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2022 Michigan Evidence
ATs › AT: LIO Good---TL

3 – their authors cherry-pick data – their ev engages in the myth of the LIO it’s a nostalgic misreading of history – every so-called US led success was devoid of LIO principles

Staniland, PhD, 18

(Paul, PoliSci@MIT, AssocProfPoliSci@UniversityOfChicago, 7-29, https://www.lawfareblog.com/misreading-liberal-order-why-we-need-new-thinking-american-foreign-policy)

Witnessing the chaos, critics of the Trump administration have made its damage to the post-1945 “liberal international order” a central part of their criticism. In their view, the United States created and led a post-World War II order—made up of international rules and institutions, free trade, and democracy—that generated enormous benefits now threatened by the Trump administration’s actions. A post-Trump foreign policy, they argue, needs to re-embrace the fundamentals of this order. Pushing back against Trump’s foreign policy is an important goal. But moving forward requires a more serious analysis than claiming that the “liberal international order” was the centerpiece of past U.S. foreign-policy successes, and thus should be again. Both claims are flawed. We need to understand the limits of the liberal international order, where it previously failed to deliver benefits, and why it offers little guidance for many contemporary questions. First, advocates of the order tend to skim past the policies pursued under the liberal order that have not worked. These mistakes need to be directly confronted to do better in the future. Proponents of the order, however, often present a narrow and highly selective reading of history that ignores much of the coercion, violence, and instability that accompanied post-war history. Problematic outcomes are treated as either aberrant exceptions or as not truly characterizing the order. One recent defense of the liberal order by prominent liberal institutionalists Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, for instance, does not mention Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, or Libya. Professors Stephen Chaudoin, Helen Milner, and Dustin Tingley herald the order’s “support for freedom, democracy, human rights, a free press.” Kori Schake writes that Western democracies’ wars are “about enlarging the perimeter of security and prosperity, expanding and consolidating the liberal order.” Historian Hal Brands argues that the order has advocated “political liberalism in the form of representative government and human rights; and other liberal concepts, such as nonaggression, self-determination, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.” Other analysts have persuasively argued that these accounts create an “imagined” picture of post-World War II history. Patrick Porter outlines in detail how coercive, violent, and hypocritical U.S. foreign policy has often been. To the extent an international liberal order ever actually existed beyond a small cluster of countries, writes Nick Danforth, it was recent and short-lived. Thomas Meaney and Stephen Wertheim further argue that “critics exaggerate Mr. Trump’s abnormality,” situating him within a long history of the pursuit of American self-interest. Graham Allison—no bomb-throwing radical—has recently written that the order was a “myth” and that credit for the lack of great power war should instead go to nuclear deterrence. Coercion and disregard for both allies and political liberalism have been entirely compatible with the “liberal” order. The last two decades have been a bumpy ride for U.S. foreign policy. Since 9/11, we have seen the disintegration of Syria, Yemen, and Libya, a war without end in Afghanistan, the collapse of the Arab Spring, the rise and resurgence of the Islamic State, and the distinctly mixed success of strategies aimed at managing China’s rise. At home, the growth of a national-security state has placed remarkable power in the hands of Donald Trump. Simply returning to the old order is no guarantee of good results. Grappling openly with failure and self-inflicted wounds—while also acknowledging clear benefits of the order—is essential for moving beyond self-congratulatory platitudes. Second, the liberal order in its idealized form had very limited reach into what are now pivotal areas of U.S. security policy: Asia, the Middle East, and the “developing world” more broadly. The core of the liberal order remains transatlantic, but Asia is now growing dramatically in wealth and military power. What is the record of the order in the region? There was certainly some democracy promotion when authoritarian regimes began to totter, but there was also deep, sustained cooperation with dictators like Suharto and Ferdinand Marcos; while there are some regional institutions (such as ASEAN), they are comparatively weak; while there are some rules, they have been deeply contested. Close U.S. allies like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea (the latter two experiencing long bouts of U.S.-allied autocracy) were not integrated into a broad alliance pact like NATO. India and Pakistan were never part of the core order, and China was only very partially integrated (primarily into the economic pillar of the order, and through ad hoc security cooperation from the 1970s). Southeast Asia has been a site of warfare and authoritarianism for much of its post-1945 history. The United States has long considered the Middle East vital to its security, but the extent to which the United States should invest its own blood and treasure in protecting the area was always up for debate. It was only in the 1970s that the United States decided it was prepared to use force to defend the region; “dual containment” in the 1990s was always controversial, while the invasion of Iraq and its chaotic aftermath revealed deep fissures over how much presence was enough. Meanwhile, liberalism, democracy, human rights, and international institutions have not made much of a mark in the region. Jake Sullivan, in a rather odd defense of the order, suggests that “Middle Eastern instability has been a feature, not a bug, of the system.” This is not reassuring about the order’s ability to structure politics in the area. The same can be said about the order’s history in Africa, with deep Western involvement in civil wars, support for authoritarian regimes, and often-counterproductive demands for economic liberalization contributing to ongoing instability. The legacy of the “liberal order” is both far more complex and shallower outside of the north Atlantic core than within it. Invocations of the order are seen with greater cynicism and suspicion in these areas than in Washington or Berlin. Yet they are precisely the regions that are increasingly the focus of U.S. security policy. Finally, and as the preceding already suggests, the idea of “liberal order” is itself frequently too vague a concept, and was too incomplete a phenomenon, to offer guidance on a number of key contemporary questions. Allison goes so far as to call it “conceptual Jell-o.” The extremely abstract principles that experts use to define the order are confronted with a reality of extreme historical variation. This amorphousness undermines its usefulness as an actual guide to future foreign policy. U.S. alliances in Western Europe since World War II looked dramatically different than those in East Asia. Both have achieved their basic goals, so which should be the model for the future? The United States often applied pressure to coerce its allies into adopting economic and security policies conducive to U.S. interests—going so far as to threaten abandonment of close European allies—even as it simultaneously built key elements of the liberal order. The core of the liberal order was a more tenuous and contested political space than we often remember. This inconsistency applies to involvement in the domestic politics of other states. The United States has regularly embraced authoritarian leaders (and distanced itself from democratic regimes), while at other times it has helped to push these leaders out in the face of domestic mobilization. Advocates of the order tend to stress the latter and dismiss the former as aberrant, but both strategies contributed to the ultimate victory of the liberal order over the Soviet bloc. The order’s history offers support for aggressively promoting democracy, accepting democratization when it emerges, and strongly supporting friendly dictators. This makes it unhelpful for grappling with the question of whether and how to promote democracy. The same is true of military interventions and covert operations abroad. U.S. leaders invested heavily in Cold War proxy wars and the overthrow of foreign regimes, while at other times and places they avoided such interventions. This history carries important implications for addressing today’s policy challenges. Simply appealing to the order does not, for instance, tell us much about how to deal with a rising China: Since the liberal order included highly institutionalized alliances, loose “hub-and-spoke” arrangements, and coalitions of the willing, and was characterized by both preventive wars and containment, it is extremely unclear what the order suggests for America’s China strategy. While “rules-based” order is a term in vogue, it doesn’t tell us what the rules should actually be, or how they should be decided. Nor does appealing to the liberal order help us understand whether the United States needs to be deeply involved or largely absent from the Middle East, or somewhere in between. Under the order, democracy promotion and assertive liberal intervention sometimes occurred, but so too did restraint and an acceptance of autocracy. There are no answers in the liberal international order for navigating the enormously difficult terrain of the contemporary Middle East.

2022 Michigan Evidence
ATs › AT: LIO Good---TL

2 - Interventionism – LIO norms are hollow and coercive – they’re a guise for endless intervention

Staniland 18 --- PhD from MIT (Paul Staniland is Associate Professor of Political Science and Chair of the Committee on International Relations at the University of Chicago, “Misreading the “Liberal Order”: Why We Need New Thinking in American Foreign Policy,” July 29, https://www.lawfareblog.com/misreading-liberal-order-why-we-need-new-thinking-american-foreign-policy)//CMR

Pushing back against Trump’s foreign policy is an important goal. But moving forward requires a more serious analysis than claiming that the “liberal international order” was the centerpiece of past U.S. foreign-policy successes, and thus should be again. Both claims are flawed. We need to understand the limits of the liberal international order, where it previously failed to deliver benefits, and why it offers little guidance for many contemporary questions. First, advocates of the order tend to skim past the policies pursued under the liberal order that have not worked. These mistakes need to be directly confronted to do better in the future. Proponents of the order, however, often present a narrow and highly selective reading of history that ignores much of the coercion, violence, and instability that accompanied post-war history. Problematic outcomes are treated as either aberrant exceptions or as not truly characterizing the order. One recent defense of the liberal order by prominent liberal institutionalists Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, for instance, does not mention Iraq, Afghanistan, Vietnam, or Libya. Professors Stephen Chaudoin, Helen Milner, and Dustin Tingley herald the order’s “support for freedom, democracy, human rights, a free press.” Kori Schake writes that Western democracies’ wars are “about enlarging the perimeter of security and prosperity, expanding and consolidating the liberal order.” Historian Hal Brands argues that the order has advocated “political liberalism in the form of representative government and human rights; and other liberal concepts, such as nonaggression, self-determination, and the peaceful settlement of disputes.” Other analysts have persuasively argued that these accounts create an “imagined” picture of post-World War II history. Patrick Porter outlines in detail how coercive, violent, and hypocritical U.S. foreign policy has often been. To the extent an international liberal order ever actually existed beyond a small cluster of countries, writes Nick Danforth, it was recent and short-lived. Thomas Meaney and Stephen Wertheim further argue that “critics exaggerate Mr. Trump’s abnormality,” situating him within a long history of the pursuit of American self-interest. Graham Allison—no bomb-throwing radical—has recently written that the order was a “myth” and that credit for the lack of great power war should instead go to nuclear deterrence. Coercion and disregard for both allies and political liberalism have been entirely compatible with the “liberal” order. The last two decades have been a bumpy ride for U.S. foreign policy. Since 9/11, we have seen the disintegration of Syria, Yemen, and Libya, a war without end in Afghanistan, the collapse of the Arab Spring, the rise and resurgence of the Islamic State, and the distinctly mixed success of strategies aimed at managing China’s rise. At home, the growth of a national-security state has placed remarkable power in the hands of Donald Trump. Simply returning to the old order is no guarantee of good results. Grappling openly with failure and self-inflicted wounds—while also acknowledging clear benefits of the order—is essential for moving beyond self-congratulatory platitudes. Second, the liberal order in its idealized form had very limited reach into what are now pivotal areas of U.S. security policy: Asia, the Middle East, and the “developing world” more broadly. The core of the liberal order remains transatlantic, but Asia is now growing dramatically in wealth and military power. What is the record of the order in the region? There was certainly some democracy promotion when authoritarian regimes began to totter, but there was also deep, sustained cooperation with dictators like Suharto and Ferdinand Marcos; while there are some regional institutions (such as ASEAN), they are comparatively weak; while there are some rules, they have been deeply contested. Close U.S. allies like Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea (the latter two experiencing long bouts of U.S.-allied autocracy) were not integrated into a broad alliance pact like NATO. India and Pakistan were never part of the core order, and China was only very partially integrated (primarily into the economic pillar of the order, and through ad hoc security cooperation from the 1970s). Southeast Asia has been a site of warfare and authoritarianism for much of its post-1945 history. The United States has long considered the Middle East vital to its security, but the extent to which the United States should invest its own blood and treasure in protecting the area was always up for debate. It was only in the 1970s that the United States decided it was prepared to use force to defend the region; “dual containment” in the 1990s was always controversial, while the invasion of Iraq and its chaotic aftermath revealed deep fissures over how much presence was enough. Meanwhile, liberalism, democracy, human rights, and international institutions have not made much of a mark in the region. Jake Sullivan, in a rather odd defense of the order, suggests that “Middle Eastern instability has been a feature, not a bug, of the system.” This is not reassuring about the order’s ability to structure politics in the area. The same can be said about the order’s history in Africa, with deep Western involvement in civil wars, support for authoritarian regimes, and often-counterproductive demands for economic liberalization contributing to ongoing instability. The legacy of the “liberal order” is both far more complex and shallower outside of the north Atlantic core than within it. Invocations of the order are seen with greater cynicism and suspicion in these areas than in Washington or Berlin. Yet they are precisely the regions that are increasingly the focus of U.S. security policy. Finally, and as the preceding already suggests, the idea of “liberal order” is itself frequently too vague a concept, and was too incomplete a phenomenon, to offer guidance on a number of key contemporary questions. Allison goes so far as to call it “conceptual Jell-o.” The extremely abstract principles that experts use to define the order are confronted with a reality of extreme historical variation. This amorphousness undermines its usefulness as an actual guide to future foreign policy. U.S. alliances in Western Europe since World War II looked dramatically different than those in East Asia. Both have achieved their basic goals, so which should be the model for the future? The United States often applied pressure to coerce its allies into adopting economic and security policies conducive to U.S. interests—going so far as to threaten abandonment of close European allies—even as it simultaneously built key elements of the liberal order. The core of the liberal order was a more tenuous and contested political space than we often remember. This inconsistency applies to involvement in the domestic politics of other states. The United States has regularly embraced authoritarian leaders (and distanced itself from democratic regimes), while at other times it has helped to push these leaders out in the face of domestic mobilization. Advocates of the order tend to stress the latter and dismiss the former as aberrant, but both strategies contributed to the ultimate victory of the liberal order over the Soviet bloc. The order’s history offers support for aggressively promoting democracy, accepting democratization when it emerges, and strongly supporting friendly dictators. This makes it unhelpful for grappling with the question of whether and how to promote democracy. The same is true of military interventions and covert operations abroad. U.S. leaders invested heavily in Cold War proxy wars and the overthrow of foreign regimes, while at other times and places they avoided such interventions. This history carries important implications for addressing today’s policy challenges. Simply appealing to the order does not, for instance, tell us much about how to deal with a rising China: Since the liberal order included highly institutionalized alliances, loose “hub-and-spoke” arrangements, and coalitions of the willing, and was characterized by both preventive wars and containment, it is extremely unclear what the order suggests for America’s China strategy. While “rules-based” order is a term in vogue, it doesn’t tell us what the rules should actually be, or how they should be decided. Nor does appealing to the liberal order help us understand whether the United States needs to be deeply involved or largely absent from the Middle East, or somewhere in between. Under the order, democracy promotion and assertive liberal intervention sometimes occurred, but so too did restraint and an acceptance of autocracy. There are no answers in the liberal international order for navigating the enormously difficult terrain of the contemporary Middle East.

2022 Michigan Evidence
ATs › AT: LIO Good---TL

1 – Empirics – LIO has failed with EVERY crisis their ev cites

Zelikow 22 — Philip Zelikow Professor of History at the University of Virginia. A former U.S. diplomat and Executive Director of the 9/11 Commission, he has worked for five presidential administrations., “The Hollow Order,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 22 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-06-21/hollow-order-international-system, accessed 7-1-2022, WMK

In their statement, China and Russia achieved peak hypocrisy. But the existing world order, which aspired to build a global commonwealth, had already been failing. The free world’s leaders had long ago started favoring performative commitments over the real action needed to safeguard the planet from crises. They expanded NATO without meaningfully responding to increasing Russian aggression. Distracted and chastened by misadventures in the Muslim world, Washington in particular disengaged from practical deeds, even as its rhetorical commitment to the international order varied. The United States’ high defense spending had more to do with satisfying domestic constituencies than with supporting any positive strategy. The world’s transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources was based on hollow pledges and private action. As support for globalization waned, the United States and other countries retreated from trade agreements and neglected international institutions for civilian and common economic action. The world’s drive in the early years of this century to improve global health and human development petered out.

The emptiness of the supposed international system was especially obvious at the end of 2019, when the COVID-19 pandemic broke out. Charged with unprecedented global responsibilities, China and the United States stepped down, not up. Beijing withheld crucial information about the outbreak. Washington withdrew from the World Health Organization just when it most needed U.S. leadership. Wealthy countries began a mad scramble to develop vaccines, but they moved too slowly to create other treatments and hoarded whatever shots and therapeutics pharmaceutical companies could produce, leaving the rest of the world behind. The best estimates suggest that the virus caused about 15 to 20 million deaths and trillions of dollars of economic damage.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Liberal International Order Bad › ! – African Instability

African civil wars are the only scenario for great power conflict --- bipolarity stops wars except those motivated by fears that civil wars will threaten resources essential for state survival

Yeisley 11 (Mark O. Yeisley – PhD in IR from Duke University, assistant professor of IR @ the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. <KEN> “Bipolarity, Proxy Wars, and the Rise of China,” Strategic Studies Quarterly. Spring 2011. DOA: 11/19/19. )

Volumes of scholarly literature detail China’s rise to great-power status and the likely implications thereof.37 Given its prodigious economic growth, it is natural to question whether such a rise will be accompanied by US-Sino conflict. Such an outcome is unlikely, primarily because of a return of nuclear parity within a bipolar environment.38 There are concerns over China’s increasing need for fuel imports to support its expanding infrastructure. China shows little concern with the political ideologies of regimes with which it trades; yet, its willingness to deal with states like Iran and Sudan could worsen relations with the United States.39 China’s ongoing military modernization also appears designed in part to deny the United States the ability to deter it in the near future through strategies focused primarily on interruptions of its oil supply via area denial or control of critical eastern sea lines of communication. China is expanding its web of regional alliances via arms transfers and other inducements that may result in a wall of allies the United States will find difficult to penetrate to protect its interests in the Eastern Hemisphere.40 China is also willing to protect those interests militarily where necessary; some aver the 1996 Taiwan crisis indicated China may be prepared to take Taiwan by force in a preemptive attack.41 Yet, evidence suggests its neighbors welcome the economic opportunities China presents to them and believe its intentions are peaceful and focused on domestic stability and growth rather than regional dominance.42 Since it is unlikely that any regional attempts to balance a rising China are forthcoming, at least in the near term, it falls to the United States as the peer competitor to do so. While US military preeminence is still clear, trends appear to indicate the United States will find it increasingly difficult to compete with China for strategic resource requirements as China’s geostrategic influence expands. Bipolarity, Nuclear Weapons, and Sino-US Proxy Conflict in Africa It is likely China will achieve economic and then military parity with the United States in the next two decades. China currently possesses 240 nuclear warheads and 135 ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States or its allies; that number of nuclear warheads is estimated to double by the mid 2020s.43 As during the Cold War, a bipolar system in which war between the United States and China is too costly will lead to policy decisions that seek conflict resolution elsewhere.44 [Insert Footnote 44] 44. Aaron Friedberg, “The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?” International Security 30, no. 2 (2005): 17–19, argues that the costs of such conflict will cause both sides to carefully avoid direct conflict. [Exit Footnote 44] But why would China’s rising necessarily lead to geostrategic competition with the United States, and where would this most likely occur? Unlike the Cold War, access to strategic resources rather than ideology would lie at the heart of future US-Sino competition, and the new “great game” will most likely be played in Africa. Despite Communist Party control of its government, China is not interested in spreading its version of communism and is much more pragmatic in its objectives—securing resources to meet the needs of its citizens and improve their standard of living.45 Some estimates show that China will overtake the United States to become the world’s largest economy by 2015, and rising powers usually take the necessary steps to “ensure markets, materials, and transportation routes.”46 China is the leading global consumer of aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, zinc, tin, and iron ore, and its metal needs now represent more than 25 percent of the world’s total.47 In contrast, from 1970 to 1995, US consumption of all materials, including metals, accounted for one-third of the global total despite representing only 5 percent of the world’s population.48 China is the largest energy consumer, according to the International Energy Agency, surpassing the United States in consumption of oil, coal, and natural gas in 2009.49 As the two largest consumers of both global energy and materials, the United States and China must seek foreign policy prescriptions to fulfill future resource needs. While the United States can alleviate some of its energy needs via bio- or coal-based fuels, hydrogen, or natural gas alternatives, China currently lacks the technological know-how to do so and remains tied to a mainly nonrenewable energy resource base. Since the majority of these needs are nonrenewable, competition of necessity will be zero-sum and will be conducted via all instruments of power.50 Africa is home to a wealth of mineral and energy resources, much of which still remains largely unexploited. Seven African states possess huge endowments of oil, and four of these have equally substantial amounts of natural gas.51 Africa also enjoys large deposits of bauxite (used to make aluminum), copper, lead, nickel, zinc, and iron ore, all of which are imported and highly desired by China. Recent activity serves to prove that China seeks greater access to natural resources in Africa by avidly promoting Chinese development in a large number of African nations. South Africa, the continent’s largest economy, has recently allowed China to help develop its vast mineral wealth; it is China’s number one African source of manganese, iron, and copper.52 Chinese involvement in Africa is not wholly extractive; the continent provides a booming export market for China’s goods and a forum to augment its soft power in the region by offering alternatives to the political and economic baggage that accompanies US foreign aid.53 Of primary interest is open access to Africa’s significant deposits of oil and other energy resources. For example, China has 4,000 military personnel in Sudan to protect its interests in energy and mineral investments there; it also owns 40 percent of the Greater Nile Oil Production Company. 54 Estimates indicate that within the next few decades China will obtain 40 percent of its oil and gas supplies from Africa.55 Trade and investment in Africa have also been on the rise; trade has grown more than 10 percent annually in the past decade. Between 2002 and 2004, African exports to China doubled, ranking it third behind the United States and France in trade with the continent. Chinese investment is also growing; more than 700 Chinese business operations across Africa total over $1 billion. Aid and direct economic assistance are increasing as well, and China has forgiven the debt of some 31 African nations.56 Africa is thus a vital foreign interest for the Chinese and must be for the United States; access to its mineral and petroleum wealth is crucial to the survival of each.57 Although the US and Chinese economies are tightly interconnected, the nonrenewable nature of these assets means competition will remain a zero-sum game. Nearly all African states have been independent entities for less than 50 years; consolidating robust domestic state institutions and stable governments remains problematic.58 Studies have shown that weak governments are often prime targets for civil conflicts that prove costly to control.59 Many African nations possess both strategic resources and weak regimes, making them vulnerable to internal conflict and thus valuable candidates for assistance from China or the United States to help settle their domestic grievances. With access to African resources of vital strategic interest to each side, competition could likely occur by proxy via diplomatic, economic, or military assistance to one (or both) of the parties involved. Realist claims that focusing on third-world issues is misplaced are thus fallacious; war in a future US-China bipolar system remains as costly as it was during the Cold War. Because of the fragile nature of many African regimes, domestic grievances are more prone to result in conflict; US and Chinese strategic interests will dictate an intrusive foreign policy to be both prudent and vital. US-Sino proxy conflicts over control of African resources will likely become necessary if these great powers are to sustain their national security postures, especially in terms of strategic defense.60 What does this mean for the future of US grand and military strategy, foreign policy prescriptions, future defense acquisition priorities, and military doctrine and training?

2022 Michigan Evidence
Liberal International Order Bad › ! – African Instability

African instability causes terrorism and global war

Mead 13 (Walter Russel Mead, Distinguished Fellow at Hudson Institute, the James Clarke Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College, December 15, 2013. “Peace In The Congo? Why The World Should Care” )

One of the biggest questions of the 21st century is whether this destructive dynamic can be contained, or whether the demand for ethnic, cultural and/or religious homogeneity will continue to convulse world politics, drive new generations of conflict, and create millions more victims. The Congo conflict is a disturbing piece of evidence suggesting that, in Africa at least, there is potential for this kind of conflict. The Congo war (and the long Hutu-Tutsi conflict in neighboring countries) is not, unfortunately alone. The secession of South Sudan from Sudan proper, the wars in what remains of that unhappy country, the secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia and the rise of Christian-Muslim tension right across Africa (where religious conflict often is fed by and intensifies “tribal”—in Europe we would say “ethnic” or “national”—conflicts) are strong indications that the potential for huge and destructive conflict across Africa is very real. But one must look beyond Africa. The Middle East of course is aflame in religious and ethnic conflict. The old British Raj including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka offers countless examples of ethnic and religious conflict that sometimes is contained, and sometimes boils to the surface in horrendous acts of violence. Beyond that, rival nationalisms in East and Southeast Asia are keeping the world awake at night. The Congo war should be a reminder to us all that the foundations of our world are dynamite, and that the potential for new conflicts on the scale of the horrific wars of the 20th century is very much with us today. The second lesson from this conflict stems from the realization of how much patience and commitment from the international community (which in this case included the Atlantic democracies and a coalition of African states working as individual countries and through various international institutions) it has taken to get this far towards peace. Particularly at a time when many Americans want the US to turn inwards, there are people who make the argument that it is really none of America’s business to invest time and energy in the often thankless task of solving these conflicts. That might be an ugly but defensible position if we didn’t live in such a tinderbox world. Someone could rationally say, yes, it’s terrible that a million plus people are being killed overseas in a horrific conflict, but the war is really very far away and America has urgent needs at home and we should husband the resources we have available for foreign policy on things that have more power to affect us directly. The problem is that these wars spread. They may start in places that we don’t care much about (most Americans didn’t give a rat’s patootie about whether Germany controlled the Sudetenland in 1938 or Danzig in 1939) but they tend to spread to places that we do care very much about. This can be because a revisionist great power like Germany in 1938-39 needs to overturn the balance of power in Europe to achieve its goals, or it can be because instability in a very remote place triggers problems in places that we care about very much. Out of Afghanistan in 2001 came both 9/11 and the waves of insurgency and instability that threaten to rip nuclear-armed Pakistan apart or trigger wider conflict with India. Out of the mess in Syria a witches’ brew of terrorism and religious conflict looks set to complicate the security of our allies in Europe and the Middle East and even the security of the oil supply on which the world economy so profoundly depends. Africa, and the potential for upheaval there, is of more importance to American security than many people may understand. The line between Africa and the Middle East is a soft one. The weak states that straddle the southern approaches of the Sahara are ideal petri dishes for Al Qaeda type groups to form and attract local support. There are networks of funding and religious contact that give groups in these countries potential access to funds, fighters, training and weapons from the Middle East. A war in the eastern Congo might not directly trigger these other conflicts, but it helps to create the swirling underworld of arms trading, money transfers, illegal commerce and the rise of a generation of young men who become experienced fighters—and know no other way to make a living. It destabilizes the environment for neighboring states (like Uganda and Kenya) that play much more direct role in potential crises of greater concern to us.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Liberal International Order Bad › I/L China Solves African Instability

Illiberalism --- it promotes long-term planning, democracy freezes action

Baker 17 (Thomas Baker – PhD in Sociology from the National University of Singapore, “The Real Source of China’s Soft Power,” The Diplomat. November 18, 2017. )

First, they are seeing Chinese soft power through an American lens. That the United States was the case study for Nye’s theory is not a problem; the problem is assuming that other nations need to be like America in order to be attractive. This is to universalize the particular and speaks of the ethnocentrism of many American policy thinkers. Since China is diametrically opposite to America, the conclusion is that China lacks fundamental criteria to be an attractive country. China’s attractiveness is in fact very different from the United States’, and American observers may be blind to what makes China attractive. This is not “soft power with Chinese characteristics,” as Mikael Weissmann calls it facetiously, but requires an understanding of how the rest of the world thinks. As my colleague Bill Case has proposed, China is in fact a very attractive model to leaders and politicians in Southeast Asia and no doubt in other parts of the world. Leaders see in China a powerful nation able to defy American and Western dictates, whilst ensuring economic stability and prosperity for its citizens. China emerges as a solution for struggling regimes in Southeast Asia as they navigate difficult economic scenarios or, in the case of Malaysia’s embattled Prime Minister Najib Razak, a corruption scandal that threatens the legitimacy of his premiership. China provides a useful model for already illiberal and authoritarian-leaning political leaders and regimes to sustain themselves. American and other Western observers fall into the trap of assuming that freedom, civil liberties, and democracy are more desired than economic stability and prosperity. As Chua Beng Huat has argued in the case of Singapore, liberalism is not a necessary precondition for the functioning of an advanced capitalist nation. Instead the legitimacy of Singapore’s leaders comes from their performance as economic managers and their ability to respond to citizen demands. Francis Fukuyama’s “End of History” argument increasingly looks anachronistic. Many people in developing and poorer nations look up to Singapore, and increasingly China, as a model of political stability coupled with economic growth and prosperity. If people have to give up a few civil liberties – which many do not enjoy anyway – then why not, if it means less corruption, better infrastructure, more jobs, and increased income. Looking at China’s rapid development – and as more people see it – China will grow in stature amongst lay opinion. Democracy is increasingly seen to produce inaction and stalemate as evidenced in countries across the European Union, United States, and Australia. Many Indonesians increasingly opine that things were better under authoritarianism and pejoratively call the post-1998 era “democrazy.” China, by contrast, is seen to take a no-nonsense approach to problems; it has clear objectives and gets things done. Rights may be trampled or limited in this process, but to many people who live in clogged cities like Jakarta or Manila or in underdeveloped regions, China’s model of action and development look like a godsend. In an era of economic uncertainty, declining social mobility, economic inequality, rising unemployment, and casualization, the American model looks increasingly less appealing. If the election of Donald Trump is symptomatic of these problems, then it is little wonder that people are looking to other countries to emulate. On the other side of the Pacific, China continues to grow in stature and appears to be a paradigm of stability and prosperity. China’s success is of course not guaranteed, but in a world of economic uncertainty, the China model increasingly looks more attractive than Pax Americana.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Liberal International Order Bad › I/L China Solves African Instability

The Western LIO model is privatization --- it’s an economic disease as per statistical evidence

*empirical comparison of Latin America with East Asia, income inequality, state investment/social safety nets, adjustment based on local characteristics

Arifin 17 (Bustanul, Professor of Agricultural Economics at UNILA, Senior Economist at INDEF and Professorial Fellow at InterCAFE-IPB and SB-IPB, He earned PhD from University of Wisconsin-Madison, “The Failure of the Washington Consensus, the Need for a New Reform and the Rise of the Beijing Consensus,” AEGIS: Journal of International Relations, 1(2), 118-130)

The Washington Consensus has brought a serious debate and critiques. The structuralist thinkers such Dani Rodrick and Joseph E. Stiglitz have explicitly mentioned strong critiques towards the Washington Consensus. They oppose the consensus offered by John Williamson and say the Washington Consensus has become a source of crisis and problem for developing and less-developed countries. Both Rodrick and Stiglitz have challenged the term which described as the fundamental policies of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the US Treasury Department where Stiglitz calls it as a “one size fits all” treatment of individual economies. Stiglitz said that the treatment suggested by the International Monetary Fund [IMF] and the World Bank is too simple: one dose, fast stabilize, liberalize and privatize, without prioritizing or watching for side effects (Stiglitz, 2002).

2022 Michigan Evidence
Liberal International Order Bad › I/L China Solves African Instability

Chinese leadership is key to African stability---its seen as more credible than Western aid which makes it uniquely effective

Lammich 19 — Lammich, Georg. University of Duisburg-Essen "Stability Through Multilateral Cooperation: China and Regional Security in Africa." African Conflict & Peacebuilding Review, vol. 9 no. 1, 2019, p. 100-123. Project MUSE muse.jhu.edu/article/726051. WMK

To counter these potential risks to China’s influence and reputation, close collaboration with the AU and other African subregional organizations, that are clearly non-Western actors and seen as mostly independent from US influence, offers a viable solution. The partial syntonization of China’s policies with those of the AU in areas that are either less important or in line with the Chinese security and foreign policy strategy is, on the one hand, deflecting neocolonial criticism and, on the other, balancing the interventionist position of the West. Although China’s stance toward international intervention is far more passive than the principles of mandatory intervention articulated in Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the AU and the clashes between the Chinese concept of “noninterference” with the AU’s notion of “nonindifference,” both have shown many similarities in their position on national sovereignty and interstate conflicts. China is highlighting those cases where the views of the AU and key African players converge with their own positions and use them as reference points for their military engagement or the absence thereof on the continent (Van Hoeymissen 2011: 102). Thus, in 2008, Beijing justified its criticism of international sanctions against Zimbabwe with the remark that the Chinese position was in line with that of the AU and the SADC, which both opposed sanctions and were regarded by China as the consensus of African countries on the current situation (United Nations 2008a; Van Hoeymissen 2011: 100). Apart from the rhetorical level, there is a growing appreciation of the AU as a capable actor in conflict resolution, and China has emphasized its willingness to take concrete measures to help Africa reinforce its collective security mechanism. Hence, China has supported the AU in various areas related to peace and security, particularly the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the hybrid UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), provided military aid, and conducted several training courses for AU troops and security personnel at the Peace and Security Department in China (Woldemichael 2012: iii). As stated in China’s African policy paper (2006), “China supports the positive efforts by the AU and other African regional organizations and African countries concerned to settle regional conflicts and will provide assistance within our own capacity. It will urge the UN Security Council to pay attention to and help resolve regional conflicts in Africa. It will continue its support for and participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa.” A decade after this proclamation, China-AU security partnerships have stretched from soft confidence-building measures and preemptive diplomacy to the development of specific conflict solution mechanisms and direct military support. The security-related dialogue and consulting mechanisms between China and the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa have evolved and several regular exchange formats have been created. In 2008 a strategic dialogue mechanism between China and the AU that deals with “major international and regional issues of common concern” (MOFA 2011) was established. The African Union Commission (AUC) is also participating in the Initiative on China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security (ICACPPS), China’s regular exchange with African foreign secretaries (Huang 2011: 264–65; C. Zhang 2016). China sees the AU as the “premier pan-African institutional actor in relation to peace and security matters” (Ukeje 2018: 304) and is increasingly institutionalizing the relation with the AUC and deepening the interregional linkages. One of the goals of the Fifth FOCAC Ministerial Conference held in Beijing in July 2012, which the AU attended for the first time as a full member, was to strengthen cooperation on African peace and security between China and the AU. The action plan adopted at the conference determined that China would launch the initiative on the China-Africa Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Security, provide financial support for AU peacekeeping missions in Africa and the development of the African Standby Force, and train more AU peacekeepers and officials in peace and security affairs. In September 2015, President Xi announced that China will provide free military aid of $100 million over four years to support the African Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (Xi 2015). Three months later, at the 2015 FOCAC summit in Johannesburg, China confirmed its commitment to supporting the AU’s capacity for peacekeeping and promised an additional $US60 million in grants to the ASF and the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crisis (FOCAC 2015). In addition, to direct financial and logistic support to AU peace missions, China is also contributing indirectly to the AU’s military capacity by tying its bilateral military aid to African countries’ contributions to AU missions. Several countries, including South Africa, Tanzania, Nigeria, Burundi, and Uganda, have thus received additional military aid justified by China, due to their contribution to regional security schemes (Shinn 2008; United Nations 2009). The AU has become a major pillar of China’s security strategy in Africa, and it seems that despite the mixed results of AU missions in Africa, China will continue its support for regional African security solutions. China has shown its willingness to support regional initiatives in Africa despite other multilateral or even bilateral solutions that might, for the time being, also serve its interests on the continent. Whether the AU can also establish itself as the premier partner for issues that border on peace and security (terrorism, climate change, piracy, and migration, to name a few) will depend first and foremost on the ability of the AU to mobilize a broad pan-African consensus on these matters (Ukeje 2018: 307). China’s support for the AU and African security in general is not based on any specific program, which leaves a great amount of latitude in its long-term commitments (Van Hoeymissen 2011: 100). Technical and financial support often reflect current issues of China’s foreign policy priorities or come in the wake of big events like the FOCAC summit or top-level visits from China. The contribution to the AU mission in Darfur can thus be interpreted as a reaction to international criticism of the close ties between Beijing and Khartoum and the contribution to AMISOM as a move to protect international trade routes (Shichor 2007). This flexibility creates some uncertainty on the African side and prevents the reliable long-term inclusion of Chinese support for capacity development in Africa’s security sector.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Liberal International Order Bad › ! Warming

Warming causes extinction---runaway tipping points

Cribb 17 – Julian Cribb, Principal of JCA, Fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, Former Director, National Awareness, 2017 (“The Baker,” CSIRO, Surviving the 21st Century Chapter 4, p. 91-94)

This event, known as the Palaeocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum or PETM, happened only about ten million years after the dinosaurs were smashed by an asteroid impact. This ‘hyperthermal’ period took place quite suddenly (in geological terms)—in less than 2000 years—and lasted for about 170,000 years before the planet again cooled. The heat spike was accompanied by a major wipe-out of ocean life in particular, though most small land mammals survived. Investigating the records of old marine sediments Zeebe was able to show there had been a sharp, 70 %, leap in atmospheric CO 2 concentrations at the time. However, he concluded there was only sufficient carbon available to force the climate to warm by 1–3 °C and that some other mechanism must have been triggered by the initial warming, which then drove the Earth’s temperature to fever pitch, up by another 4–6 °C (Zeebe et al. 2009). This process is the ‘ runaway global warming ‘ which now menaces us. The significance of PETM is that it appears that about the same volume of carbon was dumped by natural processes into the Earth’s atmosphere and oceans as humans are currently dumping with the burning of fossil fuels and clearing of the world’s forests—about 3 trillion tonnes in all—and it was this that triggered the hyperthermal surge in planetary heating. As to the mechanism that could suddenly release a huge amount of extra carbon into the atmosphere and oceans and project global temperatures up by 6–9 °C, the most likely explanation is the one described at the start of this chapter—the rapid melting and escape of billions of tonnes of frozen methane, CH 4 , currently locked in tundra and seabed sediments. This phenomenon, dubbed the “clathrate gun ” (Kennett et al. 2003), is now linked by scientists not only with the PETM event but also, according to palaeontologist Peter Ward, with the Great Death of the Permian, the worst annihilation in the history of life on Earth (Ward 2008). The significance of the clathrates is that they consist of methane, a gas that is 72 times more powerful than CO 2 as a climate forcing agent in the short run, and 25 times stronger over a century or so. The clathrates could be released by a process known as ‘ ocean overturning ’, a shift in global current patterns caused by moderate warming, which brings warmer water from the surface down into the depths, to melt the deposits of frozen gas. Unlocking several trillion tonnes of methane would cause global temperatures to rocket upwards sharply. Once such a process gets under way, most experts consider, warming will happen so fast it is doubtful if humans could do anything to stop it even if they instantly ceased all burning of fossil fuels. This ‘double whammy’ of global warming caused by humans releasing three trillion tonnes of fossil carbon which then precipitates an uncontrollable second phase driven by the melting of all or part of the five trillion tonnes of natural methane deposits (Buff et & Archer 2004) is the principal threat to civilisation in the twenty-first century and, combined with nuclear conflict (Chap. 4), to the survival of the human species. The IPCC’s fifth report states that the melting of between 37 and 81 % of the world’s tundra permafrost is ‘virtually certain’ adding “There is a high risk of substantial carbon and methane emissions as a result of permafrost thawing ” ((IPCC 2014a), p. 74). This could involve the venting of as much as 920 billion tonnes of carbon. However, the Panel did not venture an estimate for methane emissions from the melting of the far larger seabed clathrates and a number of scientists have publicly criticised the world’s leading climate body for remaining so close-lipped about this mega-threat to human existence. The IPCC’s reticence is thought to be founded on a lack of adequate scientific data to make a pronouncement with confidence—and partly to fear of the mischief which the fossil fuels lobby would make of any premature estimates. However, it critics argue, by the time we know for sure that the Arctic and seabed methane is escaping in large volumes, it will be too late to do anything about it. The difficulty is that no-one knows how quickly the Earth will heat up, as this depends on something that cannot be scientifically predicted: the behaviour of the whole human species and the timeliness with which we act. Failure to abolish carbon emissions in time will make a 4–5 °C rise in temperature likely. As to what that may mean, here are some eminent opinions : • Warming of 5 °C will mean the planet can support fewer than 1 billion people—Hans-Joachim Shellnhuber, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research (Kanter 2009) • With temperature increases of 4–7 °C billions of people will have to move and there will be very severe conflict—Nicholas Stern, London School of Economics (Kanter 2009) • Food shortages, refugee crises, flooding of major cities and entire island nations, mass extinction of plants and animals, and a climate so drastically altered it may be dangerous for people to work or play outside during the hottest times of the year—IPCC Fifth Assessment (IPCC 2014b) • Corn and soybean yields in the US may decrease by 63–82 %—Schlenker and Roberts, Arizona State University (Schlenker & Roberts 2009a) • Up to 35% of the Earth’s species will be committed to extinction—Chris Thomas, University of Leeds (Thomas et al. 2004) • Total polar melting combined with thermal expansion could involve sea levels eventually rising by 65 m (180 ft), i.e. to the 20th floor of tall buildings, drowning most of the world’s coastal cities and displacing a third or more of the human population (Winkelmann et al. 2015) • Intensified global instability, hunger, poverty and conflict. Food and water shortages, pandemic disease, disputes over refugees and resources, and destruction by natural disasters in regions across the globe—Chuck Hagel, US Secretary for Defence (Hagel 2014) • “Almost inconceivable challenges as human society struggles to adapt… billions of people forced to relocate.… worsening tensions especially over resources… armed conflict is likely and nuclear war is possible”— Kurt Campbell, Center for Strategic and International Studies (Campell et al. 2007). • “Unless we get control of (global warming), it will mean our extinction eventually”—Helen Berry, Canberra University (Snow & Hannam 2014).

2022 Michigan Evidence
Liberal International Order Bad › 1nc – African Instability

Terrorism goes nuclear---extinction

Bunn 21 — Matthew Bunn is the James R. Schlesinger Professor of the Practice of Energy, National Security, and Foreign Policy at Harvard Kennedy School and the Co-Principal Investigator of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center. Matthew Bunn "Twenty years after 9/11, terrorists could still go nuclear," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 9-16-2021, https://thebulletin.org/2021/09/twenty-years-after-9-11-terrorists-could-still-go-nuclear/, accessed 7-10-2022, WMK

But that was then. Today, both al Qaeda and another major jihadist terror group, the Islamic State, have suffered tremendous blows, with their charismatic leaders dead and many others killed or captured. A US-led counterterrorism coalition destroyed the Islamic State’s geographic caliphate in Iraq and Syria. In recent years, many terrorist attacks have not been much more sophisticated than driving a van into a crowd. Al Qaeda has not managed to carry out a single successful attack in the United States since 9/11. Is a terrorist nuclear attack still something to worry about?

The short answer, unfortunately, is “yes.” The probability of terrorists getting and using a nuclear bomb appears to be low—but the consequences if they did would be so devastating that it is worth beefing up efforts to make sure terrorists never get their hands on a nuclear bomb’s essential ingredients. To see the possibilities, we need to look at motive, capability, and opportunity.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Liberal International Order Bad › 1nc – African Instability

African instability causes climate change, terrorism, and pandemics

Charles A. Ray 21, Member of the Board of Trustees and Chair of the Africa Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Former U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Zimbabwe, “Does Africa Matter to the United States?”, Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1/11/2021, https://www.fpri.org/article/2021/01/does-africa-matter-to-the-united-states/

Africa matters in terms of size, population, and rate of population growth. It is the continent currently most affected by climate change but is also a continent that can have a devastating impact on climate change globally because of the importance of the Congo Basin rainforest, which is the second-largest absorber of heat after the Amazon rainforest. The destruction of this important ecosystem could further accelerate global warming. As residents of the region come into increasing contact with the animals of the rainforest, this region could be the origin of the world’s next viral pandemic. Violent extremism and terrorism are increasing in Africa, and while now mostly localized, the danger has the potential to spread beyond the continent. Crises—natural and man-made—cause massive relocations of populations, both on the continent and abroad, which can have negative economic, social, and political impacts.

Why Africa Matters

2022 Michigan Evidence
Liberal International Order Bad › 1nc – African Instability

Chinese displacement of US leadership is sky-rocketing poverty reduction and enhancing political stability

Hodzi 18 (Obert Hodzi is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Helsinki, PhD in Political Science from Lingnan University, Hong Kong in 2016, “Delegitimization and ‘Re-socialization’: China and the Diffusion of Alternative Norms in Africa,” International Studies 55(4) 297–314, )

As China’s global influence expands, its foreign policy is increasingly focused on advancing ideas, norms and values that are often at odds with the liberal international order. For instance, China’s model of governance and development is often advanced as an alternative to the Washington consensus giving Africa an alternative source of norms. Increasingly, African countries are looking to China for leadership and inspiration in poverty reduction and for a model to achieve rapid economic growth. The implication is an increased questioning of the human rights based approach to development dominance in the liberal order. China’s strong state backed by a single dominant stable ruling party driving the national economic development agenda is gradually seen as prerequisites for Africa’s extraordinary economic growth. Ethiopia and Rwanda, two countries with the highest economic growth in Africa, emphasize the Chinese model that favours stability over competitive electoral democracy and individual civil and political rights. Combined with China’s major investments in infrastructural development, such as the standard-gauge railway in East Africa, Beijing is carving out a significant zone of influence and shaping foreign policy orientations of African countries.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Liberal International Order Bad › 1nc – Peacekeeping

Nuclear war

Brooks 14 – Professor of Law at Georgetown and a senior fellow with the New America/Arizona State University Future of War Project (Rosa, “Embrace the Chaos,” Foreign Policy, )

In numerous ways, life has gotten substantially better in this more crowded and interconnected era. Seventy years ago, global war killed scores of millions, but interstate conflict has declined sharply since the end of World War II, and the creation of the United Nations ushered in a far more egalitarian and democratic form of international governance than existed in any previous era. Today, militarily powerful states are far less free than in the pre-U.N. era to use overt force to accomplish their aims, and the world now has numerous transnational courts and dispute-resolution bodies that collectively offer states a viable alternative to the use of force. The modern international order is no global utopia, but it sure beats colonial domination and world wars. In the 50 years that followed World War II, medical and agricultural advances brought unprecedented health and prosperity to most parts of the globe. More recently, the communications revolution has enabled exciting new forms of nongovernmental cross-border alliances to emerge, empowering, for instance, global human rights and environmental movements. In just the last two decades, the near-universal penetration of mobile phones has had a powerful leveling effect: All over the globe, people at every age and income level can use these tiny but powerful computers to learn foreign languages, solve complex mathematical problems, create and share videos, watch the news, move money around, or communicate with far-flung friends. All this has had a dark side, of course. As access to knowledge has been democratized, so too has access to the tools of violence and destruction, and greater global interconnectedness enables disease, pollution, and conflict to spread quickly and easily beyond borders. A hundred years ago, no single individual or nonstate actor could do more than cause localized mayhem; today, we have to worry about massive bioengineered threats created by tiny terrorist cells and globally devastating cyberattacks devised by malevolent teen hackers. Even as many forms of power have grown more democratized and diffuse, other forms of power have grown more concentrated. A very small number of states control and consume a disproportionate share of the world’s resources, and a very small number of individuals control most of the world’s wealth. (According to a 2014 Oxfam report, the 85 richest individuals on Earth are worth more than the globe’s 3.5 billion poorest people). Indeed, from a species-survival perspective, the world has grown vastly more dangerous over the last century. Individual humans live longer than ever before, but a small number of states now possess the unprecedented ability to destroy large chunks of the human race and possibly the Earth itself — all in a matter of days or even hours. What’s more, though the near-term threat of interstate nuclear conflict has greatly diminished since the end of the Cold War, nuclear material and know-how are now both less controlled and less controllable. Amid all these changes, our world has also grown far more uncertain. We possess more information than ever before and vastly greater processing power, but the accelerating pace of global change has far exceeded our collective ability to understand it, much less manage it. This makes it increasingly difficult to make predictions or calculate risks. As I’ve written previously: We literally have no points of comparison for understanding the scale and scope of the risks faced by humanity today. Compared to the long, slow sweep of human history, the events of the last century have taken place in the blink of an eye. This should … give us pause when we’re tempted to conclude that today’s trends are likely to continue. Rising life expectancy? That’s great, but if climate change has consequences as nasty as some predict, a century of rising life expectancy could turn out to be a mere blip on the charts. A steep decline in interstate conflicts? Fantastic, but less than 70 years of human history isn’t much to go on…. That’s why one can’t dismiss the risk of catastrophic events [such as disastrous climate change or nuclear conflict] as “high consequence, low probability.” How do we compute the probability of catastrophic events of a type that has never happened? Does 70 years without nuclear annihilation tell us that there’s a low probability of nuclear catastrophe — or just tell us that we haven’t had a nuclear catastrophe yet?… Lack of catastrophic change might signify a system in stable equilibrium, but sometimes — as with earthquakes — pressure may be building up over time, undetected…. Most analysts assumed the Soviet Union was stable — until it collapsed. Analysts predicted that Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak would retain his firm grip on power — until he was ousted. How much of what we currently file under “Stable” should be recategorized under “Hasn’t Collapsed Yet”? This, then, is the character of world messiness in this first quarter of the 21st century. So on to the next question: Where, in all this messiness, does the United States find itself?

2022 Michigan Evidence
Liberal International Order Bad › 1nc – Peacekeeping

Peacekeeping is key to stop global conflicts from escalating

Hegre et al. 19 — Hegre, H., Hultman, L., &amp; Nygård, H. M. (2019). Evaluating the conflict-reducing effect of UN Peacekeeping Operations. The Journal of Politics, 81(1), 215–232. WMK

In this paper, we have evaluated a number of potential UN PKO scenarios and their prospects in reducing conflict. The UN’s new peace-building agenda, spearheaded by the newly appointed Secretary General António Guterres, puts the focus squarely on managing the outbreak, escalation, continuation, and recurrence of conflict. We have shown that PKOs are an efficient tool for managing these pathways. By simulating different scenarios, we have estimated the effect on the future incidence of conflict of different types of missions and of varying the money spent on PKOs. The results show that PKOs have a clear conflict-reducing effect. The effect of PKOs is largely limited to preventing major armed conflicts. However, there is a discernible indirect effect since the reduction of conflict intensity also tends to increase the chances of peace in following years. There are also some interesting regional differences. PKOs have the strongest effect in three regions that have been particularly afflicted by conflict: West Asia and North Africa; East, Central, and Southern Africa; South and Central Asia.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Liberal International Order Bad › 1nc – Peacekeeping

China leadership is key to UN peacekeeping operations

---UNPKOs = United Nations Peace Keeping Operations

Julienne 18 — Marc Julienne is Head of China Research within the Centre for Asian Studies of the French institute of international relations. Marc Julienne THE UNITED NATIONS OF CHINA: A VISION OF THE WORLD ORDER. “From passiveness to proactivity: China’s evolving role in peacekeeping operations” European Council on Foreign Relations, 2018. JSTOR, . WMK

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) replaced the Republic of China (Taiwan) as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 1971. China’s involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKOs) did not start before the late 1980s, during Deng Xiaoping’s period of reform and opening up. This involvement has since gone through several phases of “gradual adaptation, gradual expansion, and gradual improvement” (逐步适应、逐步扩大、逐步提; zhubu shiying, zhubu kuoda, zhubu tisheng), and has evolved from “passive and simple” participation to “proactive and constructive” (主动和建设型; zhudong he jianshe xing) participation.[8] Today, China proudly claims to be the largest contributor to UNPKOs among the UNSC permanent members (although out of all UN members it is the 12th largest contributor of troops, police, and military experts). In January 2018, China had 2,634 staff participating in UNPKOs in South Sudan, Lebanon, Mali, Darfur, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Western Sahara, Cyprus, and Afghanistan. [9] China’s role in UNPKOs has been transforming rapidly, especially since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012-2013. China is contributing in terms of troops, but it also intends to contribute in terms of norms and concepts, and it therefore tries to influence reform processes in the UN. China’s new role in UN peace and security actions, however, is facing challenges. China’s growing contribution to UNPKOs China’s first participation in a UNPKO was in 1990, when it sent five military personnel to the UN Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East. China’s contribution to UNPKOs was then low but stable during the 1990s, and started to increase rapidly in the early 2000s, reaching its peak in 2015 with more than 3,000 Chinese blue helmets worldwide. Under Xi, China’s contribution to UNPKOs has entered a new, more proactive, phase. In 2014, China dispatched 400 contingent troops to Mali, in addition to the 400 engineers, doctors, and security guards sent there the previous year. That same year, the decision to send 700 peacekeeping infantry battalion to South Sudan confirmed a new trend. During the 2015 UN Peacekeeping Summit, Xi restated China’s commitment to becoming a major actor in international peace and security. He announced that China will: join the UN Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System; set up a standing peacekeeping force of 8,000 troops alongside a standing peacekeeping police force; train 2,000 foreign peacekeepers; carry out 10 de-mining assistance programmes; and provide $100m in military aid to the African Union.[10] By December 2016, China had set up a 300-strong standing peacekeeping police force (ie. the equivalent of two Formed Police Units – FPUs), which is based in Dongying (Shandong province) and is composed of troops from the People’s Armed Police.[11] By September 2017, the standing peacekeeping force had completed the registration of 8,000 troops, including six infantry battalions, three engineers companies, two transport companies, four second grade hospitals, four security companies, three fast reaction companies, two medium-sized multipurpose helicopter units, two transport aircraft units, one UAV unit, and one surface naval ship.[12] This shows the wide scope of missions that Chinese peacekeepers intend to deal with. China also stepped up its contribution to the UN Peacekeeping Police, which was set up in 2000 and whose numbers rose considerably in 2013 with the dispatch of its first FPU to the UN Mission in Liberia. Comprising 140 police staff, it constitutes almost the entirety of China’s worldwide total of 153 peacekeeping police. It is therefore surprising that the Chinese provisional representative to the UN, Wu Haitao, did not mention this in his statement during the UN Peacekeeping Police Summit in September 2017.[13] Praising China’s active role in peacekeeping police in current UN missions, he only mentioned South Sudan, Cyprus, and Afghanistan (13 staff altogether). The trend towards increasing Chinese contribution to UNPKOs in conflict areas, such as South Sudan, is also linked to China’s interest in protecting the growing numbers of Chinese nationals abroad, argues Li Dongyan, from the China Academy of Social Sciences. She believes that this trend continues, noting that “China refers to both the UK’s operation in Sierra Leone, as well as France’s operation in Mali”. These two operations were launched on the initiative of the two European powers, without a UN mandate, to evacuate foreign citizens (in Sierra Leone) and to support the local army (in Mali). China’s particular interest in these two operations further supports the notion that China is likely preparing to send national forces abroad in the future.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Liberal International Order Bad › ! – AI

Cooperation key to safe AI development – the impact is miscalc and rogue tech – escalation and paranoia should give you a low threshold for the impact

Hass and Balin 19

Ryan, fellow in foreign policy program @ brookings, and Zach, publications coordinator @ brookings, 1-10-2019, "US-China relations in the age of artificial intelligence," Brookings, https://www.brookings.edu/research/us-china-relations-in-the-age-of-artificial-intelligence

The military domain presents the greatest risk for miscalculation. It also is where the need is greatest for ongoing, direct, authoritative bilateral communication to develop a better shared understanding of ethical boundaries around AI, particularly given the potential implications for warfighting. The bilateral relationship already faces an acute security dilemma, where actions on one side make the other feel less secure and push it to develop countermeasures. As AI technologies become more integrated into weapons systems and those systems gain autonomous capabilities, this security dilemma could grow more pronounced, causing each side to nationalize innovation streams and limit transparency in order to seek an edge over the other. In other words, an existing security dilemma could quickly morph into an AI nightmare. The stakes are high. As others have pointed out, the United States and China stand on the cusp of rapid change in the conduct of war, not unlike the employment of cavalry, the advent of the rifled musket, or the merging of fast armor with air support to achieve a blitzkreig. Both countries are investing heavily to merge AI-enhanced capabilities and enable machine-based decision processes with minimal human interaction. In the event of a confrontation between U.S. and Chinese forces (e.g., in the South China Sea), robotics and AI could play a critical role. Rapid escalation is an acute risk, particularly if the pace of technological advancements in capabilities exceeds the development of protocols for maintaining human agency in decision-making loops. The real possibility of unintended and rapid escalation should provide incentive for both sides to begin developing boundaries around uses of AI in warfighting. The normative development process around previous arms control treaties, including the Chemical Weapons Convention, could offer applicable lessons that the United States and China could draw from.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Liberal International Order Bad › ! – Bioterror and Pandemics

Co-op key to solve disease and bioterror – lack of co-op causes failure of aid and global disease pandemics – extinction

Bouey and Feng ‘17

Jennifer, behavioral epidemiologist @georgetown, and Cheng, dir. of global health program @ research center for public health, 05-08-17, "US-China Dialogue on Global Health Background Report," Georgetown Initiative for US-China Dialogue on Global Issues , https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF10119.pdf

The health threat posed by migration has recently reared its head in China. An outbreak of yellow fever that began in Angola in December 2015 spread to China three months later, marking the first case of yellow fever ever reported in all of Asia, followed by 10 more Chinese cases imported from Angola by May. Yellow fever is a sometimes deadly disease caused by a mosquito-borne virus. While no cure exists, there is a vaccine, but it is generally administered only to those living in or traveling to areas where the disease is endemic. As such, China’s 1.4 billion citizens are almost universally unvaccinated. The Chinese cases came from Chinese workers returning home after having worked in Angola, where over 200,000 Chinese workers are employed on work visas for China’s aid and investment projects in the country.46 Chinese authorities do require travelers to Angola to be vaccinated for yellow fever, but there are fears that many of the Chinese workers there may not have abided by this rule. The spread of yellow fever to China is particularly worrisome given the region’s massive population and the fact that the primary vector of transmission— the Aedes aegypti mosquito—is common across much of China and nearby countries in South and Southeast Asia. Many epidemiologists have voiced concerns about how dangerous this confluence of factors could prove to be. So far, the United States and China have each responded to Angola’s yellow fever epidemic separately. In addition to increasing domestic mosquito monitoring and control activities to boost its own preparedness, the Chinese government provided Angola with half a million dollars in emergency assistance in February, before the outbreak had even spread to China.47 The CDC’s Mozambique Field Epidemiology Training Program graduates have collaborated with Angola’s Ministry of Health to track down suspected cases of yellow fever and intervene accordingly.48 With so much recent discussion between U.S. and Chinese health authorities regarding cooperative health security efforts in Africa, the tragic yellow fever outbreak offers the two countries an opportunity to achieve significant collaborative action on global health, if they choose to embrace it. The recent concerns of yellow fever epidemic also brought attention to China’s vaccine production. The global vaccine industry has long been dominated by a few multinational companies. In the past decade, vaccine manufacturers from China, India, and other emerging economies entered the international market and helped to drive down the vaccine price. For Jiankang Zhang, representative for PATH’s China Programs, the growth of China’s vaccine industry is “a very positive development for global health, as governments and international procurement agencies will be able to afford more life-saving vaccines and thus protect more lives.” A Chinese vaccine manufacturer obtained the first WHO prequalification vaccine (the Japanese encephalitis vaccine) in October 2013.49 Hope has been high that other vaccines manufactured from China will be qualified and enter the global market before the next pandemic. In the wake of the yellow fever epidemic in 2016, China’s Sinovac Biotech pledged to provide sufficient yellow fever vaccine supply for all Chinese expatriate workers.50 As the world is wondering what the next global pandemic will be, China’s vaccine manufacturing capacity may soon become one of the keys to stemming a potential global crisis. A final global health threat for the United States and China to consider as an area for greater cooperation is bioterrorism. Bilateral cooperation on counterterrorism is long established, but there is little evidence of collaboration in combating bioterrorism. Microsoft founder Bill Gates recently brought this issue into sharp relief at the Munich Security Conference that was attended by 450 senior decision makers from around the globe. Gates warned that “whether it occurs by a quirk of nature or at the hand of a terrorist, a fast-moving airborne pathogen could kill more than 30 million people in less than a year.”51 Among other recommendations, he advocated that countries need to prepare for pandemics in the same manner that the military prepares for war—with “germ games” and other pandemic exercises. He concluded that bioterrorism now ranks with nuclear war and climate

2022 Michigan Evidence
Liberal International Order Bad › ! – Space coop

China-US space cooperation prevents conflict and miscalc

Yang 18 Adam Yang, The Diplomat, 3-17-2018, Adam Yang is a Major in the U.S. Marine Corp and a student at the Command and Staff College, Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia "How Should the US Engage China in Space?," Diplomat, ) AD

The 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy categorized China as a revisionist power, and through this lens, it seems strategically sound for the United States to shield its precious technical advantages from a potential adversary. Nevertheless, some NASA officials insist that the United States should still collaborate with China to capitalize on a revolutionary period of high technical exchange between China and other space powers. Other officials warn that if the U.S. and China do not find meaningful ways to cooperate in space, relations could devolve into greater mistrust and lead to conflict. To guide strategic thinking on U.S. space policy, this article submits that policymakers may gain strategic insights on how to address China’s growing influence in the space domain by examining its actions in the maritime domain. Deriving Strategic Insights from Sea to Space Enjoying this article? Click here to subscribe for full access. Just $5 a month. To derive strategic insights from the maritime environment for the space domain, this article surveys how China: 1) applies force, 2) manipulates laws, 3) shapes the environment, 4) cooperates internationally, and 5) conducts diplomacy. First, China possesses three major maritime agencies that apply force in order to protect and pursue its interests: the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), People’s Armed Police (PAP) and the Maritime Law Enforcement Forces that include the Coast Guard, and the Maritime Militia. As Andrew Erickson notes, each agency represents the largest of its kind globally. The PLAN commands over 300 ships (whereas U.S. Navy has 277 as of 2017) and its Coast Guard has over 1,200 ships. In their research on territorial disputes in the South China Sea, scholars Christopher Yung and Patrick McNulty find that China utilized its military and paramilitary forces 148 times from 1995 to 2013 – more than all other active claimants (Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan) combined in the same period. Their research concluded that as China’s capabilities increased, Beijing was more likely to use force to advance its interests and less likely to defer to legal or multilateral solutions. From a space perspective, U.S. policymakers can surmise that if China had a comparable offensive capability in the space domain, it might also prefer utilizing force to challenge rivals over other means. Though China currently does not have an offensive space capability on par with the scale of its maritime forces, the U.S. Department of Defense 2017 Annual Report to Congress asserted that the PLA is aggressively acquiring a range of counterspace capabilities. Given the fact that there are no international limitations on developing ground-based counterspace weapons, China may pursue an equivalent path of developing a high quantity of systems to overwhelm adversaries during conflict. Second, China could reinterpret laws as a pretext to apply force. In the maritime domain, China reinterprets the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to challenge U.S. freedom of navigation patrols through the South China Sea. China claims waters extending past 12 nautical miles and into the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), saying that foreign states must refrain from threatening the “territorial integrity or political independence” of the owning state. Concurrently, in 1992, China promulgated domestic maritime laws that extended its sovereign claims and deemed the commercial or research activities of other states illegal in contested waters. The international community at large does not recognize this reimagining of the EEZ; however, it does provide China some legal footing and domestic cover to deploy maritime forces in this region. Similarly, the Central Military Commission is exploring the legalities for the use of force in space. PLA doctrine proclaims the need to destroy, damage, or disrupt an adversary’s space capability to secure victory in the information space. Nationally, China codified its security strategy of active defense – using defensive counterattacks in order to spoil the offensive actions of an adversary – in its National Security Law of 2015. By watching the evolution of China’s space-related domestic laws or reinterpretations of international laws, U.S. policymakers may find China strategically telegraphing its intentions through legal maneuvering. Third, when China feels international laws are unfavorable, it may create an alternate framework that advances its own interests. Shortly after a tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration of The Hague ruled against China’s activities in the South China Sea in 2016, China announced that it would create a “maritime judicial center” and a “maritime arbitration center” to promote its own vision for maritime law. China claimed that this endeavor would advance the nation’s role as a maritime power and support the development of its Belt Road Initiative. Skeptics assert that China initiated this endeavor to harden its claims on disputed territories and to divert cases away from UNCLOS courts. By doing so, China can create legal precedents to interpret international maritime laws and begin to undermine the international maritime system framed around UNCLOS. In the space arena, China is not anywhere close to rearranging an entire judicial system around its views; however, it actively participates in international space organizations and introduces measures that could limit the ability for the United States to project force. Through the United Nations, China and Russia have twice (2008 and 2014) proposed the legally binding Treaty of Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). The primary U.S. objections to the treaty were that it did not include verification mechanisms, only applied to space-based weapons, and did not include ground based ASAT weapons – a primary counterspace capability China is advancing. Fourth, policymakers could also examine China’s maritime cooperation initiatives to envision potential space cooperation. China’s counterpiracy operation in the Gulf of Aden has slowly emerged as a valuable mechanism to improve U.S.-China cooperation as seen through the counterpiracy exercises of December 2014. On a grander scale in June 2017, China laid out an ambitious vision for cooperation in relation to the “Maritime Silk Road” as part of its larger Belt and Road Initiative. This plan envisions the establishment of cooperative principles, environmental norms, maritime security, and “collaborative governance” to achieve mutual prosperity. If one believes in China’s sincerity, working cooperatively across these lines could greatly reduce security tensions and set conditions for long-term mutual gain. Subsequently, China is pursuing international cooperation in space – not only for security and economic reasons, but also to bolster the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party to domestic and international audiences. The European Space Administration (ESA) has already expressed desires to cooperate with China on human space flight and the use of its future space station. China especially values its relationship with ESA due to the opportunities to trade and transfer technologies denied by the United States. China and Russia have also agreed to cooperate on human space flight and deep space exploration. Though these initiatives are not on the scale of a Maritime Silk Road, they do offer U.S. policymakers opportunities to work with a rising space power for positive ends. Finally, the United States should pay attention to China’s diplomatic and engagement efforts with other nations. Contrary to the cooperative tenets for a Maritime Silk Road, in 2016, China convinced Cambodia to block an Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) joint statement that recognized The Hague’s arbitration ruling on the South China Sea dispute in favor of the Philippines. In June 2017, Vietnam resisted China’s demands to vacate an oil venture within its EEZ, but eventually capitulated when China threatened to use force. The most concerning aspect for Vietnam was an atypical silence from its neighbors – particularly from the Philippines, Indonesia, and Singapore. Apparently, China’s political and economic leverage over these nations prevented them from publicly sympathizing with Vietnam or rebuking China’s actions. Seemingly, when pressed, China uses soft and hard power tactics bilaterally to dislodge multilateral initiatives that counter it interests. Could China disrupt the U.S.-European alliance as it did with ASEAN unity? At this stage, Chinese-European cooperation in space seems well intentioned. Nevertheless, U.S. policymakers should consider whether China’s growing space relations with Europe, Russia, or any other space power could complicate U.S. interests in other areas. As China strengthens its partnerships, its ability to shape laws, institutions and the strategic preferences of others increase as well. Conclusion The United States sits at an important period to develop a comprehensive space strategy that addresses China’s growing influence. U.S. cooperation with the Soviets in space during the Cold War was not due to a desire for true cooperation, but a means to manage a potential crisis related to the management of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. The United States could develop a similar mechanism for limited engagement with China to send positive signals and reduce misperceptions. China’s activities in space have already intersected with U.S. interests and will only increase in frequency and intensity over time. In the end, for the United States to compete and lead in the space domain, it must engage new players and shape the contours of the game. If Washington is worried about how China will play the game, it can always look in the maritime arena for strategic clues.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Liberal International Order Bad › ! – Noko

Cooperation is key to prevent US-North Korean nuclear war

Ikegami 17 Masako Ikegami is a professor in the Department of Innovation Science at the School of Technology and Environment at the Tokyo Institute of Technology. Previously, she was director of (and a professor at) the Center for Pacific Asia Studies at Stockholm University. Her research interests include Asian security; conflict prevention and confidence building; arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation; and science, technology, and society issues. She holds a doctorate in sociology from the University of Tokyo and a Ph.D. in peace and conflict research from Uppsala University in Sweden. Ikegami has been an active member in the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, and was Abe Fellow at the East-West Center in Washington, D.C. and Honolulu in 2011–2012. By Masako Ikegami, June 15, 2017 Prevent nuclear catastrophe: Finally end the Korean War https://thebulletin.org/2017/06/prevent-nuclear-catastrophe-finally-end-the-korean-war/

The long-simmering confrontation between the United States and North Korea has reached a moment of unprecedented tension. The risk that unintended war will break out due to misjudgment is high. Indeed, as others have observed, East Asia is witnessing a “Cuban Missile Crisis in slow motion.”

According to Graham Allison, director of Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, it is now time “to examine previously unthinkable options” on the Korean Peninsula—such as scaling back joint US-South Korean military exercises in exchange for a freeze on North Korean tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Considering these “unthinkable” options, Allison writes, would follow in a tradition established during the Cuban Missile Crisis by John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev, who both “blinked,” and whose behavior ultimately amounted to cooperative crisis management. One of the most unthinkable options for the Korean Peninsula—but perhaps the most promising—is for the United States and China to finally pursue a formal end to the Korean War.

2022 Michigan Evidence
Liberal International Order Bad › ! – CC

Strong US-China relations is key solve climate change

Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, 02-2018’, " Bilateral Cooperation between China and the United States: Facilitating Progress on Climate-Change Policy," National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation and Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, , MMC

Over the past two decades, disagreements between developing and developed countries have often frustrated efforts to reach consensus on an effective international response to the problem of global climate change. Key disputes have centered on the appropriate prioritization of economic development versus climate mitigation, responsibility for historic emissions versus contribution to current and forecasted emissions, and total emissions versus emission per capita. While differences between developing countries’ perspectives and developed-country perspectives on these issues are unlikely to be resolved in the short term, the imperative to move beyond these disputes toward a more cooperative and coordinated approach to global climate mitigation is becoming urgent. At this critical juncture, the recent joint announcements between China and the United States concerning climate change actions represented an important development in global climate negotiations and were appropriately hailed as offering a new model for improved cooperation between emerging and developed economies. Given the size of the two countries’ economies and their large contributions to global GHG emissions, the actions outlined in the joint announcements per se will have a significant impact on future mitigation efforts—and, indeed, did much to facilitate a successful outcome in Paris. By demonstrating these actions, China and the United States may encourage other countries to increase their climate mitigation ambitions. This paper has identified three specific areas of international climate policy, namely marketbased mechanisms, comparison of efforts, and trade policy and climate policy interactions, where China and the United States can deepen their cooperation. Cooperation on marketbased climate policies, particularly cap-and-trade, is important, not only because marketbased approaches offer the most cost-effective approach to mitigating GHG emissions, but also because emissions trading systems make it possible to address equity concerns by adjusting the level of the emissions cap and the allocation of emission allowances. A logical focus for China–U.S. cooperation with respect to market-based mechanisms is capacity building. A functioning cap-and-trade system requires properly designed government and market institutions. At a micro level, the United States and China can exchange experience and expertise on topics such as allowance allocation, price ceilings and floors, allowance banking and borrowing, and other detailed emissions trading rules. At a macro level, both China and the United States confront challenges to implementing cap-and-trade systems— in the United States because of political polarization and in China because of features of the regulated electricity market and the power of state-owned enterprises. Cooperation and communication can help both countries overcome these barriers, while also advancing theoretical and empirical understanding of cap-and-trade and other market-based approaches. Cooperation on standards and procedures for comparing mitigation efforts can strengthen the technical basis for other aspects of China–U.S. cooperation, particularly in the area of cap-and-trade systems, and facilitate the linkage of homogeneous or heterogeneous climate policies. Cooperation in this area can also increase transparency and consistency in climate negotiations, improve trust among parties, and advance efforts to track collective progress toward achieving global mitigation targets. But China and the United States have different preferences and interests in terms of the scope and timeframe of mitigation efforts and other issues. Thus it will be important to recognize from the outset that no single perfect comparison metric is likely to satisfy both countries’ needs. Instead, a suite of metrics is likely to offer the best option for comprehensively reflecting and comparing the mitigation efforts undertaken by each country. More broadly, it will be important to develop a rigorous, systematic, and transparent system for tracking domestic policy developments in the context of an international climate policy framework. Interactions between trade and climate policy constitute a third important area for future U.S.–China cooperation. Reforms can be initiated within the WTO and UNFCCC, which currently provide the dominant frameworks for global coordination on trade and climate change. But China and the United States should also explore opportunities to advance progress in this area through more flexible plurilateral and bilateral relationships. Cooperation between the two countries to develop GHG standards and methods for comparing the impact of domestic climate policies would be particularly helpful in reducing the potential for future trade conflicts and facilitating the coordination of climate and trade policies. Climate change has added a new dimension to a bilateral relationship that is already one of the most important of the twenty-first century. While China and the United States have different national interests in many areas, climate change represents an important area where their interests, and those of every other country interested in the wellbeing of its citizens and future generations, converge. But the success of the China–U.S. relationship in this arena will be determined less by the ability to find common ground than by the ability to find solutions that properly address the real socioeconomic and political differences that exist between these two nations. If an effective response to climate change eventually requires the participation of all countries, despite their different cultures, states of economic development, and political systems, successful China–U.S. cooperation under the hybrid Paris climate policy architecture may well prove crucial in paving the way for broader international cooperation to reduce the risk of global climate change.