2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › Biotech › 2nc Biotech Norms Fail
IUBMB, 04 (IUBMB, 5-10-2004, "Biotechnology: What it is, what it is not, and the challenges in reaching a national or global consensus," The International Union of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology, , LASA-CSK)
Each country, state, or organization with not inconsiderable due diligence has cobbled together a cluster of meaningful words and phrases in an attempt to identify biotechnology and get a “grasp on the beast,” desiring to get a frame of reference on which to build decision-making regarding resource allocation, comparative analyses, and many of the other features described above, including many aspects of importance to the academic sector such as funding for research, research-training, training, and education.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › Biotech › 1nc Biotech Norms Fail
Finabel ’21 — European Army Interoperability Organization. February 11, 2021; “The Bio-enhanced Soldier In International Law: Classification And Obligations"; https://finabel.org/the-bio-enhanced-soldier-in-international-law-classification-and-obligations/; //CYang
The first obligation is that the weapon under review would discriminate accurately enough to only target combatants or to be used against legitimate military targets. The second obligation is proportionality, meaning that the use of a weapon must be proportional to the military objective and must keep civilian casualties to a minimum. The final obligation is to avoid unnecessary suffering. This, however, can be rather problematic when it comes to countermeasures against enhanced soldiers as the standards neutralising personnel are different from those governing material. If the reinforced soldier in question falls under the category of “material”, then the level of severity for neutralising the system will be higher. It is therefore essential that a legal categorisation of reinforced soldiers is created from the outset. This could be problematic since states could have divergent understandings of how this category of soldiers should be classified, thus leading to countermeasures that would not comply with the laws of warfare regarding the minimising of suffering.
Human enhancement for military applications would, in certain circumstances, be caught under the obligations of compliance with IHL. This is because it could be seen either as means of warfare, or method of warfare, depending on the interpretation. States would have to review whether or not it is compatible with their obligations under the rules of warfare. Such obligations would demand discrimination between civilians and military targets, not to mention the principles of proportionality and unnecessary suffering. However, such would have to be considered on a case-by-case basis, as different technologies could encompass different legal classifications based on their purposes.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › AI › 1nc Norms Fail LAWS
Trager & Luca ’5-11 — Robert; an associate professor of political science at the University of California, Los Angeles. Laura; a graduate student in political science at the University of California, Los Angeles. May 11, 2022; "Killer Robots Are Here — and We Need to Regulate Them"; Foreign Policy; https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/11/killer-robots-lethal-autonomous-weapons-systems-ukraine-libya-regulation/; //CYang
So far, the international community has attempted — and failed — to regulate LAWS. In December 2021, after eight years of technical discussions, government and civil society representatives met at the U.N. in Geneva to set an agenda for regulating LAWS for the first time in what was billed as a “historic opportunity.” Most attendees favored legally binding rules that apply equally to all states to govern the development and use of these technologies. Yet, by any standard, the meeting failed. Despite years of preparatory discussions within the framework of the U.N. Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) — a forum for restricting the use of weapons considered to cause unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately — the attendees barely managed to agree on 10 more days of discussion this March and July. This outcome was to be expected given the positions of the major powers and the CCW rules requiring consensus before action is taken. (Disclosure: Both authors have been affiliated with the CCW.) In response, a wide array of actors — from Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch to some of the states in favor of a LAWS ban, including Argentina and the Philippines — are calling for a process to develop legally binding prohibitions on these weapons outside of the CCW. Alternative approaches to prohibition treaties have had some success in the past, such as when countries agreed to give up land mines through the 1997 Ottawa convention; cluster munitions through the 2008 Oslo Accords; and even nuclear weapons through the 2017 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which was the first treaty to completely ban nuclear weapons in line with international humanitarian law and establish pathways for current nuclear weapon states to renounce them. However, while many states signed these treaties, most of the powerful states did not. Unfortunately, even this limited success is likely to be elusive in the case of LAWS. The primary reason is that states are increasingly aware that these non-substitutable technologies may become crucial to their security and are thus unlikely to unilaterally abandon them. If states’ adversaries have them, they will likely believe they need them — and absent the sort of nonproliferation regime that exists for nuclear weapons, their adversaries will, in fact, continue to rapidly develop LAWS without much oversight. Nonproliferation has yet to receive much attention in the case of LAWS, but it has worked to varying degrees in the past with the missile technology control regime, biological weapons, chemical weapons, and, of course, nuclear weapons. The landmark Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT), which entered into force in 1970, met the requirements of major and lesser powers: It did not require those who possessed nuclear weapons to renounce them immediately, allowed other states access to the benefits of civilian use of nuclear power, and relied on a trusted international organization that was charged with the dual responsibility of promoting and controlling nuclear technology. A similar nonproliferation regime for LAWS could facilitate regulation of their development, transfer, and employment — even by the powers that do not give them up. It would reduce the use of these technologies for authoritarian control and terrorist actions worldwide and, as in the nuclear case, create the possibility of developing norms against LAWS use that apply to all. This would admittedly be complicated. The nuclear nonproliferation regime has thus far been largely successful because it has been a central pillar of major powers’ grand strategies. Indeed, detente in the Cold War involved superpowers agreeing to police proliferation in their spheres of influence. Security guarantees mollified countries that otherwise would have felt too insecure to forgo nuclear weapons. Threats and promises convinced countries, such as Iran when it signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, to accept stricter limits on its nuclear program than it would have otherwise. Without this focused attention, nonproliferation and arms embargo regimes regularly fail. Indeed, the autonomous weapons used in Libya were exported by Turkey in violation of a U.N. arms embargo. A successful LAWS nonproliferation regime would thus require states to prioritize the issue more than they currently do in their national security strategies, especially as the technologies become more widespread and effective. Another issue that all nonproliferation regimes face is the dual-use nature of technology. In a striking example, in December 2020, the U.S. Air Force employed an algorithm called MuZero to select targets for missile strikes in a training exercise. MuZero was developed and made public by DeepMind, a subsidiary of Google’s parent company, Alphabet, which has pledged not to work on autonomous weapons. Although DeepMind showcased its algorithm by training computers to play games like chess and Go at superhuman levels, the U.S. Air Force’s use of the technology raised concerns about using DeepMind’s work for more lethal purposes. Existing nonproliferation regimes try to address this problem through targeted export restriction agreements for dual-use technologies. The Australia Group provides a model for this: Its 43 countries coordinate export limitations on technologies that facilitate biological or chemical weapons development. Although this hasn’t halted proliferation entirely, it has arguably slowed its pace. The problem of restricting the spread of software, which can be copied, is even more difficult. This is important because many actors could pair autonomy-enabling software with commercially available hardware to produce weapons easily.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › AI › 2nc Ideological Divide
Erik Lin-Greenberg 20, postdoctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House. Texas National Security Review, Vol 3, Iss 2. Spring. "Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making" )LR
Despite the surge in international attention on AI, not all states have developed robust AI capabilities, particularly for military applications. One recent study finds significant variation in the capacity of states to “exploit the innovative potential of AI” for government purposes.51 States like the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States receive high marks for AI readiness, while other allies like Spain, Turkey, and Montenegro fall lower on the readiness scale.52 This unequal distribution of AI technology can result from differences in the organizational, financial, and human capital available to develop and deploy new technologies and differences in political support for the use of AI.53 Uneven distribution of AI technologies has important implications for the ability of allies and partners to divide military tasks during crises. Variation in the capacity to adopt and integrate AI technology into state militaries can create AI “haves” and “have-nots.” Some states — like Germany — possess a robust technology sector, have the financial resources to fund research and acquisitions, and maintain defense bureaucracies that are sufficiently skilled and flexible to integrate new AI technologies.54 Indeed, many of these states have created government institutions to manage military AI development. The United States, for example, established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center in 2018 to coordinate the Defense Department’s AI programs.55 Other states lack these resources and are unable to rigorously pursue new AI capabilities. For instance, many of NATO’s economically weaker members have focused their defense spending on modernizing conventional forces and updating Cold War-era hardware, and not on AI development.56 Even if a state has the resources to develop AI capabilities, limited public support for AI-enabled military systems can hamper such efforts. Opposition can stem from the uncertainty surrounding AI’s functionality, or from moral and ethical objections to delegating decisions on the use of force to computers. One recent cross-national survey, for instance, finds significant public disapproval of the use of lethal autonomous weapons among key U.S. allies. To be sure, autonomous weapons and AI are distinct, but AI is incorporated into the software architecture of most autonomous systems, and pundits and the public often conflate the two.57 In South Korea and Germany, 74 and 72 percent of the local populations, respectively, oppose their use (compared to 52 percent opposition among the U.S. public).58 These two countries are close U.S. allies that host dozens of U.S. military installations and over 60,000 American troops.59 In addition to creating obstacles to the conduct of multinational military operations, AI can also strain the ability of alliance leaders to make decisions during a crisis. Alliance decision-making is often characterized as a contentious process in which policymakers from states with different national interests, military capabilities, and risk tolerances coordinate their preferences.86 Policymakers seek to advance their state’s own interests during deliberations, frequently leading to negotiated policy compromises. NATO allies, for instance, routinely have policy disagreements — take, for instance, clashes over the response to Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 and over the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.87 Alliances and coalitions are also fraught with commitment problems, where states fear that allies will back out of agreements or drag them into unwanted conflicts.88 Divergent national positions and fears of abandonment can lead decision-making consultations between states to be drawn out, and, if conducted in the midst of a crisis, leave alliances unable to respond decisively to threats.89
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › AI › 2nc Ideological Divide
Melissa Heikkilä 21 - Senior Reporter for AI at MIT Technology Review. (“German coalition backs ban on facial recognition in public places,” POLITICO, 09/24/2021, ) PJW
Germany's incoming government is throwing its weight behind a ban on the use of biometric identification technologies such as facial recognition in public places. According to their coalition deal, the Social Democrats (SPD), Greens and liberal Free Democrats (FDP) want to "exclude" biometric recognition in public spaces as well as automated state scoring systems by AI through European law. "Biometric recognition in public spaces as well as automated state scoring systems by AI are to be excluded under European law," reads the coalition agreement, presented on Wednesday. The EU's Artificial Intelligence Act, proposed in April, creates product safety rules for “high risk” AI that is likely to cause harm to humans. It also bans certain “unacceptable” AI uses, such as social scoring and restricts the use of remote biometric identification in public places from law enforcement, unless it is to fight serious crime, such as terrorism. The AI Act's prohibitions are some of the bill's most contentious articles, and many European countries have yet to decide what they think. Germany's support of a ban could rally other countries to the same view. Belgium and Slovakia have already expressed their support. Some EU countries, such as France, are worried that a ban on facial recognition would weaken national security. Members of the European Parliament have also called for a full ban on facial recognition in public places. "The clear 'no' to biometric surveillance in public spaces and additionally the right to anonymity online and offline as well as the right to encryption are a paradigm shift in the German discussion about AI. This will be very welcomed support for the upcoming negotiations on the AI Act," said German MEP Svenja Hahn, who belongs to the FDP and is one of the co-negotiators of the AI Act in the Parliament's internal market committee.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › AI › 2nc Ideological Divide
Natalia Drozdiak 21 - EU Reporter on Foreign Policy and NATO. (“Europe Is Already Policing Privacy. AI Could Be Next,” Bloomberg, 04/13/2021, ) PJW
Hey everyone, it's Natalia. Europe is already the world’s tech privacy cop. Now it might become the AI cop too.
Companies using artificial intelligence in the EU could soon be required to get audited first, under new rules set to be proposed by the European Union as soon as next week.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › AI › 2nc Ideological Divide
Czuchaj, et al 21 - Dariusz Czuchaj, attorney at law, counsel at Dentons’ Warsaw office, is a member of the Intellectual Property and Technology practice team. Marc Elshof is a partner in Dentons' Amsterdam office and Co-Head of Europe Data Privacy & Security. He has specialised experience in complex IT and data protection matters. Marc advises our global clients on their national and cross-border data protection issues and worldwide data protection strategies, as well as on cybersecurity issues. He further assists our clients on their IT matters, including complex IT contracting, software licensing, SaaS agreements, and outsourcing projects. Anna Szczygieł, advocate and associate in the Warsaw office of Dentons, is a member of the Intellectual Property Practice Group. (“Key challenges of artificial intelligence: AI privacy concerns and the GDPR,” Dentons, last updated April 2021, ) PJW
The issue of data privacy is often among the first risks that come to mind in relation to artificial intelligence, since developing, testing and implementing AI technologies often involve the processing of personal data. According to Dentons’ AI survey, 81 percent of respondents cited personal data protection as a significant concern.
Users of AI technology that operate in the European Union or that serve customers in Europe need to be aware of the EU data protection framework, including notably the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). In addition, on April 21, 2021, the European Commission published its “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down harmonized rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and amending certain Union legislative acts” (the Draft AI Act – available here, in English as well as other EU languages; the Slovenian Presidency of the Council of the European Union published its compromise text on November 29, 2021—available here, in English), which also has important data protection implications.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › AI › 1nc Ideological Divide
Heikkilä ’21 — Melissa; Senior Reporter for AI at MIT Technology Review, Bachelor of Social Sciences from the University of Helsinki. March 29, 2021; "NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics."; POLITICO; https://www.politico.eu/article/ NATO-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/; //CYang
[TITLE]: “NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.” Big differences over how to treat autonomous weapons could undermine NATO’s drive. On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way. The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use. “We need each other more than ever. No country alone or no continent alone can compete in this era of great power competition,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană, the alliance’s second in command, said in an interview with POLITICO. The standard-setting effort comes as China is pressing ahead with AI applications in the military largely free of democratic oversight. David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said Beijing's lack of concern with the tech's ethical implications has sped along the integration of AI into the military apparatus. "I'm ... not sure that they're having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they're definitely not applying our democratic values to these technologies,” he said. Meanwhile, the EU — which has pledged to roll out the world's first binding rules on AI in coming weeks — is seeking closer collaboration with Washington to oversee emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. But those efforts have been slow in getting off the ground. For Geoană, that collaboration will happen at NATO, which is working closely with the European Union as it prepares AI regulation focusing on “high risk” applications. The pitch NATO does not regulate, but “once NATO sets a standard, it becomes in terms of defensive security the gold standard in that respective field,” Geoană said. The alliance's own AI strategy, to be released before the summer, will identify ways to operate AI systems responsibly, identify military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it's up to NATO standards,” van Weel said. The strategy will also set ethical guidelines around how to govern AI systems, for example by ensuring systems can be shut down by a human at all times, and to maintain accountability by ensuring a human is responsible for the actions of AI systems. “If an adversary would use autonomous AI powered systems in a way that is not compatible with our values and morals, it would still have defense implications because we would need to defend and deter against those systems,” van Weel said. “We need to be aware of that and we need to flag legislators when we feel that our restrictions are coming into the realm of [being detrimental to] our defense and deterrence,” he continued. Mission impossible? The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context. The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies. “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said: That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly. The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently. There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control. Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious concerns about the technology. These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › General › 2nc Interoperability
Schwartz & Peifer 17 – Paul M. Schwartz is the Jefferson E. Peyser Professor of Law at the UC Berkeley School of Law and the Director of the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology. Karl-Nikolaus Peifer is a Professor of Law at the University of Cologne and the Director of the Institute for Media Law and Communications Law. (“Transatlantic Data Privacy Law,” Georgetown Law Journal vol. 106 issue 1, November 2017, ) PJW
INTRODUCTION Due to the significance of international flows of personal information, the stakes are high today for the European Union (EU) and the United States when it comes to data privacy law. According to one estimate, the EU-U.S. economic relationship involves $260 billion in annual digital services trade.' Cross-border information flows represent the fastest growing component of trade in both the EU and the United States. As one technology reporter noted, "International data transfers are the lifeblood of the digital economy." 2 Yet, differences in transatlantic regulations potentially imperil critical international data flows. 3 In today's information economy, much of the EU-U.S. data trade involves personal data. Leading U.S. companies depend on access to and use of the personal information of EU citizens to provide data-driven services on the continent. Cloud providers, which offer decentralized mobile access to computing power throughout the world, similarly access and use the personal data of EU citizens. A threat to these data flows derives from EU doubts as to whether the United States has sufficient privacy protection. The resulting EU-U.S. dispute has been termed the "transatlantic data war." 4 This term refers to the transatlantic conflict around transfers of personal data. The roots of this "war" are found in the differing legal approaches to information privacy in the two jurisdictions. The differences are institutional, substantive, and, at the same time, elusive. Both sides recognize information privacy as an important value yet struggle to identify the meaning of core differences and the critical baseline for future collaboration. In the United States, there has been skepticism about EU privacy rights and whether they are merely disguised protectionism. 5 In the EU, there has been a longstanding debate about whether U.S. law provides sufficient protections for the personal information of EU citizens when U.S. companies and public authorities collect and process it.6 This policy debate has been accompanied by the EU setting strict limits on transfers of personal data to any non-EU country that lacks significant privacy protections. The restrictions are set by two EU legal mandates. The first is the European Directive on Data Protection, which permits data transfers from the EU to a thirdparty nation only when it has "adequate" privacy protections.7 The second is the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which will replace the Directive on May 25, 2018." Under the GDPR, the adequacy requirement for data transfers continues to be the legal touchstone.9 The EU has never considered U.S. data privacy law to have an adequate level of protection.o It has faulted U.S. information privacy law for its patchwork nature and lack of adequate remedies. In response to the EU's judgment that the privacy protections of U.S. law are insufficient, the EU and the United States developed a set of first-generation solutions for transatlantic exchanges. A turning point for these mechanisms came in June 2013, with the start of Edward Snowden's revelations regarding the practices of the National Security Agency (NSA)." For the EU, the resulting information demonstrated that the NSA had engaged in data surveillance of EU citizens without adequate respect for their data privacy rights. The NSA's storage and analysis of bulk data pertaining to EU citizens was a major point of contention. 12 The resulting political firestorm has either invalidated or imperiled all firstgeneration transatlantic data transfer mechanisms. 13 An initial second-generation solution, the EU-U.S. Privacy Shield, was finalized in June 2016.14 There are already legal challenges to it in the EU. 1 5 Bridging the transatlantic data divide is, therefore, a matter of the greatest significance. On the horizon is a possible international policy solution around "interoperable," or shared legal concepts. President Barack Obama and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) promoted this approach. For the Obama White House, there was a need for a "multistakeholder process" with the international partners of the United States to "facilitate interoperable privacy regimes." 1 6 These regimes were to be based on the starting point of "mutual recognition," which entailed an "embrace of common values surrounding privacy and personal data protection." 1 7 The extent of EU-U.S. data privacy interoperability, however, remains to be seen. In exploring this issue, this Article analyzes the respective legal identities constructed around data privacy in the EU and the United States. It identifies profound differences in the two systems' image of the individual as bearer of legal interests. The EU has created a privacy culture around "rights talk" that serves to protect "data subjects." 8 In the EU, rights talk forms a critical part of the postwar European project of creating the identity of a European citizen. As Jirgen Habermas argues, this task is a constitutional one that is central to the EU's survival.19 In the United States, by contrast, data privacy law is based on the idea of consumers whose interests merit governmental protection in a marketplace marked by deception and unfairness. In the United States, the focus is on "marketplace discourse" about personal information and the safeguarding of "privacy consumers. "20 This Article uses the models of rights talk and marketplace discourse to analyze how the EU and United States protect their respective data subjects and privacy consumers. A focus of the Article is on the respective doctrines of consent and contract in the two legal systems, which reflect profoundly different perspectives. In the EU, there is a collective approach to ordering privacy. Consequently, the EU limits contract through strict requirements of necessity, purpose limitation, and a ban on "tying." 21 As for consent, it is subject to limits in the EU that make it unusable in many areas as a legal basis for personal data processing. Where the focus of the EU is on restricting consent and contract, these doctrines are absent in U.S. data privacy law. In the absence of a requirement of a legal justification for personal data processing, parties in the United States can collect and use personal data without consent or contract.22 Their only duty is to follow any sector laws or other mandates that might exist. There are also likely future forces for convergence and divergence on the horizon. The forces moving the two legal systems for privacy together are a shared technological environment, increased political agreement around the benefits of personal data flow, and common security and law enforcement concerns. The forces moving the systems apart begin with the political and institutional dimensions of the EU's rights talk. There are also great differences concerning privacy remedies and a strong possibility for misunderstandings and disagreements around concepts of contract and consent in the two systems.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › General › 2nc Interoperability
Bazin ’18 — Aaron; Managing Director of the Donovan Strategy and Innovation Group, U.S. Special Operations Command. January-February 2018; "An Alliance Divided? Five Factors That Could Fracture NATO"; Army University Press; https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO/; //CYang
Technology advances. The participants agreed that technology advances are important for NATO’s continued cohesion. Technology will constitute a significant intervening factor in how NATO nations maintain their cohesion in the future for three reasons. First, ever-evolving communication technology can facilitate the spread of risks coming from outside of the Alliance and exacerbate their negative effect. The examples that resonated the most during focus group sessions are information warfare and targeted propaganda against NATO nations. Internet communications technology creates infinite room for alternative media that distort reality, contribute to the emergence of populist and radical movements, and increase the danger of miscommunication among nations.
Second, NATO risks losing the innovation game to the commercial defense industrial sector. In the future, private companies will continue to stay ahead of NATO in designing specifications and setting standards for platforms. This can have a major impact on readiness and interoperability among NATO nations if their innovation efforts (e.g., the U.S. Third Offset Strategy) do not materialize.31
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › General › 2nc Interoperability
Ackerman 06 ( Robert K. Ackerman, minored in political science. war correspondent covering the Iraq War embedded with the U.S. Army’s 101st Airborne Division, he served as a media advisor or a press secretary for candidates in state and presidential campaigns. “In NATO, Technology Challenges Yield to Political Interoperability Hurdles” https://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/11597)LR
The greatest challenge facing NATO interoperability is the desire of individual nations to safeguard information and technology from their allies, according to the general manager of the agency tasked with enabling coalition interoperability. Nations with extensive data collection and processing systems are reluctant to share all elements of detailed information with even longtime allies, lest sensitive intelligence and technology aspects are revealed. And, many useful information technologies and systems developed by an individual nation are subject to export controls, which hinders their acceptance and implementation by other NATO nations. Ensuring coalition interoperability amid these conditions is complicated by the military transformation that is empowered by the rapid evolution of information technologies. The NATO Consultation, Command and Control (C3) Agency, or NC3A, is striving to enable coalition interoperability both through technological advances and by overcoming the political-cultural barriers that hinder interoperable military operations. The NC3A faces a tougher task than its national equivalents because it must bring together systems that are designed to address national needs, which often differ widely even among member nations. Not only must these systems interoperate among other national systems, they also must interoperate with NATO systems and networks. So, the cultural challenge is to establish a coalition setting where all the participants in the coalition will trust a common domain of information that can be shared by all participants, he says. Achieving that goal will require providing a secure information-sharing environment that is transparent enough for all the participants to understand that their information is protected fully. Goals include system-of-systems architectures that can allow diverse systems to interoperate effectively. This will require a different set of standards that remain to be developed, Wilhelmsen offers. “We are not there yet in many of the areas for coalition interoperability,” he admits. The programmatic area is where the technology gap rears its head. The United States is far ahead of even its most technologically capable allies, and many new and incoming NATO members are using obsolete 1960s and 1970s technologies. Wilhelmsen notes that the agency continues to assess the capability maturity of technologies that member nations bring to the coalition arena.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › General › 1nc Interoperability
Soare, 21 (Simona R. Soare was a Senior Associate Analyst at EUISS from 2019 to end May 2021. Her research focused on United States security policy, transatlantic security and EU-NATO relations. Prior to joining EUISS, Simona served as advisor to the Vice-President of the European Parliament (2015-2019) and as an analyst with the Romanian Ministry of Defence, working on transatlantic and European security. She has also been a research associate with the Institut d’Études Européennes (IEE) at Université Saint Louis-Bruxelles. Simona holds a PhD in Political Science from the National School for Political and Administrative Studies in Bucharest where she lectured on international security (2008-2015). She is the recipient of a U.S. Department of State fellowship on U.S. Grand Strategy and has published extensively on American and transatlantic security. 6-11-2021, "Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies," GMFUS, , LASA-CSK)
Not all allies have the defense funding, technological capacity, skills, and military infrastructure to facilitate rapid defense innovation, including the adoption and scaling of emerging technologies. And not all that have such resources and knowledge are willing to share them in collaborative innovation processes. Leading allies—the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands—already have national-focused approaches to the adoption of EDTs. By contrast, for most Central and Eastern countries EDTs in defense are mainly a long-term prospect. Previous challenges in integrating cyber capabilities into NATO operations, persistent capability gaps among the allies, and slow standardization procedures are a good indication of the magnitude of the challenge, which is acknowledged at the highest levels of NATO decision-making. As Secretary-General Stoltenberg has stated, a technological gap between the allies would undermine interoperability and weaken alliance cohesion. In the context of the NATO AI and big data strategies and the Defense Innovation Accelerator, allies should reflect on how to improve and facilitate technological transfers among themselves. This could enable smaller allies to specialize in niche EDTs capabilities, as has been the case with cyber, for example, and could prevent the emergence of new technological and capability gaps between the allies. The Biden administration’s focus on shared democratic values and the digital agenda, and its willingness to strengthen NATO and technology partnerships, constitute a window of opportunity for the alliance. It should be fully capitalized on to accelerate transatlantic collaborative defense innovation.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › General › 1nc Say “No” – Transatlantic Data War
Soare '21 [Simona R, Jun 11, "Innovation as Adaptation: NATO and Emerging Technologies," https://www.gmfus.org/news/innovation-adaptation-nato-and-emerging-technologies]
*EDT: emerging and disruptive technologies//DG
There is great convergence and commonality among the recommendations of the Advisory Group on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies and the NATO 2030 Reflection Group. Both call for the establishment of transatlantic digital consultations and dedicated structures, including a NATO Advanced Technology Projects Agency and funding instruments such as a NATO Investment Bank. Building on these recommendations, as well as on NATO-private sector dialogues, in February Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg proposed the establishment of a NATO Defense Innovation Initiative “to promote interoperability and serve as a catalyst for transatlantic cooperation on defense innovation.”18 After consultations and meeting political roadblocks, the allies decided to establish the Defense Innovation Accelerator instead as a more flexible, opt-in, and off-budget instrument.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › General › 1nc Say “No” – Transatlantic Data War
TADPF = Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework
Xirui Li 22 - pursuing doctoral studies at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) of Nanyang Technological University (NTU) in Singapore. She is also a non-resident research fellow at the Intellisia Institute in Guangzhou, China. (“BEHIND THE US CONCESSIONS TO THE EU ON TRANSATLANTIC DATA TRANSFERS,” AsiaGlobal Online, 04/13/2022, ) PJW
The announcement of preliminary agreement on the long-awaited TADPF cheered business sector on both sides of the Atlantic. Microsoft applauded the framework, saying that it would “rebuild and strengthen the data protection bridge between the EU and the US.” Global Data Alliance, a cross-industry coalition of companies, reckoned that the new framework would increase economic opportunities in both the US and Europe.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › General › 2nc Say “No” – Private Sector
Jankowski '21 – Political Adviser and Head of the Political Section at the Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Poland to NATO [Dominik, " NATO and the Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Challenge” in NATO in the Era of Unpeace: Defending Against Known Unknowns, pp 99-102//DG
Second, NATO will need partners on its path towards achieving a comprehensive implementation strategy on EDTs. This will require connection with the private sector early and often, clearly communicating NATO’s priorities and requirements while providing accessible opportunities for industry, including non-traditional ones. Much of the innovative work being undertaken in the commercial sector is being carried out by companies that have never worked in the defence realm or have no wish to do so. Therefore, building new partnerships at NATO with the private sector will enable the Alliance to increase awareness, share data, and creatively tap into experiences and knowledge. Moreover, NATO and the EU should initiate a strategic dialogue to address fundamental issues of tech governance and data sharing in order to overcome the transatlantic tech policy divide.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Emerging Tech Coop Fails › General › 1nc Say “No” – Private Sector
Erik Lin-Greenberg 20, postdoctoral fellow at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House. Texas National Security Review, Vol 3, Iss 2. Spring. "Allies and Artificial Intelligence: Obstacles to Operations and Decision-Making"
– Lin-Greenberg)LR
Second, civilian engineers and researchers that develop AI technology may refuse to work on military AI contracts. Disruptions to AI development can hinder the fielding of new capabilities and generate mistrust between the government and civilian firms. Google employees, for instance, protested their involvement in Project Maven, a Defense Department program that uses AI to analyze video collected by military drones.62 In a letter to their CEO, the employees argued that “Google should not be in the business of war,” explaining that the company should not “outsource the moral responsibility of [its] technologies to third parties,” and that work on Defense Department-backed AI would “irreparably damage Google’s brand.”63 The resistance ultimately led Google to terminate its involvement in the contract and generated public criticism of the Defense Department’s AI efforts.64
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › No Solve Cohesion › 2nc Afghanistan Thumps
Hudson & Ryan ’21 — John Hudson; Michigan State University, B.A. in International Relations. He is a national security reporter at the Washington Post covering the State Department and diplomacy. Missy Ryan; Georgetown University, BA in English; Harvard University, master's in public policy. She writes about diplomacy, national security and the State Department for The Washington Post. August 17, 2021; "Withdrawal from Afghanistan forces allies and adversaries to reconsider America’s global role"; Washington Post; https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/withdrawal-from-afghanistan-forces-allies-and-adversaries-to-reconsider-americas-global-role/2021/08/17/2808ddbc-ff84-11eb-825d-01701f9ded64_story.html; //CYang
President Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan has triggered a globe-spanning rethink of America’s role in the world, as European allies discuss their need to play a bigger part in security matters and Russia and China consider how to promote their interests in a Taliban-led Afghanistan.
Biden’s defiant address to the nation on Monday, when he stood “squarely” behind his decision to pull out U.S. troops, also renewed one of the most hotly contested debates of the post-9/11 era: Would a withdrawal from Afghanistan convey weakness, provoke aggression and shatter America’s ability to lead on the international stage, or would it reflect a sound realignment of the national interest, put the country on better footing to deal with the new challenges of the 21st century, and clarify to allies and adversaries what the United States is and is not willing to expend resources on?
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › No Solve Cohesion › 2nc Afghanistan Thumps
Olsen ’21 — Henry; Washington Post columnist and a senior fellow at the Ethics and Public Policy Center. August 27, 2021; “The crisis in Afghanistan is shaking NATO. Its foundation was already weakening in Europe.”; Washington Post; https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/08/27/crisis-afghanistan-is-shaking- NATO-its-foundation-was-already-weakening-europe/; //CYang
[TITLE]: “The crisis in Afghanistan is shaking NATO. Its foundation was already weakening in Europe” European leaders are correct to wonder what the frightening incompetence on display in Afghanistan means for the NATO alliance. But they should also be nervous that the public opinion in their own countries is making the alliance unsustainable. Our NATO allies are democracies, and thus their leaders must always take public opinion into account. They cannot long ignore or run counter to their voters’ deeply held views. That’s why polls from 2020 and earlier this year of European public opinion should concern both U.S. and European leaders. The polls show that European public opinion is mixed concerning core U.S. interests and ambivalent at best about involving their own nations’ militaries in armed conflict. The good news is that European opinion about NATO and the United States remains mostly positive. A June 2021 Pew Research Center poll found that 61 percent of Europeans had a favorable opinion of NATO, including majorities in every country except Greece. Europeans also held positive opinions of the United States, with more than 55 percent of every country’s populace expressing a favorable view. The problem comes when pollsters dig a bit deeper. The central feature of any military alliance is that all members come to the aid of one another in case of attack. That unified stance — collective defense in strategic parlance — is what makes the alliance credible. If one or more parties won’t defend other members, the whole enterprise falls apart. Indeed, that is what many European leaders fear as the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan raises questions about its ability to live up to its commitments. Whether that fear is justified or not, the fact is that majorities in most European nations already oppose the use of their troops to aid a NATO ally. That startling finding comes from a February 2020 Pew Research poll. The survey asked respondents from 16 NATO nations whether that nation should use military force to defend a NATO ally in a serious military conflict with Russia. Majorities of only five nations — the United States, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands and Lithuania — answered yes. Pluralities or majorities in every other nation surveyed opposed coming to the ally’s assistance, with opposition rising to 60 percent among Germans. One might wonder why NATO is viewed favorably given this response, but another question from the 2020 poll provides clarity. The same people were also asked whether they thought the United States would use military force to aid a NATO ally under attack by Russia. Majorities or pluralities in every European nation surveyed said it would, with percentages rising above 70 percent in Italy, Spain and Britain. Many Europeans clearly believe that NATO is a device to ensure U.S. protection for them rather than a collective alliance whereby all support all. This underlying belief might be a reason only 10 of NATO’s 30 members currently meet the alliance’s target of spending 2 percent of gross domestic product on defense each year. This finding alone is troubling, but another poll points to other worrisome signs. The United States increasingly views China as an existential threat. This is why it is shifting military resources to the Pacific theater to combat China’s rise and working to persuade U.S. allies to resist Chinese efforts to make those nations’ economies dependent upon Chinese consumers and companies. This means that NATO allies will increasingly be asked to shoulder some of the burden in a de facto anti-Chinese alliance at the same time as NATO itself deploys against Russia. Europeans do not want to do that. A January 2021 poll from the European Council on Foreign Relations found 60 percent of Europeans want their nation to remain neutral in any conflict between China and the United States. The poll also found that 59 percent of those surveyed believe that China will be more powerful than the United States in a decade; only 19 percent vouched for continued U.S. supremacy. Finally, 67 percent said that Europe could not always rely on the United States and had to look after its own defense. Each of these trends points to electorates that won’t back the United States in the conflict that U.S. leaders of both parties see as most important.
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › No Solve Cohesion › 2nc Article V
Adam Taylor 19 - writes about foreign affairs for The Washington Post, BA in economics with a focus on international relations from the University of Manchester, MA from the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. (“Would NATO allies keep their promise to defend members that are attacked? It depends whom you ask.” The Washington Post, 12/02/2019, ) PJW
Collective self-defense is enshrined at NATO’s very core: Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty directly states that “an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all” and that force can be used in response. It’s also a relatively untested commitment — and an increasingly fraught one. Since NATO’s founding in 1949, it has been invoked only once: On Sept. 12, 2001, after the terrorist attacks in the United States the day before. Seventy years after the founding of NATO, it’s not clear that all allies are on the same side about what collective self-defense would actually mean. President Trump has emerged as a powerful critic of the alliance, while Turkey’s intervention in northeastern Syria raised concerns about just how far collective security would go. In a recent interview with the Economist, French President Emmanuel Macron wondered whether NATO’s collective security could result in his country fighting a war against Syria. “What will Article 5 mean tomorrow?” Macron wondered aloud. It’s not clear whether members of the public are clear on that either. Earlier this year, British polling firm YouGov quizzed people in four major NATO powers — Britain, France, Germany and the United States — about what foreign nations they would be willing to defend, including NATO allies and some non-NATO allies such as Sweden and Ukraine. The results suggested that being a NATO ally did not ensure public support. Only minorities of the populations in France and Germany said that they would not defend Romania, a NATO ally since 2004 and a European Union member, or even Turkey, a NATO ally since 1952 (Britons were also divided on support for Turkey). However, in all countries polled, majorities said they would support Finland and Sweden, which are not part of NATO. Majorities in Britain and the United States also said they would come to the aid of Ukraine, a country that was blocked from joining NATO in 2008 — confusingly, a decision pushed by the United States at the time. And although Germany and the United States have a decades-long alliance, only a minority of Germans said they would come to the defense of Americans if the United States were attacked YouGov’s poll was conducted in April, but shared again Monday in anticipation of a NATO meeting in London this week during which Trump and other world leaders will celebrate the anniversary of the alliance’s founding. The results prompted debate among European security experts, with many wondering how to parse the information, whether the question itself was phrased in a confusing or misleading way, or even whether the polling data could be considered accurate at all (comparative international polling is an expensive and difficult business, with lots of opportunities for error and misinterpretation). Some other surveys have found similar levels of national disagreement about how Article 5 would work in practice, although the takeaways are often complicated. In 2017, the Pew Research Center asked people in a variety of NATO member states whether they would respond with military force if a NATO ally got into a serious conflict with Russia. Only 40 percent of Germans favored using military force in this situation, compared with 45 percent of Britons, 53 percent of the French and 62 percent of Americans. Germany may be notable for its mixed feelings about the alliance. A poll conducted this year by the German company Körber-Stiftung found that many in the country were skeptical about key parts of its NATO relationship, with only 39 percent saying that Germany should have a closer relationship to the United States rather than Russia. Whether these polling numbers convey a shifting view of NATO collective security among the public may not matter — national security decisions are made not by referendum. Trump, who was a fierce critic of NATO on the campaign trail and still complains regularly about European military spending, eventually committed to Article 5 in June 2017 during a White House news conference with Romanian President Klaus Iohannis. But only a year later, Trump suggested that Montenegro, a small nation that joined NATO last year, could lead to a global war. “They are very aggressive people. They may get aggressive, and congratulations, you’re in World War III. But that’s the way it was set up,” Trump said during an interview with Fox News in July 2018 “Don’t forget, I just got here a little more than a year and a half ago,” Trump added. During a recent interview, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said that Article 5 was the “cornerstone of NATO” and that the fact that no European nation had been attacked since NATO started was “perhaps the greatest success” of the organization. But if NATO’s collective security serves best as a tool for deterrence, it relies on the perception that it would actually work in practice. The risk now is that if it ever had to be used in practice, world leaders might find it is a relic of the past that no longer functions.
2022
Michigan
Negative
NATO Engagement Fails › No Solve Cohesion › 2nc Article V
Paul Poast 6/7 - associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago and a nonresident fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. (“What NATO Needs to Do Before Finland and Sweden Join,” Carnegie Endowment, 06/07/2022, ) PJW
While political momentum may make these membership bids inevitable, the ultimate effects of bringing Finland and Sweden into the alliance depend on making sober decisions before they enter. Specifically, NATO allies must have a plan for defending the two countries. The two Nordic countries’ defense cannot rest alone on the perceived sanctity of NATO’s Article 5 defense commitment or on a vague plan to address the issue later. WHAT’S THE PLAN? To be effective, alliances need to have hard discussions about war plans. Who will the allies defend and how will they do so? Do the prospective new members agree with existing NATO allies on who constitutes a threat and where? Do the two groups have similar visions for how to address the threat Russia poses if the situation becomes acute? Are their military doctrines compatible? These are pivotal questions for all alliances. When states form an alliance, the final treaty is commonly short on war-planning specifics. But discussions over aspects of war plans often consume a fair amount of time and energy during such negotiations. Indeed, disagreements over these issues can ultimately undermine an alliance’s formation. If a state does not see the potential alliance as adequate for meeting its security aims, it can look elsewhere. This most infamously occurred in August 1939. The Soviet Union, frustrated over an inability to agree with the United Kingdom on how best to counter a potential German attack, left the Anglo-French-Soviet defense treaty negotiations. It then signed a nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany. Hard bargaining over the defense practicalities of a potential alliance treaty was also part of the creation of NATO itself.1 Far from a given when the alliance treaty was negotiated in 1948 and 1949, there were endless arguments about how to define the North Atlantic region in the first place. This definition turned out to be critical at the strategic level of war planning: before one can talk about logistics and tactics, one must decide who should actually be protected. The talks nearly broke down over debates about whether to include Norway (France was opposed), Italy (U.S. and British officials were skeptical), or Algeria (then a French department). Wanting to ensure that a deal was reached, the parties made compromises: Norway and Italy were included, and Algeria was indeed covered (until it gained independence, at which point the North Atlantic Treaty was amended). While details over executing the actual defensive procedures were delegated to a soon-to-be-created body (the “O” of NATO), the perception was that there was time to figure it out. Communism was a threat, but there was no perception of an immediate Soviet invasion. While a failure to settle logistical and operational details might have been understandable when NATO was formed, the truth is that planning for the defense of prospective new members continued to be neglected, including in recent decades. Consider the closest parallel to Finland’s accession, that of the Baltic states. Even in the 1990s, before Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania became official candidates for NATO membership, the states were seen as largely indefensible, in purely military terms, from an operational and tactical standpoint. No solutions to this challenge were pursued until well after their entry into the alliance. NATO members chose to overlook the lack of a solution when they admitted the Baltic states in 2004, on the grounds that the alliance ought to support fledgling democracies that had demonstrated their value through peacekeeping operations. More importantly, at that time Russia did not pose an imminent threat. This defensive shortcoming was eventually corrected, so to speak, in the wake of Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine by the creation of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence. Like the 2014 Wales Summit pledge that NATO members made to increase their military spending, the Enhanced Forward Presence was motivated by Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. The threat of armed aggression, long a concern of the Baltic states, had now been realized. For the Baltic states and other members of NATO’s eastern flank, there was a window of opportunity to adjust. No such window is obvious in the case of Finland. WHERE ARE THE TROOPS? Planning is about more than just paper reports and memoranda to be filed away and dusted off when the time arrives. It is about ensuring that the proper resources are being developed and deployed to execute a plan. One such issue that NATO members must decide as soon as possible is whether to position forces in Finland and Sweden and, if so, how many. Even if alliance members opt not to pre-position forces in the two Nordic countries, they will have to determine where the forces that would be used for their defense will come from. Russia’s military is being weakened by the war in Ukraine and has displayed shortcomings that few analysts predicted. It will take time for Russian forces to recover, but eventually they will probably still be capable of “fait accompli” operations against some section of Finnish or even Swedish territory. This would involve quickly moving forces into an unprotected or lightly protected portion of territory, thereby compelling the other side to take offensive action in order to reverse the territorial acquisition. Concerns over such an operation against Finland are heightened by its 800-plus-mile border with Russia. While Finland has approximately 3,000 personnel in its border guard, these forces are oriented primarily toward enforcing immigration control rather than stopping an invading force. When coupled with Russia’s threats, this force positioning creates a precarious state of existing defenses along that border. As the creation of the Enhanced Forward Presence implies, NATO’s Article 5 does not automatically deter aggression. This is because, to use the language popular among international relations scholars, it ultimately does not “tie hands.” It is true that Article 5 obligates alliance members to treat an attack in North America or Europe on one or more members as “an attack against them all,” but the text goes on to say that each member will then assist “by taking forthwith . . . such action as it deems necessary.” Practically, this means that for each NATO member and the alliance as a whole, Article 5 is more appropriately viewed as specifying something akin to saying an attack on one merits a response to be determined by the individual members. Concretely, once the North Atlantic Council determines that an attack meriting an Article 5 response has occurred, the members decide on the appropriate response and then individual members decide how they will contribute to that response. Since NATO decisionmaking is predicated on consensus, meeting the first two thresholds for an Article 5 action is never guaranteed. Of course, failure on the part of the NATO allies to assist a member under attack could carry reputational consequences; if Russia were to witness a nonresponse to a quick incursion into, say, the Baltic states, then Moscow might be emboldened to take further measures. But the likelier problem is that NATO may respond meekly. The space between a nonresponse and full-fledged direct military engagement by all NATO members against the aggressor is wide enough to allow for a host of options that meet the letter of Article 5’s terms without changing the military facts on the ground. This is why, as illustrated by the Enhanced Forward Presence, deterrence requires “sinking costs,” meaning forward deploying troops on NATO territory before an attack occurs. But for this approach to be effective, it cannot be done lightly. The forces must not be merely a tripwire, where a few troops are deployed with the understanding that their deaths would trigger a larger response. Such a policy would be too slow to stop a fait accompli operation and would run again into the problem that Article 5 does not obligate any particular type of action. Instead, forces need to be deployed in large enough numbers to have a material impact on the aggressor’s battle plan. Ideally, the forward-deployed NATO forces would be sufficient to tip the local balance of power in favor of the defender so as to deny territory to the aggressor. At a minimum, they should be enough to slow down the aggressor’s strike, preventing the invading forces from securing territory before the defender’s reinforcements could arrive. This assumes that foreign forces would even be allowed on Finland’s territory. That is not yet clear. HARD CONVERSATIONS Given that Finland’s membership process is proceeding swiftly, that NATO is actively and heavily supporting Ukraine’s fight against Russia, and that NATO bureaucrats are busy crafting a new Strategic Concept, there is little space right now for hard conversations on the above points. This is unfortunate, as the lack of conversation could start the new relationship off on precarious footing.