2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: QPQ CP – Democracy › 1AR – Say No – Turkey
Cook 18 (Steven A. Cook, PhD and MA in political science from the University of Pennsylvania, MA in international relations from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, 7-5-2018, "Strongmen Die, but Authoritarianism Is Forever," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/05/strongmen-die-but-authoritarianism-is-forever/)
Turkey’s political trajectory is an exemplary case of a country permanently rolling back democratizing reforms, but it’s not the only one. Husngary’s Viktor Orban and Jaroslaw Kaczynski’s Law and Justice party in Poland are undermining the rule of law, democratic values, and human rights in the service of what they define as authenticity and security. These are developments that predate the migrant crisis that is buffeting Europe, though the large number of people from Africa and the Middle East seeking refuge in the European Union has made Orban’s and Kaczynski’s message more politically potent, and thus the undoing of democratic institutions and liberal values politically acceptable, for large numbers of Hungarians and Poles. Observers often describe the way these leaders — including Erdogan — have forged illiberal democracies, or in Turkey’s case, an elected autocracy, as demonstrations of power politics. But these pejoratives are meaningless outside the imprecisions of newspaper editorials. Orban, Kaczynski, and Erdogan have articulated a vision of the future of their societies that appeals to and makes sense for large numbers of people. The Hungarian and Polish leadership have done so basically in opposition to the liberal principles upon which the EU was built. In the Turkish case, the AKP’s program can best be summed up as piety, prosperity, and power. Voters in all three countries have justly rewarded these leaders. Yet for all their apparent success, the Turkish, Hungarian, and Polish leaders have opposition. Over the last 15 years, about half of Turkey’s electorate has consistently opposed the AKP and Erdogan. In 2016, Orban staged a referendum aimed at preventing migrants from entering Hungary. The proposed measure received 98 percent support of the people who voted, but in a political blow, it fell well short of the 50 percent voter turnout needed to become binding. In Poland, the Law and Justice party’s turn away from the West produced the Committee for the Defense of Democracy that has been able to bring large numbers of people into the streets at various times to protest Kaczynski’s worldview. But what’s important is how, in response to opposition, leaders in Turkey, Hungary, and Poland have established new institutions, manipulated existing ones, and hollowed out others to confront political challenges or to close off their possibility. Formal institutions come in the form of laws, rules, regulations, and decrees; their origins are found in political contestation and often reflect the interests of the winners in those conflicts. Informal institutions are uncodified, but that doesn’t mean they are less powerful than formal institutions. Sometimes these norms, which are based on the way things have long been done, are more powerful than written rules. The old boys’ network that has sustained elite, white, male privilege in the United States has often trumped legislative and administrative measures created to level the playing field for women and minorities. One of the best examples of institutional manipulation is the way in which Turkey’s AKP used its majority in the Grand National Assembly to whitewash a 2014 parliamentary investigation into corruption charges against four government ministers that threatened to ensnare Erdogan and his family. The process rendered the idea of parliamentary oversight essentially meaningless and gave the Turkish leader an opportunity to argue — credibly for his constituents — that the original allegations were an attempted coup. Since the corruption allegation, Erdogan has manipulated institutions to reverse the outcome of an election he did not like in 2015, tried his opponents in courts packed with his supporters, and debased Turkey’s electoral laws to ensure the passage of a referendum on constitutional amendments that would grant the presidency extraordinary powers. The AKP has used the legal system to jail journalists — most often on spurious terrorism-related charges — and force ownership changes in the media industry. These attacks on the press, along with the transformation of the state-owned broadcaster and state-run news service into an arm of the AKP, have crowded out independent newsgathering. In the recent elections, the state-owned Anadolu Agency called the presidential election for Erdogan well before the Supreme Electoral Council — made up of AKP appointees — could count the vast majority of ballot boxes. This prompted Erdogan to appear on television graciously accepting another presidential term, making it impossible for the election board to contradict Anadolu’s projection and thus rendering the board a mere prop in AKP’s electoral theater. The institutional manipulations and innovations during the AKP era that have been employed to serve Erdogan’s goals will endure after he is gone. This is because institutions tend to be sticky — they remain long after the moment when they are needed, often leveraged by a new cohort of politicians to advance their agendas. This does not imply that institutional change is impossible. It is just that revisions take place in the context of existing institutions and previous innovations. For example, the origins of Egypt’s current repressive laws concerning the press and civil society organizations can be traced back through any number of revisions to the 1950s and 1960s. In this way, authoritarianism tends to build on itself. It may eventually give out, but short of a revolution that undermines a mutually reinforcing political and social order, institutions will have a lasting impact on society. Despite all the apparent change in Egypt since early 2011, the country’s politics still revolve around a system that Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Free Officers founded in the 1950s. The data social scientists have generated indicate that transitions to democracy often fail: Some countries lose their democracy, and those that do only get it back in rare and very specific circumstances. France became democratic again after the defeat of the Vichy government and Nazi Germany. Hungary and Poland were supposed to be shining examples of transitions to democracy. Those countries may yet live up to democratic ideals that as EU members they ostensibly share with other democracies, but because of what Orban and Kaczynski have done, the path to that goal will be long and hard. As for Turkey, no doubt the military will outlast Erdogan, but it is unclear if it will outlast Erdoganism.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: QPQ CP – Democracy › 1AR – Say No – Turkey
Taylor 19 [Adam Taylor writes about foreign affairs for The Washington Post. He studied at the University of Manchester and Columbia University, “Turkey’s Erdogan tests the limits of Trump’s threats”, 10-10-2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/10/10/turkeys-erdogan-tests-limits-trumps-threats/]
It remains to be seen how the Turkish government would respond to economic pressure. Erdogan has shown himself repeatedly willing to ignore U.S. interests; his allies view Syria’s Kurds as an existential threat. “Like the United States, Turkey does not go abroad in search of monsters to destroy,” Turkey’s communications director Fahrettin Altun wrote in an op-ed for The Post. “But when monsters attempt to knock down our doors and harm our citizens, we have to respond.” Though Trump prefers to use economic pressure rather than military strength or diplomatic negotiations, it often fails to produce the desired effect: It is not clear why Turkey would back down in the face of U.S. sanctions when countries such as Iran, North Korea, Russia and Venezuela have not. Speaking to reporters on Wednesday afternoon, Trump suggested that it would ultimately be Erdogan’s decision. “I’ve gotten him to stop for virtually from the first day that I was in office,” Trump said at the White House. “But they’ve wanted to fight and that’s the way it is and they’ve done it for so long.”
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: QPQ CP – Democracy › 1AR – Say No – Turkey
Williams 19 [Katie Bo Williams is the senior national security correspondent for Defense One, where she writes about defense, counterterror, NATO, nukes, and more, “How Do You Solve a Problem Like Ankara?”, 12-2-2019, https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2019/12/how-do-you-solve-problem-ankara/161611/]
Turkey has long felt underappreciated and disrespected in NATO.
Although the country almost always contributes manpower to NATO missions — in Afghanistan and elsewhere — its most important resource, as far as the West is concerned, is not economic or military might but its strategic location.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: QPQ CP – Democracy › 1AR – Say No – Turkey
Kontos 19, [Michalis Kontos, Assistant Professor, Department of Politics and Governance, School of Law, University of Nicosia, Cyprus, CYPRUS AND THE GREAT POWERS AN EVALUATION OF RUSSIAN-CYPRIOT RELATIONS IN THE NEW EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN ENVIRONMENT]
The study of contemporary Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East verifies, to a large degree, the validity of these theoretical assumptions. The structure of the international system is changing due to uneven growth dynamics, which cause respective adaptions at the level of perceptions and prestige. In that sense, US overexpansion and its consequences forced Washington to a strategic withdrawal from the Middle East, which, subsequently, changed the way others saw the US and transformed its prestige accordingly. Consequently, Russia exploited this situation in order to establish its presence and increase its influence in the region, which led to a redistribution of power and triggered a struggle for the formation of a new regional balance of power. In this framework, realignment of interests and reconfiguration of bilateral and multilateral relations was a natural outcome of the changing power distribution and perceptions. If we focus our microscope on bilateral and multilateral relations between the US, Russia, Turkey and Cyprus we may observe two independent variables, which define the direction of the overall set of relationships, which are mutually reinforcing: Turkey’s post-Kemalist foreign policy and the degree of tensions between Russia and the US/NATO. It seems that the more Turkey distances itself from its Western allies the more impetus its relations with Russia may gain. On the other hand, the more US-Russian relations worsen, the more Russia is motivated to embrace Turkey aiming to put NATO’s internal unity to the test. At the same time, Turkey’s independent regional agenda and hegemonic aspirations in the Eastern Mediterranean tends to disturb its relations with regional States. Whether Washington’s decision is (or will be) to change its partners in the region, or to try to bring Ankara back on board through a stick-and-carrot strategy, US interests will more or less favor the convergence between Israel, Cyprus and Greece. Moreover, the more Washington is engaged in containing Russia’s influence in the region the more its cooperation with these countries will be enhanced. Therefore, we may assume that the more Ankara and Moscow converge and the more Washington and Moscow clash, the more US-Turkish relations will be disturbed and US-Cypriot relations will improve.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: QPQ CP – Democracy › 1AR – Say No – Poland
Hjelmgaard 20 [Kim Hjelmgaard, “These countries quietly slid into authoritarianism. Should the US be concerned under Trump?,” USA Today, Oct 7, 2020, pg. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2020/10/07/what-authoritarian-countries-can-tell-us-democracy-and-trump/3518563001/
In nearby Poland, President Andrzej Duda and the powerful leader of his ruling Law and Justice party, Jarosław Kaczyński, have slowly dismantled many democratic checks and balances by filling the ranks of the nation's courts with loyal judges.
The Law and Justice Party has tightened the government's grip on state institutions and companies including the media, increased its powers to spy on its citizens and imposed new taxes on those who oppose socially conservative measures such as keeping gay marriage illegal, strict immigration laws and a proposed near-total ban on abortion in a country that already has some of Europe's most restrictive reproductive laws.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: QPQ CP – Democracy › 1AR – Say No – Hungary
Judy Dempsey 20. Nonresident senior fellow at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of Strategic Europe. "Orbán Exploits Coronavirus Pandemic to Destroy Hungary’s Democracy". Carnegie Europe. 3-31-2020. https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/81410
As if European Union leaders didn’t know what has been taking place in Hungary over the past decade.
Since his election as prime minister back in 2010, Viktor Orbán has systematically undermined the rule of law, weakened the judiciary, grabbed control of large parts of the media, and curbed independent academic institutions, such as the Central European University.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: QPQ CP – Democracy › 1AR – Say No – Hungary
Nietsche 19 [Carisa; research assistant in the Transatlantic Security Program at the Center for a New American Security; “How Hungary’s Orban Puts Democratic Tools to Authoritarian Use”; 06-10-19; World Politics Review; https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/27928/how-hungary-s-orban-puts-democratic-tools-to-authoritarian-use]
In his visit to the White House last month, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who proudly describes himself as an illiberal democrat, did what every good populist does: He explained that he had a mandate from the people. “From the people, by the people, for the people. That is the basis for the Hungarian government,” he said when asked about democratic backsliding in his country.
Like other populist leaders, Orban uses a number of tactics to back up his claims: sidelining the media to quell critics, whipping up perceived threats from migrants, refugees and others from abroad, and, like other euroskeptics, casting the European Union as a bogeyman. One less-documented item in Orban’s toolkit, which is cast in a seemingly democratic sheen, is his use of national consultations—soliciting citizen feedback on government policies or regulations through surveys and opinion polls.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: QPQ CP – Democracy › 2AC – Say No – General
Paul Poast, Political Sciene @ UChicago, and Alexandra Chinchilla, Political Science @ UChicago 20, “Good for democracy? Evidence from the 2004 NATO,” International Politics, Volume 57, Issue 3.
NATO has a curious view of itself. The preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty listed ‘democracy’ as a ‘founding principle’ even though Portugal, a founding member, was under the authoritarian Estado Novo regime when the treaty was signed. Neither Turkey nor Greece, the frst two countries to join NATO following its formation, was suspended from the alliance during periods of authoritarian backsliding. One might assert that these seemingly hypocritical exceptions to the democratic principle were driven by Cold War necessities. Indeed, compare the language used in the 1968 NATO Strategic Concept—a periodically revised document of NATO’s strategic priorities—and the post-Cold War 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts. Whereas the 1968 document contains zero uses of the word ‘democracy’ (or variations, such as ‘democratic’), it has 28 uses of the word ‘deterrence.’ In contrast, the 1991 document contains 5 mentions of ‘democracy’ and just 6 of ‘deterrence,’ and the 1999 document contains 12 mentions of both terms. When NATO countries agreed to expand the alliance, NATO’s 1995 ‘Study on Enlargement’ noted ‘encouraging and supporting democratic reforms’ as a core tenet of expansion (NATO 1995). Hence, it appears that one of NATO’s post-Cold War strategies was to fnally take seriously its democratic principles (NATO 2018).
Given that NATO documents clearly demonstrate that democratic development became a core mission of NATO after the Cold War, how well has it fulflled this mission? Although some key post-Cold War expansion members, notably Poland and Hungary, have backslid on democratic reforms, has the post-Cold War NATO expansion fostered democratic development more broadly in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space? The existing scholarship on this question offers mixed answers. Gibler and Sewell (2006, 429) maintain that ‘the expansion of NATO eastward… aided the creation of a peaceful environment for democracy to survive.’ According to them, NATO reduced levels of external threat and provided much-needed bargaining leverage with Russia to resolve border issues and remove Russian troops from Eastern European states. In contrast, Dan Reiter (2001) expressed skepticism nearly two decades ago: ‘NATO membership has not and will not advance democratization in Europe…. [E]nlargement did not contribute much to democratization in the three East European states admitted in 1999, and the promise of NATO membership is unlikely to speed democracy within any of the nine countries currently awaiting a decision on their request for membership.’ Reiter then highlighted the ‘risks of further enlargement’ vis-a-vis Russia as pointing toward holding of on further expansion. Mearsheimer (2014) argues similarly that by antagonizing Russia, NATO expansion threatened the prospects for democratic development in Ukraine. Poast and Urpelainen (2018) ofer a middle-of-the-road argument. Exploring the post-Cold War experience of the Baltic states, they argue that these states’ nascent democratic regimes were underpinned by actions and efforts taken by the states themselves, along with Nordic assistance, well before NATO membership was even a possibility. NATO membership did not harm the prospects of democratic development, but it also did not directly foster the peaceful environment necessary for democracy to fourish. NATO’s role was, at best, indirect.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: QPQ CP – Democracy › 2AC – Say No – General
Bechev ’22 [Interview of Dimitar Bechev by Ferenc Laczo, 2-22-2022, "The competitive element in competitive authoritarianism is still very pertinent. Dimitar Bechev on Turkey Under Erdogan," Review of Democracy, , St. Mark’s, AshritM]
Ferenc Laczo: While you underline in the book that tilting the playing field was Erdogan’s way of surviving and prospering in politics, you also insist on long-term structural and institutional forces behind the rise of competitive authoritarianism in Turkey. What would you say are the main reasons behind the quite dramatic democratic decline in the country leading to the rise of competitive authoritarianism? How special or different is the Turkish regime as compared to other countries frequently cited these days when it comes to the subject of democratic decline, such as Russia, Poland, Hungary, or Serbia, to take examples only from Central and Eastern Europe, but you may, of course, wish to compare the country more globally too?
Dimitar Bechev: That’s a great question and I could spend hours upon hours delving into it. Turkey never had a perfect democracy. Even in the best of days, there were many conflicts and deficiencies that tainted the image of Turkish democracy, such as polarization within society, the prevalence of what Turks would call the deep state (even if the term is contested), the nationalist undercurrents in Turkish politics, the history of violence, and the culture of winner takes all, which has been quite systematic.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: QPQ CP – Democracy › 2AC – Solvency – Turkey – Lies
Reuters ’20 [Reuters Staff, 12-26-2020, "Erdogan says Turkey will break economic 'triangle of evil' with reforms," U.S., , St. Mark’s, AshritM]
Erdogan promised a slate of judicial and economic reforms last month, leading to expectations of the possible release of politicians, including Kurdish ones, and human rights advocates from jail. But Erdogan’s recent comments on court rulings and criticism aimed at his government have fuelled scepticism about his pledge.
Speaking via videolink at a ceremony in Ankara, Erdogan said 2021 would be “the year of democratic and economic reforms” and that efforts to present the reforms to parliament would move “as soon as possible”.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: QPQ CP – Democracy › 1AR – Solvency – Turkey – AT: Democracy
Cook ’19 [Steven A., 5-13-2019, "Turkish Democracy Can't Die, Because It Never Lived," Foreign Policy, , St. Mark’s, AshritM]
The moves and countermoves of Turkish politics belie the notion that the country was a democracy or was democratizing until the AKP won its first election in 2002. Turkey, like a host of other countries, became proficient in some democratic practices, and its constitutions established what resembled democratic institutions, but few of its leaders ever demonstrated a commitment to democratic norms. Without it, cynicism and authoritarianism flourished alongside of, and even with the help of, democratic practices.
2022
Michigan
Evidence
AT: QPQ CP – Democracy › 1AR – Solvency – Turkey – AT: Democracy
Li ’22 [May, 5-17-2022, "Rise of Erdogan and Democratic Erosion in Turkey," Democratic Erosion, , St. Mark’s, AshritM]
The popularity behind Erdogan even though Turkey is no longer considered a free country according to the Freedom House, is also at the core of the rise of populism and populist leaders such as Erdogan himself. The modern state of Turkey was built under leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk who created a secular nation for the Muslim majority. Secularism allowed Turkey to break from its imperial past, creating a new national identity for Turkish citizens. This meant that Islam would no longer play a significant role in the policies and laws of the new modern state. While the goal of secularism was intended to modernize Turkey, it also created a division between religious opposition within the population.
Then came Erdogan, a charismatic politician who appealed to the conservative population of Turkey. Using the deep division between those who supported a secular Turkey and those who supported an Islam State, liberalist and conservatives, and different groups of nationalists, Erdogan was able to emerge himself as the “voice and hope of the people.” He targeted the secular elites and blamed them for the failures of the state and for failing to represent the people. The economic boom during his time in office has also greatly contributed to his popularity. As said by Baris Unlu, a former political science professor, “Many people supported the APK Party even though they weren’t supporters per-se because they were sick of pre-2002 Turkey.”
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Kritiks › Security K › 2AC---Link Turn
Derek Bolton 21, Lecturer at the University of Bath, 2021, “Targeting Ontological Security: Information Warfare in the Modern Age,” Political Psychology, Vol. 42, No. 1, https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12691, RMax
Our view of how states interact and compete is expanded when we combine IW with OS. Much as with any other interest (e.g., physical or economic security), the desire for OS can be manipulated and undermined. Facets of IW can thus be viewed as part of a spectrum of tactics used to target the endogenous sources of OS. While representational force and counterpower both target subjectivity, their applicability is limited, either to when a victim’s subjectivity depends upon its relationship with the speaker or to large egoistical states, respectively. Moreover, their overt nature means the speaker is exposed to backlash, potentially diluting the impact external actors have. Given these limitations, actors have impetus to pursue IW. By covertly perverting the information landscape, IW can manipulate domestic efforts at relating events or policies to national narrative, making certain options appear more/less shameful. Actors might also polarize debates between subgroups in an effort to undermine the perceived stability of the national narrative, erode a sense of home, and increase challenges to the positive recognition of subgroups. As seen during the 2016 U.S. election, Russia was able to exploit technological advances to exacerbate and polarize debates and foster misperceptions between ideological cleavages, eroding the foundations of OS and generating anxiety. The result was a divided American populace preoccupied with regaining stability and the preservation of specific interpretations of the meta-national narrative.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Kritiks › Broad/1AC › 1AC---NATO Good
Slavoj Žižek 22, Professor of Philosophy at the European Graduate School, “What Does Defending Europe Mean?” Op-ed featured in Project Syndicate (PS), Published Mar. 2 2022, //chico
And now some who call themselves leftists (I wouldn’t) are blaming the West for the fact that US President Joe Biden was right about Putin’s intentions. The argument is well-known: NATO was slowly encircling Russia, fomenting color revolutions in its near-abroad, and ignoring the reasonable fears of a country that had been attacked from the West in the last century.
There is, of course, an element of truth here. But saying only this is equivalent to justifying Hitler by blaming the unjust Treaty of Versailles. Worse, it concedes that big powers have the right to spheres of influence, to which all others must submit for the sake of global stability. Putin’s assumption that international relations is a contest of great powers is reflected in his repeated claim that he had no choice but to intervene militarily in Ukraine.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Kritiks › Broad/1AC › 1AC---Defensive Realism
Media Ajir 18, and Bethany Vailliant, instructors of political science and international relations at the University of Nebraska, Fall 2018, “Russian Information Warfare: Implications for Deterrence Theory,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 3, p. 70-89, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/26481910, RMax, language edited in brackets
While it is a common perception in the West that Russia is acting offensively, there lies explanatory power as well in understanding that the Russians view their actions as being defensive in nature. In the Russian view, technology is a particular method the West uses to “attack” it—but less for inflicting crippling [brutal] blows than as a way to spread unacceptable ideas, norms, practices, and behaviors. Russian intelligence services are increasingly worried about the potential detrimental national security effects arising from the internet. In fact, the vast majority of Russian writing on information conflict is defensive in tone and focused on information security due to their perception of the global information space as a serious threat to Russian sovereignty. The original Russian source government document “Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation” states that there is a trend in foreign media to publish biased information about Russian state policy and that there is discrimination against Russian mass media. Additionally, they observe what they perceive as increasing pressure on the Russian population through Western propaganda efforts that “erode Russian traditional and spiritual and moral values.”2 The belief that the West was heavily involved in the color revolutions and in the Arab Spring, as well as with the protests preceding Putin’s reelection in 2012, is a deeply held one. In response, Russia views the media and the internet as tools to defend its authoritarian state and ideology both at home and abroad through dissemination of its own views and propaganda efforts. To understand this fully, one must first consider Russian information warfare concepts before examining three specific Russian information warfare tools.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Counterplans › Private Sector › Private Sector Fails
Kathleen Mary Carley 22, Professor of Computer Science, Institute for Software Research at Carnegie Mellon University, “COVID-19 Disinformation: A Multi-National, Whole of Society Perspective,” Advanced Sciences and Technologies for Security Applications, ISBN 978-3-030-94824-5, Springer Cham, DOI: , p. 13 (found under, “Chapter 1: A Political Disinfodemic”) //chico
On the good news side, social media platforms took action and new laws regulating disinformation came into play. However, many of the laws are difficult to enforce. Actions taken by the platforms have not been universally welcomed as: they often appear capricious, may be interfering with free speech, might not be applied in a uniform non-partisan global fashion, may be based on biased algorithms, afford the platforms too much power, and interfere with science. The global nature of social media, countering laws focused on freedom of speech, and technical difficulties in identifying the actual human behind specific posts effectively makes policy and law enforcement difficult. From a platform perspective it is important to note that there is an ecology of platforms. Information or actors banned from one platform may simply migrate to another platform. For disinformation, it often simultaneously exists on multiple platforms—so banning it from one is a temporary measure as it will simply get rewritten, turned into a meme, or combined with other information and then re-appear on the platform that banned it. Since a typical user employs eight social media platforms, it is relatively easy for anyone to move disinformation between platforms.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Counterplans › DoS › 2AC---DoS CP---DoS Fails
Christopher Paul 16, senior social scientist at the RAND corporation, Ph.D. from University of California, Los Angeles, 9/1/2016, “Enhancing US Efforts to Inform, Influence, and Persuade,” Parameters, Vol. 46, No. 3, , RMax
Also, Defense responsibilities for contingency response necessitate retaining capabilities to inform, influence, and persuade. Even the most robust State Department imaginable will lack the kind of surge capacity and expeditionary capability needed to respond to the crises and contingencies for which our military prepares. When the US military presence in a foreign country expands from negligible to massive, who will be alongside the operating forces, explaining and making their presence palatable? The answer is military communicators. If all the military communicators went away, no one would conduct critical inform, influence, and persuade missions at the outset of an emergent crisis, which is why the DoD needs to remain capable. In fact, Defense personnel, as argued above, should continue to become more capable, given the possible savings for other defense capabilities.
Further, military leaders should be encouraged to use informational combat power as part of their combined arms approach to prevail over our nation’s foes, rather than outsourcing the capability to other parts of the government.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Counterplans › DoS › 2AC---DoS CP---DOD Key
Simon Handler 21, assistant director of the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative under the Snowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, former special assistant in the U.S. Senate; and Justin Sherman, a fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Cyber Statecraft Initiative, 4/22/2021, "The United States Needs a Public Strategy for Deterring Disinformation," National Interest, , RMax, language edited in brackets
In cyberspace, U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) can play an important role in disrupting adversary disinformation campaigns. Operations such as USCYBERCOM’s campaign against the TrickBot botnet in the lead up to the 2020 general election and its paralysis [stoppage] of Russia’s Internet Research Agency on the day of the 2018 midterms must continue for effective deterrence by denial.
Information conflict is reshaping the future of cyber conflict. If the U.S. national security community continues to focus just on the 1s and 0s, it will doom the United States to continually suffer successful attacks against its democracy and security. Similarly, to the extent that the government continues to pursue cyber conflict as a purely government problem, as opposed to part of a broader contest involving the likes of media outlets and internet platforms, the United States will fail to mount the society-wide response needed to effectively deter harmful foreign activities and better compete in this contest for information.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Counterplans › DoS › 2AC---DoS CP---DOD Key
James Davitch 22, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel, M.S. in Airpower Strategy and Technology Integration from Air University, M.A. in Interdisciplinary from the University of Oklahoma, March 2022, “Dealing with Disinformation: The Barriers to Success and a Path Forward,” Air and Space Operations Review, Vol. 1, Issue 1, pp. 4-17, RMax
The US military’s approach to information warfare relies on personnel, organizations, techniques, and procedures grounded in conventional doctrine.1 When it comes to tactical information operations, instead of doing what the Joint force needs them to do, US military members do what they know how to do. This reality leaves combatant commanders at a comparative disadvantage relative to foes who use the information space to exploit a vulnerability of the United States while avoiding its historic conventional military strengths. Winning in the information domain today and tomorrow will require the Department of Defense to acquire a new capability. In conflicts with peer competitors, clear, concise, and correct communication is a major weapon of warfare.
This article advocates for a new kind of fires team to assist with this problem. The proposed “anti-disinformation” cell would compete in the cognitive rather than physical domain. The Department should begin to think about force packaging that includes not only traditional military hardware like ships, aircraft, and munitions, but also people who can help understand the geopolitical situation and communicate in a way advantageous for US national interests. Recommendations in this article are also pertinent to civilian national security leaders as they consider ways to respond to adversary moves and inform public opinion to help achieve political ends.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Counterplans › DoS › 2AC---DoS CP---Links to DOD DA
Pecquet 22 (Julian Pecquet, the founder and editor of Foreign Lobby Report, a US news site that offers comprehensive coverage of foreign influence operations in Washington and beyond, 5-25-2022 "US looks to expose Russian propaganda in Africa," Africa Report, https://www.theafricareport.com/207268/us-looks-to-expose-russian-propaganda-in-africa/, DOA: 6-30-2022//Smarx Ahsan---Edited for Spelling)
The State Department's counter-propaganda arm has released its first-ever report on Russian disinformation in Africa as the Joe Biden administration looks to expose the Kremlin following the invasion of Ukraine.
The Global Engagement Centre, which leads and coordinates US efforts to “recognize, understand, expose, and counter foreign propaganda and disinformation”, released a three-page bulletin on Russian activities on 24 May. The report focuses particularly on Mali and other Sahel countries where the Kremlin-linked Wagner Group of mercenaries operates.