2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Russia › Solvency › No Solvency---Baltics/Eastern Europe
Joanna Szostek, 2017, PhD in Politics from the University of Oxford and lecturer in Political Communication at the University of Glasgow, November 20, 2017, “Nothing Is True? The Credibility of News and Conflicting Narratives during “Information War” in Ukraine”// SK
The Ukrainian case similarly disrupts the assumption that audiences support a foreign state’s strategic narrative because they are “vulnerable” to its influence activities. To describe an audience as vulnerable implies that it is excessively credulous, lacks critical thinking skills, or perhaps lacks access to good quality journalism. In the present study, the participants who sympathized with Russia’s strategic narrative were no more credulous nor deprived of good journalism than their West-leaning and non-aligned counterparts. One cannot, therefore, attribute their attitudes solely to interaction between misleading Russian media content and their naivety. In fact, the Russia-leaning participants did not particularly trust Russian sources, and their views were shaped through exposure not only to the Russian narrative, but also to the fiercely anti-Russian Ukrainian narrative, which infuriated them. Their infuriation at the Ukrainian narrative can be traced to their personal, social connections to Russia, which they valued and perceived as threatened by Ukrainian politicians who had given them nothing in return. The present study, thus, supports the idea that social and communication “linkage” to a foreign state (Levitsky and Way 2010) at the individual level can play a role in strategic narrative reception. Linkage generates practical and emotional reasons for some Ukrainians to value friendly relations with Russia (Szostek 2017b), setting them at loggerheads with their government, which presents ties to Russia as thoroughly undesirable.
The present study has exposed complexities in what credibility means when it is applied to narratives in the news. Within International Relations, credibility has previously been described as “an important source of soft power” (Nye 2004: 106), but it has usually been presented as the straightforward product of honesty and good reputation. Studying how the Odesa diarists responded to news has shown that credibility also depends on whether sources and narratives address the issues of most concern to the audience, with skepticism elicited by what gets ignored, as well as what gets said. It should not be surprising that people negotiate the meanings of news with reference to their values and experiences. Decades of work on “interpretive communities” have shown personal experience playing a central part in how people negotiate the meanings of other genres, including soap operas and literature (Schrøder 1994).
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Russia › AT: IL › IL---AT: Ukraine
Michael Butler 22, member of the Governing Council of the International Studies Association-Northeast as well as a Senior Fellow at the Canadian Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (CCR2P) at the University of Toronto, 5/12/22, “Ukraine’s information war is winning hearts and minds in the West,” //mh
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has dominated headlines since late February 2022. The war struck a nerve among Western audiences, evoking a high degree of support for Ukraine.
The reasons for the prominence of the war in the West are many and varied.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Russia › AT: IL › IL---AT: Euro Populism
Yasmeen Serhan 20, Yasmeen Serhan is a staff writer at The Atlantic. She joined the magazine in 2016 as an editorial fellow in Washington, D.C. In 2017, Yasmeen moved to the U.K. to join The Atlantic’s newly established London bureau as a reporter covering British and European politics. She currently writes about populism and nationalism for The Atlantic, March 2020, "Populism Is Meaningless," https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/03/what-is-populism/607600/ //AShah
This view has led to a number of other misconceptions: One is that any politician who invokes the will of “the people” must necessarily be a populist. If that were the case, every politician could be labeled a populist, because “everybody talks about people in a democracy,” Daphne Halikiopoulou, an associate comparative-politics professor at the University of Reading, told me. Another misconception is that populism and xenophobic nationalism, or , are inherently linked. In reality, neither ideology is reliant on the other to exist. “Both prioritize a particular ‘in’ group over an ‘out’ group,” Halikiopoulou said, but populists tend to prioritize “ordinary people,” whereas nativists prioritize those of a certain ethnic background.
A final misconception is that the populist label is appropriate for any politician who deviates from the mainstream—an idea that has been recently applied to noteworthy figures on the left, such as the outgoing British Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn and the U.S. presidential candidate Bernie Sanders. Though both men exhibit some populist tendencies—both, for example, criticize those they consider to be part of the economic elite—they fall short of being traditional populists, at least under Fieschi’s definition. For one, neither claims to represent an exclusive and homogenous “people,” but rather the interests of citizens as a whole. And neither has vilified his opponents as inherently illegitimate.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Russia › AT: IL › IL---AT: Euro Populism
Simon Kuper 22, journalist for the Financial Times, 1/20/22, “Why America is dangerously polarised — and Europe is not,” https://www.ft.com/content/5655ab7c-1152-414e-bd22-67acd06c5c51/mh
Contrast two leaders. Donald Trump’s approval ratings barely budged during his presidency, and his supporters dismissed every scandal as “fake news”. But when Boris Johnson turned out to have doubled as a party host during lockdown, his supporters fled: his net favourability rating went from +29 per cent in April 2020 to -52 per cent last week, according to pollsters YouGov.
Here, in microcosm, is the uniqueness of American polarisation. People often discuss polarisation as a global problem, but in fact, in most western European and even Latin American democracies, rival camps aren’t deeply entrenched or always entirely serious.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Russia › AT: IL › IL---AT: Euro Populism
Philip Manow 21, Professor of Comparative Political Economy at the University of Bremen, 12/15/21, “The political economy of populism in Europe”, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-12/2021-12-15-political-economy-populism-europe-manow.pdf/mh
Beyond illuminating the driving forces of the populist backlash in Europe, the above typology helps us understand how policymakers could respond to it. During the past five years, centrist policymakers have increasingly focused on how to ‘defeat’ populism, which they have tended to see in simplistic terms. But the heterogeneity of populism, as discussed in this paper, means there is no one solution that can be applied everywhere – even in Europe. Rather, in each country’s case an effective solution will necessarily reflect the type of political economy involved.
This has particular implications for EU-level policymaking. Both trade and migration policy have become highly Europeanized, usually in ways that have removed barriers to the movement of goods, services and people across borders. This trend has often exacerbated the social and economic pressures that inspire different populist forces, while removing the opportunity for national policymakers to deal with these pressures. This means that any solutions will by definition need to involve EU institutions. Yet the heterogeneity of populism means that any one-size-fits-all policies emanating from Brussels could reinforce, rather than solve, the conflicts discussed in this paper.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Russia › AT: IL › IL---AT: Baltics---Presence Bad
Holly Ellyatt 22, reporter and journalist on European economics and politics, 6/23/22, “Moscow and NATO could be about to clash over Russia’s European exclave Kaliningrad,” //mh
A new front in tensions between Russia and NATO has opened up after one of the Western military alliance’s members, Lithuania, banned the transit of some goods coming from Russia to its exclave Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea.
Russia has vowed to retaliate over what it described as the “hostile actions” of Lithuania, warning of “serious” consequences, while NATO members have reiterated their support for the country.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Russia › AT: IL › IL---AT: Baltics---No Invasion
LRT 22, is the Lithuanian National Radio and Television, a publicly owned media group by the Lithuanian people, February 2022, "No signs of Russia planning attack on Baltics – NATO committee chair," https://www.lrt.lt/en/news-in-english/19/1608809/no-signs-of-russia-planning-attack-on-baltics-nato-committee-chair //AShah
NATO has not seen any signs that Russia might be planning to attack the Baltic states, according to Admiral Rob Bauer, chairman of the NATO Military Committee.
He told reporters in Vilnius that, in the military sense, the Russia's ongoing military buildup in Belarus could be viewed as a “combination of capabilities”.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Russia › AT: IL › IL---AT: Baltics---No Invasion
Richard Milne 22, Nordic and Baltic Bureau Chief and European correspondent, 3/8/22, “War in Ukraine: will the Baltics become the ‘new West Berlin’?,” https://www.ft.com/content/d711c884-653d-4336-a490-b9075e5ce82f/mh
The three Baltic states have been trampled over by everyone from the Russians and Soviets to the Germans, Swedes and even Ottomans in the past few centuries. But, even as the world wonders whether they will be next on Russian president Vladimir Putin’s invasion list after Ukraine, there is a counterintuitive sense in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that they are as safe as they ever have been.
“If you look at the past 800 to 900 years of history, an argument could be made that we have never been so secure. Because we have so many very powerful allies, we’re an independent country with our own standing army, a free and open and flourishing trade and investment environment,” says Krisjanis Karins, Latvia’s prime minister.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Russia › AT: IL › IL---AT: Baltics---No Invasion
Andre Damon 22, Writer and editor for the World Socialist Web Site specializing in geopolitics and economics, 6/27/22, “NATO announces plan for massive European land army,” //mh
In what NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg called the “biggest overhaul of our collective deterrence and defense since the Cold War,” the US-led NATO alliance has announced plans to build a massive standing land army in Europe, numbering in the hundreds of thousands.
Stoltenberg said NATO would increase its “high readiness forces” sevenfold, from 40,000 to 300,000, deploying tens of thousands of additional troops, as well as countless tanks and aircraft, directly to Russia’s border.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Russia › AT: IL › IL---AT: Baltics---Squo Solves
William Gallo 22, foreign policy and international affair correspondent, 3/23/22, “After Russia’s Ukraine Invasion, Baltics Push for Permanent NATO Presence,”
The small Baltic countries, whose militaries have long been dwarfed by that of neighboring Russia, are renewing their push for NATO to establish a larger and more permanent presence on their territory following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — with a combined population of only about six million people — have long been seen as some of NATO’s most vulnerable nations. The countries joined the Western military alliance in 2004 but are connected to the rest of European NATO countries by only a narrow corridor, which lies between the heavily armed Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Russia-allied Belarus.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Russia › AT: IL › IL---AT: Baltics---Squo Solves
Alexandra Sarlo 17, is currently a PhD candidate in Political Sciences at University of Pennsylvania. Alexandra specializes in Comparative Politics. She also holds an MA from Georgetown University in Russian and East European Studies and a BA in Russian from Cornell University, July 2017, "Fighting Disinformation in the Baltic States," Foreign Policy Research Institute, https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/07/fighting-disinformation-baltic-states/ //AShah
The main techniques Baltic states have used to counter disinformation from Russian media sources involve fining or suspending channels that display overt biases. For example, Latvia fined PBK three times in 2014 for showing fake or biased broadcasts from Russian news. The radio station Autoradio Rezekne was also fined once. PBK was fined again in 2015. These fines, while highly publicized, were less than $5,000 each, and the fine for the radio station was equivalent to $885. Latvia also temporarily suspended the Russian television station RTR Planeta in 2014 for alleged incitement to war, which violates Latvian media law. Latvia has provided a space for the work of independent Russian news site Meduza, founded by journalists fired from Russian news site Lenta.ru over their coverage of the war in Ukraine. Lithuania has also fought back against Russian disinformation, repeatedly suspending RTR Planeta.
Estonia found itself facing an extremely hostile information environment as early as 2007. At that time, Estonian government institutions, newspapers, banks, and other companies were subjected to weeks of cyber-attacks after the removal of the Bronze Soldier, a Soviet war memorial, from central Tallinn. In 2015, Estonia began broadcasting a new Russian-language channel, ETV+, to provide an alternative for the Russian-speaking population. However, the new station has been hampered by regulations that require live programming to be translated directly into Estonian. It has been more popular with Estonian-speakers than with the Russian-speaking minority, who have access to a wide range of better-resourced channels directly from Russia that are under no such regulation.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Russia › AT: IL › IL---No Escalation
Bill Bray 22, author on defensive actions, 1/4/22, “The Information Warfare Myth,” //mh
Russia’s troop buildup on the Ukrainian border may culminate in a full-scale invasion. Or it may be meant to coerce NATO to negotiate and concede to some of Vladimir Putin’s demands regarding Ukraine’s future. But one thing it surely demonstrates is that the efficacy of information warfare to achieve political and security objectives is greatly overstated. The U.S. military and national security community should take note.
One could be forgiven for concluding Vladimir Putin’s Russia is the world’s grand practitioner of information warfare. It’s a conclusion Putin ostensibly promotes, if, for no other reason, because it conjures an image of power that may be more illusion than reality.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Russia › AT: IL › IL---Russian Info Ops Inevitable
Terry L. Thompson 20, lecturer in cyber policy at the Johns Hopkins University and University of Maryland, Baltimore County, “No Silver Bullet: Fighting Russian Disinformation Requires Multiple Actions,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, vol 21, no 1, pp. 182, //chico
These efforts by the United States, EU, and NATO provide an improved deterrent against Russian disinformation. But the Russian effort to sow discord and mistrust is relentless. Inspired by President Vladimir Putin's desire to turn Americans against one another and armed with increasingly sophisticated cyber operators in the Russian military, Russian disinformation has become a powerful twenty-first-century information weapon that will not be easily defeated. (22) Russian tactics are constantly evolving, and rapid advances in artificial intelligence and deep-fake videos will make detecting disinformation and other active measures increasingly difficult in 2020 and beyond.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Russia › AT: IL › IL---Russian Info Ops Fail
Bermet Talant 22, freelance journalist from Oxford, 3/1/22, “Russia is losing the information war,” https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/russia-losing-information-war/mh
Zelensky’s defiance and candor have sparked admiration at home and abroad. A month ago, 53 per cent of Ukrainians thought he wasn’t capable of defending the country in the event of the Russian invasion. Now, his people call him a true leader they are proud of.
This frank and direct communication is a stark contrast to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s pre-recorded rambling diatribes, and the silence around the war enforced in the Russian media, as the Kremlin, once again, tries to obscure the scale of its involvement in Ukraine.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Russia › AT: IL › IL---Russian Info Ops Fail
Jeff Schogol 22, senior Pentagon reporter with Task & Purpose. He reports on both the Defense Department as well as individual services, covering a variety of topics that include personnel, policy, military justice, deployments, and technology, May 2022, " Russia actually isn’t as good at information warfare as everyone thought," Task & Purpose, https://taskandpurpose.com/analysis/russia-propaganda-war-ukraine/ //AShah
Prior to kicking off its mega-sized Charlie Foxtrot in Ukraine, the Russians were widely regarded as masters of deception and propaganda.
Whether it was Russian troops masquerading as “little green men” in Crimea in 2014 or the successful hacking of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s 2016 presidential campaign, the Kremlin set the gold standard for subterfuge. As Russian President Vladimir Putin was poised to send his forces into Ukraine in February, the State Department warned that Russia’s invasion could be preceded by an elaborately staged “false flag” operation as a pretext for war, just as the Nazis had done in 1939 when they claimed Poland had attacked Germany.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Russia › AT: IL › IL---Russian Info Ops Fail
CRI 21, publishes novel research at the leading edges of global risk mitigation, governance design and culture. Their content explores the key challenges and existential threats facing humanity, and the underlying problems with current approaches for addressing them, “It's a MAD Information War”, //lenox
While the 2016 U.S. election was a watershed in computational propaganda, the same phenomenon has basically swept the planet, beginning as early as 2010. Ukraine, Estonia, China, Iran, Mexico, the UK, and the U.S. have all had major politically significant incidents of computational propaganda. Research on computational propaganda is underway at various academic centers and think tanks, including at the Oxford Internet Institute, the Stanford Internet Observatory, and the Digital Forensics Lab of the Atlantic Council. The focus has been largely on the techniques, organizations, and forensic approaches, revealing a dangerous new frontier of digitally enhanced irregular warfare. We posit that this frontier leads toward mutually assured destruction, like all frontiers of arms races in weapons technologies.
In one sense, mutually assured destruction in the context of information war is simple. It has been known from the earliest days of military strategy: you can be blinded by your own smokescreen, and even more so when your enemy is using one too. The use of powerful information manipulation tactics to coerce the enemy requires the creation of organizations that specialize in making and using such tools of war. History suggests that it can be hard to achieve trust and collaboration in governments that maintain large and complex propaganda operations. Stalin’s demise in Russia can be at least partially attributed to this lack of trust. Stalin spent his last days in a bunker, paranoid and suffering the consequences of creating an almost completely manipulated information environment. Accounts show that during the Cold War, both the CIA and KGB used deceptive techniques to convince their own government agencies of the success of their campaigns (i.e. the agencies propagandized their own colleagues to ensure continued support for their work). Societies that depend on the politicized control of information end up shrouding both political leaders and the masses in mere simulations of reality.
We have reached a point at which a difference in magnitude has become a difference in kind.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Russia › Squo Solves › 2NC---Squo Solves Russia
Max Boot 22 (Max Boot, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security Studies, 2-10-2022, "Why the U.S. Ramped Up Its Information War With Russia," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/why-us-ramped-its-information-war-russia, DOA: 6-24-2022//Smarx Ahsan)
For years, American officials have lamented that the United States fights with one arm tied behind its back when it comes to waging information war—i.e., the battle for “hearts and minds.” Adversaries including the self-declared Islamic State and the Kremlin are free to spread lies and conspiracy theories, while the U.S. government generally feels compelled to hew to the truth in its public pronouncements (even as it often tries to conceal scandalous misconduct). U.S. adversaries find it easy to beam propaganda into the United States—often under false pretenses via social media—but it is harder for independent information to penetrate into more tightly controlled media spaces in countries such as China, North Korea, and Russia.
Now, as the crisis over Ukraine escalates, the Joe Biden administration seems to have developed an effective technique for waging information war. Rather than allowing President Vladimir Putin’s government to freely disseminate ludicrous conspiracy theories about anti-Russia plots involving the West and Ukraine, the administration has chosen to fight back by releasing intelligence reports about Russia’s attempts to create a justification for an invasion of Ukraine.
2022
Michigan
Negative
ADV---Russia › Squo Solves › 1NC---Squo Solves Russia
Philip Seib 22, professor of Journalism and Public Diplomacy at USC, 5/9/22,”Why Russia is losing the information war,” https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/why-russia-losing-information-war/mh
Poor Vladimir Putin. Sitting at his long table by himself, confronting failure. The Russian military machine, weighed down by its antiquated hardware and obsolete tactics, can barely hold its own against Ukraine. The Russian economy is on life support. The archenemy, NATO, is poised to expand further, adding Finland and Sweden to its ranks. The Kremlin is not a happy place.
Putin’s information war is also not going well. Just a decade ago, things were very different. Russia had embraced information warfare as a low-risk tool to undermine adversaries. Gen. Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general staff of Russia’s armed forces, wrote in 2013: “The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.”
2022
Michigan
Negative
Kritiks › Security › Link---Hybrid War
Maria Malksoo 18, Researcher at the International Centre for Defence Studies, Tallinn, Estonia and a Lecturer at the Institute of Government and Politics, University of Tartu, Estonia. Her main research interests include critical security studies, political anthropology and European memory politics. “Countering Hybrid Warfare as Ontological Security Management: The Emerging Practices of the EU and NATO” European Security 27(3), pp. 374-392 //lenox
NATO “Hybrid warfare” has emerged as yet another “resilience test” (Stoltenberg 2015a) for the Alliance in its post-Cold War existential search for a new purpose and mission. Moreover, the hybrid insecurity predicament enables the allies to bring together the renewed focus on NATO’s traditional mission (i.e. endorsing collective defence in order to counter the main geopolitical contestant of the North Atlantic Alliance in Europe) and the Alliance’s post-Cold War out-of-area military expeditions. While “tak[ing] on two different forms of strategic challenges simultaneously” – that is, “the Russian hybrid warfare approach” and that of “other non-state actors like ISIS to the south” – remains NATO’s “greatest challenge”, the common idea behind these “hybrid strategies” endorses the relevance of “a comprehensive approach across the DIMEFIL spectrum” (i.e. diplomatic/political, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, legal) for NATO (Breedlove 2015, p. xxv; cf. Bell 2012, pp. 225-226). The “beauty of the hybrid warfare concept” is accordingly seen to lie in its ability to “provide[] tools for a comparative strategic perspective of NATO’s southern and eastern flanks, while allowing for a differentiated response” (Johnson 2015, p. 276). NATO’s motto in the face of these twofold challenges is called to be “adopt, adapt, adept”: the new strategies adopted to deal with the hybrid threats to NATO’s East and South need to be accompanied by NATO’s adaptation of “its structure and readiness to become adept at handling the new challenges it faces” (Calha 2015, p. 9). Countering hybrid threats posed by Russia and the Islamic radicals threatening the territories, populations, interests, and values of the Alliance thus enables NATO to endorse its continuing relevance by constructing a strong narrative and maintaining its OS as the core security guarantor for its members (cf. Flockhart 2012, pp. 78-79). The softer, partnership geared, or so-called “Jane” narrative of the early-post Cold War NATO is clearly giving way 23 to a more familiar, hard security-focused “Tarzan” self-vision and public representation (see further Flockhart 2011). Calling the kettle black is the least of NATO’s worries: Russia’s use of “proxy soldiers, unmarked Special Forces, intimidation and propaganda, all to lay a thick fog of confusion; to obscure its true purpose in Ukraine; and to attempt deniability” is explicitly dissected in outlining NATO’s emerging counter-strategy to hybrid engagements of the sort (Stoltenberg 2015a). Yet, just the traditional set of NATO’s capabilities is clearly deemed to be insufficient in the face of, inter alia, “sophisticated disinformation and radicalization campaigns” (Stoltenberg 2015b), this more forceful and traditional antagonist-driven agenda reflects NATO’s long-pursued comprehensive approach – that is, “a combination of military and non-military means to stabilize countries” (that others use to “destabilize”) (Stoltenberg 2015a). “Hybrid” is accordingly coined as “the dark reflection” of NATO’s comprehensive approach, and accordingly, early warning and situation awareness, good governance and the resilience of societies become equally essential parts of deterrence and defence against hybrid threats (Stoltenberg 2015a). This necessitates “renewed attention to strategic communications” and public outreach and education “to build up public awareness and resilience” and “strengthen the role of an informed civil society in every member state” (Calha 2015, p. 10).13 NATO declared its readiness to address the specific challenges posed by “hybrid warfare threats” in the Wales Summit Declaration of 5 September 2014 as a forceful response to the conflict in Ukraine. While NATO’s traditional toolbox of collective defence is hardly perfectly geared for “insidious and ambiguous threats” (Johnson 2015, p. 270; Calha 2015, p. 4), countering hybrid warfare emerges as a continuing relevance and resilience test for the Alliance. NATO’s institutional responses to “hybrid threats” have been further detailed in its Readiness Action Plan, a roadmap for building capability packages, a comprehensive concept for creating an enhanced NATO response force, in a classified strategy for hybrid warfare and a cyber security action plan. Altogether, the ambiguity and gradient nature of hybrid tactics directly challenge the ontological underpinnings of NATO’s core mission and strength as hybrid activities might “progress incrementally towards a threatening situation while remaining under NATO’s Article 5 threshold” (Calha 2015, p. 4). The detection and definition of a threat hence becomes significantly less straightforward, pointing at the need to renegotiate the scope and substance of NATO’s collective defence clause (i.e. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty) in light of the contemporary hybrid engagements. Conclusion This article has brought the notion of OS to bear on the thus far heavily policy-oriented hybrid warfare literature. As hybrid threats epitomize ontological insecurity, NATO and the EU’s synergistic discourse and emerging practice on countering the hybrid menace emerges as an attempt at the institutionalization of their organizational OS-seeking. Tackling the hybrid challenges of the day in apparent unison further provides NATO and the EU a silver lining of a tightened cooperation between the two organizations. Further research could map the complex interactions between the OS-seeking strategies of these distinct intergovernmental institutions and their member states/societies with regard to countering hybrid warfare. It would be interesting to investigate, for example, how the traditional lines of division within the European community along the more Russia-friendly and Russia-wary countries might tap into the institutional dynamics of hybrid threat management of the EU and NATO. Moreover, the newly established special sub-institutions to confront hybrid threats within the EU along with the organizationally unaffiliated Centre of Excellence could themselves develop their own 25 identities, OS drives and placating routines, potentially generating organizational fragmentation and inter-agency tensions instead of bolstering the OS of the Union as a whole (cf. Steele 2017). With regard to the ethical drawbacks of effective hybrid threat management, such endeavour points at the problematic prospect of compromising the already fuzzy distinction between politics and war – as according to the hybrid warfare paradigm, all politics becomes reduced to the potential build-up phase for a full-blown confrontation. In that sense, hybrid warfare is close to the criteria of “minimal wars, which consist in merely threatening the enemy with negotiations held in reserve” (Clausewitz 1976, 604, emphasis in the original). The alleged “minimality” of such a way of warfare nonetheless has considerable potential to induce broad and deep securitisation of various public policy processes in the Western societies and their supranational organizations in question. Hybrid warfare and the emerging institutionalization of its countering practices highlight the paradox of defending democratic security communities, as the efficacy of such defence might in fact be detrimental to some of the core organising principles of democracy. An alternative approach would be to argue that hybrid warfare, and the countering practices it is generating, have simply brought the nature of the modern power out into the open. As Foucault maintains in his Society Must Be Defended, liberal “civil peace” must be understood as a secret form of war, for “war is the principle and motor of the exercise of political power” in general (Foucault 2003, p. 18). Viewed from such a perspective, hybrid warfare and its emerging management practices by the EU and NATO enable us to see what politics is allegedly all about anyway – “the continuation of war by other means” (Foucault 2003, p. 15). For the EU and NATO, hybrid warfare embodies not just the unsettling of the politics/war distinction but raises the fundamental question about the practical distinguishability of their physical and ontological security in the first place.
2022
Michigan
Negative
Kritiks › Capitalism › Cap K---Link---Info Warfare
Joseph Bernstein 21 is a senior reporter at BuzzFeed News and a 2021 Nieman Fellow. “Bad News: Selling the story of disinformation,” Harper’s Magazine, //chico
This finding resonated with earlier research suggesting that disinformation typically needs the support of political and media elites to spread widely. That is to say, the persuasiveness of information on social platforms depends on context. Propaganda doesn’t show up out of nowhere, and it doesn’t all work the same way. Ellul wrote of the necessary role of what he called “pre-propaganda”:
Direct propaganda, aimed at modifying opinions and attitudes, must be preceded by propaganda that is sociological in character, slow, general, seeking to create a climate, an atmosphere of favorable preliminary attitudes. No direct propaganda can be effective without pre-propaganda, which, without direct or noticeable aggression, is limited to creating ambiguities, reducing prejudices, and spreading images, apparently without purpose.