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Hathaway et al. 21 [Oona A. Hathaway, Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Tobias Kuehne, J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School; Randi Michel, J.D., Yale Law School & Ph.D., Yale University; Nicole Ng, J.D. Candidate, Yale Law School; "Congressional Oversight of Modern Warfare: History, Pathologies, and Proposals for Reform"; William & Mary Law Review, Volume 63, Issue 1, Article 4; Published: 10-2021; Accessed: 6-20-2022; https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3914&context=wmlr; KL]
B. Siloing and Its Implications for Oversight and National Security
While committees may gain political benefits from guarding their turfs, information siloing frustrates Congress’s ability to carry out effective oversight of the executive branch. The information gaps resulting from siloing of reporting and notification may lead to poorly informed and under-vetted congressional decision-making. Ultimately, information siloing of modern military operations can harm national security and foreign relations.
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CRS 21 [Congressional Research Service; “Defense Primer: U.S. Policy on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems”; November 17, 2021; DOA: 6/25/22; ; Lowell-ES]
Lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) are a special class of weapon systems that use sensor suites and computer algorithms to independently identify a target and employ an onboard weapon system to engage and destroy the target without manual human control of the system. Although these systems are not yet in widespread development, it is believed they would enable military operations in communications-degraded or -denied environments in which traditional systems may not be able to operate. Contrary to a number of news reports, U.S. policy does not prohibit the development or employment of LAWS. Although the United States does not currently have LAWS in its inventory, some senior military and defense leaders have stated that the United States may be compelled to develop LAWS in the future if U.S. competitors choose to do so. At the same time, a growing number of states and nongovernmental organizations are appealing to the international community for regulation of or a ban on LAWS due to ethical concerns. Developments in both autonomous weapons technology and international discussions of LAWS could hold implications for congressional oversight, defense investments, military concepts of operations, treaty-making, and the future of war.
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Stone 21 [Corin R. Stone is a Scholar-in-Residence at the Washington College of Law, where she is conducting research, developing programming, and contributing to the Tech, Law and Security courses. She is on leave from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) where, until August 2020, she served as the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Strategy & Engagement. From 2014-2017, Ms. Stone served as the Executive Director of the National Security Agency (NSA). https://www.justsecurity.org/79254/artificial-intelligence-in-the-intelligence-community-oversight-must-not-be-an-oversight/]//LP
Throughout this series, I have explored the most pressing foundational issues impacting the Intelligence Community’s (IC) ability to meet the urgency of this moment in the global artificial intelligence (AI) race. The current bipartisan support for taking bold action to drive national security use of AI is key to the IC’s success. That support must propel change in the priority areas I have already identified: modernizing the IC’s budget and acquisition processes and enabling a risk-tolerant culture with a new IC AI risk assessment framework
that helps IC officers navigate the uncertainty that necessarily accompanies technological innovation. There is one other area, however, that cannot be ignored if the IC is to keep pace with our nation’s adversaries and provide policymakers with accurate, timely, and impactful insights: congressional oversight.
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Burton and Soare 19 [Dr Joe Burton, New Zealand Institute for Security and Crime Science, University of Waikato, Dr Simona R. Soare, Institut d’Etudes Européennes, Université Saint Louis; "Understanding the Strategic Implications of the Weaponization of Artificial Intelligence"; 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle, NATO CCD COE Publications; Published: 2019; Accessed: 6-23-2022; https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_14_Understanding-the-Strategic-Implications.pdf; KL]
Politics in this respect will be integral to outcomes in the deployment of military AI across domains. Strategy has always been the use of force to achieve political objectives, but we assert that politics will shape how AI is used as much as being the goal of the deployment of AI. What AI will not be able to do for combined arms operations, or any other type of operation for that matter, any time in the near future, is lift the fog of war: the veil of uncertainty around the interests driving opponents’ actions. It will not alleviate the security dilemma and may complicate arms control and disarmament efforts as barriers to entry are lowered due to the acceleration of technological progress in the civilian sector.
5. STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
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Bergmann and Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College; Alexandra Schmitt, a senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School; "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance"; Center for American Progress; Published: 4-22-2015; Accessed: 6-20-2022; https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/; KL]
The current security assistance framework at the State Department and the DOD often perpetuates the status quo by creating incentives to continue providing assistance to the same partners. Between congressionally mandated allocations to large security partners in the State Department’s FMF assistance and specific authorities created for certain countries, there are often few built-in incentives to reexamine a partner’s record or backsliding. And when reviews are done, there is strong resistance to shift funding due to the potential fallout. Rarely is the top consideration the effectiveness of assistance. In an interview with the authors in June 2020, Anthony Wier, a former deputy assistant secretary in the State Department’s Bureau of Legislative Affairs, explained, “Right now, the best predictor for what we propose to spend this year is what we proposed last year – in other words, the whole system is basically just drifting from year to year.”66
This greatly affects the perception of other U.S. security assistance partners. Countries know that the United States is unlikely to cut assistance, even despite bad behavior, in order to avoid harming a bilateral relationship. Recipients take note of such reluctance to pull aid even when gross abuses occur and thus ignore U.S. chastising on bad behavior. As long as the United States is unwilling to cut off assistance or move funds elsewhere after a country commits actions that U.S. officials oppose, security assistance will provide no foreign policy leverage.
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Bergmann and Schmitt 21 [Max Bergmann, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, where he focuses on European security and U.S.-Russia policy. From 2011 to 2017, he served in the U.S. Department of State in a number of different positions, including as a member of the secretary of state’s policy planning staff, where he focused on political-military affairs and nonproliferation; special assistant to the undersecretary for arms control and international security; speechwriter to then-Secretary of State John Kerry; and senior adviser to the assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs. Prior to serving in the State Department, he worked at CAP as a military and nonproliferation policy analyst and at the National Security Network as the deputy policy director. Bergmann received his master’s degree from the London School of Economics in comparative politics and his bachelor’s degree from Bates College; Alexandra Schmitt, a senior policy analyst on the National Security and International Policy team at the Center. She previously worked on U.S. foreign policy advocacy at Human Rights Watch and received her Master in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School; "A Plan To Reform U.S. Security Assistance"; Center for American Progress; Published: 4-22-2015; Accessed: 6-20-2022; https://www.americanprogress.org/article/plan-reform-u-s-security-assistance/; KL]
U.S. engagement with partners could be dominated by military issues if foreign officials turn to DOD counterparts instead of diplomats for assistance resources. Because the DOD controls its own security assistance accounts, other foreign policy concerns may get trumped if partners go around the State Department to get aid from the Pentagon. Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD) worried at a 2017 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing that the shift to increasing DOD authorities could “send a fundamental message that the United States considers security relationships over all other U.S. foreign policy objectives or concerns, including human rights or good governance.”10 Under the current framework, the State Department’s ability to put the brakes on security assistance or military cooperation under DOD authorities is highly limited because the State Department does not control implementation and can often only approve or disapprove of DOD proposals. While State Department officials and ambassadors can and sometimes do halt or temper problematic efforts, doing so requires exerting significant political capital that is in short supply.11 Centralizing control at the State Department would help to fix this bureaucratic imbalance between diplomacy and the Pentagon.
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Committee on Armed Services 19 [Committee on Armed Services U.S. House of Representatives; "Oversight Plan for the 116th Congress"; Published: 2019; Accessed: 6-25-2022; https://armedservices.house.gov/_cache/files/b/2/b236a61e-6d45-40cd-9ad8-bc99b83dfa3b/AE1FC7A607C9432146B32AF84E99181B.hasc-oversight-plan-for-the-116th-congress.pdf; KL]
The committee will continue its oversight and assessment of threats to U.S. national security as it considers the fiscal year 2020 and fiscal year 2021 defense budget requests. This effort will involve appropriate oversight hearings with the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the individual military service secretaries and chiefs of staff; combatant commanders; other officials of the Department of Defense and the military departments; officials from the intelligence community; and the Secretary of Energy, the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, and other officials of the Department of Energy. In addition, the committee will invite the views and perspectives of outside experts in academia, industry, associations and advocacy organizations, and those in private life with expertise on these matters. Finally, the committee will continue its aggressive outreach program to seek the views and perspectives of service members and their families to include Active Duty, National Guard, and Reserve members across the United States and at deployed locations overseas.
The committee carries out its oversight of the Department of Defense and its subordinate departments and agencies as well as portions of the Department of Energy through activities involving the full committee and its standing subcommittees. The committee will continue to conduct robust oversight and investigations regarding matters within the jurisdiction of the committee. Certain issues and activities will require more extensive review. Investigatory work that may support the oversight responsibilities of standing subcommittees will be conducted in a coordinated manner. Each subcommittee will conduct oversight of the programs within its jurisdiction in accordance with the committee’s rules and the Rules of the House of Representatives.
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Worthington 10 [Samuel A. Worthington, President and Chief Executive Officer of InterAction, the largest alliance of U.S.-based international nongovernmental organizations focused on humanitarian assistance, poverty reduction, and sustainable development working in conflict, disaster, and peaceful zones throughout the world; "Book Reviews: Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military"; PRISM 2, no. 1, Book Reviews; Published: 2010; Accessed: 6-25-2022; https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/journals/prism%20/v2i1/f_0024318_19841.pdf; KL]
Even though action is being taken to improve civilian-military relations and to limit humanitarian worker kidnapping, it should not be forgotten that Reveron’s vision of warrior-diplomats and development workers exceeds the military’s capabilities and core skill set. As Secretary Gates stated, the militarization of U.S. foreign policy and civilian activities is not the solution to underfunded civilian agencies. Allowing the expansion of the U.S. military into civilian sectors will not only continue the understaffing of civilian agencies and complicate the mission of the military, but it will also contribute to a variety of obstacles, including insecurity, within the development community.
While the U.S. military provides much-needed technical and operational assistance to other nations during military training, humanitarian disasters, and transnational operations, the effectiveness of DOD as a development and diplomatic actor remains very much in question. Even after years of programs in Iraq and Afghanistan, DOD does not appear to have a methodology for measuring the effectiveness of its development, humanitarian, and diplomatic activities. Best practices and sensibilities of the 21st century require that development organizations assess the community’s needs for the type and placement of buildings and for goods and services, including education and skill development, prior to taking any action. The military lens is necessarily different and often cannot be the same as the lens through which U.S. civilian aid workers and the NGO community view their tasks. The unfortunate result can be unusable buildings that feed the very “hard” feelings the military’s diligent work was intended to transform. The civilian diplomat is similarly shaped by a different skill set and broader orientation to diplomatic relations between states or with nonstate actors. Reveron’s argument for changing the nature of military and security in the world is well founded and unavoidable, but the expansion of the military into development and broader diplomatic fields requires skills and flexibility the military does not have, nor are they skills it should develop. Civilian agencies should lead development operations, and Reveron’s warrior-diplomats should adopt the more focused roles of ensuring better security cooperation, training peacekeepers, and building armed forces in the developing world that respect rule of law and human rights. As the U.S. military evolves and adapts to the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, it must cooperate with and help strengthen the U.S. State Department and USAID to align diplomatic, development, and defense policies and capacity. PRISM
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Young 20 [Thomas-Durell Young, Senior Lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate School; "The "Politics" of Security Cooperation and Security Assistance"; Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Defense Exports and Cooperation; Published: 9-10-2020; Accessed: 6-18-2022; https://www.dasadec.army.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2344014/the-politics-of-security-cooperation-and-security-assistance/; KL]
In 1955 a book titled The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640–1945 was published; it would soon become a landmark study of civil-military relations.1 Gordon Craig’s unassuming tome became widely influential within and outside the civil-military relations field and spurred the publication of what has become a wide literature on the politics of armies (particularly those of the United Kingdom, Italy, Russia, and France) that takes a different approach to our conventional understanding of civil-military relations.2 What makes these latter books prescient in their instruction is that they disabuse readers of the erroneous assumption that armies are somehow subservient to their political masters and eschew involvement in domestic politics or in any system of governance. As the historical record demonstrates (and, dare one suggest, a reflection of the U.S. Armed Forces in a contemporary setting3), armies are all but inherently political and need to be recognized as such if their effect on civil-military relations is to be properly assessed.
The intrinsically political nature of military organizations is no less true when it comes to armies’ efforts in the education, training, and equipping of foreign partner nations’ armed forces, known as security cooperation (SC) and security assistance (SA). Yet much of the American bureaucracy and legal framework for these activities treat them as fundamentally technical problems that are susceptible to improvement through better procedures. This technicism, to purloin a term from Samuel Huntington,4 is arguably at the heart of many of our failures and disappointments in building partner security forces (for example, those of Afghanistan,5 Iraq,6 and Mali7) or in reforming defense institutions in Central and Eastern Europe.8 Virtually every fix proposed to partners is yet another technical or bureaucratic adjustment rather than an acknowledgment of the fundamentally political nature of these activities, both within a partner nation as well as among U.S. agencies responsible for planning and carrying out the assistance programs.
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Desiderio et al. 22 [Andrew Desiderio, Lara Seligman, Connor O’Brien; "Pentagon vs. Congress tension builds over monitoring billions in Ukraine aid"; POLITICO; Published: 6-2-2022; Accessed: 6-21-2022; https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/02/congress-pentagon-ukraine-aid-oversight-00036463; KL]
The Pentagon was already struggling to keep up with Congress’ demands for oversight of its spending. Then, lawmakers earmarked an extra $40 billion for Ukraine.
Concerns are mounting on Capitol Hill about the Biden administration’s ability to properly account for the unprecedented wave of cash and to track the thousands of U.S. weapons heading to Ukraine for its war with Russia. And given the Pentagon’s recent track record concerning congressional oversight, it’s coming under increased scrutiny from members of both parties — from progressive Elizabeth Warren to libertarian Rand Paul.
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Brooks et al. 21 [RISA BROOKS is Allis Chalmers Associate Professor of Political Science at Marquette University, a Nonresident Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and an Adjunct Scholar at West Point’s Modern War Institute; JIM GOLBY is a Senior Fellow at the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin, an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and a co-host of the podcast Thank You for Your Service. He is a retired U.S. Army officer; HEIDI URBEN is an Adjunct Associate Professor in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program, a Nonresident Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and an Adjunct Scholar at West Point’s Modern War Institute. She is a retired U.S. Army officer; Published: May/June 2021; Accessed: 4-13-2021; "Crisis of Command"; Foreign Affairs; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-04-09/national-security-crisis-command; KL]
When U.S. President Donald Trump left office on January 20, many of those concerned about the state of civil-military relations in the United States breathed a deep sigh of relief. They shouldn’t have. Yes, Trump used the military as a political prop, referred to some of its leaders as “my generals,” and faced a Pentagon that slow-rolled his attempts to withdraw troops from battlefields around the world. But problems in the relationship between military officers and elected officials did not begin with Trump, and they did not end when Joe Biden took office.
Civilian control over the military is deeply embedded in the U.S. Constitution; the armed forces answer to the president and legislature. Starting in 1947, Congress built robust institutions designed to maintain this relationship. But over the past three decades, civilian control has quietly but steadily degraded. Senior military officers may still follow orders and avoid overt insubordination, but their influence has grown, while oversight and accountability mechanisms have faltered. Today, presidents worry about military opposition to their policies and must reckon with an institution that selectively implements executive guidance. Too often, unelected military leaders limit or engineer civilians’ options so that generals can run wars as they see fit.
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Golby and Feaver 21 [Jim Golby, senior fellow at the Clements Center for National Security at the University of Texas at Austin; Peter Feaver, professor of political science and public policy and director of the American Grand Strategy Program at Duke University; "Biden Inherits a Challenging Civil-Military Legacy"; War on the Rocks; Published: 1-1-2021; Accessed: 6-25-2022; https://warontherocks.com/2021/01/biden-inherits-a-challenging-civil-military-legacy/; KL]
The new commander-in-chief starts with the enormous advantage of being “not Trump.” He will need all of that advantage — and will need to have learned from Obama-era missteps — in order to navigate through the tricky civil-military waters we have described above. Members of the Biden team come in as seasoned professionals, but we hope that leads them to caution and humility rather than unwariness and hubris as they conduct national security policy. If Lloyd Austin wins over the critics and proves himself to be both fully sensitive to these civil-military realities and savvy in how he seeks to overcome them, he may yet emerge as the successful and strong secretary of defense the Department of Defense so desperately needs. The early slate of civilian nominees named for key roles is a welcome sign. The initial weeks after the inauguration will be of particular importance in setting the tone, especially after the tumultuous and stressful transition. Even so, the norm of civilian management of the Defense Department will be more difficult to reestablish, like so many other civil-military norms that have weakened in recent years, if Congress does grant another recently-retired general legal permission to serve as secretary of defense. Biden, and Austin, will need all the top civilian defense talent they can get.
Notwithstanding all of the other urgent priorities vying for his attention, neglect of the civil-military file would likely impose intolerable costs on Biden down the road — a price that would be vividly evident, sooner or later, when an urgent national security crisis takes center stage. The only prudent course is for the Biden team to attend to both policy and process at the same time — to move out quickly on the pandemic and the economy, while also setting the national security establishment on the path to healthier civil-military relations. Problems in the civil-military foundations of an administration must be fixed before a crisis lays bare the rot that may lie just out of view.
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Nikitin 22 [Beth D. Nikitin, Specialist in Nonproliferation; "Biological Security Engagement in Ukraine: U.S. Cooperation and Threat Reduction Programs"; Congressional Research Service; Published: 3-11-2022; Accessed: 6-23-2022; https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11886; KL]
During its invasion of Ukraine, the Russian government has accused Ukraine of possessing a clandestine biological weapons program with support from the United States. To the contrary, the United States has cooperated with Ukraine on biological security programs ranging from laboratory security to disease surveillance and pandemic response, as documented by the U.S. embassy website, annual budget requests, and congressional oversight hearings. These programs are rooted in the U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR). The United States and Ukraine are both members of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which prohibits such weapons, and the United States has stated that both are in full compliance with their obligations. The State Department assesses that the Russian government "maintains an offensive biological weapons program" in violation of the BWC.
Congress has raised questions about this issue in recent hearings. U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Avril Haines testified on March 10 that "we do not assess that Ukraine is pursuing either biological weapons or nuclear weapons." State Department Spokesman Ned Price said on March 9, "Russia is inventing false pretexts in an attempt to justify its own horrific actions in Ukraine." The allegation has led to concern that Russia may be planning a "false flag" operation in which it plants evidence or uses a biological weapon against Ukraine but blames another party.
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Serbu 3/14 [Jared Serbu, DEPUTY EDITOR/DOD REPORTER; “Congress taps brakes on DoD project to reform IT funding”; March 14, 2022 8:17 am; DOA: 6/20/22; ; Lowell-ES]
Last week’s passage of an omnibus spending bill eliminated the threat of a full-year continuing resolution and gave the Defense budget a nearly 4.7% spending increase. But lawmakers were less generous when it came to the matter of expanding a program meant to test major reforms to how DoD funds technology modernization.
The final agreement rejected the Pentagon’s request to significantly expand what’s known as the Software and Digital Technology Pilot Program in 2022. The pilot, in short, lets major IT programs fund development using a single “color of money,” rather than trying to wedge their budgets into the R&D, procurement and operations accounts that were originally designed for major weapons systems.
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Mathews 21 [Jessica T. Mathews, Distinguished Fellow and former President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; "Present at the Re-creation?"; Foreign Affairs; Published: March/April 2021; Accessed: 6-23-2022; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-16/present-re-creation?check_logged_in=1; KL]
In short, what Biden regularly calls “the power of our example” is nothing like what it used to be. When it comes to the pillars of a law-abiding democracy, the United States is now more an example of what to avoid than of what to embrace. The country retains military primacy and the economic heft to impose sanctions, but the former has limited utility, and the latter are seldom effective when wielded unilaterally. To achieve its ends, Washington will have to heal at home—a long, slow process—while it rebuilds its power to persuade. As secretary of state, Antony Blinken will likely lead an important effort to rebuild morale and effectiveness within the country’s diplomatic corps, luring back talented professionals who fled Trump’s chaos, broadening recruitment, pursuing reforms to make the department’s work more efficient and creative, and appointing diplomatic veterans to key posts at home and abroad. But such steps will take a long time to make a difference. Meanwhile, Biden’s team may be seriously overestimating the leverage that the United States retains for initiatives that depend on its example, such as the global summits the president wants to convene on climate change and renewing democracy.
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Desiderio et al. 22 [Andrew Desiderio, Lara Seligman, Connor O’Brien; "Pentagon vs. Congress tension builds over monitoring billions in Ukraine aid"; POLITICO; Published: 6-2-2022; Accessed: 6-21-2022; https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/02/congress-pentagon-ukraine-aid-oversight-00036463; KL]
The Pentagon was already struggling to keep up with Congress’ demands for oversight of its spending. Then, lawmakers earmarked an extra $40 billion for Ukraine.
Concerns are mounting on Capitol Hill about the Biden administration’s ability to properly account for the unprecedented wave of cash and to track the thousands of U.S. weapons heading to Ukraine for its war with Russia. And given the Pentagon’s recent track record concerning congressional oversight, it’s coming under increased scrutiny from members of both parties — from progressive Elizabeth Warren to libertarian Rand Paul.
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Ebright 2/11 [Katherine Ebright, counsel with the Brennan Center’s Liberty & National Security Program, where she focuses on war powers and the constitutional separation of powers; “The Pentagon Must Submit to Congressional Oversight”; February 11, 2022; DOA: 6/18/22; ; Lowell-ES]
And there has been abuse — not just in the scope of military operations, which , but also in the conduct of those operations. As recent reporting has revealed, the military has critical civilian infrastructure, the collection of evidence on civilian harm, and about reckless airstrikes from officers in the field. Last month, 50 Democratic lawmakers DOD to “end this pattern” and “emphasize[] the rule of law.” That necessarily entails abiding by reporting requirements, instead of forcing lawmakers to learn about military misconduct from investigative journalists.
Shortly after taking office, Biden that revitalizing our national security institutions would “require[] a recommitment to the highest standards of transparency.” He also promised to “work closely and cooperatively with the Congress” to improve the accountability of those institutions. Biden’s signing statement, which greenlights the DOD’s noncompliance with congressional reporting requirements, does not reflect these commitments.
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FDD 21 [Foundation for Defense of Democracies, nonprofit, nonpartisan 501(c)(3) research institute focusing on foreign policy and national security; "Congressional Oversight and Biden Administration Foreign Policy"; Published: 2-23-2021; Accessed: 6-21-2022; https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2021/02/23/congressional-oversight-and-biden-administration-foreign-policy/; KL]
Nomination hearings for executive branch officials are an essential tool for Congress to utilize in conducting effective oversight of foreign policy. These hearings allow members of Congress to study an administration’s approach to issues, secure policy commitments based on their own assessments and views, and identify lines of inquiry driven by national security concerns.
Congress has thus far developed an important foundation on U.S. policy toward China, Iran, and Russia through hearings for key Biden administration officials. This foundation will require sustained attention in the months ahead as Congress continues to engage with the Biden administration. The following are summaries of key statements by Cabinet-level officials and the questions that Congress should ask in future hearings for sub-Cabinet nominees and in broader oversight efforts. We periodically make these questions available on a range of national security issues.
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Sahay 21 [Usha Sahay, senior editor at Politico Magazine, where she focuses on foreign policy and global affairs. She is a 2021 graduate of the Harvard Kennedy School, where she received a Master in Public Policy. While at the Kennedy School, Usha was a Belfer Center student fellow, working as a research assistant to Prof. Fredrik Logevall and the Belfer Center Cyber Project. Her paper “Revitalizing NATO: A Role for the U.S. Congress” was the co-winner of the Robert Belfer Award for Best Policy Analysis Exercise in International and Global Affairs. Usha is the creator and host of the War on the Rocks podcast series “A Most Terrible Weapon.” Prior to graduate school, Usha was managing editor of War on the Rocks, and has also been an editor at the Wall Street Journal and HuffPost. She started her career as a Herbert Scoville, Jr. Peace Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. Usha graduated magna cum laude from Columbia University, where she majored in political science and history; "Revitalizing NATO - A Role for the U.S. Congress"; Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School; Published: 9-2021; Accessed: 6-24-2022; https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Revitalizing%20NATO%20-%20A%20Role%20for%20Congress%20-%20Sahay.pdf; KL]
Congress retains significant influence on foreign policy despite today’s constrained environment and the executive branch’s general dominance of this area. Notably, most of these avenues of influence can be pursued in a highly partisan climate. Initiatives like spotlighting rights abuses abroad, critiquing the executive branch, and interacting with allies often have bipartisan support, while tactics like private conversations with foreign counterparts and statements to the media do not require reaching across the aisle at all.80
Perhaps most importantly, many of the legislature’s most important channels of influence are informal ones, largely separate from the formal, constitutional powers that today’s Congress often struggles to exercise. Indeed, Congress wields influence even when it does not pass legislation. As James Lindsay wrote three decades ago:
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NON-MILITARY CP/DA UPDATES › Uniqueness › 2NC---Oversight Uniqueness
Fontaine and Schulman 20 [Richard Fontaine, Chief Executive Officer at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He served as President of CNAS from 2012 to 2019 and as Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow from 2009 to 2012. Prior to CNAS, he was Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator John McCain for more than five years. Fontaine also has worked at the State Department, on the National Security Council, and on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Loren DeJonge Schulman, Adjunct Senior Fellow and the former Deputy Director of Studies and Leon E. Panetta Senior Fellow at CNAS. Before joining CNAS, she served in senior staff positions in the White House National Security Council and Department of Defense; "Congress’s Hidden Strengths: Wielding Informal Tools of National Security Oversight"; The Center for a New American Security (CNAS); Published: 7-30-2020; Accessed: 6-24-2022; https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/congresss-hidden-strengths; KL]
There is good reason for members to do so. Members of Congress can, individually and together, wield considerable informal influence over American military interventions.5 Legislating war is not only politically difficult but can also be rigid, where policy influence leaves room for flexibility and negotiation.6 Overemphasizing formal authorization, sanctions, or appropriations measures can ignore oversight of “military intervention and conflict [that] should be continuous and focused more heavily on the conduct of campaigns long after their initiation.”7 The preparatory, preventive, and educational work ahead of and during an intervention is an area of vital Congressional concern, and here informal approaches sometimes work best.
History suggests that presidents consider congressional opinion a great deal when making use-of-force decisions, in part because these views can serve as a proxy for domestic will.8 Executives are especially sensitive to such signals “because public defeats threaten to weaken their credibility on the world scene,” whereas shared expressions of resolve may intimidate adversaries.9 George H. W. Bush, for instance, asked Capitol Hill for a last-minute authorization before launching the Gulf War in 1991, hoping to avoid “weakening his hand” in global opinion.10 Senators John McCain, Joseph Lieberman, and Lindsey Graham helped set the political conditions in which George W. Bush pursued the Iraqi “surge” strategy in 2007. Barack Obama ultimately determined not to strike Syria after its regime’s chemical attack, citing insufficient congressional support for such a move.