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2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Offense › 1NC---Econ Decline

Heg is unsustainable and causes long-term economic decline

Layne 12 [Layne, Christopher, Christopher Layne is University Distinguished Professor of International Affairs and the Robert M. Gates Chair in National Security at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. His fields of interest are international relations theory, great power politics, U.S. foreign policy, and grand strategy., “This Time It’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana”, Texas A & M University, ]//AA

Revisiting the 1980s’ Debate on American Decline: The ‘‘Declinists’’ Were Right Of course, this is not the first time that the United States has been gripped by fear of decline.5 In the 1980s, Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers triggered an intense but brief debate about whether America’s power was in relative decline (Kennedy 1987). In arguing that the United States was experiencing the relative decline of its economic power, Kennedy was not alone. Other prominent scholars making this case included Chace (1981), Calleo (1982), Gilpin (1987), and Huntington (1988b). The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers reso- nated because it dovetailed with popular fears that the United States, enervated by the costs of the Cold War, was being surpassed economically by Japan and West Germany. While Kennedy’s thesis struck a chord with the public, the US foreign policy elite lashed out at the notion that the United States was declining. Two leading establishment scholars, Harvard profes- sors Samuel P. Huntington and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., went so far as to label Kennedy and the others as ‘‘dec- linists’’—a subtle twist of the English language imply- ing that they were advocates of US decline rather than dispassionate analysts of what they regarded as worrisome trends in the United States’ great-power trajectory (Nye 1991; Huntington 1988a).6 Contrary to the way their argument was portrayed by many of their critics, the 1980s declinists did not claim either that the United States already had declined steeply, or that it soon would undergo a rapid, catastrophic decline. Rather, they pointed to domestic and economic drivers that were in play and which, over time, would cause American economic power to decline relatively and produce a shift in global distribution of power. The declinists con- tended that the United States was afflicted by a slow—’’termite’’—decline caused by fundamental structural weaknesses in the American economy.7 Kennedy himself was explicitly looking ahead to the effects this termite decline would have on United States’ world role in the early twenty-first century. As he wrote, ‘‘The task facing American statesman over the next decades. .. is to recognize that broad trends are under way, and that there is a need to ‘manage’ affairs so that the relative erosion of the United States’ position takes place slowly and smoothly, and is not accelerated by policies which bring merely short-term advantage but longer-term disadvantage’’ (Kennedy 1987:534; my emphasis). When one goes back and re-reads what the 1980s declinists pinpointed as the drivers of American decline, their analyses look farsighted because the same drivers of economic decline are at the center of debate today: too much consumption and not enough savings; persistent trade and current account deficits; chronic federal budget deficits and a mount- ing national debt; and de-industrialization. Over time, 1980s declinists said, the United States’ goals of geopolitical dominance and economic prosperity would collide. Today, their warnings seem eerily pre- scient. Robert Gilpin’s 1987 description of America’s economic and grand strategic plight could just as easily describe the United States after the Great Recession: With a decreased rate of economic growth and a low rate of national savings, the United States was living and defending commitments far beyond its means. In order to bring its commitments and power back into balance once again, the United States would one day have to cut back further on its overseas commitments, reduce the American standard of liv- ing, or decrease domestic productive investment even more than it already had. In the meantime, American hegemony was threatened by a potentially devastating fiscal crisis. (Gilpin 1987:347–348) In the Great Recession’s wake—doubly so since it is far from clear that either the United States or glo- bal economies are out of the woods—the United States now is facing the dilemmas that Gilpin and the other declinists warned about. Counterfactual questions—‘‘What would have hap- pened if?’’—are difficult to answer. Nevertheless, it is useful to ask where the United States might be today had the warnings of the ‘‘declinists’’ been heeded. Perhaps the United States would have taken corrective economic and fiscal steps two decades ago that would have ameliorated the crisis in which it now finds itself. However, the debate about US decline ended abruptly when, in short order, the United States’ main geopolitical and economic riv- als—the Soviet Union and Japan, respectively—expe- rienced dramatic reversals of fortune. The Soviet Union unraveled, and in the early 1990s Japan’s eco- nomic bubble burst, plunging it into a cycle of defla- tion and low growth from which, two decades later, it has yet to recover. Seemingly overnight the threats to the United States’ military and economic suprem- acy were removed from the international chessboard. The 1990s subsequently witnessed a euphoric American triumphalism that wiped away any thoughts of US decline. On the contrary, the ‘‘unipolar moment’’ and the ‘‘end of history’’—along with the emergence of the so-called Washington consen- sus—seemed to confirm that both America’s power and its ideology were unchallengeable in the post- Cold War world (Fukuyama 1989; Krauthammer 1990–1991). The Great Recession has put paid to such fantasies and put the spotlight on the domestic drivers of American decline. Domestic Drivers of American Decline: Debt, Deficits, and the Dollar’s Uncertain Future China’s rise is one powerful indicator of America’s relative decline. The United States’ mounting economic and fiscal problems—evidenced in summer 2011 by the debt ceiling debacle and Standard & Poors’ down- grading of US Treasury bonds—are another. There are two closely interconnected aspects of the United States’ domestic difficulties that merit special attention: the spiraling US national debt and deepening doubts about the dollar’s future role as the international economy’s reserve currency. Between now and 2025, the looming debt and dollar crises almost certainly will compel the United States to retrench strategically, and to begin scaling back its overseas military commitments. The causes of the looming US fiscal crisis are com- plex. For understanding, a good starting point is the late political scientist Arnold Wolfers’ observation that modern great powers must be both national security states and welfare states (Wolfers 1952). States must provide both guns—the military capabili- ties needed to defend and advance their external interests—and butter, ensuring prosperity and sup- plying needed public goods (education, health care, pensions). Since World War II, the United States has pretty much been able to avoid making difficult ‘‘guns or butter’’ decisions precisely because of its hegemonic role in the international economy. The dollar’s role as the international system’s reserve currency allows the United States to live beyond its means in ways that other nations cannot. As long as others believe that the United States will repay its debts, and that uncontrollable inflation will not dilute the dollar’s value, the United States can finance its external ambitions (‘‘guns’’) and domes- tic social and economic programs (‘‘butter’’) by bor- rowing money from foreigners. As Figure 4 shows, this is what the United States has had to do since the early 1980s when it started running a chronic current account deficit. As Figure 5 illustrates, the majority of US government debt is owed to foreign, not domestic, investors, and China is the United States government’s largest creditor. Following the Great Recession, it has become increasingly apparent that unless dramatic measures to reign-in federal spending are implemented, by the end of this decade there will be serious ques- tions about the United States’ ability to repay its debts and control inflation.8 The causes of mounting US indebtedness are many. One is the Great Reces- sion, which caused the Obama administration and the Federal Reserve to inject a massive amount of dollars into the economy, in the form of stimulus spending, bail-outs, and ‘‘quantitative easing,’’ to avert a replay of the Great Depression of the 1930s. A longer-term cause is the mounting costs of entitle- ment programs like Medicare, Social Security, and Medicaid—costs which will escalate because of the aging of the ‘‘Baby Boomer’’ generation. Another factor is the cost of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which have been financed by borrowing from abroad rather than raising taxes to pay for them. These wars have been expensive. Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel lau- reate in economics, and his coauthor Linda Bilmess have calculated that the ultimate direct and indirect costs of the Iraq war will amount to $3 trillion (Sti- glitz and Bilmiss 2008). No similar study has as yet been done of the Afghanistan war’s costs. However, the United States currently is expending about $110–120 billion annually to fight there, and fiscal considerations played a major role in the Obama administration’s decision to begin drawing down US forces in Afghanistan (Woodward 2010; Cooper 2011). Because of the combined costs of federal govern- ment expenditures—on stimulus, defense, Iraq and Afghanistan, and entitlements—in 2009 the Congres- sional Budget Office forecast that the United States will run unsustainable annual budget deficits of $1 trillion or more until at least the end of this decade, and observed that, ‘‘Even if the recovery occurs as projected and the stimulus bill is allowed to expire, the country will face the highest debt ⁄ GDP ratio in 50 years and an increasingly urgent and unsustain- able fiscal problem’’ (CBO 2009:13). In a subse- quent 2010 report, the CBO noted that if the United States stays on its current fiscal trajectory, the ratio of US government debt to GDP will be 100% by 2020 (CBO 2010). Economists regard a 100% debt-to-GDP ratio as critical indicator that a state will default on its financial obligations. In an even less sanguine 2011 analysis, the International Monetary Fund forecast that the United States will hit the 100% debt-to-GDP ratio in 2016 (IMF 2011). If these estimates are correct, over the next decade the grow- ing US national debt—and the budget deficits that fuel it—could imperil the dollar by undermining for- eign investors’ confidence in the United States’ abil- ity to repay its debts and keep inflation in check. This is important because, for the foreseeable future, the United States will depend on capital inflows from abroad both to finance its deficit spending and private consumption and to maintain the dollar’s position as the international economic system’s reserve currency. America’s geopolitical preeminence hinges on the dollar’s reserve currency role. If the dollar loses that status, US hegemony will literally be unaffordable. The dollar’s reserve currency status has, in effect, been a very special kind of ‘‘credit card.’’ It is spe- cial because the United States does not have to earn the money to pay its bills. Rather, when the bills come due, the United States borrows funds from abroad and ⁄ or prints money to pay them. The Uni- ted States can get away with this and live beyond its means, spending with little restraint on maintaining its military dominance, preserving costly domestic entitlements, and indulging in conspicuous private consumption, as long as foreigners are willing to lend it money (primarily by purchasing Treasury bonds). Without the use of the ‘‘credit card’’ provided by the dollar’s reserve currency status, the United States would have to pay for its extravagant external and internal ambitions by raising taxes and interest rates, and by consuming less and saving more; or, tightening its belt and dramatically reduc- ing its military and domestic expenditures. In other words, the United States would have to learn to live within its means.9 As a leading expert on interna- tional economic affairs observed just before the Great Recession kicked in, the dollar’s vulnerability ‘‘presents potentially significant and underappreci- ated restraints upon contemporary American politi- cal and military predominance’’ (Kirshner 2008). Although doubts about the dollar’s long-term health predated the Great Recession, the events of 2007–2009 have amplified them in two key respects (Helleiner 2008; Kirshner 2008). First, the other big players in the international economy now are either geopolitical rivals like China or ambiguous ‘‘allies’’ like Europe, which has its own ambitions and no longer requires US protection from the now- vanished Soviet threat. Second, the dollar faces an uncertain future because of concerns that its value will diminish over time. Indeed, China, which has vast holdings of American assets (more than $2 tril- lion), is worried that America’s fiscal incontinence will leave Beijing holding the bag with huge amounts of depreciated dollars. China’s vote of no confidence in the dollar’s future is reflected in its calls to create a new reserve currency to replace the dollar, the ren- minbi’s gradual ‘‘internationalization,’’ and in the lectures China’s leaders regularly deliver telling Washington to get its fiscal house in order. Alarm bells about the dollar’s uncertain status now are ringing. In April 2011, Standard & Poor’s warned that in the coming years there is a one-in-three chance that the United States’ triple A credit rating could be reduced if Washington fails to solve the fis- cal crisis—and in August 2011 S& P did downgrade the US credit rating to AA. In June 2011, the IMF said that unless the United States enacts a credible plan to reign in its annual deficits and accumulating national debt, it could face a sovereign risk crisis in the next several years. In a May 2011 report, the World Bank declared that the dollar probably will lose its status as the primary reserve currency by 2025 (World Bank 2011). In the coming years, the United States will have to defend the dollar by reassuring foreign lenders (read: China) both that there will be no runaway inflation and that it can pay its debts. This will require some combination of budget cuts, entitle- ments reductions, tax increases, and interest-rate hikes. Because exclusive reliance on the last two options could choke off growth, there will be strong pressure to slash the federal budget in order to hold down taxes and interest rates. It will be almost impossible to make meaningful cuts in federal spending without deep reductions in defense expen- ditures (and entitlements), because, as Figure 6 shows, that is where the money is. With US defense spending currently at such high levels, domestic political pressures to make steep cuts in defense spending are bound to increase. As the Cornell international political economist Jona- than Kirshner puts it, the absolute size of US defense expenditures is ‘‘more likely to be decisive in the future when the U.S. is under pressure to make real choices about taxes and spending. When borrowing becomes more difficult, and adjustment more difficult to postpone, choices must be made between raising taxes, cutting non-defense spending, and cutting defense spending’’ (Kirshner 2008:431). In the spring of 2011, the Obama administration proposed to cut US defense spending by $400 mil- lion over eleven years. But that is a drop in the bucket, and cuts of a much larger magnitude almost certainly will be needed.10 Big defense cuts mean that during the next ten to fifteen years, the United States will be compelled to scale back its overseas military commitments. This will have two conse- quences. First, as the United States spends less on defense, China (and other new great powers) will be able to close the military power gap with the United States. Second, the United States’ ability to act as a regional stabilizer and a guardian of the global commons will diminish. In this respect, America’s fiscal crisis and the dollar’s uncertain future are important drivers of American decline. The End of the Pax Americana US decline has profound implications for the future of international politics. Hegemonic stability theory holds that an open international economic system requires a single hegemonic power to perform critical military and economic tasks. Militarily, the hegemon is responsible for stabilizing key regions and for guarding the global commons (Posen 2003). Econom- ically, the hegemon provides public goods by opening its domestic market to other states, supplying liquidity for the global economy, and providing a reserve cur- rency (Kindelberger 1973; Gilpin 1975). As US power continues to decline over the next ten to fifteen years, the United States will be progressively unable to discharge these hegemonic tasks. The United States still wields preponderant military power. However, as discussed above, in the next ten to fifteen years the looming fiscal crisis will compel Washington to retrench strategically. As the United States’ military power diminishes, its ability to com- mand the commons and act as a hegemonic stabilizer will be compromised. The end of the United States’ role as a military hegemon is still over horizon. How- ever, the Great Recession has made it evident that the United States no longer is an economic hegemon. An economic hegemon is supposed to solve global economic crises, not cause them. However, it was the freezing-up of the US financial system triggered by the sub-prime mortgage crisis that plunged the world into economic crisis. The hegemon is sup- posed to be the lender of last resort in the interna- tional economy. The United States, however, has become the borrower of first resort—the world’s largest debtor. When the global economy falters, the economic hegemon is supposed to take responsibil- ity for kick-starting recovery by purchasing other nations’ goods. From World War II’s end until the Great Recession, the international economy looked to the United States as the locomotive of global eco- nomic growth. As the world’s largest market since 1945, America’s willingness to consume foreign goods has been the firewall against global economic downturns. This is not what happened during the Great Recession, however. The US economy proved too infirm to lead the global economy back to health. Others—notably a rising China—had to step up to the plate to do so. The United States’ inability to gal- vanize global recovery demonstrates that in key respects it no longer is capable of acting as an eco- nomic hegemon. Indeed, President Barak Obama conceded as much at the April 2009 G-20 meeting in London, where he acknowledged the United States is no longer able to be the world’s consumer of last resort, and that the world needs to look to China (and India and other emerging market states) to be the motors of global recovery. Other recent exam- ples of how relative decline and loss of economic hegemony have eroded Washington’s ‘‘agenda set- ting’’ capacity in international economic manage- ment include the US failure to achieve global economic re-balancing by compelling China to reva- lue the renminbi, and its defeat in the 2009–2010 ‘‘austerity versus stimulus’’ debate with Europe.

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Offense › 1NC---China War

US-China war goes nuclear – wargaming proves

Pettyjohn and Wasser 22 – has a PhD and an MA in foreign affairs from the University of Virginia and a BA in history and political science from the Ohio State University and Wasser holds an MS in foreign service, with distinction, from the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, and a BA in international and global studies from Brandeis University, 5/20/22 (Stacie L and Becca, “A Fight Over Taiwan Could Go Nuclear”, Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-05-20/fight-over-taiwan-could-go-nuclear)//jd 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has raised the specter of nuclear war, as Russian President Vladimir Putin has placed his nuclear forces at an elevated state of alert and has warned that any effort by outside parties to interfere in the war would result in “consequences you have never seen.” Such saber-rattling has understandably made headlines and drawn notice in Washington. But if China attempted to forcibly invade Taiwan and the United States came to Taipei’s aid, the threat of escalation could outstrip even the current nerve-wracking situation in Europe. A recent war game, conducted by the Center for a New American Security in conjunction with the NBC program “Meet the Press,” demonstrated just how quickly such a conflict could escalate. The game posited a fictional crisis set in 2027, with the aim of examining how the United States and China might act under a certain set of conditions. The game demonstrated that China’s military modernization and expansion of its nuclear arsenal—not to mention the importance Beijing places on unification with Taiwan—mean that, in the real world, a fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear. Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway republic. If the Chinese Communist Party decides to invade the island, its leaders may not be able to accept failure without seriously harming the regime’s legitimacy. Thus, the CCP might be willing to take significant risks to ensure that the conflict ends on terms that it finds acceptable. That would mean convincing the United States and its allies that the costs of defending Taiwan are so high that it is not worth contesting the invasion. While China has several ways to achieve that goal, from Beijing’s perspective, using nuclear weapons may be the most effective means to keep the United States out of the conflict. GEARING FOR BATTLE China is several decades into transforming its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into what the Chinese President Xi Jinping has called a “world-class military” that could defeat any third party that comes to Taiwan’s defense. China’s warfighting strategy, known as “anti-access/area denial,” rests on being able to project conventional military power out several thousand miles in order to prevent the American military, in particular, from effectively countering a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Meanwhile, a growing nuclear arsenal provides Beijing with coercive leverage as well as potentially new warfighting capabilities, which could increase the risks of war and escalation. China has historically possessed only a few hundred ground-based nuclear weapons. But last year, nuclear scholars at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Federation of American Scientists identified three missile silo fields under construction in the Xinjiang region. The Financial Times reported that China might have carried out tests of hypersonic gliders as a part of an orbital bombardment system that could evade missile defenses and deliver nuclear weapons to targets in the continental United States. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that by 2030, China will have around 1,000 deliverable warheads—more than triple the number it currently possesses. Based on these projections, Chinese leaders may believe that as early as five years from now the PLA will have made enough conventional and nuclear gains that it could fight and win a war to unify with Taiwan. A fight between China and the United States could very well go nuclear. Our recent war game—in which members of Congress, former government officials, and subject matter experts assumed the roles of senior national security decision makers in China and the United States—illustrated that a U.S.-Chinese war could escalate quickly. For one thing, it showed that both countries would face operational incentives to strike military forces on the other’s territory. In the game, such strikes were intended to be calibrated to avoid escalation; both sides tried to walk a fine line by attacking only military targets. But such attacks crossed red lines for both countries, and produced a tit-for-tat cycle of attacks that broadened the scope and intensity of the conflict. For instance, in the simulation, China launched a preemptive attack against key U.S. bases in the Indo-Pacific region. The attacks targeted Guam, in particular, because it is a forward operating base critical to U.S. military operations in Asia, and because since it is a territory, and not a U.S. state, the Chinese team viewed striking it as less escalatory than attacking other possible targets. In response, the United States targeted Chinese military ships in ports and surrounding facilities, but refrained from other attacks on the Chinese mainland. Nevertheless, both sides perceived these strikes as attacks on their home territory, crossing an important threshold. Instead of mirror-imaging their own concerns about attacks on their territory, each side justified the initial blows as military necessities that were limited in nature and would be seen by the other as such. Responses to the initial strikes only escalated things further as the U.S. team responded to China’s moves by hitting targets in mainland China, and the Chinese team responded to Washington’s strikes by attacking sites in Hawaii. A NEW ERA One particularly alarming finding from the war game is that China found it necessary to threaten to go nuclear from the start in order to ward off outside support for Taiwan. This threat was repeated throughout the game, particularly after mainland China had been attacked. At times, efforts to erode Washington’s will so that it would back down from the fight received greater attention by the China team than the invasion of Taiwan itself. But China had difficulty convincing the United States that its nuclear threats were credible. In real life, China’s significant and recent changes to its nuclear posture and readiness may impact other nations’ views, as its nuclear threats may not be viewed as credible given its stated doctrine of no first use, its smaller but burgeoning nuclear arsenal, and lack of experience making nuclear threats. This may push China to preemptively detonate a nuclear weapon to reinforce the credibility of its warning. China might also resort to a demonstration of its nuclear might because of constraints on its long-range conventional strike capabilities. Five years from now, the PLA still will have a very limited ability to launch conventional attacks beyond locations in the “second island chain” in the Pacific; namely, Guam and Palau. Unable to strike the U.S. homeland with conventional weapons, China would struggle to impose costs on the American people. Up until a certain point in the game, the U.S. team felt its larger nuclear arsenal was sufficient to deter escalation and did not fully appreciate the seriousness of China’s threats. As a result, China felt it needed to escalate significantly to send a message that the U.S. homeland could be at risk if Washington did not back down. Despite China’s stated “no-first use” nuclear policy, the war game resulted in Beijing detonating a nuclear weapon off the coast of Hawaii as a demonstration. The attack caused relatively little destruction, as the electromagnetic pulse only damaged the electronics of ships in the immediate vicinity but did not directly impact the U.S. state. The war game ended before the U.S. team could respond, but it is likely that the first use of a nuclear weapon since World War II would have provoked a response. The most likely paths to nuclear escalation in a fight between the United States and China are different from those that were most likely during the Cold War. The Soviet Union and the United States feared a massive, bolt-from-the-blue nuclear attack, which would precipitate a full-scale strategic exchange. In a confrontation over Taiwan, however, Beijing could employ nuclear weapons in a more limited way to signal resolve or to improve its chances of winning on the battlefield. It is unclear how a war would proceed after that kind of limited nuclear use and whether the United States could de-escalate the situation while still achieving its objectives.  

2022 Michigan Counterplan
1NC Shells › 1NC Shells---Offense › 1NC---China War

Heg causes US-China War – Thucydides’s trap

Goswami 22- is a Doctoral Scholar at Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P Jindal Global University. He holds a Masters in Development Studies from Indian Institute of Technology-Guwahati; and Bachelors in Political Science from University of Delhi, 2022. (Anubhav, “Balancing Grand Strategy for America to Offset Thucydides’s Trap with China”, Journal of Strategic Security, Volume 15 Number 2, Accessed 6/18/22)//jd 

Hegemonic Grand Strategy in the Context of Thucydides’s Trap Alison’s work captured the attention of leaders in both Washington and Beijing. As a confidence-building measure, China laid out the concept of ‘New Type of Great Power Relation’ in 2013 based on cooperation; respect to each other’s core interests; and dialogue between Washington and Beijing. The concept emphasizes that the United States and other neighboring countries should respect the core interests of China, in other words acknowledging Beijing’s territorial Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 15, No. 2 https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/iss2/2 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.2.1983 7 claims in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.25 The United States distanced itself from Beijing’s proposed framework as Washington realized giving recognition to Beijing’s “core interest” would tantamount to legitimizing China’s disputed territorial claims as well as giving away lopsided concessions in East Asia.26 While United States is well within its right to protect its interests, China views Washington’s skepticism as arrogantly holding on to its primacy in the international system and denying a rising China her rightful place. China claims such attitude “dangerous or even irresponsible” because it can exacerbate both countries’ progress towards the apocalyptic Thucydides’s Trap, thereby, exploiting “perceptions of the trap by blaming the United States for trying to keep China down.”27 One of the reasons for China’s ability to peddle such a narrative is due to U.S. foreign policy stubbornly holding on to a hegemonic grand strategy even in a multipolar world. Christopher Layne defined U.S. hegemonic grand strategy as a “strategy of preponderance”–in simple terms–a strategy to maintain primacy in the world through preeminent U.S. political, military, and economic power.28 With China already an established pole, Beijing expects Washington to share the economic-security dual leadership of the world. The key implication here is that China’s outward-facing policies will inevitably clash with United States’ preponderance or hegemonic status. In 2008, U.S. National Intelligence Council report argued that America should adjust its international ambitions and forgo continued primacy in favor of accommodating the rising powers in the interest of greater global governance.29 If the United States continues to pursue its hegemonic grand strategy, it will accelerate the conflict which might trigger the Thucydides’s Trap. The way for the United States to avoid the trap is neither to gravitate toward confrontation nor adopt a passive accommodation. Rather, there should be a shift in United States grand strategy that suits the multipolar world. Realist Interpretation of China’s Rise and the Likelihood of a Trap A realist interpretation of China’s rise is even more gloomy for the future United States-China relationship. Offensive realists claim that it makes “good strategic sense for states to gain as much power as possible to ensure one’s own survival.”30 Founder of offensive realism, John J. Mearsheimer writes, “fearful of other states, and knowing that Goswami: Balancing Grand Strategy for America Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2022 8 they operate in a self-help world, states quickly realize that the best way to survive is to be especially powerful.”31 Therefore, offensive realists argue that a rising power like China will not stop at simply achieving ‘balance of power’ with United States but turning that balance in its favor. This makes the case for the emergence of a trap in their bilateral relationship even more likely. More worryingly, leadership in Beijing have increasingly come to believe that destiny is on their side. After the recent rupture of democratic norms in the United States as well her embarrassing departure from Afghanistan and the growing desire among American people to reduce their country’s footprint in the world; Chinese leaders are increasingly looking at America as a declining power. Underestimation of America’s capacity as well as her desire to retaliate could inspire Beijing to formulate super ambitious foreign policies regarding Taiwan or the disputed waters of South China Sea or the East China Sea that could force the Americans to intervene militarily. Various wargames drawn up by multiple studies in the United States opines that a violent confrontation between the U.S. and China could escalate from many sources of conflict like Taiwan, accidental collusion at sea, third party instigation, and trade which ultimately leads to one destination: a nuclear holocaust. The resurgence of China and its desire for irredentist overreach has put U.S. in a catch-22 situation. Maintain primacy or hegemony and it will only make Beijing more resentful towards America, fueling further Chinese revisionism in Asia. On the other hand, if the United States retreats from East Asia as a step towards abandoning hegemony, Beijing could interpret it as a sign of decline of American national power. Sensing weakness, China may next target the post-World War international order that has been carefully built by America and that has been so critical to preserving its national interests. Rewriting the rules of the current international world order to its benefit is an essential part for any aspiring hegemon and China has always held a grudge against the current one. Critics of Thucydides’s Trap argue that war between America and China is unlikely, either due to Chinese civilizational belief of peaceful rise and co-existence or due to nuclear weapons that guarantees Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).32 There are also criticism that Thucydides Trap promotes iron law of inevitability of war between two competing nations.33 Rather it’s the performance of leaders and dynamics of decision-making (acting in the interest of their citizens and aided by Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 15, No. 2 https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol15/iss2/2 DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.15.2.1983 9 insights from Thucydides’s History), they say, that determines the path to an eventual war.34 There are also arguments that these dynamics of decision-making that can impact China and the United States’ foreign policy decisions which may trigger the Thucydides’s Trap also leaves open the possibility of a United States-China war due to psychological misperceptions. These psychological misperceptions can be mitigated by rising powers giving sufficiently credible cooperative signals that should remove uncertainty about the riser’s intentions in the mind of the declining state.35 However, in real world situation, credible cooperative signals rarely fall so neatly as credible or cooperative to the declining states. In the run up to the First World War, repeated assurances by the Germans about its naval built-up failed to dissuade the fears of the British. From the prism of offensive realism, British act of counter-arming the Royal Navy is a predictable move to accumulate more power in order to preserve its security and primacy in the open seas. Finally, there are the optimists who totally discard the possibilities of war by claiming that war between China and the United States is not a viable option for both countries in formulating policy toward each other. Factors like the huge gap of comprehensive power between China and the United States, the close economic ties and security cooperation between China and U.S. allies, the flourishing cultural and people-to-people exchanges among all related countries, and the changing public attitude toward war, will drive China and the United States to seek resolution to their disputes by peaceful means.36 However, realist argument of relative gains does not make for such an optimistic assessment. States pursue relative gains over others which necessarily makes international relation a zero-sum game in which China’s gain is inevitably a loss for America. At the more immediate future, the battle for relative gains will break out over cornering advantages in maritime domain, cyber spying or hacking, the shadow of A2 or AD and Air Sea Battle, and a closer strategic alignment between competing nations.37 To that effect, changes are already happening on ground with China pursuing aggressive maritime policies, to which United States is responding by drawing up support from likeminded nations to uphold the freedom of seas (Quad and AUKUS). On the other hand, China is shoring up support in its own way by courting and coaxing Russia and other authoritarian nations by fanning illiberal policies at home and abroad. Beijing is also increasing its defense Goswami: Balancing Grand Strategy for America Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2022 10 spending to develop an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) plan that “entails missile, air, and sea forces capable of neutralizing U.S. bases as far away as Guam, and searching out and destroying U.S. naval battle groups in the region that might engage Chinese forces.”38 Both sides will try to accumulate relative gains as much as possible under the logic of offensive realism to tilt the balance of power in their favor. Right now, the scale is tilted in favor of the United States. However, a question begets here. If China manages to narrow the gap in their respective national powers in future, then what will be the reaction and response of the American leadership and people at the slow death of their superior position in the world? Sparta had to face this dilemma 2500 years ago, so did the British twice in early part of 20th century and the Americans themselves for fifty long years in the previous century. In an analysis of the last 500 years, Graham Alison claims that out of the 16 cases of rising versus ruling power case, 12 has been settled by war. Statistics like that are quite unhelpful for optimists.  

2022 Michigan Topicality
Aff › Neg Misc › Interp – Businesses

Cybersecurity is action with companies and businesses

Vegas ’22 [Marta; 02/18/2022; Vegas, Postgraduate in journalism from the Complutense University of Madrid, Sustainability Leader for Telefónica Hispam; CE Noticias Financieras English, //smarx, AZG]

In an increasingly digital world in which we spend much of our time, it is essential to achieve greater and greater security. The term cybersecurity is generally associated with companies and businesses, as it has an important implication in terms of losses, costs and the number of threats they receive.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Aff › 1AR

International Maritime Organization defines Maritime domain awareness as anything relating to maritime security

International Maritime Organization, 18 (11/14/22; “Enhancing maritime domain awareness in West Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden”; International Maritime Organization ) //LVL

Maritime domain awareness is the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact security, safety, the economy or the marine environment.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Aff › 2AC

CI: Maritime domain awareness is anything associated with security – that includes machine learning

Saildrone ’20 [10/20/20; "Machine Learning Will Automate Maritime Domain Awareness," //smarx, AZG]

Saildrone uncrewed surface vehicles (USVs) have conducted extensive data collection missions around the world, continuously collecting meteorological and oceanographic variables above and below the sea surface and building an unprecedented at-sea image library of some four million images. This image library is the foundation of Saildrone’s machine learning software, unlocking new maritime domain awareness (MDA) capabilities at sea, a challenging environment where every pixel is moving across every frame.

MDA is the effective understanding of anything associated with the safety and security of the global maritime domain—illegal fishing, drug enforcement, and limiting intrusion into protected marine sanctuaries. The United States Coast Guard was tasked with exploring the feasibility, costs, and benefits of improving maritime domain awareness using a low-cost autonomous system like the saildrone. Throughout the month of October, Saildrone is demonstrating how its platform could be used to conduct MDA missions offshore and in remote areas of the ocean.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Aff › 2AC

W/M – Maritime domain awareness includes disruptive tech like AI

Sakhuja ’18 [Vijay; 06/11/18; MPhil and PhD degrees from the Jawaharlal Nehru University, Senior Fellow Gujarat National Law University, "Artificial Intelligence and Maritime Domain Awareness," Society for the Study of Peace and Conflict, //smarx, AZG]

There are several disruptive technologies that find application in the maritime domain beyond warfighting. Among these Artificial Intelligence (AI), its cutting edge application in machine learning (ML), internet of things (IOT), big data, and blockchain can profoundly change the management of the maritime domain, including search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, combating illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing, counter piracy, counter trafficking, environment protection and illegal migration, to name a few.

A robust AI based maritime domain awareness (MDA) can potentially contribute to transparency across the seas and oceans by integrating multi-source data, analytics and advanced Cloud services making data accessible much more easily. It is possible to track vessels, determine the type of cargo and even the business behavior of shipping companies, including freight forwarders.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Neg › 2NC

Maritime security cooperation is an extension of conventional forces

CJCS, 18 (6/8/22; “Joint Maritime Operations”; JCS ) //LVL

Security cooperation tasks may include the use of coastal riverine, construction, EOD, mobile diving, intelligence, logistics, medical, and training resources. Maritime forces may also employ security cooperation MAGTFs to enhance civil-military operations or conduct security force assistance activities to build partner capability or capacity. The USCG’s Atlantic Area Command and Pacific Area Command have OPCON of the Coast Guard’s deployable specialized forces to provide specialized capabilities in incident response, maritime law enforcement, port security, and antiterrorism/counterterrorism and can be brought together for surge operations which can deploy in advance of a potential conflict to conduct prevention activities or, after a conflict has ensued, to compliment conventional forces and contribute to establishing and sustaining stability.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Neg › 1NC

Interp: NATO Maritime Security is limited to conventional military operations and cyberspace

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 22 (7/14/22; “NATO’s maritime activities” NATO ; Accessed 7/16/22) //LVL

The 2011 Alliance Maritime Strategy derives four maritime roles for the Alliance to contribute to: deterrence and collective defence, crisis management, cooperative security and maritime security. Since 2014, the Alliance’s adaptation to the changed security environment has been pursued along two essential tracks: strengthening the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture and enhancing NATO’s contribution to projecting stability. Reinforcement of the Alliance Maritime Posture is an integral and cross-cutting part of the implementation of these two tracks and was reconfirmed in the 2022 Strategic Concept. The Alliance Maritime Strategy describes NATO’s four strategic roles or what it does in the maritime domain. The Alliance Maritime Posture describes NATO’s functions or how it uses the maritime domain and the Alliance’s naval forces. NATO is strengthening its deterrence and defence posture in all domains. The maritime domain encompasses oceans and seas, on, above and below the surface, in all directions. It is a continuum and it is fully connected to other domains and areas. The Alliance’s naval forces include those maritime forces, sensors and other capabilities under national or NATO command that contribute to Alliance security. The Alliance Maritime Posture comprises the Alliance’s naval forces, their presence within the maritime domain and the operational and cooperative activities that they conduct in the performance of three functions, which contribute to Alliance security: Strategic function: the presence of maritime forces creates strategic and deterrent effects, including for assurance and messaging, and demonstrates NATO’s intent to operate without constraint and as required. The flexibility of maritime forces provides nearly instant availability of inherently tailorable force packages yielding a range of attractive, measured and viable political and military options. Security function: maritime security has become a mainstay of NATO’s maritime activities. Allies have developed sophisticated skills, tactics, techniques and procedures associated with maritime security. The maintenance of a safe and secure maritime environment can be undertaken through a range of maritime security operations and/or activities. Maritime forces can provide a ready and flexible mechanism and significant versatility for a broad range and scale of missions and tasks. Warfighting function: during peacetime and in a crisis, maritime forces are primarily deterrent in nature. They can contribute to conventional operations, nuclear deterrence and ballistic missile defence, to advance Alliance security interests. Allies’ maritime forces provide deterrence and defence in their contiguous seas, extending the defence of their national territory and can project power at distance. Maritime forces can rapidly transition from low-intensity to high-intensity missions and tasks. Surface, sub-surface and above-surface capabilities and forces work together to exercise sea denial or control, support reinforcement, protect assets, project power and support joint forces and joint effects. Maritime and joint exercises are key to maintaining and developing warfighting competencies and improving Allies’ combined maritime skills and readiness for all operations. Some areas and competencies being incorporated into future exercises include high-end warfighting capacities, such as the protection of sea lines of communication and rapid reinforcement, carrier strike, amphibious forces, anti-submarine warfare, land attack, deep-precision strike, and integrated air and missile defence; countering hybrid threats in the maritime domain; and countering threats in cyber space.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Cybersecurity › Affirmative › 1AR – Cybersecurity – Protection

More definitive evidence proves that cybersecurity includes info-protection

Nawaz ’19 [Saba; 10/07/19; Nawaz, M.A. in Mass Communication and Media Studies; “Cyber-security and its objectives,” The Express Tribune, //smarx, AZG]

Cyber security is one of the most fundamental security paradigms in today's modern warfare era. Countries should protect their own information assets, because in today's warfare everyone's rivalry tries and seeks to target their information system. This is an advanced strategy of states to overthrow their adversary by creating new cyber threats such as APTs. APTs are known as advanced persistent threats, which are highly complex threats and are very difficult to counter. Cybersecurity is a part of information security and can be defined as the protection of information assets by addressing threats to information processes, stored and transported by an internetworked information system. Cybersecurity usually refers to an entity initiating threats due to the existence of global cyberspace (i.e. internet). Cyber security requires stakeholders in the cyberspace area to be active in security, beyond the protection of their own assets.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Cybersecurity › Affirmative › 1AR – Cybersecurity – Protection

‘Cybersecurity’ means protection an info system from a threat

Johnson ’20 [09/04/20; Johnson, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology; “Grid Security Research and Development Act,” House of Representatives Congressional Session, Authenticated U.S. Government Information, //smarx, AZG]

CYBERSECURITY.-The term 'cybersecurity' means protecting an informa- tion system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an in- formation system from a cybersecurity threat or security vulnerability.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Cybersecurity › Affirmative › 2AC – Cybersecurity – Protection

Cybersecurity is the protection of digital systems – here’s qualified and definitive evidence

Treacy ’18 [Mike; 03/30/18; Treacy, 20 years of cybsercurity expertise, CEO of Salt Cybersecurity; "E.M.M.A. International Consulting Group Inc. Welcomes Mike Treacy As Their Cybersecurity Practice Lead," E.M.M.A. International Consulting Group, Inc., a global leader in FDA compliance consulting, //smarx, AZG]

"We are extremely pleased to have a seasoned Cybersecurity subject matter expert like Mike join our team," said Dr. Carmine Jabri, CEO of E.M.M.A. International. "Mike brings 20 years of leading-edge cybersecurity expertise to our team. He has spent years working as an expert to advance the state of the art in information systems' security. He understands the concerns and needs of large and small businesses alike after having worked for small tech start-ups and Monster.com."

Cybersecurity can be defined as the protection of digital systems against theft and damage to hardware and software. As medical device innovation grows, as well as the use of digital systems to track health progress, E.M.M.A. International sees the importance of providing cybersecurity services to its clients.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Cybersecurity › Affirmative › W/M – OCOs – Strengthen Systems

W/M – OCO’s are defined to project power in or through cyberspace

NIST ’No Date [National Institute of Standards and Technology; “offensive cyber operations (OCO),” Information Technology Laboratory, Computer Security Resource Center, //smarx, AZG]

Definition(s): Cyberspace operations intended to project power by the application of force in or through cyberspace.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Cybersecurity › Affirmative › W/M – Cohesion – Strengthen Systems

Cohesion can strengthen coordination

Potter ’19 [Pitman B.; 12/22/19; professor of law at the University of B.C. and a distinguished fellow at APF Canada; and Stewart Beck, President and CEO of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada; "Stewart Beck and Pitman Potter: Canada’s future China strategy must consider national interests, global challenges," Vancouver Sun, //smarx, AZG]

The West cannot turn back the clock. For good or ill China has arrived and we need to be on the front foot as opposed to simply reacting to decisions taken in Beijing or Washington. Implemented together, the principles of autonomy, national interests, and integrated cohesion can strengthen Canada's capacity to proactively co-ordinate and effectively manage relations with China. China can no longer be viewed in isolation from challenging global dynamics. Neither should Canada's China policies.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Cybersecurity › Affirmative › W/M – Interoperability – CI Strengthen Systems

CE Noticias Financieras ’21 [07/27/21; “They publish regulations that strengthen interoperability in the Specialized National Justice System,” https://advance-lexis-com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crid=504c4553-9aa3-4d37-bac2-7e4b3ddcea32&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A637N-V4N1-DY1R-B1MG-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=443607&pdteaserkey=sr3&pditab=allpods&ecomp=rz2yk&earg=sr3&prid=dded7a6f-0446-49af-b709-4146c010cbd0 //smarx, AZG]

On Monday, the regulation that strengthens interoperability in the Specialized National Justice System (SNEJ) for the Protection and Punishment of Violence against Women and Members of the Family Group was published. The law includes a number of ombudsman's recommendations and will allow for more articulated work on the problem.

Supreme Decree 145-2021-PCM, which regulates Law No. 30926, seeks a harmonious and cohesive functioning of the existing processes and digital platforms of the SNEJ, composed of the Judiciary, the Public Ministry (MP), the National Police of Peru (PNP), the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, and the Ministry of Women and Vulnerable Populations (MIMP).

The Ombudsman's Office highlighted the actions of the regulation that aims to establish measures to strengthen interconnection and cohesive work through digital platforms. These actions are considered fundamental in the care and prevention of gender violence, through an articulated reaction and with the speed that is required.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Cybersecurity › 2NC – OV › AT: CIA Triad = Arbitrary

[C] – Availability is the property of being accessible and usable

Newton and Hogan ’15 [Elaine; Michael; December 2015; Newton, PhD in Engineering and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon University; Hogan, Distinguished Graduate of the Infantry Officer Candidate School, electronics engineer at NIST; “Supplemental Information for the Interagency Report on Strategic U.S. Government Engagement in International Standardization to Achieve U.S. Objectives for Cybersecurity,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, //smarx, AZG]

Availability, property of being accessible and usable upon demand by an authorized entity.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Cybersecurity › 2NC – OV › AT: CIA Triad = Arbitrary

[B] – Confidentiality is ensuring info is not made available

Newton and Hogan ’15 [Elaine; Michael; December 2015; Newton, PhD in Engineering and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon University; Hogan, Distinguished Graduate of the Infantry Officer Candidate School, electronics engineer at NIST; “Supplemental Information for the Interagency Report on Strategic U.S. Government Engagement in International Standardization to Achieve U.S. Objectives for Cybersecurity,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, //smarx, AZG]

Confidentiality, property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes;

2022 Michigan Topicality
Cybersecurity › 2NC – OV › AT: CIA Triad = Arbitrary

[A] – Integrity is protecting the accuracy and completeness

Newton and Hogan ’15 [Elaine; Michael; December 2015; Newton, PhD in Engineering and Public Policy at Carnegie Mellon University; Hogan, Distinguished Graduate of the Infantry Officer Candidate School, electronics engineer at NIST; “Supplemental Information for the Interagency Report on Strategic U.S. Government Engagement in International Standardization to Achieve U.S. Objectives for Cybersecurity,” National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce, //smarx, AZG]

Integrity, property of protecting the accuracy and completeness of assets;

2022 Michigan Topicality
Cybersecurity › 2NC – OV › Violation – OCO’s

Even offensive cyber capabilities are about manipulating adversarial networks – NOT strengthening our own

Egloff ’21 [Florian J.; 10/26/21; DPhil in Cyber Security from the University of Oxford and Masters in International Relations from Geneva Graduate Institute; and James Shires,

Offensive cyber capabilities (OCCs) are the combination of people, technologies, and organizational attributes that jointly enable offensive cyber operations: the adversarial manipulation of digital services or networks. Most works on OCCs focus on their (de-)escalatory potential in terms of diplomatic tension, instability, or power. This article argues for a re-orientation toward the normatively prior question of their relative violence. It asks: how are OCCs integrated into violent state capacities and what are the consequences? The article proposes three logics of integration by which OCCs are included in violent state actions, in both repressive and interstate situations. These logics—substitution, support, and complement—weigh the benefits of using OCCs against an adversary instead of, as part of, and in addition to other means of violence, respectively. The article argues that the violence of OCCs depends on two things: first, whether one adopts a narrowly physical or a more expansive definition of violence and, second, which logic of integration governs their use. On a narrow definition of violence, substitutive and supportive uses of OCCs are less likely to be violent than conventional alternatives, and complementary uses of OCCs are not violent at all. On a wider definition, both substitutive and supportive uses of OCCs can lead to more violence than conventional alternatives, while complementary uses of OCCs are highly likely to increase violence overall. Acknowledging the different logics of integration for OCCs, and understanding their violent effects, has important analytical and policy benefits for global security studies.

2022 Michigan Topicality
Cybersecurity › 2NC – OV › Violation – OCO’s

OCO’s are for disrupting OTHER countries’ networks, NOT strengthening our own – here’s definitive evidence

Hanson ’18 [Fergus; 2018; Professional Fulbright Scholar based at Georgetown University working on the uptake of new technologies by the US Government, Fellow at Cambridge University’s Lauterpacht Research Centre for International Law and the Centre for Strategic and International Studies; and Tom Uren, Senior Fellow at ASPI, formerly of the Department of Defence and CSIRO; “Organization, Command and Approvals,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, //smarx, AZG]

For the purposes of this policy brief, we use a draft definition that’s being developed as part of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet’s Cyber Lexicon project. It defines offensive cyber operations as ‘activities in cyberspace that manipulate, deny, disrupt, degrade or destroy targeted computers, information systems, or networks’.7 Given the range of countries with varying capabilities and using examples from open sources, offensive cyber operations could range from the subtle to the destructive: removing computer accounts or changing passwords; altering databases either subtly or destructively; defacing web pages; encrypting or deleting data; or even attacks that affect critical infrastructure, such as electricity networks. Even though it may use the same tools and techniques, cyber espionage, by contrast, is explicitly designed to gather intelligence without having an effect—ideally without detection. The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace has commissioned ASPI’s International Cyber Policy Centre to do further work on defining offensive cyber capabilities.