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2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Heg Unsustainable › 2NC---Overstretch

Heg is unsustainable - multiple crises in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia are overstretching the US

Brands ’22 – Professor of Global Affairs [Hal; Hal Brands is the Henry A. Kissinger Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is also a columnist for Bloomberg Opinion. He is the author or editor of several books regarding foreign policy and grand strategy; 1-18-22; "The Overstretched Superpower”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-01-18/overstretched-superpower; Foreign Affairs; accessed 6-26-2022; AH]

he first year of Joe Biden’s presidency ended as it began, with the United States facing crises on multiple fronts. In the spring of 2021, there were simultaneous war scares in eastern Europe and the western Pacific, thanks to a Chinese intimidation campaign against Taiwan and a Russian military buildup on the Ukrainian border. At the start of 2022, the world was no calmer. China’s menacing maneuvers near Taiwan continued. Russian President Vladimir Putin, having mobilized an even bigger force near Ukraine, was threatening to start Europe’s largest war in decades. Meanwhile, Tehran and Washington looked to be headed for a renewed crisis over Iran’s nuclear program and its drive for regional primacy. Being a global superpower means never having the luxury of concentrating on just one thing. That is a rude lesson for Biden, who took office hoping to reduce tensions in areas of secondary importance so that the United States could focus squarely on the problem that matters most: China. It also indicates a larger weakness in Washington’s global posture, one that Biden now owns but did not create. The United States is an overstretched hegemon, with a defense strategy that has come out of balance with the foreign policy it supports. Biden’s first year has already shown how hard it is to manage an unruly world when Washington has more responsibilities—and more enemies—than it has coercive means. Over the longer term, a superpower that fails to keep its commitments in line with its capabilities may pay an even heavier price. ASIA FIRST Biden’s initial theory of foreign policy was straightforward: don’t let smaller challenges distract from the big one. Of all the threats Washington faces, Biden’s interim national security strategy argued, China “is the only competitor” able to “mount a sustained challenge to a stable and open international system.” That challenge has become greater as China has accelerated its efforts to overturn the balance of power in Asia. When Biden took office, U.S. military leaders publicly warned that Beijing could invade Taiwan by 2027. Biden was not naive enough to think that other problems would simply vanish. With trouble brewing on this central front, however, he did seek a measure of calm on others. Biden avoided another doomed “reset” with Russia, but held an early summit with Putin in a bid to establish a “stable and predictable” relationship. He also sought to find a path back to the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, thereby reducing the growing risk of confrontation in the Middle East. Finally, Biden ended the U.S. war in Afghanistan, a decision he justified by arguing that it was time to refocus attention and resources on the Indo-Pacific. Relations with U.S. allies followed the same pattern: the administration dropped U.S. opposition to the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline linking Russia and western Europe, wagering that ending a contentious dispute with Germany would make it easier to win Berlin’s cooperation vis-à-vis Beijing. Biden’s emerging defense strategy has a similar thrust. The Trump administration made a major shift in U.S. defense planning, arguing that the Pentagon must relentlessly prepare for a conflict against a great-power challenge—particularly from China—even though that meant accepting greater risk in other regions. Biden’s Pentagon likewise spent 2021 focusing on how to deter or defeat Chinese aggression, withdrawing scarce assets such as missile defense batteries from the Middle East, and making longer-term budgetary investments meant to “prioritize China and its military modernization as our pacing challenge.” TROUBLE EVERYWHERE Biden is undoubtedly right that the Chinese challenge overshadows all others, despite unresolved debates in Washington over exactly when that challenge will become most severe. His administration has made major moves in the Sino-American competition during its first year—expanding multilateral military planning and exercises in the western Pacific, focusing bodies such as NATO and the G-7 on Beijing’s belligerence, and launching the AUKUS partnership with Australia and the United Kingdom. Yet Biden hasn’t enjoyed anything resembling a respite on other fronts. The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan precipitated the collapse of the government there, generating a near-term crisis that consumed Washington’s attention and leaving longer-term legacies—strategic and humanitarian—that are likely to do the same. Meanwhile, a brutal internal conflict in Ethiopia destabilized one of Africa’s most important countries. Most problematic of all, U.S. relations with Iran and Russia became worse, not better. Iran has taken a hard-line stance in negotiations on a revived nuclear deal while steadily decreasing the amount of time it would need to produce a potential weapon. Tehran’s proxies have also conducted periodic attacks against U.S. personnel and partners in the Middle East as part of an ongoing effort to force an American withdrawal from the region. Putin, for his part, has authorized or at least permitted significant cyberattacks against critical infrastructure in the United States. He threatened war against Ukraine in the spring and has now mobilized forces for what U.S. officials fear could be a major invasion and prolonged occupation of that country. To preserve the peace, Moscow has demanded an acknowledged Russian sphere of influence and the rollback of NATO’s military presence in eastern Europe. What exactly Putin has in mind for Ukraine is uncertain, but “stable and predictable” is clearly not how he envisions his relationship with the United States. These are ominous signs for 2022. The United States could find itself facing grave security crises in Europe and the Middle East in addition to persistent and elevated tensions in the Pacific. And these possibilities hint at a deeper problem in U.S. statecraft, one that has been accumulating for years: strategic overstretch.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Heg Unsustainable › 2NC---North Korea

Heg is unsustainable – terrorism and NoKo

Rapanyane 20 – is a Lecturer of Politics & International Relations at the North West University, Mahikeng Campus, and has an Ma in International Relations from the University of Limpopo, 3/31/20 (Makhura Benjamin, “The new world [dis] order in the complexity of multi-polarity: United States of America's hegemonic decline and the configuration of new power patterns”, Journal of Public Affairs, Volume 21, Issue 1, accessed 6/23/22)//jd 

Having considered the above challenges to USA hegemony, it is also important to outline the external challenges to the USA hegemony. One of the fundamental external challenges of the USA hegemony is the problem of Nuclear Weapons. Such as those of North Korea, which continues to constitute a major hegemonic challenge and serious concern for the USA in the international system because of its belligerence toward USA and proscribed weapons technology including the likes of armed intercontinental ballistic missiles which threaten the homeland of USA by means of countering and thwarting any nuclear threats from the USA and other warheads ballistic missiles. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1993 had no effective outcome on the disarmament of North Korea. As such, North Korea still continues to amass these weapons of mass destruction esp. after it withdrew from the NPT in 2003 (Kim, 2010, p. 68). After this withdrawal, North Korea became independent and not obligated by any international agreement or law in the build-out of Nuclear weapons. Thus, this is often portrayed as an intimidating remark to its neighboring countries like South Korea which signed a Mutual Deference Treaty with the USA to host thousands of USA soldiers (Mclnnis et al., 2017, p. 5). A challenge in this instance is that, in the call for North Korea's denuclearization, championed by the USA in the international system, nothing significant was done. Worse, North Korea maintains that these weapons are for the purpose of deterrence (Bennett, 2010). Hence, this has bestowed greatly to what is called “a relationship-driven by crisis and mutual hostility” between North Korea and the USA (Armstrong, 2004, p. 13). Equally important is the issue of Terrorism in the international system which has become the apparent and continual trait of the post-cold war period. In the year 1995, terrorist activities were reinforced in the international security environment (Jones & Smith, 2001). As a result, this had constituted a major security challenge as they involved the killing of Rabin Yatzhak (Prime Minister) of Israel, the bombardment of Riyadh (Co-joined Military Centre) in Saudi Arabia, several bombardments in France, the bombardment of the embassy of Egypt in Pakistan which indicated a new epoch of Global terrorism which can be extremely severe and lethal than any other security threat undertaking (Burke, 2016; CCN World News, 1995; Ephron, 2016; Reuters, 2017). Based on the Rand-St Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, at least 30,725 terrorist attacks are recorded in the midst of 1990 and 1996 which make up an estimated 4,000 thousand on an annual basis (Jones & Smith, 2001, p. 11). The foregoing records show well that there had been a recorded multiplication of terrorist attacks which make a huge security threat to the world and USA as a Superpower. Equally important is the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack which was recorded in the USA in order to furnish that this has become a security threat to the USA itself (Aras & Toktas, 2007, p. 1033). It was after this attack that the then-president George W Bush made announcement declaring a war on terror (Amadeo, 2019). Sen (2014, p. 29) argues extensively that globalization in combination with technological development had contributed immensely to the growth of terrorist organized crimes and terrorists in being able to perform terrorist activities very fast. They can also plan and execute terrorist attacks in various countries at a time, preserve collegiality in the times of challenges and also be able to seize both lethal and advanced weapons of mass destruction in the process. As a growing international security challenge, it also questions the capability or effectiveness of the USA as a superpower in the international system. As for Hoffman (1996, p. 79), all of these terrorist attacks symbolize and/ constitute a major terminal threat than traditional terrorist enemies to the US hegemony. One example of this is the Islamic State, which constitutes a crucial intimidating remark to the international system and USA. Arguably, it is its religious reasons, which underpin a great major concern to the global hegemony. The application and utility of religion had “attracted a network of global supporters, and disrupted international security with its campaigns of violence and terrorism” (Blanchard & Humud, 2017). Thus the remark: “ISIS is the outgrowth of broader global trends of Islamization that stress the tensions between religiosity and modernity, compounded by an increase in Islamic militancy” (Oosterveld & Bloem, 2017, p. 5). Another significant aspect of this discussion is interstate wars which make up a great deal of international security threat too, to the USA hegemony as they are often characterized by high volumes of refugees, Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and widespread infrastructural destruction and also the killing of innocent victims (Gesteyger, 1999, p. 69; Williamson & Simpson, 2011). The Rwandan genocide and Burundi's civil war (in the early 1990s) and the Sudanese Second civil war (1983–2005) and Darfur crisis (2003-ongoing) resulting in the killings of thousands to millions of people are the relevant examples in this instance (Daley, 2007, p. 333; Makki, 2004). The post-Cold War period with the USA as the global hegemony has seen an increase in regional violent confrontations of which to some extent included the fragmentations of states and also the intensive civil war strifes (Komlosy, 2016, p. 470). Both the South Sudanese Independence and the fragmentation of Yugoslavia are relevant case points. 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
Uniqueness › UQ---Heg Unsustainable › 2NC---Generic

Heg is unsustainable and leads to domestic decay

Beckley 18 [Michael Beckley, Michael Beckley is a leading expert on the balance of power between the United States and China. The author of two books and multiple award-winning articles, Michael is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Previously, Michael was an International Security Fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and worked for the U.S. Department of Defense, the RAND Corporation, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He continues to advise offices within the U.S. Intelligence Community and U.S. Department of Defense., Unrivaled : Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower., pg. 135-154, Cornell University Press, 2018. EBSCOhost]//AA

Crisis Instability Unfortunately, the unipolar era will not be totally free from conflict. Although unipolarity precludes hegemonic rivalry, it may increase the risk that crises between the United States and weaker nations will escalate to war.12 The reason is that U.S. military superiority could embolden the United States to stand firm in a crisis while simultaneously inciting weaker opponents to shoot first, in a desperate attempt to stun the United States before the U.S. military wipes out their offensive forces.13 Under unipolarity, this dynamic looms over U.S. relations with all nations. It is most dangerous, however, with regard to North Korea, China, and Russia, because these countries can inflict apocalyptic damage on American cities and have ongoing disputes with the United States over territory (e.g., Taiwan, Crimea, the Korean Peninsula), the U.S. military presence abroad, freedom of navigation, and human rights. In the years ahead, many events can, and almost surely will, spark crises between the United States and these countries. A primary goal of U.S. security policy, therefore, must be to reduce the risk that such crises escalate to major wars. How? NORTH KOREA The North Korean case is the gravest, but also the simplest, because the United States has no good options and only one nonhorrible option: deter- rence.14 North Korea will never give up its nuclear arsenal, which is its main insurance policy against a U.S. or South Korean attack, and the U.S. military cannot reliably destroy North Korea’s nuclear weapons or conven- tional artillery before it has a chance to use them.15 Deterrence may feel unsatisfying, because it places U.S. security at least partly in North Korea’s hands. Like old age, however, deterrence only seems intolerable until one considers the alternative.16 The U.S. Depart- ment of Defense estimates that a U.S.-North Korean war would kill 20,000 people per day in South Korea alone, even if no nuclear weapons were used. It also admits that the U.S. national missile defense system only has a 50 percent chance of intercepting a North Korean ballistic missile headed for the U.S. mainland.17 Given these dire statistics, the United States should learn to live with a North Korean nuclear capability—just as it learned to live with the Soviet and Chinese nuclear arsenals. Deterrence, however, does not mean doing nothing. The United States should continue to make clear that it will “totally destroy” North Korea if it attacks the United States or its allies or transfers nuclear materials to other states or groups.18 To back up these threats, the United States should inte- grate additional terminal and midcourse interceptors to its national missile defense system and develop boost-phase interceptors.19 It also should redouble efforts to improve civil defenses and counterforce capabilities.20 These measures will enhance America’s ability to emerge from a nuclear war relatively unscathed, and thereby hopefully deter North Korea from starting a war in the first place.21 At the same time, the United States should engage in diplomacy with North Korea and contingency planning with China. North Korea will never negotiate away its nuclear arsenal, but it might accept limits on that arsenal in exchange for U.S. security assurances. The United States therefore should offer to recognize North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, forswear mili- tary strikes, and lift economic sanctions so long as North Korea abides by “three no’s”: no additional nuclear weapons, no improved nuclear weap- ons or delivery vehicles, and no export of nuclear materials.22 To compel North Korea to accept this bargain, the United States needs to tighten sanctions on North Korea, which in turn requires making a side deal with China. Currently the Chinese government looks the other way when Chinese companies smuggle goods into North Korea. China could crack down on these violations, but will do so only if it feels assured that a North Korean collapse, which would be made more likely by tighter sanc- tions, would not result in U.S. forces swarming up the Korean Peninsula toward China’s border. Recent research suggests that China is willing to abandon North Korea, but not if it means American troops on the banks of the Yalu.23 The United States, therefore, should offer China a deal: in return for full Chinese sanctions on North Korea, the United States will let China dictate the terms of a joint contingency plan for a North Korean collapse. As part of this plan, the United States would promise to keep its troops south of the 38th parallel and offer to withdraw its forces entirely from the Korean Pen- insula once the dust has settled if China will accede to a U.S. alliance with a reunified Korea. The U.S. military will probably hate this proposal, because it cedes con- trol of North Korea’s territory and nuclear sites to China without a fight. Allowing China to secure North Korea, however, would keep U.S. troops out of a potential nuclear hellhole and reduce the likelihood of a U.S.-China clash.24 The geographic reality is that Chinese forces can occupy North Korea before U.S. reinforcements even mobilize for an attack—China has at least 150,000 troops perched on its border with North Korea, which is only sixty miles from North Korea’s main nuclear sites and two-thirds of its mis- sile sites.25 Given that Chinese troops will be first on the scene, the U.S. military should stay out of their way. Instead of going to war with China over North Korea’s carcass, the United States should help China secure the area by providing intelligence on North Korea’s nuclear sites and technical expertise to dismantle them. CHINA AND RUSSIA The situations with China and Russia are less dire than the North Korean case, but more complicated, because China and Russia have more ways to hurt the United States but also more to offer it. Even as the United States competes with these powers for influence, it cooperates with them in numerous areas. Adopting a policy of pure deterrence, therefore, would be shortsighted and dangerous. Unfortunately, there is widespread disagreement among strategists about what the United States should do to enhance crisis stability with these two regional powers, aside from some fairly obvious confidence building mea- sures, including codes of conduct for military forces and for civilian aircraft and ships, backchannels for diplomats to work out face-saving compro- mises, crisis hotlines linking the top leaderships, military-to-military exchanges, cyber and nuclear risk reduction centers, and joint peace and humanitarian operations.26 Some scholars argue that the United States should simply retrench from East Asia and Eastern Europe and grant China and Russia broad spheres of influence.27 The most extreme of these proposals would have the United States abrogate its alliances in Asia and Europe and pull its forces out of both regions. Retrenchment has its appeal.28 Indeed, it seems the logical, God-given strategy for a self-sufficient superpower protected by two vast oceans. Yet large-scale retrenchment not only would sap U.S. influence in Asia and Europe, but also reduce crisis stability by undermining deterrence.29 China or Russia might be emboldened by a U.S. withdrawal from their regions and ramp up coercive pressure on their demoralized neighbors. Successful security policy requires a balance of reassurance and deterrence.30 Retrench- ment is skewed too heavily toward the former. A better way to enhance crisis stability while preserving the territorial status quo in Asia and Europe would be to combine economic and political engagement with an “active denial” military strategy.31 The overarching goal of this strategy would be to create local “situations of strength” that raise the costs of military aggression for China and Russia, but without backing them into a corner.32 Such a strategy would have three main elements. First, the United States would bolster the antiaccess/area-denial (A2/ AD) capabilities of China and Russia’s neighbors by providing them with loans, arms, training, and intelligence. The objective would be to turn China and Russia’s neighbors into prickly “porcupines,” capable of denying terri- tory to China and Russia but not to take and hold territory themselves.33 In East Asia, this means helping China’s maritime neighbors acquire advanced anti-air and anti-ship missiles plus the platforms and targeting capabilities to launch them. In Eastern Europe, it means prepping the Baltic States to wage guerilla warfare.34 Second, the United States would create buffers between U.S. forces on the one hand and Chinese and Russian forces on the other. American forces would remain in Asia and Europe and roam wherever international law allows, but they would be stationed in dispersed and hardened bases scat- tered around the periphery of each region, where they could be called on in the event of war but otherwise kept beyond the reach of Chinese and Rus- sian forces. Decreasing the number of American soldiers based near China and Russia’s borders would reduce the likelihood of incidents, help reas- sure China and Russia that the United States does not intend to launch massive strikes on their homelands at the outset of a crisis, and increase the resilience of U.S. forces in the region by reducing their exposure to Chinese or Russian preemptive attacks. Third, the United States would backstop the local balances of power in Asia and Europe, but would plan to do so gradually. In minor conflicts, the United States would try to convince China or Russia to back down by using nonmilitary forms of coercion.35 As described in chapter 5, the United States is uniquely empowered to impose painful sanctions and embargoes on hostile countries (and to deny enemies the ability to respond in kind) because of its central role in global banking, plentiful energy resources, and unparalleled ability to disrupt international ship- ping.36 In the initial stages of a conflict, therefore, the United States could use financial sanctions, embargoes, or cyber operations to try to achieve “victory without violence,” as it did in compelling Iran to negotiate curbs on its nuclear program and in deterring Russia from annexing eastern Ukraine.37 If the conflict escalated to war, the United States could initially “lead from behind,” supporting local forces with logistics, intelligence, and if absolutely necessary, limited air and missile strikes on Chinese or Russian forces operating in the combat theater rather than those stationed on the Chinese or Russian mainlands. These strikes could be conducted from sub- marines, stealth-aircraft, or road-mobile missile batteries—all of which are far less vulnerable to Chinese and Russian A2/AD forces than surface ships, nonstealth aircraft, and ground forces. If the United States needed to ratchet up the pain, it could escalate horizontally before doing so vertically; that is, by opening up new geographic fronts rather than throwing U.S. forces into the cauldron of the main combat theater. This strategy obviously sacrifices military effectiveness for crisis stability. The U.S. military could gain a major advantage over China or Russia if it simply unloaded on their bases, missile batteries, satellites, and radar installations at the outset of a war. The U.S. military generally favors this type of knockout punch strategy and for good reason: pinprick strikes and gradual escalation invite a grinding war of attrition.38 Why give the enemy a chance to fight back? Offensive doctrines make sense against weak states that do not have nuclear weapons. Against China or Russia, however, a military posture primed for rapid escalation could be a recipe for disaster. An offensive pos- ture not only risks turning minor disputes into major wars, it also could turn conventional wars into nuclear wars. Some of the systems that support China and Russia’s conventional military forces—missile batteries, radars, satellites, submarines—also support their nuclear arsenals, so Chinese or Russian leaders might mistake U.S. strikes on these systems as a preemp- tive U.S. attack on their nuclear deterrents. Moreover, China and Russia have declared that they would use nuclear weapons to retaliate against a conventional attack on their homelands. Perhaps these declarations are bluffs. But is it really so hard to imagine that, in the heat of battle and when facing the potential annihilation of their militaries, one of these nations might fire off a nuclear weapon in the hope of shocking the United States into a cease-fire? Such a scenario might sound alarmist, but Russia’s mili- tary doctrine explicitly calls for using nuclear weapons to “deescalate” con- ventional wars, and Chinese leaders have suggested that the PLA is prepared to do likewise.39 In a multipolar or bipolar world, it might make sense for the United States to risk nuclear war to prevent a peer competitor from overrunning Asia or Europe. Better to nip the problem in the bud than repeat the mis- takes of Munich and empower aggressors. In today’s unipolar world, how- ever, no rival power is capable of going on a Hitler-style rampage across Eurasia, so the stakes for the United States in a war there would be moder- ate, and the main danger would be in doing too much rather than too little. Instead of rushing into wars with China or Russia, therefore, the United States should pick its battles, escalate gradually, and let local actors do most of the heavy lifting. Imperial Overstretch The theory of imperial overstretch holds that superpowers tend to expand beyond their means and collapse as a result.40 Such overexpansion is driven in part by hubris. As Christopher Layne explains: “A hegemon eas- ily is lured into overexpansion. When it comes to hard power, hegemons have it, and seldom can resist flaunting it. Thus, we should expect a unipolar hegemon to initiate many wars and to use its military power promiscuously.”41 In addition to hubris, superpowers also tend to suffer from a pervasive sense of insecurity. As Robert Jervis explains: The very extent of the hegemon’s influence means that all sorts of geo- graphic and ideological disturbances can threaten it. Frontiers can be expanded, but doing so just recreates them. Hegemony thus also ironi- cally magnifies the sense of threat. The very fact that the United States has interests throughout the world leads to the fear that undesired changes in one area could undermine its interests elsewhere. Disturbances that would be dismissed in a multipolar or bipolar world loom much larger for the hegemon because it is present in all corners of the globe and everything seems interconnected.42 In short, superpowers tend to become paranoid and militaristic, and these impulses, in turn, compel them to expand abroad—thereby creating more “turbulent frontiers” to defend, interests to pursue, and threats to address.43 This self-perpetuating pattern of expansion ultimately exhausts the super- power’s resources because “the costs of empire tend to rise geometrically as its size increases, whereas its resources increase only arithmetically.”44 Is the United States doomed to follow this historical pattern and fritter away its resources on reckless adventures abroad? In the wake of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is hard to argue with the assessment that “the United States is becoming the poster child for strategic overextension.”45 Yet, U.S. overextension is not inevitable. In fact, a clear-eyed recognition of the unipolar distribution of power could help the United States temper its imperial temptations. As the world’s only superpower, the United States is exceptionally secure and, therefore, can afford to play wait-and-see, allowing threats to emerge fully before responding. This situation stands in contrast to the Cold War, when anything that happened anywhere in the world seemingly had impli- cations for the U.S.-Soviet power balance. Allies had to be wooed and cod- dled to keep them from joining the other side. Communist advances, even in peripheral areas, had to be countered to maintain U.S. prestige and cred- ibility. Today, by contrast, there are no dominos that must be kept from fall- ing, and America’s survival does not hang in the balance of the crisis of the day. The U.S. military, therefore, can focus on first-order missions— deterring major powers and rogue states that brandish weapons of mass destruction—rather than playing globo-cop. The virtues of strategic restraint might seem obvious, but they often are lost in U.S. foreign policy debates.46 As Fareed Zakaria points out, the Amer- ican media and some policymaking elites in Washington remain wedded to a Cold War mindset that mistakes “activity for achievement.”47 In this view, every crisis abroad and every move by a foreign rival must be countered with a robust assertion of American power. To do otherwise, some pundits and policymakers argue, would abdicate American leadership, embolden enemies, and demoralize allies. Better for the United States to shoot first and develop a strategy later, they argue, then fail to intervene at all. This misguided mindset has kept the U.S. military at war for most of the past two decades—with little to show for it. Of the campaigns in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, only the first could be considered a clear vic- tory.48 The combined costs of these conflicts—seven thousand American dead, fifty thousand wounded, and $6 trillion—hardly seem justified. To regain strategic solvency, the United States should take three steps. First, American policymakers should resurrect the so-called Powell Doc- trine and make it the cornerstone of debate before every major military intervention.49 This doctrine, which was originally developed by Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger in the 1980s and then elaborated by chair- man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell in the 1990s, consisted of a series of questions that had to be answered “yes” before sending American soldiers to fight and die abroad: 1. Is a vital national security interest threatened? 2. Do we have a clear attainable objective? 3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed? 4. Have all other nonviolent policy means been fully exhausted? 5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement? 6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered? 7. Is the action supported by the American people? 8. Do we have genuine broad international support? The core assumption of the Powell Doctrine is that the United States rarely needs to rush into war to keep itself safe. It is a doctrine designed to conserve U.S. power, so that when vital interests are threatened, the U.S. military can respond vigorously with forces that have not been chewed up in wars of choice over trivial issues in peripheral areas. In practice, the Powell Doctrine implies that the U.S. military should focus on preparing for wars against China and Russia, which are the only major powers not currently aligned with the United States, and against North Korea, which is the only minor power that currently has nuclear weapons and clear hostile intent toward the United States. The U.S. mili- tary also can allocate some resources to killing terrorists abroad, but this should be done primarily with special operations forces and drones rather than large-scale military occupations. The doctrine further implies that the United States should avoid fighting wars where victory depends on controlling the politics of chaotic countries. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown, local leaders will rarely do what the United States wants if doing so conflicts with their interests, and no reasonable amount of American blood or treasure can change that fundamental fact.50 The United States can support local allies in troubled regions with tools short of military occupation, including diplomacy, aid, military training, intelligence, arms, special operations raids, and drone strikes. In general, however, the U.S. military should be allowed to focus on its core competency—destroying enemy militaries—rather than being asked to rebuild tattered nations. Second, Congress should reassert its authority to regulate the use of force.51 According to the U.S. Constitution, Congress is supposed to decide where and when the United States goes to war. The president can order short-term military interventions, but only when the nation’s security is in imminent danger. The United States followed this Constitutional principle for most of its history. Since the end of the Cold War, however, Congress has retreated from for- eign policy. It allowed the Clinton administration to send U.S. forces to Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo without congressional authorization; rubber- stamped the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq; and allowed the Obama administration to double U.S. forces in Afghanistan in 2009 without a vote and attack Libya in 2011 without a single hearing. In the future, Congress should subject proposals for large-scale military interventions to public debate and a formal vote. The foreign affairs com- mittees could lead the way by holding hearings before each intervention and soliciting testimony from a wide-range of experts. These hearings could be paired with trips to the region in question, where members of Congress could meet with political actors and journalists, researchers, and aid workers. These practices were standard operating procedure in the 1970s and 1980s and should become so again. Congress also should pass legislation limiting the president’s ability to launch a preventive or unprovoked nuclear strike.52 The president should still be able to order retaliatory or preemptive strikes, but preventive or unprovoked strikes should require sober deliberation among multiple offi- cials. President Trump’s casual comments about nuclear war with North Korea underscore the risks of giving him unchecked authority to order an attack. To reduce these risks, Congress should require the unanimous con- sent of a small group of officials—including the vice president, the secre- tary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the four leaders of the House and the Senate—for any preventive or unprovoked nuclear strike. Third, the United States should institute a war tax for any military opera- tions that require supplemental funding. For nearly 200 years, from 1812 to 2001, the United States paid for its wars in part by raising special taxes on individuals and corporations. These “pay as you fight” taxes ensured that all Americans sacrificed for the common cause. Since 9/11, however, the United States has paid for its wars by borrowing, adding trillions of dollars to the national debt. This practice of putting wars on the credit card is not just fiscally irresponsible, it is dangerous, because people are much more likely to support a stupid war if they do not have to pay higher taxes to finance it.53 The flip side is that a mandatory war tax would make American leaders more judicious about when and where to send U.S. forces into battle.54 The three steps highlighted above would almost certainly reduce U.S. military involvement in the Middle East. That would be wonderful. The United States has three important interests in the region—oil, counterter- rorism, and democracy—but none requires a large U.S. military commit- ment. Instead, the United States should adopt an offshore balancing strategy in the Middle East, limiting its peacetime presence to a skeletal base structure, and put boots on the ground only if a local power threatens to dominate or destroy the region.55 The U.S. military does not need to guard Middle Eastern oil reserves, because no state is powerful enough to seize them or seriously disrupt world oil markets: Iraq’s military has already been neutered by the United States; Iran’s military has been ground down by decades of conflict and sanctions; Iranian-backed Shiite militias lack the heavy forces and air defenses needed for large-scale conquest; and Saudi Arabia’s military is geared for internal security and air superiority, not ground invasions.56 Iran could try to blockade the Strait of Hormuz, where most of the oil flowing out of the Persian Gulf is shipped, but rigorous campaign analyses suggest that Iran could destroy only twenty oil tankers, a number far from suffi- cient to shock the oil market, and the U.S. military could break an Iranian blockade with air and missile strikes launched from over the horizon.57 A Saudi civil war could threaten the free flow of oil, given that most of the Kingdom’s disgruntled Shia minority lives in the Eastern Province near the country’s oil production facilities. A mass uprising, however, is unlikely, because Saudi Arabia’s internal security forces are robust, roughly 90 per- cent of Saudi workers are government employees that depend on the mon- archy for their livelihoods, and the Saudi government has huge cash reserves to keep the gravy train running during economic downturns.58 Even if Saudi Arabia succumbs to civil war, sending U.S. Marines into Mecca and Medina would not pacify the situation.59 The United States also does not need a large military presence in the Middle East to contain Islamist terrorism. All of the deadly Islamist terror- ist attacks committed on American soil since 9/11 have been carried out by U.S. citizens or legal residents, so bombing or occupying the Middle East for the umpteenth time is unlikely to reduce the risk of attacks further.60 Moreover, that risk is already extremely low: since 1991, Americans have been four times more likely to drown in bathtubs than be killed by a jihadi.61 The main battles in the war on terror should be fought by U.S. intelligence agencies and domestic law enforcement, not by the U.S. mili- tary. In this regard, the United States already does more than enough: it has more than a thousand government organizations and two thousand private companies engaged in counterterrorism, giving it two counterter- rorism organizations for every Islamist terrorist suspect it has ever arrested.62 Finally, the United States should not use military force to promote democracy in the Middle East. If two decades of nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan have taught us anything, it is that the U.S. military can- not install liberal democracy where powerful local actors do not want it.63 The United States succeeded in democratizing Germany and Japan after World War II only because their populations were war-weary and desper- ate for U.S. protection from the Soviet Union.64 In the Middle East today, by contrast, most people hate the United States and do not share a com- mon enemy with it. They therefore tend to view U.S. troops stomping around their homelands the same way the Vietnamese did in the 1960s. If the United States is serious about promoting democracy in the Middle East, it should reduce its support for corrupt authoritarian regimes there— that is, by becoming less involved in the region—not by occupying more countries militarily. Domestic Decay According to a tradition of political thought going back to Plato and Aristo- tle, hegemons can become victims of their own success and collapse from within.65 Having vanquished foreign rivals, various clans within the domi- nant nation may turn on each other, resulting in the weakening of national institutions and, in extreme cases, civil war. This pattern—peace abroad fueling conflict at home—has been docu- mented by numerous scholars, including Max Weber, Otto Hintze, Charles Tilly, and Michael Desch.66 These scholars have shown that during periods of great power competition nations tend to develop strong bureaucracies and efficient systems of taxation and espouse a strong sense of patriotism and national unity. During periods of low external threat, however, nation- states sometimes tear apart.67 For example, the relatively tranquil interna- tional environment in Europe from 1815 to 1853 (often called the Pax Britannica) witnessed an unprecedented breakdown in state cohesion and a series of revolutions in the late 1840s.68 Similarly, the benign external threat environment enjoyed by the United States in the 1850s exacerbated internal tensions that culminated in the Civil War.69 By contrast, during the World Wars and the first half of the Cold War, American national unity rose and government institutions expanded dramatically in scope and size.70 Recent trends in the United States fit this historical pattern: since the col- lapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, partisan divisions in the United States have surged to levels not seen since the Civil War, and gridlock has become America’s political norm, with recent Congresses ranking among the most polarized and least productive in the post–World War II era (figure 6.1).71 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Moderation Gridlock 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Start year of Congress Figure 6.1. Historically dysfunctional: polarization and gridlock in the U.S. Congress, 1947–2013. Note: “Moderation” measures the proportion of centrist legislators in the House and Senate (lawmakers whose floor votes place them closer ideologically to the center of the chamber than to their own party median), divided by the ideological gulf between party medians. “Gridlock” measures the ratio of failed measures to all salient issues on Washington’s agenda. For an issue to be “salient,” it needed to inspire at least four New York Times editorials in a given Congress. Source: Binder 2003, 2014, 2015. The 9/11 terrorist attacks briefly brought Americans together, but the cama- raderie quickly evaporated, a fact that suggests that the threat of terrorism is not serious enough to mobilize the nation the way a genuine hegemonic rivalry does. If anything, the terrorist threat has probably exacerbated divi- sions within American society by inciting witch hunts for terrorist suspects and igniting vicious debates on immigration, torture, war, and privacy. Without a unifying national mission, Americans have sorted themselves into clans based on social class and culture. Consequently, the two major political parties are divided not just by policy preferences, but also by iden- tity. Rural whites now overwhelmingly vote Republican while most minor- ities and urban whites vote Democrat.72 This crude tribalism leaves little room for compromise. If the partisan divide were merely about policy, the parties could split the difference. Now that American politics has become a clash of cultures, however, both parties view compromise with the other side as immoral and dangerous. For this reason, policymaking in the unipolar era has lurched between grid- lock and partisan overreach, and many of the problems highlighted in earlier chapters have festered, including spiraling entitlement costs; crumbling infra- structure; declining rates of upward mobility and entrepreneurship; racially and economically stratified systems of education and healthcare; a bloated and racially biased criminal justice system; a convoluted tax code that incentivizes tax evasion rather than domestic investment; and a crazy patchwork of federal, state, and local regulations that benefit big firms with armies of lawyers rather than small start-ups or public infrastructure projects. If present trends are not reversed, the United States may slip into a vicious cycle in which partisan gridlock undermines public trust in govern- ment, which incentivizes politicians to starve the government of resources and authority, which leads to even poorer government performance, which leads to more defunding of the bureaucracy. This downward spiral has already begun. Non-defense discretionary spending, a category that includes everything besides interest payments on the national debt and spending on entitlements and defense (e.g. spending on education, infrastructure, transportation, R&D, housing, energy, envi- ronmental protection, job training, food, agriculture, childcare, justice, and international affairs), has shrunk to just 11 percent of the federal budget, down from 25 percent in the 1960s and 1970s.73 As journalist Ezra Klein has pointed out, the U.S. government is becoming nothing more than an insur- ance company with an army.74 Such a weak state might be great for lobby- ists and large corporations, but not for the average American. The United States thus faces a challenge: how to tackle national problems without a foreign bogeyman to unite the country and galvanize collective action. To meet this challenge, the United States needs to empower a cen- trist American majority, and doing that requires structural change to U.S. political institutions. What changes?

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Defense › 1NC---Offshore Balancing Good

Offshore balancing is the best foreign policy option for the US – it preserves hegemony while using the least resources possible

Mearsheimer ’16 – Professor of Political Science [John; JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER is R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. STEPHEN M. WALT is Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School; 6-13-16; "The Case for Offshore Balancing”; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-06-13/case-offshore-balancing; Foreign Affairs; accessed 7-7-2022; AH]

There is a better way. By pursuing a strategy of “offshore balancing,” Washington would forgo ambitious efforts to remake other societies and concentrate on what really matters: pre­serving U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere and countering potential hegemons in Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. Instead of policing the world, the United States would encourage other countries to take the lead in checking rising powers, intervening itself only when necessary. This does not mean abandoning the United States’ position as the world’s sole superpower or retreating to “Fortress America.” Rather, by husbanding U.S. strength, offshore balancing would preserve U.S. primacy far into the future and safeguard liberty at home. SETTING THE RIGHT GOALS The United States is the luckiest great power in modern history. Other leading states have had to live with threatening adversaries in their own backyards—even the United Kingdom faced the prospect of an invasion from across the English Channel on several occasions—but for more than two centuries, the United States has not. Nor do distant powers pose much of a threat, because two giant oceans are in the way. As Jean-Jules Jusserand, the French ambassador to the United States from 1902 to 1924, once put it, “On the north, she has a weak neighbor; on the south, another weak neighbor; on the east, fish, and the west, fish.” Furthermore, the United States boasts an abundance of land and natural resources and a large and energetic population, which have enabled it to develop the world’s biggest economy and most capable military. It also has thousands of nuclear weapons, which makes an attack on the American homeland even less likely. These geopolitical blessings give the United States enormous latitude for error; indeed, only a country as secure as it would have the temerity to try to remake the world in its own image. But they also allow it to remain powerful and secure without pursuing a costly and expansive grand strategy. Offshore balancing would do just that. Its principal concern would be to keep the United States as powerful as possible—ideally, the dominant state on the planet. Above all, that means main­taining hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. Unlike isolationists, however, offshore balancers believe that there are regions outside the Western Hemisphere that are worth expending American blood and treasure to defend. Today, three other areas matter to the United States: Europe, Northeast Asia, and the Persian Gulf. The first two are key centers of industrial power and home to the world’s other great powers, and the third produces roughly 30 percent of the world’s oil. In Europe and Northeast Asia, the chief concern is the rise of a regional hegemon that would dominate its region, much as the United States dominates the Western Hemisphere. Such a state would have abundant economic clout, the ability to develop sophisticated weaponry, the potential to project power around the globe, and perhaps even the wherewithal to outspend the United States in an arms race. Such a state might even ally with countries in the Western Hemisphere and interfere close to U.S. soil. Thus, the United States’ principal aim in Europe and Northeast Asia should be to maintain the regional balance of power so that the most powerful state in each region—for now, Russia and China, respectively—remains too worried about its neighbors to roam into the Western Hemisphere. In the Gulf, meanwhile, the United States has an interest in blocking the rise of a hegemon that could interfere with the flow of oil from that region, thereby damaging the world economy and threatening U.S. prosperity. Offshore balancing is a realist grand strategy, and its aims are limited. Promoting peace, although desirable, is not among them. This is not to say that Washington should welcome conflict anywhere in the world, or that it cannot use diplomatic or economic means to discourage war. But it should not commit U.S. military forces for that purpose alone. Nor is it a goal of offshore balancing to halt genocides, such as the one that befell Rwanda in 1994. Adopting this strategy would not preclude such operations, however, provided the need is clear, the mission is feasible, and U.S. leaders are confident that intervention will not make matters worse. HOW WOULD IT WORK? Under offshore balancing, the United States would calibrate its military posture according to the distribution of power in the three key regions. If there is no potential hegemon in sight in Europe, Northeast Asia, or the Gulf, then there is no reason to deploy ground or air forces there and little need for a large military establishment at home. And because it takes many years for any country to acquire the capacity to dominate its region, Washington would see it coming and have time to respond. In that event, the United States should turn to regional forces as the first line of defense, letting them uphold the balance of power in their own neighborhood. Although Washington could provide assistance to allies and pledge to support them if they were in danger of being conquered, it should refrain from deploying large numbers of U.S. forces abroad. It may occasionally make sense to keep certain assets overseas, such as small military contingents, intelligence-gathering facilities, or prepositioned equipment, but in general, Washington should pass the buck to regional powers, as they have a far greater interest in preventing any state from dominating them. If those powers cannot contain a potential hegemon on their own, however, the United States must help get the job done, deploying enough firepower to the region to shift the balance in its favor. Sometimes, that may mean sending in forces before war breaks out. During the Cold War, for example, the United States kept large numbers of ground and air forces in Europe out of the belief that Western European countries could not contain the Soviet Union on their own. At other times, the United States might wait to intervene after a war starts, if one side seems likely to emerge as a regional hegemon. Such was the case during both world wars: the United States came in only after Germany seemed likely to dominate Europe. In essence, the aim is to remain offshore as long as possible, while recognizing that it is sometimes necessary to come onshore. If that happens, however, the United States should make its allies do as much of the heavy lifting as possible and remove its own forces as soon as it can. Offshore balancing has many virtues. By limiting the areas the U.S. military was committed to defending and forcing other states to pull their own weight, it would reduce the resources Washington must devote to defense, allow for greater investment and consumption at home, and put fewer American lives in harm’s way. Today, allies routinely free-ride on American protection, a problem that has only grown since the Cold War ended. Within NATO, for example, the United States accounts for 46 percent of the alliance’s aggregate GDP yet contributes about 75 percent of its military spending. As the political scientist Barry Posen has quipped, “This is welfare for the rich.” Offshore balancing would also reduce the risk of terrorism. Liberal hegemony commits the United States to spreading democracy in unfamiliar places, which sometimes requires military occupation and always involves interfering with local political arrangements. Such efforts invariably foster nationalist resentment, and because the opponents are too weak to confront the United States directly, they sometimes turn to terrorism. (It is worth remembering that Osama bin Laden was motivated in good part by the presence of U.S. troops in his homeland of Saudi Arabia.) In addition to inspiring terrorists, liberal hegemony facilitates their operations: using regime change to spread American values undermines local institutions and creates ungoverned spaces where violent extremists can flourish. Offshore balancing would alleviate this problem by eschewing social engineering and minimizing the United States’ military foot­print. U.S. troops would be stationed on foreign soil only when a country was in a vital region and threatened by a would-be hegemon. In that case, the potential victim would view the United States as a savior rather than an occupier. And once the threat had been dealt with, U.S. military forces could go back over the horizon and not stay behind to meddle in local politics. By respecting the sovereignty of other states, offshore balancing would be less likely to foster anti-American terrorism. A REASSURING HISTORY Offshore balancing may seem like a radical strategy today, but it provided the guiding logic of U.S. foreign policy for many decades and served the country well. During the nineteenth century, the United States was preoccupied with expanding across North America, building a powerful state, and establishing hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. After it completed these tasks at the end of the century, it soon became interested in preserving the balance of power in Europe and Northeast Asia. Nonetheless, it let the great powers in those regions check one another, intervening militarily only when the balance of power broke down, as during both world wars. During the Cold War, the United States had no choice but to go onshore in Europe and Northeast Asia, as its allies in those regions could not contain the Soviet Union by themselves. So Washington forged alliances and stationed military forces in both regions, and it fought the Korean War to contain Soviet influence in Northeast Asia. In the Persian Gulf, however, the United States stayed offshore, letting the United Kingdom take the lead in preventing any state from dominating that oil-rich region. After the British announced their withdrawal from the Gulf in 1968, the United States turned to the shah of Iran and the Saudi monarchy to do the job. When the shah fell in 1979, the Carter administration began building the Rapid Deployment Force, an offshore military capability designed to prevent Iran or the Soviet Union from dominating the region. The Reagan administration aided Iraq during that country’s 1980–88 war with Iran for similar reasons. The U.S. military stayed offshore until 1990, when Saddam Hussein’s seizure of Kuwait threatened to enhance Iraq’s power and place Saudi Arabia and other Gulf oil producers at risk. To restore the regional balance of power, the George H. W. Bush admin­istration sent an expeditionary force to liberate Kuwait and smash Saddam’s military machine. For nearly a century, in short, offshore balancing prevented the emergence of dangerous regional hegemons and pre­served a global balance of power that enhanced American security. Tellingly, when U.S. policymakers deviated from that strategy—as they did in Vietnam, where the United States had no vital interests—the result was a costly failure. Events since the end of the Cold War teach the same lesson. In Europe, once the Soviet Union collapsed, the region no longer had a dominant power. The United States should have steadily reduced its military presence, cultivated amicable relations with Russia, and turned European security over to the Europeans. Instead, it expanded NATO and ignored Russian interests, helping spark the conflict over Ukraine and driving Moscow closer to China. In the Middle East, likewise, the United States should have moved back offshore after the Gulf War and let Iran and Iraq balance each other. Instead, the Clinton administration adopted the policy of “dual containment,” which required keeping ground and air forces in Saudi Arabia to check Iran and Iraq simultaneously. The George W. Bush administration then adopted an even more ambitious strategy, dubbed “regional transformation,” which produced costly failures in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Obama administration repeated the error when it helped topple Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya and when it exacerbated the chaos in Syria by insisting that Bashar al-Assad “must go” and backing some of his opponents. Abandoning offshore balancing after the Cold War has been a recipe for failure.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Defense › 1NC---AT: Heg Solves War/Sustainable

US hegemony is unsustainable – tensions lead to war in the long-term

Ward 14 [August 22, 2014, Ward, Alex, Alex is a reporter covering the White House, with a focus on foreign policy and national security, as well as a co-host of Vox's "Worldly" podcast. Before joining Vox, Alex was an associate director in the Atlantic Council's Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security where he worked on military issues and US foreign policy. He also wrote the #NatSec2016 newsletter for War on the Rocks where he covered the 2016 presidential election and the candidates' views on national security., “Only US Can Prevent Great Power War”, The Diplomat, ]//AA

As the World War I centennial is celebrated, repressed thoughts of great power war once again begin to surface. With today’s highly “interconnected global economy” underwritten by a liberal order leading to the “rise of the rest,” it appears unlikely that any state would want to disrupt the current system. And yet, the constant stream of somber news reignites fears of a calamitous global catastrophe. In times of international flux, where the worst seems possible, it is important to turn to those who can best interpret these eras. In the case of great power or “hegemonic” wars, there is hardly a greater authority than Robert Gilpin. In his seminal work on the subject, War and Change in World Politics, Gilpin argues that three preconditions must be met for a hegemonic war to occur. First, Gilpin believes that the soon-to-be warring parties must feel there is a “‘closing in’ of space and opportunities.” Second, there must be a general “perception that a fundamental historical change is taking place.” Finally, events around the world start to “escape human control.” Notably, all three of these conditions currently exist in the world. Closing In Europe, where great power conflict took place for centuries, was heavily congested and contested. As powers like Britain, France, Germany and others rose, they fought for influence and geography at the expense of the others’ territory. Due to the close quarters, any desire for expansion on one country’s part would cause concern in the others. Today, some say, the world is different. The two powers that would compete in a war — the United States and China — are separated by a vast ocean, supposedly making it hard for each to antagonize the other. This, however, is not true. The map may show an expansive world, but new technologies — leading to hyperconnectivity and shorter travel times, especially for military equipment — have made the world “claustrophobic.” To wit, when China announced an “Air Defense Identification Zone” the United States quickly deployed two B-52 bombers to challenge its claim. And that was using old equipment. Both China and the United States are developing hypersonic missiles and vehicles. Humanity has already conquered physical space with commercial flight and fast ships. Now, it continues to shrink space even further for potentially decisive advantage. It is also hard to claim that China and the United States are far apart when they regularly bump up against each other as they have in the South China Sea. Perception Since the dawn of “Pax Americana” after World War II, belief in the United States as the undisputed global hegemon remained fairly stable. Until now. According to a recent Pew poll, Americans’ views of the United States as a global power have reached a 40-year low. Indeed, only 17 percent believe that America plays a “more important and powerful role than ten years ago.” Rightly or wrongly, this perception exists. Even though most people still find the United States preferable to China, regional powers can use the widespread belief that America is declining to make their cases for running the system. In fact they are already doing so to a degree. For example, China’s Global Times reports that 47 percent of people believe China has achieved “major power” status. Should both perceptions keep trending in the same direction — the United States is declining while China rises — then the feeling of an historic shift is almost inevitable. Human Control As current events prove, even the great powers cannot stop horrendous things from happening in the world. From Latin America and Africa to Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, chaos and turmoil run rampant. While this is a particularly bad period for international affairs, it is naïve to think this may be an isolated epoch. In fact, there is reason to think the world might grow more unstable in the years ahead. Over the next 11 years, the world can expect another one billion people, reaching a total of around 8 billion by 2030. As technology becomes more powerful, it will do two things. First, it will empower the individual, or a group of individuals, to do great good or great harm. Second, it will allow individuals to be more aware of how the middle class lives. People around the world will demand similar things, causing stress on governments and brewing civil unrest and instability. Thus, as people are further empowered and further angered, the probability that these non-state actors — indeed, normal, everyday people — disrupt international affairs or geopolitics is high. Governments will continue to have less and less control of the citizenry, allowing the regular citizen to do with her newfound power what she wills. In essence, we will see, in a big way, the diffusion of power.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Offense › 1NC---Russia War

Only US-Russia nuclear war causes extinction

Bostrom ’2 [Nick; Oxford philosophy professor; “Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards,” nickbostrom website]

A much greater existential risk emerged with the build-up of nuclear arsenals in the US and the USSR. An all-out nuclear war was a possibility with both a substantial probability and with consequences that might have been persistent enough to qualify as global and terminal. There was a real worry among those best acquainted with the information available at the time that a nuclear Armageddon would occur and that it might annihilate our species or permanently destroy human civilization.[4] Russia and the US retain large nuclear arsenals that could be used in a future confrontation, either accidentally or deliberately. There is also a risk that other states may one day build up large nuclear arsenals. Note however that a smaller nuclear exchange, between India and Pakistan for instance, is not an existential risk, since it would not destroy or thwart humankind’s potential permanently. Such a war might however be a local terminal risk for the cities most likely to be targeted. Unfortunately, we shall see that nuclear Armageddon and comet or asteroid strikes are mere preludes to the existential risks that we will encounter in the 21st century.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Offense › 1NC---Russia War

US is willing to go great extents to maintain heg and weaken Russia, including war---Ukraine proves

Dogan 2/22/22 [Dogan, Haluk, Haluk Dogan is a PhD candidate in Strategy and Security within the Department of Politics at the University of Exeter, where he also completed his MA in International Relations. His research focuses on international relations theory, foreign policy analysis, and West-Russia relations., “The US provoked the Russian invasion to maintain its global primacy”, TRT World,

In a moot effort to cling to its hegemony and keep NATO relevant, Washington has, in turn, allowed the invasion to happen. Following a long period of escalation, Russian President Vladimir Putin has ordered troops into Eastern Ukraine’s two breakaway regions, prompting immediate Western condemnation and an emergency UN Security Council meeting. While Moscow stands accused by the West of increasing acts of aggression on the Ukrainian border, the invasion was not a one-sided event. For months, the Anglo-American bloc has been unwilling to de-escalate the crisis. Washington and London have aimed to resuscitate the case for the NATO alliance, to invalidate arguments for a separate European Union-wide security arrangement, and to weaken Russia in seeking to prevent the emergence of rival blocs in Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific regions. However, to put it bluntly, this strategy will not reverse the decline of American hegemony. Is the ‘transatlantic alliance’ back? A couple of days before the invasion, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy expressed his disappointment at the failure of his Western “friends” to support Ukraine vis-a-vis Russian aggression. This perception is consistent with Ukrainian officials’ previous accusation that US President Joe Biden gave Moscow a “green light” to invade. Kiev’s disappointment is completely understandable. Giving Moscow the green light is as much about transatlantic relations as it is about West-Russia or Ukraine-Russia relations. The US’ post-World War II hegemony is predicated on its domination in continental Europe, with NATO acting as the principal mechanism for achieving American primacy. The Anglo-American strategy now focuses on preventing European states from acting independently. The Russian threat is thought to serve that aim, pushing Europe to be in need of American and British power. The Anglo-American bloc has never been happy with France’s attempts to establish an alternative European security mechanism, or with Germany’s relations with Russia – especially in terms of cooperation on the Nord Stream gas pipeline. The growing economic ties between the European Union and China are also causes of concern for the Anglo-American alliance. In this context, it is not surprising Biden pointed out at the 2021 Virtual Munich Security Conference: “America is back. The transatlantic alliance is back…The partnership between Europe and the United States, in my view, is and must remain the cornerstone of all that we hope to accomplish in the 21st Century, just as we did in the 20th Century.” Eliminating Russia in the ‘Great Game’? Neither NATO nor Western states will go to war with Russia over the invasion of Ukraine. The invasion justifies their efforts to undermine Russia economically and politically. However, the strategy of weakening Russia is not only about its military activities in Eastern Europe. The Kremlin has long embraced an approach that emphasises Russia’s great power status in a multipolar world, in direct opposition to the US’ vision of a unipolar world in which it reigns supreme. Therefore, the Anglo-American goal is not only to weaken Russia via economic sanctions, or harm Moscow’s economic interests in Europe, but also to divert its attention and energy away from the Indo and Asia-Pacific in particular, with the aim of hindering Russia’s partnerships with India and China. India has decades-long ties with Russia, and New Delhi recently started receiving Russian S-400 defence systems. But India is also a member of Quad – an alliance involving the US, Japan, and Australia, which aims to counter China’s growing assertiveness. Both the US and Britain have long been pushing India to cooperate with them in dealing with China. At the last Quad meeting, the US requested that India stand by its side in the face of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Another important topic for discussion was the growing economic and diplomatic relationships between Russia and China. The Anglo-American bloc hopes that the Ukraine invasion will severely wound Russia, preventing it from being an important rival actor in their confrontation with China. The question of American decline Anglo-American domination will push Europe into submission to some extent, and Russia will be wounded. But will this reverse the unravelling of American hegemony in the long term? As Russian President Vladimir Putin made clear in his televised speech just before the invasion, sanctions imposed by the West will not dissuade Russia from attempting to preserve its standing on the world stage. NATO has already lost prestige and power, and the invasion of Ukraine will only worsen this situation. Increasing the Anglo-American bloc’s weight in Europe due to the conflict in Eastern Europe will also have a negative impact on their ability to contain China in Asia. As it follows Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will not cause France to abandon its call for strategic autonomy for the EU entirely, nor will it change the interdependence of Europe and Russia on gas. The Anglo-American coalition’s gas diversification efforts in favour of Europe will affect the strategic dynamics in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Yet it is not likely to obstruct the Nord Stream 2 project, despite Washington wanting to see this. Due to the steady erosion of the US’ hegemonic position in the world economy, it appears that China will continue to be the EU’s biggest trading partner. India has already signalled that it will remain neutral on the Ukraine crisis, which implies that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have little impact on the close ties between Moscow and New Delhi. More crucially, this situation appears to have given Moscow and Beijing further reasons to act together and get closer, despite their conflicting interests in Asia. They share a common desire to challenge the Western-dominated international system. Should Russia be wounded by Western sanctions, it will rely on China in economic terms to some extent, while their collective security actions will hasten the demise of US hegemony. In the case of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, there is no absolute winner. Indeed, nothing will change in terms of the ongoing and gradual unravelling of global American hegemony.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Offense › 1NC---Oil Wars

Oil wars cause disease, disability, environmental destruction, violence, and humanitarian disasters--extinction.

Klare, PhD, 11

(Michael, Five Colleges professor of Peace and World Security Studies, The Public Health Implications of Resource Wars )

Competition for resources between or within nations is likely to become an increasingly common cause of armed conflict. Competition for petroleum is especially likely to trigger armed conflict because petroleum is a highly valuable resource whose supply is destined to contract. Wars fought over petroleum and other resources can create public health concerns by causing morbidity and mortality, damaging societal infrastructure, diverting resources, uprooting people, and violating human rights. Public health workers and the organizations with which they are affiliated can help prevent resource wars and minimize their consequences by (1) promoting renewable energy and conservation, (2) documenting the impact of past and potential future resource wars, (3) protecting the human rights of affected noncombatant civilian populations during armed conflict, and (4) developing and advocating for policies that promote peaceful dispute resolution. War has enormous tragic impacts on people's lives and the environment. War accounts for more death and disability than many major diseases do. It destroys families, communities, and sometimes entire nations and cultures. It siphons human and financial resources away from health and other human services. It damages the infrastructure that supports the health of society, such as systems that provide safe food and water, electrical power, transportation, and communication. War violates human rights. It uproots people, forcing them to migrate to other countries or to become internally displaced persons within their own countries. It contributes to the spread of infectious disease. The mindset of war—which endorses the notion that violence is the best way to resolve conflicts or disputes—contributes to domestic violence, street crime, and many other kinds of violence throughout the world. War, and the preparation for war, contaminates and damages the environment and uses vast amounts of nonrenewable fuels and other resources. In sum, war damages not only the health of people but also the very fabric of society.1 Wars today tend to be fought within nations (civil wars) instead of between nations. They are fought mainly with small arms and light weapons, and they usually involve attacks on civilians. In the past 20 years, since the end of the Cold War and withdrawal of US and Soviet military assistance to many less developed countries, military forces and armed groups in some countries have had to become more self-reliant, for example by engaging in illicit enterprises and exploiting local natural resources. As the International Committee of the Red Cross has demonstrated, insurgent groups frequently acquire weapons by trading resources (such as minerals) that are under their control, often illegally.2 Such resources have come to be called “conflict minerals” or “conflict resources.” Also in the past 20 years, control over armed forces has become decentralized, with military power deriving from control of resources, arms, or drugs, or from the intensity of fear created in the local population. The US government has recognized a clear link between illegal resource extraction and contemporary conflicts on the one hand and humanitarian disasters with resultant public health consequences on the other. The preamble to Section 1502 of the Wall Street Reform Act of 2010 states: It is the sense of Congress that the exploitation and trade of conflict minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is helping to finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, particularly sexual- and gender-based violence, and contributing to an emergency humanitarian situation therein.3 In an effort to combat this trade, the act requires US corporations to take appropriate measures to identify the source of minerals used in their products and to eliminate those deemed to be conflict minerals. The sale of diamonds to finance other military activities of this type has contributed to additional humanitarian disasters, prompting additional efforts to curb illicit trafficking. Resource wars are violent conflicts that are largely driven by competition for control over vital or valuable natural materials, such as oil, water, land, timber, animals (or animal products), gold, silver, gems, and other key minerals. Resource wars can occur between states as (1) wars of conquest, in which a state or empire employs force to acquire resource-rich territories or colonies; (2) territorial disputes, in which 2 or more states fight over a border region or offshore territory with valuable resource deposits; or (3) access wars, in which a state fights to gain access to a critical resource deposit in another country. Resource wars can also occur within states, when groups fight for control over key sources of raw materials or over the allocation of the fees and royalties (or “rents”) obtained by governments from private entities that extract resources from areas owned or controlled by the state. A desire to gain control over a valuable resource supply or the wealth it generates is a dominant factor leading to war; however, conflicts over resources are usually driven by other factors as well, such as ethnic animosities and historical grievances.4,5 In the current article, we examine what makes resource wars distinctive and an important issue for public health, and we outline ways in which public health workers and the organizations and professional associations with which they are affiliated can minimize the consequences of these wars and contribute to their prevention. Much of this article is focused on wars fought over petroleum; in a recent commentary we examined armed conflicts over water and what public health workers can do to address them.6 Go to: WHY RESOURCE WARS ARE RELEVANT TO PUBLIC HEALTH We believe that resource wars are relevant to public health because of their profound consequences for public health and because public health workers have potential roles and responsibilities to minimize these consequences and to help prevent resource wars. Public health has been defined as what we, as a society, do collectively “to assure the conditions in which people can be healthy.”7 Resource wars threaten the conditions in which people can be healthy. Although public health is a societal function, it is a function performed mainly by public health workers in government agencies, academic institutions, nongovernmental organizations, and private-sector entities who work to assure the conditions in which people can be healthy. Although most public health workers do not address resource wars, some have the opportunity—and the responsibility—to help document the health consequences of resource wars, to raise awareness of these consequences, and to advocate for policies and programs for minimizing these consequences and for helping to prevent resource wars. Public health has a responsibility to address the fundamental causes of disease and to prevent adverse health outcomes.8 War is a major cause of disease, disability, and death; thus, war is a major public health problem.1,9 The Public Health Oath, which some public health students recite at orientation and graduation, includes the declaration: I will work to ensure that people have the chance to live full and productive lives, free from avoidable disease and disability.10 Resource wars threaten people's ability to live full and productive lives; they also provide opportunities for public health workers to help prevent avoidable disease, disability, and death.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Offense › 1NC---Oil Wars

US heg is linked to oil power over the globe. China would fill in US vacuum with renewable dev.

Anand Toprani 21, associate professor of strategy and policy specializing in diplomatic and military history, energy geopolitics and political economy, author, Ph.D. in History from Georgetown, M.Phil. in Modern European History from Oxford, B.A. in History from Cornell, The Journal of Military History and Political Science Quarterly, 7/1/2021, "Hydrocarbons and Hegemony," National Defense University, ,  kav  

By contrast, oil was the quintessential energy source for the “Neotechnic” age of steel, internal combustion, chemicals, and electricity—the Second Industrial Revolution. Without access to patents jealously guarded by German chemical companies through their alliances with oil companies, coal producers had no ability to produce synthetic fuels or enter the petrochemical industry.31 The latter, in particular, was a major consumer for petroleum besides transportation and power generation. The petrochemical industry that emerged after World War II became the world’s primary source of synthetic rubber and helped spearhead the “green revolution” through the diffusion of fertilizers developed from petrochemicals (not to mention the oil-fueled mechanization of agriculture). 

The close relationship between the oil industry and the health of the global economy and petroleum’s indispensable role in modern warfare means it is no surprise that the superpowers that emerged from World War II possessed large domestic supplies of oil. But U.S. hegemony depended on more than mere self-sufficiency, which mostly evaporated after 1948.32 A large U.S. domestic industry created the wherewithal to expand overseas both for markets and for new supplies. This process incentivized American diplomats to solidify U.S. predominance in Latin America and influence over budding oil producers in areas once of marginal interest to the United States (such as the Persian Gulf). Oil also shifted the naval balance in favor of the United States even before World War I, particularly in the Pacific, where Great Britain and Japan were relatively starved of oil while the U.S. Navy enjoyed prolific oilfields in California.33 

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Offense › 1NC---NATO Cohesion

NATO cohesion checks Russia and China war through deterrence

Marcus Kolga 21, Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute Center for Advancing Canada’s Interests Abroad, “Improving NATO’s cohesion is critical to combat Russia and China’s threat,” [GRU = Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie]

A united NATO is critically important to projecting credible deterrence. The erosion of domestic trust and confidence in the Alliance among its member states, including Canada, represents a threat to this cohesion. A proposal to withdraw Canada from NATO was tabled at a recent policy conference for one of Canada’s three major political parties. The proposal was defeated, but it represents a fringe anti-NATO narrative within Canada’s illiberal left; if left unaddressed, such a narrative could grow.

If countries like Russia perceive NATO as an atomized collection of states with varied priorities rather than a unified front, the Alliance is exposed to a significant risk of miscalculation in which a foreign adversary might believe they can cross a red line and only face a limited response. Thus, gaps in cohesion within the alliance directly threaten to undermine political and military deterrence. The Alliance and members states must work towards improving communications strategies to foster greater basic general understanding of NATO’s purpose, its missions and its role in protecting its members against external threats.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Offense › 1NC---NATO Cohesion

U.S. hegemony undermines NATO cohesion

Ozkaleli and Gunes 21 [13 Dec 2021, Ozkaleli, Ferit Murat, I am a faculty member at the School of Public and International Affairs, ADA University, Baku, Azerbaijan, where I teach international relations theory, comparative politics and foreign policy analysis. I received my Ph.D. from University of Colorado at Boulder and MA from University of Denver. I also completed the Summer Institutive of Political Psychology at Ohio State University. I was as an associate professor, political science department chair, and the director of the Middle East Research Center at Zirve University, Turkey., Gunes, Ali, ADA University, School of Public and International Affairs, Baku, Azerbaijan; Teaching Fellow CERGE-EI Foundation, Prague, Czech Republic, “Allied but Deviating NATO in the Multipolar World”, Brill, ]//AA

Utilizing ideal points, we proposed cohesion, deviation, and adhesion measures to empirically explore security alliance cohesion, Member State deviations, and third state adhesions. Our findings suggest that security alliances such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact had higher cohesion than other UN members, that external threat increased security alliance cohesion, and that the United States turned out to be the most significant deviating member in NATO Since 1980, while third countries such as Australia, South Korea, and Japan were more aligned with the NATO alliance whereas Israel was more aligned with the United States. By using our measures, one can study any alignment pattern among any state groups in the UN, even without a priori identifications of state groupings. Measures developed and tested in this study can provide researchers with strong diagnostic tools. The study contributes to the overall UNGA voting literature by providing statistical inferences about the validity of the data. We believe that the approach and new measures presented here could be useful to investigate cohesion levels in other intergovernmental organizations such as the EU and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, as well as economic communities like BRICS, while pinpointing each state’s political distance vis-à-vis each other or to a defined group of states. Furthermore, using this approach and these new measures could help researchers to concentrate on specific questions (e.g., whether the foundation of BRICS really brought Member States together on the issues of high politics, or whether Brexit could have been predicted). In other words, while the approach offered here was utilized more for descriptive purposes, it presents a superior alternative to measure variance across time, increasing our predictive power for actual or potential dramatic policy shifts at Member State and at (any) group level by using the UNGA voting data. As the Trump administration threatened to abandon NATO, and as Russia revives and China rises, “How long can NATO last in a post-US hegemonic, multipolar world?” became one of the most important questions in contemporary world politics. Contrary to Trump’s withdrawal rhetoric, we found that the height of the US ally deviation from NATO was during 2001–2008, coinciding with the presidential term of George W. Bush. In fact, our findings suggest that Trump’s NATO deviation scores came behind those of two Democrat presidents, Obama and Clinton, when they were put into an ordinal scale for heuristic purposes. Throughout this article, we deliberately tried to avoid any discussion that might not be empirically verified, keeping the scope of the article rather descriptive. Still, we believe studying the past of the security alliances would give us considerable explanatory and even predictive power. We observed that threat perception, both for external and internal (i.e., intra-alliance) threats, played a significant role in political alignments for security alliances. The 9/11 attacks and activation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty led to a turning point for the NATO allies, as free riding was replaced by joining costly global wars that were arguably triggered by US hegemony in the world. In the past, the United States provided deterrence against the Soviet Union as a public good for NATO members. Over the past two decades, however, an increasing number of NATO members have come to believe that they are being dragged into “American wars.” In this case, the problem would not be one of US abdication or abandonment but balancing the hegemon.59 NATO has survived US ally deviation for four decades. The height of US deviation was actually in the past, not in the present. While alliance cohesion was an important topic, especially after the end of the Cold War, discussions about NATO have happened largely at a theoretical level, revolving around realist, liberal and constructivist propositions about whether NATO would collapse or survive.60 The present research, in contrast, was conducted at an empirical level. By applying this approach to NATO, we were able to measure the flexibility of the arrangement and obtain evidence to show what was really happening with the United States and NATO, despite what might have been expected from the rhetoric of Trump. While our findings support some earlier proposals, such as the external threat hypothesis, they also contradict some others, including the literature on the decline of US hegemony and its policy implications. We therefore hope that the new approach developed here to measure foreign policy preferences by using a spatial model and UNGA voting data might reignite interest for more empirically driven future research on NATO and other alliances, as well as cohesion of states in other organizations, while also strengthening the overall validity and therefore confidence in using UNGA voting data with spatial models.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Offense › 1NC---NATO Cohesion

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reinvigorates NATO cohesion, but it’s not guaranteed.

McRaven 4/20/22 [William H. McRaven, a Senior Adviser at Lazard, is a retired Navy Admiral and was Commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command from 2011 to 2014. Peter Orszag is the Chief Executive Officer of Financial Advisory at Lazard. He was Director of the Office of Management and Budget from 2009 to 2010 and Director of the Congressional Budget Office from 2007 to 2008. Theodore Bunzel, the head of Lazard Geopolitical Advisory, has worked in the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and at the U.S. Treasury Department.; “Made in the Alliance”; Foreign Affairs; April 20, 2022; https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2022-04-20/made-alliance]//eleanor

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has reinvigorated the Western alliance and bolstered transatlantic solidarity. After being declared “brain dead” by French President Emmanuel Macron in 2019, NATO has sprung to life, deploying forces to its eastern flank and coordinating the provision of sophisticated weapons that have helped Ukraine impede Russia’s invasion. For the first time in its history, the European Union has financed the purchase and delivery of lethal aid. Western countries have vastly exceeded expectations in implementing coordinated financial sanctions that have crippled Russia’s economy. Even neutral Switzerland joined the fray. But no matter how remarkable this solidarity may be in the short term, there is no guarantee that it will last: if policymakers are complacent, powerful trends predating the Ukraine crisis could overwhelm and ultimately derail it. Protectionist sentiment and self-defeating trade wars have pulled at the seams of Western economic integration. Former U.S. President Donald Trump’s threats to pull out of NATO and the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 have chipped away at military trust between the United States and Europe. A Marine Le Pen victory later this month in France would pose additional challenges to the alliance, and looming concerns about the 2024 presidential election raise doubts about the United States’ commitment. If not managed intelligently, the reawakening of Europe as a diplomatic and military actor and the reexamination of global economic interdependence catalyzed by Russia’s invasion could result not in a strengthened transatlantic alliance but in a more worrying outcome: the emergence of three distinct blocs, one centered around the United States, a second around Europe, and a third around China (which would include Russia). Such a world—with the United States and Europe often collaborating, but also at odds when their interests diverge—would make the management of China and Russia more difficult, as the two would have opportunities to trigger and exploit U.S.-European tensions. It would also represent a major missed opportunity for the United States and Europe.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Offense › 1NC---Multilateralism

Warming causes extinction

David Spratt 19, Research Director for Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration, Ian Dunlop, member of the Club of Rome, formerly an international oil, gas and coal industry executive, chairman of the Australian Coal Association, May 2019, “Existential climate-related security risk: A scenario approach,” https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/148cb0_b2c0c79dc4344b279bcf2365336ff23b.pdf

An existential risk to civilisation is one posing permanent large negative consequences to humanity which may never be undone, either annihilating intelligent life or permanently and drastically curtailing its potential.

With the commitments by nations to the 2015 Paris Agreement, the current path of warming is 3°C or more by 2100. But this figure does not include “long-term” carbon-cycle feedbacks, which are materially relevant now and in the near future due to the unprecedented rate at which human activity is perturbing the climate system. Taking these into account, the Paris path would lead to around 5°C of warming by 2100.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Offense › 1NC---Multilateralism

A reimagined multilateralism is key to prevent existential climate change

Gallagher and Kozul-Wright 19 [5-8-2019, Gallagher, Kevin P., Dr. Kevin P. Gallagher is a professor of global development policy at Boston University (BU), where he directs the Global Development Policy Center (GDP Center. The GDP Center’s mission is to advance policy-relevant research for financial stability, human wellbeing, and the environment on a global scale., Kozul-Wright, Richard, Mr Richard Kozul-Wright is Director of the Globalisation and Development Strategies Division in United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)., “A New Multilateralism for Shared Prosperity”, Boston University Global Development Policy Center, ]//AA

A NEW MULTILATERALISM FOR A GLOBAL GREEN NEW DEAL The rules and practices of the multilateral trade, investment and monetary regime are in need of urgent reform. These rules are currently skewed in favor of global financial and corporate interests, and powerful countries, leaving national governments, local communities, households, and future generations to bear the costs of economic insecurity, rising inequality, financial instability, and climate change. The rules of the global trade and investment regime have been instrumental in delivering this unbalanced outcome. These limitations are now widely recognized and a number of efforts are underway, particularly in the developing world, to establish policies for reform.32 The most effective efforts will be those that recognize the systemic nature of the challenge, rather than piecemeal policy tinkering. A renewed multilateralism is required to provide the global public goods needed to deliver shared prosperity and a healthy planet, to cooperate and coordinate on policy initiatives that demand collective action, to mitigate common risks, and to ensure that no nation’s pursuit of these broader goals infringes on the ability of other nations to pursue them. The “Geneva Principles for a Global Green New Deal” advances an urgent research and policy agenda for a New Multilateralism to calibrate the global economy toward a 21st century vision of stability, shared prosperity, and environmental sustainability. The original New Deal, launched in the United States in the 1930s and replicated in distinct ways elsewhere in the industrialized world, particularly after the end of the Second World War, established a new social contract and accompanying development path that focused on four broad components: recovery from Depression, extensive public investment, regulation of finance, and redistribution of income. While these broad features were consistent with specific policy goals tailored to particular economic and political circumstances, they made job creation, the expansion of productive investment and faster productivity growth common features of successful post-war economies. In building a global new deal today, we can learn from those core principles. As before, states require the space to tailor proactive fiscal and public policies to boost investment and raise living standards, supported by regulatory and redistributive strategies that tackle the triple challenges of large inequalities, demographic pressures and environmental problems. However, the original New Deal was neither directed at development of the Global South, nor at global climate change. The specific challenges of inequality and insecurity in the 21st century will require innovative and global approaches. The “Geneva Principles for a Global Green New Deal” articulates a set of cohesive principles for the design of a reformed multilateral trade and investment regime. Five broad strategic goals should frame any such deal: 1. A productive global economy built around full and decent employment at livable wages, for all countries 2. A just society that targets closing socio-economic gaps, within and across generations, nations, households, race and gender 3. A caring community that protects vulnerable populations and promotes economic rights 4. A participatory politics that defeats policy capture by narrow interest groups and extends the democratic principle to economic decision making 5. A sustainable future based on the mobilization of resources and policies to decarbonize growth and recover environmental health in all its dimensions These goals will be manifest differently in different nations across varying stages of economic development. Specific policy programs and measures will necessarily reflect local circumstances, but there will be a series of initiatives that will likely surface across countries regardless of their level of development. Governments everywhere need to end austerity and boost demand in support of sustainable and inclusive economies using an active mix of fiscal and monetary policies as part of a general expansion of government spending that covers physical and social infrastructure but also employing, whenever appropriate, public employment schemes. Significant public investment in clean transport and energy systems is imperative to establish low carbon growth paths and to transform food production for a growing global population as well as addressing problems of pollution and environmental degradation more generally. This will need to be supported by a green industrial policy, using a mixture of general and targeted subsidies, tax incentives, equity investments, loans and guarantees, as well as accelerated investments in research, development and technology adaptation, and a new generation of intellectual property and licensing rules. Specific measures and support will be required in developing countries to help them leapfrog the old, dirty development path of the Global North. Raising wages in line with productivity will be key to moving to a fairer society; this is best achieved by giving workers a secure and protected right to organize into unions. At the same time, job insecurity also needs to be corrected through appropriate legislative action (including on informal and precarious work contracts) and active labor market measures. And again, more progressive tax policies, including on income, wealth, corporations, property and other forms of rent income, could help address income inequalities. Regulating private financial flows will be essential to steering private finance toward these broader social goals. Curtailing restrictive business and predatory financial practices will be key to reigning in corporate rentierism and crowding in private investment to productive activities included in the green economy But countries cannot be expected to undertake any such policy programs in isolation. At the global level, a new multilateralism is urgently needed to pursue these in a way that maximizes the effectiveness of national development strategies without creating negative global spillovers to partner nations. A new multilateralism will require the following design principles: 1. Global rules should be calibrated toward the overarching goals of social and economic stability, shared prosperity, and environmental sustainability and be protected against capture by the most powerful players 2. States share common but differentiated responsibilities in a multilateral system built to advance global public goods and protect the global commons 3. The right of states to policy space to pursue national development strategies should be enshrined in global rules 4. Global regulations should be designed both to strengthen a dynamic international division of labor and to prevent destructive unilateral economic actions that prevent other nations from realizing common goals 5. Global public institutions must be accountable to their full membership, open to a diversity of viewpoints, cognizant of new voices, and have balanced dispute resolution systems STEPS FORWARD Only through extensive reforms can the financial and trading systems support a more stable global economy, help deliver prosperity for all, and backstop the public investment drive needed to move, at the required speed, to carbonfree and inclusive growth paths. As things stand, current arrangements fall far short of providing countries with the resources and predictability needed to support a global green new deal. A properly resourced, and more democratically governed, IMF and World Bank will need to get back to their original business of stabilizing exchange rates, controlling unruly capital flows and funding infrastructure projects in a low carbon and inclusive manner. These institutions will need to coordinate with — and not attempt to coopt — an emerging set of development finance institutions that are ramping up their lending activities to provide additional public financing to the system. The WTO needs to return to its roots as a venue for the negotiation of rules regarding trade per se, and not as a universal engine of laissez-faire. Bilateral trade agreements, in which powerful nations strong-arm weaker ones, should be shunned in favor of true multilateralism. All of these institutions will need to calibrate their efforts toward these broader goals, and adhere to these “Geneva Principles for a Global Green New Deal” in order to succeed. The financing requirements will be in the trillions of dollars with private investments crowded in to the mix through a properly funded public investment push. Financing for such a push will need to come from a mixture of tax and debt instruments; returning to the progressive tax structures common before the 1980s, along with new structures to prevent the abusive fiscal strategies employed by transnational corporations. Doing so will require concerted international efforts and dedicated institutional support mechanisms. But the growth, over the last four decades, of financial markets from 12 trillion to 300 trillion dollars serves as an indicator of the transformative role that a properly managed credit regime could play in financing a global new deal. If only a fraction of this increase had been directed to meeting environmental and social challenges the threat of a climate breakdown would be far less daunting today. Other more tailored mechanisms such as for addressing forest-related degradation and water scarcity will also have to be added to an institutional landscape tailored to delivering sustainable outcomes. Significant attention will need to be paid to the debt sustainability of nations, corporations, and households as the global community scales to meet these broader goals. More debt relief for heavily indebted nations, including orderly processes analogous to corporate bankruptcies, are required. However, given that private capital flows will remain a feature of the interdependent economic order, even a well-managed economy may succumb to a sustained and major attack on its currency, and a liquidity problem can then be rapidly transformed into an international debt crisis. Pursuing a global green new deal must accept that international finance is under-regulated and that avoiding the threat of a downward spiral into debt deflation requires new responses such as capital controls and sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms — both of which are increasingly difficult under international trade and investment treaties. The crisis of the multilateral trading system is also an opportunity to redirect it toward the goal of sustainable development.33 Reforms to trade and investment rules are perhaps the highest priority given the laws and regulations in the trade and investment regime now stretch across the global financial, trading, investment system — as well as deep into national policy making. Trade and investment rule reform must ensure the maximum space to undertake financial regulations and debt workouts, innovation and industrial policy, and policies for social welfare that are in line with the demands of a global green new deal, including the effective use of subsidies to support structural transformation and the development of alternative energies and to reengineer the production process of carbon-intensive industries. Rolling back the numerous free trade agreements and bi-lateral investments treaties, which have been particularly destructive of policy space, is a priority. New efforts for reform at the WTO are an opportunity to put these Geneva principles into forward looking action.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Offense › 1NC---Laundry List

Heg causes a laundry list of impacts including endless war, climate change, financial crisis, and damage to democracy

Wertheim 20 (Stephen Wertheim, Research Scholar at the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, April 2020—exact day not published, “The Price of Primacy”, Foreign Affairs, accessed 7/1/2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2020-02-10/price-primacy)//sfs

Both champions and critics of U.S. grand strategy after the Cold War have christened the project “liberal hegemony.” But American objectives and methods were always more hegemonic than liberal. Despite diverging over whether and how to promote liberalism, U.S. policymakers have for nearly three decades converged around the premise that Pentagon planners set forth in 1992: the United States should maintain a military superiority so overwhelming that it would dissuade allies and rivals alike from challenging Washington’s authority. That superiority quickly became an end unto itself. By seeking dominance instead of merely defense, the strategy of primacy plunged the United States into a downward spiral: American actions generated antagonists and enemies, who in turn made primacy more dangerous to pursue.

For most of the 1990s, the costs of this strategy remained somewhat hidden. With Russia flattened and China poor, the United States could simultaneously reduce its defense spending and expand NATO, launch military interventions in the former Yugoslavia and for the first time station tens of thousands of troops in the Middle East. Yet by the end of the decade, U.S. dominance had begun to generate blowback. Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda terrorist group declared war on the United States in 1996, citing the U.S. military’s presence in Saudi Arabia as their top grievance; two years later, al Qaeda bombed the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 people. U.S. policymakers, for their part, were already exaggerating the threat posed by weak “rogue states” and gearing up for ambitious military interventions to promote democracy and human rights. These pathologies shaped Washington’s overly militarized reaction to the 9/11 attacks, as the United States entered into successive conflicts in which its capabilities and interests did not exceed those of local actors. The result was endless war.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Offense › 1NC--- Iran War

Iran war goes nuclear

Avery 13 – Lektor Emeritus & Associate Professor, U of Copenhagen

John Scales Avery, Lektor Emeritus, Associate Professor, at the Department of Chemistry, University of Copenhagen, since 1990 he has been the Contact Person in Denmark for Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, An Attack On Iran Could Escalate Into Global Nuclear War, 11/6/13, http://www.countercurrents.org/avery061113.htm

Despite the willingness of Iran's new President, Hassan Rouhani to make all reasonable concessions to US demands, Israeli pressure groups in Washington continue to demand an attack on Iran. But such an attack might escalate into a global nuclear war, with catastrophic consequences. As we approach the 100th anniversary World War I, we should remember that this colossal disaster escalated uncontrollably from what was intended to be a minor conflict. There is a danger that an attack on Iran would escalate into a large-scale war in the Middle East, entirely destabilizing a region that is already deep in problems. The unstable government of Pakistan might be overthrown, and the revolutionary Pakistani government might enter the war on the side of Iran, thus introducing nuclear weapons into the conflict. Russia and China, firm allies of Iran, might also be drawn into a general war in the Middle East. Since much of the world's oil comes from the region, such a war would certainly cause the price of oil to reach unheard-of heights, with catastrophic effects on the global economy. In the dangerous situation that could potentially result from an attack on Iran, there is a risk that nuclear weapons would be used, either intentionally, or by accident or miscalculation. Recent research has shown that besides making large areas of the world uninhabitable through long-lasting radioactive contamination, a nuclear war would damage global agriculture to such an extent that a global famine of previously unknown proportions would result. Thus, nuclear war is the ultimate ecological catastrophe. It could destroy human civilization and much of the biosphere. To risk such a war would be an unforgivable offense against the lives and future of all the peoples of the world, US citizens included.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Offense › 1NC--- Iran War

American hegemony entrap it into an Iran-Israel conflict

Kurtzer et. al 21 - Kurtzer is former U.S. Ambassador to Egypt and former U.S. Ambassador to Israel and S. Daniel Abraham Professor of Middle East Policy Studies at Princeton University’s School of Public and International Affairs, Miller received his PhD in Middle East and U.S. diplomatic history from the University of Michigan and a former State Department Middle East analyst, and Simon is Professor in the Practice of International Relations at Colby College and has previously served on the U.S. National Security Council and in the Department of State, 4/26/21 (Daniel, Aaron, and Steven, “Israel and Iran Are Pulling the United States Toward Conflict”, Foreign Affairs, , accessed 7/5/22)//jd

Israel and Iran aren’t yet on the verge of a major escalation or war, and continued progress on the Iran nuclear talks in Vienna would likely forestall one, if Israel judges that trying to undermine a deal would exact too great a cost in its relations with Washington. But the factors that might well produce a significant blowup are now aligning in frightening fashion. An April 11 explosion at the Natanz nuclear facility—presumed to be the work of Israel—was a dramatic salvo in the shadow war over Iran’s nuclear program. In response to the attack, Iran ramped up its enrichment capacity. An errant Syrian missile landed near Dimona in Israel on April 22, and Israel struck back at the launch site in Syria. Such chains of events risk escalating, even unintentionally, to open conflict. The Biden administration, understandably preoccupied with the politics of domestic recovery, has expressed its intention to reenter the 2015 Iran nuclear deal but appears to be in no particular hurry to do so. Yet without intensified U.S. diplomacy designed to restrain both Israel and Iran, the administration could easily find itself drawn into a conflict it neither wants nor needs and that undermines its real priorities at home. A FRUSTRATED IRAN Briefing Congress on April 14, Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines identified Iran as one of the four top threats facing the United States. She noted, “We expect that Iran will take risks that could escalate tensions and threaten U.S. and allied interests in the coming year.” That assessment rises in part from Iran’s growing frustrations at home and abroad. Sanctions have devastated the Iranian economy; COVID-19 cases are spiking; and Iran’s maximalist positions—demanding the removal of all U.S. sanctions, including those consistent with the nuclear deal, while refusing to engage directly with Washington—have put sanctions relief out of reach for the moment. Sooner or later, Israel will likely use military force to try to prevent Iran from weaponizing its enriched uranium. To date, Tehran has been quite risk averse in responding to U.S. and Israeli strikes, including the assassination of a top Iranian scientist and the sabotage of Iranian nuclear sites. But that posture could change. Frustrated by the lack of sanctions relief and confounded by the ease with which Israel has penetrated its internal security, Iran may become more willing to take risks—much as it was in 1996, when it attacked a U.S. military installation in Saudi Arabia, and in the fall of 2019, when it struck Saudi oil facilities. Iran’s decision to begin enriching uranium at 60 percent is a clear demonstration that the country has the capacity to get to 90 percent, which is weapons grade, relatively quickly. The fact of this capability by no means suggests that Tehran can build a bomb instantaneously or even has made the decision to do so. But if negotiations fail, Iran will continue to move forward with advanced centrifuges to create enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon. The Israeli government has issued stark warnings that a return to the nuclear deal without changes would be intolerable. If the United States and Iran return to compliance under these circumstances, the potential for escalation might increase. Sooner or later, Israel will likely use military force to try to prevent Iran from weaponizing its enriched uranium—and the United States will be dragged into the conflict. PREOCCUPATION AND CONSTRAINT During his presidential campaign, Joe Biden promised a quick return to the 2015 Iran nuclear accord. He probably shouldn’t have. He is confronting the most daunting task of national recovery of any president since Franklin Roosevelt, and domestic priorities and politics make reentry into the Iran nuclear deal particularly difficult. Complicating the task are the policies of Biden’s predecessor, former U.S. President Donald Trump. The Trump administration imposed sanctions against Iran on human rights and counterterrorism grounds. Because these sanctions are not covered by the nuclear deal, a return to the agreement won’t make them disappear. Iran, however, has demanded that all these sanctions be lifted before it will comply with its nuclear obligations. Little constituency exists in Washington for returning to the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran on precisely the same terms as before. Republicans and even some crucial Democrats oppose it. All these factors, combined with the need to reserve political capital for the administration’s domestic agenda, have rendered Biden cautious and averse to taking risks with Iran’s nuclear development. A DESPERATE CALCULUS Israel’s escalating actions against Iran reflect Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s security concerns and his increasing distrust of the United States. Netanyahu does not believe that the United States fully accounts for the threats that Iran’s nuclear program, missile capabilities, and support for terrorism pose to Israel. In his view, the draconian sanctions that the Trump administration imposed on Iran upon its withdrawal from the deal should be given more time to shape Iran’s economy and political decisions. If, instead, the United States reenters the nuclear agreement without altering it to address Iran’s ballistic missile program or its activities in the region, Israel will find itself in an untenable position. Escalation with Iran may prove attractive to Netanyahu as he faces domestic problems, including corruption charges and a political stalemate. Netanyahu has reasons to be confident in his country’s ability to take these matters into its own hands. Unlike several years ago, when the Israeli military had a restraining influence, Netanyahu now enjoys the support of a hawkish army chief of staff, Lieutenant General Aviv Kochavi. Israel’s military capabilities vis-à-vis Iran are much more advanced than even a few years ago. Israel has secured flight routes over Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states and ordered enhanced fuel tankers from the United States. Together, these advances dramatically improve the Israeli air force’s ability to fly repeated sorties against targets within Iran. In addition, Israel now has access to bases in the United Arab Emirates from which to conduct surveillance or raids against Iran, just across the Persian Gulf. Moreover, escalation with Iran may prove attractive to Netanyahu as he faces domestic problems, including corruption charges and a political stalemate. The Israeli prime minister is too responsible to lead his country to war solely in order to escape his legal troubles. But he does stand to benefit, as the Israeli public would not want to encumber a wartime prime minister with a trial, which would likely be postponed, and as political opponents would be forced to rally around him in a national unity coalition. AMERICA INTO THE BREACH There are no easy options available to the United States to divert a determined Netanyahu from the path of escalation that he is on. Netanyahu believes he knows how to handle Washington. He has considerable support within the Republican Party and among many Democrats; he also has calculated that the Biden administration will not want to jeopardize its domestic legislative agenda by engaging in a public dispute with Israel. Indeed, the only U.S. policy that might deter Netanyahu from the path leading to war would be firm refusal and strong diplomacy. Washington would have to make Netanyahu understand that further escalation with Iran would damage U.S.-Israeli relations and that the administration will not back down in the face of domestic political pressure. At the same time, the administration would need to press the other signatories to the nuclear deal to tell Iran in no uncertain terms that its actions are provocative, that some of its positions in the Vienna talks are unreasonable, and that the clock is running out for returning to full compliance. A firm stance with Israel and tough diplomacy on the nuclear deal just might allow the United States to avert the slide toward dangerous escalation between Israel and Iran. PARTNERSHIP AT A CROSSROADS Israel and Iran have temporarily settled into a low level, carefully calibrated conflict. Under these conditions, the Iranian nuclear program takes two steps forward and the Israelis push it at least one step back. With no brakes on its policy, Israel is likely to continue assassinations, cyberattacks, and bombings in order to hobble the Iranian program, frustrate U.S. efforts to reenter the nuclear deal, and dissuade Iranian authorities from returning to compliance. Israel will also continue to ramp up its military capability. The scenario is an ugly one whose long-term stability may not hold, either because Israel’s real objective is to provoke an Iranian response that would provide cover for an attack on Iran’s facilities or simply because neither country’s strategy is as clever or finely tuned as it imagines. In September 2019, Iran launched a drone attack on the Saudi oil company Aramco, which took half of Saudi Arabia’s oil production offline in a matter of minutes and caught both Riyadh and Washington by surprise. Israel cannot know which of its incremental attacks will incur an Iranian response that could lead to spiraling escalation—and no one knows what level of nuclear enrichment or accumulation of fissile material will trigger an all-out Israeli assault on Iran. One way or another, escalation will suck the United States into a war it did not seek, at a time and place it did not choose. The Biden administration must make a decision. It can bet that a fragile stability will last until its legislative agenda is complete, in which case it does not need to intervene. Or it can step in now, on the assumption that the near-term consequences of a political confrontation with Israel and muscular diplomacy with Iran will be more manageable than the consequences of a war within the next two years. This week, some of Israel’s most senior security officials—its national security adviser and director of military intelligence, along with the head of the Mossad—will visit Washington for intensive talks on Iran against the backdrop of Israeli concerns that Washington is not showing sufficient regard for Israel’s views. According to Israeli press reports, however, Israeli officials have been instructed not to talk about the details of current negotiations in Vienna over the nuclear deal. The Israeli government, pursuing its own strategy, is working at cross-purposes with a U.S. administration that sees its objectives as crucial to domestic cohesion and Middle Eastern stability. Netanyahu’s current campaign perpetuates the Israeli prime minister’s battles with Democratic presidents and undermines the cooperation that supposedly characterizes the two countries’ long-standing alliance. Perhaps U.S. and Israeli interests are simply incompatible. Israel’s prime minister surely has a duty to preserve his country’s security; but so does an American president. In the ebb and flow of international relations, the pivotal moments are not always obvious—but the crisis precipitated by the Israeli government’s open challenge to the United States surely looks like one of them

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Offense › 1NC--- Indo-Pak War

Indo-Pak nuke production increasing- extinction in multiple ways

Strain, writer quoting Jerry Peterson, a professor emeritus in the Department of Physics, 19

(Daniel , University of Colorado at Boulder,https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2019/10/191002144251.htm//KRS)

A nuclear war between India and Pakistan could, over the span of less than a week, kill 50-125 million people -- more than the death toll during all six years of World War II, according to new research. A new study conducted by researchers from the University of Colorado Boulder and Rutgers University examines how such a hypothetical future conflict would have consequences that could ripple across the globe. Today, India and Pakistan each have about 150 nuclear warheads at their disposal, and that number is expected to climb to more than 200 by 2025. The picture is grim. That level of warfare wouldn't just kill millions of people locally, said CU Boulder's Brian Toon, who led the research published today in the journal Science Advances. It might also plunge the entire planet into a severe cold spell, possibly with temperatures not seen since the last Ice Age. His team's findings come as tensions are again simmering between India and Pakistan. In August, India made a change to its constitution that stripped rights from people living in the long-contested region of Kashmir. Soon after, the nation sent troops to Kashmir, moves that Pakistan criticized sharply. "An India-Pakistan war could double the normal death rate in the world," said Toon, a professor in the Laboratory of Atmospheric and Space Physics. "This is a war that would have no precedent in human experience." It's a subject that Toon, also of the Department of Atmospheric and Ocean Sciences, has had on his mind for decades. He came of age during the height of the Cold War when schoolchildren still practiced ducking-and-covering under their desks. As a young atmospheric scientist in the early 1980s, he was part of a group of researchers who first coined the term "nuclear winter" -- a period of extreme cold that would likely follow a large-scale nuclear barrage between the U.S. and Russia. Toon believes that such weapons are still very much a threat -- one that's underscored by current hostilities between India and Pakistan. "They're rapidly building up their arsenals," Toon said. "They have huge populations, so lots of people are threatened by these arsenals, and then there's the unresolved conflict over Kashmir." In his latest study, Toon and his colleagues wanted to find out just how bad such a conflict could get. To do that, the team drew on a wide range of evidence, from computer simulations of Earth's atmosphere to accounts of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan in 1945. Based on their analysis, the devastation would come in several stages. In the first week of the conflict, the group reports that India and Pakistan combined could successfully detonate about 250 nuclear warheads over each other's cities. There's no way to know how powerful these weapons would be -- neither nation has conducted nuclear tests in decades -- but the researchers estimated that each one could kill as many as 700,000 people. Most of those people wouldn't die from the blasts themselves, however, but from the out-of-control fires that would follow. "If you look at Hiroshima after the bomb fell, you can see a huge field of rubble about a mile wide," Toon said. "It wasn't the result of the bomb. It was the result of the fire." For the rest of the globe, the fires would just be the beginning. The researchers calculated that an India-Pakistan war could inject as much as 80 billion pounds of thick, black smoke into Earth's atmosphere. That smoke would block sunlight from reaching the ground, driving temperatures around the world down by an average of between 3.5-9 degrees Fahrenheit for several years. Worldwide food shortages would likely come soon after.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Offense › 1NC--- Indo-Pak War

Root case of Indo-Pak War is US hegemony

Sujit Lahiry Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Panjab University Regional Centre in Sri 2019

{Muktsar Sahib, Punjab, India, April 2019, “Conflict, Peace and Security: An International Relations Perspective with Special Reference to India,” KRS}

In the post-Cold War period, the US role in imparting or implanting democracy has got a big boost. Following the disintegration of the USSR, the USA had successfully mobilized the Eastern European countries into adopting a liberal–democratic regime. However, what followed in these countries has been a phenomenal upsurge of violence, upheaval, political instability, economic backwardness as well as conflicts based on ethnicity, race, tribe and culture. In other words, the US role in post-conflict transformation has been pretty dismal. Further, in the immediate aftermath of withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, the USA had successfully imposed a puppet democratic regime under the leadership of Hamid Karzai. Moreover, while the Soviet forces left Afghanistan, Al Qaeda and Taliban stayed back and pose a scathing challenge to the West, and especially the USA. The 9/11 in the USA and 7/7 bombings in London have compelled the USA to pursue its ‘War on Terror’ with greater enthusiasm. Afghanistan and Sri Lanka are at the stages of conflict transformation, whereas we can argue that the most intractable conflict, the Indo-Pak dispute, operates on the plane of conflict prevention and conflict resolution. The democratic churnings of the Arab Spring are primarily aimed at promoting democracy by the mighty hyper-power the USA. Moreover, the USA has now become the world’s sole policeman. The USA has not performed its reconstruction programme in any of these countries with any zeal. Thus, the USA has failed in the post-conflict transformation project in every nook and corner of the world, be it Somalia, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and, more recently, in Darfur (Sudan). The crisis in Ukraine represents a ‘New Cold War’ between the USA and Russia that is being played out in the contemporary world. Varun Sahni, in a 2004 article, has aptly pointed out the nature of US hegemony: We can see in this part of the world US forces performing the entire range of tasks that ‘imperial powers’ have performed through recorded history: to conquer (Iraq), to deter (the Pacific Fleet, American forces in Japan and South Korea, and American strategic bombers on Guam), to punish (Afghanistan) and to police (Iraq). The policing function, which would require the conversion of a significant part of US military capability into an imperial constabulary, is the only one that the American forces are not performing well. It is therefore, perfectly logical that Washington is keen to subcontract this vital military task to other states. (Sahni, 2004, p. 248)

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Offense › 1NC---Econ Decline

Economic decline causes a plethora of security threats and risks nuclear war

Mann 14 [May, 2014, Mann, Eric N., Eric Mann is a special agent with a United States federal agency, with significant domestic and international counterintelligence and counter-terrorism experience. Worked as a special assistant for a U.S. Senator and served as a presidential appointee for the U.S. Congress. He is currently responsible for an internal security and vulnerability assessment program. He received his Bachelors at University of South Carolina and Graduate degree in Homeland Security at Georgetown, “Austerity, Economic Decline, and Financial Weapons of War: A New Paradigm for Global Security”, ]//AA

The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic considerations within states can figure prominently into the calculus for future conflicts. The findings also suggest that security issues with economic or financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict, and change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts toward one another. The research shows that security concerns emanating from economic uncertainty and the inherent vulnerabilities within global financial markets will present new challenges for national security, and provide developing states new asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states. The security areas, identified in the proceeding chapters, are likely to mature into global security threats in the immediate future. As the case study on South Korea suggest, the overlapping security issues associated with economic decline and reduced military spending by the United States will affect allied confidence in America’s security guarantees. The study shows that this outcome could cause regional instability or realignments of strategic partnerships in the Asia-pacific region with ramifications for U.S. national security. Rival states and non-state groups may also become emboldened to challenge America’s status in the unipolar international system. The potential risks associated with stolen or loose WMD, resulting from poor security, can also pose a threat to U.S. national security. The case study on Pakistan, Syria and North Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons vulnerable to theft, and how financial factors can influence WMD proliferation by contributing to the motivating factors behind a trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The inherent vulnerabilities within the global financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations and other non-state groups, who object to the current international system or distribution of power, with opportunities to disrupt global finance and perhaps weaken America’s status. A more ominous threat originates from states intent on increasing diversification of foreign currency holdings, establishing alternatives to the dollar for international trade, or engaging financial warfare against the United States. The importance of this paradigm shift in U.S. national security, which places new emphasis on the causal relationships between economics and global security threats, will require innovative strategies.