ian Schofield, BA in Modern Language – French and Italian - @ Uni of Bath, Reporter/Deputy Editor @ Scrip World Pharmaceutical News/Informa, “France Eases Procedures For GMO-Containing Medicines”,
The French medicines agency, ANSM, has implemented a new, simplified procedure for medicines containing genetically modified organisms, including gene therapies and certain vaccines, that are to be tested in clinical trials or made available under early access protocols. As of 1 June, all applications for the "contained use" of GMO-containing products in clinical trials must be made to ANSM, as must requests for "deliberate release" of such products in the context of early and compassionate access to advanced therapy medicinal products (ATMPs) prepared on an ad hoc basis for gene therapy. Under EU rules, the individual member states are responsible for authorizing clinical trials of investigational medicinal products containing or consisting of GMOs, which must comply with the EU legislation on the deliberate release of GMOs into the environment or their contained use. In France, the transfer of GMO responsibilities to ANSM comes in the wake of new rules in January this year. These rules were outlined in a decree of 30 December 2021 that updated the processes for evaluating biotechnologies and simplified the procedures relating to the uses of GMOS presenting a "zero or negligible risk." From today, trial sponsors can now use a new centralized "simplified procedures" platform for submitting applications to ANSM for GMO trials, which can be accessed via the ANSM website. The submission must be accompanied by a technical dossier and a list of the trial sites. For deliberate release purposes, companies must file an application for authorization, again using the simplified procedure platform and including a technical dossier. The content of the dossier, which was set out in a decree of 25 January 2022, should include an assessment of the potential risks posed to public health and the environment, according to ANSM. Simplified And Full Dossiers As of 1 June, a simplified dossier is required for clinical trials of genetically modified human cells, adeno-associated viral vectors, and authorized medicines. A full dossier is required for any other type of viral vector. There are common application forms for each of these types of trials. For genetically modified human cells, for example, the form should be used for human cells genetically modified by means of retro/lentiviral vectors, including genome edited cells. In such cases, the applicant must show that there is no risk of formation of replication competent virus, and that residual infectious retro/lentiviral vector particles have been reduced to negligible concentrations in the finished product, or there is negligible risk associated with the presence of residual infectious viral vector particles in the finished product. The form should also be used for human cells genetically modified by means of adeno-associated viral vectors, including genome edited cells, where the applicant demonstrates that there is no risk of formation of replication competent virus; and for human cells genetically modified without viral vectors, including genome edited cells. For already authorized GMO-containing medicines to be used in a trial, the information submitted should include the date of EU marketing authorization, the latest update of the summary of product characteristics, and any new risks identified and risk-minimization measures implemented. The applicant should also explain why it considers that the conduct of the proposed trial "does not entail risks other than those already assessed in the context of the marketing authorization procedure." New Advisory Body Responsibility for trials of GMO-containing medicines previously lay with the research ministry. While ANSM has now taken over this role, the research ministry has set up a new expert advisory committee on the contained use of GMOs. ANSM can ask this committee for an opinion on matters relating to contained use, while for deliberate release it can consult ANSES, the French agency for food and environmental and occupational health and safety.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging tech › AI › 2ac AT Soft Law Fails - AI
Villasenor, 20 (John Villasenor, 7-31-2020, "Soft law as a complement to AI regulation," Brookings, , LASA-CSK)
While the dialogue on how to responsibly foster a healthy AI ecosystem should certainly include regulation, that shouldn’t be the only tool in the toolbox. There should also be room for dialogue regarding the role of “soft law.” As Arizona State University law professor Gary Marchant has explained, soft law refers to frameworks that “set forth substantive expectations but are not directly enforceable by government, and include approaches such as professional guidelines, private standards, codes of conduct, and best practices.” Soft law isn’t new. The authors of a 2018 article in the Colorado Technology Law Journal point out that uses of soft law go back decades. Examples they cite include the U.S. Green Building Council’s 1993 Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) certification standards, the Food and Drug Administration’s longstanding practice of issuing non-binding guidance, and, in recent years, explanatory blog posts and tweets from agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and Federal Communications Commission. There are other examples as well. Bluetooth, the standard used for short-range wireless communication between pairs of devices like laptops and wireless speakers, was developed through a collaboration among technology companies. Wi-Fi, the set of wireless local area networking (LAN) standards that allows us to connect computers and many other devices to hotspots in homes and offices, was developed by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). The certification through the Wi-Fi Alliance, a related soft law framework, ensures that products labeled with the Wi-Fi Alliance logo have “met industry-agreed standards for interoperability, security, and a range of application specific protocols.” While soft law has been applied in many fields, there are multiple reasons why it is particularly well suited for AI. First, as Marchant writes, “the pace of development of AI far exceeds the capability of any traditional regulatory system to keep up.” Congressional legislation and agency administrative rulemaking operate on time scales of years. By contrast, enormous private and public sector investments have spurred rapid AI development. According to the National Venture Capital Association, “1,356 AI-related companies in the U.S. raised $18.457 billion” in 2019. A February 2020 report from the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) reported that, for the government’s 2020 fiscal year, “unclassified, non-defense Federal investments in AI R&D, total[ed] $973.5 million.” Research funded by the Department of Defense includes DARPA’s $2 billion “AI Next” campaign, which was announced in late 2018. With those levels of investment, the AI technology landscape is changing by the month. This rate of development is ill suited for time scales involved in administrative law, which often takes more than a year to go from a proposed rule to a final rule. A second reason soft law is suitable for AI is the sheer complexity of the landscape. It would make no sense—financially, logistically, or in terms of staffing—to task one or more government agencies with the rulemaking and oversight extensive enough to cover all of the many applications and industries where AI will be used. For a small subset of applications, such as autonomous vehicles where the potential harms caused by failures are particularly acute, government regulation will play an important role. But most uses of AI aren’t nearly so high stakes. For those applications, soft law developed with input from companies, civil society groups, academic experts, and governments will be a key method to promote innovation consistent with ethical frameworks and principles.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging tech › AI › 2ac AT Coop Fails – AI – Data
Luca Bertuzzi 22 - journalist and editor at EURACTIV, specialized in EU affairs and digital policies. Luca covers AI, cybersecurity, data, privacy and platform regulation. He oversees an international team based in Brussels, Paris and Berlin. (“Inside the EU's rocky path to regulate artificial intelligence,” International Association of Privacy Professionals, 02/09/2022, ) PJW
In April last year, the European Commission published its ambitious proposal to regulate Artificial Intelligence. The regulation was meant to be the first of its kind, but the progress has been slow so far due to the file's technical, political and juridical complexity.
Meanwhile, the EU lost its first-mover advantage as other jurisdictions like China and Brazil have managed to pass their legislation first. As the proposal is entering a crucial year, it is high time to take stock of the state of play, the ongoing policy discussions, notably around data, and potential implications for businesses.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging tech › AI › 2ac AT Coop Fails – AI – Data
EPRS 20 - European Parliamentary Research Service. (“The impact of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) on artificial intelligence,” Panel for the Future of Science and Technology, June 2020, ) PJW
AI is compatible with the GDPR AI is not explicitly mentioned in the GPDR, but many provisions in the GDPR are relevant to AI, and some are indeed challenged by the new ways of processing personal data that are enabled by AI. There is indeed a tension between the traditional data protection principles – purpose limitation, data minimisation, the special treatment of 'sensitive data', the limitation on automated decisions– and the full deployment of the power of AI and big data. The latter entails the collection of vast quantities of data concerning individuals and their social relations and processing such data for purposes that were not fully determined at the time of collection. However, there are ways to interpret, apply, and develop the data protection principles that are consistent with the beneficial uses of AI and big data. The requirement of purpose limitation can be understood in a way that is compatible with AI and big data, through a flexible application of the idea of compatibility, which allows for the reuse of personal data when this is not incompatible with the purposes for which the data were originally collected. Moreover, reuse for statistical purposes is assumed to be compatible, and thus would in general be admissible (unless it involves unacceptable risks for the data subject). The principle of data minimisation can also be understood in such a way as to allow for beneficial applications of AI. Minimisation may require, in some contexts, reducing the 'personality' of the available data,rather than the amount of such data, i.e., it may require reducing, through measures such as pseudonymisation, the ease with which the data can be connected to individuals. The possibility of re-identification should not entail that all re-identifiable data are considered personal data to be minimised. Ratherthe re-identification of data subjectsshould be considered as creation of new personal data, which should be subject to all applicable rules. Re-identification should indeed be strictly prohibited unless all conditions for the lawful collection of personal data are met, and it should be compatible with the purposes for which the data were originally collected and subsequently anonymised. The information requirements established by the GDPR can be met with regard to AI-based processing, even though the complexity of AI application has to be taken into account. The information made available to data subjectsshould enable themto understand the purpose of each AI-based processing and its limits, even without going into unnecessary technical details. The GDPR allows for inferences based on personal data, provided that appropriate safeguards are adopted. Profiling is in principle prohibited, but there are ample exceptions (contract, law or consent). Uncertainties exist concerning the extent to which an individual explanation should be provided to the data subject. It is also uncertain to what extent reasonableness criteria may apply to automated decisions. gconcerning privacy by design and by default, do not hinder the development of AI systems, if correctly designed and implemented, even though they may entail some additional costs. It needs to be clarified which AI applications present high risks and therefore require a preventive data protection assessment, and possibly the preventive involvement of data protection authorities. Finally, the possibility of using personal data for statistical purposes opens opportunities for the processing of personal data in ways that do not involve the inference of new personal data. Statistical processing requires security measures that are proportionate to the risks for the data subject, and which should include at least pseudonymisation. The GDPR prescriptions are often vague and open-ended The GDPR allows for the development of AI and big data applications that successfully balance data protection and other social and economic interests, but it provides limited guidance on how to achieve this goal. It indeed abounds in vague clauses and open standards, the application of which often requires balancing competing interests. In the case of AI/big data applications, the uncertainties are aggravated by the novelty of the technologies, their complexity and the broad scope of their individual and social effects. It is true that the principles of risk-prevention and accountability potentially direct the processing of personal data toward a 'positive sum' game, in which the advantages of the processing, when constrained by appropriate risk-mitigation measures, outweigh its possible disadvantages. Moreover these principles enable experimentation and learning, avoiding the over- and underinclusiveness issues involved in the applications of strict rules. However, by requiring controllers to rely on such principles, the GDPR offloads the task of establishing how to manage risk and find optimal solutions onto controllers, a task that may be challenging as well as costly. The stiff penalties for non-compliance, when combined with the uncertainty on the requirementsfor compliance, may constitute a novel risk, which, rather than incentivising the adoption of adequate compliance measure, may prevent small companies from engaging in new ventures. Thus, the successful application of GDPR to AI-application depends heavily on what guidance data protection bodies and other competent authorities will provide to controllers and data subjects. Appropriate guidance would diminish the cost of legal uncertainty and would direct companies – in particular small ones that mostly need such advice – to efficient and data protection-compliant solutions. Some policy indications The study concludes with the following indications on AI and the processing of personal data. • The GDPR generally provides meaningful indications for data protection in the context of AI applications. • The GDPR can be interpreted and applied in such a way that it does not substantially hinder the application of AI to personal data, and that it does not place EU companies at a disadvantage by comparison with non-European competitors. • Thus, the GDPR does not require major changes in order to address AI applications
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 1ar AT Ukraine Thumper
Skaluba & Rodihan 22 - Christopher Skaluba served as the principal director for European and NATO policy in the office of the secretary of defense from 2012 to 2015. Conor Rodihan is the associate director of the Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is the co-author of “Geometries of Deterrence: Assessing Defense Arrangements in Europe’s Northeast” and has previously supported the Atlantic Council’s two flagship task force reports on defense and deterrence in Europe, “Permanent Deterrence: Enhancements to the US military presence in North Central Europe” and “Moving Out: A Comprehensive Assessment of European Military Mobility.” Prior to joining the Atlantic Council, he interned at the US Mission to NATO. He is a graduate of the University of Denver, where he received bachelor’s degrees in International Studies and Russian. (“No consensus? No problem. Why NATO is still effective.” Atlantic Council, 01/18/2022, ) PJW
As the crisis over Ukraine intensifies, key stakeholders are looking to Brussels for signs of Western resolve. At the NATO-Russia Council meeting on January 12, the Alliance delivered: In a vivid expression of solidarity, it categorically (and unanimously) rejected Russian demands to forgo future expansion or withdraw forces from member countries.
Yet as the crisis evolves, decisions about how to support Ukraine will become more difficult, and there’s a limit to how unified NATO can be. While the West might agree on introducing tough new economic sanctions and reinforcing the Alliance’s eastern flank, boosting Kyiv’s military capacity—by supporting an insurgency, for instance, or sending anti-tank weapons—will be impossible to achieve by consensus and is much more likely to come from individual members than under NATO auspices.
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac AT Ukraine Thumper
Skaluba and Rodihan ‘22 - Christopher Skaluba is Director of Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and Transatlantic Security Initiative; Conor Rodihan is Associate Director of Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and Transatlantic Security Initiative (Atlantic Council, “No consensus? No problem. Why NATO is still effective.”, January 18, 2022, )//RG
Yet as the crisis evolves, decisions about how to support Ukraine will become more difficult, and there’s a limit to how unified NATO can be. While the West might agree on introducing tough new economic sanctions and reinforcing the Alliance’s eastern flank, boosting Kyiv’s military capacity—by supporting an insurgency, for instance, or sending anti-tank weapons—will be impossible to achieve by consensus and is much more likely to come from individual members than under NATO auspices. This shouldn’t be surprising. Consider Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its ongoing support for separatists in Ukraine’s Donbas region: NATO actions in support of Kyiv have been more political than operational, leaving it to individual allies to provide munitions, equipment, and training to Ukrainian forces. And despite a recurrent pledge that Ukraine would one day be welcome to join the Alliance, as well as the sympathy expressed by allies for Ukraine’s plight, there’s been precious little progress on this front. NATO is primarily concerned about defending its members from Russian aggression—which it is also wary of provoking by supporting the Ukrainian military. Yet despite its lack of meaningful military support for Ukraine, the crisis has been the animating issue on the Alliance’s agenda since 2014. Russia’s attacks on Ukraine and its support for separatists have driven major NATO initiatives on readiness, defense planning, force posture, intelligence, and technology development, with an eye toward beefing up the Alliance’s northern and eastern flanks and deterring Russia in both the conventional and sub-threshold realms. As an institution established to safeguard Europe, it has successfully geared itself to deter the type of destabilizing Russian belligerence currently on display. Critics of the alliance (and even some supporters) have interpreted NATO’s unwillingness to militarily support Ukraine—especially during the most significant challenge to the European security order since the Cold War—as an indicator of its declining relevance, timidity, or its divisions. But that overstates the importance of political consensus to NATO’s value and understates its role as an effective and flexible defensive alliance. This is a role with potentially critical benefits for Ukraine. First, it sets too high a bar for an alliance of thirty members with aligned, but distinct, priorities. Unanimity on every issue is impossible, let alone one as complex as military support to Ukraine. Debate and disagreement, as it should be for any democratic institution, are built-in features of NATO—not bugs. In reality, it’s astounding how often NATO does reach consensus about issues big and small, creating an unrealistic expectation that it always will. The opposite of consensus is not failure. Suggesting otherwise turns any debate that doesn’t end harmoniously into an indictment of NATO, playing straight into Russian propaganda. Second, a belief that NATO’s value is tied primarily to achieving consensus on every issue misses the more mundane (and important) ways it supports its allies and partners. Its affinity for process—particularly its ability to build a common situational understanding among its members—is an invaluable tool. Habits of consultation and information sharing, buttressed by deep cooperation on operations, intelligence sharing, defense planning, and interoperability, create the foundation upon which any consensus is to be built. Even in the absence of that agreement, the ability to collectively define threats and jointly train to confront them is immensely valuable in its own right. Third, these habits of cooperation give NATO members the flexibility to act outside of the Alliance’s frameworks. While NATO does much by consensus—such as its missions in the Baltic states—the skills it helps members develop is central to enabling them to form separate coalitions for action. This happened recently with ample success in taking on the Islamic State. Such flexibility should be a point in NATO’s favor, not evidence of its ineptitude. In the case of military support for Ukraine, policymakers will find more attractive alternatives for dealing with Moscow’s aggression outside of the auspices of the Alliance. Up to and including its recent dialogue with Russia, it has taken a host of consensus actions to support Ukraine—from condemning Kremlin aggression and standing up for Kyiv politically to reaffirming its open-door policy with an expectation that Ukraine will eventually become a member. It might even share intelligence and develop training and advisory programs for the Ukrainian military. And while it won’t find a consensus to fight, it could provide the foundation for certain allies to support Ukrainian forces in ways consistent with their national priorities outside of NATO. In that case, NATO’s enabling value to its members in complicating Putin’s cost-benefit assessment should be applauded. Last week’s NATO-Russia Council meeting showcased an Alliance working in lockstep and finding political consensus in responding to preposterous Russian demands. NATO should always strive for this degree of consensus. But if and when this crisis intensifies, and Putin advances further into Ukraine, expectations for NATO assistance will be raised, decisions about how to respond will become more difficult, and consensus will be more elusive. Despite the rhetoric we might hear in response, this is not evidence of NATO’s ineffectiveness—but rather a reflection of how democratic institutions function. And even absent consensus, NATO can still contribute invaluably to Ukraine’s sovereignty.
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac AT Ukraine Thumper
Boot ‘5-17 — Max; University of California at Berkeley, BA in history; Yale University, MA in history. He is a historian, best-selling author and foreign-policy analyst who has been called one of the “world’s leading authorities on armed conflict”. May 17, 2022; “Thanks, Vladimir Putin, for greatly strengthening NATO”; Washington Post; ; //CYang
It turns out NATO is neither brain dead nor broken. The unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine has given the alliance a new lease on life, making it more politically united and militarily formidable than at any time since the end of the Cold War.
NATO stands as one against Russian barbarism in Ukraine. Even Germany is boosting its anemic defense spending and finally sending heavy weaponry to Ukraine. Other states are doing far more, with the United States, Poland, Canada and Britain leading the way in providing arms and ammunition. NATO is doubling the number of battalion-size “battlegroups” deployed to the front-line states of Eastern Europe, from four to eight, while the United States has increased its troop deployment in Europe from 80,000 to 100,000 personnel.
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac AT Turkey
Ülgen ‘22 - Visiting Scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels and the Executive Chairman of the Istanbul based EDAM think tank (Sinan, Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, No. 20, “Change and Continuity in Turkish Foreign Policy”, Winter 2022, )//RG
The end result of Turkey’s tarnished ties with its traditional allies in the West and its neighborhood(s) have demonstrated the limits of the illusion of Ankara’s strategic autonomy. Indeed, despite its aspiration, Turkey remains firmly anchored in the Western community of nations. In addition to being a NATO member, over 40 percent of the country’s exports are destined for EU member states and another 6 percent or so each to the UK and the United States. In addition, Turkey gets most of its foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology from Western countries. EU member states account for almost 70 percent of all incoming FDI, with another nearly 10 per- cent accounted by the United States. Against this backdrop, the 2020 economic downturn, compounded by a sharp drop in FDI, a negative foreign investment balance sheet (excluding real estate), and a lowering of credit risk scores—and, more recently, a spike in inflation and a downturn in the value of the national currency—are to be associated with these frail political relations. The next phase of Turkey’s foreign relations paradigm will therefore be marked by how well the country’s growing capabilities—but also its ambitions—can be reframed to allow for a more cooperative foreign policy pattern. This objective will in turn require three fundamental changes. The first is the decoupling of foreign policy from domestic political considerations. A new balance will have to be found between the need for a democratic government that is accountable to its electorate and the need for a more mature and predictable foreign policy. This new understanding should be instrumental in containing the proclivities of the ruling elites to instrumentalize foreign policy for domestic goals. This objective will be greatly facilitated by a second, namely the reinstitutionalization of foreign policy. As discussed above, the transition back to a presidential system has led to the erosion of the role of traditional institutions (e.g., ministries) in the policymaking process—to the benefit of the presidential administration. This is also true of foreign policy, where the role of the Foreign Ministry has been diminished. This domain requires re- balancing, which would reempower the traditional institution of policymaking. Such a rebalancing would improve the predictability of Turkey’s foreign policy, as the heavier weight of the relevant institutions could more effectively counter the tendencies fueled by exclusively domestic political considerations. Third, the country’s foreign policy retransformation will be more effective if Turkey’s partners respond positively to such an agenda of change. The United States and the EU—Turkey’s strategic allies in the domains of security, defense, and economy—can help Ankara in its bid to develop a new understanding of how Turkey, as a rising power, can prioritize positive sum scenarios. For instance, Washington will need to alter its approach and start to engage constructively with the Turkish leadership to tackle the corrosive set of bilateral problems, including the ongoing U.S. relationship with the PKK-linked Syrian PYD and the dysfunctionalities in defense industry cooperation. At the same time, the EU will need—at the very least—to cease its obstructionism regarding the launch of an ambitious trade agenda and endorse the start of the negotiations for a modernized Customs Union between Turkey and the EU. The outcome of new negotiations to reach a fair and lasting model of cooperation on the refugee issue will be of equal importance. At bottom, what is at stake in the next decade is the identity of Turkish foreign policy. A departure from what marked the past decade—unilateralism inspired by a strong yearning for strategic autonomy—is already under way. This change in approach is evident in the more recent efforts at diplomatic rapprochement with allies and regional partners. Ultimately, the success of this transformation will be conditional on a clear demonstration of intent by the country’s leadership that Turkey, as a rising power, needs to establish a more constructive and cooperative relationship with its main allies.
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO › 2ac AT Turkey
Şahin and Sözen ‘22 - Devrim Şahin is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science and International Relations as well as the research assistant in Cyprus Policy Center at Eastern Mediterranean University; Ahmet Sözen is professor of International Relations. He is the Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations as well as the Founding Director of the think tank Cyprus Policy Center at Eastern Mediterranean University (Uluslararası İlişkiler / International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 74, “The Complexity Effect in U.S.-Turkey Relations”, March 8, 2022, )//RG
In the recent decade, the U.S. has pursued a strategy to support armed Kurdish groups to repel radical Islamic terror groups, particularly ISIS. Nevertheless, Turkey has become increasingly concerned about the strengthening of the Kurdish administration and its nationalist ambitions. These concerns are pushing Turkey into the arms of U.S. rivals in the region. Both Iran and Russia are expanding their authority in the region by establishing political and military support for radical regimes such as Assad’s in Syria and political and militant movements like Hezbollah. These strategic policies are increasingly connecting Iran’s and Russia’s allies in an ever-strengthening regional security complex. Given these regional circumstances, Turkey finds itself flip-flopping between these rival regional security complexes. The primary cause for current problems in U.S.-Turkey relations is not simply the recent actions of the two countries. The complex view of the IR system facilitates the understanding that the U.S.-Turkey relationship is shaped by the feedback loops generated under both regional and global circumstances. The complexity of the international system can trigger a dramatically different evolution of relations between U.S. and Turkey as a feedback (reaction) caused by the U.S. For example, the U.S. does not hesitate to use methods like arming the YPG, even if these methods hurt former allies such as Turkey. As a result, U.S.-Turkish relations continue to be vulnerable to the U.S. approach toward minority, rebel groups which have problematic bonds with Turkey. The international roles that the U.S. and Turkey pursued for themselves in the post-9/11 era have had consequences for perceptions of historical friendship or hostilities – what the Regional Security Complex Theory ties to cooperative or non-cooperative behavior of states. There were hostility perceptions among Turkish military and Foreign Service chiefs in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union when the U.S. sought to maintain its global supremacy role. Given its resources, the U.S. cannot help but be superior to smaller, poorer states that do not have Washington’s military capacity. The issue is the way in which the U.S. dominates – that is, its treatment of its allies, not considering their strategic security concerns, etc. Turkey was deeply concerned with events in northern Iraq following the 1991 Iraq war. These events amounted to challenge Turkey’s priority of preventing the emergence of an independent Kurdish administration in northern Iraq. The hostility perceptions in Turkey turned to be reciprocal between the U.S. and Turkey thanks to the feedback loops generated by the 9/11 attacks. The unilateral U.S. reaction to the 9/11 attacks during the Bush administration undermined the U.S.-led liberal international order and played no small role in the inauguration of Trump as a president who questions this order and views local U.S. allies as burdens on the U.S. If we acknowledge that the complexity of the international relations system is at play here, the causal logic of the complexity approach leads us to expect that Turkey’s internal characteristics can pressure systemic transformation – something other than the predictions generated by the regional security complex approach.83 A U.S. that operates with a systemic moral conscience could assist Turkey in managing its affairs. Facing complexity invokes improving diplomacy and collaboration, adopting multilateral solutions and soft power and constructing some advanced strategic partnerships. If the U.S. chooses to nurture its relationships with allies such as Turkey, the erosion of the U.S. position of influence could be mitigated and the U.S. still could be the primary actor in maintaining stability in the Middle East. The underlying message of this paper is that the U.S. and Turkey are rebuilding their alliance due to various factors. Both countries could form a revised alliance as an important constituent of the regional peace system. Neither of them desires the continuation of the Syrian chaotic status-quo and its accompanying insecurity nor do they desire Iran to dominate with a greater role in Syria or in the Middle East. Clearly, the security of the region is in a state of greater flux today than it has been in the past, yet tackling the present challenges in the Middle East depends on the effective involvement of regional U.S. partners.