2022
Michigan
Counterplan
The US has no chance at successful arms control negotiations with Russia---they want to hold onto their nukes post-Ukraine.
Steven Pifer 22, former US ambassador to Ukraine and non-resident senior fellow at the Arms Control and Non-proliferation Initiative, 5/23/2022, “The Russia-Ukraine War: A Setback for Arms Control,” , RH
The Russia-Ukraine war is entering its fourth month, with no end in sight. The Kremlin seems intent on achieving a victory on the battlefield, while relations between the West and Russia plummet to new lows. One casualty: U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
US-Russian relations are impossible – political principles, power ambitions, and long-standing conflicts prevent an effective relationship
Goldgeier ’21 [James; 04/06/21; Goldgeier, professor of International Relations at American University, doctorate in political science from the University of California, Berkeley, "U.S.-Russian Relations Will Only Get Worse," Foreign Affairs, //smarx, AZG]
It is hard to imagine that U.S.-Russian relations could get much worse, but sadly, they are unlikely to get better anytime soon. Over the past two decades, Russian President Vladimir Putin has defined his country’s interests in ways that are incompatible with the interests of the United States and its European allies. The latter believe that democracy, the rule of law, and the provision of security to eastern European countries enhance stability; Putin, meanwhile, considers the spread of democracy to be a threat to his regime and believes that having vulnerable neighbors enhances Russian security.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Good faith negotiations with Russia are impossible---Putin uses peace talks as opportunities to regroup Russian forces.
Steven Erlanger 22, chief diplomatic correspondent in Europe for The New York Times, a position he assumed in 2017, 3/29/2022, “Peace Talks May be Little More than Russian Tactics, Analysts say,” , RH
BRUSSELS — As envoys made progress in peace talks on Tuesday, Russia offered concessions that signaled a more realistic course for the war in Ukraine, while indicating it is also in no hurry to end the conflict, according to diplomats and analysts.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Can’t solve – Putin wants complete disarmament at the border
Kirby ’22 [Paul; 5-9-2022; "Why has Russia invaded Ukraine and what does Putin want?," BBC News, , smarx, AZM]
Ahead of the war, he demanded that Nato turn the clock back to 1997 and reverse its eastward expansion, removing its forces and military infrastructure from member states that joined the alliance from 1997 and not deploying "strike weapons near Russia's borders". That means Central Europe, Eastern Europe and the Baltics.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
US action alone is insufficient – Russia requires the removal of ALL NATO commitments to eastern Europe
Roth ’21 [Andrew, 12-17-2021, "Russia issues list of demands it says must be met to lower tensions in Europe," Guardian, , smarx, AZM]
Russia has put forward a highly contentious list of security guarantees it says it wants the west to agree to in order to lower tensions in Europe and defuse the crisis over Ukraine, including many elements that have already been ruled out.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
**Specific Aff Updates** › Space Assets 2AC AT: EU CP Net Benefit
Economist 19 --- International Weekly Newspaper.
[Published: 3-14-19. “What would happen if America left Europe to fend for itself?” The Economist. Accessible: ]
Yet the Europeans would immediately face institutional hurdles. Compared with Russia’s top-down system, command and control is hard enough in consensus-bound nato. It would be a bigger challenge for Europeans alone, especially if they did not inherit nato’s command structure. The eu may want to take the lead, but military thinking is not in its dna. Besides, an eu-only alliance would be a pale shadow of nato: after Brexit, non-eu countries will account for fully 80% of nato defence spending.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
**Specific Aff Updates** › Space Assets 2AC AT: EU CP Net Benefit
Tony Barber 19, Europe editor at the Financial Times, 11-4-2019, "New EU leadership team must up its game on foreign policy," https://www.ft.com/content/e08b101e-fa48-11e9-a354-36acbbb0d9b6
The new EU leadership team taking office in Brussels knows that, if the bloc’s common foreign policy is to command respect, the first place where it must achieve success is in Europe’s neighbourhood. It needs to be well-planned, as united as possible, efficiently executed and imbued with a larger sense of long-term strategy. In all these regards, two recent episodes — one concerning the Balkans, and the other Syria — have been little short of a debacle.
Each incident points to the EU’s inability to translate its undoubted weight as a commercial and regulatory bloc into hard power on the world stage. It is not just a matter of lack of military muscle, important though that is. The real problem is that, whenever two or more of the EU’s biggest countries are in disagreement, a common European foreign policy is either paralysed [stagnated] or becomes a question of finding the lowest common denominator among 28 states. An often overlooked point is that these disagreements tend to arise out of domestic political tensions in individual countries — over, for example, irregular migration or attitudes to Islam or Russia. Such tensions hobble the attempts of governments to find common ground with their EU partners.
In any case, France, Germany and other EU countries usually prefer to keep their freedom of manoeuvre when it suits them. The Syrian episode centres on Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, who is Angela Merkel’s preferred candidate to succeed her as German chancellor. Ms Kramp-Karrenbauer was named defence minister in July in an apparent attempt to raise her profile with German voters. But the proposal for a multinational security zone in northern Syria that she came up with this month was startling for its naivety and lack of preparation. Before unveiling her plan, Ms Kramp-Karrenbauer, who replaced Ms Merkel as the Christian Democratic party’s leader in December ahead of elections due in 2021, consulted neither her Social Democratic coalition partners nor Germany’s Nato and EU allies. Her proposal skipped over crucial questions such as whether the UN Security Council would endorse it, whether the US would take part and whether Germany’s under-resourced armed forces would send soldiers to Syria. To each question it rapidly became clear that the answer was almost certain to be no. Indeed, it was hard to tell who was more dismissive of the initiative — Russia and Turkey, which control events on the ground in Syria, or Heiko Maas, Germany’s foreign minister, who is of course a colleague of Ms Kramp-Karrenbauer. In this way, the plan served no purpose other than to illustrate the incoherence of the German coalition’s foreign policy, not to mention the EU’s near-irrelevance in Syria.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
**Specific Aff Updates** › Space Assets 2AC AT: EU CP Net Benefit
Edward Lucas 18 --- Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA).
[Published: 12-04-18. “The Delusion of Strategic Autonomy.” CEPA. Accessible: ]
Some Europeans want to take the initiative, stitching up deals with China and other trading partners (Latin America, Japan) who feel bruised by the mercantilist “America First” approach. They would like to make the euro into a reserve currency, ending the European dependence on the dollar-based international financial infrastructure. Europe may be puny when it comes to hard security, they argue, but it wields clout elsewhere: just imagine if it combined its capabilities on aid, diplomacy, finance, trade, and soft-power strategically.
Such an approach would be interesting; it would certainly give the U.S. administration cause to rethink its approach to Europe, though possibly not in the way that Europeans would like.
For now and the foreseeable future, though, the question is purely theoretical. The practical trend is towards greater impotence, not autonomy. Brexit is a distraction. The Franco-German axis, on which many hopes rested only a year ago, has splintered. Second-tier countries such as Italy (run by eccentric populists) and Spain (with a weak minority government), Sweden (with no government at all) and Poland (self-marginalized) are in no position to take their share of the burden. At the level of European institutions, nothing will happen until the dust settles from the European Parliament elections, perhaps by the end of next year.
The result is introversion and impotence: an open door for Russian influence, and, increasingly, Chinese. That is frustrating for everyone, not least the United States, which for years has been urging Europe to do more. But instead of serious contributions to global security, what Europe offers is empty talk of autonomy, exemplified by the notion of a “European Army”—a militarily nonsensical idea which threatens to weaken NATO at a time when the Alliance needs to do more, not less.
Against this bleak background it is easy to despair. But it is worth remembering that the West survived the Cold War in worse shape than it is now. The USSR was a serious strategic adversary which controlled half of Europe and projected power all over the world. Russia is a nuisance not a threat. It succeeds mainly through bluff, not muscle. Transatlantic disunity is nothing new either. Europe shunned the U.S.-led cold war in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. France stormed out of NATO’s command structure in 1966 and did not return until 2009.
Woolly, self-indulgent talk of “autonomy,” strategic or otherwise, counts for little when migration, climate change, humanitarian catastrophes, and technological change all remind Europeans insistently of the competitive, dangerous, and interconnected outside world. Like it or not, these threats necessitate cohesion, decisiveness—and a strong transatlantic Alliance.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
**Specific Aff Updates** › Space Assets 2AC AT: EU CP – Perm
Stanley R. Sloan 17, Visiting Scholar in Political Science at Middlebury College and Author of Defense of the West: NATO, the European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain, “Washington Might Feel The Chill Of A More United European Defense”, War on the Rocks, 6/22/2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/washington-might-feel-the-chill-of-a-more-united-european-defense/
The answer given by most European and American defense experts is that the European allies do need to do more. But most also agree that those efforts will be most effective if shaped by and built within the framework of the transatlantic alliance and its leading institution, NATO.
A somewhat different argument appeared in these pages recently, observing that President Trump had not yet reduced its commitment to Europe as many have feared, but have nonetheless managed to alienate our allies. Despite the downside, the authors, Benjamin Friedman and Joshua Shifrinson, argue that Trump’s policies could lead to an increase in European defense efforts. Whether the increases currently underway are in any way stimulated by Trump’s “tough talk” remains to be seen. The allies agreed in the 2014 Wales Pledge to increase defense spending to reach the goal of 2 percent of GDP by 2024. The pledge came explicitly in response to Russian aggression against Ukraine and threatening behavior toward NATO allies.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
**Specific Aff Updates** › Space Assets 2AC AT: EU CP – Perm
Schake 17 [Kori, Distinguished Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Deputy Director-General of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Lecturer in the Public Policy Program at Stanford University, PhD in Government from the University of Maryland, “NATO Without America?”, The American Interest, 5/25/2017, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/05/25/nato-without-america/]
But most European governments conduct their national security policies at a much greater distance from their militaries, celebrating their concentration on “soft power” tools in lieu of force. Not only do they privilege those tools, they often consider their policies, and themselves, morally superior for the choice. One need only listen to EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker or read of the European Parliament passing legislation condemning U.S. intelligence agencies to share President Trump’s aggravation with Europe. We sentimentalize the Transatlantic connection at our peril.
However, NATO’s fundamental bargain continues to be overwhelmingly advantageous to the United States. European states would be both less willing and less able to help us without NATO. European allies would likely spend even less—not more—on defense without the constant hectoring of the United States within NATO. They would likely spend more on military pay and benefits than on high-end weapons and capabilities; all Western militaries must contend with competing demands on their funding, but the problem is more effectively addressed in NATO, where militaries have greater political capital to make hard choices than in solely national or EU forums. They would not be nearly as able to get organized and act decisively for a common purpose when needed. And they would be less likely to feel an obligation to participate in wars that the U.S. military fights beyond Europe. Diplomatically, we would need to negotiate European states into participating in our endeavors rather than expecting them to proffer a good excuse to remain out. That may seem a subtle difference, but it isn’t.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
**Specific Aff Updates** › Space Assets 2AC AT: ESA CP
Alexandra Stickings 19. Research Fellow for Space Policy and Security, MSc in International Security and Global Governance from Birkbeck College, University of London, a BA(Hons) in International Studies from the Open University, and a BSc(Hons) in Physics with Astronomy from the University of Nottingham. “The Future of EU–US Cooperation in Space Traffic Management and Space Situational Awareness.” Chathamhouse. Aug 2019. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/CHHJ7468-Cooperation-Space-Traffic-WEB-190816.pdf
However, there are gaps in European STM capacities. Limited sensor coverage (owing to limited funding and relatively low prioritization in terms of national spending) has led to over-reliance on the US SSN for comprehensive STM. Similarly, limited national space intelligence capabilities are largely reliant on US-provided space intelligence. Another primary EU vulnerability is its lack of experience. The UK has not capitalized on its experience and although there is expertise in the analysts at Fylingdales they are, according to some experts,25 not effectively utilized, and just one sensor in the UK will not provide full STM coverage.
In addition, European sensors are not as capable as those in the US – they have lower resolution and therefore can only track large objects. To become more complementary and to contribute globally, Europe requires new and dedicated sensors capable of tracking smaller objects. One individual with experience both in the military and commercial aspects of STM expressed amazement that the community talks about the significance of STM but provides little funding for dedicated sensors. The current EU funding for future STM support systems was described as ‘pitiful’ by one expert.26 For Europe to significantly contribute to STM, at union and member state levels, requires additional funding to develop better capabilities.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
**Specific Aff Updates** › Space Assets 2AC AT: Debris Defense
Bohumil Doboš and Jakub Praˇz ́ak 21. Faculty of Social Studies, Institute of Political Studies, Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic. Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University. “Master spoiler: a strategic value of Kessler Syndrome.” Taylor and Francis Online. Apr 27 2021. https://www-tandfonline-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/full/10.1080/14702436.2021.1997095
However, the satellite numbers are expected to multiply rapidly, and it was estimated there might be no less than 107,000 active satellites by 2029 (Samson 2020). Apart from functional systems, orbits are congested by a significant amount of space debris. As of January 2021, the U.S. Space Surveillance Network tracked over 28,000 objects in the orbits; nevertheless, it is estimated that there are already about 900,000 objects larger than 1 cm orbiting the Earth, from which only about 34,000 are larger than 10 cm (ESA 2021). The number of 10 cm is vital because, generally, satellites are protected against a collision with objects smaller than 0,1 cm and objects larger than 10 cm can be possibly avoided (EU Community Research and Development Information Service 2012).
Until 2021, there were more than 560 break-ups, explosions, collisions or other fragmenting events in the orbits registered (ESA 2021), with the most notorious events of the Chinese ASAT test in 2007 and the Iridium-Cosmos collision in 2009. A single intentional Chinese kinetic ASAT test in 2007 resulted in the creation of more than 3 000 pieces of debris larger than 10 cm (Nicholls 2021) and accidental collision between Iridium and Cosmos in 2009 produced almost 2 000 pieces of debris larger than 10 cm (Secure World Foundation 2010). However, the in-orbit collisions predicted by the socalled Kessler Syndrome – a situation when the naturally occurring collisions intensify to a point when they lead to a cascading effect damaging an increasing number of systems – will increasingly occur as the number of space systems rises and may result in a cascading effect that eventually can limit or preclude access to outer space. Kessler and Cour-Palais (1978, 2637) stated that “[a]s the number of artificial satellites in earth orbit increases, the probability of collisions between satellites also increases. Satellite collisions would produce orbiting fragments, each of which would increase the probability of further collisions, leading to the growth of a belt of debris around the Earth. Hence, in the case of a severe debris-resulting incident, outer space may become impenetrable. Though the in-orbit collisions are currently rare, they are gradually and steadily becoming increasingly likely, and long-term space debris accumulating effect already requires mitigating countermeasures to keep outer space accessible for the future (Drmola and Hubik 2018). Moreover, as the Indian kinetic ASAT test in March 2019 demonstrated, the states apparently did not completely abandon additional debris-proliferating activities (Weeden and Samson 2021, 5–3, 5–4).
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Psychoanalysis › Neg › Different types
Ahmad & Nayah, 2019 (Mushtaq, assistant English professor at the Imperial College of Business Studies. Sidra, researcher at Riphah International University. “Psychoanalysis as a method of reading texts and practices: a descriptive study” Asian Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities. Vol. 8(1). February 2019. /// MF)
There are at least two ways that Freudian psychoanalysis can be used as a method to analyze texts.
The first approach is author-centered, treating the text as the equivalent to an author’s dream. Freud, Masson, & Fliess (1985) identify what they call ‘the class of dreams that have never been dreamt at all – dreams created by imaginative writers and ascribed to invented characters in the course of a story’. The surface of a text (words and images, etc.) are regarded as the manifest content, while the latent content is the author’s hidden desires. Texts are read in this way to discover an author’s fantasies; these are seen as the real meaning of the text.
2022
Michigan
Counterplan
Psychoanalysis › Neg › Root cause = desire
Owolade, 2021 (Tomiwa, graduate of the University of London in English, critic, writes about literature, politics, identity and sports for many publications including the Times and Literary Review and contributing editor for UnHerd. ‘Psychoanalysis doesn’t work” UnHerd. October 18, 2021. /// MF).
In 1881, a young woman in Vienna discovered she had lost her native German tongue. She could speak nothing but English. Bertha Pappenheim was diagnosed by her doctor with hysteria. The symptoms included contractures, hallucinations, and aphasia ― the loss of basic functions such as language. They were resistant to conventional treatment; and so Pappenheim became the first ever patient of psychoanalysis. Her name, in one of the practice’s foundational texts, Studies on Hysteria, is Anna O.
The original patient of psychoanalysis was never treated by the father of psychoanalysis, Sigmund Freud; she was treated instead by its John the Baptist, Josef Breuer, who co-wrote Studies on Hysteria. “The discovery of Breuer’s,” wrote Freud of his colleague in 1917, “is still the foundation of psycho-analytical theory”. What Breuer discovered, and Freud later developed, was that neurotic conditions could be treated by a “talking cure”. By talking about her childhood experiences to the analyst, the patient can relieve herself of the disorders that burden her — and subsequently alleviate, with the help of the analyst, the physical manifestations of such disorders.
2022
Michigan
Negative
5G Neg › 2NC – Commercial Adv – AT: Smart Cities
Jim Robbins 21, journalist for Yale Environment 360, writer for the New York Times, Conde Nast Travelar, and many other publications, author of The Wonder of Bird: What they Tell Us About the World, Ourselves, and a Better Future, 12/1/2021, "Why the Luster on Once-Vaunted 'Smart Cities' Is Fading," Yale E360, , RMax
While proponents say these communities represent the future of a healthier planet, some prominent smart cities have faced serious obstacles to realizing their utopian visions. Masdar City in Abu Dhabi abandoned its smart city master plan because of financial problems that began in 2008 and continued because the cost of some aspects of the city was far more than forecast. Songdo is a completed smart city with a population of 170,000 in South Korea that has not been able to fill its buildings. It’s sometimes described as a ghost town, or, variously, as cold, impersonal, homogenous, and dully predictable.
One recent paper on smart cites grappled with ways these cities can introduce serendipity into daily life to combat their monotonous nature.
2022
Michigan
Negative
5G Neg › 1NC – Commercial Adv – AT: Smart Cities
Hatem Zeine 17, Founder and CTO of Ossia, Wireless Power Pioneer, Physicist, 6/19/2017, The Problems With Smart Cities, Forbes,” https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2017/06/19/the-problems-with-smart-cities/3/#268c6d041ffd
The "smart city" sounds like a digital utopia, a place where data eliminates first-world hassles, dangers and injustices. But there are some problems with smart cities, and no one, to my knowledge at least, has pointed them out. Press coverage from Forbes, The Wall Street Journal, The Guardian and dozens of other publications are gleefully optimistic about smart cities. No more traffic! Renewable energy for all! Fewer fires and disease outbreaks! Billions in savings! Automated vegetable gardens on roofs! These are all real possibilities. Before we get too excited, however, let’s examine the ingredients of a smart city and what they indicate about those problems.
Sensory Overload
2022
Michigan
Negative
5G Neg › 1NC – Commercial Adv – AT: Smart Cities
Sommer Mathis 21, editor-in-chief of City Monitor; and Alexandra Kanik, data reporter for City Monitor, 2/18/2021, "Why you’ll be hearing a lot less about ‘smart cities’," https://citymonitor.ai/government/budgets/why-youll-be-hearing-a-lot-less-about-smart-cities
We’re not the first to argue that it may be time to retire the phrase “smart cities”, and the evidence of late suggests that the tech industry itself is waking up to the reality that it needs to rethink what and how it’s trying to sell to local governments.
Smart cities surfaced as a concept more than 20 years ago and served as an umbrella term to describe a large and varied set of emerging technologies that seemed destined to help metros operate more efficiently. The internet of things for municipalities has to date included everything from simple sensors that allow transportation engineers to track cycle lane usage to full-blown smart-city operations centres that brought to mind scenes from Minority Report.
2022
Michigan
Negative
5G Neg › 2NC – Eurasia DA – UQ
Peng Gang 7/22, writer for the EU Observer, Minister of Commerce of the Chinese Mission to the EU, 7/22/2022, "For China and EU, cooperation is our only right way forward," , RMax
On July 19th, the 9th China-EU High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue (HED), co-chaired by China's vice-premier Liu He and executive vice-president of the European Commission, Valdis Dombrovskis, and participated by more than 20 ministerial-level officials, was successfully held.
Through pragmatic, frank and efficient discussions, the two sides reached a series of consensus and deliverables on macro-economic policy coordination, cooperation on industrial and supply chains, WTO reform, further market opening-up, implementation of the China-EU Agreement on Geographical Indications, animal and plant inspection and quarantine, two-way opening-up of the financial sector and regulatory cooperation, among others.
2022
Michigan
Negative
5G Neg › 2NC – Eurasia DA – UQ
Zhao Jia 6/11, reporter for ChinaDaily.com, 6/11/2022, "China and Poland's friendship may lead way to European-China cooperation," No Publication, https://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202206/11/WS62a3fb64a310fd2b29e6214d.html, RMax
China is willing to work with Poland to move the traditional friendship forward, enhance mutual trust and deepen exchanges and cooperation to continue to promote the healthy and stable development of bilateral ties, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi said on Friday.
Wang made the remarks when he held the third plenary session of China-Poland Intergovernmental Cooperation Committee with Polish Foreign Minister Zbigniew Rau.
2022
Michigan
Negative
K › Set Col › 2NC---Link---Set Col
Bhatt, ND -- Associate Professor of Gender and Women’s Studies at the University of Maryland (Amy Bhatt, ND, "Unequal Global Exchange: Colonization, Politics, and Economics," Office of Minority Affairs & Diversity, , accessed 8-20-2021) //nikki
Partners in Health and Farmer’s efforts to bring modern medicine to an ex-colony such as Haiti must be considered in the current moment of globalization, where countries are growing more interconnected and financially dependent than ever before. Farmer works extensively to bring down the cost of TB-related drug pricing. This struggle over pricing highlights the challenges faced by poor countries in an increasingly global market where most drug companies are protected by patent laws safeguarded by the World Trade Organization. According to Oxfam International, roughly 14 million people in developing countries die each year from infectious diseases that could be prevented with wider access to medical treatments and medications. However, as part of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights agreement, the WTO has ensured that the patent regulations for mostly Western pharmaceutical companies should be protected over measures to increase wider availability of drugs to poor nations. Thus, Farmer’s struggle to bring down drug pricing globally reflects another postcolonial concern: the inability of ex-colonies and the poorer nations of the world to effectively receive the same standard of care and access to medical advances as the rich. For Farmer, this is a problem of neo-colonization, where wealth continues to be accumulated in the nations of the West, or the former colonizers, while poor nations, or the bulk of the colonized world, continue to suffer.