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2022 Michigan Kritik
1AC – Imperialism

Here, epistemology and technology converge to create the war assemblage, an economy of mundane war, a slow, unending violence

Grove 19 [Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa; “Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world”; August 16, 2019]//Eleanor//-ekh-

War as defined by classical war studies suggests a distinct class of actors, interests, aims, and expertise. As a result, the study of war as well as much of the social mobilization of war presumes an exteriority of war and warfare from other sectors and institutions like the economy or the state. For those who study military history, war—in this limited understanding—can certainly be decisive in the rise and fall of nation-states and even transformations of the global system when that system is only indexed by the states that populate it, but the pursuit of these histories still presumes a kind of exceptional character of war. War following this line of thought is a cataclysmic event that interrupts the otherwise normal character of daily life. For others, particularly in the field of strategic studies, warfare is a tool, an instrument whereby states and sometimes organizations pursue ends beyond the limits of politics and persuasion. War compels and determines a course of action as an orchestral direction of overwhelming force. For those who hope to abolish war, a parallel exteriority animates their theorizing about war. War, according to these thinkers, is reducible to the self-interest of hegemonic states, the militarism of soldiers, and the self-amplifying loop of profit and power. Presidents, generals, ceos, arms dealers, and patriots come together to pursue war as an end in itself. Again, those actors and those pursuits are treated as outside the normal realm of human social relations. But what if war is history? What if the very form of life that created, was reinforced by, mutated with, and emerged from the Eurocene is warlike? State-making, territorialization, expansion, annihilation, settlement, and globalization are all warlike relations. I want to consider the possibility of war and warlike relations as processes of making a form of life in which warfare is normal. And what I mean by normal is much more than what we mean when we use concepts like ideology or legitimacy or discipline. By normal, I mean the very fabric of relations that makes a form of life and a world: a war body, a war assemblage, a war ecology. I am not suggesting that war is the only form of life. There are surviving forms of life interior and exterior to the Eurocene. No process of annihilation succeeds without leaving at least a trace.3 However, the normal workings of daily global life are a state of war. Rather than think of state of war in the juridical or theoretical sense, which distinguish war from peace on the grounds of declarations or measures of order, I want to consider war as an ecology endemic to the Eurocene. So by state of war I mean state in the sense that physicists or chemists think about states of matter. Every state of matter is an order, and despite that order, every state of matter has some elements of other states. A state of matter exhibits properties like solidity, liquidity, gaseousness, or the full-on freak-out of plasma but is not entirely made up of that state. And yet the state still has an effect despite that heterogeneity. So to say that we live in a global state of war, and that the making of the Eurocene was that making of a global state of war, is to say that war intensifies the field of relations that make the world what it is right now, not that it exhausts the possibility of what the world can become. Instead, the practices and organizations—from resource extraction, enclosure, carbon liberation, racialization, mass incarceration, border enforcement, policing and security practices, primitive accumulation by dispossession, targeted strikes, to allout combat—are relations of war rather than merely correlates or opportunities for a war metaphor. To put it a bit more bluntly, politics, colonialism, settlement, capitalism, ecological destruction, racism, and misogynies are not wars by other means—they are war. War is not a metaphor; it is an intensive fabric of relations making the Eurocene. To make this claim requires rethinking—somewhat bombastically—the meaning of war. If war has such a wide application, it would seem to mean nothing. In talks, roundtables, and casual conversations, colleagues have often suggested that such an expansive definition of war is polemical or even absurd. Others have said that spreading war so thin cheapens the sacrifices and tragedies of those who have experienced “real war.” It is curious to me that many of the same people have no difficulty assigning similar base or structuring characteristics to capitalism, settlement, or patriarchy. I do not see war as a replacement or a displacement of those structuring structures. Instead, war is like those other complicated, heterogeneous, abstract machines but interrelated and importantly semiautonomous in the making of the world. The importance of shifting the point of emphasis or break between war and other “big processes” is to emphasize the way collectively making death comes to be its own organizing ecology rather than just an instrumental means for other ecologies, such as racism or sexism or capitalism, that are often more obviously invested in ordering—subordinating orders—than destruction. Furthermore, I do not think, given the extreme level of violence and deprivation necessary to create the global ecology we now inhabit, that it is “a stretch” to call war the constitutive fabric of planetary relations. Instead, war as an intensive difference takes possession of other categories, at which point phase shifts take place in categories like racism or economics. What was the slow, lethal burn of postslavery policing escalates into the fury of outright combat in the streets, a race war in the streets of 1921 Tulsa or the 2015 streets of Baltimore. Even in our sacred texts of democratic theory, the pulsing tributaries of war run throughout descriptions of political formation. John Locke argued with little dispute that slavery was the institutionalization of war.4 And W. E. B. Du Bois said of the process of reconstruction after slavery that war had begun again, and in fact had never ended.5 Do we think that the same could not be said for the vast carceral project directed at black people described so well by Michelle Alexander or Loïc Wacquant?6 The common retort is to ask whether this line of thinking means all forms of killing should be considered war. I think that is a reasonable question. However, I believe that retort actually demonstrates the problem of war in the Eurocene. Take, for instance, the lynching of African Americans after the American Civil War or the routine murder of Native Americans by settlers before the arrival of the American cavalry during the period of westward expansion. Were these killings disparate acts of murder or strategically valuable microevents of war? How would patriarchy’s sadistic continuity and heterogeneous creativity across geography and time survive without the nearly viral practices of domestic violence that suture norms to bruises, scars, and corpses? To exclude the way each micropractice of war—murder—aggregates over time and space into continental scale, slow-motion warfare would significantly impoverish our understanding of the role war plays in the making of global systems. Any one act of brutality could be dismissed on idiosyncratic grounds and attributed to lazy claims about human nature. Or these acts of brutality can be brought into a conceptual jurisdiction of war such that we can get a glimpse of how these seemingly disparate practices of violence resonate, congeal, and order the global system. The historical granularity necessary to prove this seemingly absurd proposition is well beyond the scope of this book. Instead, this chapter and the larger aim of the book try to identify operators or machines in the emergence of war that confound the tried and true questions of sovereignty, security dilemmas, and the increasingly apparent absurdity of circumscribing global political change to the behavior of “great powers” in a rationalist and statecentric sense. The commitment to a world run by the causal agents of states, regimes, and norms (whether thick or thin) appears to me like the Velveteen Rabbit: toys whose straw stuffing is beginning to poke through worn skin and whose button eyes have been long since lost. Unlike the mythic rabbit, there is nothing real for these fetishes to become.7 The first step to understand war as a form of life that is world forming requires building a community of concepts capable of capturing the diversity of relations at work in the making of war. It is a messy inquiry. In recoil from this indiscernible mess, there are those who would rather “un–black box” phenomena by exhaustively identifying all actants or detailing complex processes of social and material change, but these approaches are ill-suited to describing the broader ecology of war. The problem with the desire to explain or un–black box phenomena is that it seduces us to focus on those phenomena on which we think we have the best chance of imposing an artificial autonomy or separation of things and events. Those phenomena that seem to give themselves up to analyzable bits and pieces are prized for publication and research funding. This cult of discreteness has not gotten us very far. Reality does not, as some realist philosophers say in a creepy analogy to butchering, “cut at the joints.”8 Positivism, even the complexity and systems variety, wants an object of inquiry at an instant. In a particularly Whiteheadian moment, Merleau-Ponty responds to the desire for discreteness with disdain: In human existence, then, there is a principle of indetermination, and this indetermination does not merely exist for us . . . from some imperfection in our knowledge. . . . Existence is indeterminate in itself because of its fundamental structure: insofar as existence is the very operation by which something that had no sense takes on sense. . . . Existence has no fortuitous attributes and no content that does not contribute to giving it its form, it does not admit any pure facts in themselves, because it is the movement by which facts are taken up.9 In the attempt to vivisect existence—to reduce to an instant what is process and movement, rhythm and relation—those more subtle connections or resonances whose effects are felt but not discrete are overshadowed by those relationships we can chart and measure. Such an approach circumscribes our thinking rather than allowing it to remain open to the emergence of thought as provoked by a wild world. Domesticated notions of complexity are stand-ins for the merely complicated. Real complexity suggests that there is novelty in the world rather than thinking that novelty is an effect of a complicated process. This is what Merleau-Ponty means when he says that the indeterminate is the “fundamental structure of the world.” Those who see in complexity the mere character of complicatedness invest in that image of complexity the hope for more sophisticated predictive models and desire a mechanistic universe defined by initial conditions.10 For those striving to create positivism 2.0, chance exists as an endangered species to be extinguished once all the data are in. I think this diminishes the creative and chaotic elements of becoming characteristic of ecologies like war, and reinvests the desire for order and control with a false and dangerous telos. The aleatory is reduced to a question of epistemology rather than being seen as a generative principle of the cosmos, giving new confidence to those who would see to make useful predictions or pronouncements upon their models of the world. I admit it is tempting when new scientific discoveries verify our own theoretical belief in thinking that somehow science has finally gotten it right. However, one need only look at what happens when the image of thought founded on this new faux-empiricism combines with the shabby categories of interest and security to see how quickly scientific facts about complexity or quantum physics or networks or sociobiology can be put to use for preventive war and social control.11 In international relations, even insights about uncertainty can become a predictive social scientific method.12 The postcolonies and pockets of peoples surviving settlement are still finding that the “study” of their cultures’ complexities serves the interests of those who would obliterate difference rather than those who would insist on a new pluralism. Anthropologists, sociologists, and economists—all armed with the latest in social-actor-network theory, complexity equations, and advanced social media scraping algorithms—are deployed as part of the subsequent revisions of the Human Terrain System in Iraq, Afghanistan, Chicago, Los Angeles, the Dakota Access Pipeline, Yemen, Mexico, Mali, and back again. Knowledge separated from its ethical considerations is readily weaponized.13 Rapidly scoping from the micro of culture to the macro of the planetary scale, the Eurocene is already transitioning from territorial warfare to geopolitically motivated geoengineering and regional terraforming to institutionalize hegemony geologically while still refining the microscopic collection of data on threats as small as a single person.14 Inspired by the work in early chaos and catastrophe theory, Deleuze and Guattari suggest another path for the pursuit of complexity. Rather than ignore the overwhelming complexity of the world, scientific inquiry can be a way to cope with chaos “defined not so much by its disorder as by the infinite speed with which every form taking shape in it vanishes.”15 Creative sciences attack the problem of chaos by attributing functions to chaos so that its shifting patterns, orders, and relations can be thought. Functions are a kind of “fantastic slowing down, and it is by slowing down that matter, as well as the scientific thought able to penetrate it with propositions, is actualized.”16 I want to develop war as something between a function and a concept. I am trying to draw together consistencies by extending out, “building bridges,” and occupying larger zones of components and functions that attempt to slow down, distinguish, and make actual indexible territories of interest, which only appear whole because investigation as a science has imposed a kind of temporary and hesitant “freeze frame.”17 One could become worried that such provisional moments could get mistaken for reality itself, however, with close attention, care for the world, such mistakes are hard to maintain. The relational (in movement-process) and substantive character of the world defies reductionism. Novelist and philosophical tinkerer Tristan Garcia explains the neither/nor of concept object-relations as follows: A thing is nothing other than the difference between that which is in this thing and that in which this thing is. Unless one guarantees this double sense, there are no thinkable things. Every reductionist who claims to deduce that which this or that thing is from that which composes this or that thing only succeeds in dis-solving the very thing that they claim to account for. We attempt to accomplish the exact opposite of this: to guarantee things as invaluable differences embedded in the distribution channels of being of the world. To complete our task, we set out to discover the meaning which circulates among things, between that which composes them and that which they compose, inside or outside us, with or without us.18 War in particular demands this double aspect of things to capture war’s territorializing and deterritorializing tendencies to make and unmake things and be a thing all at the same time. Although throughout the book I take inspiration from new scientific research—examples from neuroscience, physics, evolutionary biology, artificial intelligence, and experimental psychiatry—that inspiration will not be used to build some new, more stable, method of inquiry, but instead I will try to trouble a still pervasive image of the world as law-governed. Therefore, war serves a double movement: it presents itself as an ordering principle or form of ecology despite the frequent conflation between war and chaos, while also undermining the image of the world as one ruled by the laws of a singular transcendental order. Even many postpositivists, particularly interpretivists, of various kinds are unsettled by this kind of open-ended or experimental thought, absurdly big claims, oriented around assemblages, resonances, or systems of thought particularly in the context of war and violence because it means letting go, at least for a moment, of the desire to ascribe blame or culpability—from my perspective, consonant with causality—to particular individuals in time and space. This is a deficit, but it comes with the benefit of elucidating, even if only vaguely, the operators in the generation of technics, affects, peoples, and weak or novel connections in the savage ecologies that often determine, or at least circumscribe, the incipient possibilities of action by the individuals we so desperately want to hold accountable for their failures or vices. Remember Walt Whitman’s words that began this book, “The war—that war so bloody and grim—the war I will henceforth forget—was you and me.” The question in the context of this research is: Why is there so consistently an arrangement of racial supremacy, power, ethics, and violence to prosecute or distribute war and technical-martial logic to support and distribute it? While it is valuable to investigate how leaders can function to amplify conflict, what is striking is how quickly any one leader can be replaced and how little the trajectory of war changes. Following Sloterdijk’s pronouncement on the becoming atmospheric of contemporary warfare, collective violence is saturating every corner of the Earth system, but like carbon, neither the distributors nor distribution of violence is equitable. Saturation is no excuse for universality. There will never be a we that is human as such. And yet there is also no tribe, history of proper names, or nation-state that can bear the responsibility in any meaningful way. Twenty or thirty generations of malicious and sadistic decisions cannot amount to the collective effect of the heterogeneous relations that produced the Eurocene but neither should we let go of the particular forms of life that congealed around an instrumental approach to collective violence that swallowed and then organized peoples, nonhuman peoples, and things throughout Europe and then the regions those people, nonhuman peoples, and things settled. Mapping something like the totality of those actors and relations is impossible and maybe even counterproductive, but tracing the lineages of warfare that came to enable the expansion of the Europeans until they became a “cene,” a geologically and geopolitically significant order, may gather up a swarm of conceptual machines still buzzing through our contemporary moment. Consequently, I am less interested in why once such an institution or assemblage is in place, a leader at a given moment succeeds in making actual the already present virtual tendencies of war. Consider how difficult it is to reconcile our lost hope for Barack Obama with the expected failure of George W. Bush or how quickly the terror over Donald Trump was normalized once the adults from the military stepped in, precisely because foreign policies of each arrangement of leadership are in many ways indistinguishable, particularly from the perspectives of their victims.19 It is not surprising to me, then, that sovereigns make war, or that they take advantage of democratic paradoxes to do so. The problematic that drives this section is how such a complex, mobile, and global ecology of war so closely aligns and adheres to such a seemingly local decision as a sovereign act of violence or declaration of war. One might take a lesson from the electrification of sound. In order to amplify or magnify a sound and preserve the fidelity of a particular harmonic arrangement, one cannot simply “turn up” the volume. It requires a certain interface between the means of amplification, the ambient qualities of the room, the number of people present, and the resonant capabilities of those people, the furniture, the walls, the floor, and the ceiling. Similarly, political decrees or decisions to produce effects must reverberate and interface with complex assemblages of institutions, economies, ethical dispositions, affective discourses, and other machinic operators. From this perspective, sovereign “decisions,” whether by presidents or suicide bombers, appear to be on both sides of the razor’s edge between cause and effect. Such an approach requires, as Deleuze writes, “not so much . . . convincing, as being open about things. Being open is setting out the ‘facts’ not only of a situation, but of a problem. Making visible things that would otherwise remain hidden.”20 So we have a world full of sovereign violence, but the place of a given sovereign in the distribution of that violence remains obscure. What follows is an attempt to flush out the contemporary milieu or ecology of war in its mutational, material, and global tendencies to open up the landscape for something that requires a history. In the following chapter, I return to the specific historical mutations of war that contributed war’s contemporary becoming as a Euro-cum-American facialization of the Eurocene. The sections that follow look for these “loose associations” or dif­ferent assemblages that may not yet have converged or connected but have tendencies and internal resonances that I think organize war’s various becomings. In particular, I consider the ecology of annihilation that characterizes American practices of warfare now dominant among “great powers.” These parts do not follow one from the other. They are often disjointed in their locations and themes. The hope is that the consistency that does connect them is one of possibility or chance rather than necessity so that the sense of inevitability that often characterizes the analysis of global security is not so easily territorialized for the capture of war. Some connections will appear more obvious than others, but, like other kinds of ecologies, sometimes the connections are merely the happenstance of coinciding; contingency can produce novelty and novelty can be catastrophic and horrifying. From this perspective, I ask what it would mean to consider the driving force of the Eurocene, war, ecologically.

2022 Michigan Kritik
1AC – Imperialism

Here, the exploited participates in the same neoliberal logics of pragmatism, implicitly consenting to become sites of knowledge extraction

Tazzioli, 21—Lecturer in Politics and Technology, Goldsmiths University of London (Martina, “Technologies of Control and Infrastructures of Redistribution,” e-flux #123, December 2021, dml//-ekh-)

A well-known slogan that emerged from the disability movement during the 1990s goes: “Nothing about us without us.” It stresses that no policy should be adopted without fully involving those who are affected by that policy. Nowadays, it is a catchphrase used across different fields and institutional settings, signaling that “participation” has become a placeholder for inclusion, democracy, and horizontal decision-making processes. Yet, what does “participation” in a given system mean when the epistemic-political codes, the ability to maneuver, and the stakes of the participation are set in advance by the party in control? So-called “participatory programs,” like surveys and other forms of data acquisition, have been used extensively by humanitarian agencies since the 1990s, and more recently have shifted into systems for practicing what I instead call “participatory confinement.” In such systems, individuals are nudged and encouraged to actively participate in their own confinement and governmentality, “for their own good.” Christopher Kelty, a scholar of science studies and anthropology, rightly claims that this sort of “participation is more often a formatted procedure by which autonomous individuals attempt to reach calculated consensus.” Not only are the goals and forms of participation often preestablished and surreptitiously imposed, but individuals are also de facto pushed to corroborate, contribute to, and improve mechanisms of confinement and coercion. Here, I focus on refugee humanitarianism as a case study for coming to grips with modes of participatory confinement as a systematic political technology of governmentality.

Modes of participatory confinement in refugee humanitarianism are inflected by clear-cut asymmetric relations between asylum seekers on one side, and humanitarian actors on the other. This initial condition and its trend towards reform by way of inviting participation is reminiscent of the diagnosis of prison reform by Michel Foucault in a lecture he gave in 1976. Furnishing an anticipatory example of participatory confinement, he writes: “There is an attempt to make prisoners themselves participate in devising the very programmes for their punishment, through the prisoners’ councils and so on. This is the idea that the individual, singly or collectively, is meant to accept the punitive procedure.” Nowadays, participatory approaches are center stage on the agendas of international agencies and NGOs in the context of the so-called “refugee crisis” in Europe. They continue to operate with the same neoliberal logics of prior reforms to systems of punishment and control that performatively invite the exploited to frame the forms of that exploitation, while actually ceding no power to the “participant.”

2022 Michigan Kritik
1AC – Imperialism

Cognition has become the newest battlefield – subtle disciplinary strategies create a neuro-geopolitical entanglement

Grove 19 [Jairus Victor Grove is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Hawai'i Research Center for Future Studies at the University of Hawai'i at Mānoa; “Savage Ecology: war and geopolitics at the end of the world”; August 16, 2019]//Eleanor //-elkh-

This is the terror that keeps Jürgen Habermas up at night. What will we do if we discover our freedom is contingent, that our very nature can change?31 The plan of the rest of this chapter is to follow Malabou’s provocation through to the heart of that terror. However, unlike Habermas and others, I hope to do so without the sentimental attachment to a humanity that never existed. Rather, I want to push Malabou’s concepts further. I want to consider what happens to plasticity and destructive plasticity when they are let loose in the wilds of politics. As knowledge of our formable and forming nature becomes not just known but made practical, the nightmare of humanists becomes real. Populations of human bodies without essential identities can be altered or, in the language of cybernetics, steered. Unlike understandings of power, even subtle forms of disciplinary power, plasticity on the scale of the individual and the polis represents the possibility of change without subjection, that is, without resistance. Rather than the relations of power that make subjects in the Foucauldian image, we have the possibility of designing or steering subjects that have no index of what they were before, such that something could resist. Instead, plasticity represents the possibility of a frictionless change—in the sense that one can imagine (and has imagined) the alteration of the brain or the assemblage of bodies-brains-semiotics-technics that is often called the social—that would leave no trace of what could be called an alternative. This is not the failure of resistance to produce an outcome, as in the case of the noncompliant prisoner who nonetheless remains imprisoned. Instead, plasticity raises the question of techniques that produce bodies that do not know that the “they” that they once were wanted to resist or even are imprisoned. The incorporation of plasticity into politics raises the specter of Gilles Deleuze’s “societies of control,” in which individuals become “dividuals”— humans as counters in a flexible and constantly “modulating” economy.32 Control in this context is often read systemically, as if only the “society” views humans as counters but the “dividuals” themselves, like Robert Duvall’s character in thx 1138, yearn to be free, to be unique. Confronting plasticity and its explosive potential to obliterate precursors poses a dif­ferent dividual, a real dividual: bodies stripped not just of their identity but of the desire to have an identity or to have an identity nonidentical to the identity that preceded it. Control represents the real possibility of order without the leverage or friction of ordering. Normatively I do not disagree with Habermas and others that this reduction of freedom to an engineering problem is horrifying. The point of disagreement is that arguing against the existence of such a possibility will have an effect on the probability of this nightmare.33 The attempt to safeguard humanity through the scapegoating of materialist thinking is self-defeating, as it insists that human freedom and dignity are independent of the brain while also decrying the possibility of each “becoming material.” In its cruelest form, this line of argument amounts to trying to cure someone with Alzheimer’s by scolding her about the intrinsic dignity and rationality of humans. Lesions beat argument every time. So rather than taking recourse to moralize the horror of control, it is necessary to take seriously the possibility of control as a material configuration enabled by the inessential nature of humans: their plasticity. Furthermore, I ask the reader to affirm the horror of destructive plasticity rather than look away or flee into the arms of humanist sentimentality.

2022 Michigan Kritik
1AC – Imperialism

Security co-operation operates on an axis of reversing the South Project, sustained through false flag operations, fascist militarization, and colonial violence that makes conflict structurally inevitable

Campbell ’19 — Horace; Professor of African American Studies and Political Science, Syracuse University. He is the author of Global NATO and the Catastrophic Failure in Libya. April 9, 2019; “Global NATO: A 70-Year Alliance of Oppressors in Crisis”; CounterPunch; ; //CYang//-ekh-

The celebration of NATO’s 70 years of existence provides another opportunity to unearth the real history of the ideas, practices and destruction wrought by this military alliance. Even with the clear exposure of the cooperation between NATO, the CIA and the British MI6 to spread terror and psychological warfare in Europe immediately after the formation of this military alliance, the mainstream media, academics and policy makers remain silent on activities of the ‘stay behind armies’ and ‘false flag’ operations that distorted the real causes of insecurity in the world after 1945. The evidence of the manipulations of the peoples of the world to ensure the continued survival of NATO has been well documented in the fraudulent interventions and bombings in the Balkans right up the present multiple wars against the peoples of Iran.

Vijay Prashad had identified NATO as the prime defender of the Atlantic project. This Atlantic project, he noted was, “a fairly straightforward campaign by the propertied classes to maintain or restore their position of dominance.” This Atlantic Project was anchored in the military alliance called NATO with its principal work, that of reversing the South Project; the struggles for peace bread and justice by the poorer citizens of the planet, especially those who had emerged on the world stage after the decolonization of Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › DA › 2AC---Korea Thumper

Korean thumps.

Chris Martin 8-25-2021, "US approves $258 million arms sale to South Korea", Defense News, https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2021/08/25/us-approves-258-million-arms-sale-to-south-korea/, DL

WASHINGTON — The U.S. State Department has OK’d a sale of precision-guided weapons worth about $258 million to South Korea.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › DA › 2AC---Israel Thumper

Israel thumps.

Jacqueline Alemany 5-17-2021, Congressional Investigations reporter at the Washington Post, "Power Up: Biden administration approves $735 million weapons sale to Israel, raising red flags for some House Democrats", Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/05/17/power-up-biden-administration-approves-735-million-weapons-sale-israel-raising-red-flags-some-house-democrats/, DL

FIRST IN POWER UP: The Biden administration has approved the sale of $735 million in precision-guided weapons to Israel, raising red flags for some House Democrats who are part of the shifting debate over the U.S. government’s support for the Israeli government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › DA › 2AC – AT: Humiliation DA

Ukraine is the tip of the iceberg – Russia is on something

Kapetas 22 – Anastasia Kapetas is the National Security Editor at The Strategist. (Anastasia Kapetas, "Why Putin might be pleased with the results of his war in Ukraine," Strategist, 6-9-2022, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-putin-might-be-pleased-with-the-results-of-his-war-in-ukraine/, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

As we reflect on the 100-day mark of the Russo-Ukrainian war and what we’ve learned, we need to understand that the West has fundamentally misunderstood Russia and continues to do so, argues Kyle Wilson, visiting fellow at the Centre for European Studies and former Australian diplomat who had postings in Russia, China and Poland.

This is why many in the commentariat are failing to appreciate that Russian President Vladimir Putin is probably happy with how his invasion of Ukraine is turning out, he says.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › DA › 2AC – AT: Humiliation DA

Russia is a revisionist power using NATO as an excuse for expansion

Chupryna 22 – Oleg Chupryna is PhD student at the Centre for European and Eurasian Studies. (Oleg Chupryna, "The Truth behind the Myth of Russia ‘Threatened’ by NATO," Balkan Insight, 4-1-2022, https://balkaninsight.com/2022/06/22/the-truth-behind-the-myth-of-russia-threatened-by-nato/, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

So what’s the real reason for Russia’s aggressive anti-Western politics?

It sits in plain view, if one takes the time to read the speeches, interviews or articles of Putin and other public figures in Russia.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › DA › 2AC – AT: Humiliation DA

Status quo is enabling further Russian expansion

Zagorodnyuk 22 – Andriy Zagorodnyuk is a former Ukrainian defence minister and chair of thinktank the Centre for Defense Strategies in Kyiv. (Guardian, "Ukraine is desperate for peace, but we won’t sign up to a bogus Russian deal," 6-3-2022, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jun/03/ukraine-peace-bogus-russian-deal-surrendering-territory-russia-terrible, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

Many armed conflicts do end with a compromise, but it would be illogical to assume all of them should. The only reason for this invasion was Putin’s obsession with subjugating Ukraine. What compromise is possible when your adversary’s goal is that you should not exist? The unspeakably brutal way in which Russians treat our occupied towns and villages is known throughout the world. True peace can only be secured when the invader leaves our country.

As the old saying has it, the night is darkest just before the dawn. Russia is now applying maximum available force, but the evidence of 1960s tanks being dusted off for battle, use of conscripts and the patching up of new military units without collective training demonstrate that it has exhausted its options. That is why Russia is pushing the idea of a compromise. It needs a pause to show gains to the Russian public and to give itself time to recover before moving on further with its attempt to subjugate Ukraine.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › DA › 2AC – AT: Humiliation DA

Backing down enables more Russian aggression NOT the other way around – endless war

Applebaum 22 – Anne Applebaum is a staff writer at The Atlantic. (Anne Applebaum, "The War Won’t End Until Putin Loses," Atlantic, 5-23-2022, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/05/why-ukraine-must-defeat-putin-russia/629940/, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

The third assumption is that this Ukrainian government, or any Ukrainian government, is politically able to swap territory for peace. To do so would be to reward Russia for invading, and to accept that Russia has the right to kidnap leaders, murder civilians, rape women, and deport anybody it chooses from Ukrainian territory. What Ukrainian president or prime minister can agree to that deal and expect to stay in office? Russian cruelty also means that any territory that is temporarily ceded will, sooner or later, become the source of an insurgency, because no Ukrainian population can promise to endure that kind of torture indefinitely. Already, guerrillas in the city of Melitopol, occupied since the first days of the war, claim to have killed several Russian officers and carried out acts of sabotage. An underground is emerging in occupied Kherson and will appear in other places too. To concede territory for a deal now will simply set up another conflict later on. The end of one kind of violence will lead to other kinds of violence.

This does not mean that the war can or should go on forever, or that diplomacy has no place at all. Nor does it mean that Americans and Europeans should be blind to the real challenges that a long conflict will pose to Ukraine. The Western coalition backing Kyiv could certainly fray; the wave of adrenaline that has so far propelled the Ukrainian army and leadership could crash. Ukraine’s economy could grow worse, making the fight much harder or even impossible to sustain.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › DA › 2AC – AT: Humiliation DA

Letting Ukraine lose will NOT solve Russia

Stanovaya 22 – Tatiana Stanovaya is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. (Tatiana Stanovaya, "What The West (Still) Gets Wrong About Putin," Foreign Policy, 6-1-2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/06/01/putin-war-ukraine-west-misconceptions/, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

Imagine a situation where Ukraine accepts most of Russia’s demands: It recognizes Crimea as Russian and the Donbas as independent, commits to a slimmed-down army, and promises to never join NATO. Will that end the conflict? Even if, to many, the answer appears to be an obvious “yes,” they are incorrect. Russia may be locked in a battle with Ukraine, but geopolitically, it sees itself as waging war against the West on Ukrainian territory. In the Kremlin, Ukraine is seen as an anti-Russian weapon in Western hands—and destroying it will not automatically lead to Russia’s victory in this anti-Western geopolitical game. For Putin, this war is not between Russia and Ukraine—and Ukrainian leadership is not an independent actor but a Western tool that must be neutralized.

So, whatever concessions Ukraine could make (regardless of how politically realistic they may be), Putin will continue escalating the war until the West changes its approach to the so-called Russian problem and admits that—as Putin sees it—the roots of Russian aggression are the result of Washington ignoring Russian geopolitical concerns for 30 years. This has been Putin’s real objective for a long time, and it remains unchanged. Unrealistic Russian demands rejected by Kyiv are even a way for the Kremlin to increase the stakes in a Russia-West confrontation, testing the West’s ability to stay united and consistent. The West today is looking at the problem in the wrong light: In seeking to stop Russia’s war, it focuses on Moscow’s artificial pretexts for its invasion of Ukraine and overlooks Putin’s obsession with the so-called Western threat as well as his readiness to use escalation to coerce the West into a dialogue on Russian terms. Ukraine is only a hostage.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › DA › 2AC – AT: Humiliation DA

Ukraine loses now but the aff solves it

DePetris 22 – Daniel DePetris is a foreign affairs columnist for Newsweek and a fellow at Defense Priorities, a thinktank that advocates for restraint in foreign interventions. ("The war in Ukraine has entered a new, and more difficult, phase," 6-23-2022, https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2022/jun/23/the-war-in-ukraine-has-entered-a-new-and-more-difficult-phase, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

Wars are a series of twists and turns. Momentum can shift and quickly alter fortunes on the battlefield, and intangible elements like leadership and motivation can shred the assessments of the most seasoned military analysts. Military campaigns that look promising initially can, over time, turn into quagmire, as mistakes accumulate, terrain changes and the adversary alters its tactics. The war in Ukraine is a textbook case in point.

During the war’s first two months, the Ukrainian army proved to be formidable, courageous and highly innovative against a better-armed Russian foe, which military experts had almost unanimously expected would prevail. A day after Russia’s invasion began, the US intelligence community was concerned that Russian forces would capture Kyiv in a matter of days. Vladimir Putin probably assumed a quick and relatively painless operation.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › DA › 2AC – AT: Humiliation DA

Assume the worst, hope for the best – Putin wants more than Ukraine

Palacio 22 – Ana Palacio is a former minister of foreign affairs of Spain and former senior vice president and general counsel of the World Bank Group. She is also a visiting professor at the Edmund E. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and a member of the Atlantic Council’s Board of Directors. (Ana Palacio, "Not just Ukraine: Putin wants to remake the world," Atlantic Council, 2-25-2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/not-just-ukraine-putin-wants-to-remake-the-world/, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

Russian President Vladimir Putin offered his reasoning for the “special military operation” in a Monday speech littered with contrived grievances and a self-serving perversion of history. Putin’s address can only be characterized as unhinged and reminiscent of the worst Soviet-era propaganda in which white is black and the aggressor is a victim. He proclaimed the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk, regions in eastern Ukraine held by Kremlin-backed rebels. He negated Ukraine’s sovereignty, culture, and identity.

Then on Thursday, announcing the start of the invasion, he described Ukraine’s government as an illegitimate junta and the country’s turn away from Moscow since the Maidan square protests of 2014 as the outcome of a coup orchestrated by the West. If the world wasn’t staring at a great tragedy, Putin’s bizarre tone and awkward efforts to project (forced) consensus through a televised meeting of the country’s security council would have been stunning political theater.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › DA › 2AC – AT: Humiliation DA

Even if it’s unintended, allowing the Ukraine War to rage on risks WWIII the longer it continues

Powell 22 – Alvin Powell is a Harvard Staff Writer. (Alvin Powell, "What does Russia really want?" Harvard Gazette, 2-24-2022, https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2022/02/what-does-russia-really-want/, Accessed 6-24-2022, LASA-SC)

With Russian troops in full-scale assault against Ukraine, a key step for the U.S. and its NATO allies should be tripling combat-ready troops in the Baltics and NATO-allied eastern Europe to deter any thought of a Ukraine-style incursion there.

Retired Brigadier Gen. Kevin Ryan, a senior fellow at Harvard’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, said even though it is unlikely that Russia would invade Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, their NATO membership, Lithuania’s borders with Russia-friendly Belarus, and Estonia and Latvia’s with Russia raise the stakes of a broader conflict. He said concrete steps to deter Russian President Vladimir Putin should be taken.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › DA › 2AC – AT: DoD Tradeoff DA

More arms lower costs

Kaidanow 17 – ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS. (Tina, United States Department of State, "Foreign Military Sales: Process and Policy," 1-20-2017, https://2017-2021.state.gov/foreign-military-sales-process-and-policy/index.html, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)

Arms transfers also support the U.S. defense industrial base and DoD procurement. Purchases made through the foreign military sales (FMS) system often can be combined with DoD orders to reduce unit costs for our own military; beyond this, the U.S. defense industry employs over 1.7 million people across our nation or about 3.5 million including indirect employment. These individuals and the companies they work for represent a key part of American entrepreneurship and innovation, maintaining the United States as the world leader in the defense and aerospace sectors and helping ensure our armed forces sustain their military edge.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › DA › 2AC – AT: DoD Tradeoff DA

Arms don’t cost money – only a net gain – at worst comes from the supercharge fund.

DSCA 22 – The Defense Security Cooperation Agency, as part of the United States Department of Defense, provides financial and technical assistance, transfer of defense matériel, training and services to allies, and promotes military-to-military contacts. (“SECURITY COOPERATION OVERVIEW,” 6-23-2022, , Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC) **date accessed through https://httpstatus.io/

By Policy, the USG does not conduct FMS for profit. By U.S. law, the USG may not incur debt on an FMS sale to your country. The LOA will require that your country pay the full cost associated with the FMS sale - which includes the cost of the defense equipment/services and any costs incurred by the USG while providing you with the defense equipment/services. We must ensure that, when the equipment or service is delivered and the case is closed, the USG has neither made a profit nor passed a debt to the U.S. taxpayer.

To build and re-build the administrative infrastructure necessary to support individual FMS cases would be a slow process and very costly to our foreign partners. Therefore, the USG maintains a standing infrastructure at the DoD level, within each of the Military Departments (MILDEPs), and within select other DoD organizations that conduct FMS. That standing infrastructure - skilled employees, information technology systems, offices, etc. - is funded by an administrative surcharge applied to every FMS case. The FMS administrative surcharge fund is managed by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) under the oversight of the DoD Comptroller.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › CP › 2AC – AT: Negotiate CP

Putin doesn’t care about sanctions

Simmons 22 – Anne Simmons is the Wall Street Journal's Moscow Bureau Chief. She has spent more than 25 years reporting from Europe, Africa, the Middle East and North America, and most recently was a writer/editor covering global development at the Los Angeles Times. ("Putin Blasts the West, Says Sanctions on Russia Over Ukraine Are Backfiring," WSJ, 6-17-2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/sanctions-so-far-fail-to-dent-russias-war-effort-11655383912, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)

ST. PETERSBURG, Russia—In a combative speech, Russian President Vladimir Putin criticized the West for failing to recognize the rise of new power blocs since the end of the Cold War, and warned that its sanctions on Moscow had backfired, creating a growing economic crisis in Europe.

“The idea was clear: crush the Russian economy violently,” Mr. Putin said at the annual St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, which Russia pitches as an alternative to the World Economic Forum in Davos to drum up investment in its economy. “They did not succeed. Obviously, that didn’t happen.”

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › CP › 2AC – AT: Negotiate CP

Putin will not negotiate

RFE 22 – RFE/RL's Ukrainian Service is dedicated to covering all of Ukraine, including the conflict zones and Crimea, and sets a standard for balanced reporting and high-impact investigative journalism. (RFE, "Putin Tells Guterres He Still Has Hope For Negotiated Agreement With Ukraine," RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, 4-26-2022, https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-kreminna-russian-losses/31821314.html, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said Putin has shown no seriousness about diplomacy to end the war despite a series of international efforts.

"We've seen no sign to date that President Putin is serious about meaningful negotiations," Blinken told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 26.

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › CP › 2AC – AT: Negotiate CP

Negotiations fail – other allies don’t want them, Putin says no, and it greenlights further aggression

WaPo 22 – The board highlights issues it thinks are important and responds to news events, mindful of stands it has taken in previous editorials is. (Washington Post Editorial Board, "Now is not the time to seek a deal with Putin," Washington Post, 5-26-2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/05/26/now-is-not-time-seek-deal-with-putin/, Accessed 6-25-2022, LASA-SC)

Wars end. Many, if not most, end with negotiation. That might be what happens with the war Russia launched against Ukraine on Feb. 24, too, though one former Moscow regime member warns against urging Ukraine to negotiate while President Vladimir Putin is still bent on more conquest. “You just can’t make peace now,” Boris Bondarev, who recently resigned from his mid-level Russian Foreign Ministry post to protest the war, said in an interview with Puck. “If you do, it will be seen as a Russian victory.” That would just encourage the Putin regime to exploit a cease-fire to rearm, then resume the war, Mr. Bondarev argued: “Only a total and clear defeat that is obvious to everyone will teach them.”

Mr. Bondarev makes a compelling point. It would be a disaster — both moral and strategic — if Mr. Putin were invited to talks before his major war objectives had been thwarted. Clear enough to a junior practitioner of international affairs, this wisdom seems to escape ostensibly more seasoned figures. Former U.S. secretary of state Henry A. Kissinger said at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, that Western governments should push Ukraine into talks with Mr. Putin in the next 60 days, as well as support permanent Ukrainian territorial concessions, lest the conflict turn into a destabilizing “new war against Russia itself.” Similar thinking seems to be at work in Italy and Hungary, which are reportedly urging the European Union to advocate a cease-fire and peace talks at its summit next week. Our colleagues on the New York Times editorial board have called on President Biden to counsel Kyiv not to “chase after an illusory ‘win.’”

2022 Michigan Affirmative
PRECESION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) AFF – COMPILED › CP › 2AC – AT: Hotlines CP

Hotlines fail

Pape, 14 — Robert A., Pape Professor of Political Science Director of the Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism University of Chicago, 2014 (“Establishing a Workable US-China Hotline (CHILINK),” University of Chicago, April 30th, Available Online at )

In 1989, after the Tiananmen Square protests, President George Bush attempted to contact Deng Xiaoping via phone. There was no hotline in place, and the President’s call was unanswered. This incident highlighted the need for such a hotline to be established. In 1997, President Bill Clinton and President Jiang Zemin announced an agreement to establish a presidential hotline, so that, as President Clinton said, they “may confer on a moment’s notice.” In May 1999, the United States accidentally bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. Clinton attempted to contact Chinese President Jiang Zemin, but the call was not answered, despite the fact that their presidential hotline had been made operational in 1998. This underscores the difficulty in communicating via any hotline in direct crisis situations. As a further insult to the United States, President Jiang spoke directly with Russian President Boris Yeltsin later that day on the China-Russia hotline. In February 2008 the United States and China signed a formal agreement to establish a new hotline, called the Defense Phone Link, but the agreement was negotiated and signed following 4 talks between David Sedney, the US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, and Chinese defense ministry official Qian Lihua. It has only been used four times. The inadequacies of these hotlines offer key insights into the construction a new hotline proposal. The 2008 hotline agreement with China arranges for a call to be routed through the Zhongnanhai telecommunications directorate, which then chooses to forward the call to the foreign affairs office within of Department of Defense, or the PLA’s command headquarters in West Beijing. The internal Chinese disconnect between the military and civilian personnel makes crisis management very difficult Secretary of Defense Robert Gates noted that President Hu was unaware that the PLA was carrying out a test flight of a new jet fighter in 2011, an action that could easily be misinterpreted by American foreign policy officials. The new Chinese National Security Council attempts to remedy this disconnect in authority. Moreover, the Chinese Communist Party rules dictate that the Standing Committee vote prior to conveying information to the Americans, making rapid communication between US and Chinese presidents in times of crisis very difficult. China also has a history of cutting communication during times of crisis to demonstrate anger.