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2022 Michigan Kritik
AFF ANSWERS › Thesis – NOT an Empire

The US works with independent nation states and its model of global leadership is not like traditional empires

Ikenberry ‘04 (G John, 2004, Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order, Council on Foreign Relations, (Accessed 7/14/22), G. John Ikenberry is Peter F. Krogh Professor of Geopolitics and Global Justice at Georgetown University and Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States.) //Doof

The debate on empire is back. This is not surprising, as the United States dominates the world as no state ever has. It emerged from the Cold War the only superpower, and no geopolitical or ideological contenders are in sight. Europe is drawn inward, and Japan is stagnant. A half century after their occupation, the United States still provides security for Japan and Germany-the world's second- and third-largest economies. U.S. military bases and carrier battle groups ring the world. Russia is in a quasi-formal security partnership with the United States, and China has accommodated itself to U.S. dominance, at least for the moment. For the first time in the modern era, the world's most powerful state can operate on the global stage without the constraints of other great powers. We have entered the American unipolar age. The Bush administration's war on terrorism, invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, expanded military budget, and controversial 2002 National Security Strategy have thrust American power into the light of day-and, in doing so, deeply unsettled much of the world. Worry about the implications of American uni polarity is the not-so-hidden subtext of recent U.S.-European tension and has figured prominently in recent presidential elections in Germany, Brazil, and South Korea. The most fundamental questions about the nature of global politics-who commands and who benefits-are now the subject of conversation among long-time allies and adversaries alike. Power is often muted or disguised, but when it is exposed and perceived as domination, it inevitably invites response. One recalls the comment of Georges Clemenceau, who as a young politician said of the settlement ending the Franco Prussian War, "Germany believes that the logic of her victory means domination, while we do not believe that the logic of our defeat is serfdom." At Versailles a half-century later, he would impose just as harsh a peace on a defeated Germany. The current debate over empire is an attempt to make sense of the new uni polar reality. The assertion that the United States is bent on empire is, of course, not new. The British writer and labor politician Harold Laski evoked the looming Amer ican empire in 1947 when he said that "America bestrides the world like a colossus; neither Rome at the height of its power nor Great Britain in the period of economic supremacy enjoyed an influence so direct, so profound, or so pervasive...." And in deed, Dean Acheson and other architects of the postwar order were great admirers of the British Empire. Later, during the Vietnam War, left-wing thinkers and revisionist historians traced the same deep-rooted impulse toward militarism and empire through the history of U.S. foreign policy. The dean of this school, William Appleton Williams, argued in The Tragedy of American Diplomacy that the nation's genuine idealism had been subverted by the imperial pursuit of power and capitalist greed. Today, the "American empire" is a term of approval and optimism for some and disparagement and danger for others. Neoconservatives celebrate the imperial exercise of U.S. power, which, in a modern version of Rudyard Kipling's "white man's burden," is a liberal force that promotes democracy and undercuts tyranny, terrorism, military aggression, and weapons proliferation. Critics who identify an emerging American empire, meanwhile, worry about its unacceptable financial costs, its corrosive effect on democracy, and the threat it poses to the institutions and alliances that have secured U.S. national interests since World War II. THE "E" WORD No one disagrees that U.S. power is extraordinary. It is the character and logic of U.S. domination that is at issue in the debate over empire. The United States is not just a superpower pursuing its interest; it is a producer of world order. Over the decades-with more support than resistance from other nations-it has fashioned a distinctively open and rule-based international order. Its dynamic bundle of oversized capacities, interests, and ideals constitutes an "American project" with unprecedented global reach. For better or worse, other states must come to terms with or work around this protean order. Scholars often characterize international relations as the interaction of sovereign states in an anarchic world. In the classic Westphalian world order, states hold a monopoly on the use of force in their own territory while order at the international level is maintained through the diffusion of power among states. Today's unipolar world turns the Westphalian image on its head. The United States possesses a near-monopoly on the use of force internationally; on the domestic level, meanwhile, the institutions and behaviors of states are increasingly open to global-that is, American-scrutiny. Since September 11th, the Bush administration's assertion of "contingent sovereignty" and the right of preemption have made this transformation abundantly clear. The rise of unipolarity and the simultaneous unbundling of state sovereignty is a new and volatile brew. But is the resulting political formation an empire? And if so, will the American empire suffer the fate of great empires of the past: ravaging the world with its ambitions and excesses until overextension, miscalculation, and mounting opposition hasten its collapse? The term "empire" refers to the political control by a dominant country of the domestic and foreign policies of weaker countries. The European colonial empires of the late nineteenth century were the most direct, formal kind. The Soviet "sphere of influence" in Eastern Europe entailed an equally coercive but less direct form of control. The British Empire included both direct colonial rule and "informal empire." If empire is defined loosely, as a hierarchical system of political relationships in which the most powerful state exercises decisive influence, then the United States today indeed qualifies. If the United States is an empire, how ever, it is like no other before it. To be sure, it has a long tradition of pursuing crude imperial policies, most notably in Latin America and the Middle East. But for most countries, the U.S.-led order is a negotiated system wherein the United States has sought participation by other states on terms that are mutually agreeable. This is true in three respects. First, the United States has provided public goods particularly the extension of security and the support for an open trade regime in exchange for the cooperation of other states. Second, power in the U.S. system is exercised through rules and institutions; power politics still exist, but arbitrary and indiscriminate power is reigned in. Finally, weaker states in the U.S.-led order are given "voice opportunities"-informal access to the policymaking processes of the United States and the intergovernmental institutions that make up the international system. It is these features of the post-194S international order that have led historians such as Charles Maier to talk about a "consensual empire" and Geir Lundestad to talk about an "empire of invitation." The American order is hierarchical and ultimately sustained by economic and military power, but it is put at the service of an expanding system of democracy and capitalism.Fundamentally, then, the debate over the new American empire hinges on how extensive and deeply rooted these characteristics are-and whether its assertion of power since September 11 constitutes a fundamental break with this liberal past. THE GLOBAL RACKET In The Sorrows of Empire, Chalmers Johnson advances the disturbing claim that the United States' Cold War-era military power and far-flung base system have, in the last decade, been consolidated in a new form of global imperial rule. The United States, according to Johnson has become "a military juggernaut intent on world domination." Driven by a triumphalist ideology, an exaggerated sense of threats, and a self serving military-industrial complex, this juggernaut is tightening its grip on much of the world. The Pentagon has replaced the State Department as the primary shaper of foreign policy. Military commanders in regional headquarters are modern-day proconsuls, warrior-diplomats who direct the United States' imperial reach. Johnson fears that this military empire will corrode democracy, bankrupt the nation, spark opposition, and ultimately end in a Soviet-style collapse. In this rendering, the American military empire is a novel form of domination. Johnson describes it as an "international protection racket: mutual defense treaties, military advisory groups, and military forces stationed in foreign countries to 'defend' against often poorly defined, overblown, or nonexistent threats." These arrangements create "satellites"-Ostensibly independent countries whose foreign relations revolve around the imperial state. Johnson argues that this variety of empire was pioneered during the Cold War by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and the United States in East Asia. Great empires of the past-the Romans and the Han Dynasty Chinese-ruled their domains with permanent military encampments that garrisoned conquered territory. The American empire is innovative because it is not based on the acquisition of territory; it is an empire of bases. Johnson's previous polemic, Blowback, asserted that post-1945 U.S. spheres of influence in East Asia and Latin America were as coercive and exploitative as their Soviet counterparts. The Sorrows of Empire continues this dubious line. Echoing 1960s revisionism, Johnson asserts that the United States' Cold War security system of alliances and bases was built on manufactured threats and driven by expansionary impulses. The United States was not acting in its own defense; it was exploiting opportunities to build an empire. The Soviet Union and the United States, according to this argument, were more alike than different: both militarized their societies and foreign policies and expanded outward, establishing imperial rule through "hub and spoke" systems of client states and political dependencies. In Johnson's view, the end of the Cold War represented both an opportunity and a crisis for U.S. global rule-an opportunity because the Soviet sphere of influence was now open for imperial expansion, a crisis because the fall of the Soviet Union ended the justification for the global system of naval bases, airfields, army garrisons, espionage listening posts, and strategic enclaves. Only with the terrorist attacks of September 11th was this crisis resolved. Bush suddenly had an excuse to expand U.S. military domination. September 11 also allowed the United States to remove the fig leaf of alliance partnership. Washington could now disentangle itself from international commitments, treaties, and law and launch direct imperial rule. Unfortunately, Johnson offers no coherent theory of why the United States seeks empire. At one point, he suggests that the American military empire is founded on "a vast complex of interests, commitments, and projects." The empire of bases has become institutionalized in the military establishment and has taken on a life of its own. There is no discussion, however, of the forces within U.S. politics that resist or reject empire. As a result, Johnson finds imperialism everywhere and in everything the United States does, in its embrace of open markets and global economic integration as much as in its pursuit of narrow economic gains. Johnson also offers little beyond passing mention about the societies presumed to be under Washington's thumb. Domination and exploitation are, of course, not always self-evident. Military pacts and security partnerships are clearly part of the structure of U.S. global power, and they often rein force fragile and corrupt governments in order to project U.S. influence. But countries can also use security ties with the United States to their own advantage. Japan may be a subordinate security part ner, but the U.S.-Japan alliance also allows Tokyo to forgo a costly buildup of military capacity that would destabilize East Asia. Moreover, countries do have other options: they can, and often do, escape U.S. domination simply by asking the United States to leave. The Philippines did so, and South Korea may be next. The variety and complexity of U.S. security ties with other states makes Johnson's simplistic view of military hegemony misleading. In fact, the U.S. alliance system remarkably intact after half a century-has helped create a stable, open political space. Cooperative security is not just an instrument of U.S. domination; it is also a tool of political architecture. But Johnson neglects the broader complex of U.S.-supported multilateral rules and institutions that give depth and complexity to the international order. Ultimately, it is not clear what the United States could do-short of retreating into its borders or ceasing to exist-that would save it from Johnson's condemnation. PAX AMERICANA In Colossus, Niall Ferguson argues that the United States is indeed an empire and has been for a long time. To Ferguson, however, it is a liberal empire that upholds rules and institutions and underwrites public goods by maintaining peace, ensuring freedom of the seas and skies, and managing a system of international trade and finance. The United States is the imperfect but natural inheritor of the British system of global governance; it is open and integrative and inclined toward informal rule. Accordingly, Ferguson's worry is not that the world will get too much American empire but that it will not get enough. U.S. leaders, for all their benign intent, have unusually short attention spans and tend to go "wobbly." In Ferguson's view, the United States shares many characteristics with past empires. Like Rome, it has remarkably open citizenship. "Purple Hearts and U.S. citizenship were conferred simultaneously on a number of the soldiers serving in Iraq last year, just as service in the legions was once a route to becoming a civis romanus," Ferguson writes. "Indeed, with the classical architecture of its capital and the republican structure of its constitution, the United States is perhaps more like a 'new Rome' than any previous empire-albeit a Rome in which the Senate has thus far retained its grip on would-be emperors." The spread of America's language, ideas, and culture also invites comparison to Rome at its zenith. But Ferguson is even more taken by parallels with the British Empire. U.S. presidents, from Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, and John F. Kennedy to Ronald Reagan, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, have put their power work promoting the great liberal ideals of economic openness, democracy, limited government, human dignity, and the rule of law-a "strategy of openness" that is remarkably similar, Ferguson argues, to the aspirations of the British Empire in the second half of the nineteenth century. After all, it was a young Winston Churchill who argued that the aim of British imperialism was to "give peace to warring tribes, to administer justice where all was violence, to strike the chains off the slave, to draw the richness from the soil, to place the earliest seeds of commerce and learning, to increase in whole peoples their capacities for pleasure and diminish their chances of pain.... " Most of Colossus retells the familiar story of the rise of U.S. global dominance as an exercise in liberal empire. What is distinctive about American imperialism, according to Ferguson, is that it has been pursued in the name of anti-imperialism. For each phase of U.S. history, Ferguson nicely illuminates the tensions between republican ideals and the exercise of global power and shows how those tensions are often resolved. The Cold War-and George Kennan's doctrine of containment-provides the ultimate example of this fusion of anti-imperialism and hard power. Security, openness, democratic community, political commitment, and the mobilization of U.S. power went together. The core of U.S. global rule involved the enforcement of rules of economic openness, but the United States was also willing to act forcefully to integrate countries into the liberal order. Ferguson's most interesting claim is that the world needs more of this liberal American empire. This argument stems in part from the uncontroversial claim that the current international order needs enlightened leadership and that only Washington can provide it. (Ferguson holds little hope that Europe will ever overcome its preoccupation with the internal contradictions of its enlargement.) It is especially the wider system of sovereign but failed states that needs imperial supervision by Washington. In vast swatches of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East national self determination has led to much grief. Ferguson argues without qualification that "the experiment with political independence-especially in Africa-has been a disaster for most poor countries." To Ferguson, the extension of liberal empire into these regions (even involving some form of colonial rule) is necessary. What precisely these imperial arrangements would look like, however, remains unclear. When Ferguson says that he is "fundamentally in favor of empire," he is to some extent pulling a conceptual sleight of hand. What Ferguson means by "liberal empire" scholars have previously called "liberal hegemony": a hierarchical order that is still very different from traditional forms of empire. By virtue of its power, the liberal hegemon can act on its long-term interests rather than squabble over short-term gains with other states; it can identify its own national interests with the openness and stability of the larger system. The United States thus shapes and dominates the international order while guaranteeing a flow of benefits to other governments that earns their acquiescence. In contrast to empire, this negotiated order depends on agreement over the rules of the system between the leading state and everyone else. In this way, the norms and institutions that have developed around U.S. hegemony both limit the actual coercive exercise of U.S. power and draw other states into the management of the system. Ferguson's case for the virtues of American empire hinges on his claim that in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse, the world could have gone one of two ways: international order organized around independent nations or an American imperium. He maintains that a world of decentralized, competing states, many of which are not democracies, would result in chaos. This may be true; he is certainly right that stability and open markets are not easily sustained without the support of powerful states. But the notion of liberal empire conflates very different types of U.S.-led order. One in which Washington coerces other states into obedience is very different from a system of multilateral rules and close partnerships. The challenges of peace and economic development that Ferguson identifies are best pursued by advanced democracies working together. Ultimately, such a cooperative order would require that Washington transcend the atavistic habits of empire rather than pursue a more complete realization of it. In the end, Ferguson finds invoking the image of empire useful for political reasons. Unlike the British, Americans do not believe that they operate an empire. As a result, the United States makes a flighty and impatient imperial power (in contrast to the British, who acquired a cultural mentality for global rule). Ferguson thinks that speaking honestly about the reality of American empire will foster understanding of its duties and obligations. Yet precisely the opposite is true. The United States does not need to view the world as its Raj and deploy a colonial service to the vast periphery; it needs to find ways to exercise its power in sustained, legitimate ways, working with others and developing more complex forms of cooperative international governance. It is also extremely doubtful that the American people would accept such a massive imperial undertaking: last September, as soon as President Bush revealed the price tag for occupying Iraq, public support plummeted immediately.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › NB › 2AC – AT: RCA NB

Russia and China prevent Security Council effectiveness – NATO avoids

EL-Bawab, 4/26 (Nadine El-Bawab, 4-26-2022, "UN Security Council's inaction on Ukraine prompts questions on reform," ABC News, , LASA-CSK)

While experts said the U.N. facilitates diplomacy and keeps the lines of communication open between major powers, the Security Council's actions are tied to major powers' interests. The inequity of the Security Council is that nothing can be done if it opposes what the major powers want, Poast said. While the Security Council has not been able to pass any resolutions regarding the war in Ukraine or act to stop or prevent it, Poast said taking action is not part of its role. That is why NATO was created; to have a separate union, without China and Russia, allowing Western states to take action. "One of the big things that drove the process of creating NATO was the recognition sitting around late 1947 [to] 1948, that, from the British and the American perspective, they weren't going to be able to work with the Soviet Union," Poast said, adding that the powers needed a separate entity that would enable them to take action. Even in the early days of the U.N., Poast said there were concerns over whether the British, French and Americans would be able to work with the Soviets and Chinese. This was proven in 1999 when NATO took action in Kosovo, after the Security Council did not act, and again in 2011 when NATO intervened in Libya. "It's also a key reason why we're seeing NATO be very active in this war, because of exactly the fact that the U.N. Security Council has been ineffective in doing anything about this. But in contrast, NATO has been highly effective in trying to do something to support Ukraine," Poast said.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › NB › 2AC – AT: UN Good NB

P5 veto powser means nothing gets done

Koliward, 21 (Priya Koliwad, 10-06-2021, "Is the United Nations Still a Relevant International Body? — The World Mind ," World Mind, , LASA-CSK)

One of the arguments at the forefront in support for eliminating the United Nations is that the most powerful organ of the UN, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), is not relevant to the modern world. The main evidence for this claim is that the UNSC only has five permanent member states: USA, Russia, Britain, China, France) and 10 non-permanent member states. This structure results in misuse of veto power, often blocking key decisions that are needed by nations with little to no representation. It also prevents developing countries from being represented, which is necessary in the present day.

Over the years, it has become clear that the Security Council’s permanent members have little interest in internal reform. Since this is the case, it is in the best interest of the other UN member states to continue to push for reform. With powerful countries moving to unilateralism, populism, and nationalism at the expense of multilateralism and collective action, a united and forward-looking Security Council capable of effectively driving the wider United Nations to achieve its goals is essential.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › NB › 2AC – AT: UN Good NB

The UN doesn’t have the scientific expertise to be effective

Juma, 2000 (Calestous Juma, Fall 2000, "The UN's Role in the New Diplomacy," Issues in Science and Technology, , LASA-CSK)

As a new form of international diplomacy develops to deal with a number of emerging issues in which science and technology play a central role, the United Nations (UN) risks being relegated to the sidelines. The influence and effectiveness of diplomats and international civil servants will increasingly depend on the extent to which they can mobilize scientific and technical expertise in their work. This need not require the UN to acquire extensive in-house scientific competence, but the organization–especially the office of the secretary general–must learn to tap advisory services to identify, mobilize, and use the best available expertise. Although a large number of UN agencies, programs, and treaties rely on scientific and technological expertise for their work, they are not designed to receive systematic science advice as a key component of effective performance. In most cases, science is used in the UN to support special interests and political agendas that do not necessarily advance the goals of the organization. But this should not come as a surprise. The UN was founded and grew to prominence in the era of the Cold War, when much of diplomacy was devoted to dealing with threats arising from external aggression. Today, attention is turning to issues such as infectious diseases, environmental degradation, electronic crimes, weapons of mass destruction, and the impacts of new technologies, which in the past would have been the concern of individual nations but have now grown to international stature. The UN’s capacity to deal with these questions must also grow. What is notable about the UN is that it includes organizations that cater to a wide range of jurisdictions but not to the growing community of science advisors. Even agencies such as the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) have done little to provide a platform for the world’s science advisors. Specialized agencies such as UNESCO, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the World Health Organization, and the UN Industrial Development Organization relate to the UN secretary general’s office through a bureaucratic hierarchy that is not responsive to timeliness. They are generally accountable to their governing bodies and are heavily influenced by the interests of activist states. Even UN programs that deal with science-based issues such as the environment have yet to place knowledge at the core of their operations. They have failed to take into account the long-term implications of scientific advancement for their operations. Much of the attention in these programs is devoted to territorial aggrandizement and not to the role of knowledge in global governance. They are vestiges of Cold War institutional structures.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › NB › 2AC – AT: UN Good NB

UN charter outdated and ineffective in carrying out effective policy

Boothby, 99 (Derek Boothby, 07-14-1999, " NATO and the United Nations," No Publication, , LASA-CSK)

Personally, I doubt very much that the U.N. should ever be in the business of military peace enforcement. That is a task that should be carried out by fully effective military organizations, such as NATO or groups of states willing to do and capable of doing the job. Such organizations should first be given political license from the U.N. Security Council under Chapter VII; the operations should be halted if that political license is subsequently withdrawn. But the U.N. itself has neither the military command systems nor the political cohesion to carry out military-enforcement tasks. Moreover, it is arguable that a U.N. that carried out military peace enforcement--except perhaps in the most unique circumstances--would find itself in much political trouble with its members. In my view, Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, as an authority for U.N. peace enforcement, was written for a different era and has little military application to today's world.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Solvency › 1AR – Solvency – AT UN Bad Links to Aff

NATO doesn’t require UN oversight

Perry , 98 (James T. Perry, 1-1-1998, "," Naval War College Press, , LASA-CSK)

Chapter VIII of the UN Charter13 refers to regional organizations, such as NATO, in the context of appropriate regional action in the maintenance of international peace and security.14 It is in this area that a relationship exists between the two organizations, with ultimate authority centered in the United Nations. Excepting the area of international peace and security, however, the relationship between the UN and NATO is not hierarchical. When the NATO Charter was established in 1949 by the Treaty of Washington,15 it made no mention of any relationship to the Security Council as a "regional arrangement," nor did it contain any provision providing for action only upon the authorization of the Security Council, or for reporting activities "in contemplation." Instead, the Treaty of Washington expressed the obligation of NATO's member states to be that of "collective self,defense" under Article 51 of the UN Charter and, correspondingly, embodied only the obligation to report "measures taken" to the Security Council.16 This formulation was adopted by the United States and its NATO allies because subordination of NATO actions as a regional arrangement to Security Council review in advance during the Cold War would have subjected all actions to Soviet veto. By characterizing NATO's military actions as "collective self,defense" under Article 51, there would be no action of a "regional arrangement" under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and no prior Security Council review.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Cyber

Empirics prove China and Russia block all UN attempts at cyberspace international law

Segal, 17 (Adam Segal, 6-29-2017, "The Development of Cyber Norms at the United Nations Ends in Deadlock. Now What?," Council on Foreign Relations, , LASA-CSK)

The prospects of developing norms of state behavior in cyberspace have been looking positively bleak recently. The Lazarus Group, which appears to have ties to North Korea, is suspected of being behind the WannaCry ransomware attacks that spread to 150 countries and hobbled the UK’s National Health Service. Russian hackers have been named as the culprits in the hacking of the Democratic National Committee (DNC), and are suspected of being responsible for blackouts in Kiev in 2015 and 2016. This week’s attack, Petya/NotPetyta, first looked like a new version of ransomware, but now seems designed for disruption and destruction. The attack appears to have originated in Ukraine, on the day before a holiday marking the 1996 adoption of that country’s first constitution, so early suspicion is that Moscow is behind the attacks, though this is still highly speculative (Russia itself has also suffered from Petya). Despite the proliferation of state-backed attacks, for a brief window, there did seem to be some forward movement on cyber norms. This week China and Canada agreed not to conduct cyber espionage for commercial gain against each other. Beijing has now signed similar agreements with the United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and the G-7 and G-20. In 2013, a group of government experts (GGE) at the UN agreed that international law, and especially the UN Charter, applies to state activity cyberspace. In 2015, the same group agreed to four peacetime norms promoted by the United States: states should not interfere with each other’s critical infrastructure; they should not target each other’s computer emergency response teams; they should assist other nations investigating cyberattacks; and they are responsible for actions that originate from their territory. That process seems to have reached a dead end. Last week, Michelle Markoff, deputy coordinator for cyber issues in the State Department published an explanation of the U.S. position at the end of the 2016-2017 GGE process. Markoff’s frustration is palpable, as she writes the current “report falls short of our mandate and doesn’t meets the standard that the previous GGEs have set for us.” The sticking point is the application of international law. The United States wanted to use the report to begin explaining exactly how international law applies in cyberspace, especially in the areas of the exercise of the inherent right of self-defense and the law of state responsibility, including countermeasures. Other participants argued that it was too early in the development of cyberspace to have such deliberations, and would in themselves be destabilizing. They would be “incompatible with the messages the Group should be sending regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention.” Markoff does not call out the obstructionist states by name, but it is safe to assume China and Russia were among them. Beijing has never liked the idea that international law applies to cyberspace, and began walking back the 2013 report almost as soon as the ink was dry. Chinese officials have consistently stressed the UN Charter and the importance of sovereignty without mentioning the rest of international law. During the 2015 meeting of the UN group, China’s representative proposed taking out all references to international law in the upcoming report. In the wake of the DNC hack, Moscow would certainly not support discussions about countermeasures, which might cover U.S. reprisals for hacking and information operations.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Cyber

Perm solves – UN fails without the US pushing for cyber norms

Herman, 21 (Slate Herman, J.D. Candidate, University of Colorado Law School, 1-29-2021, "Cybersecurity and the U.N. Charter: A Square Peg in a Round Hole," Colorado Technology Law Journal, , LASA-CSK)

In this note I contend that the U.N. Charter fails to adequately address non-state actors or provide effective alternatives to armed conflict. The question of how to correctly classify these actions under international law then arises. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter imbues nations with the power of self-defense against an armed attack.[20] The ancient concept of an armed attack creates significant ambiguity when applied to the revolutionary concept of cyberwarfare. The use of armed forces and other similar definitions are inadequate in their understanding of cyberoperations. The U.N. Charter also fails to prescribe appropriate responses to cyber-attacks and splits appropriate action into two categories, neither of which allow cyber operations to be classified correctly. Current international law does not adequately address the growing problem of cyberwarfare. Specifically, the blind spots created by Articles 2(4), 41, 42, and 51 of the U.N. Charter in failing to address cyber warfare, coupled with lack of responsibility for non-state actors expose the United States to significant risk.[21] The United States must be active in pushing the U.N. to consider new regulations to fix these potholes in the U.N. Charter. Though some governmental bodies seem unwilling to join the discussion surrounding proper international cyberoperations, others leap headlong into the murky topic. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) has taken the largest step to adequately define cyber operations and explain how international legal regimes apply to cyberweapons.[22] In 2009, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence embarked on a journey to produce a manual on the international law governing cyberwarfare, which became known as the Tallinn Manual.[23] The project collected distinguished practitioners and scholars in an attempt to project how current legal standards would govern this new form of warfare. With its primary focus on wartime action, the Tallinn Manual dives deeply into cyber operations involving the use of force and those that occur in the context of armed conflict.[24] In 2013, this text began serving as a resource for governments and scholars in the legal field.[25] Almost immediately after its publication, the group began work on a second edition of the Tallinn Manual. Released in February 2017, Tallinn 2.0 expanded on the original version and added multiple provisions while updating the original.[26] This manual serves as a background from which I make many of my assumptions and conclusions.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – Biotech

UN biotech regulation wrecks developing countries widening the tech gap

Miller, 96 (Henry I. Miller, Robert Wesson Fellow of scientific philosophy & public policy, Hoover Institution Consulting Professor at the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, 7-1-1996, "Biotechnology and the UN: New challenges, new failures," Nature, , LASA-CSK)

The overregulation of technology, though damaging to industrialized countries, is particularly devastating to developing countries because it acts as yet another, and formidable entry barrier to R&D. Thus, the UN's design's on biotechnology are likely to increase further the income gap between the "have" and "have not" nations, which more than doubled between 1960 and 1991. Poorly crafted regulatory proposals constitute a lose-lose proposition for the developing world. Virtually every field trial of every new biotechnology derived variant of rice, cassava, maize, wheat, sweet potato, or other plant would require an environmental assessment. These schemes would divert scarce resources to the regulation of activities that are largely of negligible risk, send inaccurate messages about risk to the public and to politicians, and impose a "tax" on innovation which is based on the excessively regulated techniques. These approaches also make new products artificially expensive to use, test, and produce: New crop plant varieties must be adapted to local conditions and the expense of testing them would become prohibitive. Thus, unnecessary case by case 834 review would diminish the degree and speed of technology diffusion to the developing world, developing countries would be prevented from participating in worldwide technological trends, and the technology gap that already exists between the industrialized and developing countries would widen further. There are bitter ironies in the demand that the developing world adopt unscientific, technique-based and anti-innovative regulatory approaches. First, the clamor usually originates from regulators or activists in industrialized countries who both regard Third-world regulation as an opportunity to validate their minority view of genetic engineering as manifesting unique risks and see prospects for becoming players on a larger stage. Second, such policies preferentially undermine research on precisely the kinds of low-value-added but important products that are most needed in developing countries- safer and more nutritious foods, improved bioremediation agents, and alternatives to chemical pesticides and fertilizers. At the same time, these poorly conceived policies exact a high cost, they are unlikely to afford any increment in environmental or public health protection

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – AI

Slaughterbots prove unanimity makes UN regulation of AI impossible

Shaed, 21 (Sam Shead, 12-17-2021, “UN talks to ban ‘slaughterbots’ collapsed — here’s why that matters,” CNBC, , LASA-CSK)

A UN conference failed to agree on banning the use and development of so-called “slaughterbots” at a meeting in Geneva last week, raising alarm bells among experts in artificial intelligence, military strategy, disarmament and humanitarian law. Slaughterbots are weapons that select and apply force to targets without human intervention. Instead, they make their decisions with artificial intelligence software, which is essentially a series of algorithms. For the first time ever this year, the bulk of the 125 nations that belong to the United Nations’ Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) said they wanted new laws to be introduced on killer robots. However, some countries that are developing these weapons including the U.S. and Russia, were in opposition, making a unilateral agreement impossible. The U.K. and several other nations also objected. “We would have liked to have seen everyone get behind that,” Emilia Javorsky, a physician scientist who leads the Future of Life Institute’s advocacy program on autonomous weapons, told CNBC. “All it takes is one,” she added. The conference concluded Friday, with the group pledging to “intensify” discussions and consider possible steps that are acceptable to all. The fact that the CCW failed to agree on anything concrete last week was hailed as an “epic failure” by Javorsky. “It is now blatantly clear this forum — whose unanimity requirement makes it easily derailed by any state with a vested interest — is utterly incapable of taking seriously, let alone meaningfully addressing, the urgent threats posed by emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence,” she said. Verity Coyle, a senior advisor at Amnesty International, said in a statement that the window of opportunity to regulate killer robots grows ever smaller as research and testing of these weapons presses forward. “The CCW has once again demonstrated its inability to make meaningful progress – it’s now time that committed states take the lead on an external process that can deliver the type of breakthrough we’ve previously seen on landmines and cluster munitions,” she said.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Aff › Solvency › 2AC – Solvency – AI

Political fights and lack of AI integration into systems wrecks interoperability

Fournier-Tombs, 21 (Eleonore Fournier-Tombs, 5-31-2021, "The United Nations needs to start regulating the 'Wild West' of artificial intelligence," Conversation, , LASA-CSK)

Conversely, the lack of regulation at the United Nations can be considered a challenge for agencies seeking to adopt more effective and novel technologies. As such, many systems seem to have been developed and later abandoned without being integrated into actual decision-making systems. An example of this is the Jetson tool, which was developed by UNHCR to predict the arrival of internally displaced persons to refugee camps in Somalia. The tool does not appear to have been updated since 2019, and seems unlikely to transition into the humanitarian organization’s operations. Unless, that is, it can be properly certified by a new regulatory system. Trust in AI is difficult to obtain, particularly in United Nations work, which is highly political and affects very vulnerable populations. The onus has largely been on data scientists to develop the credibility of their tools.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Perm---AT: Cease---1AR

“Cease” means to stop for a short time or slow down.

Benjamin ’01 [Susan; March of 2001; Benjamin, expert on plain language "Attorneys: Cause or Cure?" Plain Language, //smarx, AZG]

This ownership can develop into an expertise envied by many, requested by all; or it can become a sort of linguistic rigor mortis. Case in point: in my plain-language training sessions, the term cease and desist invariably crops up in discussions about wordiness. Why not use cease or desist? Or how about stop? Because, comes the response, cease means stop for a short time, and desist means stop for good. Or cease means slow down and desist means stop. Or this prizewinner: cease means stop and desist means leave the room. This subjectivity, by the way, is not usually rooted in stubbornness or arrogance so much as in a belief that goes something like this: language is; therefore, it must be.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Yes Revisionism---Revanchist---1AR

Russian tendencies are revisionist and revanchist --- it threatens the entire LIO

Balachandran, 22 (Gopalan Balachandran, Co-director, Albert Hirshman Centre on Democracy, Professor of international history and politics, 3-7-22, ‘Revisionism, Revanchism, and the War in Ukraine’, Geneva Gradute Institute, / alundy)

This is a somber moment for all of us. The Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy, like everyone else in this room, is committed to a just, democratic, inclusive, and rules-based international order. This order is now beset by fresh and dangerous uncertainties. In co-hosting  we would like to underscore the importance of this commitment as we try to grapple with the dangerous uncertainties caused by Russia’s unjustified and brutal invasion of Ukraine.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Yes Revisionism---Ukraine---1AR

Ukraine uniquely proves --- Russia bases their rhetoric in historical revisionism to justify invasion.

Serhan, 22 (Yasmeen Serhan is a staff writer at The Atlantic, 2-27-22, Who Is Vladimir Putin’s Revisionist History For?, The Atlantic, /alundy)

Putin is not the only world leader who has harkened back to an ahistorical past to justify his decisions in the present. Right-wing nationalists  have sought to portray themselves as the primary defenders of a glorious past that their enemies would seek to deny or forget. By  and seeking to cultivate a politics of , Putin has attempted the same. But in his justification for the invasion of Ukraine, Putin’s ahistoricism has bordered on delusion. Whether the Russian people or the rest of the world share in it, for now, appears to be immaterial: If there’s one audience this revisionist history is designed for, it’s Putin himself.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Yes Revisionism---Hybrid War---1AR

Revisionism is uniquely proven in hybrid warfare.

Sargeant, 21 (Madison Sargeant, research assistant at Project on the Political Economy of Security, 2/3/2021, Small Wars Journal, “Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine: Historical Revisionism and ‘Twiplomacy’”, /alundy)

The rise of digital diplomacy has provided state actors new venues to promote their national interests. Twitter specifically has emerged as a “megaphone and substantive communications medium”[1] for heads of state, governmental institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and scholars. The Russian Federation has exploited the growing importance of social media platforms to diplomacy in order to seek legitimization and normalization of its 2014 annexation of Crimea, which is recognized almost universally as Ukrainian territory.[2] Despite a robust digital campaign, the percentage of Ukrainians that believe Crimea is Russian territory has actually decreased since 2014. Furthermore, Russia’s social media activity has not strengthened its claim to Crimea, but it does provide insight into how the state uses emerging technologies below the threshold of war to meet strategic objectives.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Yes Revisionism---1AR

Putin’s propaganda is grounded in revisionist tendencies, revising the past.

Mendel, 22 (Iuliia Mendel journalist, ex-press-secretary to the President of Ukraine, and communication consultant, 2-20-22, Putin – the Crude Revisionist who Ignores Lessons of History," KyivPost, /alundy)

Vladimir Putin wants not only to seize new territories, but to own history. History often falls victim to autocracies and dictatorships. Reshaped historical narratives become compelling explanations of all-powerful leaders and serve their propaganda as one of the instruments to preserve and increase their political weight.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Yes Revisionism---2AC

Putin’s policy reflects revisionist goals.

Grigoryan, 22 (Armen Grigoryan, co-founder and vice president of the Yerevan-based Centre for Policy Studies, 5/23/22, New Eastern Europe - A bimonthly news magazine dedicated to Central and Eastern European affairs, "The war in Ukraine and historical revisionism," /alundy)

On April 16th, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law imposing fines of up to 15 days in jail for equating the USSR and Nazi Germany’s goals and actions during the Second World War. This law also covers denial of the USSR’s “humanitarian mission during the liberation of European countries”. This is the logical extension of a law adopted in July, which prohibited these aforementioned actions but did not mention punitive measures. Before this, in 2014, public statements containing “false information” about the USSR’s wartime actions or Soviet veterans were criminalised. An amendment to the country’s criminal code imposed large fines or up to five years imprisonment.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Solvency---AT: Terror---2AC

US-Russia cooperation can’t solve terrorism in the Middle East – differing tactics and barriers make them incompatible

Clarke ’18 [Colin P.; 02/09/2018; Ph.D in international security policy from the University of Pittsburgh, non-resident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, lecturer at Carnegie Mellon University, associate fellow at the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, political scientist at the RAND corporation, "Russia Is Not a Viable Counterterrorism Partner for the United States," TheRANDBlog, //smarx, AZG)

Foolish as it would be to argue that U.S. and Russian interests never align, the United States in its broader battle with terrorism cannot cooperate meaningfully with Moscow. On a practical level, there are difficulties in sharing intelligence even with trusted allies, much less in a relationship rife with mistrust, as U.S.-Russia ties now are. More importantly, the argument that Moscow and Washington are fighting a common enemy because both face threats from militant Islamists is misleading: A close look at the battles each is waging reveals that Russia and the U.S. are fighting either different groups or the same groups but for different reasons and using very different approaches. Today Russia is America's adversary and its actions, particularly attempts to fracture NATO, do not align with larger U.S. security goals. Calling Moscow a “partner” in the counterterror fight would hand it a huge PR victory—note that the Putin-Trump call was made public by the Kremlin—and a giant fig leaf to cover up its efforts to undermine the U.S. on the global stage.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Solvency---AT: Treaty Violations---2NC

Treaty violations are reciprocal but the US has failed to attempt negotiation – caused the breakdown of European security

Pifer 20 [Steven, 11-19-2020, nonresident Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Center on the United States and Europe, Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Initiative, A retired Foreign Service officer, his more than 25 years with the State Department focused on U.S. relations with the former Soviet Union and Europe, as well as arms control and security issues. "The looming US withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty," Brookings, ] EZAY

The Trump administration’s antipathy toward arms control will strike again on November 22, when the United States withdraws from the Open Skies Treaty. That is a mistake. While Russia has violated the treaty, the United States has reciprocated. NATO allies support the treaty — which focuses first and foremost on enhancing European security — and wish the United States to remain a party.

2022 Michigan Counterplan

Solvency---AT: Arms Control---1AR

Russia and the US empirically can’t cooperate over arms control

Reuters ’19 [01/31/19; "US, Russia Nuclear Treaty Talks Fail," VOA, //smarx, AZG]

MOSCOW/BEIJING —