2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Disads › Politics › 2AC---No Link---CIA Normal Means
Catherine A. Theohary 18, Specialist in National Security Policy, Cyber and Information Operations, “Information Warfare: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, crsreport: R45142 version 5 //chico
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has a history of conducting information warfare or psychological operations, particularly with respect to countering guerilla organizations abroad. Monitoring Soviet disinformation was once solely the purview of the CIA, until the Active Measures Working Group was established in 1981 and tasked with coordinating the activities of multiple, disparate activities within the U.S. government.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Disads › DOD Tradeoff › No link---normal means
USC 22, US Code, 1-3-2022, "22 USC CHAPTER 102, SUBCHAPTER II: COUNTERING RUSSIAN INFLUENCE IN EUROPE AND EURASIA," , cy
§9543. Coordinating aid and assistance across Europe and Eurasia
(a) Authorization of appropriations
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Topicality › Cybersecurity › 1AR---C/I---Disinfo = Cyberattack
Kevin Caramancion et al 22, internationally acclaimed author and speaker on information disorder research currently affiliated with the University at Albany, Yueqi Li, Elisabeth DuBois, Ellie Seoe Jung, College of Emergency Preparedness, Published 4/12/22,
According to a report by the Institute for Public Relations, 63% of Americans view disinformation as a major problem in society, yet there are limited avenues to combat it outside of media literacy and news spaces [1]. similarly, a report by Neustar International Security Council (NISC) found that 48% of cybersecurity professionals think of disinformation as a threat, of which 49% say the threat is very significant. The study also found that 91% of cybersecurity professionals thought that stricter measures should be implemented on the Internet [2]. The gravity of the impact of disinformation on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information makes it necessary to view disinformation not simply as an error of information but as a form of cyberattack.
Cybersecurity relates to the protection and defense of personal information, computer systems, and critical infrastructure. Cyber threats tend to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of technology systems. Disinformation, the sharing of deliberately misleading or biased information, has been formally classified as an information disorder by the Council of Europe (2017) [3]. The goal of disinformation is to change an individual’s thoughts and behaviors, consequently influencing public opinion by altering one’s view of reality or accentuating one’s prior held beliefs to disrupt truth-seeking. Deceptive information can leave people confused about basic facts and current events, creating a dangerous situation affecting public safety, organizational reputations, or governmental functions. In many ways, disinformation is thus similar to a cyberattack, where instead of compromising a computer system, it compromises our cognitive abilities. Such disruptions have been coined cognitive hacking—where such practices can result in a greater threat than a cyberattack on critical infrastructure [4]. The damage caused by disinformation can be challenging to repair, as people form opinions based on cognitive and confirmation biases. The deceptive nature of disinformation is further accentuated by economic pressures and advertisement-centric models that incentivize disinformation to overload information channels, often drowning the truth. Just as technology and social media expansion increase cybersecurity risks, they exacerbate the impact of disinformation.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Topicality › Cybersecurity › 1AR---C/I---DI=CS
Saj Huq 20, leads cyber innovation at Plexal and is director of Lorca, the London Office for Rapid Cybersecurity Advancement, “It’s time to accept that disinformation is a cyber security issue,” Computer Weekly, 12/23/2020, https://www.computerweekly.com/opinion/Its-time-to-accept-that-disinformation-is-a-cyber-security-issue
The internet, as life-changing as it can be for digitising businesses, connecting communities and informing individuals, doesn’t come with a user guide to help us navigate it. And as people become more aware of the dark side of the web, they are looking for tools that help to defend them against campaigns designed to manipulate how they think or behave.
Misinformation and disinformation are rife, but so far it’s been seen as a challenge for policy-makers and big tech, including social media platforms. However, because disinformation is by nature an online risk, it is a challenge for our cyber security ecosystem to tackle, too.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Topicality › Cybersecurity › 2AC---T---Includes Disinfo
Paul Cobaugh et al 18, Vice President of Narrative Strategies, a coalition of scholars and military professionals, Anastasios Arazamptis, and Justin Sherman, “An Assessment of Information War as a Cybersecurity Issue,” Real Clear Defense, 3/2/18, https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/06/18/an_assessment_of_information_warfare_as_a_cybersecurity_issue_113541.html
Summary: Information warfare is not new, but the evolution of cheap, accessible, and scalable cyber technologies enables it greatly. The U.S. Department of Justice’s February 2018 indictment of the Internet Research Agency – one of the Russian groups behind disinformation in the 2016 American election – establishes that information warfare is not just a global problem from the national security and fact-checking perspectives; but a cybersecurity issue as well.
Text: On February 16, 2018, U.S. Department of Justice Special Counsel Robert Mueller indicted 13 Russians for interfering in the 2016 United States presidential election [1]. Beyond the important legal and political ramifications of this event, this indictment should make one thing clear: information warfare is a cybersecurity issue.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Topicality › Cybersecurity › 2AC---AT: T Cyberattacks
Sean S. Costigan, Director of ITL Security and Professor at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, and Michael A. Hennessy 16, scholar of Canadian foreign, defense and naval history, British Columbia graduate, “Cybersecurity: A Generic Reference Curiculum,” July 2016, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_10/1610-cybersecurity-curriculum.pdf
For definitional clarity, we have relied on the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) definition of cyberspace, the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, which includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers….” Cybersecurity has been defined as “the activity or process, ability or capability, or state whereby information and communications systems and the information contained therein are protected from and/or defended against damage, unauthorized use or modification or exploitation.” That basic definition shapes what we have included throughout this document.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Topicality › Security Cooperation › T- SC---Includes Nonmilitary Security Agencies
Still says DoD tho
CRS 16, Congressional Research Service, 8/23/2016, “DOD Security Cooperation: An Overview of Authorities and Issues,” https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44602.html, RMax
DOD defines “security cooperation” as a broad set of activities undertaken by DOD to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. Included in the definition are DOD interactions with both foreign defense and foreign nonmilitary security establishments. Security cooperation includes all DOD-administered security assistance programs that (1) build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; (2) develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and (3) provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.4 According to DOD, security assistance is a subset of DOD's security cooperation portfolio.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Add-Ons › DOD Innovation › Add-On---DoD Innovation---2AC
Sydney Litterer 22, Research Assistant at the RAND Corporation; and Krista Romita Grocholski, physical scientist at the RAND Corporation, 4/22/2022, "Effective Use of Nonlethal Weapons Could Require Combating Disinformation," No Publication, https://www.rand.org/blog/2022/04/effective-use-of-nonlethal-weapons-could-require-combating.html, RMax
In an era of strategic competition, nonlethal weapons can potentially bolster U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) capabilities. The temporary and reversible effects of these weapons can provide DoD with an appropriate response to provocations that don't merit the use of lethal force, reducing the potential for collateral damage while mitigating the risk of inadvertent escalation in peacetime and gray-zone situations.
Public perceptions can have powerful effects on how these systems are employed and the impact of their use. Understanding these factors, and particularly the potential for negative narratives emerging from the use of novel technologies could be vital for DoD as it develops innovative nonlethal weapons because the technologies they rely on may be poorly understood by the general public.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Solvency › U.S. Key › U.S. Key---Agreement
David Shedd 20, professor at the Patrick Henry College, former acting director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and Ivana Stradner, Visiting Research Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, J.S.D. from the University of California, Berkeley,8/11/2020, "Countering Russia’s Influence Operations in the Balkans," https://www.heritage.org/europe/commentary/countering-russias-influence-operations-the-balkans, RMax
Even the pandemic has the potential for fomenting political unrest.
In recent days, thousands of Serbs have taken to the streets to protest Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic’s announced strict curfew in response to a surge in Covid-19 cases. Many have pointed a finger at pro-Russia ultra-right groups and foreign intelligence services for fueling the violent riots.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Solvency › NATO Key › NATO Key---Private Sector
John Fuisz 22, CEO/Founder at Veriphix, “Veriphix Announced as Winner of NATO Innovation Challenge - Fall 2021 Iteration: Veriphix to implement Beacon, the industry's first belief tracking dashboard, for NATO Countering Cognitive Warfare Efforts,” , cy
WASHINGTON, Feb. 24, 2022 /PRNewswire-PRWeb/ -- Co-organized by NATO's Innovation Hub and the Canadian Ministry of Defence, the 2021 iteration of the NATO Innovation Challenge ended on 30 November 2021 with the victory of Veriphix, a US company that has developed a belief dynamics platform to track and measure a population's beliefs about any topic, empowering brands to move customers towards ideas, products and services.
This challenge, co-organized with the Canadian Special Operations Forces Command, with Innovation for Defence Excellence and Security (funding program of the Canadian Ministry of Defence for innovation) and Old Dominion University, dealt with Cognitive Warfare and brought together more than 130 solutions from 13 nations. High-level authorities such as Mrs. Jody Thomas, Deputy Minister of National Defence of Canada and General Philippe Lavigne, NATO Supreme Allied Commander Transformation, showed their support by opening the event.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Solvency › NATO Key › NATO Key---Broad
D. F. Reding & B. Wells 22, Dale F. Reding and Bryan Wells are both Chief Scientists at NATO, “COVID-19 Disinformation: A Multi-National, Whole of Society Perspective,” Advanced Science and Technology for Security Applications, ISBN 978-3-030-94824-5, Springer Cham, DOI: , p. 25-43 (under the ch. titled, “Cognitive Warfare: NATO, COVID-19 and the Impact of Emerging and Disruptive Technologies,”) //chico
Disinformation campaigns are hardly new and have long been a staple of geopolit- ical conflict. Nevertheless, the precision, breadth, volume, automation and audacity of such attacks are unprecedented. Exploiting the situation, some states, social groups and individuals with malice and forethought sought to conduct cognitive warfare on entire populations, using the opportunities presented by COVID-19 to seek political or social advantage. These have had, and will continue to have, severe consequences for Alliance nations and the health of its citizens. Ultimately, as we have discussed in this chapter, the NATO alliance has faced these issues through the active use of S&T and a focus on facts, concrete actions, and trust-building. Nevertheless, it is a well understood psychological phenomenon that facts do not always win an argument. While arguably a successful strategy, the lingering effects of these attacks suggest that the struggle is far from over. In the end, whether it is at the strategic or tactical level, conflict is a decidedly human activity. The most effective way to overcome an opponent is to impact their thoughts and beliefs, thereby turning them against themselves. Continued research into disinformation and its impact on societies will help develop new battle plans to counter these attacks. Further, the success and increasing development of more sophisticated attacks suggest that cognitive warfare will become even more important for the Alliance as potentially the sixth operational domain for NATO.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Solvency › NATO Key › NATO Key---Broad
Molly McKew 17, a writer, and expert on information warfare; she currently serves as narrative architect at New Media Frontier, a social media intelligence company. As an analyst and author; her articles have appeared in Politico Magazine, the Washington Post, and other publications, September 2017, "The Scourge of Russian Disinformation," Congressional Hearing, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115jhrg26880/html/CHRG-115jhrg26880.htm //AShah
Third, irregular warfare, including information warfare, will be fought within our borders. This means we need to rethink authorities. Our most experienced assets shouldn't be boxed out of defending the American people. We need sanctioned irregulars to build defensive and retaliatory capacity in information operations, and a good place to start would be a combination of U.S. Special Forces--who are, by mission, trained to fight unconventional wars--with counterintelligence and independent actors. We must also work with our trusted allies on the geographic front lines of NATO using--as you noted, Senator Gardner--the 10th Special Forces Group, our Europe-aligned group, which brings a range of knowledge and experience in countering Russia to the table.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Solvency › NATO Key › NATO Key---Broad
Gill and Goolsby 22, Ritu Gill has a PhD in psychology from Carleton university, Rebbeca Goolsby is the co-Lead of a NATO Research Technology Group on cyberdiplomacy and communications, “COVID-19 Disinformation: A Multi-National, Whole of Society Perspective,” Advanced Science and Technology for Security Applications, ISBN 978-3-030-94824-5, Springer Cham, DOI: , p. XXII, 213 (under “Foreword”) //chico
Our unity and our ability to adapt is even more critical as we face a more unpre- dictable, complex, and rapidly changing sphere of geopolitical conflict. We face more sophisticated cyber-attacks and disinformation, a more assertive Russian, brutal terrorism, nuclear proliferation, disruptive technologies ever. The security impact of climate change, so crucial for own public opinions, and where NATO is embarking energetically in that direction. And, of course, the most critical game-changer in global affairs in many, many decades, or probably centuries, is the shift in the worldwide balance of power with the rise of China.
Such hostile activities seek to undermine our democracies, our institutions, our shared values on which our Alliances is founded. But perhaps more fundamentally, it seeks to undermine the trust of our citizens in the very institutions of democ- racy because this competition, global competition that never ends, historically, is today also a competition of fundamental ideas. And the most crucial part is what we do, not only to describe this intimidation as worrisome and concerning but to take concrete actions to face this phenomenon. We must continue to invest in our strategic communications capabilities and build an evidence-based understanding of the (dis)information environment to contest a highly contested communications space.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Solvency › Security Cooperation/DOD Key › DOD Key---Training
Meghan Fitzpatrick 22, strategic analyst with Defence Research and Development Canada; Ritu Gill, section head with DRDC; Jennifer Giles, communication strategy and operations officer for the Marine Corps, “Information Warfare: Lessons in Inoculation to Disinformation,” The US Army War College Quarterly: Parameters, Vol 52, No. 1, cy
In addition to the computer-based training, the service components should also implement focused in-person media literacy training at the company level. Sessions should be held in small classrooms or town halls and led by DoD facilitators, from public affairs or communication strategy and operations, who have been trained by leading public-sector practitioners. The training should address trouble areas flagged by the annual computer-based class and facilitate practical application exercises that test the students’ ability to recognize and counter disinformation using personal devices. The practical application exercises would model leading public-sector courses but would focus on DoD equities. The in-person class would also offer an opportunity for servicemembers to discuss ongoing adversarial cyberattacks, media influence, military actions, challenges faced by partners and allies, and foreign interference in domestic events.
In addition, family predeployment briefs should integrate media literacy training to increase awareness before a servicemembers’ deployment. Although the Department of Defense cannot mandate family members take online media literacy training, many are concerned about the threat of false information and welcome opportunities to understand and protect themselves from these threats.43 Family readiness officers and key spouse leaders are also conduits to promote and share online media literacy education opportunities and encourage awareness.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Solvency › Security Cooperation/DOD Key › DOD Key---Internal Disinfo
Raphael Cohen 21, Director of the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND Project AIR FORCE; Nathan Mustafaga, associate policy researcher at the RAND Corporation, Joe Cheravitch; Defense analyst at the RAND corporation; Alyssa Demus, associate international/defense researcher at the RAND Corporation; Scott Harold, political scientist and Associate Director of the RAND Center for Asia Pacific Policy; Jeffrey Hornung, senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation; Jenny Jun, Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Science at Columbia; Mike Schwille, senior policy analyst at RAND; Elina Treyger, political scientist at the RAND Corporation; Nathan Vest, adjunct research assistant at RAND, “Combating Foreign Disinformation on Social Media,” , cy
Train for Disinformation, Focus on Key Demographics, and Minimize Widespread Bans on Smart Phone and Social Media Use
The joint force has made significant strides toward incorporating counter-disinformation efforts on social media into their regimen. One way has been to simulate the social media environment through such programs as ION. Another has been to make real-world information environment monitoring a part of regular training exercises, such as Trident Juncture. There are pros and cons to both approaches, but detecting and responding to disinformation needs to be built into training programs—from the unit level down to the individual service member level—particularly as disinformation on social media becomes a staple of great-power competition.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Solvency › Security Cooperation/DOD Key › DOD/Military Key
Henry RIdgewell 2016, Henry Ridgwell reports for VOA from London, September 2016, “NATO Warns West Is 'Losing Information War' Against Russia, IS”, Voice of America News /sk
LONDON - The West must step up its efforts to combat and counter the information war being waged by its opponents, according to NATO officials. They warn that countries like Russia are exploiting the freedom of the press in Western media to spread disinformation. The term "hybrid warfare" is frequently used to describe the tactics used by the Kremlin in its forceful takeover of Crimea in 2014, when unmarked, heavily armed gunmen now widely known as the 'little green men' began storming Ukrainian military bases in the region. Moscow initially denied they were Russian military, yet weeks later similar unidentified armed units appeared in eastern Ukraine. That conflict between Russia-backed rebels and the Ukrainian military is still continuing. The West is under attack Speaking at this month's United Nations General Assembly, Ukraine's President Petro Poroshenko said hybrid warfare is being waged against the whole Western world. "Political pressure, blatant propaganda, interference with the electoral process, economic coercion, secret subversive and military operations, cyberattacks, misuse of diplomatic measures, these are modern and congenial methods of the undeclared war," Poroshenko said. At a recent conference on Information Warfare at the London-based Royal United Services Institute, the Director of the NATO StratCom Center of Excellence Janis Sarts said the West is playing catch-up. West not focused on this type of warfare "The technology is ours. The marketing powerhouses are in our countries. Yet we're having this discussion against the feeling of being pushed. Against the feeling of being pushed by different actors: Russia, Daesh... also China in more subtle ways," said Sarts, using and Arabic term for the Islamic State. The conference focused on the growing reach of Russian state media such as the 24-hour news channel Russia Today or RT, often accused of being a propaganda outlet for the Kremlin. Senior editor at The Economist Edward Lucas argued channels like RT should not be considered as journalism. "Russia has really grasped the post-truth environment. And they will lie about things absolutely brazenly. They understand the weaknesses of our media in the post-Cold War environment: that we prioritize fairness over truth." Russia investing big money Lucas added the West should do more about what he termed "social media hygiene." "There's a real problem with comment fields, and with fake social media accounts, particularly on Twitter. The Russians are putting lots and lots of money into creating tens of thousands of trolls." Mark Laity, the chief of Strategic Communications at NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe or SHAPE, noted that Russia includes information strategy as a key pillar of its conflict planning, but in the West the communications are often handed off to separate public relations teams. "We are still fighting on the margins," he said, "when actually a properly funded, strategic communication effort is incredibly cheap compared to other costs." Laity warned Russia was deploying disinformation and hybrid warfare in its intervention in Syria - most recently in the disputed bombing of an aid convoy outside Aleppo earlier this month. He added the West must learn how to fight back.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Solvency › Security Cooperation/DOD Key › DOD/Military Key
Glenn Alexander Crowther 17, Senior Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “The Cyber Domain,” The Cyber Defense Review, Vol. 2, No. 3, , cy
In addition to the Three Warfares, China has made advances in conceptualizing “strategic information war”. This concept “refers to the use of information and information technology in the political, economic, (science & technology), diplomatic, cultural, and military arenas to secure information advantage. In this broad sense, information war spans military and civilian spheres, peacetime and wartime, and has a global nature.” [35] Although there are a variety of names for the Russian approach, the most accurate appears to be “new generation warfare” which “is manifested in five component elements: political subversion, proxy sanctuary, intervention, coercive deterrence and negotiated manipulation.” [36] Together these two approaches provide a significant threat to the United States, NATO Allies and like-minded partners around the world. This means that we all need to be competing in the information space. Information competition is so important that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently designated “information” to be a joint function, co-equal with the existing joint functions of command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. [37]
The military has five functions that partially exist in the information environment and seven that exist entirely within the environment: Information Operations (IO), Military Deception, Psychological Operations (PSYOPs, also known as Military Information Support Operations or MISO), Public Affairs, and Strategic Communications are entirely within the environment. Communications & Signals, Cyber, Electronic Warfare (EW), Intelligence, Space operations and Operations Security (OPSEC) exist partially within. Physical operations also have an information effect, as when a US Army unit goes to a firing range in eastern Poland. All of these functions are legitimate military operations within cyberspace.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Solvency › Security Cooperation/DOD Key › DOD/Military Key
Tonya Riley 21 (Tonya, Technology and cybersecurity policy researcher, 4-30-2021, "Analysis," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/04/30/cybersecurity-202-defense-department-isnt-armed-combat-growing-threat-information-warfare-experts-warn/, DOA: 6-22-2022//Smarx Ahsan)
National security experts will warn Congress today that the U.S. government isn't doing enough to fight back against the growing national security threat of information warfare aimed at sowing distrust in the U.S. government at home and abroad.
“Cyber-enabled disinformation, whether domestically or foreign generated, is a national security problem, corroding our democracy and governmental institutions, and threatening our public health and, potentially, public safety,” former NSA general counsel Glenn Gerstell will testify in front of the House Armed Services subcommittee on cyber, innovative technologies and information systems.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Solvency › Security Cooperation/DOD Key › DOD/Military Key
Alicia Wanless 18, director of the Partnership for Countering Influence Operations at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Ph.D. researcher at King’s College London; and Michael Berk, Visiting Research Fellow with the Centre for Cyber Security and International Relations at the University of Florence, 3/27/2018, "For Every Action There is an Information Reaction: How Exercises Need to Adapt in a Digital Age," https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/3/27/for-every-action-there-is-an-information-reaction-how-exercises-need-to-adapt-in-a-digital-age, cy + RMax
The internet, social media, artificial intelligence, and other digital technologies are enabling the manipulation of the information environment for strategic purposes. Global hyper-connectivity and increasing competitiveness have propelled information warfare as a viable means of achieving strategic objectives—but what its theory and practice means can vary from military to military and expert to expert. Indeed, a lack of universal definitions, combined with a desire by military thinkers to carve things up into military domains and focus on hardware and technology, has left the role of information in the context of 21st century warfare insufficiently examined. This article, building on a previous one entitled "The Strategic Communication Ricochet," considers why information is more than a domain, and how military exercises must be adapted accordingly to foster increased resilience to information warfare.
The idea that information can be used in conflict is not new—great military strategists such as Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, and Clausewitz all emphasized using information to outmaneuver an enemy.[1-3] Despite an historic awareness of information in warfare, finding an internationally accepted definition of information warfare has been a challenge. Part of the problem is the word information itself—which can encompass many things. For example, one meaning as provided by the Oxford Dictionary is “data as processed, stored, or transmitted by a computer”—this could entail everything from code to content.[4] This understanding has been reflected in some military materials, such as the U.S. handbook on Inform and Influence Activities, which breaks the information environment out into three dimensions: the physical (e.g., infrastructure), informational (e.g., data) and cognitive (e.g., values, beliefs).[5] Such scope, however, means that information is actually integrated into nearly everything a military does—from command and control functions to public affairs. Yet, information activities are often treated as something stand alone, or unrelated to more traditional military domains. Moreover, when it comes to the cognitive dimension of information in particular, there is an emphasis on outgoing communication with little attention to how such content will be twisted and used by adversaries against the sender to negatively affect leadership and decision-making.
2022
Michigan
Affirmative
Solvency › Advocates---Countermeasures › Solvency---OCOs
Justin Ling 22, journalist for VICE News, has written in Medium, The Guardian, Business Insider, MSN Canada, The Independent, and Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 5/13/2022, "NATO Should Elevate Its Cyber Game, and Quickly," Centre for International Governance Innovation, https://www.cigionline.org/articles/nato-should-elevate-its-cyber-game-and-quickly/
When Moscow attacked Ukraine in February, President Vladimir Putin expected a quick victory.
Not only did the Kremlin have military superiority, but it planned a concerted cyber and information campaign to disrupt the Ukrainian state, galvanize support among Russophones, weaken Western resolve and convince Ukrainians that resistance is futile.